TO   THE   IIONORAnLE 

JUSTICES    OF   THE   SUPREME   JUDICIAL   COURT 

OF  MASSACHUSETTS, 

TO     WHOSE     LAHOUS     I     AM     I.NDEHTED    FOR     SO     Mi;CII     OF    WHAT    18 
VALUABLE    IN    THE    WOKK,    I     DEDICATE    THIS    UNI'UE- 
TENDINO    EFFOKT    TO    ELUCIDATE    A    DEPART- 
MENT  OF   AMERICAN   JURISPRUDENCE. 

In  doing  this,  I  desire  to  add  to  the  traditional  veneration 
for  this  Court  which  I  have  shared  in  common  with  the  peo- 
ple of  the  Commonwealth  an  expression  of  personal  respect- 
for  its  members,  which  the  long  intercourse  into  which  I 
have  been  brought,  since  my  admission  to  its  bar,  has  served 
to  develop,  and  constantly  to  strengthen. 

Within  tliat  time,  every  one  of  its  members  has  been 
changed.  Men,  the  loved  and  the  honored,  have  one  after 
another  passed  away  in  the  fulness  of  their  fame,  and  others 
are  now  occupying  their  field  of  honorable  labor  ;  but  illus- 
trious as  are  the  names  tliat  stand  out  upon  its  records 
among  the  great  and  good  men  of  the  Commonwealth,  never 
have  its  laws  been  more  ably,  faithfully,  and  acceptably 
administered  than  by  those  who  now  occupy  these  seats  of 
justice. 

To  bear  my  humble  tribute  to  the  official  and  personal 
qualities  of  the  men  who  have  in  this  field  won  and  sus- 
tained the  united  respect  of  an  appreciative  public,  I  sub- 
scribe myself 

Their  obliged  and  obedient  servant, 

EMORY  WASHBURN. 

Cambridge,  July,  1860. 


670349 


P  R  E  F  xV  C  E 

TO    THE    FIFTH    EDITION. 


In  presenting  to  the  profession  this  fifth  edition  of  Wash- 
BUKX  ON  Real  Property,  the  first  issued  since  the  author's 
death,  a  few  words  of  preface  seem  proper.  Of  the  work  itself, 
but  little  more  need  be  said  than  to  refer  to  the  fact  that  for 
twenty-six  years  it  has  hold  its  place  nnchallontrcd,  as  the  only 
comprehensive  American  treatise  on  the  subject  of  Real  Proj)- 
erty ;  although  various  valuable  works  on  special  topics  have 
appeared,  notaldy  witliin  the  last  ten  years.  Since  its  first 
appearance,  it  has,  as  an  authority  in  the  courts  and  a  text- 
book in  the  schools,  not  only  formulated  the  existing  law,  and 
helped  in  no  inconsideraljle  degree  to  develop  and  harmonize 
it, — a  function  which  every  sound  treatise  achieves  to  a  greater 
or  less  extent;  but  its  very  language  has,  by  frequent  judicial 
citation,  become  incorporated  in  the  authoritative  law  of  many 
of  the  States. 

The  law,  however,  never  stands  still,  and  the  multitude  of 
decisions  and  tlio  important  statutory  changes  that  have  been 
made  in  the  di'))artmcnt  of  Real  Property  in  the  decade 
since  the  last  edition  of  this  work  appeared,  have  called  for 
very  extended  labor  in  the  direction  of  condensation  as  well 
as  of  addition.  The  author's  death  occurring  so  soon  after 
that  edition  came  out,  devolved  much  the  larger  part  of  this 
labor  upon  the  editors.  In  the  discharge  of  this  duty  they 
have  for  the  most  part  confined  their  additions  to  the  notes. 
The  changes  in  the  text  have  been  mainly  limited  to  the 
removal  of  some  obvious  errors  in  the  form  of  statement,  and 


Vi  PREFACE   TO   THE    FIFTH    EDITION. 

to  the  excision  of  statutory  matter  superseded  by  recent  legis- 
lation, and  of  repetitions  chiefly  to  be  found  in  what  was  added 
by  the  author  after  the  first  edition. 

In  the  chapter  on  Homestead,  however,  as  the  foundation  of 
the  law  was  wholly  by  enactment,  the  additions  and  correc- 
tions have  been  substantial,  so  as  to  bring  the  text,  as  nearly 
as  mio-ht  be,  abreast  with  the  present  condition  of  the  law. 
Whatever  o})inion  may  obtain  as  to  the  propriety  of  originally 
including  a  topic  of  this  character  in  a  general  common-law 
treatise,  the  editors  had  no  choice  but  to  retain  it,  and,  if  re- 
tained, to  have  it  as  nearly  complete  as  space  would  permit. 
For  although  the  ground  had  been  covered  by  Mr.  Thompson's 
valuable  work,  yet,  in  the  interval  since  the  publication  of  his 
book,  the  new  decisions  number  over  fifteen  hundred.  In  other 
places,  also,  it  will  be  found  that  such  additions  have  been 
made  to  the  text  as  were  necessary  to  cover  the  development 
of  several  branches  of  the  law. 

In  the  more  mechanical  parts  of  these  volumes  —  the  index, 
table  of  cases,  and  verification  of  citations  —  no  pains  have 
been  spared  to  ensure  accuracy;  and  the  editors  trust  that 
the  results  will  be  satisfactory  to  the  profession. 

J.  W. 
S.  G.  C. 

Boston,  December,  1886. 


PREFACE 

TO  THE   FOURTH   EDITIOX. 


To  carry  out  the  original  purpose  and  desicrn  of  the  present 
work  renders  it  necessary  to  add  to  or  modify  its  statements 
and  propositions,  from  time  to  time,  to  conform  to  the  growth 
and  progress  of  the  law.  It  was  intended  to  give  a  connected 
view  of  the  law  of  Real  Property  as  it  prevails  in  the  several 
States  and  under  the  Federal  government,  so  far  as  it  could 
be  regarded  American  in  its  character.  For  this  purpose,  it 
was  not  only  necessary  to  collect  and  collate  the  decisions  of 
the  State  and  Federal  courts,  but  to  make  liberal  reference 
to  English  reports  and  accredited  treatises,  and  from  these  to 
form,  so  far  as  might  be,  a  consistent  and  complete  system  of 
this  department  of  the  law. 

If  successfully  accomplished,  two  objects  would  be  attained : 
the  profession  and  the  student  would  be  sujiplied  with  a  work 
that  seemed  to  be  needed  for  use ;  and  a  process  of  assimila- 
tion among  the  laws  of  the  different  States  would  thereby  be 
promoted,  and  the  bonds  of  union  between  them  gain  strength 
by  an  identity  of  domestic  institutions  and  popular  thought. 

Judging  from  the  manner  in  which  the  work  has  been  re- 
ferred to  by  the  various  courts,  it  is  believed  that  it  has  not 
wholly  failed  in  either  of  these  respects. 

Since  the  publication  of  the  last  edition,  some  two  thou- 
sand cases  have  been  decided  by  the  courts,  which  bear 
upon  the  subjects-matter  of  the  work,  by  which,  and  other 
causes,  changes  and  modifications  of  sullicient  magnitude  and 
importance  in  the  existing  rules  of  law  have  been  wrought 


Vlll  PREFACE   TO    THE    FOURTH    EDITION. 

to  call  for  an  effort  to  collect  and  embody  these  into  the  work 
as  it  had  already  been  given  to  the  public.  An  edition,  there- 
fore, which  should  embrace  these  cases,  seemed  to  be  a  neces- 
sity, and  has  accordingly  been  prepared.  Where  these  cases 
were  in  effect  a  re-statement  of  well-considered  points  of  law, 
they  have  been  referred  to  simply  by  name.  But  to  such  of 
them  as  contained  new  points,  or  presented  a  principle  already 
familiar  in  an  original  or  more  elaborate  form,  have  been  as- 
signed a  more  extended  discussion  and  examination  ;  and,  in 
so  doing,  a  statement  of  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  par- 
ticular cases  has,  at  times,  been  adopted,  which  might,  perhaps, 
seem,  at  first  sight,  more  consistent  with  the  idea  of  a  digest 
than  a  summary  treatise.  Where  this  has  been  done,  it  has 
been  for  the  purposes  of  illustration  and  explanation. 

This  accumulation  of  cases  has  arisen,  in  no  small  degree, 
from  the  fact  that  the  laws  of  the  different  States  differ  essen- 
tially upon  many  subjects ;  and  it  is  often  as  important  to  cite 
cases  to  show,  that,  upon  a  given  point,  the  law  of  one  State 
is  not  like  tliat  of  another,  as  it  is  to  state  what  the  law  of 
the  former  State,  in  fact,  is.  In  this  way,  citations  have  often 
been  multiplied  upon  a  single  point,  beyond  what,  at  first 
thought,  might  seem  necessary  or  proper. 

In  the  matter  of  the  changes  wrought  by  the  legislation  of 
the  States,  new  statutes  are  so  frequent,  and  often  so  arbitrary, 
and  it  is,  at  times,  so  difficult  to  get  ready  access  to  them,  that, 
if  errors  in  this  respect  should  be  detected,  the  cause  may,  per- 
haps, be  accepted  as  an  excuse.  In  collecting  and  digesting 
the  cases  cited  from  the  reports,  liberal  use,  so  far  as  they 
extend,  has  been  made  of  the  "American  Reports,"  —  a  selec- 
tion made  by  Mr.  Isaac  Grant  Thompson  with  excellent  judg- 
ment and  discrimination  ;  while  an  earnest  effort  has  been 
made,  from  other  sources,  to  make  the  examination  and  colla- 
tion of  these  reasonably  complete. 

To  give  some  idea  of  the  topics  upon  which  new  or  sub- 
sidiary matter  will  be  found  in  the  following  pages,  there 
may  be  mentioned,  as  among  them,  homestead  exemption  ; 
when  and  how  far  tenants  may  deny  their  landlords'  titles ; 
what  force  a  landlord  may  apply  in  expelling  a  tenant ;  how 
far  tenants  are  liable  to  others  for  injuries  arising  from  the 


PREFACE   TO    THE    FOUHTII    EDITION.  IX 

condition  of  the  premises  in  their  oceii]):inev  ;  liow  far  tlic 
tenant  of  one  part  of  a  il\vellin<^-honse  can  coni|)el  a  tenant 
of  another  part  to  join  in  makinji^  repairs ;  whether  the  sale 
of  pjrowint]^  trees  and  crops  is  within  tlie  ITth  section  of  the 
statute  of  frauds ;  how  far  absohito  (h'eds  can  he  shown,  by 
parol,  to  be  only  mortgages  ;  the  order  in  which  owners  of 
dilTercnt  parcels  of  mortgaged  promises  are  chargeable  in  the 
redemption  thereof ;  the  validity  of  deeds,  blanks  in  which 
have  been  filled  after  execution  ;  what  American  rivers  come 
mider  the  category  of  navigable,  and  what  are  the  boundary- 
lines  of  lands  bordering  upon  them,  and  what  of  lands  bound- 
ing by  the  sea,  or  by  lakes  and  ponds;  the  jiower  of  courts  to 
reform  deeds,  in  order  to  correct  mistakes ;  how  far  erecting 
and  occupying  up  to  division-fences  affect  the  title  to  tlie 
adjacent  lands  ;  how  far  holding  lands  as  partnership  assets 
is  a  conversion  of  the  same  "  out  and  out ; "  and  how  far  one 
liolding  an  easement  of  way  can  release  or  exchange  it  by 
parol. 

With  such  materials,  and  the  space  they  necessarily  occupy 
in  a  work  like  this,  it  has  been  impossible  to  avoid  expanding 
it  considerably  beyond  its  previous  limits  in  its  present  form. 
But  while  it  has  been  an  aim  in  its  composition  to  keep  it 
within  the  narrowest  compass,  its  main  purpose  has  been  to 
bring  the  work  up  to  the  present  time,  and  to  render  it  as 
accurate  and  complete  as  could  be  done  by  personal  effort 
and  attention. 

Cambeidge,  March,  1876. 


PRE  F  ACE 

TO   THE  FIRST   VOLUME   OF   THE   FIRST   EDITION. 


The  circumstances  under  wliicli  tliis  work  is  now  offenMl 
to  tlio  profession  are  briefly  tliesc  :  — 

When  called  upon  to  state  and  illustrate  to  the  classes  of  a 
law  school,  collected  from  almost  every  State  in  the  Union, 
the  leadintr  principles  of  the  Law  of  Real  Property,  the  author 
was  led  to  believe  that  there  was  a  want  to  be  supplied  by  a 
work,  which,  while  it  retained  so  much  of  the  En^lisli  common 
and  early  statute  law  as  applied  to  this  country,  should  com- 
bine with  it,  as  a  basis,  the  elements  of  American  law  as  the 
same  had  been  developed  in  the  legislation  and  judicial  decis- 
ions of  the  General  and  State  governments,  in  order  to  form 
as  nearly  as  might  be  one  homogeneous  system. 

A  conviction  of  the  need  of  such  a  work,  in  the  nature  of 
an- elementary  treatise,  strengthened  with  reflection,  till  the 
result  has  been  an  attempt  to  achieve  it  in  the  present  vohnnes. 

That  to  do  this  required  the  subject  to  be  treated  in  some 
of  its  parts  historically,  and  sometimes  to  refer  to  what  had 
become  practically  obsolete,  every  intelligent  reader  will 
readily  understand.  The  American  statesman  who  should 
content  himself  with  studying  the  simple  text  of  the  Consti- 
tution, witliout  the  light  which  English  and  Colonial  history 
throws  upon  its  provisions,  would  find  himself  at  a  loss  to 
understand,  or  how  to  solve,  many  of  the  questions  to  which 
the  construction  of  that  instrument  has  given  and  is  giving 
rise. 

So  the  American  lawyer  would  find  still  greater  difhculty 
in  understanding  that  great  unwritten  body  of  principles  which 


XU  PREFACE   TO    FIRST   VOLUME   OF    FIRST   EDITION. 

form  the  basis  of  the  common  law  of  nearly  every  State  in 
the  Union,  if  he  could  not  go  back  historically  to  the  coming 
in  of  the  feudal  system  at  the  Conquest,  read  the  charter  of 
Runnymede  in  the  light  of  the  circumstances  which  sur- 
rounded it,  and  trace  the  gradual  loosening  of  the  bands 
of  tenure  before  and  at  the  passage  of  the  statute  Quia 
Emptores. 

If  the  early  English  common  law  had  no  other  application, 
a  knowledge  of  it  could  not  be  dispensed  with  by  a  lawyer, 
as  a  means  of  understanding  the  terms  and  phrases  in  modern 
use,  and  as  furnishing  the  elementary  thoughts  and  opinions 
which  have  been  and  still  are  being  wrought  into  the  expand- 
ing and  progressive  systems  of  English  and  American  juris- 
prudence. 

The  English  Law  of  Real  Property  has  undergone  surpris- 
ing changes  within  the  last  thirty  years,  whereby  a  process  of 
assimilation  in  the  systems  of  the  two  countries  upon  this 
subject  has  been  going  on,  which  is  interesting  to  the  Ameri- 
can lawyer,  and  renders  a  knowledge  of  the  laws  of  each  the 
more  important  in  the  courts  of  this  country. 

Here  was  presented  one  of  the  most  difficult  problems  in 
the  prosecution  of  the  present  work.  It  seemed  particularly 
desirable  that  it  should  not  exceed  two  volumes  of  convenient 
size ;  while  to  compress  into  that  space  all  that  should  be  said 
of  the  English  law,  as  well  as  of  the  statutes  and  decisions  of 
thirty-one  different  States  and  governments,  each  related  to, 
and  yet  independent  of,  the  others,  seemed,  at  first  sight,  an 
impractical)le  undertaking.  How  far  the  difficulty  has  been 
surmounted,  the  reader  will  determine. 

It  has  been  the  intention  of  the  writer  to  state  no  proposi- 
tion as  law  which  did  not  appear  to  be  sustained  by  satisfac- 
tory authority.  So  far  as  the  same  could  reasonably  be  done, 
those  authorities  have  been  cited.  But,  with  all  his  precaution, 
this  could  not  fail  to  load  his  pages  with  references  ;  and  he 
has  contented  himself,  not  unfrequently,  with  citing  an  ele- 
mentary work  of  received  authority  to  sustain  a  proposition, 
rather  than  to  multiply  the  citations  of  cases  which  are  to  be 
found,  if  desired,  in  the  elementary  work  referred  to.  In 
some  instances,  he  has  been  obliged  to  rely  upon  the  digest  of 


•    PREFACE   TO    FIRST    VOLUME    OF    FIRST    EDITION.  xiii 

a  roportctl  case;  but  this  has  liccu  ilone  with  caution,  espe- 
cially wht'U  the  point  to  be  stated  or  illustrated  seemed  to  be 
new  aud  doubltul.  On  the  other  hand,  he  has,  in  i)ut  a  few 
instances,  undertaken  to  jrivc  dip'sts  of  reported  eases,  lie 
has  endeavored  to  state  i)rinciph's  fully  and  clearly,  and  oidy 
for  purposes  of  ilhistration  has  occupied  space  with  a  detail  of 
the  facts  in  the  cases  citetl. 

One  thiiij^  he  has  had  in  view  in  tiie  arrantrement  and  hll- 
ing  up  of  his  plan ;  and  that  was  to  satisfy  the  reader  that  the 
Law  of  Real  Property,  as  a  system,  was,  in  most  respects, 
symmetrical  and  complete.  The  popular  notion,  it  is  true, 
is,  that  this  branch  of  the  law  is  inevitably  dry,  intricate,  and 
distasteful.  But  if  its  terms  arc  less  familiar,  and  its  rules, 
from  the  remoteness  of  their  oritrin,  scemintrly  more  arbitrary 
and  artificial,  and,  as  a  whole,  it  is  less  flexible  and  easy  to  con- 
form to  the  changing  habits  of  a  people  tlian  those  of  trade 
and  commerce  and  the  mere  personal  relations  of  society,  it 
should  not  be  forgotten,  that,  as  a  science,  it  altogether  tran- 
scends those  in  exactness  and  certainty,  and  that  many  even 
of  its  sul)tleties  disap])ear  when  the  i-elations  of  its  elements 
have  been  ascertained  by  study  and  investigation. 

It  should  not  be  forgotten  that  it  lies  at  the  foundation  of 
the  English  common  law  itself ;  that  it  was  upon  this  sturdy 
stock  that  the  laws  and  institutions  of  trading,  manufacturing, 
commercial  England  were  ingrafted,  and  are  now  in  no  small 
degree  dependent  for  their  element  of  vitality. 

Nor  should  it  be  overlooked,  that  with  the  Saxon  love  of 
land,  and  the  Norman  love  of  dominion  over  the  sj)ot  one 
calls  his  own,  the  law  which  regulates  and  enforces  the  rights 
of  property  in  the  soil  will  never  cease  to  be  of  interest  to  a 
people  in  whose  veins  this  common  blood  is  mingled. 

It  lias,  moreover,  been  the  field  in  wliieli  the  keenest  intel- 
lect and  most  ])rofound  learning  of  the  best  jurists  of  England 
and  our  own  country  have  found  am j tie  scope  and  employment 
in  grasping  and  analyzing  its  princij^les,  mastering  its  subtle- 
ties, and  testing  and  applying  its  rules. 

It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  so  many  writers  have, 
from  time  to  time,  employed  their  best  powers  in  the  prepa- 
ration of  works  embodying  and  illustrating  the  Law  of  Real 


XIV  PREFACE   TO   FIRST   VOLUME   OF   FIRST   EDITION. 

Property.  Every  age  since  Glanville  has  had  its  writers  upon 
this  subject,  and  no  period  has  been  more  prolific  than  the 
present.  No  English  treatise,  of  course,  covers  the  same 
ground  as  was  proposed  to  be  done  in  the  present ;  though  it 
would  be  doing  injustice  to  the  treatise  of  JVir.  Joshua  Wil- 
liams, and  the  notes  on  leading  cases  by  Mr.  Tudor,  among 
the  more  recent  of  those  works,  if  acknowledgment  had  not 
been  made,  as  it  often  is  in  these  pages,  for  tlie  aid  they  have 
afforded  in  the  preparation  of  this  work.  They  will,  more- 
over, show  the  use  which  has  been  made  of  the  earlier  treatises 
of  Blackstone,  Fearne,  Cruise,  Sanders,  Flintoff,  Sugden, 
Butler,  Crabb,  Preston,  Burton,  and  others  already  familiar 
to  the  American  lawyer.  The  work  will  show,  besides,  how 
far  he  has  availed  himself  of  the  labors  of  American  authors, 
whose  aid,  when  resorted  to,  he  has  intended  fully  to  ac- 
knowledge. 

This  attempt  to  produce  a  new  work  upon  a  hackneyed 
topic  will  not,  it  is  hoped,  render  the  writer  obnoxious  to  the 
charge  of  presumption  in  view  of  the  eminent  ability  of  those 
who  have  gone  before  him.  He  hopes  it  may,  at  least,  be 
found  to  possess  the  merit  of  being  adapted  to  the  wants  of 
the  American  lawyer,  as  well  as  the  American  student ;  and 
if,  in  its  composition,  it  is  found  to  want  the  terseness  and 
directness  which  might  be  derived  from  a  strict  adherence,  at 
all  times,  to  the  use  of  technical  terms  and  phrases,  the  reason 
for  it  might  be  traced  to  a  wish  to  present  the  propositions  it 
contains  in  language  readily  apprehended  by  the  student. 

Regarding  the  Law  of  Real  Property  as  a  system  composed 
of  several  parts,  yet  substantially  complete  in  itself,  he  has 
endeavored  to  arrange  his  topics  with  a  due  regard  to  their 
natural  order  of  sequence,  in  relation  to  each  other. 

The  work  is  divided  into  three  books :  the  first  embracing 
the  nature  and  quantity  of  estates  in  corporeal  hereditaments, 
with  their  qualities  and  characteristics,  which  will  be  found 
in  the  volume  now  published  ;  the  second  treating  of  incor- 
poreal hereditaments,  their  nature  and  characteristics  ;  and 
the  third,  presenting  in  outline  the  titles  by  which  real 
property  may  be  acquired  and  held,  and  the  rules  of  its 
transmission  and  transfer,  will  constitute  a  second  volume. 


PllEFACE   TO    FIRST    VOLUME    OF    FIU.ST    EDITION.  XV 

It  ia  8ul)divitlod  into  chaijtcrs,  each  intended  to  embrace  a 
separate  and  distinet  sul)ject,  with  a  Hubdivisiuii  in  sonic 
cases  into  sections,  with  such  a  reference  in  the  notes  to  tlie 
American  statutes  as  to  give  the  reader  a  toleraldy  full  idea 
of  the  coincidence  or  diversity  of  the  rules  of  tin'  soxn-al 
States  ujjon  those  subjects  therein  treated  of. 

It  aims,  in  brief,  to  provide  a  safe  and  convenient  bi>ok  of 
reference  to  the  lawyer ;  while  it  furnishes  an  elementary 
treatise  for  the  use  of  the  student,  embracing  what,  in  the 
form  of  lectures,  has  been  received  with  favor  by  successive 
classes  of  the  Law  School,  for  which  they  were  originally 
prepared. 

From  the  encouragement  he  has  received  from  both  lawyers 
and  students  to  undertake  the  work,  he  is  induced  to  hope 
that  it  will  be  found,  in  some  measure,  to  supply  the  want  in 
which  it  originated. 

Cambridge,  July,  18G0. 


NOT  E. 

For  tlic  convenience  of  those  who  may  liave  occasion  to 
cite  or  examine  the  woi'k  now  offered  in  a  new  edition,  tlic 
])a,ircs  of  the  lirst  edition  are  retained. 

The  figures  upon  the  margin,  with  a  star  prefixed,  indicate 
the  pages  of  that  edition. 

The  second  volume  of  the  present  edition  l)egins  with 
Estates  upon  Condition  at  page  444  of  the  first  volume 
of  the  first  edition.  The  third  l)egins  with  Titlb-Descknt 
at  page  397  of  the  second  volume  of  the  first  edition.  The 
star  pages  are  retained  as  a  means  of  referring  from  one 
part  of  the  work  to  another,  instead  of  those  of  the  present 
edition. 


CONTENTS. 


BOOK    I. 

CORPOREAL    HEREDITAMENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

PAOB 

NATURE  AND  CLASSIFICATION  OF  UEAL  PROPERTY    .     1 


CHAPTER  II. 

FEUDAL   TENURES,    SEISIN,    ETC 39 

CIIAFfER   III. 

ESTATES    IN    FEE-SIMPLE 73 

CHAPTER  IV. 

ESTATES-TAIL 97 

CHAPTER  V. 

ESTATES    FUR    LIFE. 
SECTION    I. 

Their  nature  and  incidents 120 

SECTION  II. 
Of  estovers 134 


XX  CONTENTS. 

SECTION  in. 
Of  emblements I33 

SECTION  IV. 
Of  waste 145 

CHAPTER  VI. 

ESTATES    BY   CURTESY 169 

CHAPTER  VII. 

DOWER. 

SECTION  I. 
Nature  and  history  of  dower 191 

SECTION  n. 
Of  what  a  widow  is  dowable 202 

SECTION  III. 
Requisites  of  dower 221 

SECTION  IV. 
How  lost  or  barred 251 

SECTION  V. 
How  and  by  whom  assigned 281 

SECTION  VI. 
Nature  of  the  estate  in  dower 312 

CHAPTER     VIII. 

JOINTURE 324 

CHAPTER  IX. 

ESTATES    BY   MARRIAGE. 
SECTION   I. 

Estates  during  coverture ^    339 

SECTION  II. 
Rights  of  homestead 353 


CONTENTS.  XXi 

Division  1.  —  What  arc  homestead  rights,  and  who  ma}' claim  353 

Division  2.  —  In  what  sucli  rights  may  be  claimed  ....  30.0 

Division  3.  —  How  such  rights  are  ascertained  and  declared.  383 

Division  4.  —  How  fur  such  rights  answer  to  estates    .     .     .  398 

Division  5.  —  How  far  such  rights  are  exempt  from  debts     .  414 

Division  G.  —  How  far  such  rights  may  prevent  alienation     .  428 

Division  7.  —  How  such  rights  may  be  waived  or  lost  .     .     .  446 
Division  8.  —  Of  procedure  affecting  such  rights,  and  effect 

of  change  in  the  condition  of  the  estate    .     .  457 


CHATTER   X. 

ESTATES    FOU    YEARS. 

SECTION  I. 
Nature  and  history  of  estates  for  years 462 

SECTION  II. 
How  estates  for  j'cars  may  be  created 476 

SECTION  III. 
Of  conditions  in  leases 501 

SECTION  IV. 
Of  covenants  in  leases 517 

SECTION  V. 
Of  assignment  and  sub-tenancy 538 

SECTION   VI. 
Of  eviction,  destruction,  and  use  of  premises  .     ...  .     555 

SECTION   VII. 
Of  sun'ender,  merger,  &c 579 

SECTION   VIII. 
Lessee  estopped  to  deny  lessor's  title 588 

SECTION  IX. 
Of  disclaimer  of  lessor's  title ....     601 


XXll  CONTENTS. 

SECTION  X. 
Of  letting  lands  upon  shares 604 

SECTION  XL 
Of  descent  and  devise  of  terms 611 

CHAPTER  XL 

ESTATES   AT   WILL. 
SECTION   I. 

Estates  properly  at  will 612 

SECTION  IL 
Estates  from  year  to  year 633 

CHAPTER  XII. 

TENANCIES   AT   SUFFERANCE,  LICENSES,  ETC. 

SECTION  I. 
Tenancies  at  sufferance 648 

SECTION  n. 
License 661 

CHAPTER  XIIL 

JOINT-ESTATES. 

SECTION  I. 
Estates  by  joint-tenancy ,         .    .     674 

SECTION  II. 
Estates  in  coparcenary ,    «    .    .    683 

SECTION  m. 
Tenancies  in  common .     685 


CONTKNTS.  Xxiii 

SKmoN    IV. 
Estates  in  partnership 7uO 

RECTK^N    V. 
.Toint-tnortgages 7()j 

SECTION   VI. 
Estates  in  entirety 700 

SECTION    VII, 
Partition 71  <» 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Abbey  Tlomestead  Assoc,  i'.  Willard,  i. 

im,  Gua. 
Abbot  V.  Hiivley,  iii.  272. 
Abbott  f.  Abbott,  i.  8:3,  400.  437,  438, 
452;  iii.  408,  423,42(3,453. 

V.  Allen,  iii.  485.  487. 

V.  Alsdorf,  iii.  323. 

I".  Berry,  i.  714. 

c.  Bni'lstroet.  ii.  502,  598. 

V.  HiitltT,  ii.  350. 

V.  Cromartie,  i.  592. 

V.  Cumin,  ii.  205. 

I'.  Godfroy's  Heirs,  ii.  60. 

u.  Holway,  ii.   453,   471,  483;    iii. 
385. 

V.  Jenkins,  ii.  053. 

V.  Kasson,  ii.  138. 

r.  Mills,  iii.  80. 

r.  Stewartstown,  ii.  320. 

r.  Ujjton,  ii.  I'.HJ. 
Abby  r.  IJilhips.  i.  537. 
Abeel  v.  Hadcliff.  ii.  548. 
Abell  ('.  Brown,  ii.  524. 

r.  Cross,  iii.  2.';5. 
Abercronibie  r.  Baldwin,  i.  090. 

V.  Redpatli,  i.  551. 

V.  Kiddle,  i.  131,  309. 
Abcrgaveny's  (Lord)  case,  i.  080. 
Abingdon's  case,  i.  2'.)0. 
Abington  r.  North  Bridirewater,  iii.  465. 
Abney  v.  l*oi)e,  i.  304,  455. 
Abraham  v.  Twigj^,  ii.  437.  772.  774. 
Academy  of  Music  r.  Ilackett.  i.  513. 
Accidental  Death  Ins.  Co.  v.  McKensie, 

i.  591,  000. 
Acer  r.  Westcott,  iii.  348. 
Ackerman  r.  Lyman,  i.  05L 
Ackia  V.  Ackla.  ii.  108. 
Ackland  r.  Lutlev,  i.  407,  041 ;  ii.  601. 
Ackley  v.  Chamberlain,  i.  307,  368,410. 

V.  Dvpert,  iii.  84. 
Ackroyd'r.  Smith,  ii.  300. 
Acland  v.  Caisford,  ii.  2.30. 
Acocks  r.  Phillips,  i.  513. 
Acquacknonk  Water  Co.  v.  Watson,  ii. 
307. 


Acton  r.  Blundcll,  ii.  374,  375. 

V.  Dooley,  iii.  01. 
Adair  i^.  Lott,  i.  170.  181. 
Adam  v.  Ames  Iron  Co.,  i.  712,  710. 
V.  Brings   Iron  Co.,  i.  19,  088,  718; 

ii.  401.  403. 
V.  Kerr,  iii.  290. 
Adams  v.  Adams,  i.  121,  402;  ii.  294, 

502,  538,  050. 
V.  Andrews,  i.  008. 
v.  Beadle,  i.  14. 
I'.  Beiknian,  i.  270. 
V.  Bit^elow,  ii.  144. 
V.  Brown,  ii.  184,  233,  245. 
r.  Bucklin.  ii.  289,  293. 
»•.  Butts,  i.  317. 
r.  Conover,  iii.  488,  511. 
V.  Corriston,  ii.  110,  139. 
V.  Cuddy,  iii.  340,  435. 
V.  Freeman,  i.  002. 
V.  Frothingham,  i.  087,  719  ;  iii.  217, 

408. 
V.  Frye,  iii.  312. 
V.  Gibney,  i.  521. 
r.  (ioddard,  i.  580. 
V.  Guerard,  i.  50;  ii.  472,  517,049. 
V.  (iuice,  iii.  57,  171. 
f.  Hill,  i.  230,  244;  ii.  222. 
!•.  Jenkins,  i.  374,  437. 
v.  Lojian,  i.  123;  iii.  200. 
c.  McKesson,  i.  004,  010. 
V.  Marshall,  ii.  333. 
V.  Medsker.  iii.  282. 
V.  Morse,  iii.  472,  473. 
V.  Palmer,  i.  257,  340;  iii.  224,  226, 

228. 
V.  Parker,  ii.  121. 
V.  Payiiter.  ii.  205. 
V.  Pease,  iii.  43"J,  443. 
V.  Hiibertson,  ii.  148. 
V.  Rockwell,  iii.  71.  88.  90. 
V.  Ross.  i.  88;  ii  271,  000.  053,  654, 

055;  iii.  207.  478.  608. 
r.  Saratoga  &  W.  R.  R..  iii.  451. 
r.  Savagf,  ii.  424,  440,  447,  400,660 

004. 
r.  Smith,  i.  14. 
f.  Steer,  iii.  404. 


XSVl 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Adams  v.  Stevens,  ii.  46  ;  iii.  405. 

V.  Von  Alstyne,  ii.  390,  391. 

V.  Walker,  ii.  378. 

V.  Wlieeler,  ii.  157. 
Addison  v.  Hack,  i.  666,  667,  672;  ii. 

397. 
Adkins  v.  Hudson,  ii.  472. 
Adrian  v.  Sliaw,  i.  395,  454. 
Adsit  V.  Adsit,  i.  335,  386. 
yEtna  Ins.  Co.  v.  Franks,  i.  435. 

V.  Tyler,  ii.  98,  241. 
Agricultural  Bank  v.  Kice,  iii.  268,  272, 

'2  I  b. 

Agricultural,  &c.  Ass.  v.  Brewster,  ii. 

.544. 
Ahearn  r.  Bellman,  i.  640. 
Ahrend  v.  Odiorne,  ii.  90. 
Aiken  v.  Bruen,  ii.  215. 

V.  Gale,  ii.  186,  212,  214,  215,  221, 
222  227. 

V.  Smrtli,  i.  481,  604,  605,  606. 
Aikin  v.  Albany  R.  R.,  i.  532. 
Aiknian  r.  Harsell,  i.  265,  318. 
Ainswortli  v.  Ritt,  i.  577. 
Ake  V.  Mason,  iii.  434,  493,  507,  524. 
Albany's  case,  ii.  695. 
Albany  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bay,  iii.  268, 

271. 
Albany  Street,  Re,  iii.  226. 
Albee  r.  (Carpenter,  i.  107. 
Albion  Bank  v.  Burns,  ii.  224,  228. 
Alden  v.  Carver,  ii.  90. 

V.  Wilkins,  ii.  75. 
Alderman  v.  Neate,  i.  481,  482. 
Alderson  v.  Miller,  i.  594,  600;  iii.  101, 
127. 

V.  Piatt,  i.  655. 
Aldred's  case,  ii.  327,  365. 
Aldrich  v.  Billings,  iii.  82,  451. 

V.  Cooper,  ii.  212. 

V.  Martin,  i.  6»6 ;  ii.  08,  225,  229. 

V.  Parsons,  i.  5. 
Aldridge  r.  Dunn,  ii.  93,  95. 

V.  Kibyre,  i.  590 ;  ii.  143. 
Alexander  v.  Alexander,   ii.  725;   iii. 
312. 

V.  Bradley,  i.  309. 

V.  Carew,  i.  044;  iii.  349. 

V.  I)e  Kermel,  i.  312. 

V.  Dorsey,  i.  577. 

V.  Fisher,  i.  149. 

V.  Greenwood,  ii.  265. 

V.  Kennedy,  iii.  153. 

V.  Kilpatrick,  i.  355. 

V.  Merry,  iii.  222. 

V.  Mills,  ii.  696. 

I'.  Pendleton,  iii.  156. 

V.  Polk,  iii.  14.5,  170,287. 

V.  Sclireiber,  iii.  520,  522,  524,  525. 

V.  State,  iii.  77. 

V.  Tams,  ii.  514. 

V.  Warrance,  i.  174  ;  ii.  289,  508. 

V.  Wlieeler,  iii.  152. 
Alford  V.  Vickery,  i.  639,  642. 


Alger  V.  Kennedy,  i.  562. 
Allan  I".  Gomme,  ii.  318,  350,  854. 
AUcock  V.  Moorhouse,  i.  508,  5.39. 
Alleghany  City  ;,'.  Moorehead,  iii.  61. 
Allegheny  v.  Ohio  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  iii. 

202. 
Allen  V.  Allen,  i.  127,  128;  ii.  279;  iii. 
84,  109. 

V.  Ashley  School  Fund  Tr.,  ii.  748, 
768. 

V.  Bates,  iii.  458. 

V.  Bryan,  i.  526,  550,  551. 

V.  Bryant,  ii.  571. 

V.  Carpenter,  i.  141,  660. 

V.  Carruth,  i.  437. 

i;.  Chatfield,  i.  592. 

V.  Clark,  ii.  181,  186,  211,  213,  214, 
216 

V.  Cook,  i.  409,  410,  424. 

V.  Culver,  ii.  296. 

I'.  Everly,  ii.  106. 

V.  Everts,  iii.  240. 

V.  Gibson,  i.  699. 

r.  Hall,  i.  689. 

V.  Holton,  i.  677  ;  iii.  141,  461,  508. 

V.  Hooper,  i.  344;  iii.  268,  274. 

i\  Howe,  ii   13. 

r.  Indett,  ii.  566. 

?•.  Jackson,  ii.  10. 

V.  Jaquish,  i.  477,  579,  585,  631. 

V.  Kellani,  iii.  91. 

V.  Kingsbury,  iii.  484. 

V.  Lambden,  i.  467. 

V.  Little,  iii.  545. 

V.  McCoy,  i.  219. 

V.  Maddock,  iii.  542. 

V.  Mayfield,  ii.  594. 

r.  Mooney,  i.  22,  23. 

V.  Parish,  iii.  71,  119. 

r.  Poole,  i.  090. 

V.  Pray,  i.  S3 5. 

V.  Savward,  iii.  498,  508,  517. 

V.  Scott,  iii.  412,  413,  421,  465. 

V.  Taft,  iii.  458. 

V.  Tavlor,  ii.  365. 

V.  Thaver,  i.  83. 

V.  Trustees,  i.  105,  118. 
Allerton  v.  Belden,  ii.  189. 
Alley  V.  Bay,  i.  435. 

V.  Lawrence,  ii.  709. 
Alley  on  Beattv's  Plan,  ii.  348. 
Allis  r.  Billings,  iii.  263. 

V.  Moore,  ii.  346  ;  iii.  178. 
Allison  V.  Shilling,  i.  44.3. 
Allyn  r.  Mather,  ii.  631 
Alms-House  Trustees  v.  Smith,  ii.  191. 
Alter's  Appeal,  iii.  227,  406. 
Altes  V.  Hinckler,  iii.  238. 
Altham  v.  Anglesea,  ii.  459. 
Altham's  case.  i.  106. 
Aitheimer  '•.  Davis,  i.  384. 
Althorf  r.  Wolfe,  i.  1.57. 
Alton  r.  Pickering,  i.  617,  626. 
Alvord  V.  Collin,  iii.  235. 


TAULK   OF   CASES   CITKD. 


XXVll 


Alvonl  Co.  V.  Olcason,  i.  2.1,  27. 
Alwood  V.  Miinetiflil,  i.  .OJU. 
r,  KiiLkmim,  i   (M)u,  UCKJ. 
AniMer  r.  Norton,  i.  ^W. 
Anient  r.  Wolf,  iii.  106. 
Amor.  Acnilcmy  of  A.  &  S.  i'.  Harvard 

Collt'gc,  iii.  652. 
Anier.  Aciidemy  of  Music  i-.  Sniitli,  ii. 

218. 
Ainer.  Bib.  Soc.  v.  Wetmore,  iii.  564. 
Amir,  (iiiano  Co.  v.  U.  S.  CJuano  Co., 

iii.  I'.t4. 
Ames  r.  Aslilev,  ii.  50.3. 

V.  Elilred,  "i.  ;J07,  385. 

r.  Norman,  i.  TOO,  707,  708. 
Amlierst  c.  Lyiton,  ii.  021. 
Amiierst  Acailemy  r.  Cowls,  ii.  564. 
Aniidon  c.  IJenjiimin,  iii.  ."512. 
Amidown  r.  I'eck,  ii.  LtO.  255. 
Ammidown  r.  B:ill,  iii.  421. 

V.  Granite  Hank,  iii.  418,  420. 
Amner  v.  Loddinnton,  ii.  785). 
Amonott  r.  Amis,  iii.  117. 
Amory  r.  Fairhanks,  ii.  252. 

V.  Kannoffsky,  i   58-S,  584. 

V.  Mercditli,  ii.  712,  7l;J. 

V.  Heilly,  ii.  92. 
Ancaster  r.  Mayer,  ii.  207. 
Anders  r.  Meredith,  i.  01*4. 
Anderson  v.  Amlerson,  i.  430;  iii.  542. 

I'.  Baumgartner,  ii.  101,  127. 

V.  Buchanan,  ii.  349. 

V.  Cary,  ii.  9. 

i;.  Chicago  Ins.  Co.,  i.  564. 

V.  Coburn,  i.  4.50;  iii.  80. 

V.  Culbert,  i.  435. 

V.  D.irby,  i.  4!M1 ;  iii.  165. 

V.  l)iiu;as,  iii.  340. 

V.  Eden,  ii.  703. 

V.  Greblc,  iii.  565. 

V.  Hubble,  iii.  90. 

V.  J.ick^on,  ii.  753.  760. 

V.  N\ff,  ii.  1.54,  150. 

V.  ()[)[)enheiiner,  i.  677. 

V.  Tribble,  i.  432. 

V.  Weston,  iii   298. 
Anding  c.  Davis,  ii.  5.3. 
Andover  Bapt.  Soc.  v.  Hazen,  ii.  6.39. 
Andrew  v.  Spurr,  iii.  406. 
Andrews,  Ex  jxtrte,  ii.  244. 

t;.  Andrews,   i.  310,   329,   333 ;   iii. 
390. 

V.  Appel,  iii.  601 

V.  Brnmfleld,  ii.  7'^4. 

V.  Burns,  ii.  151. 

v.  Davison,  iii.  400.  .504,  605. 

V.  Denison,  iii.  501. 

V.  Fiske,  ii.  75,  160,  170. 

V.  Gillespie,  ii.  257  ;  iii.  407,  504. 

V.  Hagadon,  i.  879. 

V.  Hailes.  i.  689. 

v.  Lyons,  iii  90,  91. 

I'.  Royo,  ii   690,  707,  757,  760,  786 

V.  Senter,  ii.  21. 


Andrews  r.  Scotton,  ii.  261,  269. 

V.  Sparliawk,  ii.  676. 

r.  Todil,  iii    V2.'>. 
Andnis  c.  folfinaii.  ii.  01,  05,  06. 
Angel  I-.  Boner,  ii.  197,  19S. 
Angell,  I'elition  of,  ii.  632. 

r.  Handall,  i.  660. 

r.  Kotteiibury,  i.  89;  ii.  6.38. 
Angier  v.  Agnew,  i.   149,  16(J,  161;  ii 

\us,  116. 
AngUsea  r.  Cliurcli  Wardens,  ii.  20. 
Angus  r.  Dulton,  ii.  .'WO,  343,  ;i»l. 
Ahkeny  r.  I'ierce,  i.  689. 
Annan  v.  Folsom,  iii.  347. 
Annapolis  K.  K.  c  Gantt,  ii.  107. 
Anonymous,  i.  03;  ii.  234,  209,289,441; 

iii.  138,  :i:{7,  338, 
Ansloy  r.  Loiigmire,  i.  688,  696. 
Anson  r.  Anson,  ii.  201. 
Anthony  r.  (iiftord,  iii.  60. 

V.  Lapliam,  ii.  .']08. 

r.  Smith,  ii.  W. 
Antomarciii  <•.  Kussell,  ii.  388. 
Antoiii  r.  Bilkiia[),  i.  5,  34,  060. 
Apple  r.  Apple,  i.  204. 
Applegate  r.  Gracy,  iii.  270,  1340,  844. 

V.  Mason,  ii.  196. 
Api)leton  V.  Boyd,  i.  077,  706;  ii.  148, 

149. 
Arbuckle  v.  Ward,  ii.  339;  iii.  59. 
Arcedocline  r.  Bowes,  ii.  187. 
Archer  i-.  Bennett,  ii.  829 ;  iii.  420. 

V.  Jones,  i.  132. 
Archer's  case,  ii.  038,  050,  078. 
Arden  v.  I'nllen,  i.  509,  .576. 
Ards  I'.  Watkins,  i.  620.  551,  .552. 
Arents  v.  Commonwealth,  ii.  127. 
Argyle  r.  Dwinell,  i.  717. 
Arkwright  r.  tJell,  ii.  380. 
Arlin  r.  Brown,  ii.  90. 
Armitage  v.  Wickliffe.  ii.  109,  134. 
Arms  V.  Ashley,  ii.  547. 

V.  Burt,  i.  88. 

V.  Lyman,  i.  719. 
Armstrong  r.  Armstrong,  ii.  701,  798. 

V.  Brownfield,  iii.  427. 

V.  Caldwell,  ii.  403 ;  iii.  150. 

V.  Cummings,  i.  578. 

r.  Darby,  iii.  478. 

V.  Kerns,  ii.  700. 

V.  Lawson,  iii.  369. 

v.  Pratt,  ii.  207. 

r.  Kisteau.  iii.  144,  160,  177. 

r.  Wheeler,  i.  625. 

r.  Wolslev,  ii.  466. 
Arnold  r.  Arnold,  i.  204,  700. 

V.  Brown,  i.  110;  ii.  6<I9,  570,  703 

V.  Crowder.  i.  23,  24,  29. 

r.  Den,  iii.  10. 

V.  Elltnore,  iii.  4.36. 

I'.  Foot.  ii.  225,  mS,  371  ;  iii.  67. 

V.  Gilbert,  ii.  707. 

V.  Grime'*,  iii.  2<V,t. 

V.  H.  K.  U.  Road,  ii.  86a 


xxvm 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Arnold  i'.  Mattison,  ii.  54. 
V.  Nash,  i.  G17,  620,  660. 
V.  Kevoult,  i.  489. 
V.  Kichiuond  Iron  Works,  iii.  263. 
V.  Stevens,  ii.  356,  396. 
V.  Wainwright,  i.  701,  702. 
Arnot  V.  Post,  ii.  134. 
Arnwine  v.  Carroll,  ii.  533. 
Arques  v.  Wasson,  ii.  103. 
Arrington  v.  Cherry,  ii.  572. 
Arrison  v.  Harmstead,  iii.  260. 
Arrowsmitli   v.  Burlington,  i.  70,  71 ; 

iii.  224. 
Arthur  v.  Bockenham,  iii.  574. 
V.  Cole,  ii.  10. 
V.  Weston,  iii.  279,  280. 
Arts  V.  Maydole,  i.  379. 
Artz  V.  Grove,  ii.  53. 
Asay  V.  Hoover,  ii.  169. 
Ascough's  case,  i.  559. 
Ashby  V.  Eastern  R.  R.,  i.  60;  iii.  447. 

V.  White,  ii.  393. 
Ashcroft  V.  Eastern  R.  R.  Co.,  iii.  462. 
Asher  v.  Mitchell,  i.  432,  458. 
Ashhurst  v.  Given,  ii.  436, 475, 488,  506, 
564. 
I'.  Montour  Iron  Co.,  ii.  85. 
Ashhurst's  Appeal,  ii.  467,  499,  500. 
Ashley  v.  Ashley,  ii.  339,  373;  iii.  156, 
176. 
V.  Olmstead,  i.  385. 
V.  Warner,  i.  506,  629,  630,  632; 
ii.  27. 
Aslimun  v.  Williams,  i.  5,  673. 
Ashwell  V.  Avers,  iii.  290. 
Askew  V.  Daniel,  iii.  270. 
Askins  r.  Coe.  iii.  90. 
Aspden  v,  Austin,  i.  519. 
Astbury,  Ex  parte,  i.  30. 
Astor  V.  Hoyt,  i.  554;  ii.  172. 
V.  L'Amoreaux,  ii.  577 
V.  Miller,  i.  529,  531,  534,  554. 
Astrom  v.  Hammond,  iii.  211. 
Atherton  v.  Johnson,  iii.  145. 
Atkin  V.  Merrell,  i.  214. 
Atkins  V.  Bordraan,  ii.  353,  355,  393 ; 
iii.  412. 
y.Chilson,  i.  167,516;  ii.  23. 
V.  Kinnan,  iii.  231,  239,  242. 
r.  Kron,  i.  130. 
V.  Sawj^er,  ii.  170,  171. 
V.  Sleeper,  i.  467. 
V.  Yeomans,  i.  291,  294. 
Atkinson  v.  Atkinson,  i.  394,  408,  440. 
V.  Baker,  i.  127. 
V.  Hutchinson,  i.  107- 
Atlanta  Mills  v.  Mason,  ii.  315,  399. 
Atlantic  Dock  Co.  v  Leavitt,  i.  518 ;  ii. 

293,299;  iii,  288,331. 
Attaquin  v.  Fish,  i.  167. 
Attersol  v.  Stevens,  i.  156. 
Attorney-Gen.   v.  Boston  Wharf  Co , 
iii.  459. 
V.  Bowyer,  iii.  549. 


Attorney-Gen.  v.  Butler,  ii.  564. 

V.  Chambers,  iii.  64,  65,  446. 

V.  Delaware,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.,  iii.  443. 

V.  Doughty,  ii.  327,  366. 

V.  Federal   St.   Meeting-House,  ii. 
537,  538,  539. 

V.  Folsom,  iii.  53,  54. 

V.  Gill,  ii.  773. 

V.  Hall,  ii.  760,  783,  787;  iii  565. 

V.  Merrimack  Mg.  Co.,  ii.25;  iii.  79. 

V.  Moore,  ii.  5G8;  iii.  555. 

V.  Pearson,  ii.  558. 

V.  Purmort,  ii.  43. 

V.  Scott,  ii.  498. 

V.  Vigor,  ii.  145. 

V,  Williams,  ii.  350. 

V.  Wistanley,  ii.  258. 

V.  Woods,  iii.  443 
Attwater  v.  Attwater,  i.  86;  ii.  9. 
Attwood  V.  Fricot,  ii.  406. 
Atwater  v.  Bodfish,  ii.  398. 
Atwood  V.  Atwood,  i.  225,  271,  289. 

V.  Vincent,  ii.  90. 
Aubin  V.  Daly,  i.  219. 
Auburn  Bank  v.  Roberts,  ii.  172. 
Auer  V.  Penn,  i.  583. 
Aufricht  v.  Northrop,  ii.  117. 
Augenbaugh  v.  Coppenheffer,  i.  523. 
Augusta  V.  Moulton,  ii.  341. 
Augusta  Bank  v   Earle,  ii.  303. 
Augustus  V.  Seabolt,  ii.  562,602,609; 

iii.  6. 
Auriol  V.  Mills,  1.  524,  535,  536. 
Austen  v.  Halsay,  ii.  96. 
Austin  V.  Abearne,  i.  492. 

V.  Austin,  ii.  70. 

17.  Bailey,  iii.  148. 

;;.  Barrett,  i.  690. 

V.  Bradley,  ii.  67. 

f.  Burbank,  ii.  269. 

V.  Cambridgeport  Parish,  ii.  7,  16, 
18;  iii.  558,  559. 

V.  Downer,  ii.  58. 

V.  Hall,  i.  699. 

V.  Hudson  River  R.  R.  Co.,  i.  156, 
472  ;  ii.  382. 

V.  Rutland,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.,  i.  692, 
715 ;  ii.  391 ;  iii.  61,  157,  445. 

I'.  Sawyer,  iii.  416. 
V.  Shaw,  iii.  279. 

?'.  Stanley,  i.  357,  377. 

17.  Stevens,  i.  132,  154. 

V.  Swank,  i.  387,  450. 

V.  Thompson,  i.  616. 

V.  Underwood,  i.  418. 
Auworth  V.  Johnson,  i.  155,  575. 
Avans  v.  Everett,  i.  378. 
Avant  y.  Robertson,  i.  279. 
Avelyn  v.  Ward,  ii.  17,  757. 
Averall  v.  Wade,  ii.  230. 
Averctt  v.  Ward,  ii.  267,  277. 
Averill  r.  Guthrie,  ii.  156. 
i;.  Taylor,  i.  480;  ii.  181. 

V.  Wilson,  iii.  99. 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


X  X 1 X 


Avon  Mf;;.  Co.  v.  Andrews,  iii.  420. 
A>er  f.  AyiT,  ii.  4til,  IbtS,  WJ. 

V.  KiiiLTV,  ii.  6. 

V.  lliiwks.  i.  U27. 

I'.  SpriiiK',  i.  28'.t,  .']02. 
AylilTe  r.  Murray,  ii.  601. 
Ayiinj^  /-.  Kruiner,  ii.  2. 
Aylswortli  r.  Wlilti-Dnib,  ii.  493. 
Ayniiir  r.  Hill,  ii.  128. 
Ayray's  case,  iii.  27'.'.  2"^0. 
Ayres  r.  Kulklaiitl,  i   '.i.j;  ii.  802. 

V.  Hiistf.l,  ii.  2.U. 

V.  Waite,  ii.  18'J 

V.  Wattson,  ii.  195. 


B. 


Babl)  V.  PiTJey,  i.  119,  ."iiO,  .344,  846. 
Babbit  V.  .Sero{,'|,'in,  i.  700,  70U. 
Babcoek  r.  Bowman,  iii.  204. 

V.  Gibbs,  i.  808. 

V.  IIoL'V,  i.  41'.»,  4;]:j;  ii.  112,  115. 

V.  Jonlaii,  ii.  50,218. 

V.  Kennedy,  ii.  142. 

V.  Scovill,  i.  534. 

17.  Utter,  i.  G70 ;  iii.  438. 

V.  Wynian,  ii.  .54. 
Baclielder  v.  Wakefield,  i.  000 ;  iii.  217. 
Backenstoss  c.  Stabler,  iii.  472. 
Backiiouse  r.  Bonoini,  ii.  382. 
Backus  r.  Cbapinan,  i.  G'J3. 

V.  Detroit,  iii.  443,  445. 

i;.  McCoy,  iii.  480,  481,  483,  484, 
487,  401. 
Bacon  v.  Howdoin,  i  482  ;  ii.  181,  182  ; 
iii.  4i:5,  420. 

V.  Brown,  i.  0:!(!,  051  ;  ii.  51. 

V.  Goodnow,  ii.  loS,  222. 

V.  Huntington,  ii    22. 

I'.  Lincoln,  iii  488. 

V.  Mclntire,  ii.  I'Jl,  102. 

V.  Sitni)son.  iii.  249. 

V.  Taylor,  ii.  471. 

V.  W.  Furnace  Co  ,  i    512,  514. 
Badge  v.  Floyd,  ii.  773,  780. 
Badger  v.  Boardnian,  ii.  324,  .325. 

V.  Iloltiies,  i.  005. 

V.  Lloyd,  ii.  773,  780 
Badgley  r.  Bruce,  i  287. 
Badhun  r.  Tucker,  ii.  8,  157. 
Bagley  v.  Fletcber,  iii.  207. 

r.  Freeman,  i    525,  529,  584,  541, 
554 

V.  Morrill,  iii   428. 
Bagnell  v.  Broderick,  iii.  199,  205,  208, 

20'J. 
Bagott  V.  Orr,  iii.  60. 
Bagsbaw  r   Spencer,  ii.  401. 
Baier  v.  Berbericb,  ii.  517. 
Bailey  v.  yEtna  Ins.  Co.,  ii.  76. 

V.  Appleyard,  ii.  313. 

i;.  Burges,  ii   .55 1 

V.  Carleton,  iii.  162,  164,  160. 


Bailey  r.  He  Crospigny,  i.  ■'A)l. 

V.  Delapiaiiie,  i.  5^2. 

r.  FilUbruwn,  i.  008. 

V.  Gould,  ii.  123. 

i;.  lloppin,  ii.  5'J7,  Oil. 

r.  Kilburn,  iii.  98. 

V.  .Miitenberger,  iii.  507. 

I'.  .Moore,  i.  5'.t(i. 

r.  Myrick,  ii.  232. 

i\  IVarson,  i.  •t'A). 

V.  Uicbardson,  ii   205. 

I'.  .Si.sson,  i.  712. 

V.  Stepbens,  i.  (i02. 

V.  Wells,  i.  535,  579,  680. 

V.  Wliite,  iii.  428,  4.59. 
Baily  v.  U.  K.  Co..  iii.  44;J. 

i\  Smitb,  ii.  2'>7. 
Bain  r.  Clark,  i.  505. 
Haiiibridge  r.  Owen,  ii  234. 
Maine  r.  Williams,  ii.  229. 
Bainton  i-.  Wanl,  ii.  089. 
Hainway  r.  Cobb,  i.  29. 
Haird  /■.  Boucber,  ii.  71.3. 

V.  B.  II.  Col.,  ii.  43. 

V.  Corwin,  i.  715. 

I-.  Trice,  i.  420. 
Baker  r.  Adams,  i.  040,  Oil. 

1-.  Baker,  i.  01,  28.3,288,317. 

V.  Bessey,  iii.  421. 

r.  Bliss,  iii.  3.30. 

V.  Bridge,  i.  91  ;  iii.  503. 

V.  Cbase.  i.  220.  227  ;  ii.  542. 

V.  Dening,  iii.  280. 

V.  Dewey,  iii.  401. 

V.  Falea,  iii.  217. 

r.  Flood,  ii.  203. 

V.  (Javitt,  ii.  109,  130,133,  ITS 

V.  Oostling,  i.  551. 

V.  Hall,  ii.  407,  479. 

r.  Haskell,  iii.  308,  310,  315. 

r.  Hunt,  iii.  479. 

r.  .Jord.'iii.  iii.  410. 

r.  Matcber,  iii.  348. 

V.  .Mattocks,  i.  40,  116. 

V.  Pratt,  i.  581.  583. 

i\  Scott,  ii.  055. 

/•.  Talbott,  iii.  4.34. 

V.  Terrell,  ii.  227. 

r.  Tbrasber.  ii.  03. 

r.  Townsend,  iii.  1.30. 

V.  Vining.  ii.  509,  613. 

V.  Wind.  ii.  47. 
Balcb  r.  Onion,  ii.  18.3. 
Baldwin  v.  Allison,  ii.  276,  623. 

V.  Brown,  iii.  94. 

V.  .lenkins.  ii.  .'>8. 

V.  Maultsby.  iii.  311. 

I'.  Porter,  ii.  552. 

I'.  .Spriggs.  iii.  576. 

r.  Tiiompson.  ii.  227. 

r.  Tuttie.  iii.  350. 

r.  Walker,  i.  527.  540.  548 ;  ii.  142. 

r.  Wliiting.  i.  088. 
Balfour  v.  Ballour,  i.  696. 


XXX 


TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 


Balkum  v.  Wood,  i.  429. 
Ball  V.  Cuilimore,  i.  616,  617. 

V.  Deas,  i.  678. 

V  Duiisterville,  iii.  297. 

V.  Lively,  i.  5b9. 

f.  Wyeth,  i.  538,  567 ;  ii.  50,  195. 
Ballance  v.  Forsyth,  iii.  236. 
Ballard  (•.  Ballard,  ii.  599. 

V.  Ballardvale  Co.,  ii.  173. 

V.  Butler,  i.  570. 

V.  Carter,  ii.  145;  iii.  543. 

V.  Dyson,  ii.  350. 
Ballentine  v.  Poyner,  i.  149,  150. 
Ballentine's  Estate,  i.  350. 
Ballou  V.  Taylor,  ii.  191,  193. 
Balls  V.  Westwoot],  i.  580,  593. 
Bally  V.  Wells,  ii.  300;  iii.  502. 
Ralston  V.  Bensted,  ii.  377. 
Baltimore  v   Warren  Mfg.  Co.,  ii.  367. 

V.  White,  iii.  347,  502. 
Baltimore  &,  Pot.  K.  R.  Co.  v.  Reany, 

ii.  381. 
Bamfield  v.  Popham.  ii.  772. 
Bancroft  v.  Cambridge,  i.  70. 

V.  Coolidge,  i.  2. 

V.  Ives,  iii.  19,  577. 

V.  Wardwell,  i.  627. 

V.  White,  i.  248. 
Banfield  c.  Wiggins,  ii.  533. 
Bangs  r.  Smith,  ii.  713. 
Banister  v.  Henderson,  i.  62 ;  iii.  514. 
Bank  of  America  v.  Banks,  iii.  125. 
Bank  of  Angusta  v.  Earle,  ii.  303. 
Bank  of  Commerce  v.  Owens,  i.  216. 
Bank  of  England  v.  Tarleton,  ii.  128, 

130. 
Bank  of  Metropolis  v.  Guttschlick,  ii. 

195. 
Bank  of  Pennsylvania  v.  Wise,  i.  11, 

548,  549. 
Bank  of  So.  Carolina  v.  Campbell,  ii. 
224. 

V.  Mitchell,  ii.  230. 

V.  Rose,  ii.  195. 
Bank  of  State  of  Indiana  v.  Anderson, 

ii.  112.  121,  123,  154. 
Bank  of  U.  S.  v.  Carroll,  ii.  263. 

V.  Covert,  ii.  128,  129. 

V.  Dunseth,  i.  292. 

V.  Housman,  ii.  445  ;  iii.  401. 
Bank  of  Washington  r.  Hupp,  ii.  143. 
Bank  of  Westminster  v.  Whyte,  ii.  45, 

Banks  v.  Am.  Tract  Soc,  ii.  365. 

V.  Haskie,  i.  461. 

V.  Ogden,  iii.  61,  66,  452. 

V.  Sloat,  ii.  488,  500,  706. 

V.  Sutton,  i.  211,  234;  ii.  630. 
Banner  v.  Johnston,  ii.  226. 
Banning  v.  Bradford,  ii.  268. 

;;.  Edes,  iii.  299, 
Bannister  v.  Bull,  ii.  654. 
Bannon  v.  Angier,  ii.  350,  396. 
Banton  v.  Sborey,  iii.  369. 


Baptist  Assoc,  v.  Hart,  iii.  549,  550,  554 
Barber  v.  Babel,  i.  400. 

V.  Barber,  iii.  464. 

V.  Harris,  i.  707,  708;  iii.  115. 

V.  Hoot,  i.  346. 
Barbour  v.  Barbour,  i.  201,  245. 
Bardwell  v.  Ames,  iii.  412,  415. 
Bare  v.  Hoffman,  ii.  394. 
Barford  v.  Street,  iii.  568. 
Barger  v.  Miller,  iii.  294,  295. 
Baring  v.  Keeder,  i.  41. 
Bark  v.  Bark,  iii.  509. 
Barker  v.  Barker,  i.  180,  186,  276 ;  ii. 
524. 

V.  Bell,  ii.  105, 109, 170,  194;  iii.  78. 

V.  Blake,  i.  289,  290. 

V.  Danier,  i.  526. 

r.  Dayton,  i.  456. 

V.  Greenwood,  ii.  502,  538. 

r.  Keat,  ii.  441,  456. 

V.  Parker,  i.  240;  ii.  121. 

V.  Richardson,  ii.  346. 

V.  Salmon,  iii.  72,  174. 

V.  Wood,  ii.  188. 
Barkley  v.  Wilcox,  ii.  372. 
Barksdale  v.  Elam,  ii.  11. 

V.  Garrett,  i.  277. 
Barkshire  v.  Grubb,  ii.  330,  332. 
Barlow  v.  McKinlej',  iii.  493. 

V.  Salter,  ii.  768. 

V.  St.  Nicholas  Bk.,  iii.  492. 

V.  Wainwright,  i.  636, 639,  643, 647. 
Barnard  v.  Edwards,  i.  277,  313. 

V.  Jennison,  ii.  239. 

V.  Jewett,  ii.  516,  518. 

V.  Onderdonk,  ii.  251. 

V.  Poor,  i.  157. 

V.  Pope,  i.  689,  690,  715. 
Barnes  v.  Allen,  ii.  779. 

v.  Barnes,  i.  663,  673. 

V.  Burt,  iii.  471. 

V.  Cm  mack,  ii.  200. 

V.  Gay,  i.  214,  217,  234,  419. 

V.  Irwin,  ii.  706. 

V.  Lee,  ii.  134,  146. 

V.  Mawson,  ii.  401. 

V.  McKay,  iii.  89. 

V.  Racster,  ii.  216,  231. 

V.  Ward,  i.  573. 

V.  White,  i.  379,  412. 
Barnet  v.  Doughert}-,  ii.  516. 
Barnett  v.  Nelson,  ii.  61,  235. 
Barnett's  Appeal,  ii.  4tJ9,  572,  574. 
Barney  v.  Arnold,  ii.  763,  765. 

V.  Baltimore,  iii.  445. 

V.  Frowner,  i.  291,  301. 

V.  Keith,  iii.  126. 

V.  Leeds,  i.  357,  363,  393,  409,  459. 

V.  McCarty,  ii.  153;  iii.  335,  343. 

V.  Miller,  iii.  425. 

V.  Myers,  ii.  216. 
Barnfield  v.  Wetton,  ii.  767. 
Barnhart  v.  Campbell,  i.  688,  689. 
Barns  v.  Hatch,  iii.  311. 


TAIJLK    OP'    CASES    CITKD. 


XXXl 


Barnstiible  r.  Thaclicr.  ii.  318  ;  iii.  138. 
Hiirtiiim  I',  t'liilds,  iii.  401. 
Burr  r.  (iiillowav,  i.  1^2. 

V.  Gnitz,  i.  "0:5 ;   iii.  138,  142,  147, 
loo,  H;4,  ;!2H. 

i:  Kiimnl,  ii.  i:>5. 
Barrel!  r.  Biirnll.  ii.  770.  799. 

I'.  .Joy,  ii.  5-J7,  i^l'J,  676. 

V.  Sal)ine,  ii.  02. 
Barrett  r.  Barron,  iii.  32o. 

.-.  Fr.ncli,  ii.  4'.1,  471,  472  ;  iii.  895. 

r.  Miirpliy,  iii.  J.jli. 

V.  I'ortcr,  iii.  623. 

V.  Knife,  i.  r>\:i 

V.  Wilson,  i.  4:53. 
Barroilhet  i'.  Battelle,  i.  515,  5:J0,  541, 

553. 
Barron  v.  Barron,  ii.  513,  550. 
Barrow  r.  lliclianl,  ii.  14.  2y8,  317,  320. 
Barrows  c.  Holian,  ii.  511,  512. 
Barruso  v.  Madan,  ii.  7. 
Barry  v.  Adams,  iii.  350. 

r.  (Jainblo,  iii.  205. 
Bartholonu'w  r.  Candee,  iii.  479,  483, 
4S7. 

r.  Ell  wards,  iii.  164,  420. 

V.  Hamilton,  i.  20. 

V.  Hook,  i.  410. 
Bartlct  r.  Harlow,  i.  088. 

V.  Kinj;,  ii.  5()1. 
Bartlett  v.  Bartlctt,  ii.  49,  600,  507,  545; 
iii.  272. 

V.  Drake,  i.  487 ;  iii.  297,  353. 

V.  Kmerson,  iii.  450. 

V.  Farrinj^ton.  i.  523,  628. 

V.  Ciou^e,  i.  213. 

V.  I'erkins,  ii.  805. 

I'.  Piekersgill,  ii.  619. 
Barto  c.  Ilimrod,  iii.  224. 
Barton  r.  Dawes,  iii.  426. 

r.  Morris,  iii.  270. 
Barwifk's  case,  ii.  582. 
Bascom  r.  Albertson,  iii.  553,  555,  556, 
557. 

V.  Smith,  ii.  197. 
Basford  '•.  Pearson,  iii.  125,  253,  255, 

400.  488. 
Baskin's  A])pc'al,  i.  454. 
Bass  r.  Kdwards,  ii.  320,  849. 

V.  Mitclu'U,  iii.  423. 

c.  Scott,  ii.  4!»8. 
Basse  v.  (Jallej^ger,  ii.  67,  08. 
Bassett  r.  Bassett,  iii.  256,  400. 

V.  Bradley,  ii.  219. 

V.  Brown,  i.  487  ;  iii.  276. 

V.  Mason,  ii.  202. 

I'.  Messner,  i.  379,  412,  401. 
Bastanl's  case,  i.  270. 
Batchelder  v.  Hatciielder,  i.  031. 

i".  Dean,  i.  4t)9,  471. 

V.  Kenniston,  iii.  64,  459. 

V.  Uohinson,  ii.  105,  252. 

1'.  Sturnis,  iii.  529. 
Bateoiaa  v.  Bateman,  i.  246. 


Bates  V.  Bates,  i.  205,  405,  451. 

1-.  Boston  &  N.  Y.  Central  R.  U., 
iii.  289,  2!>0. 

r.  Foster,  iii.  WXt,  617. 

V.  .Miller,  ii.  201. 

V.  Norcross,   i.   260 ;   iii.    100,  338, 
49H.  612.  613. 

V.  liud.lick.  ii.  216. 

V.  Seely,  i.  710. 

r.  Slira-der,  i.  159. 

I'.  Tymason,  iii.  l.'M. 
Batesville  Inst.  r.  Kaufl'man,  ii.  125. 
Bath  V.  Miller,  ii.  164. 
Batte  r.  McCaa,  iii.  273. 
Battel  r.  Smith,  i.  087. 
Matiey  r.  Hopkins,  ii.  075. 
Battle  r.  I'etway,  ii.  572. 
Batty  r.  Snook,  ii.  68,  05. 
Baugan  r.  .Maim,  iii.  79. 
Bantrh  r.  Walker,  ii.  509. 
Baugher  v.  Merrvman.  ii.  5.3. 
Baiim  r.  C.rifishy,  ii.  91,  92.  96,  97. 
Bauni'^artner  r.  (juessfeld,  ii.  612. 
Baxter  r.  Arnold,  iii.  400. 

V.  Bodkin,  iii.  125.  201. 

V.  Bradbury,  i.  484;  iii.  18,  119,  121, 
512,  527. 

V.  Browne,  i.  480. 

I',  (^hild,  ii.  05. 

1-.  Dear,  i.  400;  ii.  47. 

V.  Dyer.  ii.  108. 

V.  Mclntire.  ii.  194. 

c.  Willey,  ii.  54. 
Bay    City    Gas    Light     v.    Industrial 

Works,  iii.  459. 
Bayer  v.  Cockerill,  ii.  479;  iii.  381. 
Bayler   i-.  Commonwealtii,   ii.   44 ;   iiL 

370. 
Bayles  i*.  Ba.xter,  ii.  514,  618. 

I'.  Greenleaf,  ii.  (»3. 

r.  Younj;,  iii.  ■'540. 
Bayless  r.  (ilenn.  ii.  258. 
Bayley  v.  Bailey,  ii.  47,  65. 

r.  Bradley,  i.  095. 
Baylor  /•.  St.  Ant.  Bank,  i.  355. 
Bayly  i-.  Lawrence,  i.  559. 

V.  Muche,  ii.  200. 
Baynton  v.  Finnall,  i.  349. 
Beach  r.  Beach,  ii.  573. 

r.  Farish,  i.  5^><>.  5(>0. 

V.  llollister,  i.  710.  . 

V.  .Miller,  iii.  493. 

V.  Packard,  iii   401. 

V.  White,  iii.  357. 
Beahan  r.  Stapleton,  iii.  431. 
Beal  r.  Blair,  ii.  83. 

V.  Boston  Car  Sprinp  Co.,  i.  651. 

V.  Warren,  iii.  208,  .355,  358. 
Bealey  v  Shaw,  ii.  335.  370. 
Beall  V.  Berkhalicr.  iii.  525. 

V.  Fox,  iii.  55;1,  .'>.'>!. 
Beals  r.  Case,  ii    •"•27. 

V.  Cobb,  ii.  4'.l.  207. 
Beaman  v.  Buck,  iii.  249. 


XXXll 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Beaman  v.  Russell,  iii.  259. 

1-.  Whitney,  iii.  280,  333. 
Bean  v.  Bachelder,  iii.  153,  460. 

V.  Bootliby,  ii.  204. 

V.  Coleman,  ii.  354 ;  iii.  473. 

V.  Whitcomb,  ii.  275. 
Bear  v.  Snyder,  i.  270,  289. 
Bearce  !•.  Jackson,  iii.  482. 
Beard  v.  Fitzgerald,  ii.  212. 

V.  Knox,  i.  196. 

V.  Nutthall,  i.  331. 

V.  Stanton,  ii.  535. 

V.  Westcott,  ii.  724,  761. 
Beardman  v.  Wilson,  i.  505,  539,  541, 

543. 
Beardslee  v.  Beardslee,  i.  204,  205,  267. 
Beardsley  v.  Foot,  iii.  90. 

V.  Hotchkiss,  ii.  711,  714. 

V.  Knight,  i.  721. 
Beasley  v.  Clarke,  ii.  342. 
Beatie  v.  Butler,  ii.  73,  76,  81. 
Beatty  v.  Bordwell,  i.  698. 

V.  Gregory,  i.  669. 

V.  Mason,  iii.  235. 
Beatty's  Plan,  Alley  on,  ii.  346. 
Beaty  v.  Hudson,  iii.  455. 
Beaudely  v.  Brook,  ii.  450;  iii.  362. 
Beaupland   v.  McKeen,  iii.  84,  89,  93, 

101,  527. 
Beavan  v.  McDonnell,  i.  485. 
Beavers  v.  Smith,  i.  292,  299,  301,  302, 

311. 
Beavin  v.  Gove,  ii.  254. 
Bechtel  v.  Carslake,  iii.  518. 
Beck  V.  Carter,  i.  573. 

V.  Gray  bill,  ii.  509. 

V.  McGillis,  ii.  146. 

V.  Metz,  iii.  20. 
Becker  v.  De  Forest,  i.  565. 

V.  St.  Ciiarles,  iii.  519. 

V.  Van  Valkenburgh,  iii.  178. 

V.  Werner,  i.  504. 
Beckerkord,  In  re,  i.  366,  376,  392. 
Beckett  v.  Howe,  iii.  5.39. 
Beckman  i'.  Kreamer,  ii.  390. 
Beckwith  v.  Howard,  i.  518. 
Beckwith's  case,  ii.  455,  456,  457. 
Beddoe  v.  Wadsworth,  iii.  481,  483. 
Bedell's    case,    ii.   438,   451,   483;    iii. 

376. 
Bedford  v.  British  Museum,  ii.  326. 

i;.  Kelly,  i.  593. 

V.  M'Elherron,  i.  603,  636. 

V.  Terhune,   i.  529,   539,  540,  544, 
547,  581,  583,  585,  623. 
Bedford's   (Le  Countee)   case,  ii.  458, 

460. 
Beebe  v.  Swartwout,  iii.  500,  511. 
Beecher  v.  Baldy,  i.  362,  374,  .391,  421, 
422,  438. 

V.  Parmele,  i.  656. 
Beekman  v.  Bonsor,  iii.  554,  555,  557. 

r.  Frost,  iii.  339. 

V.  Saratoga,  &c.  R.  R.,  ii.  304. 


Beer  v.  Beer,  i.  491. 
Beers  v.  Beers,  i.  156. 

V.  St.  John,  i.  154. 
Beevor  v.  Luck,  ii.  215. 
Belcher  u.  Burnett,  ii.  611. 

V.  Costello,  ii.  125. 

>:  Weaver,  iii.  334. 
Belden  v.  Carter,  iii.  306,  307. 

V.  Meeker,  ii.  119. 

V.  Seymour,  ii.  464, 465;  iii.  398, 504, 
526. 
Belding  v.  Manly,  ii.  116,  122. 
Belfour  v.  Weston,  i.  508,  569,  585. 
Belk  V.  Massey,  iii  335,  340. 
Belknap  v.  Gleason,  ii.  193. 

V.  Tnmble,  i.  718;  ii.  343,  378. 
Bell  r.  Ellis,  i.  624,  628. 

V.  Fleming,  ii.  154,  157,  158,  160, 
162. 

V.  Ingestre,  iii.  311. 

t'.  Longworth,  iii.  147,  350. 

V.  McCawley,  iii.  342. 

V.  McDuffie,  iii.  385. 

V.  Nealy,  i.  254. 

V.  New  York,  i.  131,  262,  293,  308; 
ii.  181,  182,  222,  223,  23-5,  246, 
266. 

r.  Scammon,  ii.  445,  466,  763,  764, 
766;  iii.  396,  398,  564. 

V.  Thomas,  ii.  152. 

V.  Twilight,  1.  126;  ii.  81 ;  iii.  360. 

V.  Woodward,  ii.  204,  227;  iii.  409, 
410. 
Bell    County  v.  Alexander,  i.  91 ;   iii. 

5.53. 
Bellairs  v.  Bellairs,  ii.  10. 
Bellamy  v  Bellamy,  ii.  523. 
Bellasis  v.  Burbriche,  i   475,  493. 
Beller  v.  Robinson,  i.  471. 
Bellinger  v.  Union  Burial  Ground  Soc, 

iii.  109,  518. 
Belloc  V.  Rogers,  ii.  113.  266. 
Bellows  V.  Boston,  C,  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  ii. 
105,  140. 

V.  Copp.  iii.  203. 
Bells  V.  Gillespie,  ii.  753,  772. 
Belmont   v.  Coman,   ii.   217,   218;   iii. 
522. 

V.  O'Brien,  ii.  191. 
Belslay  v.  Engel,  ii.  653. 
Belton  V.  Avery,  ii.  58. 
Bemis  v.  DriscoU,  i.  389. 

V.  Leonard,  i.  467. 

V.  Wilder,  i.  504,  506,  516. 
Benaugh  r.  Turrentine,  i.  277. 
Bender  v.  Fromberger,  iii.  486,  487. 

V.  Stewart,  i.  690. 
Benedict  v.  Benedict,  i.  666. 

V.  Bunnell,  i.  357,  368,  431. 

V.  Morse,  i.  649. 
Benesch  v.  Clark,  ii.  713,  721. 
Benham  v.  Rowe,  ii.  78,  79,  80,  234. 
Benjamin  v.  Heeny,  i.  521. 
Benje  v.  Creagh,  iii.  145. 


TABLE   OP    CASES   CITED. 


xxxm 


Benncr  r.  EvnnR,  i.  205. 
BcMinL'soii  r.  Aiki'ii,  iii.  300,  612. 
Beiiiiet  r.  Hitilc,  i.  MO,  60-i. 

f.  Hiilloik.  i.  G!».;;  iii.  158. 

V.  Davis,  i.  177  ;  ii.  601. 

r.  \VeHtl)eci<,  iii.  ;{62. 

i;.  Williiiins,  iii.  362. 
Bennett  r.  IhUvt*.  ii.  140. 

V.  Unx.ksi,  iii.  6:18. 

r.  C'linip,  ii.  6()(J. 

V.  Ciiild,  i.  707,  710. 

V.  C'lemence.  i.  001.  092  ;  iii.  163. 

V.  Conant,  ii.  264,  281  ;  iii.  100. 

V.  DiiviH,  i.  173. 

V.  Holt,  ii   tl;!. 

I'.  Irwin,  iii.  404. 

r.  Koltiiison,  i.  OtiO. 

«'.  StevunsDii,  ii.  08. 
Bennock  v.  Wiiipple,  i.  020 ;  ii  67. 
Benaeil  «.  Ciiiiii(elli>r,  i.  486. 
Bensiey  v.  Atwill,  iii.  ;}i:5. 
Benson  r.  Aitkin,  i.  400,  431. 

V.  IJollesi,  i.  630. 

i;.  Matsilorf,  ii.  600. 

I".  Miners'  Bank,  ii.  401. 
Benson's  Ace,  lie,  i.  :i:iS. 
Bent  r.  Ik-nt,  ii.  600,  607. 

V.  Kopers,  iii.  422. 
Bentiiani  v.  Smith,  ii.  707. 
Bentley  i'.  Long,  ii.  608. 

I'.  Sill,  i.  603. 

v.  Vanderlieyilen,  ii.  196. 
Benton  v.  Ilorsley,  iii.  427. 

r.  Jones,  ii.  63. 

V.  Wood,  ii.  275. 
Benzein  v.  liobinett,  ii.  107. 
Benlan  c.  St-iljiwick,  ii.  183,  184. 
Berg  I'.  Siiiplfv,  iii.  336,  340. 
Bergen  i'.  Bennett,  ii.  06,  72,  555,  601, 

710.  710. 
Berger  r.  Duff,  ii.  566,  507,  718. 
Bergman  r.  Roberts,  i.  603,  •'.()(». 
Berkshire  M.  F.  Ins.  Co.  i-.  Sturgis,  iii. 

300,311. 
Berlin  v.  Burns,  i.  426,  448. 
Berly  i'.  Taylor,  ii.  647. 
Bernal  v.  Hovious,  i.  005. 
Bernard  v.  Jennison,  ii.  55. 
Bernays  r.  Keild,  ii.  07. 
Bernstein  v.  Iliinn's,  iii.  361. 
Berridge  >•■  Wanl,  iii.  449. 
Berrien  c.  McLane,  ii.  557. 
Berry  i-.  Anderson,  iii.  303,  305,  311, 
320  322 

V.  Billings,  iii.  384,  390,  466,  468. 

t>.  Dcrwart,  ii.  134. 

V.  Heard,  i    100. 

V.  Mutual  Ins   Co.,  ii.  87. 

V.  Uaddin,  iii.  210. 

V.  STiyder,  iii.  441. 

v.  Williamson,  ii.  5^31. 
Berryhill  r.  Kirchncr,  ii.  109. 
Berrynian  r.  Kelly,  iii.  106. 
Bertie  v.  Abingdon,  i.  113. 
VOL.  I. —  c 


I  Herfie  r.  Kalklaml,  ii.  10,  11. 
Hortlis  r.  .\unan,  i.  7M'.i,  71U. 
Bertram  r.  ("<jok,  i.  603. 

V.  CurtiH,  iii.  494. 
Besley  v.  Lawrence,  ii.  225. 
Bessell  r.  LancUberg,  i.  043. 
Besson  c.  Kveland,  li.  610,  511. 
Best  r.  Allen,  i.  4:;2,  447. 

V.  Gholaon,  i.  418,  432. 
Bethlehem  .-.  Annis,  ii.  09,  70,  125. 
Betsey  c  Torrance,  iii.  351,  362. 
Bettison  v.  IJudd.  i.  680. 
Belts  i:  .June,  i.  492. 
Betz  c.  Brvan,  iii.  4f*l. 

V.  Defbert,  i.  014,  047. 

i;.  lleebner,  ii.  127. 
Bevans  r.  Briscoe,  i.  142. 
Beverley  v.  Beverley,  ii.  440. 
Beverly  r.  Burke,  iii.  162. 
Bibl)  i'  Keid,  iii.  318. 

r.  Smith,  ii.  610. 
Bibby  r.  Carter,  ii.  381. 
Bickell's  Ai>pcal,  ii.  616,  516. 
Bickford  r.  Daniels,  ii.  68. 

I'.  Page,  iii.  487,  603. 
Bicknell  v.  Bicknell,  ii.  89. 

»'.  Coinstock,  iii.  144. 
Biddle  v.  Ilussman,  i.  668. 

V.  Heetl,  i.  609. 
Biery  i'.  Zeigler,  i.  511. 
Bigelow  c.  liush,  ii.  205. 

V.  Cassedy,  ii.  181. 

V.  Collamore,  i.  6.36,  537,  574. 

r.  Foss,  iii.  90,  02. 

r.  Hubbard,  iii.  401. 

I'.  .Jones,  i.  83,  091. 

V.  Littlefield,  i.  714. 

V.  Kising,  i.  7(M). 

V.  Topliti;  ii.  46 ;  iii.  85,  .338. 

r.  Willson.  ii.  100,  181. 
Bilbey  >•.  I'oston,  i.  441. 
Mill  V.  Curetoii,  ii.  492. 
Billings  r.  Clinton,  ii.  611,  512. 

I'.  Taylor,  i.  161,  218,  297. 

V.  Sprague,  ii.  224. 
Billingslcv  r.  Nil>lett,  i.  422. 
Billingtoii  r.  Welsh,  iii.  86,  337,  338 
Bilson  r.  Manuf.  Ins.  Co.,  ii.  243. 
Bingham  >•.  Barley,  iii.  204. 

r.  Wciderwa.x,  iii.  620,  529. 
Ringliam'.s  .\ppeal,  ii.  707. 
Binghanipton  Bridge,  ii.  308,  309. 
Hinnerman  r.  Weaver,  ii.  10. 
Bmnev  <•.  Chapman,  i.  592. 

r.'Hnll,  ii.  .S90,  309. 
Birch  r.  Linton,  iii   200. 

V.  Wright,  ii.  176,  177. 
Bircher  v.  Parker,  i.  33. 
Birckhead  v.  Cummiiigs,  i.  473,  046 
Bird  c.  Baker,  i.  470. 

V.  Christopher,  ii.  694. 

V.  Gardner,  i.  .304. 

I'.  Harris,  iii.  602. 

V.  Wilkinson,  ii.  54. 


XXXIV 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Binlsall  v.  Phillips,  i.  642. 

Eirge  v.  Gardiner,  i.  57^:5. 

Birlett's  Estate,  ii.  499. 

Birmingham  r.  Anderson,  iii.  459. 

Birnie  v.  Main,  ii.  193. 

Bisbee  v.  Hall,  i.  497. 

Bishop  !•.  Bedford  Charity,  i.  570. 

V.  Bishop,  i.  18. 

V.  Doty,  i.  607. 

V.  Elliott,  i.  22. 

V.  Ploward,  i.  636. 

V.  Hubbard,  i.  385. 

V.  Schneider,  ii.  158 ;  iii.  343. 
Bisland  v.  Hewett,  i.  262,  286 ;  ii.  93. 
Bissell  r.  Grant,  ii.  354,  586. 

V.  N.  Y.  Cent.  K.  H.,  iii.  449,  451. 

V.  Strong,  iii.  394. 
Bissett  V.  Bissett,  iii.  334. 
Bittenger  v.  Baker,  i.  142,  145. 
Bivins  v.  Vinzant,  iii.  499. 
Bixler  v.  Savior,  iii.  517. 
Black  V.  Bla'ck,  i,  701. 

r.  Cm-ran,  i.  402,  419. 

V.  Hills,  iii.  267. 

V.  Lamb,  iii.  304,  311. 

V.  Lindsay,  i.  691. 

V.  McAuley,  ii.  763. 

V.  Morse,  ii.  212. 

V.  Rockmore,  i.  426. 

V.  Shreve,  iii.  311,312,  318, 321,  323. 

V.  Woodrow,  iii.  251. 
Blackburn  v.  Gregson,  ii.  90,  94. 

V.  Warwick,  ii.  65,  67,  246. 
Blackmon  v.  Biackmon,  i.  333. 
Blackmore  v.  Boardman,  i.  469,  531. 
Blackstone  Bank  v.  Davis,  i.  85;  ii.  9. 
Blat'kwell  >•.  Overli}',  ii.  54. 
Blackwood  V.  Jones,  iii.  85,  89,  93. 
Blades  v.  Higgs,  i.  17,  655;  iii.  3. 
Blagge  V.  Miles,  ii.  712.  721 ;  iii.  229. 
Blain  v.  Harrison,  i.  287,  314. 

v.  Stewart,  iii.  341,  .344. 
Blaine  i-.  Chambers,  iii.  312,  418. 
Blair,  Appellant,  ii.  148. 

V.  Bass,  ii.  123. 

V.  Claxton,  i.  5'i4. 

V.  Rankin,  i.  535. 

V.  Smith,  iii.  94,  96,  99,  156,  177. 

V.  St.  Louis,  Harr.,  &c.  R.  R.  Co., 
iii.  321. 

V.  Taylor,  iii.  494. 

V.  Thompson,  i.  231. 

V.  Waite,  iii.  90. 

r.  Ward,  ii.  1.35,  154,  210,  221,  230. 
Blaisddl  1-.  Hieht,  iii.  544.      , 

V.  Portsmouth,  G.  F.,  &  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  i.  661,  662,  663. 
Blake  v.  Clark,  iii.  412,  421. 

V.  Coats,  i.  606. 

V.  Fash,  iii.  317,  325. 

V.  Foster,  i.  485. 

r.  Hawkins,  ii.  712.  713,  714. 

V.  Natter,  i.  701,  703. 

V.  Sanborn,  ii.  268. 


Blake  r.  Sanderson,  i.  555. 

V.  Tucker,  iii.  116,  120. 

V.  Williams,  ii.  127. 
Blakeley  v.  Calder,  i.  716. 
Blakeniore  v.  Byrnside,  ii.  52, 
Blakeney  v.  Ferguson,  i.  2.34. 
Blaker  v.  Anscombe,  ii.  501. 
Blanchard  l:  Baker,  ii.  368. 

V.  Benton,  ii.  109. 

V.  Blanchard,  ii.  27,  588,  592,  598, 
627,  629,  779;  iii.  565. 

V.  Blood,  i.  341. 

V.  Bridges,  ii.  363,  308. 

V.  Brooks,  ii.  600,  627;  iii.  105, 122, 
478,  508,  565. 

V.  Colburn,  ii.  145. 

r.  Ellis,  iii.  117,  119,  121,  527,  530. 

V.  Porter,  iii.  439. 

V.  Tyler,  i.  592;  iii.  304,344. 
Bland  v.  Lipscombe,  ii.  313,  392. 
Blandy  v.  Asher,  i.  453. 
Blaney  v.  Bcarce,  ii.  57,  105,  169. 

V.  Hanks,  iii.  326. 

V.  Rice,  iii.  433,  435,  436. 
Blankard  v.  Galdy,  i.  40. 
Bhintin  v.  Whitaker,  i.  593. 
Blatchford  v.  Woolley,  ii.  689. 
Bledsoe  v.  Doe,  ii.  211 ;  iii.  242. 

V.  Little,  iii.  210. 
Bleeker  v.  Smith,  i.  503,  514,  515. 
Blessing  v.  House,  iii.  74. 
Blethen  v.  Dwinall,  ii.  189,  191. 
Blewett  V.  Tregonning,  ii.  313,  392. 
Bligh  1-.  Brent,  i.  19. 
Blight  V.  Banks,  ii.  98,  94,  95;  iii.  240. 

V.  Rochester,  i.  588, 591, 598 ;  iii.  98, 
99,  174. 

V.  Schenck,  iii.  322. 
Blin  p.  Pierce,  ii.  532. 
Bhss  V.  Am.  Bible  Soc,  iii.  549. 

V.  Ball,  iii.  166. 

V.  Greeley,  ii.  876. 

V.  Kennedy,  iii.  412. 

V.  Rice,  ii.  393. 

V.  Whitney,  i.  32. 
Blitheman  v.  Blitheman,  ii.  452. 
Blivins  r.  Johnson,  i.  380. 
Bloch  V.  Pfaff,  iii.  169,  433,  4.34. 
Block  V.  Bragg,  i.  383. 

V.  Isham,  ii.  298. 
Blockley  v.  Fowler,  ii.  78. 
Blodgett  V.  Hildreth,  i.  679,  716 ;  ii.  513, 
514,519,545;  iii.  509. 

V.  Stone,  ii.  393. 

V.  Wadhams,  ii.  134. 
Blodwcll  r.  Edwards,  ii.  629. 
Blondeau  r.  Sheridan,  iii.  488,  496. 
Blood  V.  Blood,  i.  205,  226,  283  ;  ii.  152, 
469;  iii.  339. 

r.  Wood,  iii.  162,  163,  164. 
Bloodgood    V.   Mohawk    &    H.    R.   R , 

ii.  304;  iii.  22-5. 
Bloom  V.  Noggle,  ii.  151. 

V.  Van  Rensselaer,  ii.  71,  80,  85. 


TAIiLK    OF    CASES    CITKD. 


X  \  \  V 


Bloomer  v.  WaMron,  ii.  !Joo,  701,  708. 
Blossom  r.  Hrij;litmiui,  i.  08H ;  iii.  :i77. 
niouiit  r.  Iliirvi-v.  ii.  I.".t8,  .MX). 
Blue  r.  Hliu',  i.  ;i7(),  JIM;   ii.  IKO. 
Blue  Jiicket  c.  Joliiison  Co.  Cummrs., 

iii.  iy8. 
Blum  r.  Kvnns,  ii.  771. 

V.  KohiTtsnn,  i.  013. 
BlumenlMTK  r.  Myers,  i.  M5. 
Hlunieiitlial  r.  lilooinint^dalc,  i.  (>46. 
Blunt  r.  (Jie,  i.  2S7. 

V.  Norris,  ii.  125. 
Blyer  r.  MoniiolintKl.  ii.  '220,  225. 
Blvmiro  r.  Boistic,  ii.  210. 
BIytii  r.  D.niH'tt.  i.  ')0(1,  ({:}fl. 
Hivtiii'  r.  I)arj,'aiii,  iii.  202. 
Bo'anl  r.  MoanI,  iii.  1  U». 
Board  iif  I-M.  of  Normal  St-lionl  v.  Trus- 
tees of  First  llaj).  Cliiircli,  ii.  4. 
Boardman  r.  Dean.  iii.  300,311,304,401. 

V.  Osborn,  i.  r)')."),  6-^7. 

'•.  Uecd.  iii.  204,  20.",,  200,  42.3.  4')5. 
Boilwell  r.  \Vel)sier,  ii.  47,  .iii,  '>:],  ')~. 
Bo^jardii.s  v.  Trinity  Clmrcli,  i.  81,001 ; 

iii.  2H;J. 
Bo^gess  V.  Meredith,  i.  OrtO. 
Boggs  V.  Anderson,  iii.  ;!38. 

I'.  Merced  Mining  Co.,  iii.  88,  200, 
210,  418. 
Bogie  V.  Uiitledge,  i.  2-30. 
Bogy  r.  Shoal),  iii.  11.5,  117,  381. 
Bohanaii  v.  Pope,  ii.  210. 
Bolianiion  c.  Streshley,  ii.  .535. 
Bolianon  r.  Walcot,  iii.  578. 
Bohlen's  Kstate,  ii.  500. 
Bohon  r.  Bohon,  iii.  508. 
B  ling  V.  I'.wing,  iii.  'Ml. 
Bolivar  Mg.  Co.  i'.  Ncponsct  Mg.  Co., 

ii.  303  ;  iii.  58. 
Bolles  r.  Dtiff.  ii.  240. 
Bollinger  v.  Choteau,  ii.  180,  2-30,  240. 
Bolster  i'.  Cushman,  i.  248. 
Bolton  r.  Ballard,  i.  2:V.) ;  ii.  201. 

V.  Bolton,  ii   :]■][). 

V.  Brewster,  ii.  II 1. 

I'.  Carlisle,  iii.  200. 

V.  Landers,  i.  GOl,  632. 

V.  I.ann,  iii.  4:J1. 

V.  Tondin,  i.  04G. 
Bomar  r.  Mullins,  i.  34.3. 
Bonihaiigh  v.  Miller,  ii.  .306. 
Bond  r.  Bond,  iii.  2()G.  207. 

V.  Coke,  iii.  410,  471. 

V.  Fay,  iii.  423.  420,  430. 

V.  Rosling,  i.  4S3. 

i".  Strickland,  i.  432. 

V.  Swearingen,  iii.  20,  110. 
Bonham  r.  Galloway,  ii.  100. 
Bonithon  r.  Ilockmore,  ii.  244. 
Bonnell  v.  Smith,  i.  403. 
Bonner,  Petitioner,  i.  713. 

r.  Kenneheck  Purchase,  i.  715. 

I-.  Peterson,  i.  216.  2S.">. 
Bonney  v.  Foss,  i.  0,  7,  8,  164,  592,652 


Bonney  r.  Morrill,  iii.  458. 

V.  Smith,  ii.  73. 
Bonomi  c  BackliouMe,  ii.  .382. 
Boody  «•.  DaviH,  ii.  4.'.;  iii.  3(IK.  311 
Booker  r.  Anderrton.  i.  433,  4  Ix     n    1"^3 

i».  Gregory,  ii.  245. 

V.  Stivender.  iii.  .3"J5. 
Bool  r.  Mi.x,  i.  43').  4MH  ;  iii.  liOl. 
Boon  r.  Murphy,  ii.  05. 
Boone  >•■  Boone,  i.  3."i7. 

r.  Cliiles,  li.  520.  5:i5,  560;  iii.  343 

r.  Moore,  iii.  27. •. 
Boos  r.  Gimilx-r,  i.  3.>2. 
Booth  r.  Adams,  i.  002. 

r.  Alcock,  i.  400. 

r.  Booth,  ii.  258. 

r.  Clark,  ii   207, 

V.  Gait,  i.  358. 

i>.  Lambert,  i.  283. 

I'.  Small,  iii    114. 

V.  Starr,  iii.  .501.504,  505. 

r.  Terrell,  ii.  5S'). 
Bootliliy  r.  VtTiion,  i.  180 
Boothrovd  r.  Kngles.  iii.  270,  286. 
Bopp  r.  Fox.  i.  210,  704. 
Boraston's  case,  ii.  .507,  028. 
Borden  r.  Viment,  ii.  .317. 
Bordley  v.  Clayton,  i.  24»'i. 
Bordman  r.  Osliorn.  i.  555.  557. 
Borci'l  r.  Lawtoii,  i.  .501,  5'i3. 
Borel  r.  Hollins,  iii.  1<>1. 
Borland  /•.  Marshall,  i.  182. 

f.  Nichols,  i.  .335. 

I'.  Walrath.  iii.  317. 
Borron  r.  Solliliellos.  i.  301. 
Borst  c.  Empi".  iii.  404. 
Boskowitz  '•.  Davis,  i.  O'H);  ii.  646. 
Bossard  v.  White,  iii.  ;'.^>0. 
Bostick  V.  Blades,  ii.  10. 

V.  Keizor,  ii.  .5.30. 
Boston  )•    Binney,  i.  500,  020. 

V.  Kicli.irdson,    iii     147,  103,  414, 
417,  J48,  452,  453. 

r.  pohhins,  ii.  5t)<). 

V.  \Vorthington,  iii.  .504. 
Boston  Bank  >:  Chamherlin,  iii.  261. 

r.  Reed,  ii.  17-3. 
Boston,  C,  &  M    H.  R.  i-.  Gilmore,  ii. 

164. 
Boston  Iron  Co.  v.  King,  ii.  233,  210. 
Boston  &  Lowell  R.  R.  v.  Salem  &  L. 

R.  R.,  ii.  308. 
Boston  &  \y.  R.  R.  I'.  Haven,  ii.  239, 
240,  245. 
V.  Ripley,  i.  02-5. 
Boston  Water  P.  Co.  r.  Boston,  ii.  321  ; 
iii.  400. 
r.  Boston  &  W.  R.  R.,  ii  308,  309, 
312,  31.3,  .302. 
Bostwick  V.  Atkins,  iii.  206. 
I'.  Leach,  iii.  306. 
V.  McF.vov,  iii.  320. 
r.  Williams,  iii.  401.  .500,  51 L 
Bnsw.ll  .    Carlisle,  ii.  170. 


XXXVl 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Boswell  V.  Goodwin,  ii.  150,  160,  161, 

162,  195. 
Boswortli  1-.  Danzien,  iii.  433. 

V.  Sturtevant,  iii.  427. 
Botham  v.  Molntier,  ii.  165,  272. 
Botsford  V.  Burr,  ii.  459,  513,  517,  518, 
519. 

V.  Morehouse,  iii.  326. 
Bott  V.  Burnell,  iii.  24-3. 

V.  Perley,  iii.  223,  241. 
Bolting  V.  Martin,  i.  637. 
Bottorf  1-.  Conner,  ii.  93. 
Bouknight  ;•.  Epting,  ii.  467,  475. 
Bouldin  r.  Reynolds,  iii.  276. 
Bourland  r.  Kipp,  ii.  127. 
Bourn  i'.  Gibbs,  ii.  788. 
Bourne  ?-.  Bourne,  ii.  168. 
Bours  V.  Zachariah,  iii.  270. 
Bowden  i:  Lewis,  ii.  366. 
Bowditcli  r.  Banuelos,  ii.  557. 
Bowen  r.  Bowen,  ii.  17,  19. 

V.  Conner,  iii.  463. 

V.  Cooper,  iii.  130. 

V.  Guild,  iii.  150. 

V.  Kurtz,  ii.  220,  278. 

V.  Lewis,  ii.  763. 

V.  Team,  ii.  339. 
Bower  r   Cooper,  ii.  540. 

V.  Hill,  ii.  393. 
Bowers  i\  Bowers,  iii.  .369. 

V.  Keesecker,  i.  215. 

V.  Oyster,  ii.  88. 

V.  Porter,  ii.  617. 
Bowie  V.  Berry,  i.  214,  .300,  301 ;   ii. 

504. 
Bowlby  V.  Thunder,  ii.  550. 
Bowles's    (Lewis)    case,    i.    160,   161, 

206. 
Bowling  V.  Cook,  ii.  121. 
Bowman  ?•.  Foot,  i.  -506. 

V.  Lobe,  ii.  452,  590. 

V.  Manter,  ii.  196,  198. 

V.  Middleton,  iii.  22-5. 

V.  New  Orleans,  ii.  378. 

V.  Norton,  i.  358,  399,  400,  430. 

V.  Smiley,  i.  396,  425. 
Bowne  v.  Deacon,  ii.  380. 

V.  Potter,  i.  249. 
Bowser  v.  Bowser,  i.  .597. 
Box  V.  Stanford,  iii.  249. 
Bnxford    Rel.    Soc.    v.    Harriman,   ii. 

564. 
Boxheimer  v.  Gunn,  ii.  195. 
Boyce  v.  Coster,  i.  701. 

V.  Kalbaugh,  iii.  79. 

V.  Owens,  iii.  272. 
Boyd  V.  lieck,  ii.  176,  101,  195,  196. 

V.  Blankmnn,  ii.  522. 

V.  Carlton,  i.  .301. 

V.  Cudderback,  i.  432,  433,  431  ;  ii. 
243. 

V.  ElHs,  ii.  278. 

V.  Graves,  iii.  97. 

V.  Harris,  ii,  191. 


Boyd  V.  Longworth,  iii.  222. 

V.  McLean,  ii.  420,  459,  512,  518, 
519. 

V.  Parker,  ii.  225. 

V.  Slayback,  iii.  312. 
Boydell  r.  W.-ilthall,  ii.  437. 
Boyer  v.  Libliev,  ii.  510. 

V.  Smith,  i.'  596. 
Boyers  v.  Elliott,  i.  701. 

V.  Newbanks,  i.  283,  285. 
Boykin  v.  Rain,  i.  191. 
Boyle  V.  Boyle,  ii.  253. 

V.  Edwards,  iii.  504. 

V.  Peabody,  i.  469. 

V.  Shulman,  i.  446. 

V.  Tamlyn,  ii.  390. 
Boylston  v.  Carver,  iii.  458. 
Boynton  v.  Champlin,  ii.  94,  95. 

V.  Oilman,  ii.  372. 

V.  Hodgdon,  iii.  147. 

V.  Hoyt,  ii.  534,  558. 

V.  McNeal,  i.  427. 

V.  Peterborough,  iii.  7. 

V.  Rees,  iii.  346,  391. 

r.  Sawyer,  i.  2.30. 
Bozon  i\  Williams,  ii.  87. 
Brabroke  v.  Inskip,  ii.  530. 
Brace  v.  Yale,  ii.  372;  iii.  412,  419. 
Bracebridge  v.  Buckley,  ii.  28. 
Brackett,  Petitioner,  iii.  164,  167,  168. 

V.  Baum,  i.  262. 

V.  Goddard,  i.  14  ;  iii.  416. 

V.  Norcross,  i.  690. 

V.  Ridlon,  iii.  346. 

V.  Waite,  i.  345. 
Bradbury  r.  Grinsell,  ii.  346. 

V.  Wright,  ii.  286. 
Bradford  v.  Cressey,  iii.  438,  452. 

V.  Foley,  ii.  622. 

v.  Monks,  ii.  718. 

V.  Randall,  iii.  287,  288,  289. 

V.  Russell,  iii.  530. 
Bradish  v.  Gibbs,  ii.  690,  706. 

V.  Schenck,  i.  601.  607. 
Bradiee  v.  Christ's  Hospital,  ii.  386. 
Bradley  v.  Chester  Valley  R.  R.,  ii.  72, 
73,  83,  84,  85,  249,  259. 

V.  Fuller,  ii.  105,  169,  175. 

V.  George,  ii.  211,  215. 

V.  Holdsworth,  i.  19. 

V.  Peixoto,  i.  85;  ii.  9. 

V.  Rice,  iii.  443,  444,  445. 

V.  Snyder,  ii.  181,  183,  239,  266. 

i".  Wilson,  iii.  4.33. 
Bradner  v.  Faulkner,  i.  11. 
Bradshaw    v.  Callaghan,   i.    315,   715, 
710. 

V.  Hurst,  i.  4-50. 
Bradstreet  i'.  Clark,  i.  512  ;  ii.  8,  20. 

V.  Huntington,  i.  63;  iii.  139,  149, 
152,  155,  172. 
Brady  v.  Peiper,  i.  580,  582. 

V.  Waldron,  ii.  11-3,  115,  141,  176. 
Bragg  V.  Massie,  ii.  52. 


TAULK    OF    CASKS    CITKD. 


XXXVll 


Brninanl  >•.  Roston   &  N.   Y.   Central 
U.  U.,  iii.  4:iit.  450,  61». 

I'.  Colcliesier,  i.  "JOJ. 

c.  Cooper,  ii.  iHl.  •^4!1,  205. 
Braim-ril  c.  IVok,  ii.  lOI. 
Hniintrt'i'  r.  HiitlU's,  i   (J'J3. 
Hrai<fly  r.  Sliarp,  ii.  :5-2^,  :J2.t,  :]:il.  :34'.>. 
Branian  v.  Hinnliam,  iii   oOl,  '.i\6,  H'M. 

V.  Dowse,  ii.  "JIT,  'J18. 

V.  Stiles,  ii.  4(il,  tV.Kt. 
Bramble  v.  Beiiller.  iii.  510. 
Bramlet  r.  Bates,  ii.  7ti'2. 
Brancii  r.  iJoaiie,  ii.  o47. 
Bramloii  r.  l{<jl)iiison,  ii.  !',  53.'1,  5.34. 
Brandt  v.  Foster,  iii.  477,  47H,  484,  485, 
4H'J.  Ml,  520,  528,  5:^1. 

r.  Oji.len,  iii.  150,  ](«,  43;J. 
Bran^er  r.  .Manciet,  i.  521. 
Bianliain  r.  San  Jose,  iii.  74,  404. 

V.  Turnpike  Co.,  iii.  440. 
Brannan  /•.  Oliver,  ii.  570. 
Brant  v.  Uobertson,  ii.  51. 
Brantlev  r.  West,  ii.  52. 

I-.  Wolf,  iii.  2f,4. 
Branton  r.  liriffits,  i.  11. 
Bratt  r.  Bratt,  i.  477. 
Brattle  Scj.  C'hunli  c.  Grant,  i.  04  ;  ii. 
2.'),  2(5,  28,  21),  4i)l,  501,  032,  074,  083, 
740,  757,  70  ),  701,  7'Jl. 
Bratton  r.  Clawson,  i.  27. 
Brawner  c.  Stauji,  ii.  510,  535. 
Bra.xton  r.  (."ukMiian,  i.  300. 
Brayl)roke  c.  ln.skip,  ii.  145. 
Braybrooke  r.  Attorney(ienera!,  ii.  711. 
Brazee  v.  Lanca.^ter  Bank.  ii.  150. 
Breani  r.  Dickerson,  i.  53."{. 
Breckenriiitie  v.  Aiild,  ii.  58. 

r.  Brooks,  ii.  133,  244,  24.5. 

r.  Urnisbv,   ii.   105,    10;J ;    iii.   142, 
203,  204. 
Brce  r.  Ilolbeck,  ii.  120. 
Breed  r.  Kastern  H.  U.  Co.,  ii.  172. 

V.  Pratt,  iii.  .547. 
Breeding  c.  Taylor,  i.  540. 
Breit  r.  Yeaton,  ii.  700,  707. 
Brenckm.'in  r.    r\vi))ill,  i.  583. 
Brennan  r.  Wliitaker.  ii.  103. 
Brent's  case,  ii.  431,  (i02. 
Bressler  r.  Kent,  iii.  201,  208. 
Brett  V.  Cumberland,  i.  480,  527. 
Brettan  r.  Fox,  i.  4(Mj. 
Brewer  c.  Boston  &  Wor.  K.  K.,  iii.  88, 
04,  O.-j. 

V.  Connell,  i.  227. 2^36  ;  ii.  542. 

I'.  Conover.  i.  027. 

r.  Dyer,  i.  540,  580,  582. 

V.  Hardy,  ii.  444,  451,  402,  400,471 ; 
iii.  3'.t5,  :\'.n>. 

V.  Knapp,  i.  030. 

I'.  MeCiowen,  i.  511. 

r.  Marsball,  ii.  208,  32-3. 

V.  Maurer,  ii.  218. 

r.  Tborp,  i.  4*58. 

V.  Vanarsdale,  i.  305,  311. 


Brewer  r.  Wall.  i.  411,  442,443. 
Brewster  r.  Hill,  i  407. 

r.  Kid^'ell.  ii.  300. 

V.  Kiteliell.  ii.  20. 

r.  Kileliin,  ii.  205. 

r.  McCall,  iii.  .'".00. 

r.  I'owrr.  ii.  578. 

r.  Striker,  ii.  705. 
Brewton  r.  Watson,  ii.  481. 
Briee  r.  Smith,  i.  100. 
Brick  r.  {u•t.•iin^'er,  ii.  141. 
Brickett  r.  SpolTord,  iii.  140. 
Bridge  c  l',j.'^,di.hton.  iii.  354. 

r.  llublianl,  ii.  183. 

V.  WelliiiKion,  iii.  300. 
Bridjien  r.  Carliartt.  ii.  l.VJ,  188. 
Bridf^er  r.  I'ier.-uii,  iii.  4(52,  471,  47.3. 
Bridjies  r.  I'urcell.  i.  001,  004.  t,(50. 
Briditewater  r.  Holton.  i.  75,  88,  00. 
Brid','ford  c  liiddtl,  iii.  357. 
Bridgliam  i:  Tiliston,  i.  510. 
Brig^rs  i:  Davis,  ii.  400. 

I'.  Fish.  ii.  45. 

r.  Hall,  i   504. 

V.  Hill.  ii.  07. 

V.  Oxford.  Karl  of,  ii.  73. 
Brigham  r.  Eveletli,  i.  096. 

r.  Totter,  ii.  50 

r.  Shattuck,  ii.  10;  iii.  658. 

V.  Smith,  ii.  320;  iii.  411. 

r.  Winchester,  i.  237  ;  ii.  37,   124, 
110;  iii.  543,  574. 
Bright  /■.  Boyd,  i.  8. 

r.  Walki?r,  ii.  S'M,  3JJG.  330,  342, 
34.;,  340. 
Brightman  r.  Brighfman,  ii.  740. 
Brimmer  r.   Long   Wharl  I'rop'rs,   iii. 

138,  l.jO,  150.  1(5.5. 
BrinekerholT  r.  F.verett,  i.  448. 

V.  Lansing,  ii.  105;  iii.  85. 
Rringloe  v.  (Joodson,  ii.  6W,  007,  608. 
Brinkerhoff  r.  Marvin,  ii.  150.  100. 
Brinkman  r.  .lones.  ii   40,  110. 
Brinley  r.  Mann,  iii.  204,  200. 

I".  Whiting,  iii.  o-'iO. 
Brisbane  c.  Stoughlon,  ii.  73,  84. 
Briscoe  r.  Bronangh,  ii.  02. 

r.  King,  ii.  51. 

V.  Mc(  .ec,  i  (580,  008. 

r.  Power,  ii.  180,  200.  21.3,  217. 
Brislain  r.  Wilson,  ii.  (555. 
Bristol  r.  Atwater,  ii.  777. 

V.  {^irroll  County,  iii.  02. 
Bristow  r.  Warde,  ii.  724.  720. 
Brittin  c.  Handy,  i.  (570.  721. 
Britlon  r.  Twining,  i.  107. 
Bni.idbcnt  v.  Humsbotham,  ii.  371,  .375, 

:;7(S.  378. 

Broadway  Bank  r.  Adams,  ii.  0,  533, 

534. 
Brobst  V.  Brock,  ii.  100.  115.  179. 
Brock  r.  Berry,  i   (5.'i7.  (■•'•O. 
r.  Kastman,  i.  (5<.H».  715. 
Brocket  r.  Foscuc,  iii.  SW. 


XXXVIU 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Broiiie  ;•.  Stepliens,  ii.  584. 
Bronifield  v.  Crowder,  ii.  629. 
Bronson  i-.  Coffin,  ii.  296,  298,  299,300, 
390 ;  iii.  493. 

V.  Paynter,  iii.  384. 
Broiiston  i-.  Robinson,  ii.  171. 
Brook  V.  Biggs,  i.  000. 

V.  Brook,  i.  224. 
Brookings  v.  Wliite,  ii.  49. 
Brookline  v.  Mackintosh,  ii.  346,  369. 
Brooklyn  v.  Smilii,  iii.  446. 
Brookover  r.  Ilurst,  ii.  105. 
Brooks  V.  Barrett,  iii.  547. 

V.  Brooks,  iii.  468. 

V.  Bruyn,  iii.  167. 

V.  Cliaplin,  iii.  346. 

V.  Dalrvmple,  iii.  356. 

V.  Everett,  i.  204,  213. 

V.  Fowle,  ii.  514. 

V.  Galster,  i.  32. 

V.  Hyde,  i.  367,  430. 

V.  Jones,  i.  89. 

V.  Lester,  ii.  157. 

V.  Ruff,  ii.  196. 
Broome  r.  IBeers,  ii.  269. 
Brossart  v.  Corlet,  ii.  353. 
Brothers  v.  Brothers,  ii.  570. 

V.  Porter,  ii.  540. 
Brougliton  v.  Langley,  ii.  461,  497. 

V.  Randall,  i.  207,  229. 
Brouncker  v.  Bagot,  ii.  789. 
Brouwer  v.  Jones,  ii.  317. 
Brown,  Re,  ii.  597,  599. 

V.  Armistead,  ii.  717. 

V.  Bailey,  i.  088. 

V.  Banner  Oil  Co.,  iii.  345. 

V.  Barkham,  ii.  GS. 

V.  Bartee,  ii.  84. 

V.  Bates,  i.  699,  705 ;  ii.  130,  145, 
148. 

V.  Blvdenburgli,  ii.  126. 

V.  Bowen,  iii.  80,  83,  84,  91. 

V.  Bragg,  i.  465,  509,  511,  6.35. 

V.  Bricfges,  i.  160,  621 ;  iii.  173. 

V.  Bronson,  i.  227. 

V.  Brown,  i.  376,  716 ;  ii.  547 ;  iii. 
578. 

V.  Cavuga  R.  R.  Co.,  i.  573. 

V.  Ciiadbourne,  iii.  438,  439,  443. 

V.  Clark,  iii.  575. 

V.  Clements,  iii.  211. 

V.  Cockerell,  iii.  70,  145,  17-3. 

V.  Combs,  ii.  176,547,  566;  iii.  280. 
V.  Concord,  iii.  557. 

V.  Coon,  i.  432,  433,  434,  449;  iii. 
78,  12-5. 

V.  Cowell,  ii.  570. 

V.  Cram,  ii.  116. 

V.  Dean,  ii.  04. 

V.  Dewey,  ii.  40,  62. 

V.  Doe,  ii.  573. 

r.  Driggers,  i.  431. 

r.  Duncan,  i.  .301. 

V.  Dwelley,  ii.  511. 


Brown  v.  Dysinger,  i.  589;  ii.  510. 
V.  Krost,  ii.  250. 
V.  Gibbs,  ii.  101. 
V.  Higgs,  iii.  570. 
V.  llogle,  i.  679,  690. 
V.  Holyoke,  ii.  46. 
V.  Huger,  iii.  431. 
V.  Jackson,  iii.  106,  381,  508,  510. 
V.  Jaquette,  i.  605. 
i:  Johnson,  ii.  188. 
V.  Keller,  i.  370,  599,  602,  631,  632, 
V.  Kelsey,  iii.  570. 
V.  King,  i.  63 ;  iii.  156,  174. 
V.  Kite,  i.  547. 
V.  Lamphear,  iii.  405. 
V.  Lapham,  i.  231,  243,  304 ;  ii.  201, 

204,  222. 
V.  Lawrence,  ii.  585,  587,  595,  609  ; 

iii.  18. 
V.  Leach,  ii.  116. 
V.  Lincoln,  i.  605,  607. 
I'.  Lynch,  ii.  517. 
V.  McCormick,  iii.  119. 
V.  McCune,  iii.  78. 
V.  McKee,  ii.  297. 
V.  ]\IcMullen,  i.  713. 
V.  Meredith,  i.  313,  315. 
t;.  Metz,  iii.  501,  503. 
V.  Nevitt,  ii.  263. 
V.  Newbold,  i.  638. 
V.  N.  Y.  C.  R.  R.,  i.  481. 
V.  Nichols,  iii.  419. 
V.  Kickle,  ii.  58,  63. 
V.  Parsons,  i.  469. 
V.  Pentz,  ii.  386. 
V.  Powell,  i.  547. 
V.  Quilter,  i.  568. 
V.  Renshaw,  ii.  473,  531. 
V.  Reynolds,  iii.  317. 
V.  Robins,  i.  19  ;  ii.  382. 
V.  Saltonstall,  iii.  424. 
V.  Simons,  ii.    125,    135,  189,   210, 

215,  221. 
V.  Snell,  ii.  110,  139,  173. 
i\  Staples,  iii.  506. 
V.  Stewart,  ii.  107,  108. 
V.  Throckmorton,  iii.  212. 
V.  Thurston,  i.  616  ;   iii.  416. 
V.  Tomlinson,  iii.  520,  524. 
V.  Turner,  i.  718. 
V.  Tyler,  ii.  43,  259. 
V.  Vanlier,  ii.91,  93. 
V.  Veazie,  iii.  242. 
V.  Weast,  ii.  524. 
V.  Wellington,  i.  695. 
V.  Wenham,  i.  68. 
V.  Willey,  iii.  428 
V.  Williams,  i.  267. 
V.  Windsor,  ii.  383. 
V.  Wood,  i.  64,  689 ;  iii   563. 
V.  Worcester  Bank,  ii.  181,  215. 
V.  Wright,  ii.  54. 
Browne  v.  Kennedy,  iii.  436,  443. 
V.  Lewis,  iii.  617. 


TABLE   OF   CASKS   CITKD. 


.\  X  x  1  \ 


Rrownc'll  r.  Browiiell,  i.  715. 
Hrowninn  c.  llariic,  i.  tlS. 

c.  Wrinlit,  iii.  JJl. 
Brownsoii  r.  Hull,  i.  :{».;,  700. 

f.  Sciinlaii,  iii.  167. 
Ilrowiiswoitl  '•.  Iviwiirtis,  ii.  751. 
Bruce  c.  MDiincy,  ii.  I'Jl*. 

I'.  Fulton  liiink,  i.  all). 

V.  Luko,  iii.  IDfi.  110. 

V.  IVrry,  iii.  'Si'2. 

V.  Wood,  i.  IbU,  ^44,  70b ;  iii.  107, 
27-2. 
nru.k-mll  i:  Klwes,  ii.  030,  0,jl,  7J4. 
Hru(liii-ll  r.  Hoberts,  i.  5'.t4. 
Hrumlii'lil  r.  I'aliiiiT,  ii.  'J7. 
lirumiiiel  i'.  .Miicplierson,  i.  503. 
Uruiuiane  r.  .Misaioiiary  Society,  ii  205. 
Bruiulreil  v.  Walker,  ii".  "JtiO ;   iii.   120 
Brunswick  Suv.  Inst.  v.  Crussuian,  iii. 

458. 
Brunton  v.  Hall,  ii.  337,  351. 
Brush  r.  Kinslev,  ii.  07. 

V.  Ware.  iii'.  210,  212.  347. 
Bryan  r.  Atw.uer.  nl    147. 

V.  Hatirlieiler,  i.  254. 

1-.  Braiil.y,  i.  02  ;  ii.  403,  400,  471 ; 
iii.  327,  300. 

r.  Butfs.  ii.  111. 

V.  Cowart,  ii.  52,  57. 

I'.  Duncan,  ii    571. 

V.  Hyre.  iii.  580. 

r.  Uaniirez.  iii.  334. 

V.  Uland,  iii.  104. 

V.  Wash,  iii.  315. 

V.  Weenis,  ii.  53(5. 

V.  Whistler,  ii.  316. 
Bryant  /•.  Damon,  ii.  125,  128,  216,217. 

V.  Krskine.  ii.  13,  GO,  70. 

i;.  Hemiricks,  ii.  518. 

i;.  Lefever,  ii.  300. 

r.  IVnnell,  ii.  103. 

i;.  Unssell,  ii.  547,  564. 
Brvar's  App.,  ii.  205. 
Brydfies  v.  Brydges,  ii.  548,  559,  600, 

501,  502. 
Brvson  r.  Cainphell,  i.  201. 
Bul.ier  v.  Roberts,  i.  328,  329,  334,  336, 

3J4. 
Buccleuch  v.  Metropolitan  R.  R.,  ii.  301. 
Buchan  r.  Sunnier,  i.  701,  704. 
Buchanan  '°.  lla/z.ird,  iii.  202. 

v.  Hubbard,  iii.  207. 

V.  Lojiansport.  i.  0(i'.). 

17.  Monroe,  ii.  167,  205. 

r.  Moore,  iii.  455. 
Buchanan's  Appeal,  iii.  5()5. 
Buchannan  r.  SlietTer.  i.  175. 
Buck  r.  Conlonue.  i.  410. 

V.  Lantz.  ii.  507.  040. 

V.  Memphis  R.  R.,  ii.  164 

V.  Tavne.  ii.  100. 

r.  ri.-kwell,  iii.  300,  369. 

V.  I'ike,  i.  674. 

V.  Sanders,  ii.  145. 


Buck  I'.  Sherinnn,  ii.  170. 

r.  S\vn/ey,  ii.  613,  621. 
Bu('kin),'hani  c  NuUon,  i.  422. 
Buckin^'liamsliire  r.  Drurv,  i.  325,  327, 

3:^8.  .331. 
Buckle  V.  Mitchell,  iii.  358. 
Buckley  v.  Buckley,  i.  24,  27,  701 ;  iii. 
18. 

V.  Daley,  ii.  100. 
Bucklin  r.  Bucklin,  ii.  62. 
Buikner  c  Street,  iii.  508. 
Buckout  r.  Swift,  i.  8,  145;  ii.  113. 
Buckworth  v.  Sim|)son,  i.  53'J. 

V.  Thirkell,  i.  OH,  175,  178,  180,  273, 
275;  ii.  075,  740. 
Budd  f.  Brooke,  iii.  300. 
Buell  r.  ("ook,  i.  4S1. 

r.  Soutliwick,  ii.  771. 
Buffalo  &.  N.  V.  R.  R.  Co.  i-.  Bruiuard, 

iii.  224,  225. 
Buffuni  ('.  Buffum,  i.  703. 

i;.  Green,  iii.  300,  310,  304. 
Buist  V.  Dawes,  ii.  587. 
Buikcley  v.  Chapman,  ii.  122. 
Bulkier  r.  Dolbiare,  i.  100. 
Bull  f."Bull,  iii.  571. 

c.  Church,  i.  335. 

r.  Con  roe,  i.  401. 

V.  Griswold,  i.  11. 

r.  Kingston,  ii.  78;3,  787;  iii.  668. 

V.  Rowe,  i.  425. 

V.  Sykes,  ii.  43. 
Bullard  v.  Bowers,  i.  230,  231,  239. 

V.  Briggs,  iii.  300. 

V.  Harrison,  ii.  340,  355. 
BuUen  v.  Runnels,  ii.  343,  308. 
Bullis  V.  Noble,  iii.  90. 
Bullitt  V.  Taylor,  iii.  300,  356,  357. 
Bullock  r.  Bennett,  ii.  757. 

r.  Dommitt,  i.  507. 

I'.  Finch,  i.  284. 

V.  Waterman,  ii.  657. 

r.  Wilson,  iii.  20(!,  430,  442. 
Bulwer  r.  Bulwer,  i.  142. 
Bump  V.  Saurer,  ii.  '•'t'-M. 
Bumpus  V.  Platner,  ii.  52().  559 ;  iii.  360. 
Bunce  v.  Bidwell,  iii.  152. 

r.  Reed,  ii.  81. 
Bunch  r.  Bunch,  i.  34G. 
Bunker  r.  Locke,  i.  381. 
linnn  r.  Winthrop,  iii.  368. 
Burbank  v.  Day,  i.  288. 

V.  I'illsbury,  ii.  293,  296,  299 ;  iiL 
404. 

V.  Whitney,  ii.  781,  783 ;  iii.  552. 
Burch  V.  Carter,  iii.  348. 
Burchard  r.  Fraser,  ii.  185. 

r.  Hnbbar.l.  iii.  120. 
Rurd  r.  Dansdale,  i.  IHO. 
Burden  r.  Thayer,  i.  508,648,  649;  il 

142.  300,  806. 
Burdett  /•.  Clay,  ii.  123.  127.  157. 

r.  .Spilshnry,  ii.  708. 
Burdick  c.  Burdick,  iii.  351. 


xl 


TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 


Burdick  v.  Cheadle,  i.  576. 

!;.  Heivly,  iii.  U4. 

V.  Kent,  i.  '660. 
Buren  v.  Buren,  ii.  507. 
Burge  V.  Smith,  i.  256,  260. 
Burger  v.  Potter,  ii.  95,  98. 
Burgess  v.  Burgess,  iii.  538. 

V.  Gray,  iii.  171. 

V.  Wheate,  ii.  98,  413,  414, 416,  426, 
529,  581,  587,  542. 
Burhans  v.  Burlians,  i.  717. 

V.  Hutclieson,  ii.  113,  119, 121,  127, 
154,  258. 
Burk  V.  Brown,  iii.  275. 

V.  Gleason,  i.  454. 

V.  Hollis,  i.  6,  32,  34. 
Burke  i:  Adams,  iii.  812. 

V.  Barron,  i.  197,  200. 

V.  Gray,  ii.  95. 

V.  Gummey,  ii  218. 

V.  Miller,  ii.  130. 

V.  Niles,  iii.  444. 
Burklialter  v.  Ector,  iii.  344. 
Burleigh  ;-•.  Clougli,  ii.  781. 

V.  White,  ii.  511,  512,  513,  514,  518. 
Burling  r.  Head,  i.  655. 
Burlingame  i-.  Kobbins,  ii.  93. 
Burlington  University    v.  Barrett,   iii. 

537. 
Burnap  v.  Cook,  i.  435. 
Burnell  v.  Maloncy,  iii.  152,  172,  173. 

V.  Martin,  ii.  258. 
Burnes  v.  McCubbin,  i.  511. 
Burnet  v.  Denniston,  ii.  81,  156,  181, 

202. 
Burnett  v.  Burnett,  ii.  467,  475,  498. 

V.  Caldwell,  i.  626. 

V.  Lynch,  i.  518,  526;  iii.  332. 

V.  McCluey,  iii.  288. 

?;.  Pratt,  i.  705;   ii.  134,  148,  149, 
268. 

V.  Thompson,  i.  498  ;  iii.  434. 

V.  Walker,  i.  405. 
Burnham  v.  Ciiandler,  iii.  339. 

V.  Roberts,  i.  556. 
Burnley  r.  Stevenson,  iii.  250. 
Burns  r.  Bryant,  i.  640. 

V.  Cooper,  i.  549,  607. 

V.  Keas,  i.  404. 

V.  Lvnde,  i.  260,  263,  421 ;  iii.  137, 
'253,  255,  297,  304. 

V.  McGraw,  iii.  124. 

V.  Thayer,  i.  378. 
Burnside  v.  Merrick,  i.  209,  703,  704. 

V.  Terry,  i.  23,  25. 

V.  Twichell,  ii.  140.  163. 

V.  Weightman,  i.  142. 
Burr  V.  Beers,  ii.  217,  218,  220. 

V.  Smith,  iii.  552,  554. 

V.  Spencer,  ii.  106. 

V.  Stenton,  i.  484,  .''>65 ;  ii.  261. 
Burrage  v.  Briggs,  i.  112. 


Burrell  v.  Burrell,  iii.  172. 
Burrill  i:  Sheil,  ii.  552,  555,  568. 
Burris  v.  Page,  i.  203. 
Burrows  v.  Gallup,  ii.  391 ;  iii.  140. 
Burt  c.  Boston,  i.  571. 

V.  Herron,  ii.  550. 

v.  Hurlburt,  i.  340. 

V.  Merchants'  Ins.  Co.,  iii.  225. 

V.  Ricker,  ii.  147. 
Burton  i\  Barclay,  i.  579. 

V.  Baxter,  ii.'l26. 

V.  Hintrager,  ii.  112,  123,  147. 

V.  Lies,  ii.  250. 

V.  Murphy,  i.  691. 

V.  Reeds,  iii.  119,  526,  532. 

V.  Scherpf,  i.  608. 

V.  Wheeler,  ii.  224. 
Burtz  V.  Robinson,  i.  356,  458. 
Busby  V.  Rhodes,  ii.  765. 
Bush  V.  Bradley,  i.  182. 

V.  Bush,  i.  225,  276  ;  ii.  569. 

V.  Cooper,  ii.  195. 

V.  Marshall,  iii.  115,  119. 

i^.  Peru  Bridge  Co.,  ii.  304,  310. 
Bush's  Appeal,  ii.  499,  532,  540. 
Bushnell  v.  Salisbury  Ore  Bed  Props., 

ii.  363  ;  iii.  415. 
Buskin  v.  Edmunds,  i.  550,  552. 
Buskirk  v.  Strickland,  ii.  381. 
Buss  V.  Dyer,  ii.  328,  333. 
Busse,  Estate  of,  i.  358. 
Bussey  v.  Page,  ii.  140,  141. 
Bussman  v.  Gauster,  i.  481,  492,  568, 

578. 
Bustard  i'.  Coulter,  iii.  468. 
Butcher  v.  Butcher,  i.  652,  654,  655. 
Butler  ;•.  p:iliott,  ii.  281. 

V.  Gale,  iii.  492. 

V.  Godlej-,  ii.  560. 

V.  Hill,  iii.  864. 

V.  Ladue,  ii.  71,  80,  271. 

V.  Little,  iii.  565. 

V.  Page,  ii.  105,  163. 

V.  Porter,  i.  721. 

r.  Roys,  i.  689  ;  iii.  277. 

?•.  Seward,  ii.  227  ;  iii.  118. 
Butler  &  Baker's  case,  iii.  308,  316,  321, 

.324,  328,  329. 
Butt  V.  Napier,  ii.  .360. 

V.  Riffe,  iii.  493. 
Butterfield  v.  Baker,  i.  608. 

V.  Beall,  i.  188,  190;  iii.  250,  296, 
297. 
Buttrick  v.  Wentworth,  ii.  75. 
Butts  V.  Broughton,  ii.  234. 

V.  Francis,  iii.  243. 
Buxton  v.  Dearborn,  i.  377. 
Buzby's  Appeal,  ii.  592. 
Buzick  V.  Buzick,  i.  227. 
Byani  v.  Bickford,  i.  690. 
Hyrane  v.  Rogers,  i.  512,  513. 
Byrne  v.  Beeson,  i.  592. 


TABLK   OF   CASES    CITKD. 


zU 


Cabuen  v.  Mulligiin,  i.  4k^  14'J. 

CiibiJt  c.  Cliri.stii-,  iii.  ij2u. 

Oiibmiiio  r.  Liiulcll,  iii.  lill. 

Ca.lell  «•.  I'almtT,  i.   110,  469;  ii,  OftJ, 

710.  7(><). 
Ciiily  c.  Slic|)iier(l,  i.  618. 
<'.ij;j;iT  r.  Lansiiifj,  iii.  261,  322. 
Caliil  /•.  I'aliner,  iii.  144. 
C.iliii  r.  \Vriylit,i.41U. 
Caliiion  c.  LalTaii,  ii.  181. 
Lam  c.  Cliica^'i),  &c.  K.  K.  Co.,  i.  404. 

t'.  Ct).\,  ii.  624,  525. 

I'.  Maqiiire,  iii.  870. 
Ciiines  r.  Grant,  ii.  621. 
(.^aiiis  V.  Joiios,  ii.  484. 
CuiriiB  I'.  C'liabcTt,  i.  132. 

V.  Collmrii,  ii.  607. 
Colder  r.  .M.naii,  ii.  644,  640. 
L'aliiorwooil  c.  I'yser,  i.  6'J6. 
Caltlwi'll  V.  ('enter,  iii.  468. 

f.  ("opeiaiid,  ii.  4()l,  403. 

V.  Fulton,  i.   \'J;  ii.  4(ll,  402,  403; 
iii.  142,  :)27,  406,  417,  430. 

r.  Harris,  i.  6'Jl. 

r.  Kirk|)atrick,  iii.  478,  601. 

I'.  Tag^^art,  ii.  2til. 
Callioun  f.  Cook,  iii.  114. 

V.  Curtis,  i.  G!»6,  0!»G. 

i;.  McLindon,  i.  36'.). 

V.  W'illiani.-i,  i.  306. 
Calk  c.  J^tribliMK,  iii.  432,  437. 
Calkins  r.  Calkins,  ii.  101,  I'JO. 

v.  Steinbauli,  i.  <')',t7. 
Call  1-.  Harker,  i.  716,710. 
Callaulian  v.  Ilawkes,  i.  617. 
Callaway  c.  llearn.  iii.  '.VJU. 
Callender  i\  -Marsli,  ii.  '•if<\. 
Calloway  v.  Doe  tl.  Joyes,  iii.  109. 
Caltlirop's  case,  ii.  420. 
Calvert  >:  Aldricli,  i.  097;  ii.  380. 

V.  Bradlev,  i.  663. 
Calvo  r   Davies,  ii.  220. 
Canibridjie  c.  Le.xinjjton,  i.  222. 
Cambridge  Valley  Bank  i-.  Delano,  iii. 

348. 
Camden  &  Atl.  Land  Co.  r.  Lipjiiiicott, 

iii.  66,  60. 
Cameron  »•.  Irwin,  ii.  81,  134. 

r.  Little,  i.  6.')(i.  022. 

V.  Mason,  ii.  ',(0. 
Cameto's  Kst.,  i.  307,  447. 
Camley  v.  Stanfield,  i.  6".t4. 
Camoron  v.  Tliurniond,  i.  689;  iii.  277. 
Camp  r.  Coxe,  ii.  170. 

r.  Pulvcr,  i.  616. 
Campau  v.  Barnard,  i.  723. 

I'.  (Jo  llrey,  i   089;  iii.  277. 

r.  Shaw,  i.  4'.'0. 
Campbell  v    Adair,  i.  302,  370,  407. 

r.  Arnold,  i.  021. 

v.  Avers,  i.  .301. 

V.  Baldwin,  ii.  90. 


Campbell  ('.  Beiniri,  i.  340;  ii.  205  ;  ill 

20H. 

V.  Brown,  ii.  518.  514. 

r.  Camjibell,  i.  (»91. 

V.  Dearborn,  ii.  63. 

V.  Klliutt.  i.  443. 

f.  Knights,  iii.  222. 

I'.  Kuhn,  iii.  •H)'J. 

V.  l.K;acli,  ii.  093. 

V.  Lewis,  i.  b'-'A). 

V.  Ix)ader,  i.  405,  049. 

V.  McCoy,  i.  608. 

f.  Me.Manus,  i.  379. 

c.  Macomb,  ii.  244. 

i;.  Mesier,  ii.  388. 

I'   Murphy,  i.  287,  293,  200. 

V.  I'eim.  Life  Ins.  C'o.,  ii.  670. 

V.  I'rocter,  i.  019. 

i;.  Hawdon,  iii.  i')44. 

V.  Samlys,  i.  128. 

r   Shipley,  i.  592. 

V.  Shrum,  ii.  218. 

V.  Smith,  ii.  220. 

r.  Stetson,  i.  54(5. 

V.  Ve.lder,  ii.  118,  119,203. 

i\  Wilco.x,  iii.  261. 

c.  Wilson,  ii.  .■>34 
Campbells  Appeal,  i.  219. 
(^anal  Ai)praisers  r.  I'eople,  iii.  440,  442. 
Canal  Co.  r.  Railroad  Co.  ii    13. 
Canal  Comnirs.  v.  I'eople,  iii.  439,  443, 

416. 
Canal  Fund  Conmirs.  v.  Kempshall,  iii. 

430,  44:5. 
Canal  Trustees  r.  Havens,  iii.  460 
Canby  v.  Porter,  i.  189. 
Candler  r.  Lunsford.  iii    168 
Canedy  v.  Marcy,  iii.  406,  408. 
Canfield  v.  Andrew,  ii    307. 

r.  Hard.  i.  .380;  iii.  .3.30. 
Cannan  r.  Hartley,  i.  045. 
Canning  r.  i'inkham.  iii.  310,  312. 
Caimon  r.  Boyd,  ii.  3.'>l. 

c.  White,  iii.  109. 
Canny  v.  Andrews,  ii.  367,  .301,  395. 
Capen  r.  I'eckham,  i.  22,  27. 

('.  Kichardson,  ii.  48,  4.'>9. 
Capers  r.  McKee.  ii.  3.j(i. 
Capner  i-.  Flemington   Mining  Co.,  ii. 

141. 
Caraway  v.  Chancy,  iii.  434. 
Carbrey  v.  Willis,  'ii.  :W3  ;  iii.  1(j9,  436, 

468. 
Carey  i*.  Rauglm,  iii.  677,  679. 

r.  Bishop,  i.  21. 

r.  Brown,  ii.  574. 

V.  Rawson,  ii.  .58. 

r.  Wilcox,  iii.  130. 
Cargill  V.  Sewnll,  i.  102. 
Carleton  v.  Rediiigton,  i   604.  006,  66d 
Carlin  v.  Chappel.  ii  :W». 
Carlisle  »•.  Blamire.  ii.  177. 

V.  Coore-.  ii.  313.  317,  XjO  ;  iii  16L 

I'.  Godwin,  i.  360,  415. 


xlii 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Carll  V.  Butman,  i.  242,  310,  311 ;  ii. 

224. 
Carlton  v.  Buckner,  ii.  97. 

V.  Jackson,  i.  239  ;   ii.  202. 
Carman  r.  Jolmson,  iii.  20G,  2U9,  211. 
Cannichael  v.  Carmichael,  i.  277. 
Carpenter  v.  Allen,  ii.  112. 

c.  Black  Hawk  Mg.  Co.,  ii.  89. 

V.  BuUer,  iii.  100. 

V.  Carpenter,  ii.  107. 

V.  Colins,  i.  619. 

V  Ue.xter,  iii.  33.3,  342,  346. 
V.  Fairservice,  iii.  259. 

V.  Lonjjtan,  ii.  258. 

V.  Millard,  i.  76  ;  iii.  410. 

V.  Muren,  iii.  354. 

V.  O'Douglierty,  ii.  89. 

V.  Prov.  Ins.  Co.,  ii.  241. 

V.  Smith,  ii.  670. 

V.  Thompson,  i.  591. 

V.  Weeks,  i.  245. 
Carpentier  r.  Brenham,  ii.  113. 

V.  Thirston,  iii.  90. 

V.  Webster,  i.  691. 

1-.  Williamson,  ii.  261  ;  iii.  381. 
Carr  v.  Caldwell,  i.  430. 

V.  Carr,  ii.  53,  61. 

V.  Foster,  ii.  343,  359. 

V.  Holhrook,  ii.  58. 

V.  Hoxie,  iii.  324. 
Carradine  v.  O'Connor,  ii.  80,  273. 
Carrig  v.  Dee,  ii.  365. 
Carrington  v.  Roots,  i.  15. 
Carroll  v.  Ballance,  ii.  107,  108. 

V.  Burns,  ii.  655. 

V.  Hancock,  ii.  599,  664. 

V.  Norwood,  iii.  422,  434. 

V.  Safford,  iii.  209. 

V  St.  John's  Soc,  i.  499,  518,  628. 
Carruthers  v.  Humphrey,  ii.  111. 
Carson  i-.  Baker,  i.  622. 

V.  Blazer,  iii.  439. 

V.  Coleman,  iii.  224. 

V.  Godley,  i.  571. 

V.  Mitchell,  ii.  571. 

V.  Murray,  i.  263. 

V.  New  Bellevue  Cemetery  Co.,  iii. 
103. 

V.  Plielps,  ii.  551 ;  iii.  251,  300. 
Carstairs  v.  Taylor,  i.  577. 
Carswell  r.  Hartridge,  i.  431 
Carter  v.  Burr,  iii.  528. 

V.  Carter,  i.  524  ;  ii.  54  ;  iii.  100. 

V.  Champion,  iii.  85,  339. 

V.  Dale,  i.  173. 

V.  Goodin.  i.  241 ;  ii.  106. 

V.  Hanmiett,  i.  555. 

V.  Hunt,  ii.  596. 

V.  Lee,  i.  593. 

V.  McMichael,  ii.  656. 

V.  Montgomery,  ii.  511. 

V.  Parker,  i.  246,  302. 

V.  Peck,  iii.  491. 

V.  Eockett,  ii.  240. 


Carter  v.  Spencer,  iii.  210. 

V.  Thomas,  iii.  574. 

V.  Warne,  i.  554. 

V.  Williams,  i.  183. 
Cartwright  '•.  Cartwright,  iii.  512. 

V.  Gardner,  i.  503,  516. 
Caruthers    v.   Caruthers,   i.    327,    330. 
331. 

V.  Humphrey,  ii.  180. 
Carvagnaro  v.  Don,  ii.  524. 
Carver  v.  Astor,  iii.  77. 

V.  Jackson,  i.  467  ;  ii.  615 ;  iii.  100. 

V.  Lasallette,  iii.  406. 

r.  Miller,  i.  697. 
Carvick  v.  Blagrave,  i.  594. 
Carwardine  v.  Carwardine,  ii.  668,  671, 

762. 
Gary  v.  Daniels,  ii.  367,  369,  371  ;  iii. 
491. 

V.  Prentiss,  ii.  195. 

V.  Tice,  i.  368,  4.31. 

V.  White,  ii.  119,  15L 

V.  Whiting,  i.  538. 

V.  Whiuiey,  iii.  203,  216,  217. 
Casborne   v.  Scarfe,   ii.  100,  146,  148, 

168. 
Case  V.  Benedict,  iii.  108. 

V.  Phelps,  iii.  356,  357. 
Casebolt  r.  Donaldson,  i.  326. 
Casey  v.  Buttolph,  ii.  204. 

V.  Gregory,  i.  597. 

r.  Inloes,  iii.  55. 

V.  King,  i.  618. 
Casliman  v.  Henry,  i.  351  ;  ii.  219. 
Cason  i;.  Hubbard,  i.  257,  271 ;  iii.  267 
Casporus  v.  Jones,  i.  290. 
Cass  V.  Martin,  i.  242,  304,  307. 

V.  Thompson,  i.  209. 
Cassel  V.  Ross.  i.  403. 
Casselman  v.  Packard,  i.  381. 
Caster  v.  Williams,  ii.  323. 
Castle  V.  Dod,  ii.  416,  428. 

V.  Palmer,  i.  421,  438,  459. 
Castleman  v.  Belt,  ii.  142. 
Caswell,  Ex  jtarte,  ii.  689. 

V.  Districh,  i.  606,  607. 
Gates  V.  Wadlington,  iii.  439. 
Catham  v.  State,  iii.  53. 
Cathcart  v.  Bowman,  iii.  489. 

r.  Robinson,  i.  41  ;  iii.  358. 
Catlierwood  c.  Watson,  ii.  511. 
Catlin  r.  Hurlburt,  iii.  479,  485,  527. 

r.  Kidder,  i.  689. 

V.  IMjlncr,  i.  341. 

V.  Ware,  i.  257,  298,  301 ;  iii.  272, 
273,  282. 
Gator  V.  Pembroke,  ii.  90,  94. 
Catt  V.  Tourle,  ii.  323. 
Cattley  v.  Arnold,  i.  629,  637. 
Cattlin  V.  Brown,  ii.  793. 
Caufraan  v.  Sayre,  ii.  193,  277. 
Cave  r.  Crafts,  ii.  331. 
Cavender  v.  Smith,  iii.  206,  209,  211, 
328. 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


xlili 


Cavis  V.  McClary,  ii.  177. 

CuziiiDVi'  r.  Cutler,  ii.  2.'{9. 

Cecil  r.  BeuvtT,  ii.  oUO ;   iii.  IJOO,  -TOO, 

312,  31;]. 
Center  v.  Pliiiitertt'  &  M.  Bank,  ii.  125, 

15:5. 
Central  Briil^e  Co.  r.  Lowell,  ii.  308. 
Central  .Mills  Co.  c.  Hart.  i.  02tJ. 
Central  I'acitic  K.  K.  Co.  c.  Meud,  iii. 

IJI. 
Central  Park  Com.,  /.V.  i.  70. 
Central  K.  U   (^o.  v.  Fritz,  i.  723 
Central  Wiiarf  u.  Inilia  Wharf,  ii.  3G1. 
Cesar  r.  Kariitz,  i.  f>7<5. 
Cessill  v.  State,  iii.  440. 
Cliace  I',  llinmun,  ii.  271. 
Clia.ll)()uri\e  r.  Ma.son,  iii.  432. 
Cliailwiek  c  Felt,  ii.  .')11. 

V.  Ilaverliill  Hridce,  ii.  304,  300. 

V.  I'arker,  i.  512,  516. 

V.  I'erkins,  ii.  54H. 
Chaffee  v.  Franklin,  i.  210. 
ChalHn  v.  ChalHn,  iii.  435. 
Cliaires  c.  Braiiy,  ii.  •>'■'>. 
Chall'ant  >:  (iraiit.  i.  :^7S. 
Chalker  c.  Chalker,  ii.  13,  18,  20;  iii, 

402. 
Chailefon.x  i-.  Ducharnie,  i.  686,  688; 

iii.  l.'>.{,  204. 
Chamberlain  v.  Bell,  iii.  339. 

V.  Bradley,  iii.  343.  460. 

r-  Biissey,  iii.  283. 

V.  Crane,  ii.  474. 

V.  Meeder,  iii.  110,  128. 

V.  Preble,  iii   504. 

i;.  Staunton,  iii.  304. 

V.  Stearns,  iii.  510. 

r.  Thompson,  ii.  100,  1G8,  174. 
Chamberlin    >•.   Donahue,   i.  613,    020, 

02(i,  034,  053. 
Chambers  r.  Cox,  i.  4.30. 

r.  (Joldwin,  ii.  67,  244. 

V.  Keene,  ii.  276. 

V.  Pi-rrv,  ii.  5<)7. 

V.  Pleak.  i.  502. 

V.  Wilson,  ii.  742. 
Chanibliss  v.  Jonlan,  i.  355. 
ChaMii)i()n  v.  Spencer,  i.  711. 
Cliam|)lin  v.  Foster,  ii.  263. 

V.  .McLeod,  ii.  '.Hi. 
Champncy  v.  Coope,  ii.  137.  107,  206. 
Chancellor  c.  Windham,  ii.  475. 
Chandler  i-.  Brown,  iii.  142,  501,  507. 

r.  Cheney,  i   70'.». 

t.  Delajilaine,  ii.  717.  71S. 

r.  Hollingsworth,    i.   Ibo.   227;   iii. 
350. 

r.  Jamaica  Plain   Aq.  Co.,  ii.  .350, 
306. 

I'.  Kent,  i.  477  ;  iii.  292 

r.  McKinney,  ii.  271  ;  iii.  267. 

V.  SimmoiiA,  i.  487.  6!)9. 

r.  Spi'ar,  iii.  16t>.  ;];}4. 

f.  Temple,  iii.  312. 


Chatidler  r.  'I'honip<ion,  ii.  398. 

V.  ThurHion,  i.   12.   141,   004,  COS, 
010. 
Chaney  i'.  Chancy,  i.  210. 
Chapel  o.  Bull,  iii.  405,  630. 

r.  Clapii.  iii.  .355. 
Chapin  r.  First   Univerealist  Soc,  iii. 
27H. 

V.  Harris,  ii.  27. 

r.  Hill,  i.  .3.32.  3:54.  335. 
Chaplin  c  Chaplin,  i.  11.3. 

V.  Sawyer,  i.  307.  413. 

('.  Simninns,  i.  282. 
Chapnnm  c.  Bluck,  i.  481,  482. 

I',  lirown,  ii.  ti^l ;  iii.  067. 

V.  Chapman,  ii.  87. 

V.  (iray,  i.  407. 

V.  Harney,  i.  512. 

r.  Kirby,  i.  512. 

V.  Lon|r,  iii.  416. 

r.  McGrew,  i.  627. 

i;.  Miller,  iii.  262. 

r.  Hoberts(jn,  ii.  256. 

V.  Schroeder.  i.  210,  277,  298. 

V.  Tanner,  ii.  00,  230. 

V.  Towner,  i.  4b2. 

r.  Wright,  i.  513. 
Chappell  v.  Allen,  ii.  8-3. 
Charle  v.  Safli)l(i.  iii.  108. 
Charles  r.  Andrews,  i.  ;>jO. 

V.  Dubose,  ii.  523. 

V.  Dinibar,  ii.  237. 
Charles  Kiver  Bridge  v.  Warren  Bridge, 

ii.  .310  ;  iii.  50,  202. 
Charless  i\  Kankin,  ii.  381,  382. 
Charter  v.  Stevens,  ii.  81. 
Chase  v.   Abbott,  i.  388;   ii.  110,  104, 
201. 

V.  Ilazelion,  i.  148,  160,  105, 

V.  Kittredge,  iii.  5;]0. 

r.  Lockerman,  ii.  147. 

c.  .McLellan,  ii.  248. 

r.  Palmer,  ii.  2;>5. 

V.  IVck,  ii.  48,  80,  01.  98. 

r.  iSilver.stone,  ii.  374. 

V.  Weston,  iii.  501,  603. 

V.  Wingate,  ii.  20. 

V.  Woodburv,  ii.  2(»0.  211,  212.  213. 
Chase's  case,  i.  210,  220.  232,  256  ;  ii.  51. 
Chaseniore  r.  Richards,  ii  374.  375,377. 
Chatfield  c.  Wilson,  ii.  .374,  375. 
Chatham  /•.  Brainerd,  iii.  440. 

.".  Souls,  i.  305. 
Chatterton  v.  Fo.x.  i.  560,  505. 
Chauncey  v.  Arnold,  iii.  254. 
Clianncy  r.  fJraydon,  ii.  16. 
Chetlington's  case,  ii.  724. 
Cheeseborough  v.  Green,  i.  18,  698 ;  iL 

;iM9. 

Cheesehrough  r.   Millard,  ii.  l-'W.  200, 
210,  221,  222.  224,  22H.  220.  '2iV\,  231. 
Cheetham  r.  Hamp!<rin.  i.  670.  672. 
Chcevcr  r.  Pearson,  i.  016,  622. 
f.  I'erley,  ii.  lUl. 


xliv 


TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 


Cheever  r.  Rutland  &  B.  R.  R.,  ii.  106. 
Chellis  V.  Stearns,  ii.  105,  139. 
Clielton  V.  Henderson,  i.  117. 
Chenango  Bridge  Co.  v.  Paige,  ii.  305, 

308. 
Chenery  v.  Stevens,  iii.  376. 
Clieney  v.  Rodgers,  i.  432. 

V.  Rosser,  i.  369. 

r.  Watkins,  ii.  473 ;   iii.  339,  393, 

394,  395. 
V.  Woodruff,  ii.  261. 
Cherrington  v.  Abney,  ii.  363,  398. 
Clierry  v.  Monro,  ii.  226. 

i:  Slade,  iii.  433. 

V.  Steele,  iii.  455. 

V.  Stein,  ii.  319,  365,  373. 

V.  Ware,  i.  369. 
Chesapeake  &  Oliio  Canal  Co.  v.  Balti- 
more &  Ohio  R.  R.  Co.,  ii.  13. 
Cheshire  v.  Barrett,  i.  489. 
Chesley  v.  King,  ii.  375. 

V.  Thompson,  i.  694. 

V.  Welch,  i.  140,  141. 
Chesnut  v.  Shane,  iii.  224,  227,  228. 
Chessman  v.  Whitteniore,  iii.  260. 
Chester  v.  Willan,  i.  681. 
Chettle  V.  Pound,  i.  591,  599. 
Chetwood  v.  Winston,  ii.  763,  768. 
Chew  V.  Buchanan,  ii.  128. 

V.  Commissifiners,  i.  182,  183,  185. 

V.  Farmers'  Bank,  i.  278,  338. 

V.  Morton,  iii.  96. 
Chew's  Appeal,  ii.  597. 
Chicago  r.  Earned,  iii.  228,  224,  234. 

V.  N.  W.  R.  R.,  ii.  343. 

V.  Robbins,  i.  572. 

V.  Wright,  i.  658. 
Chicago  Dock,  &c.  Co.  v.  Kinzie,  iii. 

65,  66. 
Chicago,  D.,  &  V.  R.  R.  v.  Lowenthal, 

ii.  125. 
Chicago  Legal  News  v.  Brown,  i.  558. 
Chick  V.  Rollins,  ii.  189,  190,  191. 

V.  Willetts,  ii.  110,  113,  192. 
Chickeiey's  case,  i.  502. 
Child  V.  Baylie,  i.  107. 

V.  Singleton,  i.  408. 

V.  Starr,  iii.  438,  448,  452. 

V.  Wells,  iii.  454. 
Childs  r.  Chiids,  ii.  266. 

V.  Clark,  i.  550,  551. 

V.  Dolan,  ii.  80. 
'    V.  McChesney,  iii.  125. 

V.  Sampson,  i.  487. 

V.  Smith,  i.  320. 
Chiles  V.  Conley,  iii.  285. 
Chilton  r.  Braiden's  Admx.,  ii.  91. 

r.  London,  ii.  313,  348. 

V.  Niblett,  i.  632. 

?•.  Wilson,  iii.  156. 
Chinn  r.  Respass,  i.  17. 
Chipman  v.  Emeric,  i.  1-57,  165,  503. 
Chiy)pendale,  Ex  parte,  ii.  88. 
Chirac  v.  Reinecker,  iii.  14. 


Chisholm  i-.  Georgia,  i.  68. 
Chittenden  r.  Barney,  ii.  182. 
Choate  v.  Burnhani,  iii.  453,  472. 
Cliolmelj'  i:  Paxton,  i.  161. 
Cholmley's  case,  ii.  630. 
Cholniondelev  v.  Clinton,  ii.  175,  178, 
182,  187,  189,  426,  530,  534;   iii.  175, 
176,  401. 
Choteau  v.  Jones,  iii.  241,  339. 
Chouteau  v.  Eckliart,  iii.  74,  204. 
Chowning  v.  Cox,  ii.  45,  72. 
Christ  Church  v.  Mack,  ii,  365. 
Christian  v.  Dripps,  i.  6,  28. 

V.  Newberry,  ii.  194. 
Christie  ;;.  Gage,  iii.  154. 
Christopher  r.  Austin,  i.  559,  561,  564. 
V.  Christopher,  ii.  92,  93. 
r.  Williams,  i.  431. 
Christy  v.  Dyer,  i.  872,  419,  436,  450; 

ii.  259. 
Chubb  V.  Johnson,  iii.  18. 
Chudleigh's  case,  ii.  418,  414,  424,  425, 
426,  429,  436,  440,  441,  446,  447,  462, 
662,  678,  679. 
Church  c.  Bull,  i.  336. 

V.  Burgiiardt,  ii.  342  ;  iii.  70,  146, 

147,  152. 
V.  Church,  i.  215,  306 ;  ii.  526. 
V.  Gilman,  iii.  218,  239,  299,  310, 

314. 
r.  Meeker,  iii.  61,  447,  448,  451. 
V.  Savage,  ii.  208. 
V.  Wells,  i.  35. 
Churchill     i'.    Churchill,    ii.   655;     iii. 

577. 
Churchward  v.  Ford,  i.  556. 
Cibel  f.  Hills,  i.  564. 
Cicotte  V.  Gagnier,  ii.  154. 
Cincinnati  r.  Newell,  iii.  272. 

r.  White,  iii.  80. 
Cincinnati,  W.,  &  Z.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Iliff,  iii. 

308,  317,  318,  32.3. 
Cipperby  v.  Rhodes,  i.  417,  448,  419. 
Cissna  i:  Haines,  ii.  196. 
City  Bank  v.  Smith,  ii.  22. 
City  Council  r.  Moorhead,  i.  569. 
Clariin  1-.  Carpenter,  i.  13,  671;  iii.  293, 
364,  366. 
V.  Godfrey,  ii.  196. 
Clancy  i\  Byrne,  i.  571. 
Clanrickard  v.  Sidney,  iii.  403. 
Clap  I'.  Draper,  i.  10;  iii.  305,  417,  473. 
Clapp  i\  Boston,  i.  662. 

V.  Bromagham,  i.  715  :  iii.  155. 
V.  Ingraham,  ii.  532,  689. 
V.  Leatherbee,  iii.  354. 
V.  Stoughton,  ii.  16;  iii.  20. 
r.  Tirrell,  iii.  3.54. 
Claremont  v.  Carieton,  iii.  439,  4.53. 
Claremont  Bridge  v.  Royce,  iii.  361. 
Claridge  v.  McKenzie,  i.  600. 
Clark  V.  Allen,  iii.  256. 
V.  Babcock,  i.  576. 
V.  Baird,  iii.  454. 


TAHLr:   OF   CASES   CITED. 


XIV 


Clark  V.  Baker,  i.  82;  ii.  177;  iii.  100. 
lo.j,  intS,  10)).  11.')   II".),  61-J. 
V.  Bench,  ii.  lO'J,  10l»,  174. 
r.  Ik'il.  ii.  '.t8. 
V.  Brown,  i.  (i80;  ii.  68. 
V.  Bult.  i.  475. 
V.  Ciimpiiii.  iii.  459. 
V.  Clia.si',  iii.  14!*. 
V.  Clark,  i.  MH,   177,  191,  222,  223, 

70!) ;  ii.  4U.j. 
V.  Conrof,  iii.  4S1),  600,  500. 
V.  Cottri-i,  iii.  471. 
i;.  Crosby,  i.  :{l)7  ;  ii  256. 
V.  Duval,  ii.  379. 
V.  Kiy,  ii.  2l'9. 
V.  Foot,  i.  157. 
V.  Giffor.l.  iii.  821. 
r.  (iiil)ert,  ii.  3:59 :  iii.  l.')8,  17-4. 
V.  Gordon,  i.  499.  518,  028. 
V.  Graliani,  iii.  250,  286,  291. 
V.  Grilfitii.  i.  330. 
I'.  H.-iMiintrle  iii.  74 
V.  Ik-nrv.  ii.  45.  40,  G5. 
V.  HoliltMi,  i.  1()1. 
V.  Hunt.  ii.  93,  95.  96.  98. 
V.  .Jenkins,  ii.  118.  154. 
V.  Jones,  i.  502,  506. 
I'.  Koiilier,  i.  645,  660. 
V.  Kin;;8lev,  iii.  233. 
I'.  Martin,  ii.  ;L>3,  324,  .326. 
V.  Merrill,  i.  471. 
r.  Munroe,  i.  230. 
V.  Owens,  i.  121. 
i".  I'arker.  i.  714. 
V.  Prentice,  ii.  263,  264. 
V.  Heilnian.  i.  2t)(). 
r.  Heyhurn.  ii.  110,  113,  249. 
V.  Scott,  iii.  55'.'. 
«•.  Shannon,  i.  37(5.  4.30. 
V.  Smith,  i.  016.  O.'l,  687;  ii.  238, 

2.;9,  240,  654. 
V.  Snodgrass.  i.  384. 
V.  Kwift.  iii.  479,  480,  489,  490. 
I'.  Tennyson,  ii.  10. 
V.  Trail,  iii.  178. 
V.  Trawick.  i.  8-32. 
f.  Troy,  iii.  312. 
V.  Way.  i.  16. 
V.  Wheelock.  i.  617. 
r.  White,  ii.  .304. 
V.  Williams,  i.  6.3 
V.  Wilson,  ii.  241.  243. 
Clarke  r.  Bancroft,  ii  229,  231. 
I'.  Courtney,  iii.  294. 
I'.  Cunnniiif^s,  i.  515,  5.36. 
v.  Curtis,  ii.  106,  173. 
V.  Hayes,  iii.  229. 
V.  McAnulty,  iii.  607. 
V.  McClure.  i.  63 ;  iii.  139,  153. 
V.  Minot,  ii.  432. 
V.  Kav,  iii.  311. 
II.  Kochester,  ii.  304  ;  iii.  223.  224. 

234. 
V.  Sibley,  ii.  44. 


Clarke  i-.  Van  Surlay.  iii.  229. 
Clarkson  r.  Skidinore,  i.  484;  ii.  261. 
Clary  c.  Frayer,  ii.  704. 

r.  Owen,  i.  26;  ii.  181,  2a3. 
Cla8on  r.  Ct>rley,  ii.  249. 
I'.  Shejilurd,  ii.  151. 
ClauHHcn  V.  La  Fran/,  ii.  525,  503. 
Clavfrinj;  r.  ("laverinjf,  i.  151. 
Claw^oll  /•.  rrimrose.  ii.  365. 
Clay  V.  itichardson.  i.  435. 
r.  Sharpe.  li.  74. 
r.  Wren.  ii.  116. 
Clavcoinb    v.    .Muiiger,    iii.    500,   505, 

531. 
Clayton  r.  HIakelv.  i.  640. 

V.  Corby,  ii.  39.3. 
Clearwater  c  Kose,  i.  88. 
Cleary  r.  McDowell,  i  il44. 
Cle.iveland  '•.  Flagg,  iii.  .352,  436. 
('leaver  r.  ('leaver,  iii.  bo'.l 
Clee  V.  Seaman,  iii.  99.  102. 
Clegg  1-.  Rowland,  i.  488. 
Clenience  v.  Stecre.i.  148,  150,  152,  164, 

155. 
Clemens  i^.  Bromfield.  i.  6.32. 
Clement  r.  Youngman.   i.   19;    ii.  401, 

402,  403;  iii.  406,  417. 
Clements  v.  Lacy,  i.  379,  426,  466. 
V.  Lami>kin,  iii.  152. 
r.  Landrum,  iii.  398. 
Clemm  c.  Wilcox,  i.  693. 
Clepper  v.  Livergood,  i.  174. 
Clei'e's  case,  ii.  455.  721. 
Cleveland  v.  Ilallett,  ii.  490,  537,  538. 
539,  548. 
V.  .Tot)e.>«,  iii.  141. 
V.  .Martin,  ii.  102,  195. 
V.  State  Bank.  ii.  708. 
Cleveland,  Columbus,  &c.  R.  R.  r.  Co- 
burn,  ii.  8. 
Clevi-8  V.  Wiliouglihy.  i.  556,  670. 
ClilFord  r.  Parker,  iii.  259. 

r.  Watts,  i.  537.  659,  566. 
Clift  r.  White,  i.  587. 
Climie  v.  Wood,  i.  26.  29. 
Cline  V.  Black,  i.  585;  iii.  287. 

V.  Upton,  i.  465. 
Clinton  r.  FIv.  ii.  69. 

r.  Westlirook,  ii.  106.  109. 
Clinton  C'o.  v.  Co.x,  ii.  192. 
Close  c.  Samm,  iii.  151.  162.  164. 
Cloud  r.  Calhoun,  ii.  562,  655;  iii.  308, 

315. 
Clougli  c.  Bowman,  iii.  422. 
r.  Clounh,  iii.  'J97. 
r.  Elliott,  i.  305  ;  ii.  222. 
V.  Hosford.  i.  626.  62». 
Clouse  V.  F.lliott.  iii    1;'>4. 
Clowes  r.  Dickenson,  ii.  186,  212. 

V.  Hawlev.  i.  690. 
ClufTgaKe  i:  Duncan,  iii.  16.3.  164,  lOd 
Clun's  case.  i.  13.3.  549.  656,  556. 
Clute  i:  Carr.  i.  (Wi6,  671. 
Clvnier  v.  Dawkins,  i.  689. 


xlvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Coates  V.  Clieever,  i.  151,  217,  218,  239, 
241,  297,  2y8. 

V.  Woodworth,  ii.  518,  562. 
Cobb  V.  Arnold,  i.  GOO. 

V.  Bennett,  ii.  390. 

V.  Lavalle,  i.  466. 

V.  Smith,  iii.  441. 

V.  Stokes,  i.  635. 
Cobel  V.  Cobel,  i.  549. 
Cob  urn,  Ex  parte,  i.  662,  667. 

V.  Ames,  iii.  445. 

V.  Coxeter,  ii.  314;  iii.  434. 

V.  EUenvvood,  i.  719. 

V.  Harvey,  ii.  291. 

V.  Hollis,  iii.  136,  161. 

V.  Litclifield,  iii.  529. 

r.  Palmer,  i.  590,  615. 
Coijhran  v.  Darcy,  i.  355. 

V.  Flint,  i.  10. 

V.  Goodell,  ii.  149,  255. 

V.  Guild,  iii.  492. 

V.  Harrow,  iii.  85. 

V.  O'Hern,  i.  176,  177,  341. 

V.  Van  Surlay,  iii.  229. 
Cochrane  v.  Paris,  iii.  156. 

V.  Libby,  i.  246. 
Cocke  V.  Brogan,  iii.  115,  292. 
Cocker  v.  Covvper,  i.  666,  672. 
Cockery  i-.  Hart,  ii.  72. 
Cockin's  Appeal,  ii.  654. 
Coder  v.  Huling,  i.  702. 
Codman  r.  Evans,  ii   314;  iii.  421,  449. 

V.  Jenkins,  i.  592. 

i:  Hall,  i.  492. 

V.  Winslow,  i.  20;  iii.  138,  217. 
Codrington  v.  Johnstone,  i.  145. 
Codwise  r.  Taylor,  ii.  81,  98. 
Cody  V  Quarterman,  i.  618,637 
Coe  V.  Clav,  i.  475,  565. 

V.  Cofumbus,  &c.  R.  R.,  ii.  56,  163, 
164. 

V.  Hobby,  i.  581. 

V.  Johnson,  ii.  82. 

V.  McBrown,  ii.  82. 

V.  Persons  Unknown,  iii.  121. 

V.  Smith,  i.  418,  434. 

V.  Wolcottville  Mg.  Co.,  i.  189,  341. 
Coffin  V.  Heath,  i.  697,  698;  ii.  389. 

V  Loring,  ii  42,  53,  57,  256. 

V.  Lunt,  i.  631. 

V.  Rav,  iii.  346. 
Coffman  r.  Huck.  i.  624. 
Cofran  r.  Cockran,  iii.  217,  296. 
Cogan  i".  Cogan,  ii.  591,  633,  674. 

V.  Frisby,  iii.  343. 
Cogel  V.  :Mickow,  i.  379. 
Coggswell  V.  Coggswell,  i.  131. 

V.  Tibbetts,  i.  253. 
Coghil  r.  Froelove,  i.  536. 
Cohen  v.  Davis,  i.  384,  416.  430,  447. 

V.  Dtipont,  i.  564. 
Coit  V.  Starkweather,  iii.  291. 
Coke  V.  Gutkese,  i.  577. 
Coker  v.  Pearsall,  ii.  142. 


Colburn  v.  Mason,  i.  689. 

V.  Morrill,  i.  564. 

I-'.  Richards,  ii.  368. 
Colby  V.  Duncan,  ii.  597.  610. 

V.  Kenniston,  iii.  337. 

V.  Korton,  iii.  97. 

V.  Osgood,  iii.  478,  512. 
Colchester  v.  Brooke,  i.  635. 

V.  Roberts,  ii.  352. 
Colcord  V.  Swan,  iii.  123,  124,  275. 
Cold   Spring   Iron  Works  v.  Tolland, 

iii.  437. 
Cole  V.  Batley,  iii.  16. 

V.  Eagle,  i.  657. 

V.  Edgerly,  ii.  121,  137. 

V.  Gill,  i.  361,  372,  419,  622 ;  iii. 
313. 

V.  Hughes,  ii.  296,  297,  298,  299, 
386. 

V.  Kimball,  iii.  501. 

V.  La  Chambre,  i.  355, 

V.  Lake  Company,   i.   56,  619  ;   ii. 
153;  iii.  408. 

r.  Levingston,  ii.  605. 

V.  Patterson,  i.  549. 

V.  Raymond,  iii.  117,  498,  501,  513. 

V.  Roach,  i.  7. 

1-.  Roe,  iii.  174. 

V.  Savings  Bank,  i.  377. 

V.  Scott,  ii.  93. 

V.  Seweil,  ii.  606,  630,  668,  683. 

V.  Stewart,  ii.  140,  163. 

V.  Wade,  ii.  558,  566,  567. 
Colobeck  V.  Girdler's  Co.,  i.  521. 
Colegrave  c.  Dios  Santos,  i.  16. 
Coleman  c.  Barklevv,  iii.  336. 

V.  Bush,  iii.  422. 

V.  Cliadwick,  ii.  374,  384. 

V.  Coleman,  i.  711. 

V.  Foster,  i.  665,  667,  671. 

V.  Haight,  i.  667. 

V.  Holmes,  iii.  191. 

V.  Lane,  i.  685. 

V.  Lewis,  i.  9. 

V.  Lyman,  iii.  480. 

V.  Manhattan  B.  Imp.  Co,  iii.  446. 

r.  Packard,  ii.  66,  112. 
Coles  ".  Allen,  ii.  514. 

V.  Coles,  i.  315. 

1-.  Soulsby,  iii.  399. 

V.  Woodmg,  i.  711. 
Colgan  V.  Bellings,  iii.  157. 

v.  McKeon,  iii.  54. 
Collamer  v.  Kelly,  i.  545. 

V.  Langdon,  ii.  122. 
Collier  ?-.  Blake,  ii.  557. 

V.  Gamble,  iii.  487. 

V.  Pierce,    ii.   319,   364,    365,   399, 
400. 
Collins  V.  Canty,  i.  638. 

V.  Carlile,  ii.  157. 

V.  Carman,  i.  336,  337. 

V.  Chantland,  i.  450,  458. 

V.  Driscoll,  ii.  315. 


TAULK    OF    CASES    CITKD. 


xlvii 


Collins  V.  Ewinp.  ii.  300. 

V.  Ilusbrouck,  i.  645. 

I'.  Hopkins,  ii.  7o. 

r.  I'ti-ntico.  ii.  ^JO;  iii.  278. 

V.  Sniitli,  ii.  ;>l'-',  [Ai'J. 

V.  Torrv,  i.  'i-'^T,  U3U,  21 1 , 2 IC. 

c.  Wliildin.  i.  547. 
Collins  .Mfg.  Co.  f.  Marcy,  ii.  14. 
Coliniin  '•.  AndiTsoii,  iii.  '2'->l. 

r.  I'ackanl.  ii.  70,  110. 
Colqulioim  '■.  Atkinson,  iii.  U'.tO,  303. 
(?o!(liiltt  r.  Brown,  i.  38tj,  41(5. 
Colthirst  r.  Ik-jiisliin,  ii.  ()()1,  072. 
Coltniim  r.  Senliousc,  ii.  774. 
Colton   V.   Seuvcv,    iii.   288,   428,  431, 
45:5. 

V.  Smith,  i.  714,  717;  ii.  173,  175. 
Coltsra.in  r.  Coltsnian,  ii.  707. 
Columbia    College   f.   Lynch,   ii.   317, 
323. 

I-.  Thacher,  iii.  502. 
Colvin  '•.  Hurnc'tt,  ii.  337,  312. 

I'.  U'urfonl,  i.  603,  ()J3;  iii.  247. 
Cohvell  r.  Warner,  ii.  131. 

v.  Woods,  ii.  57,  Gl. 
Colyer  r.  Finch,  ii.  87. 
Comhes'a  ciise,  i.  47'J  ;  ii.  080. 
Combs  I'.  Brown,  ii.  547,  500. 

r.  Jackson,  i.  09. 
(^omby  V.  McMichael,  ii.  540. 
Comer  r.  Chamberlain,  i.  187. 
Comerfonl  r.  Cobb,  iii.  290. 
("Jominp,  E.r  parte,  ii.  87. 
Comins  i-.  Comins,  iii.  150,  174. 
Comly  i:  Strader.  i.  200. 
Commercial  Bank  v.  Corbett,  i.  423. 

V.  Cunningliam,  ii.  157. 
Commissioners  v.  Thomi)son,  iii.  427. 
Commissioners  for  Sale  of  School  Lands 

in  Equity  r.  Babcock,  ii.  153. 
Commissioners  of  Canal  Fund,  &c.    See 

Canal,  &c. 
Commonwealth  v.  Alger,  i.  2,  68,  69, 
70 ;  iii.  214,  224,  438,  439,  447, 
459. 

V.  Andre,  i.  79  ;  iii.  64,  77. 

V.  Chapin,  iii.  4-39,  443. 

V.  Chapman,  i.  40. 

I'.  Charlestown,  i.  08. 

V.  Contner,  i.  548. 

V.  Coupe,  ii.  348. 

V.  Dudley,  iii.  325. 

V.  Franklin  Ins.  Co.,  i.  555. 

I'.  Ilackett,  ii.  588. 

V.  Haley,  i.  0(30. 

V.  Harrington,  i.  499. 

I'.  Hite,  iii.  53. 

V.  Hunt.  i.  223. 

V.  Knowlton,  i.  40. 

V.  Lane,  i.  223,  224. 

w.  Leach,  i.  40. 

i".  Low,  ii.  392. 

1-.  Old  Colony  R.  R.,  ii.  348. 

r.  Tejepscut  Proprs.,  iii.  93. 


Commonwealth  r.  Uoxburv,  i  08  iii. 
1'J5.  19^  201,  202,  214.  215, 
210,  217,  40M,  432,  4lt.,  417. 

I'.  Smith,  ii.  I(i5. 

V.  StHullcr,  ii.  10 

r.  Tewksbury,  i.  2,  70. 

V.  L'|>ton,  ii.  'M'J. 

V.  Vincent,  iii.  443. 

V.  Williams,  ii.  731. 
Commonwealth  Ins.  Co.  v.  Spankncbic, 

ii.  173. 
Compiler  r.  Compiler,  i.  378,  411. 
Comstock  r.  Bros-seau,  i.  05.'. 

V.  Hilt,  ii    117. 

V.  Smith,  ii.  184;  iii.  102,  113,  110, 
119,  121,  2.V.I.  508. 

r.  Van  Dcusen,  ii.  352. 
Comuniis  v.  Wesselhaft,  ii.  204. 
Conant  f.  Little,  i.  283,  281,  317. 

V.  Smith,  i.  718. 

V.  Warren,  i.  'M'J. 
Conard  r.  Atlantic  Ins.  Co.,  ii.  157. 
Concord  Bunk  r.  Bellis,  iii.  78,  107,  116, 

201,  283,  309. 
Concord    Union    Mut.   F.   Ins.   Co.   v. 

Wooilbury,  ii.  241,  209. 
Condict  r.  Flower,  ii.  219, 

V.  King,  ii.  799. 
Condit  V.  Neighbor,  ii.  806. 
Condon  v.  Barr,  i.  051. 
Conger  r.  Ring,  ii.  509. 
Congleton  v.  I'attison,  i.  533. 
Congreve  /•.  Smith,  i.  571. 
Conkey  r.  Hart,  ii.  77. 
Conklin  c.  Buyd,  ii.  .378. 

r.  Conklin,  ii.  704. 

V.  Foster,  i.  370. 

V.  Parsons,  i.  24. 
Conkling  r.  Brown,  i.  719. 
Conn  r.  l\nn,  iii.  455. 
Conn.illy  v.  Hardwick,  i.  .359,  .369. 
Connelly  i-.  Doe  d.  Skeliy,  iii.  303. 
Conner  r.  Bradley,  i.  51.]. 

I'.  Chase,  ii.  54. 

r.  Lewis,  ii.  501,  520. 

I'.  Nichols,  i.  432. 

I'.  Sliejiard,  i.  119,  219. 

c.  Tuck,  ii   559. 

V.  Whitmore,     ii.    119,    122.     133. 
177. 
Connery   v.  Brooke,  ii.    351,   354;    iii. 

409. 
Connor  v.  Follansbee,  ii.  503,  513,  618, 
619;  iii.  392. 

V.  McMurray,  i.  437,  438. 

I*.  Nichols,  i.  434. 

r.  Sullivan,  ii.  343. 
Conover  r.  Beckett,  ii.  525. 

V.  HotTmnn,  ii.  552,  554. 

V.  Mut.  Ins.  Co..  ii.  173. 

V.  Porter,  i.  200 ;  iii.  263. 

r.  Stothoflf.  ii.  574. 

r.  W.irrcn,  ii.  95. 
Conrad  c.  Harrison,  ii.  215,  231. 


xlviii 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Conroy  v.  Sullivan,  i.  417. 
Constable  v.  Nicholson,  ii.  213,  348. 
Constant  v.  Abell,  i.  6o0. 

V.  IMatteson,  ii.  '226,  575. 
Continental  Nat.  Bk.  c.  Commonwealth 

Nat.  Bk.,  ill.  90. 
Converse  v.  Blunirick,  ii.  98. 

V.  Converse,  iii.  547. 

V.  Ferrey,  i.  697. 

V.  Wales,  iii.  577. 

v.  Walker,  i.  571. 
Conway  v.  Alexander,  ii.  45,  51,  60,  63. 

V.  Cable,  iii.  228,  235. 

V.  Dunfield,  iii.  326. 

V.  Starkweather,  i.  636,  650. 

V.  Taylor,  ii.  304,  305,  306. 
Conwell  V.  Evill,  ii.  53. 
Cooch  V.  Gerry,  ii.  106. 
Cook  V.  Allen,  i.  711,  717. 

V.  Babcock,  iii.  94,   139,  145,  146, 
151. 

V.  Basley,  ii.  75. 

v.  Bisbee,  i.  95. 

V.  Brightly,  i.  627  ;  ii.  204,  294, 302, 
303. 

V.  Brown,  iii.  299,  308,  320. 

V.  Champlain  Transp.  Co.,  i.  156. 

V.  Collyer,  ii.  53. 

V.  Cook,  i.  136,  138,  320,  617. 

V.  Davenport,  i.  719. 

V.  Dennis,  iii.  157. 

V.  Fisk,  i.  206. 

V.  Gerrard,  ii.  605. 

i;.  Gudger,  ii.  61. 

V.  Guerra,  i.  552. 

V.  Hammond,  i.  67,  70,  269  ;  ii.  803, 
804 ;  iii.  14. 

V.  Hull,  ii.  371. 

V.  Humber,  i.  511. 

V.  Johnson,  i.  596  ;  ii.  142. 

V.  Klink,  i.  457. 

V.  Mayor  of  Bath,  ii.  356. 

V.  McChristian,  i.  368,  384,  400. 

V.  Norton,  i.  653. 

V.  Pridgen,  i.  670. 

V.  Sinnamon,  iii.  279. 

V.  Stearns,  i.  661,  663,  666,  671. 

V.  Whiting,  i.  14  ;  iii.  416. 
Cooke  V.  Lo.xley,  i.  589. 

V.  Piatt,  ii.  717. 
Cool  V.  Peters  Box,  &c.  Co.,  iii.  369. 
Cooley  V.  Hobart,  ii  260. 
Coolidge  I'.  Learned,  ii.  334,  392 ;  iii. 
57,  58. 

V.  Melvin,  ii.  .31  ;  iii.  353,  357. 

V.  Wells,  i.  374. 
Coombs  r.  Anderson,  i.  118. 

V.  Jordan,  ii.  156. 

V.  Warren,  ii.  172. 

V.  Young,  i.  266. 
Coon  V.  Brickett,  i.  614  ;  ii.  21. 

V.  Smith,  iii.  94. 
Cooper  V.  Adams,  i.  5,  619. 

t'.  Band}',  i.  600. 


Cooper  V.  Barber,  ii.  376. 

V.  Brockway,  iii.  240. 

V.  Cole,  i  602. 

V.  Cooper,  i.  118,  709 ;  ii.  498,  561, 
657,  780. 

V.  Crosby,  ii.  72. 

V.  Davis,  ii.  115,  141,  142,  169,  176. 

V.  Jackson,  iii.  301,  305,  306. 

V.  Louanstein,  ii.  364,  365. 

r.  Martin,  ii.  181. 

V.  Smith,  i.  592;  iii.  148. 

V.  Ulmann,  ii.  127. 

V.  Whitney,  i.  213  ;  ii.  501. 

v.,  ii.  285. 

Cope  V.  Cope,  ii.  207. 

r.  Meeks,  iii.  261,  268. 
Copeland  v.  Copeland,  ii.  151 ;  Iii.  83,  88. 

V.  Stephens,  i.  554. 
Copenrath  v.  Kienbv,  iii.  263. 
Copley  V.  Riddle,  iif.  206. 
Cojipage  V.  Alexander,  ii.  10,  11. 
Coppring  v.  Cook,  ii.  236. 
Corbet  v.  Corbet,  i.  330. 

v.  Laurens,  i.  129. 

V.  Stone,  ii.  635,  672. 
Corbett  v.  Norcross,  i.  719. 

V.  Waterman,  ii.  220. 
Corbin  v.  Cannon,  i.  690. 

V.  Healy,  i.  106,  114  ;  iii.  423- 

V.  Jackson,  i.  720. 
Corder  v.  Morgan,  ii.  74. 
Cordes  v.  Miller,  i.  565. 
Core  V.  Faupel,  iii.  154. 
Corey  v.  People,  i.  315. 
Corkhill  v.  Landers,  iii.  97. 
Corlies  v.  Howland,  ii.  91. 
Corliss  V-  Corliss,  iii.  344. 
Cormerais  v.  Genella,  ii.  80. 

V.  Wesselhoeft,  ii.  254,  506. 
Cornelius  v.  Ivins,  ii.  16. 
Cornell  v.  Hall,  ii.  62. 

V.  Hitchins,  ii.  267. 

I'.  Jackson,  i.  61  ;  iii.  135,  435,  492, 
522,  627,  528. 

V.  Lamb,  ii.  286. 

V.  Prescott,  ii.  227. 
Corning  v.  Gould,  i.  564 ;   ii.  346,  356, 
357,  360,  395;  iii.  67,  69,  72, 
80. 

V.  Smith,  ii.  265,  269,  270. 

V.  Troy  Iron,  &c.  Factory,  i.  33 ; 
iii.  160,  350,  4-35,  462. 
Cornish  v.  Abington,  iii.  89. 

V.  Searell,  i.  600. 

1-.  Stubbs,  i.  539. 
Cornog  y.  Fuller,  ii.  199. 
Cornwall  v.  Cornwall,  i.  702. 
Cornwell  v.  Wooley,  iii.  642. 
Corpening  v.  Kincaid,  i.  454,  460. 
Corr  V.  Shackelford,  i.  855. 
Cornell  v.  Ham,  i.  335. 
Cortelyeu  v.  Hathaway,  ii.  141. 
Cortelvou  v.  Van  Brunt,  iii.  446. 
Corwin  v.  Corwin,  iii.  393,  396. 


TAHLK    OF   CASES   CITKD. 


xlix 


rorwitlio  r.  GrifTlnir,  i.  713 
Cury  I'.  Cury,  ii.  721. 
('osteii's  A|i|»eiil,  li.  071. 
Coster  r.  Hiciwii,  ii.  I'.tli. 

r.  C'liuk,  i.  >'IU,  L'i:{. 

I'.  Lurillanl.  ii.  4M.  570. 
Cote  c.  Deqiiiiulri',  i.  7Uo;  ii.  263. 
Cotlier  r.  .Nltrrick,  i.  6oO. 
Cottfu  r.  .Mctit'lice,  ii.  U7. 
CottiT  r.  Liiyrr,  ii.  783,  734. 
CottiTell  r.  Diitton,  iii.  17». 

r.  LoiifT,  ii.  •<>,  i'>4,  03. 

I'.  I'lirclmsc,  ii.  02. 
rottiiiglmm  r.  Springer,  ii.  170. 
Cottle  (•   Young,  iii.  450. 
Cotton,  Ii.r  /iiirti ,  i.  12.'). 

I'.  I'ocasset  Mg.  Co  ,  ii.  314. 

r.  Ward,  iii.  512,  528. 

V.  Wood,  i.  404. 
CoulIi  c.  Stratton,  i.  331. 
Cougliliii  c.  (.'ouiililiii,  i.  430. 
Coulter  r.  Holland,  i.  2!HJ. 

c.  Hohertson,  ii.  53r*. 
Coundun  c.  Clerke,  ii.  (530;  iii  279,281. 
Country  man  r.  Deck,  iii.  4'.t4. 
Coursey  v.  Davis,  ii.  (J(M>. 
Couririglit  r.  Courtriglit,  iii.  406. 
Covell  r.  Dolloff,  ii.  1(16. 
Cowart  1-.  Page,  i.  3t*0. 
Cowderi  (•   St.  John,  i.  31. 
Cowden's  testate,  ii.  215,  230. 
Cowdrey  v.  Cowdrey,  i   390,  405. 
Cowdry  v.  Coit,  iii.  508. 

r.  Day,  ii.  00. 
Cowell  »•.  Lumley,  i.  622. 

V.  Springs  Co ,  ii.  25. 

r.  Thayer,  ii.  347. 
Cowl  V.  Varnum,  ii.  91,  95. 
Cowles  r.  Kidder,  i.  GOI,  005,  600. 
Cowling  v.  Higginson,  ii.  337,  350. 
Cowman  i-.  Hall,  i.  213. 
Cowper  V.  Andrews,  ii.  5. 

I'.  Fletcher,  i.  695. 
Cowpertliwaite  v.  Carbondale  Bank,  ii. 

617. 
Co.x  v.  Chamberlain,  ii.  099. 

1-.  Cook,  i.  3!>0. 

r.  Couch,  iii.  4.34. 

V.  Co.\,  ii.  517. 

V.  Donnelly,  i.  429. 

V.  Edwards,  ii.  469. 

17.  Fenwick,  ii.  95. 

V.  Freedley,  iii.  438,  450. 

V.  Hoose,  ii.  509. 

V.  Ilo-xie,  ii.  159. 

V.  .Tagger,  i.  313. 

V.  James,  ii.  321  ;    iii.  108,  420,  619. 

r.  Lacey,  iii.  107. 

V.  Leviston,  ii.  394,  306. 

V.  Matthews,  ii.  363. 

V.  McBurney,  i.  702. 

f.  McMullin,  i.  689. 

V.  Palmer,  iii.  259. 

i;.  Shropshire,  i.  443,  464. 
VOL.  I.  — d 


Cox  V.  \\\\U,  iii.  272. 

V.  Wheeler,  ii.  227. 
Co.xe  r.  HigU-e,  i.  302. 
Coyle  c.  Davis,  ii.  135,  211. 
Cozens  c.  Crout,  iii.  512. 

c.  Long,  i.  252. 
Craddock  <.  Kiddlesburger,  i.  12. 
Craft  f.  Webster,  ii.  103,  127,  133.  131. 
Crafts    V.  Crafts,    i.   712;   i'.   1^0,  2j0. 
238. 

V.  Hibbard,  iii.  420. 
Craig  ('.  Dimock,  iii.  251. 

r.  Hawkins,  iii  432. 

V.  Kline,  ii.  3t)l. 

V.  Leslie,  i.  36. 

V.  Pinson,  iii.  291,  292,  882. 

V.  Tap|)in,  ii.  157,  158,  162;  iii.  212. 

V.  Walihall,  i.  320. 
Craik  v.  Clark,  ii.  181. 
Crain  r.  Fox,  ii.  3<J0. 
Cram  c.  Ingalls,  ii.  476. 
Cramer  r.  Benton,  iii.  407. 
Crane  v.  Batten,  i.  508.  »10. 

V.  Bonnell,  ii.  53,  57.  03. 

V.  Briglmm.  i.  26,  20,  30. 

t;.  Caldwell,  ii.  90. 

V.  Deming,  ii.  157,  159. 

V.  March,  ii.  102,  125,  17Q 

V.  Palmer,  i.  217 ;  ii.  93. 

V.  Keeder,  iii.  53,  292.  352. 

I'.  Turner,  ii.  118. 

V.  Waggoner,  i.  360,  403. 
Cranson  v.  Cranson,  i.  227. 
Cranston  i:  (-'rane,  ii.  73,  70,  81. 
Crary  v.  Goodman,  iii.  150,  351. 
Crassen  v.  Swoveland,  ii.  64  ;  iii.  338. 
Crawford  r.  Chapman,  i.  620,  528. 

V.  Ldwards,  ii.  220. 

V.  Richeson,  i.  309. 

V.  Scovell,  iii.  264. 

I'.  Taylor,  ii.  53. 

V.  Thompson,  ii.  11. 
Crawley  i-.  .Nlullins,  i.  030. 

r.  Price,  i.  511. 

V.  Kiggs,  ii.  97. 
Creacraft  r.  Wions,  i.  3.36. 
Crecelius  r.  Ilorst,  i.  227. 
Creech  r   Crockett,  i.  0:50,  031,  649. 
Creetl  v.  Lancaster  Barik.  ii.  515. 
Creekmur  r.  Creekmur,  iii.  164. 
Creel  r.  Kirkham.  i   605 
Cregier,  Matter  of,  i.  270. 
Creighton  c.  Evans,  ii.  393. 

V.  Paine,  iii.  231. 
Crenshaw  v.  Carpenter,  i  334. 
Cresap  r.  Hutson,  iii.  103. 
Cresinger  r.  Welch,  i  486,  488;  iii.  2'«, 

266. 
Cresson  v.  Miller,  iii.  362. 

r.  Stout,  i.  28. 
Crest  r.  Jack.  i.  7,  697  :  iii.  82. 
Creveling  r.  Fritts,  ii.  522,  623. 
Crews  I-.  Pendleton,  i.  144. 

I,'.  Thread^iiU   li  :.:J,  188. 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED, 


Cribb  V.  Eofrers,  ii.  467,  475. 
Crippen  r.  Heerniaiice,  ii.  96. 

V.  Morrison,  i.  20;  ii.  112. 

V.  Morss,  i.  688. 
Crips  V.  Grvsil,  ii.  146. 
Crisfield  i:  Storr,  ii.  592,  639. 
Crisp  r.  Crisp,  ii.  592. 
Criswell  i'.  Altemus,  iii.  153,  164. 
Crisweli's  Appeal,  ii.  654. 
Crittenden  v.  rairchild,  ii.  710. 

V.  Field,  iii.  412. 

V.  Johnson,  i.  214. 

V.  Rogers,  ii.  272. 

V.  Woodruff,  i.  249;  iii.  101. 
Croade  v.  Ingraham,  i.  263,  314,  494. 
Crocker  v.  Higgins,  ii.  547. 

V.  Pierce,  iii.  119. 

V.  Thompson,  ii.  199. 
Crockett  v.  Crockett,  i.  187, 148, 152, 320. 

V.  Maguire,  iii.  338. 
Croft  V.  Bunster,  ii.  110,  257. 

V.  Lumley,  i.  639. 

V.  Powel,  ii.  71,  74. 
Croghan  v.  Livingston,  i.  728. 
Croraie  v.  Hoover,  i.  32. 

r.  Louisville  Home  Soc,  iii.  557. 
Cromraelin  v.  Thiess,  i.  539,  547,  635, 

636. 
Crompe  v.  Barrow,  ii.  723,  724. 
Cromwel's  case,  ii.  27. 
Cromwell  v.  Pittsburg  Bank,  ii.  189. 

V.  Tate,  iii.  290. 

V.  Winchester,  i.  56. 
Cronin  v.  Hazeltine,  ii.  135,  255,  280. 

V.  Richardson,  iii.  434. 
Crook  V.  Lunsford,  i.  442. 

V.  Vandevoort,  iii.  277. 
Crooker  v.  Crooker,  ii.  263. 

V.  Frazier,  ii.  170. 

r.  Jewell,  ii.  122. 
Crop  V.  Norton,  ii.  513,  552. 
Crosby  v.  Bradbury,  iii.  412,  424. 

V.  Chase,  i.  242;  iii.  116. 

V.  Loop,  i.  549,  550,  551. 

V.  Montgomery,  iii.  464. 

V.  Parker,  iii.  417. 

V.  Wadswortli,  iii.  367. 
Cross,  In  re,  i.  489. 

V.  Carson,  ii.  15,  20. 

V.  Evarts,  i.  442,  443. 

V.  Hepner,  ii.  47,  58. 

V.  Lewis,  i.  37 ;  ii.  340, 343,  845, 362. 

V.  Martin,  iii.  128. 

V.  Robinson,  ii.  133. 

V.  State  Bank,  iii.  255. 

V.  Upson,  i.  540. 
Cross'  Appeal,  ii.  514,  516. 
Crossley  v.  Higlitowler,  ii.  332. 
Crossman  v.  Field,  ii.  769. 
Crotty  V.  Collins,  i.  142. 
Crouch  V.  Puryear,  i.  151. 
Croup  V.  Morton,  i.  419. 
Crow  V.  Mark,  i.  695. 

V.  Vance,  ii.  97,  127. 


Crowell  V.  Beebe,  iii.  91. 

V.  Currier,  ii.  220. 

V.  St.  Barnabas  Hosp.,  ii.  208,  219, 
220,  225. 

V.  Woodbury,  i.  718. 
Crowley  v.  Wallace,  iii.  328. 
Croxall  V.  Shererd,  i.  102,  116 ;  ii.  491, 
498,  531,  532,  669,  587,  595,  597;  iii. 
99. 
Crozier's  Appeal,  i.  334. 
Cruger  v.  Halliday,  ii.  552. 

V.  McLaury,  i.  508,  556 ;  ii.  19,  301. 
Crummen  v.  Bennet,  i.  441. 
Crump  V.  Morrell,  i.  577. 

V.  Norwood,  i.  206,  639 ;  ii.  746. 
Crusoe  v.  Bugby,  i.  505,  511. 
Crutcher  v.  Taylor,  ii.  510. 
Crutchfield  v.  Coke,  ii.  277. 
Cubitt  V  Porter,  ii.  386. 
Cudlip  V.  Kundall,  i.  621. 
Cuffee  t:  Milk,  i.  118. 
Culbertson  v.  Duly,  iii.  18. 
Culbertson's  Appeal,  ii.  494. 
Culler  V.  Motzer,  i.  691. 
CuUum  V  Branch  Bank,  ii.  195. 

V.  Erwin,  ii.  126,  128. 
CuUwick  V.  Swindell,  i.  25. 
Culver  V.  Culver,  i.  716. 

V.  Rhodes,  i.  690. 
Cumberland  v.  Codrington,  ii.  207,  208, 
209. 

V.  Graves,  ii.  539. 
Cumming  v.  Gumming,  ii.  212,  216. 
Cummings  v.  Barrett,  i.  4;  iii.  863. 
Cummins  i'.  Bulgin,  iii.  406. 

V.  Cassily,  iii  255. 
Cunningham  v.  Gray,  i.  355. 

V.  Hawkins,  ii.  113,  192. 

V.  Uorton,  i.  614,  637,  640. 

V.  Houlton,  i.  546,  614,   625,  637, 
640,  652. 

V.  Knight,  i.  230,  232,  257. 

V.  McKindley,  ii.  535,  536. 

V.  Pattee,  i.  492. 
Cunyngham  v.  Thurlow,  ii.  696. 
Curl  r.  Lowell,  i.  617,  652. 
Curie  I'.  Barrell,  iii.  206. 
Curran  v.  Ruth,  ii.  718. 
Currey  v.  Davis,  i.  605. 
Currier  v.  Barker,  i.  640,  647. 

V.  Earl,  i.  619,  623;  iii.  102. 

V.  Gale,  i.  82  ;  ii.  133,  168,  346 ;  iii. 
156,  159,  178,  457. 

V.  Parley,  i.  643. 
Curriers'  Co.  v.  Corbett,  ii.  332. 
Curry  v.  Sims,  ii.  763. 
Curshani  i-.  Newland,  ii.  653. 
Curtin  v.  Patton,  i.  488. 
Curtis  i".  Daniel,  i.  19. 

V.  Deering,  iii.  510,  511. 

V.  Galvin,  i.  617,  656. 

V.  Gardner,  iii,  465. 

V.  Hobart,  i.  285. 

V.  Keesler,  ii.  334,  347. 


TABLE   OF   CASKS   CITKD. 


li 


Curtis  r.  Lymnn,  ii.  153. 

f.  Muiuly,  iii.  oSH. 

r.  N'inlitiii>;iilc,  iii.  r)12. 

V.  Ki.ldli-.  i.  7.  in. 

r.  Root,  ii.  OH.  170. 

f.  Tyler,  ii.  2\>o. 
Curlii>s  c.  Ay  mull,  ii.  323. 

r.  Miller,  i.  570. 
Cushinn  /•.  Aver,  ii   21:',  215. 

r.  ni.iki-."ii.  528.  5;1U,  531,  632,  534. 

I'.  Ileiiry.  ii.  57(5. 

t;   Iluril,  iii.  341. 

V.  KeiifieM.  i.  (521. 
Cusliiniui  r.  Rinnelmril,  iii.  483,  487. 

I'.  I-utlier,  ii.  4!>. 

r.  Smitli.  i.  2;  iii.  225. 
Cusii-k  r.  Douglas,  i.  355. 
Custis  r.  FitzlitiKli,  i.  17. 
Cutlil)ert  r.  Kuliii,  i.  558.  559. 

V.  Lawton,  ii.  '-VA). 
Cutlibertson  r.  Irving,  i.  485,  525,  594 ; 

iii.  101,  110. 
Cutler  r.  Diivcnpnrt,  iii.  109. 

V.  Haven,  ii.  120. 

V.  Tufts,  iii.  425,  404.  470,  472. 

V.  Tuttie,  ii.  512. 
Cutter  r.  Camhridgc,  ii.  309;  iii.  1G2. 

c.  Davenport,  ii.  44,  119,  122. 

r.  Ciriswold.  iii.  357. 

r.  Jones,  ii.  201. 
Cutting  c.  Carter,  i.  107. 

!■.  Cutting,  ii.  G89. 

0.  Rock  wood,  i.  086. 
Cutis  V.  York  Mfg.  Co.,  ii.  43 ;  iii.  304, 
312. 


D. 

Dabncy  v.  Green,  ii.  181. 

Dadnmn  »•.  lianison,  ii.  175  ;  iii.  350. 

DagijLtt  '•.  Uankin.  ii.  44,  80,  150. 

V.  Sliaw,  iii.  450. 

V.  Tracy,  i.  7.  290. 

r.  Willey,  iii.  W,  456. 
Dalil  i\  Press,  ii.  37. 
Dakin  r.  Alien,  i.  023. 
l)all)y  c.  I'ullen.  ii.  090. 
Dale  r.  Arnold,  iii.  340. 

c.  Lincoln,  iii.  306. 

c.  Roliinson,  i.  3-32. 
Daley  v.  Coons,  ii.  7i)3. 
Dallam  v.  Dallam,  ii.  703,  764,  760. 
Dalton  >•.  Annus,  ii.  3:«.  3.34,  3-30,  3:^8, 
340,   311,   345,  346,  362,   366, 
307. 

V.  Dalton,  i.  136,  150,  820. 

V.  Laudalm,  i.  550. 

V.  Rust,  iii.  427. 
Damainville  >:  Mnnn,  i.  534. 
Damb  v.  Iloffman,  i.  535. 
Dame  r.  Dame,  i.  5.  8.  10,  26,  015. 

r.  \Vin<.^ate,  iii.  351. 
Damon  v.  Damon,  iii.  663. 


Damrell  >:  Ilartf,  ii.  590. 
Dana  c.  liinney,  ii.  11*4 

V.  Ja.kbon'  St.  Wliarf.  iii.  446. 

r.  Middlesex  ISnnk,  iii.  4*25. 

I'.  New  hall,  iii.  2<M». 

r.  Valentine,  ii.  380;  iii.  60. 

r    Wentwortli,  ii.  325,  327. 
Dand  r.  Kingscote,  ii.  321  ;  iii.  415,  465. 
Dane  r.  Kirkwall,  i.  485. 
Danfortli  v.  Heattie,  i.  444;  iii.  864. 

r.  .Murray,  iii.  4'.>H. 

V.  Sargent,  i.  0:51,  0.30. 

V.  Smitli,  i.  287,  ;i04,  810. 

r.  Talbot,  ii.  5t»9. 
Daniel  <•  Mc.NLinama,  i.  270. 

r.  North,  ii.  341,  .340. 

V.  Wood,  i.  35. 
Daniels  c  Bailey,  iii.  369. 

('.  Howe,  ii.  103. 

V.  Brown,  i.  605, '610. 

V.  Cheshire  R.  R.  Co.,  iii.  438. 

r.  Citizens'  Sav.  Inst.,  iii.  419. 

I'.  Davison,  iii.  338. 

V.  l-'iscnlord,  ii   09. 

V.  Khlridge,  ii.  532.  598,  611,  028. 

r.  Henderson,  ii.  274. 

V.  Tend,  i.  20.  010,  619;  iii.  417. 

«'.  I^)we,  ii.  157. 
Danner  r.  Shisslcr,  iii.  10. 
D'Aqiiin  '•.  .Vrmant,  i.  .')42. 
Darliie's  (Countess  of)  case,  ii.  ''l''  ''■•■I 
Darby  r.  Anderson,  i.  691. 

r.  Darby,  i.  702. 

V.  Dixon,  i.  370. 

V.  Mayer,  iii.  199. 
Darcus  c  Crump,  ii.  782. 
Darcy  v.  Askwith.  i.  150,  151 ;  ii.  315, 

.321. 
D'Arcy  r.  Blake,  i.  211,  212;  ii.  542. 
Dare  v.  Heatbcotc,  ii.  3.">0. 
Darley  r.  Darlev,  iii.  574. 
Darling  /•.  Blanihard.  ii.  592,  599. 

c.  Chapman,  ii.  IH). 
Darst  V.  Bates,  iii.  298. 
Dart  r.  Dart,  iii.  105,  100, 117,  118,370. 

381. 
Dartmouth  College  >:  Clnugh,  i.  540. 
Dashiell  v.  Attorney-General,  iii.  554, 

508. 
Dasliwood  r.  Rlytbway,  ii.  105. 
Daubenspick  r.'l'latt.ii.  180. 
Daughad.iy  >:  I'aine,  ii.  92,  94;  iii.  348 
Davenport  i:  Alston,  i.  359,  369,  880. 

r.  Davenport,  iii.  490. 

V.  Farrar,  i.  214. 

V.  Hicks,  i.  420. 

V.  Lamson,  ii.  351. 

c.  Turpin,  ii.  262. 

r.  Tyrrel,  iii.  68. 
Davcv  V.  Diirrant,  ii.  79. 

r.  Turner,  i   310  ;  iii.  269. 
Davidson  >■.  Beattv,  iii.  10.3. 

V.  Cooper,  iii.'2.'>4,  200. 

V.  Cowan,  ii.  150,  166. 


lii 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED. 


Davidson  v.  Davidson,  iii.  406. 

V.  Gatacre,  ii.  638. 

V.  Kemper,  ii.  533. 

V.  Young,  iii.  88. 
Davies,  ^.r  ixirfe,  ii.  767. 

V.  Husli,  ii.  635,  037. 

V.  Hnebner,  ii.  395. 

V.  Myers,  i.  129. 

V.  Sear,  ii.  333. 

V.  Speed,  ii.  439,  664,  773,  775. 

V.  Steele,  ii.  763,  765,  768,  7G9. 
Davis  V.  Andrews,  i.  357,  380,  412,  427, 
444,456;  iii.  261. 

V.  Bartiiolomew,  i.  208,257. 

r.  Bean,  ii.  240,  256. 

V.  Beclistein,  ii.  258. 

i:  Brandon,  iii.  287. 

V.  Broelvlebank,  i.  141. 

V.  Buffiim,  i.  31,  466;  ii.  163. 

V.  Burrell,  i.  655. 

V.  Christian,  i.  702;  ii.  575. 

V.  Clark,  i.  706,  709. 

V.  Coburn,  ii.  535. 

V.  Davis,  iii.  85,  90. 

r.  Dudlev,  i.  489. 

V.  Evton,  i.  33,  142. 

V.  Gdliam,  i.  148. 

V.  Handy,  iii.  413. 

V.  Hardin,  ii.  532. 

V.  Haj'den,  iii.  370. 

V.  Hemingway,  ii.  267. 

V.  Henson,  i.  417. 

V.  Hulett,  ii.  217. 

V.  Judd,  iii.  287,  503. 

V.  Ivelley,  1.  372,  435,  436,  450. 

V.  Langsdale,  ii.  275. 

V.  Lassiter,  ii.  232. 

V.  Logan,  i.  208. 

V.  Londgreen,  ii.  378,  .394. 

V.  Mason,  i.  62,  173,  182,  184. 

V.  ]\Iaynard,  ii.  194. 

V.  Mavor,  &e.,  ii.  304. 

V.  Miflett,  i.  248. 

V.  Morris,  i.  547. 

V.  Moss,  i.  32. 

V.  Murphy,  i.  631. 

V.  Nash,  i.  621. 

V.  Norton,  ii.  625. 

V.  O'Ferrall,  i.  248. 

V.  Ownsby,  iii.  338. 

V.  Rainsford,  iii.  428,  459. 

V.  Smith,  i.  .566. 

V.  Speed,  iii.  398. 

V.  State,  i.  416. 

V.  Stoncstreet,  ii.  4.5,  63,  65. 

V.  Thompson,  i.  141,  616.  617,  629. 

V.  Townsend.  iii.  95,  96,  131. 

V.  Tvler,  i.  591. 

V.  Walker,  i.  289,  298. 

V.  Wetherell,   i.  262,  263,  305 ;   ii. 
182,  266,  271,  516. 

V.  Wright,  ii.  569. 
Davis's  Appeal,  i.  454. 
Davison  v.  Davison,  i.  338. 


Davison  v.  Gent,  i.  581. 

V.  Jolionnot,  iii.  229. 

V.  Wilson,  i.  655. 
Davol  r.  Howland,  i.  254. 
Davoue  r.  Fanning,  ii.  77,  85. 
Daw  ley  v.  Avers,  i.  368. 
Dawson  v.  Sliirlcv,  i.  2-59;  iii.  274. 

V.  St.  Paul's, 'iii.  108. 
Day,  Ex  parte,  iii.  538. 

V.  Adams,  i.  412,  444;  iii.  292,  409, 
506. 

V.  Atlantic  &  G.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  iii. 
336. 

V.  Caton,  ii.  387. 

V.Cochran,   i.   182,  183,  186,  189: 
iii.  152. 

V.  Griffith,  iii.  315. 

V.  Patterson,  ii.  215. 

V.  Roth,  ii.  578. 

V.  Swackharaer,  i.  541. 

V.  Walden,  ii.  396. 

V.  Watson,  i.  564. 
Dayton  v.  Dayton,  ii.  108. 

V.  Donart,  i,  420. 

V.  Rice,  ii.  177. 

V.  Warren,  iii.  526. 
Dean  v.  Comstock,  i.  622. 

V.  Erskine,  iii.  454. 

V.  Fuller,  iii.  293. 

V.  Lowell,  iii.  449,  451. 

V.  Mitchell,  i.  213. 

V.  (^'Meara,  i.  713. 

V.  Shelly,  iii.  124,  517. 

V.  Spinning,  ii.  179. 
Deane  v.  Caldwell,  i  525,  566,  583. 

V.  Hutchinson,  i.  6. 
Dearborn  v.  Dearborn,  ii.  69,  70,  116. 

V.  Eastman,  iii.  264. 

)■.  Tavlor,  ii   224. 
Deardorff   v.  Foresman,   iii.    308,   318, 

320. 
Deare  v.  Carr,  ii.  170. 
Dearing   v.  Thomas,   i.  385,  386,  431, 
447. 

V.  Watkins,  ii.  151. 
Dearlove  r.  Herrington,  i.  658. 
Dearmond  v.  Dearmond,  iii.  301,  304. 
Deaver  v.  Parker,  ii.  170. 

V.  Rice,  i.  608. 
Debow  V.  Colfax,  i.  134,  135. 

V.  Titus,  i.  12,  140. 
Decli's  Appeal,  i.  698. 
De  Chaumont  v.  Forsj-the,  iii.  501,  503. 
Decker  v.  Freeman,  iii.  217. 

V.  Leonard,  ii.  46. 

i\  Livingston,  i.  551,  699. 
Deckert,  In  re,  i.  356. 
Decoster  v.  Wing,  iii.  10. 
Decouche  v.  Saveticr,  iii.  175. 
Deem  v.  Phillip.s,  iii.  256. 
Deemarest  v.  Wynkoop,  ii.  100. 
Deere  v.   Chapman,   i.   356,  359,  370, 

381. 
Deerfield  v.  Arms,  iii.  62,  64,  459. 


TABLE   OF  CASES   CITED. 


liii 


Deerinp  r.  Ailiims,  ii.  5.'5'.(. 
Deery  r.  Crny,  iii.  128,  4i>0. 
De  Foreat  c.  Hyriie,  i.  uoU. 

V.  KuUon  Ins.  Co.,  ii.  240. 

V.  Uiimsay,  iii.  >i'2H. 
De  FraiuL*  r.  Ih-  Krancc,  ii.  GO. 
lien  V.  iK't;,  ii.  5-M. 
])c  (irev  r.  Kielianlson,  i.  183. 
Do  lliivoii  V.  Lamleil,  ii.  'J4'J. 
Dolioritv  i:  U'rijjlit,  iii.  41W. 
Doi  r.  liabc'l,  i.  ;i<!-',  40(5. 
Dc'liiliay  r.  Clcmt'iit,  ii.  108,  2o9. 

r.  Mc('i)iiiu-ll,  ii.  45. 
Delaire  r.  Kctiiaii,  ii.  44,  oo. 
De  Lancey  r.  (iuiii)iip,  i.  611,  599. 

I'.  Cia  Null,  i.  (»0;5. 
Delaney,  Estate  of,  i.  307. 

V.  Hostoii,  ii.  .'578. 

V.  Fo.x,  i.  a^s,  5!t2,  593,  695,  690. 

V.  Root,  i.  (KKt:  iii.  8(10. 
Delano  '•.  Moiitanue,  i.  025,  040,  052. 

V.  Willie,  ii.  ;il,  1M7;  iii.  2:12. 
Delaplaine  r.  llitclicock,  iii.  88. 

r.  Lewis,  ii.  2ii5. 
Delasliniaii  r.  IJarry,  i.  471. 
De  l.aslmiutt  r.  Sell  wood,  ii.  202. 
De  Liissns  r.  (in-enwood,  ii.  (JlO. 
Delaunay  r.  Hnrni'tf,  iii.  218. 
Delaware,  L.,  &  W.  U.  1{.  Co.  v.  Sander- 
son, ii.  401. 
De  la  Warr  i-.  Miles,  ii.  213,  392. 
Delay  c.  Vinal,  i.  :>o.s. 
Deliii,   Trustees    of,    v.   Youmans,    ii. 

370. 
Dellinger  i'.  Twee<l,  i.  424. 
Delnionico  r.  Guillaunie,  i.  701,  703. 
Delony  c.   Ilutcliison,  i.  700,  703,  705; 

ii.  149. 
Du  fvuze  V.  Bradburv,  ii.  -W). 
Deniarest  v.   Willard,  i.  531,  550,  651 ; 
ii.  142,  2'.I8. 

V.  Wynkoop,  ii.  14^1. 
Deniinn  v.  HuUitt,  iii.  287. 

V.  Colt,  i.  71)2. 

i".  Comings  ii.  105,  198,  252. 
Deinutli  '•.  Aiuwe^i',  ii.  394. 
Den  r.  Adani.s,  i.  (i;JO. 

V.  Ashniore,  i.  599. 

V.  Blair,  i.  04:5. 

V.  Branson,  i.  700. 

r.  Brown,  ii.  205. 

V.  Cassells,  iii.  455. 

V.  Clark,  iii.  201. 

V.  Cox,  ii.  757. 

r.  Crawfonl,  ii.  403,  477. 

r.  Crawson,  i.  510. 

V.  Deniarest,  i.  181  ;  ii.  597. 

V.  Dimon,  ii.  122.  i;}6.  139,  173. 

I".  Drake,  i.  043. 

I'.  PMmonston,  i.  622. 

V.  Farlee,  iii.  :'.12. 

I'.  Flora,  iii.  H>. 

r.  (Justin,  i.  592. 

V.  Hampton,  iii.  394. 


Den  r.  Hanks,  ii.  451.  472;  iii.  391,392, 

;;'.t;i,  ;J95,  :Mi. 

r.  llardiiibernli.  i.  343. 

V.  Hay.  iii.  2H). 

I'.  llfrriuK'.  iii.  455. 

.-.  II. .well.  i.  017.019. 

V.  Hunt,  iii.  l;i8,  101.  102,  10;J,  Ki 

v.  Jidiiiiiun,  i.  201,  470,  477. 

I'.  Kinney,  i   149. 

r.  Kip,  iii.  174. 

V.  L.iwsliee,  i.  350. 

V.  LI. .yd,  i.  001. 

r.  .Manners,  ii.  770;  iii.  558. 

r.  .Meliiiosli,  i.  013. 

V.  ( >'llanlon,  iii   53. 

I'.  I'artee,  iii.  318. 

V.  Post,  i.  505,  511. 

V.  I'uekey,  ii.  031. 

V.  Uieliman,  iii.  3:iH.  341,  344. 

i;.  Koake,  ii.  f.<K),  721. 

V.  Sharp,  iii.  155. 

r.  Shearer,  iii.  351. 

V.  Siinjleton,  iii.  225. 

r.  Smith,  i.  110. 

V.  Spinning,  ii.  134.  198.  258. 

V.  Troutman,  ii.  559,  500,  508. 

r.  Tunis,  ii.  251. 

V.  Wliiltem..re.  i.  343. 

r.  Woo.l,  iii.  5<i.'J. 

V.  WriK'lit,  ii.  108.  670. 
Denhy  r.  Moore,  i.  534. 
Dendv  r.  (Jamble,  i   :5'>9. 

r.  NiclK.l,  i.  514,  o:;9. 
Denhani  r.  Ilolinian.  iii.  146.  148,  151. 
De  Nieholls  r.  Saunders,  i.  552. 
Denn  v.  Brewer,  iii.  112. 

I'.  Cartwri«_'ht,  i.  471. 

V.  Cornell,  iii.  111. 

V.  Gillot,  i.  112. 

f.  Kinjr.  iii.  loS.  112. 

V.  Hooke.  ii.  03H.  (;(i5. 
Dennett  v.  Dennett,  i.  117, 120. 190;  ii. 
403.  474,  580,  030,  038,  057; 
iii.  20:;. 

('.  II.)pkiiison,  i.  11. 

V.  I'ass,  ii.  ;!0l. 

V.  I'enobseot  Co.,  i.  02:1 
Denning  v.  Smith,  ii.  81;   iii.  231,  230. 

241. 
Dennis  r.  MeCagp,  ii.  559. 

V.  Wilson,  ii.  ;;4!t.  4f.3.  400. 
Dennison  r.  (Joehrinjj,  ii.  503,  527. 

r.  Heed.  i.  511. 
Denny  »•.  Allen,  ii.  575. 

V.  Kettell,  ii.  598,  010. 
Densmore  Oil  Co.  r.  Dcnsmore,  i.  G79. 
Denton  »•.  Clark,  ii    710. 

r.  .Nanny,  i.  210.  ;;o5  ;  ii.  200. 

V.  I'erry.  iii.  31 1 . 

r.  Strii'klaii.l.  i   <>:;5. 
Dentzel  r.  Wal.li.-.  iii.  224,  274. 
De  IVyster  v.  .Miihael,  ii.  I'l ;  iii   202 
Deputy  r.  Stapletord.  iii.  270,  3,'»y. 
Derby' (Karl  of)  r.  Taylor,  i.  541. 


liv 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Derby  Bank  v.  Landon,  ii.  252. 

Deroin  v.  Jennings,  ii.  54. 

Derry  v.  Derry,  ii.  511. 

Derry  Bank  v.  Webster,  iii.  301,  309, 

315. 
Derush  v.  Brown,  i.  213,  279. 
Descarlett  v.  Dennett,  ii.  23,  24. 
Desilver,  Estate  of,  i.  69,  485. 

Rr,  iii.  263. 
Desloge  v.  Pearce,  i.  668  ;  ii.  404. 

V.  1 1  anger,  ii.  63. 
Despard  v.  Walbridge,  i.  593,  594 ;  ii.  53. 
Despatch  Line  v.  Bellamy  Co.,  i.  23, 27. 
Detroit  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.,  v.  Reuz,  ii. 

275. 
De  Uprey  v.  De  Uprey,  i.  717. 
Deuster  v.  McCamus,  ii.  211,  221. 
Devacht  v.  Newsani,  i.  597. 
Devens  v.  Bower,  ii.  254. 
Devin  v.  Hendershott,  ii.  83,  108;  iii. 
603,  506. 

V.  Himer,  iii.  255. 
Devinney  v.  Reynolds,  iii.  295. 
Devore  v.  Sunderland,  iii.  481,  483,  487. 
Devyr  v.  Schaeffer,  iii.  159. 
Dewey  v.  Brown,  i.  699. 

V.  Dupuy,  i.  535. 

V.  McLain,  iii.  219. 

V.  Van  Deusen,  ii.  146,  268. 
De  Witt  V.  Harvey,  i.  718. 

V.  Moulton,  ii.  153 ;  iii.  339. 

V.  Pierson,  i.  561,  563. 
De  Wolf  V.  Hayden,  iii.  517,  524. 

I.-.  Murphy,  i.  217. 

r.  Pratt,  iii.  247. 
Dexter  v.  Arnold,  i.  690;  ii.  147,  166, 
175,  182,  184,  189,  244. 

V.  Gardner,  iii.  550,  562. 

V.  Hazen,i.  667. 

V  Manley,  i.  520,  565,  575. 

V.  Phillips,  i.  134. 

V.  Prov.  Aq.  Co.,  ii.  377. 

V.  Shepard,  ii.  72. 

V.  Strobach,  i.  306. 
Dey  !•.  Dunham,  ii.  47,  64. 
D'Eyncourt  v.  Gregory,  i.  10,  2.3,  25. 
Deyo  V.  Bleaklj',  i.  467. 
De  Young  v.  Buchanan,  i.  636. 
Dezell  V.  Odell,  i.  589  ;  iii.  77. 
Diament  v.  Lore,  iii.  565. 
Dibble  v.  Rogers,  iii.  96. 
Dick  V.  Ma  wry.  ii.  123,  127. 

V.  Pitchford,  ii.  533. 
Dickason  r.  Williams,  ii.202,  204. 
Dicken  v.  Jolinson,  iii.  261. 
Dickenson  v.  Chase,  ii.  97. 
Dickenson's  Appeal,  iii.  17. 
Dickey  v.  McCullough,  i.  503 ;  ii.  13. 

r.  Thompson,  ii.  216. 
Dickinson  v.  Brown,  iii.  209,  210. 

V.  Davis,  ii.  507. 

V.  Goodspced,  i.  6.36,  641. 

V.  G.   J.   Canal   Co.,  u.   374,   376, 
377. 


Dickinson  v.  Hoomes,  ii.  296 ;   iii.  483, 
487,  498,  501,  503. 

V.  Mayor,  i.  160. 

V.  Williams,  i.  695. 
Dickson  v.  Chorn,  i.  436 ;  ii.  226,  229, 
2.30. 

V.  Todd,  ii.  263. 

V.  United  States,  iii.  548. 
Digges'  case,  ii.  726. 
Dighton  V.  Tomlinson,  ii.  702. 
Dikes  V.  Miller,  ii.  395 ;  iii.  66,  68,  73, 

302,  309. 
D'lle  Roupe  v.  Carradine,  i.  420. 
Dillingham  v.  Brown,  iii.  167,  238. 

V.  Jenkins,  i.  497. 

V.  Roberts,  iii.  448. 
Dillon  V  Brown,  i.  492,  629,  700. 

V.  Byrne,  i.  431 ;  ii.  494. 

V.  Dillon,  i.  128. 
Dil  worth  v.  May  field,  i.  702,  704. 
Dimock  v.  Van  Bergen,  i.  636. 
Dimond  v.  Billingslea,  i.  233. 
Dinehart  v.  Wilson,  i.  605,  606,  607. 
Dingley  v.  BufEum,  i.  32,  467,  546,  614. 

V.  Dingley,  ii   597,  599,  664. 
Dingman  v.  Kelly,  i.  480. 
Dinsdale  v.  lies,  i.  617. 
Dinsmore  v.  Racine  &  M.  R.  R.,  ii.  163. 
Dippers  at  Tunbridge  Wells,  i.  344. 
District  v.  Racine  &  M.  R.  R.,  ii.  163, 

164. 
District  of  Columbia  v.  Johnson,  iii.  99. 
Ditchett  V.  S.  D.  R.  R.  Co.,  i.  570. 
Dix  V.  Atkyns,  i.  471,  499. 

V.  Van  Wyck.  ii.  183. 
Dixon  V.  Baty,  i.  590. 

V.  Clayville,  ii.  128. 

V.  Doe  d.  Lacoste,  iii.  335,  844. 

V.  Doe  d.  Lasselle,  iii.  342. 

V.  Hunter,  ii.  1.34,  154. 

V.  Lawson,  i.  356. 

V.  Niccolls,  i.  550,  551,  606. 

V.  Saville,  i.  211. 
Doane  v.  Badger,  i.  697 ;  ii.  355,  388. 

V.  Broad  St.  Assoc,  iii.  420,  447. 

V.  Doane,  i.  129.  380,  413. 

V.  WiUcutt,  iii.  122,  123,  275,  423, 
446,  447. 
Dobbin  v.  Cruger,  iii.  119. 
Dobbins  v.  Parker,  ii.  195. 
Dnbell  /•.  Stevens,  iii.  526. 
Dobson,  Goods  of,  iii.  563. 

V.  Land,  ii.  240,  241,  248. 

?-.  Racey,  ii.  78. 
Dockham  v.  Parker,  i.  608. 
Docking  v.  Dunham,  ii.  763. 
Dockray  v.  Milliken,  i.  255. 
Dodd  V.  Acklom,  i.  582,  583. 

V.  Holme,  ii.  382. 

?•.  Witt,  iii.  4.32. 
Dodds  V.  Dodds,  i.  360,  404. 
Dodge  '•.  Aycrigg,  i.  257. 

V.  Dodge,  i.  330:  iii.  32& 
j  V.  IloUinshcad,  iii.  334 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Iv 


Dodge  r.  Mcriinlock,  i.  f.f.'J,  (]C3. 

i;.  Nicliols,  iii.  212,  454. 

V.  I'opi',  iii.  '.»1. 

I'.  Stevi-ns.  ii.  622,  62^}. 

i;.  Wiilk'v.  iii.  422,  424. 
Dodson  r.  Hjill.  ii.  t54M. 
Dotlson's  Apptal,  i.  ;J'JG. 

DiH.'  il.  Cox  c.  ,  i.  (iJ2. 

Doe  V.  AhiTiiiitliy,  iii.  204. 

V.  Alk'H,  i.  614. 

I'.  Amev,  i.  ii'Mi. 

V.  Arilior.  i.  041. 

V.  Aslil.uriiL'r,  i.  479,  482, 

t'.  Austin,  i.  0'.l3. 

I',  linker,  i.  (j.'}4. 

V.  HiinckH,  i.  614. 

r.  Hiirniinl,  iii.  161). 

V.  Hartliriip,  ii.  ;j(»2,  6:18. 

V.  Barton,  i.  0(K) ;  ii.  144,  170,  178  ; 
iii.  i»'J. 

V.  Hateiiian,  i.  643. 

V.  Batten,  i.  (339. 

V.  Beanlsley,  iii.  198,  199,  203,  338, 
3J2,  401. 

V.  Beillbnl,  iii.  242. 

V.  Bell,  i.  0:52,  047. 

V.  Bc-iijamin,  i.  47'J,  481,  482. 

V.  Bevaii,  i.  504. 

V.  BijiKS,  ii.  48M,  498. 

I'.  Birch,  i.  5()5,  610. 

V.  Bird.  i.  090;  iii.  172. 

V.  Blacker,  iii.  2'JO,  297. 

r.  Bliss,  i.  603,  516. 

V.  Bolton,  ii.  497. 

f.  Bond,  i.  609. 

V.  Bolts,  i.  099. 

V.  Bral)ant,  ii.  622 

t:  Britain,  ii.  090,  G97. 

i:  Brown,  i.  47.'),  000;  iii.  160. 

«'.  Bdrliofxton,  i.  153. 

r.  Btirn.<all,  ii.  740. 

V.  Burt,  i.  18. 

V.  Campbell,  iii.  151,  150. 

V.  Carlcton,  ii.  743,  782. 

V.  Carter,  i.  .')04. 

V.  Challis.  ii.  (Jiti. 

r.  Clianilierlaine,  i.  022. 

i;.  Ciiarlton,  ii.  054. 

V.  Clevi-land  Bank.  ii.  149. 

V.  Collier,  ii.  401,  4S8,  497. 

V.  Collins,  iii.  421. 

V.  Collis,  ii.  055;  iii.  501. 

V.  Considine.  i.  89  ;  ii.  537,  5.18,  585, 
688.  689,  692,  699,  015,  025, 
745,  754. 

V.  Cooper,  i.  003  ;  ii.  631. 

V.  Cox.  i.  021. 

V.  Craft,  iii.  203. 

r.  CraRo,  i.  634. 

V.  Crick,  i.  040. 

i:  Davics,  i.  021 ;  ii.  638,  640,  653. 

V.  Day,  i.  470. 

V.  Deavors,  iii.  234. 

I'.  Dirry,  i.  479. 


Doe  «'.  Dignowitty,  iii.  201. 
t*.  Dixon,  i.  471. 
r.  Donovan,  i.  010. 
r.  DouglaitK.  iii.  22'.'. 
«-.  Dovvdall,  iii.  113,  ilJ,  l.;o. 
I'.  Dunbar,  i.  042. 
V.  Durden,  iii.  171. 
V.  Kdjjar,  iii.  174. 
r.  Kdlin,  ii.  640. 
r.  Kdwurds,  i.  694. 
r.  Klli«,  ii.  772. 
V.  Krrinf^ton,  i.  404;  in.  \2l. 
V.  Kvaiih,  i.  0(>*J. 
V.  Kwart.  ii.  502,  6.'.h    .Mo   Ti. 
e'.  Eyre,  ii.  700. 
V.  Field,  ii.  401.  50.' 
r.  Fonnereau.  ii.  049,  710,  7K 
r.  Ford.  ii.  02<». 
»•.  Francis,  i.  000. 
V.  Fridge,  iii.  270. 
V.  Gatacre,  i.  104. 
V.  Giles,  ii.  101. 
V.  Glover,  i.  HO  ;  ii.  690. 
V.  Goffe,  ii.  052. 
V.  Goldwin,  i.  040. 
I',  (lowcr,  i.  002. 
I'.  (Jrc^'orv,  iii    148,  153. 
V.  (Jwinnell,  i.  290,  299. 
V.  Hale,-*,  ii.  142. 
r.  llarbrough,  iii.  162. 
r.  Ilarvcv,  ii.  062. 
V.  llazelf,  i.  04-3. 
r.  Hilder.  ii.  357. 
r.  Hogg,  i.  511. 
I'.  Ilolnios,  ii.  596. 
V.  lloinfray,  ii.  401,  489,  498. 
r.  Howard,  i.  041. 
V.  Ilowdl,  ii.  748;  iii.  108. 
v.  How  land.  i.  70<5. 
V.  Himlics,  i.  039,  041.  042. 
i:  Hull,  i.  048,  053;  iii.  137. 
r.  Huini)lirev9,  i   (i39. 
V.  Hurd,  iii.  3.50,  391. 
r.  Ironmonger,  ii.  050. 
V.  Jackson,  i.  040. 
I'.  .lamicey,  iii.  148,  152,  168. 
V.  .Icfferson,  iii.  154. 
r.  .lepson.  i.  509. 
I'.  .loluison,  i.  641. 
f.  .Jones,  i.  689. 
«-.  Kcighflv,  i.  042. 
V.  Knight,  iii.  .304.  306. 
r.  Lambly,  i.  042. 
v.  Laming,  i.  611. 
r.  Laniiis,  iii.  18. 
V.  Law  ley.  iii.  15.3. 
r.  Lazenbv.  i.  79. 
r.  Ix-a.  i.  040 ;  ii.  028. 
V.  Ix'wis,  i.  52'.t. 
V.  Lock,  iii.  403.  470,  47L 
I'.  Long.  i.  (502. 
V.  Lucas,  i.  012. 
r.  I^nxton,  i.  127. 
K.  Lyile,  ii.  780. 


:<•.» 


740 


Ivi 


TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 


Doe  V.  Mace,  ii.  142. 

V.  Martin,  ii.  477,  699 ;  iii.  421. 

V.  Masters,  i.  513,  514. 

V.  M'CulIough,  iii.  95,  97. 

V.  M'Keag,  i.  617,  620,  622, 

V.  McKilvain,  iii.  197. 

V.  McLoskey,  ii.  123. 

V.  Meakin,  iii.  466. 

V.  Miller,  i.  622. 

V.  Moffatt,  i.  632. 

V.  Moore,  ii.  628,  629. 

V.  Morgan,  ii.  636,  739,  745. 

V.  Morphett,  i.  640,  642. 

V.  Murrell,  i.  590. 

V.  Naylor,  iii.  341. 

V.  Nelson,  iii.  250. 

V.  Nichols,  ii.  538,  540. 

V.  Nowell,  ii.  598. 

V.  Nutt,  i.  315. 

V.  Oliver,  ii.  641. 

V.  Palmer,  i.  638. 

V.  Passinghani,  ii.  476,  497. 

V.  Paul,  i.  513. 

V.  Pearson,  i.  86  ;  ii.  9. 

V.  Peck,  i.  531. 

V.  Pegge,  ii.  177. 

V.  Pendleton,  ii.  106. 

V.  Perryn,  ii.  597,  603,  625,  687. 

V.  Phillips,  i.  511,  593;  ii.  123. 

V.  Porter,  i.  629,  637. 

V.  Prettyman,  iii.  263,  342. 

V.  Price,  i.  617. 

V.  Prigg,  ii.  597,  599. 

V.  Prosser,  i.  691 ;  ii.  536 ;  iii.  130. 

V.  Provoost,  ii.  597,  599,  637. 

V.  RafEan,  i.  631. 

V.  Reddin,  iii.  340. 

V.  Reed,  ii.  334 ;  iii.  344,  345. 

V.  Rees,  i.  589. 

V.  Reynold,  i.  599,  608. 

V.  Richards,  i.  91,  615. 

V.  Ries,  i.  479,  481. 

V.  Rivers,  i.  183. 

V.  Robinson,  i   127. 

V.  Rock,  i.  622. 

V.  Rusham,  iii.  358. 

V.  Salkeld,  ii.  443. 

V.  Scott,  iii.  559,  560. 

V.  Scudamore,  i.  186. 

V.  Seaton,  i.  485,  533,  594 ;  iii.  99. 

V.  Selby,  ii.  587,  592,  626,  746,  747. 

V.  Slieffield,  iii.  559,  560. 

V.  Sheppard,  iii.  16. 

V.  Shipphard,  ii.  622. 

V.  Simpson,  i.  595. 

V.  Smith,  i.  493,  503,  642  ;  iii.  339. 

V.  Smyth,  i.  598 ;  iii.  579. 

I'.  Snowdon,  i.  641. 

V.  Spence,  i.  641. 

V.  Stanion,  i.  480. 

V.  Stapleton,  i.  641. 

V.  Stevens,  i.  509,  510. 

V.  Stewart,  iii.  524. 

V.  Sturges,  i.  490. 


Doe  V.  Suramersett,  i.  639. 

V.  Thomas,  i.  617,  618. 

v.  Tidhury,  i.  589. 

V.  Tiniin?,  ii.  539. 

V.  Tuiinfli,  ii.  176. 

V.  Turner,  i.  141,  653  ;  iii.  16. 

V.  Underdovvn,  ii.  599;  iii.  559,  560. 

V.  Vincent,  ii.  712. 

V.  Walker,  i.  472.  474. 

V.  Wandlass,  i.  512. 

V.  Watkins,  i   641. 

V.  Watts,  i.  629,  643. 

V.  Webb,  ii.  605. 

V.  Wells,  i.  598,  602,  603. 

V.  Were,  i.  37. 

V.  White,  iii.  147,  159,  164. 

V.  Whittingham,  ii.  673. 

V.  Wiggins,  i.  593. 

V.  Wilkinson,  i.  642. 

V.  Wing,  iii.  148,  158. 

V.  Wood,  i.  622,  623,  637. 

V.  Worsley,  ii.  605. 

V.  Wroot,  ii.  573. 
Doebler's  Appeal,  i.  86 ;  ii.  631, 652,  654. 

766. 
Doidge  V.  Bowers,  i.  634. 
Dole  V.  Tluirlow,  iii.  291. 
Dolf  V.  Bassett,  i.  246.  302. 
Dolittle  V.  Eddy,  i.  500,  571,  624,  632, 

661,  662. 
DoUman  v.  Harris,  i.  436. 
DollofE  r.  Boston  &  M.  R.  R.,  ii.  333. 
Dolph  V.  Barney,  iii.  346,  347. 
Donahue  ik  Thompson,  iii.  152. 
Donald  v.  Hewitt,  ii.  194. 
Donalds  v.  Plumb,  ii.  561,  562. 
Donelson  v.  Polk,  i.  534,  535. 
Donley  v.  Hays,  ii.  126,  127,  129,  212. 
Donnell  v.  Clark,  ii.  341. 

V.  Harshe,  i.  605. 

V.  Thompson,  iii.  479. 
Donnelly  v.  Donnelly,  i.  222. 

V.  Simonton,  ii.  196. 
Donnels  v.  Edwards,  i.  705;  ii.  148. 
Donohne  r.  Chase,  ii.  75,  77. 

V.  McNichol,  ii  761. 
Donohugli  V.  Helme,  ii.  721. 
Donovan  r.  Pitcher,  iii.  17. 

r.  Vandenmark,  ii.  577. 
Doody  V.  Pierce,  ii.  188. 
Dooley  r.  Villalonga,  i.  429. 

V.  Wolcott,  iii.  337. 
Doolittle  r.  Holton,  iii.  222. 

V.  Lewis,  ii.  690,  706,  711. 

I'.  Tice,  iii.  151. 
Dorkray  r.  Noble,  ii.  122. 
Dorn  r.  Beasley,  i.  717. 

V.  Dunham,  i.  688. 

r.  Howe,  i.  368. 
Dorr  V.  Wainwright,  ii.  555t 
Dorrance  v.  Jones,  i.  555. 
Dorrell  v.  Johnson,  i.  6.54. 
Dorrow  i-.  Kelly,  ii.  152,  156. 
Dorsey  v.  Clarke,  ii.  518. 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED. 


Ivii 


Dorsey  v.  Eujjie,  i.  14  J. 

V.  MfFiirl.ind.  i.  ll"J.  431. 

V.  Sinitli.  i.  lol,  ;;•)'.». 
Doswell  r.  I)e  Lii  Liinza,  hi.  140,  148. 
Doten  r.  Hair.  ii.  2.'j5. 
Dollianl  '-.  Di-Dsoii,  iii.  15-1. 
Doton  r.  Uiissoll.  ii.  lUl). 
Doty  c.  Uiir.lick,  i.  093,  G02,  G68. 

r.  (iorliaiu,  i.  5. 
Doii;,'ni  r.  Kryer,  iii.  12*2. 
Dougliertv  r.  Mnttiicws,  i.  503. 

r.  MilCluMii.  ii.  11.  101.238. 

c.  Kaixiall,  ii.  111.  I'JT. 
Douglas  V.  ("oiijjreve,  ii.  Col. 

r.  SiiuiMway.  i.  15. 
Douglass  r.  BislKip,  ii.  Is3. 

V.  Hricc,  ii.  50(>. 

V.  Cline,  ii    105,  110,  104. 

V.  Dicksoi),  i.  22S,  210. 

c.  Durin.  ii.  ll'.l,  117. 

V.  llopiiaiigli,  iii.  511. 

i;.  Scott,  iii.  lO'.l,  110,  112,  130. 

I'.  Snow,  iii.  21.'<. 
Douf^rcy  r.  Toppinjx,  i.  204. 
Doiipe  '•.  Geiiin,  i.  5(i9,  578. 
Ddvl'  c.  Tarr,  ii.  5'J2. 
Dow  I'.  Clark,  ii.  20"J. 

I'.  Dow,  i.  l'J7. 

I',  (joulil,  iii.  274. 

V.  Jewell,  i.  71'.t  ;  ii.  515,  517,  635; 
iii.  175,  250,  261. 
Dowd  '•.  Tucker,  ii.  520. 
Dowliug  r.  Ilcnning.s.  ii.  3.39,  380,  387. 
Downer  r.  C'leiucnt,  ii.  204. 

v.  Vox,  ii.  205. 

V.  Smith,  i.  721 ;  iii.  381,  482. 

V.  Wilson,  ii.  137,  182. 
Downes  r    GrazeWrook,  ii.  77,  78.  522, 

521,  501.  570. 
Downing  c    Marshall,  ii.  579;  iii.  544, 
550. 

1-.  rahnateer.  ii.  150,  258,  277. 

V.  Wherrin.  ii.  757. 
Doyle  V.  Cohurn.  i.  302,  400,  421,  4.37. 
4.38 ;  ii.  255. 

V.  Howard,  ii.  80. 

r.  Lord,  ii.  319,  303.  305;  iii.  420. 
Doyley  v.  Attorney-General,  ii.  558. 
Dozier  i-.  Greg'>rv,  i.  154. 
Drake  v.  Kinsell,"  i.  400. 

V.  Newton,  i.  040. 

V.  Ramsay,  i.  4S0.  488  ;  iii.  204,  205. 

r.  Wells,  i.  15,  071  ;  iii.  371. 
Drane  v.  Gregory,  i.  5'j3,  004,  679,  720. 

V.  Gunter,  ii.  552. 
Draper  r.  Baker,  ii.  137. 

r.  Jackson,  i.  700. 
Drayton  r.  Grimke,  ii.  717. 

i:  Marshall,  ii.  101.  200. 
Dreutzer  v.  Hell.  i.  445  ;  iii.  354. 
Drew  r.  Drew,  i.  S^lhi. 

V.  Kimball,  iii.  Hi,  91. 

V.  Hust,  ii.  222 ;  iii.  85. 

V.  Smith,  ii.  37,  275. 


Drew  r.  Swift,  iii.  428,  431,  451. 

c.  Towle.  ii.  li^BI. 

V.  Wakefield,  ii.  554,  500. 

i:  Westtklil.  ii.  315. 
l)re.xel  /•.  Miller,  iii.  523. 
Driiian  r.  Niclioln,  ii.  70. 
Drinkwater  i,-.  Drinkwater,  i.  5-19. 
Drown  r.  Smilh,  i.  147;  ii.48.3;  iii.  398 
Drum  '•.  Simpson,  ii.  518. 
Drumtnond  v.  Uichards,  ii.  51. 
Drury  r.  Drury,  i.  :;27,  3:J0,  331.  8.32. 

r.  Foster,  iii.  253. 

r.  Triniont  Imp.  Co.,  ii.  218;  iii 
3'.«». 
Drusado  i-.  Wilde,  ii.  714. 
Drybntter  r.  Bartlioiomew.  i.  20. 
Dryden  i'.  Jcpherson,  iii.  411. 
Dubois  r.  Beaver,  i.  14 ;  ii.  380,  387. 

V.  Hull,  ii.  95. 
•    r.  Kelly,  i.  5,  32,  407. 
Dubose  r.  Young,  iii.  ;W8. 
I)id>s  r.  Dubs,  i.  174.  170,  187,214. 
Dubuque  r.  .Maloney.  iii.  449. 
1  )ut)u<|iie  Society  r.  Fleming,  i.  7.  27,  30. 
Diibunue  &  Fac.  H.  U.  r.  Litchfield,  iiL 

202. 
Ducker  v.  Belt,  ii.  203. 
Duclaud  i:  Uousseau,  ii.  112. 
Dudden  v.  Guardians,  ii.  371.  370,  377. 
Dudley  i-.  Cadwell,  ii.  101,  109,  133. 

V.  Foote,  i.  10. 

V.  Lee,  i.  044. 

r.  Sumner,  iii.  19-3,  .^30. 
Duff  r.  Wilson,  i.  594. 
DuUield  V.  Durtield,  ii.  597. 
Duffy  V.  Calvert,  ii.  559,  574. 

V.  X.  Y.  &  Harlem  R.  R.,  ii.  390; 
iii.  494,  502. 
Dufour  r.  I'ereira,  iii.  537,  5^38. 
Dugan  r.  Gittings.  iii.  218. 

r.  HolHns,  i.  722. 
Dugdale  /•.  Kobcrtson,  ii.  384,  388. 
Dugger  r   Oglesby,  iii.  491. 
Duhring  c.  Duliring,  i.  210. 
Duiinuen  r.  Rich,  ii.  317. 
Duke  r.  Balme,  ii.  90. 

V.  Hague,  i.  717. 

V.  Harper,  i.  598,  602,  004,  619;  iiL 
172. 
Dulanty  v.  I'ynchon,  i.  451. 
Dummcrston  r.  Xewfanc.  i.  313. 
Dumn  c.  Rothernu-I.  i.  040. 
Dumpor's  case.  i.  50.3.  507  ;  ii.  13. 
Duncan  r.  Dick.  i.  199. 

V.  Duncan,  i.  .335. 

I'.  Forrer,  i.  077.  081. 

V.  Ilodgcs.  iii.  252. 

r.  Mailara.  iii.  4.33. 

r.  McNeill,  ii.  193. 

V.  Sylvester,  i.  OSS.  714. 
Duneh  v.  Kent,  ii.  .574. 
Duncomb  r.  Duncomb,  i.  204,  207. 
Dundas  >•.  Bowlor.  ii.  1.30. 

I .  Hitchcock,  i.  259  ;  iii.  270.  272. 


Iviii 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 


Dungan  v.  Am.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  ii.  15L 
Dungey  v.  Angove,  i.  556. 
Dunliaui  c.  Duiiliara,  i.  406. 

V.  Kirkpatrick,  iii.  429,  474. 

V.  Osboin,  i.  204,  225,  269,  270. 

V.  Townsend,  i.  480,  623,  627. 

V.  Williams,  iii.  452. 
Dunklee  v.  Wilton  R.  R.  Co.,  ii.  331, 

899 ;  iii.  308. 
Dunkley  v.  Van  Buren,  ii.  251,  252. 
Dunlap  V.  BuUard,  i.  545. 

V.  Stetson,  iii.  438. 
Dunn  r.  Games,  iii.  281. 

V.  Merri weather,  iii.  242. 

V.  Sargent,  i.  201,  805;  ii.  611. 

V.  Tozer,  i.  400,  429,  446. 
Dunn's  Estate,  ii.  717. 
Dunne  v.  Ferguson,  i.  12. 

V.  Trustees,  &c.,  i.  622,  623. 
Dunning  c.  Finson,  i.  627.  « 

V.  Leavitt,  ii.  219. 

V.  Ocean  Bank,  i.  35 ;  ii.  261. 
Dunscomb  v.  Dunscomb,  i.  174. 
Dunseth  r.  Bank  of  U.  S.,  i.  300,  301. 
Dunsliee  v.  Grundj^,  i.  593. 

V.  Parmelee,  ii.  195,  245. 
Dunton  v.  Woodbury,  i.  451. 
Dunwoodie  v.  Reed,  ii.  625,  627. 
Duppa  V.  Mayo,  i.  512,  513,  515,  516 ; 

ii.  293. 
Dupuy  V.  Strong,  i.  699. 
Durand  v.  Isaacks,  ii.  110,  115. 
Durando  r.  Durando,  i.  204. 

V.  Wy man,  i.  541. 
Durant  v.  Johnson,  i.  686. 

V.  Palmer,  i.  571,  572. 

V.  Ritcliie,  i.  346 ;  iii.  268. 
Durel  V.  Boisblanc,  ii.  365. 
Durfee,  Pet.,  i.  336. 
Durham  v.  Angier,  i.  277,  312. 
Dussaume  v.  Burnett,  iii.  339. 
Dustin  V.  Cowdry,  i.  656,  658. 

V.  Steele,  i.  260. 
Dutton  V.  Gerrish,  i.  575. 

V.  Ives,  ii.  204,  257. 

V.  Tayler,  iii.  411. 

V.  Warschauer,  ii.  110,  113. 
Duty  V.  Graham,  ii.  112. 
Duval  V.  Bibb,  ii.  93,  473. 

V.  Marshall,  ii.  514. 
D wight  c.  Cutler,  i.  625. 
Dwight  Co.  V.  Boston,  ii.  367. 
Dwinell  v.  Perlev,  ii.  120. 
Dye  V.  Mann,  i.  374,  391,  438,  439,  452. 
Dyer  v.  Clark,  i.  209,  700,  703. 

V.  Depui,  ii.  357. 

V.  Gill,  iii.  286. 

V.  Rich,  iii.  115. 

V.  Sanford,  i.  672 ;  ii.  328,  357,  358, 
361,  362,  395,  397  ;  iii.  330,  470, 
472,  474. 

V.  Shurtk'ff,  ii.  79,  570. 

i;.  Toothaker,  ii.  179. 

V.  Wightman,  i.  559,  565,  566,  569. 


Dyer's  x\ppeal,  ii.  548. 
Dyett  1-.  Pendleton,  i.  559,  561,  564. 
Dyke  c.  Rendall,  i.  330,  331. 
Dyson  v.  Bradshaw,  iii.  311,  323. 
V.  SUeley,  i.  374. 


E. 


Eadie  v.  Slimmon,  iii.  276. 
Eagle  Fire  Ins.  Co.  r.  Lent,  ii.  270. 
Eagle  Ins.  Co.  v.  Pell,  ii.  240. 
Earl  V.  De  Hart,  ii.  371,  372. 

V.  Grim,  iii.  565,  566. 

V.  Xew  Brunswick,  ii.  709. 
Earle  r.  Earle,  i.  259,  455 ;  iii.  273. 

V.  Fisk,  iii.  388,  345. 

V.  Washburn,  ii.  562. 

V.  Wood,  iii.  560. 
Early  v.  Burtis,  i.  10. 
Earp's  Appeal,  ii.  499,  500. 
Easter  v.  Little  Miami,  &c.  R.  R.,  ii.  298, 

320  ;  iii.  128,  494. 
Easterbrooks  v.  Tillinghast,  ii.  505. 
Easterlv  v.  Keney,  ii.  532. 
Eastern  R.  R.  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  R., 

ii.  309, 
Eastham  v.  Roundtree,  ii.  507. 
East  Haven  v.  Hemingway,  iii  445. 
East  Jersey  Iron  Co.  r.  Wright,  iii.  402. 
Eastman  v.  Baker,  ii.  766. 

V.  Batchelder,  ii.  69,  117. 

V.  Foster,  i.  6 ;  ii.  225. 
East  Tenn.  &  V.  R.  R.  v.  Love,  iii.  224. 
Eaton  V.  Campbell,  iii.  342. 

V.  Eaton,  ii.  546 ;  iii.  263,  265. 

V.  Evans,  iii.  170. 

I'.  Green,  ii.  46,  47,  48,  53,  56,  63. 

V.  Jaques,  i.  498. 

V.  Gimonds,  i.  237,  240,  241,  242 ; 
ii.  182,  201.  204,  222,  245. 

V.  Smith,  iii.  429. 

V.  Swanzea  Water- Works,  ii.  342. 

V.  Whiting,  ii.  65,  71,  80,  101,  124. 
145,  105. 
Eaton's  Appeal,  i.  492. 
Eaves  i'.  Estes,  i.  7,  10,  26. 
Ebbert's  Appeal,  i.  704. 
Eberle  v.  Fisher,  i.  266. 
Echols  I'.  Cheney,  iii.  295. 
Eckhardt  v.  Schleeht,  i.  456. 
Eckman  v.  Eckman,  iii.  377,  380. 
Eddy  V.  Baldwin,  ii.  508. 
Edge  V.  Strafford,  i.  631 ,  646. 

V.  Worthington,  ii.  87. 
Edgell  V.  Hagens,  i.  435. 
Edgerly  v.  Edgerly,  ii.  506. 
Edgerton  v.  Huff,  i.  4 ;  iii.  363. 

V.  Jones,  iii.  334. 

V.  Page,  i.  521,  559,  560,  563,  564. 

V.  Young,  ii.  125.  203.  272. 
Edminster  v.  Higgins.  ii.  91. 
Edmondson  i-.  Welsh,  ii.  79. 
Edrington  v.  Harper,  ii.  45,  53,  63. 


TADLE  OP   CASES   CITED. 


lix 


Eilrinu'ton  v.  Newlaml,  ii.  112. 
Edsall  V.  Merrill,  i.  tJSt.'). 
Edboii  i".  Collmrii,  i.  (JUG. 

1-.  MuiKsull,  i.  71(5;  ii.  330,  345,  390; 
iii.  o)t,  17«. 
Eilwarils,  AV  i><ir(f,  ii.  87. 

V.  Hil.h,  i.  270. 

r.  lioiiaiiUDii,  ii.  !I7. 

V.  Hrinkor,  iii    313. 

t'.  Davenport,  iii.  121. 

V.  Kilwanis,  i.  425  ;  ii.  617. 

V.  Freeman,  ii.  452. 

c.  (iil)l)8,  ii.  784. 

V.  Hale,  i.  »!3t5,  (]50,  051,  053. 

I-.  ilaniiuonil,  ii.  02U. 

r.  Kearsev,  i.  350. 

i;.  N.  Y.  .^L  II.  U.  U.  Co.,  i.  520. 

V.  rarkliurst,  iii.  352. 

V.  Pope,  iii.  220. 

V.  Uov8,  iii.  351. 

V.  SlJater,  ii.  001,  0'J2,  0'J3,  0'J5. 

V.  Smith,  iii.  380. 

V.  Trumhull,  ii.  88. 

V.  Varick,  ii.  75;J,  758,  770. 
Effinjjer  v.  Lewis,  i.  015;  iii.  142. 
Egerton  v.  Brownlow,  ii.  432,  528,  005, 

OO'J. 
Egiileston  i-.  N.  Y.,  &c'.  K.  K.  Co.,  i.  005. 
Elinnaii  r.  Mayer,  iii.  154. 
Eiclielberger  r.  Harnitz,  ii.  700. 
Eit'ert  ads.  Kee<l,  iii.  105. 
Eister  r.  I'aul,  i.  5',l2 
Elder  c.  Burrus,  iii.  442. 

V.  Derby,  iii   512. 

I'.  Jones,  ii.  1'7. 

V.  House,  ii.  51,  62. 
Eldred-te  r.  Forrestal,  i.  204. 

I'.  I'ierce,  i.  448. 
Eldrid^c  i:  Kl.lri.lK'e.  ii.  697. 
Elfe  I'.  Cole,  ii.  110. 
Eli  I'.  Griilley,  i.  435. 
Elins  I'.  Veriliifro,  i.  385. 
Eliot  V.  Carter,  iii.  421. 

V.  Eliot,  iii.  5.39. 
Elkins  r.  Kdwanis,  ii.  101,  195. 
Ellicott  r.  Ellicott,  iii.  15. 

I'.  Mosier,  i.  288,  2:'0,  201. 

v.  Pearl,  i.  04;  iii    101,  104. 

V.  Welcii,  i.  217;  ii.  93. 
Elliot  V.  Fitcliburjr  U.  U.,  ii.  308. 

I'.  Nichols,  i.  709. 

V.  Patton,  ii.  181,  188. 

r.  Sleeper,  ii.  194  ;  iii.  282,  280,  291. 
EUiotsoii  V.  Feetliam.  ii.  .3h<». 
Elliott  V.  Aiken,  i.  521,  637,  604,  670, 
670,  583. 

i;.  Frakes,  iii.  340 

V.  Ma.xwell.  ii.  64,  03. 

V.  Pearce,  iii.  200. 

r.  Hhett,  ii.  330.  3.)4,  356,  307. 

V.  Smith,  i.  130,  589,  503,  694. 

r.  Stone,  i.  600,  610,  621,  030,  031, 
032,  649. 

V.  Turner,  ii.  23. 


Elliott  r.  Wood,  ii.  77.  78,  248. 

Elliit  I'.  Hoston,  II  ,  &  Erie  U.  U.,  ii.  710. 

V.  Carev,  iii.  442. 

r.  Didd'v.  i.  205. 

1-.  Drake,  ii.  202,  271. 

V.  Duncan,  ii.  370. 

V.  Ellis,  i.  291. 

I'.  KHse.x  M.  Hri<lge,  iii.  500. 

V.  Fibher,  ii.  5^»8. 

I'.  IIusKey,  ii.  100. 

V.  Kinyoii,  ii.  49. 

I'.  .Manchester  Carr.  Co.,  li.  ;i32. 

r.  .Martin,  ii.  271. 

c.  Murray,  iii.  170. 

f.  Pane,  iii.  18.  678. 

V.  Paitie,  i.  017.  020,  029,  031,  030. 

I'.  Selby.  iii.  671. 

V.  Tone.  ii.  304. 

r.  Welch,  i.  558;   iii.  .iwu,  .,ir^ 
Klli.son  )•.  Daniels,  li.  U)l,  lUO.  12;],  173 

V.  Pecare,  ii.  152. 

r.  Wilson,  iii.  335. 
Ellston  r.  Kennicott,  iii.  108. 
I'^llsworth  i:  Cook,  i.  182. 

r.  Lockwood,  ii.  79,  225,  250. 
Elinendorf  v.  Carmichael,  iii.  202. 

V.  Lockwood,  i,  217. 

i\  Taylor,  ii.  180. 
Elmore  '•.  Elmore,  i.  308. 

V.  Marks,  iii.  301. 
Elms  V  Uandall.  i.  595. 
lOlsbcrry  '•.  Poykin,  iii.  li>4. 
Else  V.  Osborn,  ii.  458. 
Elsey  V.  McDaniel,  iii.  202. 

V.  Metcalt,  iii.  ;i03,  310,  311. 
Elston  c.  Hohinson,  i.  3tJ0,  372,  419. 
Elwell  c.  Ikirnside.  i.  694. 

V.  C.ran<l  St.  U.  K.,  ii.  104. 

I'.  Hinckley,  iii.  175. 

V.  Shaw,  i.  470  ;  iii.  288,  294,  295. 
Elwes  V.  Maw,  i.  30. 
Elwood  V.  Klock,  i.  201,200,271,315; 

iii.  272. 
Elworthy  r.  Santonl.  i.  477. 
Ely  c.  Eastwood,  i.  43.S. 

'••  Ely,  ii.  98,  108,  258;  iii.  250. 

V.  Mat'uire,  ii.  10*5. 

r   Scofield,  ii.  199. 

r.  Wilco.v.  iii.  .33.5,  3.37,  3.39. 
Emans  i-.  Turnbiill.  iii.  59,  00,  05,  448. 
Emanuel  v.  Hunt.  ii.  123. 
Emhree  c.  Ellis,  i.  240,  248,  202. 
I'.mbry  .•.  Owen,  i.  74  ;  ii.  ;5<J8,  309,393 
Emerick  r.  Kohler,  iii.  454. 
Emerson  r.  Eur.  &  N.  A.-K.  R.,  ii.  104. 

r.  F'isk.  i.  (505. 

I-.  Harris,  i.  23:3. 

c.  Mooney.  iii.  403,  40& 

V.  Murray,  ii.  68. 

r.  Simpson,  ii.  8. 

V.  Spicer,  i.  490. 

r.  Taylor,  iii.  450. 

r.  Thompson,  i.  143. 

V.  White,  iii.  19. 


Ix 


TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 


Emerson  v.  Wiley,  ii.  356,  396  ;  iii.  108. 
Emery,  Re,  502. 

i\  Barnett,  i.  250. 

V.  Chase,  ii.  450,  470,  483;  iii.  387. 
Emigrant  Sav.  Bank  v.  Goldman,  ii.  270. 
Emison  v.  Risque,  ii.  91. 
Emmerson  ;•.  Heelis,  i.  11 ;  iii.  367. 
Eminc'S  v.  Feeley,  i.  557,  617,  622,  651. 
Emmons  v.  Murray,  iii.  265,  337. 

V.  Scudder,  i.  651. 
Enfield  v.  Day,  iii.  203. 

V.  Permit,  iii.  203,  217. 
Engels  V.  McKinley,  i.  554. 
England  v.  Slade,  i.  594. 
Englisli  V.  Jolmson,  ii.  407. 

V.  Key,  i.  527,  548. 

V.  Lane,  ii.  45,  52,  63. 

V.  Law,  ii.  510. 

V.  Wright,  i.  248. 
Ennis  v.  Harmonv  Ins.  Co.,  ii.  244. 
Eno  V.  Del  Vecchio,  ii.  327,  385,  386. 
Ensign  v.  Colbura,  ii.  141. 
Ensley  v.  Baiantine,  ii.  513. 
Ensminger  v.  People,  iii.  441. 
Enston  V.  Friday,  ii.  195. 
Ensworth  v.  Griffiths,  ii.  62. 
Episcopal    City   Mission    v.   Appleton, 

ii.  3. 
Epley  V.  Witlierow,  iii.  82. 
Epping  V.  Devanny,  i.  558. 
Equitable  L.  Ass.  Soc.  v.  Bostwick,  ii. 

217. 
Equitable  Tr.  Co.  ?'.  Fisher,  ii.  85. 
Erb  V.  Brown,  ii.  358,  396,  397  ;  iii.  86. 
Erickson  v.  Mich.  Land  &  Ir.  Co.,  ii.  384. 

V.  Rafferty,  ii.  108. 

V.  Willard,  ii.  550. 
Erskine  v.  Townsend,  ii.  36,  38,  46,  47, 

105,  109,  117,  166,  168,  180,  271. 
Ervine's  Appeal,  iii.  227. 
Erwin  v.  Helm.  iii.  236. 

r.  Olmsted,  i.  692,  693 ;  iii.  163. 

V.  Shuey,  ii.  48,  118. 
Eskridge  v.  McClure,  ii.  97,  98. 
Esling  V.  Williams,  ii.  .347. 
Essex  V.  Essex,  i.  702. 
Essex  Co.  V.  Durant,  ii.  566. 
Esson  i\  McMasters,  iii.  441. 
Estabrook  i\  Hapgood,  i.  131,  309. 

V.  Moulton,  ii.  258. 

V.  Smith,  iii.  495,  507,  509,  511,  521, 
529. 
Estep  V.  Estep,  i.  521. 

V.  Hutchman,  iii.  229,  230. 
Estes  V.  Cook,  iii.  143. 
Esty  V.  Baker,  i.  017,  631,  652;  iii.  420, 
422,  431. 

V.  Clark,  iii.  559. 

V.  Currier,  iii.  413,  420,  465. 
Eulrich  v.  Richter,  ii.  372. 
Euper  V.  Atkins,  i.  367,  446. 
Eureka  Co.  v.  Edwards,  iii.  264. 
Eustace  v.  Scawen,  i.  681. 
Evans  v.  Brittain,  i.  686. 


Evans  v.  Elliot,  i.  540,  596 ;  ii.  144. 

V.  Evans,  i.  38,  179,  273,  274,  277. 

V.  Gale,  iii.  276. 

V.  Gibbs,  iii.  324. 

V.  Goodlet,  ii.  95. 

V.  Huffman,  ii.  191. 

V.  Inglehart,  i.  139. 

V.  Kimball,  ii.  204. 

V.  King,  ii.  528,  539,  547. 

V.  Marriken,  ii.  107. 

V.  Norris,  ii.  69. 

V.  Pierson,  i.  335. 

V.  Reed,  i.  650. 

V.  Roberts,  i.  11;  iii.  364,  367. 

V.  Rosser,  ii.  10. 

V.  Smith,  iii.  537. 

V.  Summerlin,  iii.  262. 

V.  Thomas,  ii.  139. 

V.  Vaughn,  i.  468. 

I'.  Webb,  i.  316,  336. 
Evans'  Appeal,  iii.  572. 
Evansville  r.  Page,  iii.  428. 
Eveleth  v.  Crouch,  iii.  111. 
Everest  ?;.  Ferris,  ii.  123. 
Everett  v.  Everett,  ii.  514. 

V.  Whitfield,  iii.  178. 
Everman  v.  Robb,  ii  163. 
Evers  v.  Challis,  ii.  746.  762,  791. 
Everts  v.  Agnes,  iii.  321,  323. 

V.  Beach,  i.  695. 
Evertsen  v.  Sawyer,  i.  595. 
Evertson  v.  Booth,  ii.  229,  231. 
Ewart  V.  Cockrane,  ii.  332. 

?'.  Walling,  ii.  46. 
Ewer  V.  Hobbs,i.  717;  ii.  106,  112,139. 
Ewing  V.  Burnet,  i.  63;   iii.  139,  149, 
150,  162,  421. 

V.  Savary,  i.  682. 
Exchange  Bank  v.  Rice,  ii.  219. 
Exeter  New  Par.  v.  Odiorne,  ii.  498. 
Exton  V.  Greaves,  ii.  51.  239. 
Exum  V.  Canty,  iii.  379. 
Eyler  v.  Crabbs,  ii.  94. 
Eyre  v.  Burmester,  ii.  196. 
Eysaraan  v.  Eysaman,  ii.  453,  467,  468, 

481,  483  ;  iii.  385. 
Eyster  v.  Hatheway,  i.  418 ;  iii.  347. 


Fabri  v.  Bryan,  i.  658. 
Factors'  Ins.  Co.  v.  Murpliy,  ii.  203. 
Fagan  v.  Cadmus,  iii.  492. 
Falirney  v.  Holsinger,  i.  105. 
Failing  v.  Schenck,  i.  467. 
Fair  v.  Stevenot,  iii.  337. 
Fairbanks  v.  Metcalf,  iii.  299,  317,  318, 
321. 

V.  Williamson,  iii.  113. 
Faircliild  v.  Chasteileux,  i.  343,  344, 706. 

V.  Fairchild,  i.  701,  703. 

V.  Rassdall,  ii.  54. 
Fairfax  v.  Montague,  ii.  190. 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Ixl 


FairfieM  r   MfArtliur.  ii.  184. 
Fiiiris  f.  WnlkcT,  i.  'J7. 
Fiiirley  c.  FauU-y,  iii.  102,  384. 
Fairman  r.  Bavin,  ii.  522,  W9. 

V.  neal,  iii.  lt)5. 
Fairtitk'  r.  (lillaTt,  iii.  IOC,. 
Falis  /•.  Coinray  Ins.  Co  ,  ii.  G5. 
Falkner  «■.  Ik'ers,  i.  6!I2. 
Fail  r.  Sutter  County,  ii.  805,  307,  810. 
Falls  v.  Keis,  iii.  451. 
Falis  Village  W.  V.  Co.  v.  Tibbctts,  iii. 

451. 
F:il mouth  I'  Thomas,  i.  11. 
F.mclier  r.  De  .MoiUc'.:rt.',  iii.  427. 
Fani-y  v.  Si-ott,  iii  4(JJ. 
Faiiiiinfj  i\  Kerr,  ii.  71,  73. 
Faiisliaw's  cast-,  iii.  2-<l. 
Farewell/-.  Dickenson,  i.  678. 
Farley  v.  Craij;,  i.  548  ;  ii.  2'JO.  292,  293, 
302. 

V.  Parker,  i.  486. 

V.  Tlioin|i9on,  i.  548,  552. 

V.  Whiteliead.  i.  429. 
Farmer  v.  Hosiers,  i.  579. 

r.  Samuels,  i.  721. 

V.  Simpson,  i.  382,  426. 
Fanners'  IJank  r.  Bronson,  ii.  153,  170. 
F.irniers'  Fire  Ins.  Co.  c.  Edwards,  ii. 

133,  180. 
Fanners'  Loan,  &c.  Co.  v.  Carey,  ii   164. 

I'.  Hendriekson,  i.  17  ;  ii    104. 
Farmers'  &  Mech.  Bank  v.  Drury,  iii. 
302. 

V.  Greifory,  i.  710. 
Farnswortli  «•.  Boston,  ii.  172. 

V.  Taylor,  iii.  108,  459. 
Farnum  '•.  Metcalf,  ii.  181. 

V.  Peterson,  iii.  .349,  351. 

r.  Piatt,  ii.  353. 
Farquliarson  v.  Eichelberger,  ii.   539  ; 

iii.  399. 
Farr  i-.  Smith,  i.  694. 
Farrall  v.  llilditcli,  iii.  461. 
Farrand  r.  Marshall,  ii  381. 
Farrant  c.  Lovel,  ii   141. 
Farrar  r.  ChaufTetete,  i.  27. 

V.  Cooper,  iii.  103. 

V.  Farrar,  iii.  320. 

V.  Fessenden,  iii.  147,  162,  164,  342. 

V.  McCue,  ii.  710. 

I'.  Staekpole,  i.  10,  24;   iii   415. 
Farrell  r.  Bean,  ii   53. 

I'.  Parlier,  ii.  248. 

i".  Richards,  ii.  .307. 
Farrington  r.   Barr,  ii.  455,   603,  611, 
540;  iii.  401. 

V.  Kimball,  i   525. 
Farrow  v.  Edmundson,  i.  610. 
Farson  r.  Goodale,  i.  031.  630,  644. 
Farwell  ••.  Cotting,  i.  237,242,262,  808; 
ii.  200. 

V.  Murphv,  ii.  261. 

V.  Rogers,  iii.  143,  349. 

V.  Warren,  i.  058. 


Fash  I'.  Blake,  iii.  .381. 

Fau^'ht  ('.  Holway,  iii.  162. 

Faulkner  v.   Bruckenbruugh,    ii.    107, 

109,  13.3. 
Faure  r.  NVinans,  ii.  240. 
Favil  »•.  Koberis,  iii.  87. 
Fawcctis  r.  Kininuy,  iii.  326. 
Faxun  r.  Folvey,  ii  5^52  ;  iii.  363. 

V.  Wallace,  iii.  240. 
Fay,  Petitir)ner,  ii.  805. 

r.  Brewer,  i.  156;  ii.  105,  130,  170. 

V.  Cheney,  i.  237  ;  ii.  87,  109,  121, 
133,  140. 

r.  Fay,  li   502. 

r.  Ilolloran,  i.  578. 

i;.  Muzzey,  i.  20,  27;  iii.  417. 

V.  Richardson,  iii.  .300. 

i;   S^dvester.  ii   597. 

V.  Tai't,  ii.  49!». 

V.  Valentine,  ii.  25.3. 
Fears  o.  Brooks,  i.  311,  342. 

r.  Lynch,  ii.  570. 
Feather  v.  Strohoecker,  i.  723. 
Feely  v.  Buckley,  i.  710. 
Feger  r.  Keefcr,  iii.  222. 
Fchley  v.  Barr,  i.  425. 
Felch  V.  Taylor,  i   534,  554;  ii.  86,  108, 

169,  294  ;  iii.  .Wj. 
Fekler  r.  Murphv,  ii.  265. 
Fell  r.  Price,  iii.  222. 

r.  Young,  iii.  342. 
Fellows  r.  .Vlleii,  iii.  575. 

r.  Lee,  i   08. 
Fellows'  .\pi)eal,  ii.  493. 
Felton  v.  Hamilton,  iii.  281. 

V.  Simpson,  ii.  .3-39,  .342.  * 

f.  Smith,  iii.  248. 
Fenby  ;•.  .Johnson,  ii.  605. 
Fenn  v.  Hohne,  iii.  208. 

i".  Smart,  i.  507. 
Fenner  v.  Duplock,  i.  000. 
Fentiman  r.  Smith,  i.  664,  666. 
Fenton  i:  Lord,  ii.  219. 

V.  Torrey,  ii.  72. 
Fenwick  r.  Floyd,  iii.  423. 

V.  Gill,  iii.  74. 

V.  Mitforth,  ii.  458. 
Feoffees   of   Grammar  School   i'.    An- 
drews, iii.  217. 
Ferguson  »•.  'Bell,  iii.  266. 

V.  Hedges,  iii.  648,  659,  600. 

V.  Kimball,  ii.  212. 

V.  Kumler,  i.  439. 

r.  Mason,  iii.  .385. 

r.  Tweedy,  i.  183. 
Fernald  r.  Linscott,  ii.  169. 
Ferrall  c.  Kent,  i.  605. 
Ferrel  r.  Woodward,  ii.  300,  307. 
Ferribre  r.  New  (^rlcnns.  iii.  06. 
Ferrin  v.  Errol,  ii.  524.  •")25. 

V.  Kenney.  i.  610.  rtl8. 
Ferris  r.  Brown,  ii.  3:<S ;  iii.  67. 

i;.  Coover,   iii.    86,   238,  481,   45:>. 
469. 


Ixii 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 


Ferris  v.  Crawford,  il.  51,  217,  220. 

V.  Ferris,  ii.  67. 

V.  Irving,  iii.  294. 
Ferry  v.  Laible,  ii.  708. 
Ferson  v.  Dodge,  ii.  780. 
Fessler's  Appeal,  ii.  54. 
Fetrow  v.  Merriweatlier,  iii.  351,  394. 
Fetters  v.  Humplireys,  ii.  331. 
Field  V.  Gooding,  ii.  71.    • 

V.  Herrick,  i.  475 ;  iii.  500. 

V.  Howell,  i.  469. 

r.  Jackson,  i.  167. 

V.  Mills,  i.  505. 

V.  Seabury,  iii.  210. 

V.  Snell,  iii.  506. 

I'.  Stagg,  iii.  255. 

V.  Swan,  ii.  144. 
Fifield  V.  Sperry,  ii.  102,  269. 
Fifty  Associates  v.  Grace,  i.  525. 

I'.  Rowland,  i.  510,  513,  631,  656 ; 
ii.  26,  28. 
Fightmaster  v.  Beasly,  i.  694. 
Filbert  v.  Hoff,  i.  692. 
Fillebrown  v.  Hoar,  i.  564. 
Filliter  r.  Pliippard,  i.  156. 
Fillman  v.  Divers,  ii.  510,  525. 
Finch  V.  Brown,  ii.  246. 

V.  Finch,  ii.  517. 

V.  Houghton,  ii.  259. 

V.  Winchelsea,  ii.  559. 
Finch's    (Sir  Moyle)  case,  i.  652;   iii. 

279,  281. 
Findlay  v.  Smith,  i.  149,  151. 
Finlay  v.  King,  ii.  7,  12. 
Finley  v.  Dietrick,  i.  460. 

V.  McConnell,  i.  418,  4-34. 

V.  Simpson,  i.  518;  ii.  293,  299;  iii. 
331. 

V.  U.  S.  Bank,  ii.  261. 
Finn  i'.  Sleight,  i.  250. 
Finucan  v.  Kendig,  iii.  406. 
Fiquet  v.  Allison,  i.  605. 
Fireman's    Ins.    Co.   v.   McMillan,   iii. 

317. 
Firestone  v.  Firestone,  i.  228. 
First  Nat.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Salisbury,  ii.  80, 

105. 
First  Parisli  of  Sutton  v.  Cole,  i.  81 ;  ii. 

4.34. 
Fish  V.  Coster,  ii.  718. 

V.  Dodge,  i.  571. 

".  Fish,  i.  216. 
Fishar  v.  Prosser,  i.  698,  654;  iii.  155, 

172. 
Fishback  v.  Lane,  i.  449. 
Fisher  v.  Beckworth,  iii.  300,  305. 

V.  Deering,  i.  527,  548. 

V.  Dewerson,  i.  711,  712,  714,  715. 

t;.  Fields,  i.  89;  ii.  488,  687,  649. 

V.  Grimes,  i.  203. 

V.  Hall,  iii.  299,  300. 

V.  Johnson,  ii.  93,  97, 

V.  Meister,  i.  438. 

V.  Millikin,  i.  565. 


Fisher  v.  Morgan,  i.  292,  293. 

V.  Mossman,  ii.  193,  195;  iii.  85. 

V.  Otis,  ii.  127,  1.33,  25". 

V.  Provin,  i.  700,  710. 

V.  Smith,  ii.  456;  iii.  450,  451,  452 

r.  Thirkell,  i.  521,  570. 
Fisliwick  V.  Sewell,  ii.  535. 
Fisk  V.  Eastman,  i.  204. 

V.  Fisk,  ii.  100,  148. 

V.  Stubbs,  iii.  276. 
Fiske  V.  Fiske,  ii.  70. 

V.  Tolman,  i.  231 ;  ii.  117,  218. 
Fitch  V.  Baldwin,  iii.  102,  489. 

V.  Brock,  iii.  366. 

V.  Bunch,  iii.  320. 

V.  Cotheal,  ii.  137. 

V.  Fitch,  iii   102. 

V.  Johnson,  ii.  300 ;  iii.  494. 
Fitchburg  Cotton  Co.  v.  Melven,  1.  133, 

552,  557;  ii.  142,  173. 
Fite  i\  Doe  d.  Bingham,  iii.  329. 
Fithian  v.  Monks,  ii.  117,  220,  260. 
Fitton  r.  Hamilton  City,  i.  628. 
Fitzgerald  v.  Barker,  ii.  219,  220. 

r.  Beebe,  i.  595;  ii.  107. 

i\  Forristal,  ii.  249. 

V.  Reed,  i.  485. 

V.  Urton,  ii.  405. 
Fitzhugh  V.  Barnard,  iii.  344,  348. 

V.  Croghan,  iii.  291,  479,  483,  488. 
Fitzpatrick  v.  Fitzgerald,  ii.  566,  573. 
Flagg  i:  Bean,  i.  190. 

V.  Eames,  iii.  466. 

V.  Flagg,  ii.  45;  iii.  225. 

v.  Mann,  i.  721 ;  ii.  46,  47,  50,  61, 
53,  60,  61,  63;  iii.  101,  107. 

V.  Thurber,  ii.  220. 

V.  Thurston,  iii.  433,  4.34. 
Flanagan  v.  Hutchinson,  ii.  219. 

V.  Philadelphia,  iii.  442. 
Flanders  v.  Lamphear,  ii.  69,  70,  116. 
Fleetbush  i-.  Avenue,  iii.  242. 
Fleetwood's  &  Aston's  cases,  ii.  212. 
Fleming  v.  Buchanan,  ii.  689. 

V.  Gooding,  i.  592. 

V.  Griswold,  iii.  178. 

V.  Parry,  ii.  199. 
Flemister  v.  Phillips,  i.  386. 
Fletcher  v.  Ashburner,  i.  35,  173. 

V.  Cary,  ii.  253,  254,  2.55. 

V.  Chase,  ii.  182,  204,  227. 

V.  Coleman,  iii.  275. 

V.  Holmes,  ii.  110;  iii.  81. 

V  Mansur,  iii.  260,  280,  299. 

V.  McFarlane,  i.  535,  591. 

V.  McHale,  ii.  605. 

V.  Peck,  iii.  198,  203,  205. 

V.  Phelps,  iii.  443. 

V.  Smith,  ii.  368. 

V.  State  Bank,  i.  409 ;  iii.  491. 
Flight  V.  Thomas,  ii.  343. 
Flinn  v.  McKinley,  i.  690. 
Flint  V.  Sheldon,  ii.  47,  51,  53 

V.  Steadman,  ii.  654. 


TAULE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Ixiii 


Flintlioiii'i*  Appeal,  ii.  783. 
KIdoiI  r.  Floml,  i.  (i'^iG,  662. 
Flora  (•   t'arltiaii,  ii.  .'Ml. 
Florciico  r.  llopkiii!*,  i.  71t>. 
F'lori'iitiiK'  I'.  HartDii,  iii.  228. 
Flower  v.  Klwood,  ii.  1211,  IU4. 

«;.  Laiu'f,  ii.  220. 
Floyd  V.  Floy.l,  i.  013. 

r.  Miiiisi'V,  iii    153. 

V.  MnHii-i".  i.  101,  110.  460. 
Flover  r   LuviiiKtin),  li.  .'il, 
Fluck  c.  Kiplogic,  ii.  100. 
Flynii  v.  Trask,  i.  537. 
Flyiit  v.  Arnokl.  iii.  338,  344,  346,  348, 
3t)0. 

I',  lliihhard,  ii.  507. 
Fobes  V  Siiattiick,  i.  139. 
Fogarty  r.  Fiiilay,  iii.  340. 

V.  S.iwyer,  ii.  77,  113. 
Fogg  V.  Clark,  iii.  317,  503. 

I'.  Fogji,  i.  3"J3. 
Foley  V.  Cowgill,  iii.  317. 

r.  Howard,  iii.  310. 

1-.  Hose,  ii.  121),  128. 

I'.  Wvetli,  ii.  382. 
Folger  r.'Mitciiell,  i.  719. 
Folk  l:  Varii,  iii.  310,  402. 
Follansbe  r.  Kilbretli,  ii.  570. 
Folly  I'.  Vuniuvl,  iii.  302. 
Foisoni  V.  Carii,  i.  362,  375,  407,  422, 

452. 
Folt3  I'.  Hnntlev,  i.  558. 
Fonda  r.  Borst,"  ii.  321,  519. 

V.  Jones,  ii.  05. 

V.  SaK'e,   ii.   15,   18;   iii.  136,   302, 
310,311,  320. 
Fonnercau  r.  F'onnereau,  ii.  747. 
Fontain  v.  Ravenel,  iii.  551,  557. 
Foos  r.  Scarf,  ii   712,  714,  721. 
Foose  v.  Wliitteinore,  ii.  551. 
Foot  V.  Dickinson,  i.  159. 

V.  New  Haven  &  Northampton  Co., 
i.  603,  666,  070,  672. 
Foote  V.  Burnet,  iii.  478,  481,  491. 

I'.  Cincinnati,  i.  658. 

V.  Colvin,  i.  142,  627;  ii.  624,  532; 
iii.  416. 
Forbes  v.  Hall,  iii.  209. 

f.  MoEfat,  ii.  204,  662. 

V.  Smiley,  i.  028. 

V.  Smitli,  i.  174. 
Forbush  i-.  Lombard,  iii.  412. 
Forcey's  Appeal,  ii.  499. 
Ford  V.  Cobb,  i.  10,  31. 

V.  Erskine,  i.  219. 

V.  Flint,  i.  «8  ;  ii.  663;  iii.  102,  313, 
468. 

r.  Ford,  iii.  572. 

V.  James,  iii.  306,  311. 

V.  Olden,  ii.  60. 

r.  Pbilpot,  ii.  239. 

V.  Smitli,  ii.  91. 

V.  Walsworth,  iii.  501,  603. 

V.  Whitlock,  i.  007 ;  iii.  67. 


Ford  r.  Wil.Hon.  iii.  110,  102,  170. 
Foreman  c.  Foreman,  i.  35. 
Forrest  v.  Forre-st,  i  321. 

r.  Tramnieli,  i.  215. 
Forbhaw  r.  Wel-by,  ii.  493. 
Forster  c.  llale,  ii.  547,  648. 
Forsytiie  v.  liallance,  iii.  2U0. 

V.  I'reer,  i.  429. 

V.  Price,  i.  143. 
Fort  V.  Murch,  ii    121,  165. 
Fort  I'iaih  Hridj;e  i:  Smith,  ii.  310. 
Fort  Wayne   K.  K.  Co.  c  Mellett,  iii. 

351,  352. 
Forth  c.  (^Iiapman,  i.  107  ;  ii.  703,  767, 
708,  774,  780. 

I'.  Norfolk,  ii.  171. 
Fortier  v.  Ballance,  i.  602. 
Forward  i-.  Deetz.  i.  000. 
Foscue  r.  Foscue.  ii.  5JJ5. 
Fosdick  V.  Barr,  ii.  121,  151. 

I'.  Uooding,  i.  291. 

V.  Risk,  ii.  170. 
Fosgate  v.  Herkimer  Co.,  iii.  166,  170. 

174. 
Fo88  I*.  Crisj),  i.  190  ;  iii.  458. 

I'.  Straclm,  i.  408,  440. 
Foster  v.  Abbot,  i.  717. 

V.  Beardsley  Scythe  Co.,  iii.  310. 

V.  Browninji,  i.  607;  ii.  310. 

V.  Dennison,  ii.  470,  479. 

V.  Dwinel,  i.  213,  247. 

V.  Equitable  Ins.  Co.,  ii.  243. 

V.  Foss,  iii.  433. 

V.  Gordon,  i.  247. 

i;.  Hilliard,  i.  131  ;  ii.  224. 

V.  Joice,  i.  88. 

V.  Leland,  i.  452. 

V.  Mansfield,  iii.  306,  819,  320.  328. 

V.  Mapes,  iii.  331. 

1-.  Marshall,  i.  132,  188. 

r.  Morris,  i.  506. 

i;.  Perkins,  ii.  106. 

V.  Peyser,  i.  576. 

r.  Reynolds,  ii.  167. 

V.  Robinson,  i.  144. 

V.  Runk,  ii.  401. 

I'.  Strong,  ii.  125. 

V.  Trustees,  ii.  95. 

I'.  Wightman,  ii.  184. 
Foster's  Appeal,  i.  704. 
Foulke  V.   Bond,  iii.  154. 

r.  Stockdale,  iii.  174. 
Fournier  r.  Chisholm,  i.  421, 
Foust  f.  Moorman,  i.  715. 
Fow  I'.  Roberts,  i.  571. 
Fowle  f.  Merrill,  ii.  70. 
Fowler  c.  Baiiley,  i.  701. 

V.  Bott,  i.  oJiO,  666. 

V.  Bush,  ii.  104. 

V.  By  era.  ii.  273. 

t'.  Depau,  ii.  701. 

V.  Poling,  iii.  4>3.  487.  601.  510.  511. 

V.  Shearer,   i     2'.0.  257,    269,  346; 
iii.  124,  26  '.  294. 


Ixiv 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Fowler  v.  Thayer,  i.  677 ;  iii.  144. 
Fowley  v.  Palmer,  ii.  240,  244. 
Fox  V.  Corey,  i.  548. 

V.  Fletcher,  i.  706. 

V.  Fox,  ii.  526. 

V.  Hall,  iii.  345. 

V.  Harding,  ii.  169. 

V.  Hart,  ii.  395. 

V.  Nathans,  i.  G41. 

I'.  Phelps,  iii.  563,  565,  566. 

V.  Southack,  i.  79. 

V.  Union  Sugar  Refinery,  iii.  460. 
Foxcroft  i\  Barnes,  i.  717 ;  iii.  351. 
Fov  V.  Foy,  ii.  544. 
Frail  v.  Ellis,  ii.  92. 
Francestown  v.  Deering,  ii.  508,  516. 
Francis  v.  Garrard,  i.  301,  311. 

V.  Porter,  ii.  109,  110,271. 

V.  Wells,  ii.  91. 
Franciscus  v.  Keigart,  ii.  287,  435,  477. 
Frank  v.  Maguire,  i.  535. 
Franke  v.  Berkner,  ii.  467,  472. 
Franklin  i:  Carter,  i.  557,  594. 

V.  Coffee,  i.  378,  379,  455. 

V.  Borland,  iii.  101,  149. 

V.  McEntyre,  ii.  514. 

V.  Merida,  i.  600. 

V.  Osgood,  ii.  84,  567, 715,  716,  718. 

V.  Palmer,  i.  594. 

V.  Talmadge,  iii.  281. 
Franklin  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cousens,  ii.  321 ; 

iii.  451. 
Franks  v.  Lucas,  i.  451. 
Frankum  r.  Falmouth,  ii.  870. 
Fratt  V.  Whittier,  i.  24,  29. 
Fray  v.  Drew,  ii.  181,  182. 
Frazee  v.  Inslee,  ii.  205. 
Frazer,  Goods  of,  iii.  572. 
Frazier  v.  Brown,  ii.  878. 
Frederick  v.  Gray,  i.  691. 
Freeland  v.  Freeland,  ii.  256 ;  iii.  358. 
Freeby  v.  Tupper,  ii.  170. 
Freeman  v.  Auld,  ii.  184. 

V.  Baldwin,  ii.  57. 

V.  Barber,  i.  710. 

V.  Cooke,  ii.  578 ;  iii.  89. 

t;.  Foster,  iii.  508,  509. 

V.  Freeman,  iii.  248. 

V.  Headley,  i.  622. 

V.  McGaw,  ii.  121,  170. 

V.  Parsley,  ii.  709. 

V.  Paul,  i.  241. 

V.  Pope,  iii.  357. 

V.  Russell,  il.  511. 

V.  Schroeder,  ii.  118. 
Freer  v.  Stotenbur,  i.  466. 
Freison  v.  Bates  College,  ii.  184. 
French  i-.  Braintree  Mfg.  Co.,  ii.  396. 

V.  Burns,  ii.  53. 

V.  Caddell,  ii.  763. 

V.  Carhart,  ii.  331. 

V.  Crosby,  i.  286. 

V.  Freeman,  i.  20,  21. 

V.  French,  ii.  474;  iii.  291. 


French  v.  Fuller,  i.  472,  621,  687,  641. 

V.  Marstin,  ii.  338,  3.50,  352. 

V.  McAndrew,  iii.  264. 

V.  Mehan,  i.  707,  710. 

I'.  Peters,  i.  257,  259. 

V.  Pratt,  i.  303. 

V.  Rollins,  i.  126,  190 ;  iii.  168. 

V.  Spencer,  iii.  114. 

V.  Sturdivant,  ii.  47. 

V.  Turner,  ii.  123. 
Freudenstein  v.  Heine,  ii.  378. 
Freunde  v.  JMcCall,  i.  408. 
Freyvogle  v.  Hughes,  ii.  500. 
Frickee  v.  Donner,  ii.  228. 
Friedley  v.  Hamilton,  ii.  64,  155. 
Friedman  v.  Goodwin,  iii.  200,  204. 
Frink  i-.  Bellis,  iii.  490. 

I'.  Darst,  iii.  115. 

i:  Green,  iii.  396. 

V.  Murphy,  ii.  251. 
Frisbie  v.  Wliitney,  iii.  209,  213. 
Frische  v.  Cramer,  ii.  106. 
Frissel  v.  Rozier,  i.  344. 
Fritz  i:  Pusey,  iii.  491,  529. 
Frizzle  v.  Veach,  iii.  20,  352. 
Frogmorton  v.  Wharrey,  i.  112; 
Frontin  r.  Small,  iii.  294. 
Frost  V.  Angler,  iii.  428. 

V.  Beekman,  ii.  149;  iii.  321,  324, 
328,  339. 

V.  Borders,  i.  447. 

V.  Cloutman,  i.  117. 

I'.  Deering,  i.  258  ;  iii.  272,  297. 

V.  Earnest,  i.  658. 

V.  Frost,  ii.  535. 

V.  Peacock,  i.  237,  305. 

V.  Raymond,  iii.  517. 

V.  Spaulding,  iii.  428,  435,  453,  455. 

V.  Yonkers  Sav.  Bank,  ii.  181. 
Frothingham  v.  ]\IcKusick,  ii.  105,  140. 
Frout  V.  Hardin,  i.  607. 
Fry  V.  Jones,  i.  604,  608. 

V.  Miller,  i.  12. 
Fry's  Estate,  il.  467,  500,  718. 
Fryatt  r.  Sullivan  Co.,  i.  10. 
Frve  I'.  Illinois  Bank,  ii.  159,  160,  161, 

172,  196. 
Fryett  v.  Jeffreys,  i.  515. 
Fuhr  V.  Dean,  i.  656,  667. 
FuUam  v.  Stearns,  i.  29. 
Fuller,  Ex  parte,  iii.  566,  580. 

V.  Arms,  ii.  2. 

V.  Bradley,  i.  716. 

V.  Chamier,  ii.  650. 

V.  Daniels,  ii.  394. 

V.  Fuller,  ii.  724. 

V.  Gillette,  iii.  491,  492. 

I'.  Hodgdon,  ii.  177. 

V.  Hunt,  i.  436. 

V.  Pratt,  ii.  59. 

V.  Prov.  Co.  Sav.  Bank,  iii.  406. 

V.  Ruby,  i.  556,  560,  564,  565. 

V.  Russell,  ii.  271. 

V.  Sweet,  i.  557,  600,  627. 


TAIIIJ':    OF    CASKS    CITE]). 


Ixv 


Fuller  r.  Tuber,  i.  31. 

c.  Wmlsworili,  ii.  107. 
r.  Wuhoii,  i.  i;](J.  l;W,  lil'J. 
Fullerton  c  McC^unly.  ii.  (il. 
Fulton  i:  Stuart,  i.  52"J. 
Fulwood  i\  Ciniliiiiii,  iii.  431. 
Ful wood's  cast',  iii.  ;570. 
Funk  f.  Hri-al.li,  i.  2U. 

V.  Creswell.  iii.  -Wi,    178,  4J)0,  495, 
4'J'J,  ijOt;,    5U7,    610,  Gil,   62-1, 
520,  530. 
I'.  Kjjjilestoii,  ii.  712. 
V.  lialiloiiiuii,  i.  035. 
V.  KMuai.l.  i.  527.  548.603. 
i;.  McUeynoMs,  ii.  120,  227. 
V.  Voiifida,  iii.  4'J5,  610,  622,  624, 
620,  5;!0. 
Furbush  c  Chappcll,  i.  10. 

v.  Gootlwin,  ii.  105,   107,  122,  123, 
133,  130. 
Furj,'Uson  c.  Coward,  ii.  10!>. 
Furlong  v.  Leary,  i.  •il7,  031. 
Furnas  c.  Darrein,  ii.  117.  218,  220,  255, 

271  ;  iii.  4 'JO.  500,  507,  533. 
Furnoss  r.  Fo.\.  ii.  028. 
Fu8selnian  r.  Worthington,  i.  698,  002, 

619. 
Fyffe  V.  Bters,  i.  450. 

G. 

Gabbert  v.  Schwartz,  ii.  49,  258. 
Gable  r.  Ellendur.  ii.  773. 
Gadberry  r.  Slifppiird,  ii.  8,  9. 
Gatlield  /•.  Ilap^juod,  i.  32. 
Gage  c.  Brewster,  ii.  181,  218,  260,  202, 
205 ;  iii.  522. 

V.  Gage,  iii.  10. 

r.  Pitts,  ii.  357. 

V.  Smith,  iii.  178. 

V.  Sifinkr.iuss.  i.  4. 

V.  Ward,  i.  228.  233. 
Gapliardo  r.  Duniont,  i.  430. 
Gaines  r.  Catron,  i.  703. 
Gainsfurd  v.  (irithth,  iii.  521. 
Gaillu-r  r.  William,-*,  ii.  40;j. 
Galbniith  v.  (iedge.  i    701. 
Galbreath  v.  Doed.Zook.  iii.  351. 
Gale  V.  Cohurn,  ii.  444,  402,  409,  483 ; 
iii.  30(5. 

V.  Edwards,  i.  548. 

V.  Kinzie.  iii.  '"O. 

V.  Morris,  ii.  80. 

r.  Ni.xon,  i.  518 ;  ii.  293. 

V.  Ward,  i.  28. 
Gallagher  c.  Mars,  ii.  91. 
Galland  r.  Jaekman.  iii.  258.  33fl.  392. 
Gallatian  v.  Cunningham,  iii.  820. 
Gallego  V.  Any.  (Jen.,  iii.  551,554. 
Galliers  c.  Moss.  ii.  140.  435. 
Gallipot  r.  Manlove,  iii.  204. 
Gallowav  V.  Finley,  iii.  212. 

V.  Ogle,  i.  693. 
vuL.  I. —  e 


dailoway  r    Wilder,  iii.  472. 
Gulpin  I'.  Abbott,  iii.  X'AK 

f.  I'agt.'.  iii   2;2. 
Gnit  V.  (ialloway.  iii.  212. 
GulvL-ston  (-.  Menard,  iii.  44G. 
Galveston  K  K.  v.  Cowdrey,  ii.  46,  103, 

25;);  iii.  115. 
(Jamble  r.  McClure,  iii.  518. 
(Janilile's  Khtate,  ii.  40'.». 
(iames  i'.  Stiles,  iii.  230,  281. 
(iaininoii  r.  Freeman,  i.  230,  249. 
(iainon  r.  Vernon,  i.  5;{4. 
Gungweie's  Ai)peal,  i.  454. 
Gangwere's  Kstate,  i.  332. 
Gann  r.  Chenler,  ii.  03.  97. 
Ciannett  v.  Albree.  i.  503. 
(ianson  r.  Tifft.  i.  545. 
Garantlo  v.  Cooley,  iii.  41G. 
Gardiner  r.  Dering,  i.  137. 
V.  Guild,  ii.  688. 
I'.  Miles,  i.  205. 
Gardiner  Mg.  Co.  v.  Ileald.  i.  15,  719. 
Gardner  r.  Astor,  ii.  202,  6<J0. 
r.  Barnes,  ii.  75. 
V.  Kmerson,  ii.  210. 
V.  Finley,  i.  25. 
I'.  Gariliier,  i.  479;  ii.  635,  574  ;  iii. 

207. 
V.  (loofh,  i.  63;  iii.  105. 
V.  Green,  i.  204  ;  iii.  101,  107,  110 
t:  lleartt,  ii.  141. 
V.  Keteltas,  i.  473,  664,  665. 
1-.  Moore,  iii.  400. 
V.  Ogdeii,  ii.  522.  570. 
r.  Sheldon,  ii.  772. 
Garfield  r.  llatmaker,  ii.  678. 

V.  Williams,  iii.  485,  480,487,  527 
Garland  r.  Crow,  i.  121,  311. 
Garner  c.  Bond,  i.  IJOO. 
v.  Hannah,  i.  516. 
Garnhart  r.  Finney,  i.  505. 
Garnsey  v.  Mundav,  ii.  493. 

V.  Kogers.  ii.  53.  219. 
Garrard  i'.  Tuck,  i.  024. 
Garretson  v.  Cole,  iii.  211. 
Garrett  v.  Chesire,  i.  350. 

V.  Jackson,  ii.  '•iiio,  339,  343. 
i\  Moss.  iii.  270. 
V.  Seouten,  ii.  20. 
Garritt  r.  Sharp,  ii.  352,  397. 
Garson  r.  Green,  ii.  02,96. 
Gartside  i:  Outley,  i.  640. 
Garvey  v.  Dobyns,  i.  5.'j0. 
Garvin  r.  Dean,  iii.  433. 
Garw<M)d  *•.  N.  Y.  Cent.  &  H.  K    K.  K 

ii.  307,  368. 
Gary  c.  Easterbrook,  i.  416. 
Gaskill  r   Sine,  ii.  216,  221. 

r.  Trainer,  i.  613. 
Gaskin  r.  Rogers,  iii.  542. 
Ciass  r.  (Jass,  iii.  5-12. 

r.  Wilhite,  iii.  554,  557. 
Gassett  r.  (Jrout.  iii.  3.')4. 
Gates  {.'.  Adams,  ii.  212,  216,  230 


Ixvi 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 


Gates  V.  Caldwell,  iii.  519. 

V.  Green,  i  565. 

V.  iSalmuii,  i.  Gt^'J. 
Gateward's  case,  ii.  313. 
Gatling  c.  Rodman,  iii.  86. 
Gatton  V.  Tolley,  i.  436. 
Gault  V.  McGratli,  ii.  195. 
Gaunt  V.  Wainnian,  i.  i.50. 
Gaved  v.  Marhn,  ii.  339. 
Gavit  V.  Chambers,  iii.  439,  443. 
Gaw  V.  Hughes,  iii.  108. 
Gay,  Ex  parte,  i.  497. 

V.  Baker,  i.  35. 
Gayetty  v.  Bethune,  ii.  347,  349;  iii. 

420. 
Gr.yford  v.  NichoUs,  ii.  382. 
Gayle  v.  Price,  i.  249. 
Gaylord  v.  Loughridge,  i.  412. 

V.  Scarff,  iii.  238. 
Gazzolo  V.  Chambers,  i  475,  565. 
Gear  v.  Barnum,  iii.  413. 
Gee  V.  Audley,  ii.  724,  729. 

V.  Gee,  ii.  509,  514,  515. 

V.  Manchester,  ii.  769. 

V.  Moore,  i.  858,  899,  400,  430  ;  iii. 
123,  508. 

V.  Young,  i.  140. 
Geer  v.  Fleming,  i.  472. 

V.  Hamblin,  i.  2G9,  270. 
Geiss  V.  Odenheimer,  iii.  299,  303. 
Gelzer  v.  Gelzer,  i.  333. 
Geney  v.  Maynard,  i.  374. 
Gen.  Ins.  Co.  v.  United  States  Ins.  Co., 

ii.  151,  152. 
Center  i-.  Morrison,  iii.  292,  299. 
George  v.  Andrews,  ii.  220. 

V.  Baker,  i.  490;  ii.  148,255. 

V.  Cox,  ii.  317,  350,  355. 

V.  George,  iii.  538. 

V.  Kent,  ii.  215. 

V.  Morgan,  ii.  656. 

V.  Putney,  i.  589,  594. 

V.  Wood,  ii.  210,  215,  221,  234,256, 
272 ;  iii.  335. 
Georges  Creek  Co.  v.  Detmold,  i.  167. 
Georgia  Southern  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Reeves, 

iii.  494. 
Gerber  v.  Grabel,  ii.  319,  865. 
German  v.  Gabbald,  ii.  518. 

V.  Machin,  i.  689. 
German  Land  Assoc,  v.  SchoUer,  ii.  496 ; 

iii.  279. 
German  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Grim,  iii.  350. 
Gernet  v.  Ljmn,  iii.  159. 
Gerrard  v.  Cooke,  ii.  316,  852,  355. 
Gerrish  v.  Black,  ii.  2.34,  245. 

V.  Clough,  iii.  62. 

V.  Gary,  iii.  413. 

V.  Mace,  ii.  183. 

V.  Shattuck,  ii.  3.50. 
Getman  v.  Getman,  ii.  514. 
GetzIafE  c  Seliger,  ii.  257. 
Getzler  v.  Saroni,  i.  408,  4.38. 
Gheen  v.  Summey,  i.  395,  460. 


Gliegan  v.  Young,  i.  535. 

Gibbens  v.  Gibbens,  ii.  599. 

Gibbes  v.  New  York  L.  Ins.  Co.,ii.  493. 

Gibiions  v.  Dayton,  i.  635. 

V.  Dillingham,  iii.  416. 
Gibbs  r.  Barnardiston,  ii.  677. 

V.  Estey,  i.  6. 

V.  Holmes,  ii.  110. 

V.  Marsh,  ii.  555,  718. 

j;.  Patten,  i.  425. 

V.  Penny,  ii.  54. 

V.  Itoss,  i.  530,  548. 

V.  Swift,  i.  687  ;  iii.  341. 

V.  Thayer,  iii.  105,  123. 

V.  Wilson,  ii.  372. 
Gibert  v.  Peteler,  ii.  14,  15,  317,  326  ; 

iii.  249,  348,  349. 
Giblin  V.  Jordan,  i.  382. 
Gibson  r.  Brockaway,  iii.  421. 

V.  Choteau,  iii.  115,  118,  518. 

V.  Crehore,  i.  131,  216,  237,  239. 
240,  241,  242,  304,  307,  309;  ii. 
181,  182,  186,  204,  207,  209, 
214,  222,  224,  232,  236,  237, 
245,  246,  562. 

V.  DurJiam,  ii.  340. 

V.  Eller,  ii.  37,  45. 

V.  Farley,  i.  549;  ii.  173;  iii.  6. 

V.  Foote,  ii.  516. 

V.  Gibson,  i.  263,  330,  332 ;  ii.  37. 

V.  Kirk,  i.  500,  556. 

V.  McCormick,  ii.  207. 

V.  Montfort,  ii.  537. 

V.  Rogers,  ii.  537. 

V.  Soper,  iii.  264. 

V.  Taylor,  ii.  70. 

V.  Wells,  i.  166.  _ 

V.  Zimmerman,  i.  343. 
Giddens  v.  Williamson,  i.  366. 
Giddings  v.  Sears,  iii.  358. 
Gideon  v.  Struve,  i.  457. 
Gies  V.  Green,  ii.  275. 
Gifford  V.  Clioate,  i.  106. 
Gilbert  r.  Anthony,  iii.  254. 

V.  Bell,  iii.  219. 

V.  Bulkley,  iii.  826. 

V.  Dickerson,  i.  694. 

V.  Dyneley,  ii.  244. 

V.  Nortli  Am.  F.  Ins.  Co.,  iii.  317, 
318,  321. 

V.  Witty,  ii.  605. 
Gilbertson  v.  Richards,  ii.  73,  435. 
Gilchrist  v.  Patterson,  ii.  107. 

V.  Stevenson,  ii.  552. 
Gildart  r.  Gladstone,  iii.  202. 
Gile  V.  Stevens,  i.  18. 
Giles  V.  Bareraore,  ii.  191. 

V.  Ebs worth,  i.  594. 

V.  Pratt,  iii.  330. 

r.  Simonds,   i.   667,   671  ;   iii.   366, 
368. 
Gilhooly  c.  Washington,  i.  569. 
Gill,  Goods  of,  iii.  578. 

V.  Fauntelroy,  i.  691 ;  iii.  338. 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


Ixvii 


Gill  V.  Logan,  ii.  Iji\\. 

V.  Lyon,  ii.  1H»),  212. 

V.  Miildieloii,  i.  521,  522,  509,  675. 

i:  Piiiney,  ii.  50. 
Gillaii  r.  lIuu-liiiiMoii,  ii.  4U0;  iii.  221. 
(Jillespio  c.  Haili'V.  i.  48H. 

r.  Cui>iiiii);liain,  iii.  l'J8. 

V.  Miller,  ii.  787,  788. 

r.  Somerville,  i.  214,  234. 

V.  Tlioina.H,  i.  558. 
(lilli't  c.  MHynani,  i.  0158. 
Gillelt  c.  H:ilc()iu,  i.  144. 

V.  Eaton,  ii.  114. 

r.  Mult  lie  ws,  i.  5!W. 
Giiliiiin  V.  Moore,  i.  2.»0. 
Gillis  V.  Brown,  i.  2(i;J. 

V.  Martin,  ii.  40,  ;')(),  50,  03. 
Gilluin  r.  Collier,  i.  412. 
Gilman  r.  Hell,  ii.  tJS'.i,  GDI. 

r.  Hrown,  ii.  '.•2,  '.to,  'J(j. 

V.  Haven,  iii.  ;'>07. 

V.  Hiiliien,  ii.  2(54. 

v.  Moociv,  ii.  m,  271. 

r.  Morrill,  i.  (380. 

I'.  HeiliuKton,  ii.  577,  084. 

r.  Sinitli,  iii.  454. 
Gilmer  r.  Lime  Point,  iii.  225. 

V.  O'Neal,  i.  8(Jl. 
Gilmore  v.  Driscoll,  ii.  381,  382,  393. 

r.  Wilbur,  i.  0!)!». 
Gilpin  r.  Ilollingswortli,  i.  084  ;  iii.  18. 
Gilson  I'.  Gilson,  ii.  45.  50,  148. 
Gilworth  r.  Cody,  i.  :W\,  :571. 
Gimmy  r.  Doane,  i.  457. 
Giranl  L.  Ins.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Chambers, 
ii.  78.-]. 

V.  Stuart,  ii.  218. 
Gi rani's  Will,  iii.  5-^2,  5.^:]. 
Ciittin};.s  r.  .Muale,  iii.  145. 
Givan  r.  Doe  il.  Tout,  ii.  119,  121,  122, 

12:5 ;  iii.  332,  344,  :{8:]. 
Givens  r.  Dewey,  i.  3(50,  301. 

V.  McCalmont,  i.  148 ;  ii.  139,  176, 
234,  2:]5,  2.39. 

c.  Mullina.v.  i.  000. 
Glascock  V.  Uobar.ls,  i.  022. 
Glasfelter  r.  Walker,  ii.  367. 
Glass  r.  Kllison,  ii    145. 

V.  Hulbert,  iii.  248.  408. 
Gleason  >■.  Smith,  iii.  507,  508. 
Glcim  V.  Kise.  i  (iOf). 
Glendcm  /■.  Uliler.  ii.  375. 
Glenn  /•.  Bank  of  U.  S.,  i.  259. 

r.  Davis,  ii.  3(jl. 
Glenorcliy  r.  Bosville,  ii.  530. 
Gliililen  v.  Bennett,  i.  5,  18. 

V.  Blo.lnett,  ii.  000. 

V.  Simpler,  iii.  78,  88. 
Glisson  r.  Hill,  ii.  51. 
Globe  Ins.  Co.  >:  Lafisinp,  ii.  252. 
Globe  Mills  i-.  Quinn.  1.  5. 
Gloucester  r.  Gaffney,  iii.  217. 
Glover  r.  Hill,  i.  ;5r,2. 

f.  Pavn,  ii.  51,  02. 


Glynn  v.  Georpe,  i.  001. 
(jochenour  r.  .Mowry,  iii.  490. 
Goilanl  ('.  S.  C.  Uuilroad,  i.  010,  C1.3. 
Goilbold  I-.  Lambert,  iii   ^135. 
Goildanl  c.  Chase,  i.  27. 

I'.  Coe,  ii.  4(5. 

r.  Sawyer,  ii.  44,  130,  157,  \->-.  I  • ' 
Godilanl's  ease.  iii.  299,  303. 
Godfrey  c.  Humphrey,  i.  'Ml,  91 

V.  Thornton,  i.  443,  445. 

V.  Watson,  ii.  239,  244. 
Godley  I'.  Hajjerty,  i.  171. 
(iodwin  r.  Kilslui,  ii.  734. 
Goelet  r.  Gori,  i.  710. 
Goewey  c.  Urig,  iii.  1(53. 
Goylierty  v.  Bennett,  ii.  508. 
Going  V  Kmery,  ii.  Mi  ;  iii.  550,  551. 
Golder  c.  Bressler,  ii.  557,  507. 
Goldman  c.  Clark,  i.  370,  43'J. 
Goldsberry  r.  Bisliuji,  i.  028. 

V.  Gentry,  ii.  510. 
Goldsmid  r.  Trim.  W.  Imp.  Co.,  ii.  309. 
Gomber  ».  Hackett,  i.  515. 
Gomez  v.  Tradesmen's  Bank,  ii.  547. 
Goocli  V.  Atkins,  i.  31-3 
Good  V.  Coombs,  i.  (588;  iii.  277. 

r.  ZercluT,  iii.  22(5.  228. 
Goodal  V.  Godfrey,  ii.  331. 
Goodall  r.  Boardman,  i.  380. 

I'.  McLean,  iii.  501. 
Goodall's  case,  ii.  41. 
(loodburn  r.  Stevens,  i.  210,  311 ;  ii.  207. 
(Jooile  r.  Comfort,  ii.  85. 
Gooilell  '•.  Bales,  iii.  107. 

r.  Hibbard.  ii.  478. 

V.  Jackson,  i.  79. 
Gooilenow  v.  Ewer,  ii.  113. 
(looding  v.  Shea,  ii.  14(1. 
(Joodkt  r.  Smithson,  iii.  205,  206,  207. 
Go)dn)an  r.  (iore.  ii.  300. 

I',  (irierson.  ii.  51. 

V.  Han.  &  St.  Jo.  U.  H  ,  i  9.  33. 

V.  Saltash,    ii.   313,   316,  348.  392, 
393. 

V.  White,  ii.  117,  181.  2.')0,  202. 
Goodnow  v.  Empire   Lumber   Co.,  iii. 

207. 
Goodrich  r.  Jones,  i.  18,  20;   iii.  410, 
417. 

V.  Lambert,  ii.  057. 

r.  Staples,  ii.  2(51. 
Goodrid^'c  i:  Dustin,  iii.  95.  130. 
(ioodnu'ht  r.  Cntor.  i    514  ;  ii.  ()90,  (397 

I'.  Cordwent,  i.  0:>i,  0.39.  045. 

I'.  Cornish,  ii    724,  742,  782. 

r.  Davids,  ii.  20. 

V.  Duidiam,  ii.  (52o. 

r.  Hichardson,  i.  470. 

r.  Searle.  ii.  770. 

r.  Straphan.  iii.  2(51. 

r.  Wells,  ii.  5<51. 
Goodrum  i-.  (ioodrum,  1.  342. 
(Jooilsoll  r.  .Sullivan,  iii.  ."41. 
Goodson  V.  Oeacham,  iii.  119. 


Ixviii 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED. 


Goodspeed  v.  Fuller,  iii.  392,  400. 
Goodtitle  v.  Bailey,  iii.  404. 

V.  Billington,  ii.  033,  OGO,  G68. 

V.  Holdfast,  ii.  23. 

V.  Jones,  ii.  573. 

V.  Kibbe,  iii.  446. 

V  Tombs,  i.  4(35,  693. 

I'.  Way,  i.  481. 

V.  Whitby,  ii.  628. 

V.  Wood,  ii.  776,  777. 
Goodwin  V.  Clark,  ii.  683. 

V.  Gilbert,  i.  518 ;   ii.  52,  293 ;   iii. 
331,  401. 

V.  Goodwin,  i.  204. 

V.  Keney,  iii.  277. 

V.  Richardson,  i.  700,  705;   ii.  124, 
149,  16.5,  190. 
Gordon  v.  Canal  Co.,  ii.  33. 

V.  George,  i.  531. 

V.  Graham,  ii.  159. 

V.  Haywood,  i.  .345  ;  iii.  269. 

V.  Hobart,  ii.  189. 

V.  Lewis,  ii.  235,  238,  244,  245. 

V.  Little,  i.  144. 

V.  Sizer,  iii.  139,  257. 

V.  Small,  ii.  535. 

V.  Ware  Savines  Bank,  ii.  241. 
Gore  V.  Brazier,  i.  300;  iii.  501,  532. 

V.  Fitch,  ii.  352. 

V.  Gibson,  i.  486. 

V.  Gore,  ii.  684,  778. 

V.  .lenness,  ii.  141. 

V.  McBrayer,  ii.  407. 
Gorges  r.  Staiifield,  i.  135. 
Gorham  r.  Daniels,  i.  203;    ii.  478;  iii. 
395. 

V.  Gross,  ii.  388. 
Gorin  r.  Gordon,  ii.  692,  699,  700,  720. 
Goring  v.  Shreve,  ii.  170. 
Goss  V.  Singleton,  ii.  552,  553  ;  iii.  176. 
Gossett  V.  Kent,  iii.  280. 
Gossin  V.  Brown,  ii.  228. 
Gossom  V.  Donaldson,  i.  679,  721. 
Gothard  v.  Flynn,  ii.  89. 
Gott  V.  Gandv,  i.  521.  570,  576,  637. 

V.  Powell,  iii.  232. 
Gouchenour  r.  Mowry,  iii.  499. 
Gough  1'.  Planning,  ii.  10. 
Goulienant  i:  Cockrell,  i.  426. 
Gould  V.  Boston,  iii.  79. 

V.  Hudson  River  R.  R.,  ii.  391. 

V.  Lamb,  i.  89  :  ii.  537. 

V.  Lvnde,  ii.  503,  513. 

V.  Mansfield,  iii.  538. 

V.  Mather,  ii.  716. 

V.  Murch,  iii.  249. 

V.  Newman,  ii.  117,  120,  175. 

V.  School  District,  i.  465. 

V.  Thompson,  i.  622,  623,  626,  627. 

V.  Womack,  i.  333. 
Goundic  V.  Northampton  Water  Co.,  iii. 

85,  80. 
Gourley  v.  Gilbert,  ii.  593. 

V.  Kinley,  i.  196. 


Gourley  v.  Woodbury,  i.  712 ;  ii.  588. 
Gove  V.  Richardson,  iii.  97. 

V.  White,  iii.  81,  436,  449. 
Governor  v.  Woodworth,  ii.   585;   iiL 

175. 
Govier  v.  Hancock,  i.  258. 
Gowen  v.  Phila.  Exch.  Co.,  i.  662. 

V.  Shaw,  i.  695. 
Gower  v.  Winchester,  ii.  192. 
Gowlett  V.  Hantbrth,  ii.  67. 
Grable  c.  McCulloh,  ii.  110. 
Grace  v.  Hunt,  ii.  146. 

V.  Webb,  ii.  10. 
Graff  V.  Fitch,  iii.  367. 
Graffius  v.  Tottenham,  iii.  177. 
Grafton  Bank  v.  Foster,  ii.  194. 
Graham  i".  Anderson,  iii.  346,  847. 

V.  Carter,  ii.  206. 

V.  Connersville  R.  R.,  i.  7. 

V.  Craig,  iii.  155. 

V.  Crockett,  i.  360. 

V.  Graham,  ii.  53. 

V.  Hooper,  ii.  122. 

V.  Houghtaling,  ii.  600. 

V.  IMcCampbell,  ii.  96,  97. 

V.  Newman,  ii.  126. 

V.  Oviatt,  i.  415. 

V.  United  States,  i.  60. 

;•.  Way,  i.  547,  553. 
Gramlick  i'.  Wurst,  i.  573. 
Cranberry  v.  Cranberry,  ii.  245. 
Grand  Junction  Canal  v.  Shugar,  ii.  376. 
Granger  v.  Brown,  i.  642,  644. 

V.  Parker,  iii.  98. 

V.  Swart,  iii.  61,  351. 
Grant  r.  Bissett,  ii.  149,  156. 

V.  Chase,  i.  120 ;  ii.  314,  368,  399. 

V.  Dodge,  i.  230. 

V.  Duane,  ii.  181. 

V.  Fowler,  iii.  146,  162,  177. 

V.  Grant,  iii.  560. 

V.  Thompson,  i.  485. 

V.  Whitwell,  ii.  291. 
Grantham  r.  Atkins,  iii.  208. 

V.  Hawley,  i.  37,  142. 
Grapengether  i:  Fejervary,  ii.  91. 
Grattan  v.  Wiggins,  ii.   128,  129,  192, 

202.  208. 
Gratz  V.  Beates,  iii.  453,  454,  456. 

V.  Ewalt,  iii.  524. 

V.  Gratz,  i.  719. 
Graven horst  v.  Nicodemus,  i.  562. 
Gravenor  v.  Ilallum,  iii.  559. 

V.  Woodhouse,  i.  600. 
Graves  v.  Amoskeag  Co.,  iii.  414. 

V.  Berdan,  i.  537,  566,  578  ;  ii.  389. 

V.  Dudley,  iii.  311. 

V.  Graves,  ii.  47,  457,  459,  503,  519, 
520;  iii.  339,401. 

V.  Hampden  Ins.  Co.,  ii.  241,  243, 
244. 

V.  Porter,  i.  520,  531. 

IK  Rogers,  ii.  200. 
Gray  v.  Baird,  i.  454,  460. 


TAItLE   OF   CASKS   CITKD. 


I.\i\ 


Gray  r.  nnldwin,  ii.  111. 

v.  Hiirtlftt,  ii.  .';'.il  ;  iii.  85,  80. 

r.  Hcrrv,  iii.  '.Ml. 

V.  Illaiu:liiir.l.  ii.  1'),  17.  I'J.  21. 

V.  IJompas,  i.  (11;!. 

V.  Hri.lKctortli,  ii   7(13. 

I'.  Hri'/nanli'llo,  ii.  'd^i. 

V.  Dt'liici',  iii.  loi). 

r.  (liilcspie,  ii.  105. 

V.  (livens,  i.  tJiR). 

r.  (jray,  li.  500. 

I',  llornltt'ck,  iii.  405. 

V.  JiMiks,  ii.  133. 

V.  JolmsDii,  i.  588,  6'.ll. 

V.  L}  iiLJi,  ii.  555,  507,  704. 
Graydoii  c.  C'Imrcli,  ii.  42,  207. 
Grayson  r.  \Veil<lif,  iii.  400. 
Great  Falls  Co.  v.  Worster.  i.  688,  601 ; 

ii.  105  ;  iii.  118,  277,  455,  41(0. 
Greatrex  v.  llaywanl,  ii.  380. 
Greber  r.  Kleckner,  i.  4'J7. 
Green  «;.  Armstrong,  i.  4,  12, 15 ;  iii.  304, 
307,  309. 

V.  Butler,  ii.  <30,  65,  66. 

r.  Gates,  ii.  514. 

V.  Chelsea,  i.  04;  ii.  347,  303;  iii. 
447,  454. 

I'.  Clark,  ii.  515 ;  iii.  lO'J. 

V.  Collins,  iii.  488. 

V.  Crockett,  ii.  07. 

V.  Cross,  ii.  l-JO,  250. 

V.  DeiMoss,  ii.  07. 

V.  Dixon,  ii.  2.30. 

V.  Dniininond,  ii.  514,  518. 

V.  Fowler,  ii.  04. 

V.  (Jreen,  i.  200,  210,  213,  3-35,  3.38. 

V.  Hart.  ii.  101,  102,  103,  127,  104. 

V.  Irving,  iii.  5(X»,  511. 

V.  Jones,  iii.  248. 

I'.  Kemp,  ii.  18.3. 

V.  Liter,  i.  58,  00,  03,  04,  183;  iii. 
142,  1(34,  204. 

V.  Marks,  i.  417.  433,  447. 

V.  Massie,  iii.  21. 

V.  Miller,  ii.  500. 

V.  Phillips,  i.  24,  27. 

V.  Putnam,  i.  10,  204,  201. 31-3.  712  ; 
ii.  302;  iii.  217,  321,  415. 

V.  Pettingill,  ii.  18,  254. 

V.  Ramagc,  ii.  210. 

V.  iSmitii,  iii.  88. 

r.  Tanner,  ii.  150. 

r.  Teiinant.  i.  202,  301. 

f.  Thomas,  iii.  387,  301,  394,  396. 

r.  Winter,  ii.  5(30. 

I'.  Yarnall,  iii.  312. 
Green's  Fstate,  iii.  202. 
Green  Bay,  &c.  Co.  v.  Hewitt,  iii.  400, 

400. 
Green  Township,  Trustees  of,  c.  Rob- 
inson, i.  400. 
Greenaway  v.  Adams,  i.  505. 
(Jreenhy  v.  Wilcocks,  iii.  487. 
(iretne  r.  Cole,  i.  102. 


Greene  r.  Creifihton.  ii.  300,  323. 

r    DenniH,  iii.  550,  500. 

I',  (ireene,  i.  207. 
Greene  Co.  i.  Hull.  ii.  348. 
Greenhoune,  /..i  /«(»<•,  ii.  558. 
Greenleaf  f.  Allen,  i.  525,  &i5. 

r.  Birth,  iii.  403. 

I'.  Francis,  ii.  374,  377. 
Greeno  v.  Munson.  i.  598,  002,  003;  iii 

174. 
Greenough  v.  Turner,  i.  437. 

V.  Welles,  ii.  718. 
Greenshule  r.  Tai)«cott,  i.  511. 
(ireenup  r.  .Seweii,  i.  712. 
Greenwood  r.  Coleman,  iii.  207. 

f.  Curtis,  i.  223. 

r.  Mad.iox.  i.  .3.>7,  .307. 

V.  Murdock,  iii.  420. 

r.  Roberts,  ii.  703. 

V.  Kothwell,  ii.  053. 

('.  Tyler,  iii.  408. 
Greenwood's  ca.se,  iii.  547. 
Greer  r.  HIanchar,  iii.  225. 

c.  Haugabook,  ii.  305,  307. 

I-.  N.  Y.  Central,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.,  iii. 
44!  t. 
Gregg  V.  liiackmorc,  i.  720;  iii.  71,  174. 

c.  Hostwick,  i.  3(17,  384. 

V.  Tesson,  iii.  100. 

V.  Wells,  iii.  85. 
Gregory  r.  (^onnollv,  i.  095. 

i:  Doidge.  i.  Olio. 

r.  Henderson,  ii.  498. 

i:  Perkins,  ii.  54,  55. 

V.  Pierce,  iii.  272. 

c.  t?avage,   ii.    102,  121,   120,  127, 
202. 

I-.  Walker,  iii.  315. 
Greider's  Ai)|)eal,  i.  579. 
Greig  i'.  Easiin,  i.  372. 
Greton  v.  Smith,  i.  035. 
Grey  r.  Mannock,  i.  128. 
Gridley  r.  Watson,  iii.  .350. 

r.  Wynant,  iii.  274. 
Gridly  c.  Hloomington,  i.  670. 
Griffin  ,-.  Bixby,  i.  14. 

V.  Kiioit,  i.  410. 

V.  Fairbr.)ther,iii.478,481,483,484, 
487,  503. 

V.  Graham,  iii.  554,  657. 

f.  Grirtin,  ii.  80. 

r.  Kniscly,  i.  481. 

V.  Procter,  i.  .372.  437,  461. 

V.  Reece.  i.  20(3,  270. 

I'.  Sheffield,  i.  050;  iii.  26a 

V.  Shellev.  i.  450. 

V.  Sutherland,  i.  303,  454. 
Griffith  r.  Deerfelt,  iii.  205. 

r.  Griffith,  i.  247. 

r.  Hodges,  i.  583. 

f.  Kniseiv,  i.  051. 

r.  Pownall.  ii.  637.  7.32.  793. 
Griffiths  V   Pen.xon,  iii.  420. 
1  Griggs  I .  Smith,  i.  230,  246. 


Ixx 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


Griggsby  v.  Hair,  ii.  97. 
Grignon  v.  Astor,  iii.  20.3,  204. 
Grim  v.  Dyar,  iii.  562. 

V.  Murjiliy,  iii.  152. 
Grimbali  r.  Patton,  iii.  17. 
Grimes  c.  Kimball,  ii.  196,  197. 

V.  Ragland,  iii.  109. 
Grimman   v.   Legge,   i.  557,   582,  583, 

627. 
Grissler  v.  Powers,  ii.  183,  188. 
Grist  V.  Hodges,  iii.  500. 
Griswold  i\  Bigelow,  iii.  222. 

V.  Butler,  iii.  266. 

V.  Fowler,  ii.  250. 

V.  Greer,  ii.  706. 

V.  Johnson,  i.  688. 

V.  Mather,  ii.  109. 

V.  Messenger,  ii.  420;  iii.  400. 
Groesbeck  v.  Seeley,  ii.  520,  544  ;  iii. 

238,  251,  333. 
Groff  V.  I.evan,  i.  145. 
Groft  V   Weakland,  iii.  148. 
Grooms  v.  Kust,  ii.  54. 
Grose  v.  West,  iii.  450. 
Grosvenor  v.  Atlantic  Ins.  Co.,  ii.  243. 

V.  Henry,  i.  630. 
Groton  v.  Boxborough,  ii.  105, 107,  169, 

174. 
Grout  V.  Townsend,  i.  126,  132,  180; 

ii.  602  ;  iii.  275,  401. 
Grover  v.  Flye,  ii  166,  168. 

V.  Thacher,  ii.  122,  204. 
Groves  v.  Cox,  ii.  745,  769. 
Grubb  V.  Bayard,  i.  19,  403. 

I".  Grubb,  iii.  422. 

V.  Guildford,  iii.  419. 
Grube  v.  Wells,  iii.  139,  151,  171,  173. 
Grumble  v.  Jones,  ii.  772,  773. 
Grundin  v.  Carter,  i.  -326,  546,  548,  550. 
Gryraes  r.  Boweren,  i.  34. 
Guard  v.  Bradley,  iii.  308,  316. 
Gubbins  r.  Creed,  ii.  68. 
Gudgen  v.  Besset,  i.  556. 
Guernsey  v.  Wilson,  i.  7;  ii.  141. 
Guerrant  r.  Anderson,  iii.  343. 
Guesnard  7;.  Bird,  ii.  378. 
Guest  V.  Opdyke,  i.  605. 

?-.  Revnolds,  ii.  365. 
Guild  y.  Richard,  ii.  15,  18,21. 

V.  Rogers,  ii.  290,  2'.:4. 
Guill  V.  Northern,  ii.  574. 
Guilmartin  v.  Wood,  iii.  433. 
Guiod  V.  Guiod,  i.  400. 
Guion  r.  Anderson,  i.  132, 182, 187,  188, 
189. 

?'.  Knapp.  ii.  135,  212,  221. 
Gulliver  r.  Wickett,  ii.  746. 
Gully  I'.  Ray,  i.  214,  229,  234,  250. 
Gunn  r.  Barrow,  ii.  573. 

V.  Barry,  i.  355. 
V.  Wades,  i.  416. 
Gunnison  v.  Twichell,  i.  312. 
Gupliill  V.  Isbell,  ii.  572. 
Gurney  v.  Gurney,  iii.  542. 


Guthrie  v.  Gardner,  ii.  508. 

V.  Jones,  i.  29,  31. 

V.  Kahle,  ii.  108,  234. 

V.  Owen,  i.  313. 

V.  Russell,  iii.  531. 
Guy  r.  Brown,  ii.  .329. 

V.  Downs,  i.  453. 

V.  Ide,  ii.  113. 
Guynne  i-.  Cincinnati,  i.  280. 
Gwathmeys  v.  Kagland,  ii.  129. 
Gwiunell  v.  Earner,  i.  572. 
Gwyn  1-.  Wellborn,  ii.  107. 
Gwyun  v.  Jones,  i.  653. 


H. 


Haberghani  v.  Vincent,  ii.  707 ;  iii  573. 
Hackett  v.  Reynolds,  ii.  89. 
Hadfield's  case,  iii.  547. 
Hadley  v.  Chapin,  ii.  1.34. 

V.  Houghton,  ii.  271. 

V.  Morrison,  i.  627. 

V.  Pickett,  ii;  95. 

V.  Taylor,  i.  570,  573. 
Hadlock  v.  Bulfinch,  ii.  195. 

r.  Hadlock,  iii.  304. 
Haffley  v.  Maier,  ii.  266. 
Haflick  r.  Stober,  i  33. 
Hafner  r.  Irwin,  iii.  469. 
Hagan  )•.  Campbell,  iii.  202. 

V.  Walker,  ii.  264. 
Hagar  v.  Brainard,  ii.  43,  140. 

?-.  Wis  wall,  i.  717. 
Hagcr  V.  Nixon,  i.  364,  410. 
Hagthorp  v.   Hook,   ii.  234,  238,  239; 

iii.  346. 
Hague  r.  Porter,  i.  465. 
Haigli,  Ex  parte,  ii.  87. 
Haiglit  r.  Keokuk,  iii.  439. 
Haines  r.  Beach,  ii.  263. 

V.  Gardner,  i.  248. 

V.  Thompson,  ii.  50,  62,  63,  64. 
Halt  V.  Houle,  i.  445. 
Halcombe  v.  Ray,  ii.  55. 
Haldane  ?».  Johnson,  i.  514. 
Haldeman  v.  Burckhardt,  ii.  376. 

r.  Haldeman,  i.  118;  ii.  654,  655. 
Hale  V.  Glidden,  iii    161. 

V.  Heaslip,  i.  361. 

V.  Henrie,  ii.  88. 

V.  .Jewell,  ii.  57. 

V.  McLea,  ii.  374. 

I.  Munn,  i.  248. 

V.  New  Orleans,  iii.  506. 

V.  Oldroyd,  ii.  357,  397. 

V.  Patton,  ii.  68. 

V.  Pluminer,  i.  210,  211. 

V.  Rider,  ii.  2.58. 

i\  Silloway,  iii.  152. 
Haley  v.  Bennett,  ii.  91. 

V.  Colcord,  ii.  353. 
Halifax  V.  Higgens,  ii.  67. 
Hall  V.  Ashby,  iii.  3-52,  381. 


TAULE  OP   CASES  CITED. 


Ixxi 


Hall  I'.  Ball,  i.  477. 

I'.  HIias,  li.  00,  71,  72.  77,  78.  714. 

I'.  HiirjjeHH,  i.  oo7,  U:12. 

r.  iUitlor,  i.  (iOO. 

V.  C'azi-nove,  i.  4G'J. 

V.  ChatTce,  i.  tl(itj ;  ii.  767,  703,  764, 
707  ;  lii.  508. 

I'.  Cusliinn,  ii.  655. 

i\  CuslmiHii,  ii.  225. 

r.  Davis,  iii.  42'.>,  4;31. 

V.  Dcnch,  ii.  108. 

V.  Dewey,  i.  598. 

V.  Katon,  iii.  428. 

1-.  Hall,  i.  :;.14:  ii.  493. 

I'.  Harris,  iii.  o2l. 

r.  lluggins,  ii.  200. 

V.  Jones,  ii.  Ul. 

V.  Lance,  ii.  100. 

V.  Leonard,  iii.  282. 

r.  Liciifuld  Brew.  Co.,  ii.  302. 

I'.  Lund,  iii.  408. 

I'  Mavliew,  iii.  427,  525. 

V.  McCornnck,  ii.  128. 

I'.  McCoupliey,  ii.  o50. 

V.  McDnti;  ii.  87,  89;  iii.  326. 

V.  McLeoil,  iii.  67. 

V.  Nasii,  ii.  271. 

i;.  Nelson,  ii.  201,  260. 

V.  Niite,  ii.  5U6. 

V.  Orvis,  iii.  100. 

V.  Patterson,  iii.  347. 

V.  riaine,  iii.  470. 

V.  Priest,  i.  107  ;  ii.  503,  005,  745, 
747,  75.'J,  751,  703,  707,  772, 
774,  780. 

V.  Robinson,  ii.  770,  783. 

V.  Savage,  i.  268. 

V.  Sayre,  i.  341. 

I'.  Scott  County,  iii.  479. 

I'.  Stephens,  i.  03,  700,  708,  710 ; 
iii.  158,  174. 

V.  Surtces,  ii.  177,  192. 

V.  Swift,  ii.  343,  308. 

V.  Tay,  ii    157,  194. 

V.  Townc,  ii.  77. 

V.  Tufts,  i.  85. 

V.  Tunell.  ii.  100. 

r.  Waibwertli,  i.  0.35,  0-38,  639. 

V.  Wateriiouse.  iii.  208. 

V.  West.  Transp.  Co.,  i.  625. 

V.  Willianis.  ii.  532,  533. 

V.  Young,  ii.  508,  510,  545. 
Hall's  Estate,  In  rv.  i.  210. 
Hallen  r.  Uunder.  i  0.  83. 
Halleubeck  v.  De  Witt,  iii.  298. 
H.allett  V.  Collins,  ii.  500;  iii.  .>31. 

V.  Wylie,  i.  480,  500. 
Halligan  v.  Wade,  i.  502,  563,  504. 
Hallnian's  Estate,  ii.  571. 
Hallock  V.  Smith,  ii.  07. 
Halloran  r.  Wliitcomb,  iii.  81. 
Halsey  v.  Blood,  i.  721. 

V.  McCormick.  iii.  438. 
V.  Kecd,  ii.  217,  227. 


I  Halsey  <\  Tate,  ii.  6-35. 
Haistiad  v.  Hall,  ii   or>4. 
Hum  f.  Hunt,  iii.  78,  121 

t'.  Kendall,  i.  5. 
Hamblin  r.  Hank  of  Cumlierhmd,  i.  240 
Hanierton  i'.  Stead,  i.  (Sl'l,  084. 
Hamilton  r.  Adams,  iii.  242. 

V.  Crosby,  iii.  231. 

r.  Cutts,  lii.  607,  611. 

V.  Dooiittle,  iii.  381. 

f.  Elliott,  ii.  12,  18,  19. 

r.  Eowlkes,  ii.  92 

r    Lubukee,  ii.  74,  78,  79. 

V.  .Marsdin.  i.  000. 

r.  Xutt.  iii.  318. 

r.  Porter,  iii   600. 

V.  Qiiinibv,  ii.  105. 

1-.  Whiie.'ii.  355.  357,  359. 

V.  Wilson,  iii.  479. 

V.  Wright,  i.  519,  621 ;  iii.  168,  108. 
Hamit  c.  Lawrence,  i.  591. 
Hamlin  v.  Eur.  &  N.  .\    U.  U.,  ii.  101. 

V.  Hamlin,  i.  214,  210. 

r.  Jerrard,  ii.  104. 
Hammington  v.  Rudyard,  ii.  775,  790. 
Ilamnion  r.  Douglas,  i.  031. 
Hammond  v.  Ale.vander,  iii.  251. 

1-.  Hall,  ii.  374. 

t;.  Inloes,  iii.  54. 

!'.  Lewis,  ii.  120. 

V.  McLachlan,  iii.  448,  451. 

V.  Port  Koyal,  ic.  Ky.  Co.,  iii  494. 

t:  Hidgely,  iii.  4.J0. 
Hampden  .Mills  v.  Payson.  ii.  194. 
Hampton  v.  Hodges,  ii.  141. 

V.  Levy,  ii.  155. 

i;.  Moorhoad,  ii.  708. 
Hanbury  v.  Hussev,  i.  711. 
Hancliel  v.  Whitney,  i.  040.  013. 
Haucock  r.  Beverly,  iii.  345. 

r.  Butler,  ii.  057. 

V.  Carlton,  ii.  23,  38,  203. 

I-.  Day,  i.  095. 

r.  Morgan,  i.  379. 

c.  Wentworth,  ii.  301. 
Hancock's  I'state,  ii.  770. 
Hand  c.  Hall.  i.  481. 
Handbcrry  r.  Dooiittle.  iii.  514. 
Hantlley  »•.  Howe,  ii.  153. 

V.  Wrightson.  ii.  550,  551. 
Handj'  v.  Commercial  Bank,  ii.  157. 
Hanfonl  /•.  Blessing,  ii.  02. 

V.  McNair.  iii.  297. 
Hanger  r.  Abbott,  iii.  191. 
llanham  v.  Sherman,  i.  583. 
Ilanloy  v.  Wood.  ii.  4<>2.  403. 
llanna  r.  Henfro.  iii.  147,  163.  352. 
Hannah   r.  Carrington,  ii.  73,   %%    81 
101.  229. 

V.  Henderson,  iii.  5<)7. 

f.  Swarner,  iii.  315. 
Hannahs  v.  Felt,  i.  355. 
Uannan  v.  Hannan.  ii.  250. 

V.  Usborn,  i.  697. 


iXXll 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 


Hannay  v.  Thompson,  ii.  5-1. 
Hannen  v.  Ewalt,  i.  535. 
Hannon  c.  Cliristoplier,  ii.  478. 
Hannum  v.  Mcliiturf,  i.  855. 

V.  West  Chester,  iii.  408. 
Hanover   Water  Co.  v.  Asiiland   Iron 

Co.,  ii.  394. 
Hanrahan  v.  O'Reilly,  i.  5 ;  iii.  76,  80. 
Hanrick  r.  Hanrick,  iii.  50. 
Hansard  v.  Hardy,  ii.  190. 
Hansen  v.  Meyer,  i.  533. 
Hansford  v.  Holdam,  i.  437. 
Hanson  v.  Campbell,  iii.  450,  451. 

V.  Willard,  i.  718. 
Hapgood  V.  Blood,  ii.  107. 

V.  Brown,  iii.  412. 
Harbeck  v.  Vanderbilt,  ii.  197. 
Harbert's  case,  ii.  212. 
Harberton  v.  Bennett,  ii.  228. 
Harbidge  v.  Warwick,  ii.  -362. 
Hardeman  v.  Donner,  i.  355. 
Harden  v.  Darwin,  ii.  507 
Hardenburg  v.  Lakin,  iii.  274. 
Harder  v.  Harder,  i.  148;  ii.  519. 
Hardin  v.  Lawrence,  i.  717. 

V.  Wolf,  i.  361,  437. 
Harding  v.  Hale,  iii.  79. 

V.  Springer,  i.  .343,  706. 

V.  Strong,  iii.  409. 

V.  Tibbils,  iii.  237. 

V.  Townshend,  ii.  243. 

V.  Wilson,  iii.  518. 
Hardisty  v.  Glenn,  i.  593  ;  iii.  165. 
Hardy,  Ex  parte,  ii.  88. 

V.  Lane,  i.  378,  460. 

V.  Miller,  ii.  222. 

V.  Nelson,  i.  565. 

V.  Sulzbacher,  i.  883. 

V.  Wilcox,  ii.  773. 
Hare  v.  Celey,  i.  604. 

V.  Groves,  i.  566,  568. 
Hargrave  v.  King,  i.  504,  505,  511. 
Harker  i'.  Birbeck,  i.  19. 
Harkins  v.  Pope,  i.  636. 
Harkreader  v.  Clayton,  iii.  323. 
Harlan  v.  Laugham,  i.  689. 

V.  Lehigh  Coal  Co.,  i.  520;  ii.  403. 

V.  Seaton,  iii.  345. 

V.  Stout,  i.  717. 
Harle  v.  McCoy,  i.  624  ;  iii.  98. 
Harley  v.  King,  i.  525,  534,  535. 
Harlow  v.  Cowdrey,  ii.  488. 
V.  Stinson,  ii.  390. 

V.  Thomas,  iii.  495,  506,  529. 
Harman  v.  Gartman,  i.  694. 
Harmer  v.  Morris,  iii.  454. 
Harmon  v.  Brown,  ii.  10. 
V.  Flanagan,  i.  618. 
V.  Short,  ii.  100. 
Harmony  Bank's  Appeal,  ii.  225. 
Harney  v.  Morton,  iii.  110. 
Ilarpending  v.  Dutch  Church,  i.  690. 
Harper  v.  Archer,  iii.  16. 
V.  Barsh,  ii  56 ;  iii.  339. 


Harper  v.  Ely,  ii.  107,  185,  240. 

V.  Hampton,  iii.  294,  295. 

V.  Little,  iii.  294. 

V.  Perry,  iii.  336,  399. 

V.  Phelps,  ii.  513,  550. 

r.  Tapley,  iii.  339. 
Harper's  Appeal,  ii.  144,  238. 
Harral  i\  Leverty,  ii.  115,  173. 
Harramond  v   McGlaughon,  iii.  436, 
Harrel  v.  IMiller,  iii.  369. 
Harriman  v.  Brown,  iii.  455. 

V.  Gray,  i.  258,  261 ;  iii.  122 
.  V.  Harriman,  ii.  614. 

r.  Queen's  Ins.  Co.,  i.  381. 

V.  Southam,  iii.  280. 
Harrington  v.  Murphy,  iii.  529. 

V.  Worcester,  iii.  235,  239 
Harris  v.  Austell,  i.  355. 

V.  Barnes,  ii.  782. 

V.  Barnett,  ii.  504. 

V.  Burton,  iii.  268,  334. 

V.  Carniody,  iii.  277. 

V.  Carson,  i.  140. 

V.  Cohen,  i.  570. 

V.  Colquitt,  i.  386. 

V.  Elliott,  iii.  411,  418,  450. 

V.  Fly,  iii.  348. 

V.  Frink,  i.  12,  140,  622. 

V.  Gillinghara,  i.  665,  666. 

V.  Haynes,  i.  29. 

V.  Hull,  iii.  428. 

V.  McElroy,  ii.  572,  644. 

V.  Mackintosh,  ii.  367. 

V.  McKissack,  iii.  210. 

V.  Mills,  ii.  191,  193. 

V.  Norton,  ii.  151. 

V.  Pucker,  ii.  555. 

V.  Ryding,  i.  19  ;  ii  384,  388. 

V.  Thomas,  i.  167. 
Harrisburg  r.  I'effer,  iii.  507. 
Harrison  v.  Blackburn,  i.  473. 

V.  Eldridge,  ii.  258. 

V.  Forth,  iii.  360. 

V.  Good,  ii.  323. 

V.  Harrison,  ii.  550,  577,  684. 

V.  Lemon,  ii.  58. 

V.  Middleton,  i.  619,  621. 

V.  Owen,  ii.  133. 

V.  Phillips  Academy  Trs.,'  iii.  303, 
311,  354. 

V.  Pool,  iii.  15.3. 

V.  Trustees,  &c.,  ii.  47,  57,  64,  65. 

V.  Wood,  i.  314. 

V.  Wyse,  ii.  246. 
Harrold  r.  Simons,  iii.  338. 
Harsha  v  Reid,  ii.  298;  iii.  248. 
Hart  V.  Blackington,  ii.  106. 

V  Goldsmith,  ii.  280. 

V.  Israel,  i.  548. 

V.  Lyon,  ii.  300,  386. 

V.  Vose,  ii.  338  ;  iii.  67. 

V.  Windsor,  i.  619,  520,  566,  576. 
Hartley  v.  Frosh,  iii.  334. 

V.  O'Flaherty,  ii.  212,  229. 


TABLE   OF   CARES   CITED. 


Iwiii 


Hnrtlev  r.  Stito,  iii  II. 

(•.■Tiillmiii.  ii.  i:!.').  IHO.  186. 
llnrili-y's  Appeal,  ii.  71!>. 
ll.irtli-y's  Ksmte,  ii.  4'M. 
lIiirtiDim  r.  Kmilall.  iii.  200. 

V.  Scluillz.  i.  i02. 
Mnrton  c.  Ihirton.  ii.  488,  498.  601. 
Ilarlop's  ca8C',  ii.  -llil. 
llfirtaliDrn  v.  Day,  iii.  208. 

r.  llul.banl,  ii.  110. 
llartsliome  v.  Hartsliorne,  i.  210,  287, 

.ilMl. 

r.  Wat!«)n,  i.  514. 
IlartuiiK  r.  White,  iii.  -101.  502. 
Ilartweil  v.  Uiocker,  ii.  207. 

r.  Kelly,  i.  7. 

V.  Hoot.  iii.  222. 
Harvard  College  i>.  Theol.  Ed.  Soc,  iii. 

557. 
Harvey  v.  Alexander,  iii.  401. 

r.  Brvdjies,  i.  045,  055. 

V.  .Mi'toliell,  iii.  343. 

V.  Pennvpacker,  ii.  618. 

V.  Thornton,  ii.  200. 

V.  Tvler.  iii.  57. 

V.  Wickham,  i.  ISl.  189,  355. 

V.  WoodliDUse,  ii   212. 
Harvie  v.  U  inks,  ii.  240. 
Ilarvy  v.  A.<ton,  ii.  11. 
Harwood  r.  Benton,  ii.  375. 
Ihisbrouck  c.  Verniilvea,  iii.  412. 
Haskell  v.  Bailey.  ii.'UU. 

r.  New  Beilfonl,  iii.  224. 

V.  rmnam,  i.  58'J. 

?'.  Scott,  ii.  '.tl. 
Haskins  i'.  Ilaskins,  i.  658. 

t'.  Hawkes.  ii.  147. 
Haslajje  v.  Kni'^h.  iii.  21. 
Haslain  r.  Campbell,  i.  401,  402. 
Hasleni  r.  Ixickwood,  i.  4. 
Haslett  V.  Glenn,  i.  142. 
Hass  I'.  Plautz,  iii.  94. 
Hassenritter  r.  Kirchhoffer,  iii.  109. 
Hassett  v.  Ridtrelv,  i.  714. 
Hastings  v.  ClifToVd.  i.  337,  338. 

I'.  Crunckleton.  i.  148,  149. 

I'.  Cutler,  iii.  201. 

V.  Dickinson,  i.  :i03,  .326,  329,  330. 

r.  Ilastinffs,  i.  093. 

V.  Pratt,  ii.  177. 

V.  Stevens,   i.   2-37,   239,   241,  291, 
304. 
Ilastv  V.  Wheeler,  i.  153,  163. 
Hatch  V.  Bates,  iii.  208,  800,  310,  312, 
.342.  394. 

V.  Dwight,  ii.  396;  iii.  436,  458. 

t'.  Hart.  i.  607. 

i;.  Hatch,  i.  499;  iii.  260.  800,  324. 
V.  Kimball,  ii.  204;  iii.  82. 
I'.  Palmer,  i.  2.];t. 
r.  Stamper,  i.  538. 
r.  Vermont  Central  R.  R.,  iii.  163. 
•  V.  White,  ii.  252. 
Hatchell  v.  Kinbrough,  i.  000,  008. 


Haffleld   V.    Rneden.   i.   179,    IW),    27.3, 

270;  ii.  741  ;  iii.  20H. 
Hathaway  c.  Kvnn».  iii.  430. 
r.  Juneau,  iii.  424. 
r.  Payne,  iii.  320. 
r*.  Valentine,  ii.  147. 
r.  Wilson,  iii.  447. 
Hathon  i-.  Lyon,  i.  187. 
Hathorn   i;.  Stinson,  iii.  412,  438,  443, 

444. 
Hathorne  >*.  Haines,  iii.  351. 
llatHtat  r.  Packard,  i.  018,  042. 
I  laugh  r.  BIythe.  ii.  90. 
Hauser  c.  Lash,  ii.  45. 
Haven  v.  Adams,  i.  290;  ii.  It.'J,  153, 
174.  203. 

V.  B.  &  Wor.  R.  R.,  ii.  174. 

V.  Foster,  ii  207.  298;  iii.  679. 

V.  Hilliard,  iii.  540. 

c.  Wakefield,  i  4h3. 
Havens  r.  Kout-dry,  ii.  220. 

I'.  Osborn,  iii.  257. 

V.  Van  iJen  Burgh,  iii.  676. 
Haverstick  r.  Sipe,  ii  .305. 
Haverstick's  Ai)peal,  ii.  Oil,  017. 
Hawes  r.  Humphrev,  iii.  640,  574. 

V.  Shaw.  i.  593." 595.  0fK». 
Hawesville  r.  Lander,  iii.  451. 
Hawhe  V.  Snvdaker,  ii.  210,  211.  230. 
Hawk  V.  MeCullough,  iii.  519.  524. 

r.  Sensemun,  iii.  144. 
Hawkes  r.  Brigham,  ii.  254,  281. 

r.  Pike.  iii.  312. 
Hawkins  c.  Barney,  iii.  00. 

V.  Clermont,  ii.  09. 

f.  Kent,  ii   707. 

r.  King.  ii.  134. 

V.  Lee,  ii.  057. 

i".  Skeggs,  i.  141. 
Hawks  V.  Hawks,  i.  355. 
Hawksland  r.  Gatehel,  iii.  303.  317. 
Hawlev  r.  Bradford,  i.  210.  300. 

r.  James,  i.  210,  214,  307;  n.  688. 

r.  Northampton,  i.  110;  ii.  763,760. 
Hay  V.  Cohnes  Co.,  ii.  381. 

v.  Coventry,  ii.  03O,  781. 

V.  Cumberland,  i.  505. 

V.  Mayer,  i.  176;  ii.  721. 

r.  Watkins,  ii.  725. 
Hayden  v.  Bradley,  i.  622. 

V.  Dutcher,  ii.  305. 

V.  Merrill,  i.  090. 

r.  Smith,  ii.  196. 

V.  Stoughtnn,  ii,  7,  12,  13,  10;  iii. 
658,  559,  500. 
Hayes  v.  Bickerstnff,  i.  621. 

r.  Bowman,  iii.  430. 

r.  Foorde,  ii.  049. 

V.  Kershow,  ii.  443.  445,  461. 

f.  Livingston,  iii.  78. 

V.  Shattuck,  ii.  203. 

V.  Tabor,  ii.  474,  498.  605. 

r.  Ward,  ii.  224,  2l'8. 
Havford  i-.  Spokesfleld,  ii.  357,358,  300. 


Ixxiv 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Hayne  v.  Cummings,  i.  501,  518. 

V.  Maltbv,  iii.  104. 
Hayner  v.  Smith,  i.  5G1,  564. 
Haynes  v.  Bennett,  iii.  267. 

V.  Boardman,  iii.  157. 

V.  Jackson,  iii.  431. 

V.  Jones,  iii.  178. 

V.  Meek,  i.  458. 

V.  Powers,  i.  289. 

I'.  Seachrest,  iii.  278. 

V.  Wellington,  ii.  126,  260. 

V.  Wells,  ii.  305. 

V.  Young,  iii.  493,  506,  629. 
Hays  V.  Askew,  iii.  111. 

V.  Doane,  i.  29. 

V.  Jackson,  iii.  20. 

V.  Lewis,  ii.  123. 

V.  Riciiardson,  i.  36,  667;  ii.  450. 
Hayward  v  Angeil,  ii.  22. 

V.  Cain,  ii.  510. 

V.  Howe,  i.  106. 

V.  Sedgley,  i.  616. 
Haywood  v.  Enslej',  ii.  545. 
Hayworth  v.  Worthington,  ii.  53. 
Hazard  v.  Eobinson,  ii.  346,  357. 
Hazen  i-.  Barnett,  i.  720. 

V.  Thurber,  i.  293. 
Hazletine  r.  Case,  ii.  367. 
Hazleton  v.  Lesure,  i.  229. 

v.  Putnam,  i.  666,  672,  673. 
Hazlett  V.  Powell,  i.  562,  576. 

r.  Sinclair,  ii.  298,  .300;  iii.  494. 
Head  i\  Egerton,  ii.  88. 
Headlam  v.  Headley,  iii.  450. 
Headley  ''.  Goundrav,  ii.  101. 
Heald  v.  Heald,  ii.  607. 
Healey  r.  Alston,  ii.  560. 
Heap  V.  Barton,  i.  32,  467. 
Heard  v.  Baird,  ii.  83,  84,  85,  573. 

V.  Downer,  i.  402. 

r.  Evans,  ii.  118,  194. 

V.  Fairbanks,  i.  12. 

V.  Hall,  iii.  83,  123. 
Hearle  v.  Greenbank,  i.  173,  177. 
Hearn  v.  Tomlin,  i.  626. 
Heath  v.  Barmore,  ii.  807. 

V.  Bishop,  ii.  533. 

V.  Lewis,  ii.  10. 

r.  Vermeden,  i.  591. 

V.  West,  ii.  227. 

V.  WHiite,  i.  186, 187,  188,  189. 
Heatherly  v.  Weston,  i.  491. 
Heaton  v.  Findley,  i.  34. 
Hebron  r.  Centre  Harbor,  ii.  55,  59. 
Hebron  Grav.  Co.  v.  Harvey,  ii.  872, 

377. 
Heburn  v.  Warner,  ii.  49. 
Hedden  v.  Crowell,  ii.  199. 
Hedge  r.  Drew,  i.  499 ;  iii.  311. 

V.  Holmes,  ii.  272. 
Heed  v  Ford,  i.  234. 
Heermans  v.  Burt,  ii.  577. 

V.  Robertson,  ii.  579. 

V.  Schmaltz,  ii.  548. 


Heflin  v.  Bingham,  i.  16. 
Hegan  v.  Johnson,  i.  622. 
Hegeman  v.  McArthur,  i.  557,  559,564, 

582,  583. 
Heid  V.  Vreeland,  ii.  220. 
Heilbrun  v.  Hammond,  ii.  199 
Heiskell  v.  Powell,  ii.  518. 
Heist  V.  Baker,  ii.  .36,  90. 
Heistcr  v.  Fortner,  iii.  339. 

V.  Green,  ii.  90. 

V.  Maderia,  ii  54. 
Helfenstein  r.  Cave,  i.  420. 
Helfenstine  v.  Garrard,  ii.  478. 
Helfrich  i".  Weaver,  ii.  279. 
Hellawell  v.  Eastwood,  i.  23. 
Heller  ;•.  Meis,  ii.  12.3. 
Helm  V.  Helm,  i.  365. 

r.  Vogel,  ii.  218. 
Helmer  v.  Castle,  iii.  449. 
Helms  V.  May,  i.  40 ;  iii.  336. 

V.  O'Bannon,  iii.  340. 
Helps  V.  Hereford,  iii.  105. 
Helwig  V.  Jordan,  i.  571. 
Hemenway  v.  Cutter,  i.  6. 
Hemingway  i\  Scales,  i.  343,  706. 
Hemphill  v.  Flynn,  i.  636,  651. 

V.  Giles,  i.  637. 

V.  Ross,  i.  107,  109. 

r.  Tevis,  i.  618. 
Henagan  v.  Harllee,  i.  231  ;  ii.  207. 
Henchliff  v.  Hinman,  iii.  305. 
Hencke  v.  Johnson,  iii   500. 
Hendee  v.  Pinkerton,  iii.  289. 
Henderson  r.  Easoii,  i.  696. 

V.  Herrod,ii.  126,  127,  129. 

V.  Hunter,  ii.  16,  25,  26,  674. 

V.  Mears,  i.  561. 

V.  Ownb}',  i.  7. 

V.  Pilgrim,  ii.  64,  121,  126,  154. 
Hendrick  v.  Lindsay,  ii.  219. 
Hendricks  v.  Johnson,  ii.  370 

V.  Rasson,  iii.  312. 

V.  Spring  Valley  Mg.  Co.,  ii.  381. 

v.  Stark,  iii.  494,  606. 
Hendrickson  r.  Wooley,  ii.  162. 
Hendrickson's  Appeal,  ii.  166. 
Hendrix  v.  McBeth,  i.  218. 
Hendrixson  v.  Cardwell,  i.  139. 
Hendv  v.  Dinkerhoff,  i.  10. 
Henkle  /■.  Allstadt,  ii.  212. 
Hennen  v.  Wood,  iii.  204. 
Hennesey  v.  Andrews,  ii.  64. 
Hennessy  v.  Patterson,  ii.  586,  587,  589, 

591,  597,  625,  641,  650,  658. 
Hennesy  v.  Old  Colony  R.  R.,  iii.  108, 

452. 
Henning  v.  Burnet,  ii.  318,  353,  354. 

V.  H.Trrison,  ii.  9 
Henry  v.  Confidence  Co.,  ii.  192. 

J).  Davis,  ii.  42,  45,  46,  65. 

V.  Tupper,  ii.  22,  23. 
Henry's  case,  i.  286 ;  ii.  222. 
Henshaw  v.  Bissell,  iii.  88. 

V.  Clark,  ii.  404. 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Ixxv 


Henshaw  v.  Mullins,  iii.  43.'].  434. 

r.  Wi'lls.  li.  107.  117.  14:5,  231. 
IKiisoii  c.  Moort'.  i    171.  2Ul. 
Ilf|il>urii  >'.  DtiWois.  iii.  'HM. 

V.  Ilepliurn,  ii.  o>>(i. 
Herbert  r.  Kroam.  i.  \l'-l. 

V.  Iliinritk.  ii    17(3. 

r.  Wrtii,  i.  Ml,  ■ni.  .•{34,  335,  330. 
Ilonliiian  r.  Mratteii.  iii.  31h. 
llcTiiiitiine  r    romkins,  iii.  101,  120. 
licriiiiijii  V.  ivitnbiill,  iii.  o3U. 
IK-rne  r.  Beinliow,  1.  100. 
llcrr's  ICstiite,  ii   o'J4. 
Ui-rrick  r.  Atwnoil.  ii.  87. 

V.  (Iraved,  i.  :JH1,  460. 

I'.  .Mnlin,  iii.  lioi). 
Ilfrriii),'  r.  Kisiiur,  iii.  448. 

V.  n'oo.lluiil,  ji.  107. 
Ilcrrolil  V.  Uei'ii,  i.  3o8. 
llerroii  /•.  Ihrron.  ii.  63. 

r.  Williiimson,  i.  2.'J5. 
IIorsrlifcl.lt  '•    (iLM.rKc.  i.  422;  iii.  .357. 
llerski-11  V.  Huslmell,  i.  0U4.  000,  00b. 
llfrtell  r.  Van  Bureii,  ii.  718. 
IK'ss  r.  Ile.ss,  ii.  78.3. 

I'.  Xewcoiiitr,  i.  574. 

V.  SiiijtkT,  ii.  550. 
Hesseltinc  r.  Sl-hvov,  i.  570,  582. 
Hester  r.  Kenibroujih,  iii    211. 
HetfieM  r.  (Viitral  H.  R..  i.  r,05. 
Hetii  1-.  Cocke,  i.  210,  201.  304. 

V.  RiclmiDinl,  ii.  500. 
IletliringtDii  iv  Graliain,  i.  25.3. 
Ileuliiigs  r.  Kielile,  ii.  3.j0 
Hewitt,  K.r  jxirti,  i.  ;555. 

V.  Looseiiiore.  ii.  88. 

V.  Haiikin.  i.  701  ;  ii.  112. 

I'.  Tem|)Ieton,  i.  418,  434  ;  ii.  80. 
Hewlett  1-.  \V(iu(l,  i.  728. 
Hewlins  c   .Sliippam,  i.  .37,  121,06.3,006, 

072;  ii.  .31.3,  31f,. 
He.\t  r.  (Jill.  ii.  341.  .3S». 
Hexier  r.  Knox,  i.  52;5 
Hey  r.  Bniiier,  i.  31. 

r.  Mocirhouse,  i.  052,  054. 
Heyer  i-.  Pniyii,  ii.  i;»l,  I'.tii,  266. 
Heyinan  r.  Lowell,  ii.  203. 
Hey.-liain  -•.  Dettre,  i.  2!». 
Heywanl  v.  C'utlibert,  i.  2'.t2. 

f.  .JikM,  ii.  77,  80.  110,  275. 

V.  New  York,  i.  70;  iii.  224,  226. 
Ileywooil  r.  HiUlretli,  iii.  320. 

V.  .Maunder,  ii.  773. 

r.  Tillotson,  ii.  375. 
Ilibbanl  c   Hiirlbiirt.  iii.  424. 

I'.  Lam  be,  ii  658. 
IMbblewliite  i*.  McMorine,  iii.  254. 
Hickman  r   Irvine,  i.  148,  21U. 

V.  Hayle,  i.  537. 
Hickox  1-.  Lowe,  ii.  40,  61,  62. 
Hicks  r.  Bell,  ii.  406 ;  iii.  200. 

I'.  Brigliain,  ii.  176. 

r.  riiapman,  i.  489. 

V.  Coleman,  iii.  160,  168,  432,  487. 


Hicks  V.  Cram,  iii.  78. 

V.  Dow  ling,  i.  64.S,  640. 

V.  Hickit,  li.  6H,  r,t|. 

r.  Siilinian.  ii.  37H.  304. 
HickHoii  ('.  Bryan,  i.  402. 
lii<lilen  ''.  .Ionian,  ii.  514. 
Hide  r.  'riiornboningli,  li.  381. 
Hiern  r.  Mill,  ii.  ^tM. 
Hiester  r.  Creen,  ii.  30,  91. 

c.  .Maderia,  ii.  (i3. 

r.  SiliaiOer,  ii.  204. 
HiglH'e  1-.  Kice,  i.  001  ;  iii.  142,  214,  217, 

.327. 
Higbie  V.  WeHtlake.  i.  .30(). 
lliggiiibotliam  v.  Cornwell,  1.  334,  336. 

3o0. 
Higginbottom  i'.  Short,  i.  711,  718. 
lliggins  r-   Breen,  i.  222. 

f.  Flemington  Water  Co.,  ii.  3ri7. 

V.  lliggins,  i.  368.  386 ;  ii.  60». 

r.  Ku>terer,  i.  4. 
Higginson  v.  Mein,  iii.  219. 
Higb  r.  Batte,  ii  04. 
Higiiam  r.  Kabett,  ii.  350,  351. 
llilbourn  v.  Fogg.  i.  5'.K»,  603,694,  014. 
Hildebrand  v.  Kogle,  iii.  429. 

V.  Taylor,  i.  442. 
Hildretb  r.  Conant.  i.  017. 

v.  Jones,  i.  230,  242. 

r.  Thompson,  i.  201,  204,  315. 
Hileman  i*.  Bouslaugh,  ii.  050. 
Hiley  r.  Bridges,  i.  350. 
Hill  V.  Bacon,  iii.  402,611. 

r.  Bui  lev,  ii.  535. 

V.  Barclay,  ii.  22,  28. 

I'.  Baron,  ii.  588. 

V.  l)e  Kochniont,  i.  20,  610. 

V.  Dver.  iii.  218. 

V.  Edwards,  ii.  47.  102,  123. 

V.  Epley,  iii.  81,  82,  85,  80,  88,  335 

V.  (ribbs,  i.  551. 
'v.  Hill,  i.  378,411,003;  iii.  866. 

V.  Jordan,  i.  (318;  ii.  144. 

V.  Josselyn,  ii.  6<i7. 

V.  Kessler,  i.  HijG. 

V.  Lord.  iii.  447,  448.  473. 

I'.  Meeker,  iii.  345. 

V.  Movers,  i.  (•.03  ;  iii.  82,  248. 

r.  Miller,  iii.  205. 

V.  Mitchell,  i.  279. 

I'.  Moore,  ii.  133. 

I'.  Mowry,  iii.  42.3. 

V.  UolHjrtson,  ii.  106. 

V.  Koderick,  ii.  5»0. 

V.  Saunders,  i.  504. 

V.  Sewald.  i.  27.  28,  81. 

I'.  Smith,  ii.  170. 

r.  Wentworth.  i.  28.  29. 

i;.  We-<t.  ii.  146;  iii.  12a 

r.  Woo<lnian,  i.  500. 
Hillary  r.  (Jay,  i.  0.V3.  067. 

r.  Waller,  ii.  357. 
Ililleary  c.  Hilleary.  ii.  741. 
Hillhouse  r.  Chester,  iii.  14. 


Ixxvi 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Hillhouse  v.  Mix,  i.  699. 
Billiard  v.  Allen,  ii.  246. 

V.  Binford,  i.  336,  337. 

V.  Scoville,  i.  710. 
Hilliary  r.  Hilliary,  ii.  741. 
Hills  V.  Barnes,  iii.  259. 

V.  Bearse,  iii.  273. 

V.  Dey,  i.  718. 

V.  Eliot,  ii.  51,  521. 

V.  Loomis,  ii.  54. 

V.  Miller,  ii.  312,  326. 

V.  Simonds,  ii.  607. 

V.  Thompson,  i.  537. 
Hillyard  v.  Miller,  iii.  557. 
Himmelmann  v.  Sclimidt,  i.  400,  430. 
HinchcliffiJ.  Hinman,  iii.  342. 
Hinchman  v.  Emans,  ii.  206. 

V.  Stiles,  i.  206. 
Hinckley  ;-■.  Baxter,  i.  5,  10. 
Hinckley  Co.  v.  Black,  i.  5,  6,  7,  22,  23. 

V.  Lyon,  ii.  766. 
Hinde  v.  Longworth,  iii.  356. 
Hinds  V.  Allen,  ii.  249. 

V.  Ballou,  i.  230,  239 ;  ii.  122,  123, 
137. 

V.  Mooers,  ii   129. 
Hindson  r.  Kersey,  iii.  540. 
Hine  v.  Kobbins,  iii.  338. 
Hines  v.  Frantliam,  i.  699. 

V.  Roliinson,  i.  694  ;  iii.  101. 

V.  Rutherford,  iii.  154,  157. 
Hingham  v.  Sprague,  i.  620. 
Hinkley  v.  Greene,  i.  691. 
Hinman  v.  Booth,  iii.  321. 
Hinsdale  r.  Humphrey,  i.  518 ;  ii.  293  ; 

iii.  332. 
Hinson  v.  Partee,  ii.  54. 
Hinton  v.  Milburn,  ii.  588,  592,  611,  617. 
Hintze  v.  Thomas,  i.  525. 
Hipp  L'.  Hackett,  iii.  331. 
Hirschman  ;•.  Brashears,  ii.  708. 
Hitchcock  V.  Carpenter,  i.  247. 

V.  Harrington,  i.  237,  238,  289,  246, 
247,  287  ;  ii.  169. 

V.  Skinner,  i.  716. 
Hitchens  i-.  Hitchens,  i.  205,  269. 
Hitchman  v.  Walton,  ii.  141. 
Hitner  v.  Ege,  i.  183. 
Hitt  V.  Holliday,  ii.  181. 
Hittenger  v.  Eames,  i.  4. 
Hoag  V.  Hoag,  i.  594. 

V.  Wallace,  iii.  164. 
Hoback  v.  Hoback,  i.  457. 
Hobart  v.  Sanborn,  ii.  107. 
Hobbs  V.  Bliindford,  i.  185. 

V.  Fuller,  ii.  272. 

V.  Harvey,  i.  301. 

V.  Lowell,  iii.  80. 

V.  Norton,  iii.  91. 
Hoboken  Land  &  Imp.  Co.  v.  Kerrigan, 

iii.  418,  450. 
Hobson  V.  Hobson,  ii.  50. 

V.  Roles,  ii.  123. 

V.  Trevor,  ii.  677. 


Hockenbury  v-  Snyder,  i.  594. 
Hocker  r.  Gentry,  ii.  520. 
Hocking  County,  Section  16,  &c..  Trus- 
tees of,  V.  Spencer,  i.  518;  ii.  29.3. 
Hodge  V.  Amerman,  ii.  149 ;  iii.  336. 

V.  Boothby,  iii.  446,  448. 
Hodgeden  v.  Hubbard,  i.  656. 
Hodges  i:  Eddy,  iii.  101,  138,  147,  159, 
166,  167. 

V.  Shields,  i.  589,  597. 

V.  Tenn.  Mar.  &  F.  Ins.  Co.,  ii.  45. 

V.  Thayer,  iii.  527. 
Hodgkins  v.  Robson,  i.  559. 
Hodgkinson,  Petitioner,  i.  716. 

V.  Ennor,  ii.  377. 

V.  Fletcher,  iii.  151. 
Hodo  V.  Johnson,  i.  401,  402. 
Hodson  V.  Treat,  ii.  250,  266. 
Hoff  V.  Bauni,  i.  638. 
Hoff's  Appeal,  ii.  218. 
Hoffar  r.  Dement,  i.  684. 
Hoffey  r.  Carey,  ii.  50. 
Hoffman  v.  Antliony,  ii.  72. 

r.  Armstrong,  i.  13. 

V.  Lj^ons,  i.  686. 

r.  Keuhaus,  i.  412. 

v.  Porter,  iii.  279. 

V.  Savage,  i.  319  ;  ii.  346. 

V.  Stigers,  i.  343,  .344,  678,  709,  714. 
Hoffman  Steam,  &c.  Co.  v.  Cumberland 

Coal,  &c.  Co.,  ii.  522,  52.3,  526,  570. 
Hoffstetter  v.  Blattner,  i.  690. 
Hogan  V.  Harly,  i.  600. 

V  Jaques,  ii.  53,  513,  515,  533. 

V.  Manners,  i.  872. 

V.  Page,  iii.  279. 

V.  Stone,  ii.  234,  245. 
Hoge  i\  Hoge,  ii.  526  ;  iii.  566,  568. 
Hogel  V.  Lindell,  ii.  5.3. 
Hogg  V.  Gill,  ii.  341,  -346. 
Hogsett  V.  Ellis,  i.  624,  625,  627,  652. 
H.)it  V.  Underbill,  i.  488. 
Hoitt  V.  Webb,  i.  377,  392  ;  ii.  102. 
Holabird  v.  Burr,  ii.  235. 
Holbert  v.  Edens,  iii.  436,  443. 
Holbrook  v.  Betton,  ii.  43. 

V.  Bliss,  ii.  253,  280. 

V.  Chamberlin,  iii.  305. 

V.  Finnev,  i.  230. 

r.  Tirrell,  iii.  325,  .326. 

V.  Young,  i.  546,  614. 
Holcomb  V.  Corvell,  i.  688,  689. 

V.  Holcomb,  ii.  264,  265,  269. 

V.  Lake,  iii.  562. 
Holcroft  V.  Heel,  ii.  334. 
Holden  v.  Fletcher,  iii.  601. 

V.  Pike,  ii.  204,  212,  215. 

V.  Pinney,  i.  367,  382,  384,  446. 
Holder  ?-.  Coates,  i.  14. 
Holderby  r.  Walker,  ii.  782. 
Holdship  V.  Patterson,  ii  533. 
Holford  V.  Hatcl).  i.  529,  542,  545,  546 

V.  Parker,  iii.  317,  324. 
Holifieldu.  White,  i.  605. 


TABLE   OF   CASEH    CITED. 


Ixxvii 


H  .ILidiiv  r.  Daily,  iii.  273. 
Holland  r.  ("ruft.  i.  lib. 

c.  Hodgson,  i.  'J;! ;  ii.  HI. 

r.  .Moon,  iii.  -'■'>. 

V.  lvoj;tM>,  ii.  -ItiT,  IT'J. 
IIolk'Ml.eck  r.  Kowley,  iii.  4 JO,  451. 
Hollclt  r.  rojiL',  ii.  7ij:5,  704. 
llolley  V.  llawley.  iii.  llJi*.  154,  339. 

r.  Yoiini,',  i.  4»V.»,  481. 
llollidiiy  c.  .\rtliiir,  ii.  i>5,  51. 

r.  KraiiKliii  Hank,  ii.  151. 
II  >Hins  r.  Vi-rnoy,  ii.  o4.'!,  0I5. 
llollinslicad'.s  Appi-al,  ii.  530. 
Ilullis  I',  liiirns,  i.  *'>43. 

V.  Hayes,  ii.  518. 

V.  Tool,  i.  030,  031.  047,  000. 
Hollistor  1:  Dillon,  ii.  170. 

V.  Sliaw,  ii.  712. 

i".  Younj;,  iii.  152. 
Holloman  r.  Holloinan,  i.  286,  308. 
HoUoway  v.  (jalliac,  i.  000. 
Hollv  V.  Brinvn,  i.  til7. 
Holiiian  <•.  MaiJoy,  ii.  100,  108,  180. 

r.  Martin,  i.  371. 
HoliiK'.s  I'   HfUinirliam,  iii.  451. 

c.  Hust.  i.  O'.Mi. 

V.  Bl<i<,'tj.  i.  4S8.  492. 

r.  Buckley,  ii.  290. 

V.  Bvl)iL'.  ii.  2(i2. 

V.  Cieveland.  ( '.  C.  U.  R.  Co.,  iii.  08. 

v.  C();,'iiili,  ii.  ()89. 

V.  Fisher,  ii.  70,  209. 

1-.  Gorint;,  ii.  320.  349. 

V.  (irant,  ii.  51.  57,  59,  63. 

V.  Holmes,  i.  711. 

V.  Mead,  ii.  679 ;  iii.  551,  650,  557. 

r.  Sieley,  ii   350. 

V.  Stout,  iii.  330. 

V.  Treniper.  i.  31,  32. 

r.  Trout,  iii.  320. 
Holms  V.  Seller,  ii.  .JIO. 
Holridge  r.  (;ilks!)ie,  ii.  60,  68, 125,  206. 
Holrovd  r.  .Marshall,  ii.  104. 
Holt  <■.  H.-niphill,  iii.  230. 

r.  Martin,  i.  583. 

I'.  Robertson,  i.  095. 

r.  Kees.  ii.  109,  134,  179. 

V.  Sarnent,  ii.  348.  350,  .309,  396. 

!•.  Soniervillc,  i.  7<l;  ii  321  ;  iii.  451. 
Ilolton  '•.  (loodricli,  iii.  471. 

I'.  MeiLTliiMi,  ii.  53. 

V.  Whitney,  iii.  149,  158,  173. 
Iloltzapffel  r.  Baker,  i.  521,  500. 
Home  c.  Kieiiards,  iii.  43u. 
Home  Life  Ins.  Co.  t:  Sherman,  i.  567  ; 

iii.  511. 
Homestead  cases,  i.  355,  304,  878.  442. 
Homocliitto  River  Comm'rs  r.  Withers, 

iii.  224,  43'.t. 
Honeywooci  r.  Hoiieywood.  i.  147. 
Honore  r.  Bakewell.  ii.  92,  95,  97. 

V.  Hutchiiiirs.  ii.  40. 
Hool.errv  >■.  Hanlinir.  ii.  407.  479.  498. 
Hood  V.  Adams,  ii.  72,  79,  194,  281. 


Hood  r.  ICaston,  ii.  284 

I'.  Mutlier,  i.  592. 
IIuotiin)(le  V.  AnderHon,  111.  2<>i. 
HooKlaiid  V.  Watt,  i.  20;j. 
Hooker  c  Cumniiii^tt,  iii.  4-39. 

r.  Hooker,  i.  IsO.  205,  200. 

r.  New  Haven  &  N.  Co.,  iii.  226. 

r.  L'tica,  &.C.  Tump.  Co.,  ii.  NXi. 
Hoole  r.  Attoniey-(!enera!,  ii.  153. 
HooiKT.  I'.x  jinrt,,  ii.  87. 

V.  Clark,  ii.  2'.»9. 

V.  Cummiiij,'H.  ii.  15,  10,  19. 

i".  l-'arnsworth,  i.  400. 

V.  RaiMsliottoin,  iii.  322. 

r.  Scheimer,  iii.  211. 

r.  Wilson,  ii.  100. 
Hoopes  V.  Bailey,  ii.  02,  189. 
Hoot(jn  r.  (irout,  ii.  lol,  145. 
Hoots  r.  (irahatn,  i.  057. 
Hoover  v.  Cirej^ory,  iii.  18,  578. 

V.  Samaritan  Soc.  ii.  700. 
Ilopcraft  V.  Kevs,  i.  594.  0(K). 
Hope  r.  Rusha;  ii.  703.  708.  709. 

V.  Stone,  ii.  98,  514  ;  iii.   104,  509, 
513. 
Hope's   Appeal,  ii.  401,   402,  403;   iii. 

364. 
Hopkins  i\  Garrard,  ii.  92. 

V.  Glunt.  ii.  550. 

V.  Hopkins,   ii.  420,  429,  443,  488, 
491.037.  748,  749. 

r.  Jones,  ii.  275. 

I'.  Stephenson,  ii.  2;}8. 

V.  Ward,  ii.  2(i7. 
Hopkins  Academy  i-.  Dickinson,  iii.  04, 

437.  4.39. 
Hopkinson  v.   Dumns,   i.  213;    ii.   513, 
517,  540,  500. 

V.  McKnight,  iii.  518. 
Hopper  r.  Demarest,  ii.  657. 

V.  Hopper,  i.  288. 

V.  Parkinson,  i.  423. 
Hopping  !•.  Burnam,  iii.  844. 
Horlock  r.  Smith,  ii.  210. 
Horn  V.  Keteltas,  ii.  53,  644. 

I'.  Tufts,  i.  377.  392,  394,  408,  440. 

c.  Wiatt,  i.  415. 
Hornheck  i-.  Westbrook.  iii.  281,  472, 

473. 
Hornby  r.  Iloidditeb.  i.  526. 
Horner  /•.  Leeds,  i.  471.  694. 

V.  Watscm.  ii.  ;584. 
Hornscy  v.  Cnsey,  i.  335. 
Horsefall  i-.  Mather,  i.  5;i7. 
Horsey  v.  Horsey,  ii.  11. 
Horsford  v.  Wripht,  i.  505. 
Horsley  i-.  Gartli,  iii.  338. 
Horstman  v.  Gerkin.  ii.  102. 
Ilorton  >•.  Crawford,  iii.  190. 

r.  Horner,  ii.  97. 

t'.  Horton.  ii.  499. 

r.  Sledge,  ii   400.  481.  591 ;  iii.  88a 
Horwitz  r.  \i>rri«.  ii.  7'^>. 
Hosford  V.  Bnlhinl,  ii    H». 


Ixxviii 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Horsford  r.  Merwin,  i.  737. 

f.  iSichols,  ii.  250. 
Hosie  V.  Gray,  ii.  249. 
Hoskin   v.   Woodward,   i.   25 ;   ii.    115, 

1-10,  163. 
Hoskins  v.  Hawkes,  ii.  142. 

V.  Litclilield,  i.  434,  449. 

V.  Rhodes,  i.  008. 
Hotchkiss  V.  Brooks,  i.  360. 

V.  Eltiiig,  ii.  576,  701. 
Hotel  Co.  V.  Marsh,  i.  126. 
Houell  r.  Barnes,  ii.  502. 
Hough  v.  Bailey,  ii.  49. 

V.  Birge,  i.  624. 

V.  De  forest,  ii.  196. 

V.  Osborne,  ii.  123. 
Hougliton  V.  Hapgood,  i.  35,  174,  309 ; 
ii.  224,  541. 

V.  Jones,  iii.  342. 

V.  Marshall,  i.  442. 
Hounsell  v.  Smyth,  i.  573. 
Houpes  V.  Alderson,  ii.  354. 
House  V.  Burr,  i.  469. 

v.  House,  i.  16.  27,  131. 

V.  Jackson,  ii.  596. 

V.  Metcalf,  i.  571. 
Houser  v.  Eeynolds,  i.  489. 

V.  Laniont,  ii.  46,  61. 
Houston  V.  Blackman,  iii.  356. 

V.  Laffee,  i.  663,  665. 

V.  Sneed,  iii.  96. 

V.  Stanton,  iii.  312. 
Houx  V.  Batteen,  iii.  152. 
Hovey  v.  Hobson,  i.  486 ;  iii.  263,  264, 
266. 

V.  Newton,  iii.  495. 

V.  Sawyer,  iii.  434. 
How  V.  Alger,  ii.  321 ;  iii.  109. 

V.  Vigures,  ii.  41. 
Howard  v.  Amer.  Peace  Soc,  iii.  554, 
567. 

V.  Ames,  ii.  72,  78,  194. 

V.  Candish,  i.  296. 

V.  Carpenter,  i.  660. 

V.  Carusi,  ii.  783. 

V.  Doolittle,  i.  522,  566,  576. 

V.  Ellis,  i.  578. 

V.  Fessenden,  i.  6,  9. 

V.  Francis,  ii.  709. 

i\  Gresham,  ii.  265. 

V.  Handy,  ii.  264. 

V.  Harris,  ii.  65,  67,  182. 

V.  Henderson,  ii.  467,  475. 

f .  Hildreth,  ii.  191. 

V.  Howard,  ii.  109,  133,  198. 

V.  Hudson,  iii.  89. 

V.  Huffman,  iii.  327. 

V.  Maitland,  iii.  110. 

t;.  Merriam,  i.  617,  618,  631,  637, 
643,  644. 

V.  Priest,  i.  209,  700,  701,  703,  704. 

V.  Reedy,  iii.  1.50,  172. 

V.  Robinson,  ii.  172. 

V.  Shaw,  i.  622,  624,  625,  627. 


Howard  v.  Wadsworth,  iii.  46-5. 
Howard  Ins.  Co.  v.  Halsey,  ii.  212. 
Howard  Mutual  Loan,  &c.  Fund  i-.  Me- 

Intyre,  ii.  151  ;  iii.  334. 
Howards  r.  Davis,  ii.  78. 
Howe,  Re,  ii.  44,  86. 

V.  Adams,  i.  380,  397,  412,  426,427, 
444,  456. 

V.  Alger,  ii.  321 ;  iii.  109,  420,  450. 

V.  Bass,  iii.  428. 

V.  Batchelder,    i.   11,   12,  665;    iii. 
367,  369,  370. 

V.  Dewing,  iii.  311. 

V.  Howe,  iii.  263,  266,  313,  .353. 

V.  Lewis,  ii.  109,  133,  178,  196. 

V.  Russell,  ii.  45,  55. 

V.  "Wadsworth,  ii.  141. 

v.  Wilder,  ii.  194,  197  ;  iii.  325. 
Howell  V.  Howell,  ii.  509,  512,  514. 

V.  King,  ii   351. 

V.  Leavitt,  ii.  114. 

V.  Price,  ii.  51. 

V.  Richards,  iii.  521. 

V.  Saule,  iii.  425. 

V.  Schenck,  i.  144. 
Howes  V.  Bent,  i.  373. 
Howeth  V.  Anderson,  i.  567. 
Howlaud  V.  Coffin,  i.  527,  528,  530,  531, 
535,  552. 

V.  Shurtleff,  ii.  247. 

V.  Vincent,  i.  573. 
Hoxie  V.  Ellis,  i.  313. 

V.  Finney,  ii.  101;  iii.  508. 
Hoxsey  v.  Hoxsey,  ii.  783,  784. 
Hoy  1-.  Holt,  i.  537,  569. 

V.  Sterrett,  ii.  334,  339,  341,   365, 
378. 
Hoye  V.  Swan,  iii.  164. 
Hoyle  r.  Logan,  iii.  351. 

i:  Plattsburg,  &c.  R.  R.,  i.  17, 18  ;  ii. 
164. 

V.  Stowe,  i.  488. 
Hoyt  V.  Doughty,  ii.  149. 

V.  Howe,  i.  427. 

V.  Jaques,  ii.  708. 

V.  Kimball,  i.  711,  712,  714;  ii.  8. 

V.  Martense,  ii.  43. 

V.  Stoddard,  i.  555. 

V.  Swar,  i.  257  ;  iii.  271. 
Hubbard  v.  Apthorp,  iii.  510. 

V.  Epps,  ii.  535. 

1-.  Harrison,  ii.  123. 

V.  Hubbard,  i.  334 ;  ii.  13, 18,  20,  70. 

V.  Little,  iii.  159. 

V.  Norton,  iii.  493. 

V.  Savage,  ii.  157. 

V.  Shaw,  i.  134;  ii.  234,  235,  2i>9. 

V.  Wood,  i.  691. 
Hubbell  V.  Blakeslee,  ii.  137,  197. 

V.  Canady,  i.  387,  417,  449. 

V.  East  Cambridge  Sav.  Bank,  i.  22, 
26,  28. 

V.  Warren,  ii.  323. 
Hubble  V.  Wright,  ii.  49. 


TAULK    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Ilubscliiniin  c.  Alilliiiry,  i.  7. 
IIud'„'iMS  c.  Wi.o.l,  i.  Cn'l. 
IJuilsoii  /•.  CucTi)  L.  Co.,  ii.  'MO. 

V.  Hi- Villi,  ii.  I'.iK. 

V.  Wliito.  iii.  27(5. 
Hucv'b  Apin'iil.  1.  4'13. 
llujfc.  Karl,  ii   5-_'3. 

V.  McC.iiiIiv,  i.  m8;  iii.  .%7,  n7  I. 

i>.  .>rcl)oiiari,  i.  t.'.'.'). 
Huftalin  r.  Misuer,  i   (J'>S. 
Hughes,  I'll-  jxirte,  ii.  85. 

r.  Anderson,  ii.  1578,  394. 

V.  Ensien,  iii.  ;504. 

r.  Edwards,  ii.  8,  45,  101,  i:54,  17:3, 
174,  LS'.t,  r.»i,2uy. 

V.  Frisby,  ii.  IIJO. 

V.  Graves,  iii.  177. 

V.  Holli  lay,  i.  <)'.ni. 

V.  llooil,  i.  475,  505. 

V.  Kearney,  ii.  1*5,  yO. 

t'.  Lyi)n,  ii.  81. 

V.  Monty,  iii.  •'154. 

V.  Palmer,  i.  505. 

I'.  Uobotliain,  i.  580. 

I'.  Slieaff,  ii.  GO. 

I'.  Watson,  i.  257. 

V.  Wilkinson,  iii.  326. 

V.  Williams,  ii.  234,  235. 

J'.  Young,  i.  524. 
Hughes  .Minors  Apj).,  i.  489. 
Hurley  V.  (in-^'f,  i.  240. 
Hulburt  r.  Emerson,  i.  100,  109. 
Hiilet  V.  Inlow,  i.  708. 
Hulick  V.  Soovil,  iii.  197,  218,  282,  290, 

3(W,  310,  313. 
Hull  V.  Beals,  ii.  057. 

i".  Lyon,  ii.  203. 

I'.  Vauylin,  i.  02(1 
Hull  v"t  Selby  Ky.,  A'. ,  iii.  65. 
Hullain  r.  Munifile,  i.  010. 
lluuiberston  v.  lluniborston,  ii.  G31. 
Hume  r.  Gos.sett,  i.  '.\^~. 
Huinc's  I'.  Scruji;;8,  ii.  511. 
Hummer  c.  Scliott,  ii.  05. 
Humphrey  v.  Uui.>^s(>n,  ii.  123. 

V.  I'lunny,  i.  301. 

V.  Wait.  i.  577. 
Humpiiries  v.  Rrogdcn.  i.  18, 10;  ii.  341, 
381,  383,  384. 

V.  Humpiiries,  i.  143.  021. 
Huncher  i'   Whitney,  i.  007. 
Hungerford  v.  Clay,  ii.  145. 
Hunncwell  c.  Tayjor,  i.  715,  710. 
Hunnicutt  v.  I'eyton,  iii.  107. 

V.  Summey,  i.  '•W.\. 
Ilunsden  r.  ("heyney,  iii.  91. 
Hunt  V.  Acre,  ii.  201. 

V.  Bay  State  Co.,  i.  4,  10,  20. 

V.  Beeson,  ii.  G. 

V.  Cope,  i.  557,  5t')0,  .'>(J4. 

V.  Dantbrth,  i.  532,  533. 

V.  Friedman,  ii.  612. 

t>.  Hall,  i.  101. 

v.  Harding,  ii.  258. 


Hunt  V.  Hunt,  ii.  121,  170,  Jul,  i,  •,    ■  i, 
5<)2  ;  iii.  3h1. 

V.  Jl)lm^on,  i.  314. 

r.  Ix-win,  ii.  51,  273. 

r.  .Maynard.  ii.  53,  1:10,232. 

r.  .Moore,  ii.  515. 

r.  .Morton,  i.  035,  043. 

V.  Kousmaniere,  ii.  73,  OHO,  718,  719, 
734. 

V.  Stiles,  ii.  128,  252. 

c.  'I'liompson,  i.  551,  556. 

i;   Waterman,  ii.  JHJ. 

c.  Wicklifle,  iii.  211,213. 

r.  Wolfe,  i.  550. 

V.  Wrinht,  i.  711,  715;  ii.  10. 
Hunter  r.  IKinphill.  iii.  204,  205. 

c.  Hunter,  ii.  145. 

i\  Law,  i,  399. 

(•   Marlboro',  ii.  530. 

r.  Martin,  i.  701. 

r.  ( )sterli<)udt,  i.  514  ;  ii.  21. 

r.  Kiehardson,  ii.  100. 

V.  Sandy  Hill  Tru-stees,  iii.  80. 

c.  Watson,  iii.  282,  330. 
Huntingdon  r.  Lyman,  iii.  409. 
Huntington  r.  Aslur,  ii.  313. 

V.  ("otton,  ii.  170. 

V.  Havens,  iii.  110,  111. 

V.  Smith,  ii.  122.  1 15. 

i;.  Whaley.  iii.  172. 
Huntington  «5c  Montjoy's  case,  ii.  402. 
Huntley  v.  HussuU,  i.  147,  150,  163, 16C, 

102. 
Huntly  r.  O'Flaherty,  ii.  215. 
Hurd  V.  Coleman,  ii.  189. 

V.  Curtis,  ii.  297  ;  iii.  402,  471,  502. 

r.  Cusliing,  i.  122. 

V.  Darling,  i.  005. 

r.  Crant,  i.  290. 

V.  Kobinson,  ii.  50,  1.58. 
Hurford  v.  Harned,  ii.  54. 
Ilurlbut  V.  Leonard,  ii.  ;>.'j9. 

V.  Tost.  i.  480,  5<;5. 
Hurley  r.  Walton,  i.  7(:tO. 
Hum  r.  Soper,  iii.  342,  401. 
Hurst  V.  McNeil,  ii.  470,549. 

V.  Hodney,  i.  5.31. 

V.  Winehelsea,  iii.  578. 
Huse  ('.  Morris,  iii.  407. 
Iluson  r.  Young,  ii.  354. 
Hiiss  I'.  Stephens,  iij.  282. 
IIu^ton  ('.  Cantril,  iii.  355. 

r.  Leach,  ii.  ;>74. 
Hutch  c.  Bates,  iii.  .371. 
liutchings  V.  Huggins,  i.  432;  iii.  408. 

r.  Low,  iii.  2<i'.».  213. 
llutchins  r    Bvrncs   iii.  251,  2.86. 

I-.  Carlton",  ii.  123.  205,  2<HV 

V.  Hevwood.  ii   474,  511,  532. 

V.  Hibbard,  ii.  1.37. 

c.  Huggins,  i.  448. 

f.  King,  i.  14. 

r.  Miisterson,  i.  23,  27,  28. 

r.  Uuundtrev,  iii.  527. 


Ixxx 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Hutchins  r.   State  Bank,  ii.   119,  121, 

706. 
Huchiiison  r.  Chase,  i.  094. 

V.  Tindall,  ii.  549. 

r.  Kust,  iii.  342,  347. 
Button  V.  Eenkard,  ii.  713. 

V.  Sfliumaker,  iii.  161. 

1-.  Warren,  i.  144. 
HuxforJ  V.  Milligan,  ii.  763. 
Huyler  v.  Atwood,  ii.  219,  220. 
Hiiyser  v.  Chase,  i.  031,  640. 
Hyatt  V.  Ackerson,  i.  246. 

I'.  Spearman,  i.  361. 

V.  Wood,  i.  645,  649,  656. 
Hyde  v.  Stone,  i.  694. 
Hyden  v.  Hyden,  ii.  510. 
Hydraulic  Works  v.  Orr,  i.  573. 
Hyman  v.  Head,  iii.  202,  217. 
Hyndman  v.  Hyndnian,  ii.  54,  66,  78. 
Hynson  v.  Burton,  ii.  532. 


Ihbs  V.  Richardson,  i.  G51,  652. 

Iddings  V.  Bruen,  ii.  85. 

Ide  r.  Ide,  i.  86 ;  ii.  590,  753,  767,  768, 

783 ;  iii.  565. 
Idle  V.  Cooke,  i.  106. 
Iggulden  V.  May,  i.  469. 
Igiehart  r.  Armiger,  ii.  91. 

V.  Crane,  ii.  135,  212,  213,  215,  221, 
229. 
Illinois  Cent.  R.  R.  v.  McCullougli,  iii. 

322. 
Illinois  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cobb,  i. 

659. 
Inches  v.  Leonard,  ii.  191. 

V.  Hill,  ii.  589. 
Incledon  v.  Nortlicote,  i.  335. 
Indiana  v.  Milk,  iii.  77,  86. 
Ind.  State  Bank  v.  Anderson,  ii.   112, 

121,  123,  154. 
Ing  V.  Cromwell,  ii.  107. 
Ingalls  I'.  Eaton,  iii.  482. 

V.  Plamondon,  ii.  327,  333. 
IngersoU  v.  Sargeant,  ii.  287,  301. 
IngersoU's  Appeal,  ii.  763,  768. 
Ingle  V.  Jones,  ii.  716. 
Inglis  I'.  Sailors'  S.  Harbor,  ii.  551,  564, 

743 ;  iii.  553. 
Ingoldsby  v.  Juan,  iii.  271.  273. 
Ingraham  r.  Baldwin,  i.  589,  593,  600, 
632  ;  iii.  26-3. 

V.  Hutchinson,  ii.  365,  378. 

V.  Wilkinson,  iii.  02,  439. 
Ingram  ?•.  Hall.  iii.  291. 

V.  Little,  iii.  255. 

V.  Morris,  i.  217,  202. 

V.  Smith,  ii.  277. 
Ingwersen  v.  Rankin,  i.  571. 
Inhabitants,  &c.  v.  Huntress,  iii.  242. 
Inman  )•  Jackson,  iii.  564. 
Innerarity  v.  Mims,  iii.  204. 


Innis  r.  Templeton,  iii.  78,  269. 
International  Bank  r.  Bowen,  ii.  200. 
Ipswich    Gram.    Sch.   Feoffees   v.  An- 
drews, iii.  217. 
Ireland  v.  Nichols,  i.  404. 

V.  Woolman,  ii.  215. 
Irvin  V.  Smith,  iii.  344. 
Irvine  v.  Irvine,  ii.  563;  iii.  117,  203, 
265. 

V.  Marshall,  iii.  199. 

V.  McKeon,  iii.  399. 

V.  Wood,  i.  570. 
Irwin  V.  Covode,  i.  151. 

V.  Davidson,  ii.  90,  139,  176. 

V.  Ivers,  ii.  520. 

V.  Phillips,  ii.  405. 
Isaacs  V.  Gearhart,  i.  620. 
Ischam  r.  ]\Iorrice,  iii.  126. 
Isele  V.  Ailington  Five  Cents  Sav.  Bk., 
iii.  511. 

V.  Schwamb,  ii.  172. 
Isett  V.  Lucas,  ii.  129. 
Isliam  V.  Bennington  Co.,  iii.  280,  289, 

339. 
Israel  v.  Israel,  i.  095,  698. 
Ithaca  Church  v.  Bigelow,  i.  35. 
Ivay  V.  Hedges,  i.  577. 
Ives  V.  Allyn,  iii.  566. 

i\  Ashley,  ii.  524. 

V.  Davenport,  ii.  709. 

V.  Ives,  i.  656. 

V.  Mills,  i.  417,  448. 

V.  Williams,  i.  651. 
Ivory  V.  Burns,  iii.  404. 
Ivy  V.  Gibert,  ii.  81. 
Izard  V.  Bodine,  i.  695. 
Izon  V.  Gorton,  i.  575,  578,  637. 


Jackman  v.  Arlington  Mills,  ii.  367. 

V.  Ringland,  ii.  519. 
Jackson  v.  Aldrich,  i.  617. 

V.  Alexander,  iii.  393. 

V.Allen,  i.  515;  ii.  17,21. 

V.  Andrew,  i.  152,  153,  158. 

V.  Ayers,  iii.  101,  127. 

V.  Babcock,  i.  664,  665,  666. 

V.  Bard,  iii.  .303,  329. 

V.  Berner,  iii.  145. 

V.  Blanshan,  ii.  741;  iii.  562. 

V.  Blodget,  ii.  127- 

V.  Bodle,  i.  499 ;  iii.  309,  310. 

V.  Bowen,  ii.  116,  120;  iii.  71. 

V.  Bowles,  i.  422. 

V.  Bradford,  iii.  117,  127,  381. 

V.  Bra.lt,  i.  622,  634. 

V.  Brinckerhoff,  iii.  105,  127. 

V.  Bronson,  ii.  123,  127,  134. 

V.  Brown,  ii.  630,  631. 

V.  Brownell,  i.  606. 

V.  Brownson,  i.  137,  147,  148,  515. 

V.  Bryan,  i.  002,  643. 


TAiti.r:  or-'  cAsiis  ( hip. 


l>;\xi 


Jackson  .-.  Bull.  i.  01 ;  iii.  101,  118,  126. 
rj7.  ;;28.  i'Hij. 

J".  Burctiiii,  I.  -IHtj;  iii.  2G7. 

V.  Busli,  ii  :U. 

V.  L'n.lwull,  ii.  4y(),  4«4  ;  iii.  232, 377, 

3'.(;{,  liM. 
V.  CiirpeiitiT,  i.  48ti ;  iii.  206,  2G7. 
V.  ("ary,  ii.  I'M,  4bU. 
V.  Catlln,  ii.  425;  iii.  219,  227,  321, 

32 »,  37U. 
V.  Clni.se.  iii.  2<K). 
V.  Churcliiil,  i.  288. 
V.  Clark,  ii.  81  ;  iii   424. 
V.  Cluvclniid,  ii.  513;  iii.  301. 
V.  Coideii.  iii.  334. 
V.  Collins,  i.  578,  002,  003. 
I'.  Corliss,  i.  504. 
V.  Corv.  iii.  281. 
V.  Cralts,  ii.  134,  170,  180. 
V.  Crov,  iii.  243,  2^8. 
V.  Crysler,  i.  514;  ii.  20,21. 
V.  Dashicl,  ii.  703. 
V.  Davis,  i.  530,  5'J2 ;  ii.  183,  170. 
V.  Defeiiilorf,  iii.  427. 
V.  DfhiLToi.x,  i.  47!».  480,  482. 
V.  Dclancev,  iii.  3'.»3,  3y5,  3'.)0. 
V.  De  LanJv,  ii.  14t),  6;J0,  5'JO. 
r.  Hewitt,  i".  235,  237. 
V.  Deyo,  i.  0:!2  ;  ii.  673. 
r.  Dickeiisoi),  iii.  328. 
J'.  iJillon,  iii.  3!»1,  3y2,  894. 
V.  Duliois,  ii.  155. 
V.  Diuilap,  i.  400;  iii.  310.  318. 
V.  Dunsbagli.  ii.  444.  480.  484,  007. 
r.  Dysling,  ii.  358;  iii.  \ib. 
V.  Etldy,  i.  503. 
V.  Eilwarils,  i.  217. 
V.  Eldri.l^H'.  i.  481. 
V.  Elstun,  iii.  1G8. 
r.  Farmer,  i.  650,  659. 
V.  Feller,  ii.  617,  618. 
r.  Fish,  ii.  480;  iii.  384. 
V.  Florence,  iii.  393. 
V.  Ford,  ii.  64. 
V.  Fuller,  ii.  117. 
V.  Gardner,  i.  670,  584. 
r.  Garnsey,  iii.  358. 
r.  Gilchrist,  i  310;  iii.  268,  269. 
V.  Given,  ii.  554. 
I'.  Green,  ii.  47. 
I'.  Harder,  i.  720. 
V.  Harper,  i.  4'.t2. 
V.  HarriIl^;toll,  ii.  347. 
V.  Harrison,  i.  512,  613. 
V.  Hart.  iii.  r.'6. 
V.  Hathaway,  iii.  411,  418,  449. 
V.  Havner,  iii.  298,  347. 
V.  Heiiry,  ii.  80;  iii.  354. 
V.  Hixon.  i.  2h0 
f.  Hobhouse,  iii.  583. 
V.  Hoffman,  iii.  110.  120,  121,  122 
f.  HoUoway.  iii.  572. 
V.  Hopkins',  ii.  110,  117. 
V.  Housell,  i.  90. 

VOL.  I. — / 


Jackson  c.  Howe,  i.  01 ;  iii.  104. 
V.  Hubble,  iii.  117,  3^1. 
r.  IIikIhom,  iii.  190. 
V.  Hull.  ii.  171. 
I'.  Humphrey,  iii.  334. 
V.  Ireland,  iii.  1 11. 
V.  Jackson,  iii.  17,  537,  G<39. 
V.  Jansen,  ii.  704. 
r.  JohnMon.   i.    181,    182,   183,   184, 

180,  187,  188.  189. 
r.  Kip.  i.  228.  512;  ii.  711. 
V.  KisKclbrack.  i.  481. 
r.  Lan^head.  i.  530. 
r.  La«  ton,  iii.  210. 
V.  Leek.  iii. . 'WO.  311,  344,  893. 
v.  Len^rett,  iii.  .■>j'J2. 
V.  Leonard,  iii.  150. 
r.  Livint^ston.  i.  087. 
V.  Luiin,  i.  79. 
V.  Mancius,  i.  126,  132. 
i".  Martin,  iii.  504. 
V.  Massacluisetts  Ins.  Co.,  ii.  173. 
I'.  Matsdorf.  ii.  517  ;  iii.  119. 
V.  McCall,  iii.  450. 
r.  McKenriy.  ii.  444,  445. 
I'.  McLeod,  1.  086,  630,  051. 
i;.  Merrill,  i.  91. 
V.  Miller,  i.  500,  622,  032. 
r.  .Mills,  iii.  120. 
V.  Minkler.  ii.  110. 
V.  .Moore,  ii.  649;  iii.  174,  175,  525. 
V.  Morse,  i.  056. 
I'.  .Murray,  iii.  90,  101,  118. 
f.  Myers,  i.  89,   122,  481 ;  ii.  437, 

480. 
V.  Neely,  iii.  .347. 
r.  Newion.  iii.  156.  104. 
V.  O'Donajjhy.  i.  316. 
V.  Opden.  iii.  90. 
V.  Osborn,  iii.  259. 
I'.  Parkhurst,  i.  049,  652. 
V.  Peek,  iii.  121. 
V.  Pesked,  ii.  805. 
V.  Phillips,  i.  81  ;  ii.  701,  702,  779, 

781  ;  iii.  203,  661, 66.3.  656, 650, 

557. 
V.  Phipps,  iii.  301,  810.311. 
V.  Pierce,  i.  024  ;  ii.  673. 
V.  Pike,  iii.  303. 
V.  Porter,  iii.  199. 
I'.  Potter,  iii.  679. 
V.  Ramsay,  iii.  328. 
1-.  Peeves,  iii.  433. 
r.  Held.  i.  377,  424. 
r.  Richards,  i  4!tO;  iii.  IfiO.  .Sll. 
r.  Roberts,  iii   242,  243,  304.311. 
V.  Robins,  ii.  783. 
V.  Root,  ii.  480. 
V.  Rounsevilte.  i.  35. 
r.  Rowland,  i.  580,  692,  504 ;    Iii 

321. 
t.  Rutledge.  i.  .352. 
V.  Sackett.  ii.  108. 
1-.  Salmon,  i.  036. 


Isxxii 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 


Jackson  i:  Scliauber,  ii.  555,  704. 

V.  Schoonmaker,  i.  132,  469  ;  ii.  807  ; 

iii.  159,  161,  Ibo,  164,  299,  334, 

347,  393. 
V.  Schutz,  i.  54. 
V.  Sebring,   ii.   451,  484 ;   iii.  393, 

395. 
V.  Selliek,  i.  182,  184. 
V.  Sharp,  iii.  170. 
V.  Sheldon,   i.   516,   639 ;   iii.   318, 

321,  322. 
f.  Shepard,  iii.  235. 
V.  Sisson,  iii.  280. 
V.  Slater,  ii.  193. 
V.  Spear,  1.  594. 
V.  Staats,  ii.  445. 
V.  Stacey,  ii.  350. 
t'.  Stackhouse,  ii.  117. 
V.  Stanford,  iii.  288. 
V.  Stevens,    i.   343 ;    iii.   119,   275, 

498. 
r.  Stewart,  i.  592. 
V.  Stiles,  i.  592. 
V.  Sublett,  ii.  600. 
V.  Swart,  ii.  445  ;  iii.  397. 
V.  Tibbitts,  i.  147,  153,  690. 
V.  Topping,  ii.  17 ;  iii.  562. 
V.  Town,  iii.  358. 
V.  Turrell,  ii.  141. 
V.  Van  Corlaer,  iii.  96. 
V.  Van  Dalfsen,  ii.  570. 
V.  Vanderheyden,  i.  314;  iii.  123, 

243,  275. 
V.  Van  Hoesen,  i.  124. 
V.  Van  Slyck,  ii.  573. 
V.  Van  Zandt,  i.  116. 
V.  Veeder,  ii.  714. 
V.  Vermilyea,  iii.  412. 
V.  Vincent,  i.  126,  598,  602. 
V.  Vosburg,  i.  720. 
V.  Waldron,  ii.  753,  777 ;  iii.  117. 
V.  Walker,  ii.  532. 
V.  Walsh,  ii.  77,  570. 
V.  Warford,  iii.  162,  163. 
V.  Warren,  ii.  107,  153,  177,  263. 
V.  Wendell,  iii.  287. 
V.  Wheat,  iii.  146,  174. 
V.  Whedon,  i.  592. 
V.  Wheeler,  i.  602,  603. 
V.  Whitbeck,  i.  691. 
V.  Wilcox,  iii.  205. 
V.  Willard,  ii.  101,  123,  145,  171. 
V.  Winslow,  iii.  203. 
V.  Wood,  iii.  199,  287,  327,  332. 
V.  Woodruff,  iii.  164,  160. 
V.  Wright,  i.  313;  iii.  105,  118,  119, 

370. 
Jackson  County  v.  Philadelphia,  W.,  & 

B.  R.  R.  Co.,  i.  669. 
Jacobs  V.  Allard,  ii.  .367. 
V.  Iklorange,  iii.  92. 
Jacoway  ?•.  Gault,  ii.  150;  iii.  334. 
Jaffe  V.  Harteau,  i.  576. 
Jakeway  v  Barrett,  iii.  166,  443. 


Jamaica  Pond  Aq.  Co.  v.  Chandler,  i 
472 ;    ii.  356,  358 ;  iii.  375,  414,  435, 
465,  466 
James  v.  Allen,  iii.  549. 

V.  Brown,  ii.  135. 

V.  Dean,  i.  618. 

V.  James,  ii.  506,  580. 

V.  Johnson,  ii.  64,  68,  154,  202. 

V.  Morey,  i.  289,  241 ;   ii.  45,  202, 
204,  561,  562. 

V.  Plant,  iii.  387. 

V.  Stull,  ii.  77. 

V.  Thomas,  ii.  67. 

V.  Vanderheyden,  iii.  321 

V.  Wj^nford,  ii.  793. 
Jameson  v.  Smith,  ii.  704. 
Jamieson  v.  Bruce,  ii.  107. 

V.  Millemann,  i.  666,  671,  672. 
Jamison  v.  Dimock,  iii.  248. 

V.  Glascock,  ii.  522,  569. 

V.  Perry,  ii.  175. 
Janes  v.  Jenkins,  ii.  3.33 ;  iii.  492,  506. 

V.  Throckmorton,  ii.  535. 
Janvrin  v.  Janvrin,  iii.  337. 
Jaques  v.  Gould,  i.  548,  550,  567. 

V.  Methodist  Church,  iii.  315. 

V.  Sliort,  i.  530,  531. 

V.  Weeks,  ii.  45,  47,  40,  64. 
Jarechi  v.  Philh.  Soc,  i.  29. 
Jarrett  v.  Tomlinson,  iii.  352. 
Jarvis  v.  Dutcher,  ii.  89. 

V.  Russick,  iii.  222. 

V.  Whitman,  ii.  229. 

V.  Woodruff,  ii.  189. 
Jason  I'.  Eyres,  ii.  67. 
Jauretche  v  Proctor,  ii.  9. 
Javne  r.  Gregg,  iii.  317. 
Jeffers  v.  Radcliff,  i.  688. 
Jefferson  College,  Trustees  of,  v.  Dick- 
son, ii.  106,  207  ;  iii.  63. 
Jefferson  County  Bldg.  Ass.  v.  Heil,  iii. 

309. 
Jeffersonville  v.  Ferryboat,  ii.  307. 
Jeffersonville  Association  v.  Fisher,  ii. 

73. 
Jeffries  v.  Jeffries,  ii.  325,  327. 
Jemmott  i\  Cooly,  ii.  294. 
Jencks  v.  Ale.xander,  ii.  74,  508,  578. 
Jenkins  v.  Foster,  ii.  375. 

V.  Freyer,  ii.  212,  599. 

V.  Harrison,  i.  429. 

V.  Jenkins,  i.  222,  512,  513. 

V.  Jones,  ii.  72,  78,  81,  82. 

V.  McCurdv,  i.  24. 

V.  Volz,  i.  379. 

V.  Young,  i.  89 ;  ii.  435,  436. 
Jenks  V.  Edwards,  i.  475. 

V.  Morgan,  iii.  434. 

V.  Ward,  iii.  458,  491. 
Jenney  r.  Laurens,  ii.  497. 
Jennings,  Ex  parte,  ii.  305;  iii.  438. 

V.  Alexander,  i.  546. 

V.  Bragg,  iii.  324. 

V.  McComb,  i.  478. 


T.VIJLi:    OP    CASKS    CITED. 


I  .\  .\  .\  1 1 1 


Jeiinines  c  Monks,  iii.  I'JT. 

c.  Tisbiiry,  ii.  !' is. 

i:  WnnI,  ii.  tlT 

r.  WiiitakiT.  lii.  20o. 
Jennisoii  i'.  llap^ooil,  i.  ;,'0G,  311 ;  ii.  78, 
b-2'2,  5-J4.  &70. 

r.  Wiilker.  ii.  liM,  35(1,  373,  306. 
Jeniiv  c.  Ji'iiiiy,  i.  227,  260;  ii.  642. 
.Jenilad  r.  Kllv.  iii.  41»;J. 
Jt-nnne  r.  McCiirtcr.  ii.  204,  270. 
JiTvis  r.  Unitoii,  i.  1 12. 
JesscT  f.  (iillijril,  ii.  HUo. 
Jesson  c.  Doe,  ii.  052. 
Jftor  c.  renn,  i.  (MU. 
Jewell  r.  Loe,  ii.  325. 

V.  Warner,  i.  117. 
Jewett  v.  Ik-rry,  i.  513. 

V.  Hrock,  i.  3,sO,  412,  42G,  427,444. 

r.  Foster,  i.  0S7. 

I'.  Jewett,  ii.  350,  300. 

I-.  Miller,  iii.  HO.  80. 

V.  Stockton,  i.  il88. 

V.  Tucker,  iii.  3tjO. 

V.  Whitney,  i.  t)'.»3. 
JlRgits  r.  Jiggits,  i.  227. 
JilUon  r.  Wilcox,  ii.  057. 
Jobe  V.  O'Brien,  ii.  210. 
Jolin  and  Cherry  Sts.,  iii.  226. 
Johnson  v.  Anderson,  ii.  500;   iii.  450. 

i:  Baker,  iii.  311,  318,  321. 

V.  Ball,  ii.  028  ;  iii.  573. 

V.  Bantoek,  iii.  381. 

V.  Beauchamp,  i.  028. 

V.  Blydenburgh,  ii.  42. 

V.  Brown,   ii.    126,   132,    149,    207, 
268. 

V.  Camp,  i.  12. 

V.  Candage,  ii.  125,  183. 

1-.  Carpenter,  ii.  122,  164,  257. 

r.  Clark,  ii.  52. 

r  Collins,  iii.  213,  520,  530. 

V.  Conn.  Bank,  ii.  532. 

V.  Cornett,  ii    123. 

V  dishing,  ii.  089. 

1-.  Klliott,  i.  311. 

V.  Farley,  iii.  200,  301. 

17.  Gorham.  iii.  147. 

V.  Griffin  Tr.  Co.,  i.  431. 

I'.  Hannahan,  i.  OijO. 

r.  Harmon,  ii.  260. 

V.  Harris,  i.  080.  000. 

V.  Hartshorn,  i.  402. 

V.  Houston,  ii.  106. 

V.  Johnson,  i.  130,  716;  ii.  135,  146, 
204,  407,  438,  4f,6.  034. 

V.  Jordan,  ii.  310.  .322,  328,  329,  331, 
333,  300,  400. 

V.  Kinnicutt,  ii.  354,  355. 

V.  Lewis,  i   573;  ii.  123. 

I'.  Mcintosh,  i.  68,09;  iii.  194,  195, 
108. 

V.  Mehaffey,  i.  30. 

V.  Monell,  ii.  117. 

V.  Moore,  iii.  267. 


Johnson  v.  Morse,  i.  283. 

V.  Muz/y.  i.  518  ;  ii.  293;  iii.  331. 

r.  NhsIi,  iii    149,  156. 

V.  Neil.  i.  2H;i. 

r.  <  lp|>enheiin,  i    ■'■ 'T   <".H 

f.  I'arks,  ii.  407 

V.  IVrley,  i.  210 

I'.  I'hillips,  ii.  1(15. 

r.  Kayiier,  iii.  413,  420. 

<•.  Kiee,  ii.  210,  211.  221. 

r.  liiehanUon,  i.  4,  70,  375,  881 ;  ii 
150. 

V.  Kolterts,  i.  ?A]9. 

V.  Sherman,  i.  525.  55-1  ;  ii.  5.3. 

V.  Shields,  i.  31;;,  .314. 

I'.  Simeock,  ii.  741  ;  iii.  563. 

V.  Simpson,  iii.  427. 

r.  Skillman,  i.  005,  070. 

V.  Stagg,  ii.  IIH,  ;J28. 

V.  Stevens,  ii.  171. 

i:  Stewart,  i.  040. 

!•.  Stillings,  i.  344. 

I'.  Swain,  i.  O'.Hi. 

v.  Thomiison,  ii.  177,  184;  iii.  102 

i:  Valentine,  ii.  592,  698. 

V.  White,  ii.  141. 

V.  Williams,  ii.  211,  215,  221. 
Johnston  f.  Fergnson,  ii.  60. 

V.  dray,  ii.  05,  67. 

r.  HuMiphreys.  ii.  635. 

V.  Smith,  i.  548. 

V.  Vandyke,  i.  200.  .300. 
Johnstone  r.  Huddlestone,  i.  584,  038 
Johnstown  Cheese  Mfg-  Co.  i;.  Veghts, 

ii.  375. 
Jolly  c.  Arbuthnot.  ii.  143. 

c.  Brvan,  i.  000. 
Jones  V.  Bacon,  ii.  721.  783,  784. 

V.  Berkshire,  iii.  334. 

V.  Brandt,  i.  871,  419. 

1-.  Brewer,  i.  283,  284.  285,  303,310. 

r.  Bush,  ii.  488;  iii.  310. 

V.  Carter,  i.  602,  500,  513,  514  ;  iii 
204. 

V.  Chiles,  i   002. 

V.  Cincinnati    Type    Foundry,   iii 
280. 

1-.  Clark,  i.  505,  509. 

V.  Cr.nde,  ii.  08,  258. 

V.  Crane,  i.  677. 

V.  Crawf..rd.  iii.  202. 

i:  Crumley,  i.  350,  386. 

V.  Havies,  i.  587. 

v.  Detroit  Chair  Co.,  i.  6. 

r.  Devore.  i.  206. 

V.  Doe.  ii.  11. 

I'.  Doughertv,  ii.  608. 

V.  Ehrliseh,  1.  300. 

V.  Fetch,  i.  519. 

r.  Flint,  i.  11:  iii.  307. 

r.  Freed,  iii.  272. 

I'.  Freideberg.  i.  577. 

r.  Froninn,  iii.  2.31. 

V.  Frost,  iii.  123. 


Ixxxiv 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


Jones  V.  Harraden,  i.  695. 

V.  Hill,  i.  167. 

i:  Hoar,  i.  160. 

V.  Hockman,  iii.  146. 

V.  Huglies,  i.  '216;  iii.  263. 

r.  Jones,  i.  296,  622;  ii.  11. 

V.  Keitl),  ii.  310. 

V.  King,  iii.  512. 

V.  Laugliton,  ii.  651. 

V.  Mack,  ii.  106. 

V.  Maffet,  ii.  552. 

V.  Marable,  iii.  17. 

i".  Marsh,  i.  642. 

V.  Massey,  i.  696. 

V.  McDei-mott,  ii.  535. 

V.  Miller,  ii.  654. 

V.  Munroe,  iii.  349. 

V.  Myrick,  ii.  212. 

V.  Obenchain,  i.  344. 

V.  Patterson,  i.  290,  344. 

V.  Percival,  ii.  355. 

V.  Perry,  iii.  223,  226,  229. 

V.  Pettibone,  iii.  443. 

V.  Quinnipiack  Bank,  ii.  226. 

V.  Reed,  i.  512. 

V.  Reynolds,  i.  481,  482. 

V.  Richardson,  ii.  163. 

V.  Roe,  ii.  16,  677,  738,  739,  758,  777, 
801. 

V.  Ryan,  ii.  767. 

V.  St.  John,  ii.  269. 

V.  Say  &  Seal,  ii.  498. 

i\  Scott,  i.  25. 

V.  Sherrard,  i.  130;  ii.  224. 

r.  Smith,  ii.  154.  571. 

V.  Sothoron,  ii.  789. 

V.  Stanton,  i.  721. 

V.  Taylor,  iii.  222. 

V.  Thomas,  i.  144  ;  ii.  142. 

V.  Tipton,  i.  627. 

V.  Todd,  i.  2.57. 

V.  Waddy,  i.  358. 

V.  "Wagner,  ii.  384. 

V.  Walker,  ii.  11. 

V.  Weathersbee,  i.  680,  691. 

V.  Webster,  ii.  163. 

V.  Westcomb,  ii.  747. 

V.  Whitehead,  i.  152. 

V.  Wood,  ii.  721. 
Jones's  Appeal,  i.  704. 
Jones's  case,  i.  591. 
Joplin  I'.  Johnson,  i.  595. 
Jordan  v.  Fenno,  ii.  52. 

V.  God  man,  i.  443,  455. 

V.  Imthurn,  i  442. 

V.  Roach,  i.  118;  ii.  798. 

V.  Staples,  i.  607,  609. 

t\  Smith,  ii.  195. 

V.  Stevens,    ii.    483 ;    iii.   91,  257, 
398. 
Josetti  V.  McGregor,  ii.  763,  765,  767, 

768. 
Joslyn  V.  Wyman,  ii.  157,  196,  198,  300, 
272. 


Journeay  r.  Brackley,  i.  634,  535,  552, 

554. 
Joy  V.  Adams,  ii.  195. 

V.  Penny  Sav.  Bank,  ii.  299. 
Joyce  V.  Haines,  ii.  510. 

V.  Williams,  iii.  96. 
Joyner  v.  Vincent,  ii.  176. 
Judevine  v.  Goodrich,  iii.  293. 
Judge  V.  Conn.  F.  Ins.  Co.,  ii.  173. 

V.  Forsyth,  ii.  274. 
Judkins  v.  Judkins,  i.  714. 
Judson  V.  Gibbons,  ii.  553,  576. 

V.  Sierra,  iii.  274. 
Julian  V.  Bost.,  C.  F,,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.,  i. 

266. 
Jumel  V.  Jumel,  ii.  215,  227  ;  iii.  348. 
Junction  R.  R.  r.  Hnrpold,  iii.  83. 

V.  Harris,  i.  188,  190. 
June  V.  Purcell,  iii.  443. 


K. 


Kabley  v.  Worcester  Gas  Co  ,  i.  482. 
Kain  v.  Hoxie,  i.  525,  529,  641,  547. 
Kaler  ?,'.  Beaman,  ii.  354. 
Kamphouse  v.  Gaffner,  i.  670. 
Kane  r.  Bloodgood,  ii.  534,  535,  536. 

i\  O'Conners,  ii.  511. 

V.  Sanger,  iii.  480,  50-3. 

V.  Vandenburgh,  i.  167. 
Kane  County  v-  Herrington,  i.  695. 
Kannady  v.  McCarron,  ii.  107. 
Kansas  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Dunmejer,  iii. 

507,  511. 
Karker's  Appeal,  ii.  754. 
KarmuUer  v.  Krotz,  i.  56;  iii.  408,  472. 
Karnes  v.  Lloj'd,  ii.  107. 
Kaser  v.  Haas,  i.  373. 
Kastor  v.  Newhouse,  i.  570. 
Kauffelt  r.  Bovver,  ii.  88,  93,  94. 
Kauffman  v.  Griesemer,  ii.  372. 
Kavanagh  i'.  Gudge,  i.  655. 
Kay  V.  Penn  R.  R.,  i.  662. 

V.  Scates,   ii.   497,   498,   499,    753, 
763. 
Kean  v.  Hoffecker,  ii.  776. 

V.  Roe  d.  Hoffecker,  iii.  558. 
Kean's  Will,  iii.  574. 
Kearney  v.  Macomb,  iii.  273. 

V.  Post,  i.  531,  544. 

V.  Taylor,  iii.  228. 
Kearsing  v.  Kilian,  iii.  326. 
Keates  v.  Cadogan,  i.  576. 
Keating  v.  Condon,  i.  611. 
Keats  V.  Huejo,  ii.  364. 
Kcay  V.  Goodwin,  i.  548,  692,  720. 
Keech  v.  Hall,  ii.  181. 
Keeler   v.   Eastman,   i.    147,   148,  149, 
152. 

i\  Keeler,  i.  29. 

V.  Tatnell,  i.  2-59. 

V.  Vantuvle,  iii.  85. 

V.  Wood,"  iii.  465,  47a 


TAULK    OF    CASES   CITED. 


Ixxxv 


Ki'cly  r.  OTonner,  i.  r>72. 
Kcuiio  ('.  UouKlitoii,  iii.  -:<7. 
Ki'fni.-'((  Aiipciil,  ii   7H>s ;  iii.  400. 
Ki'ieiiiiiif  c.  Kficiilir.i',  iii.  1-115,  340. 
Kcil  r.  IIi'iiKy,  i.  4N''. 
Kiisol  1'.  Kiiriu8t.  i.  (I'.to. 
Kfister  r.  SiDtt,  ii.  574. 
Keitii  V.  ll..riier.  ii.  W,  UI. 

r.  Koitli,  iii.  154. 

V.  I'lirvi.s,  ii.  517. 

r.  Trapier.  i.  217.  .'500. 
Keller  r.  Mii-liaol,  i.  'Jilti. 
Kflleran  r.  IJniwii,  ii.  'Vl. 
Ki'llersberj^er  r.  K(i|)p,  i.  l-'iO. 
Kelley  r.  .Iiihil'S!*,  ii.  51 1  ;  iii.  120,  1^0. 

V.  Meiiis,  ii.  IM,  7M. 

r.  Weston,  i.  ii()5.  (iOS. 
Kellogg'  '••  Anu-s,  ii.  137,  lo8,  I'JO,  I'Jl. 

V.  Ulair,  iii.  5<>3. 

V.  Iliile,  ii.  4:;H.  4(i7.  47!). 

I'.  Inger.sdll,  iii.  4'.t2,  4"J3. 

V.  Lootnis,  iii.  1  t<'i. 

V.  Miiliii,  iii.  4H8. 

V.  Piatt,  iii.  507. 

V.  Hand,  ii.  212. 

V.  Kohinaon,  ii.  21»');    iii.  4'J4,  497, 
[*){,  f*y2. 

V.  Hockwell,  ii.  2;]5. 

r.  Smith,  ii.  12:5;  iii.  95,  435. 
Kellum  V.  Smitli,  ii.  510,  517. 
Kelly  v.  Austin,  i.  25. 

I'.  naktT,  i.  o75. 

i;.  City  Mills,  i.  27. 

V.  Dutch  Ciiurrh,  i.  6G5. 

V.  Greenfield,  iii.  54. 

V.  Herrick,  ii.  225,  229. 

V.  .lolinson,  ii.  514. 

V.  Meins,  ii.  590. 

V.  Pattersun,  i.  470. 

I'.  Payne,  ii.  91,  97. 

I'.  Thompson,  ii.  47,  57,  59. 

V.  Turner,  iii.  400. 

I'.  Waite,  i.  tJ17. 
Kelly's  ca.se,  ii.  lOG. 
Kelsey  r.  Abbott,  iii.  238. 

«'.  Unnly,  iii.  15. 

V.  Ward.  i.  523. 
Kenierer  >•.  liournes,  i.  458. 
Kemp  r.  Bradford,  ii.  588,  055. 

V.  Derrett,  i.  i'.:50. 

V.  Earp,  ii.  (')3. 

V.  Hoilaivl.  i.  337. 

V.  Kemp,  i.  402. 

V.  Mitclieli,  ii.  188. 

r.  Thorp,  iii.  203. 
Kempe  i'.  (Jf)odall,  i.  591. 
Kendall  i:  Carland,  i.  491,  550. 

r.  Clark,  i.  410 

V.  Lawrence,  i.  480;  iii.  201. 

V.  Mann,  ii.  518. 
Kenley  r.  Hu.lelson,  i.  800.  370.   . 
Kennebec  Purchase  r.  Laborec,  iii.  108. 

V.  Tiffiiny,  iii.  435,  459. 

V.  Springer,  iii.  100,  104. 


Kennedy,  fn  re,  I.  3.>C. 

r.  Pury,  ii.  50(5. 

r.  Keiineily,  i.  273;  ii.  5155. 

/.  McCarinev,  iii.  2(J2. 

(.  .\lilU,  i.  335.  330. 

V.  .\.  drow,  i.  335,  330. 

V.  Northrup,  iii.  345. 

V.  Dwell,  ii.   2,  299 ;    iii.  493.  494, 
502. 

V.  Strong,  ii.  532. 
Keiiiieily's  Apjieal,  i.  (578. 
Kenneriy  r.  Missouri  Ins  Co.,  i.  199. 
Keiiiiett  r.  IMumiiKr,  ii.  I'Xi,  139. 
Keniiey  c  I'liillips,  iii.  4ul. 
Kenniston  r.  Leighton,  ii.  455. 
Kensington  v.  Houverie,  i.  l2y. 
Kent  V.  Agard,  i.  445. 

V.  Ilartpoole.  i.  IHO. 

I',  .ludkins,  ii.  353. 

V.  Kent,  i.  •J<»4. 

V.  Lasley,  i.  398  ;  ii.  54. 

I'.  Maliatley,  iii.  672. 

V.  Waite,  ii.  317,  348,  392  ;  iii.  59, 
411. 

V.  Welch,  iii.  517,  519. 
Kenworthy  i-.  Tullis,  iii.  3iK). 
Kenvon  v.  Nichols,  ii.  310,  328. 

'v.  See,  ii.  (511,  (>41. 

V.  Segar,  iii.  293. 

r.  Shreck,  ii.  179,  249. 
Keouii  V.  Daniell,  i.  33. 
Keplinu'cr  r.  .Macubbin,  ii.  717. 
Kei-i-ell  r.  Mailey,  i.  532;  ii.  290,  GOO. 
Kepplu's  Apjieal,  ii.  9,  G'>'i. 
Kercheval  r.  Triplett,  iii.  122. 
Kerchner  r.  Singletary,  i.  3'.t7. 
Kerley  r.  Kerley.  i.  39'.t,  400. 
Keriian  r.  (Jrillith,  iii.  210. 
Kernochan  r.  New   York  Bowery  Ins. 

Co.,  ii.  241. 
Kerns  v.  Swope,  iii.  339. 
Kerr,  AV,  ii.  3(I8. 

r.  Connell,  iii.  309. 

r.  Day,  i.  52^. 

V.  Freeman,  iii.  381. 

r.  (iihiiore,  ii.  0:5,  04. 

r.  Kingsbury,  i.  32. 

r.  Moon,  iii.  19*.). 
Kerry  c.  Derrick,  iii.  505. 
Kershaw  r.  Thompson,  ii.  249.  251 ;   iii 

2^51,  232. 
Kessler  r.  Draub,  i.  455. 

I-.  State,  iii.  338. 
Kester  ?•.  Stark,  i.  717. 
Kelchiim  r.  .lanncey,  ii.  157. 

V.  Walsworth.  i'.  7IM5. 
Keti  Ita.s  r.  Penfold.  ii   .'580. 
Ketsey's  case,  i.  493. 
Key  c.  .McCleary,  ii.  53,  54. 
Keyes  r   Bines,  i.  3H0. 

r.  Mill,  i.  413,(524,  027. 
V.  Woo.l,  ii.  125,  12(5.  128. 
Keys  V.  Powell,  i.  493,  522. 
V.  Test.  iii.  80. 


Ixxxvi 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED. 


Keyser  v.  School  District,  i.  8. 

Kezer  v.  Clifford,  ii.  177. 

Kibby  v.  Cliitwood,  iii.  22G,  230. 

Kidd  V.  Deiinison,  i.  187,  147,  148. 

Kiddali  v.  Trimble,  i.  287. 

Kidder  v.  George,  iii.  492. 

Kiefter  v.  Imlioff,  ii.  328. 

Kiehle  r.  Heuliiigs,  ii.  396. 

Kier  v.  Peterson,  i.  151. 

Kiersted  v.  Orange  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  i. 

500,  518,  55G. 
Kiester  v.  Miller,  i.  580. 
Kighly  V.  Bulkly,  i.  629. 
Kilborn  v.  Robbins,  ii.  122, 201,  215,  226, 

255,  2t0. 
Kilgore  v.  Hascall,  iii.  413. 
Kilgour  r.  Crawford,  i.  717. 
Killaree  v.  Jansen,  i.  656. 
Killion  V.  Kelley,  ii.  355;  iii.  502. 
Killmore  i-.  Howlett,  iii.  369. 
Kilpatrick  v.  Kilpatrick,  ii.  92. 
Kimball  v  Blaisdell,  iii.  106,  117,  120, 
127,  498,  508. 

V.  Cocheco  R.  R.,  11.  320. 

V.  Eaton,  iii.  298. 

V.  Grand  Lodge,  Iii.  500. 

V.  Johnson,  iii.  334. 

V.  Kenosha,  iii.  450. 

V.  Kimball,  i.  246,  248. 

V.  Ladd,  iii.  171. 

V.  Lockwood,  1,  540,  596 ;  ii.  107, 
142,  148,  144. 

V.  Lohmas,  iii.  168. 

V.  Mvers,  ii.  49. 

V.  Pike,i.  548. 

V.  Rowland,  i.  513,  638,  644. 

V.  Schotr,  iii.  76,  119. 

V.  Semple,  iii.  409,  508. 

V.  Stormer,  iii.  167. 

V.  Sumner,  iii.  6. 

V.  Walker,  iii.  399,  401. 
Kimble  v.  Esworthy,  i.  417,  418. 
Kimbrell  v.  Willis,  1.  360,  403. 
Kime  v.  Brooks,  iii.  297. 
Kimpton  r.  Walker,  1.  523,  524,  535. 
Kincaid  v.   Brittain,  iii.  479,  483,  486, 
488,  495,  498,  507,  527,  530. 

V.  Burem,  1.  441. 

V.  Dormey,  iii.  97. 

V.  Meadows,  iii.  350. 
Kincaid's  Appeal,  i.  35. 
Kincheloe  r.  Tracewells,  iii.  57. 
King  V.  Aldbnrough,  i   539. 

V.  Anderson,  i.  549. 

V.  Bronsoii,  ii.  76. 

V.  Donnelly,  ii-  552. 

V.  Gilson,  i'ii.  119,  260,  338, 479, 512, 
513,  524,  527. 

V.  Hawkins,  iii.  222. 

V.  Horndon,  1.  662. 

V.  King,  i.  240,  286  ;  ii.  51,  137,  207. 

V.  Lawson,  i.  614. 

V.  Longnor,  iii.  297. 

V.  McVickar,  ii.  221. 


King  V.  Miller,  ii.  -365. 

V.  Newman,  ii.  54. 

V.  Oakley,  i.  489. 

r.  Pardee,  ii.  535. 

V.  Pedly,  i.  571. 

V.  Phillips,  i.  692. 

V.  Reed,  i.  718. 

V.  Reynolds,  i.  475,  565. 

V.  Rowan,  1.  690. 

V.  Smith,  iii.  159. 

V.  Stacey,  iii.  116. 

V.  State  Ins.  Co.,  ii.  240,241,  244. 

V.  Stetson,  1.  229,  230. 

V.  Sturgs,  i.  376. 

V.  Thompson,  iii.  248. 

V.  Utley,  ii.  648. 

V.  Weeks,  i.  701. 

V.  Wilson,  i.  543. 

V.  AVithers,  ii.  775. 

V.  Yarborough,  iii.  62,  65. 

V.  Young,  iii.  448. 
Kingdon  v.  Bridges,  ii.  506,  508. 

V.  Nottle,  iii.  479,  484. 
Kingman  v.  Higgins,  i.  448. 

11.  Sparrow,  i.  251 ;  iii.  171. 
Kingsbury  v.  Burnside,  iii.  306,  310. 

V.  Milner,  iii.  531. 

r.  Wild,  ill.  222. 
King's  Chapel  v.  Pelham,  ii.  13. 
King's  County  F.  I.  Co.  v.  Stevens,  iii. 

449, 
Kingsland  v.  Clark,  i.  558. 
Kingsley  v.  Holbrook,  i.  11,  16  ;  ii.  55, 
475 ;  iii.  291,  .367. 

V.  Kingsley,  i.  368,  401. 
Kingsmill  r.  Millard,  i.  590. 
Kiniia  v.  Smith,  ii.  101,  136,  146,  147, 

268. 
Kinne  v.  Kinne,  iii.  547. 
Kinnear  v.  Lowell,  ii.  227. 

V.  Rogers,  ii.  710. 
Kinnebrew  i'.  Kinnebrew,  iii.  392. 
Kinney  v.  Ensign,  ii.  196. 

V.  Watts,  i.  519. 
Kinnier  v.  Rogers,  ii.  710. 
Kinsler  v.  Clark,  ii.  475. 
Kinsley  v.  Abbott,  i.  705. 

V.  Ames,  1.  649  ;  ii.  71,  80. 
Kinsman  v.  Loomis,  iii.  108,  112,  121, 

127,  175. 
Kip  V.  Bank  of  New  York,  ii.  532. 

r.  Deniston,  ii.  568. 

?•.  Norton,  iii.  96. 
Kirby  v.  B.  Market  Assoc,  i.  570. 

V.  Childs,  ii.  278. 

V.  Vantrece,  i.  214. 
Kircher  v.  Schalk,  ii.  106. 
Kirk  V  Dean,  i.  256,  260,  266. 

r.  King,  iii.  70. 
Kirkham  v.  Sharp,  ii.  350. 
Kirkpa trick  v.  Kirkpatrick,  ii.  789 

V.  Wiiite,  i.  425. 
Kirtland  v.  Pounsett,  i.  626. 
luster  V.  Reeser,  iii.  462. 


TAIILK    OF   CASES   CITED. 


Kitclicll  I'.  Bur^win,  i.  3o0,  37U,  402, 

418. 
Kitclioii  r.  rriil>,'fii,  i.  (535. 
Kittlf  r.  Van  Dvck.  i.  -JIJO;  ii.  209, 
Kittreil^'e  r.  .McL.iUk'lilin,  ii.  24u. 

I".  r<-iisk'i',  i.  (iJl. 

r.  Won.Ls.  i.  11,  2t».  140;  iii.  410. 
KLipwortli  r.  Difssler,  ii.  2H>,  'J2o. 
Kk-iii  ('.  McN'iiiniirii,  ii.  53. 
Ivlenk  r.  Kiiolilo,  i.  ''Ail. 
KU'innKT  u.  Lavcrty,  ii.  052,  054,  050, 

755. 
Kliiick  r.  KeckU-y,  i.  231,  231). 

r.  I'rice,  ii.  54. 
Kline  V.  Ik-ebe.  i.   182,  488;   iii.  204, 
205. 

I".  Jacobs,  i.  005. 
Kliiu'sinitli  r.  Soewell,  iii.  202. 
Klinj^  r.  Dri's.^,  i.  507. 
Kiock  r.  WtiltiT,  ii.  53. 
Kiiiiiller  V.  Sliiirp,  iii.  480,  490. 
Knai)p  r.  Gass,  i.  ."587. 

,:  Wiii.lsor,  i.  343 ;  iii.  10. 
Knauss  v.  lima,  i.  571. 
Kllcclit  r.  Mitclic'll,  1.  tl.'.O. 
Kiieelaiid  r.  \'an  N'aikiiilmrfrli,  iii.  419. 
Knc!)itiT  r.  Kurtz,  iii.  500.  524. 
Kiietzor  v.  Brailstri't't,  ii.  258. 
Knight  .•.  Boll.  i.  341. 

i\  Ik-nott,  i.  034. 

V.  Clements,  iii.  259. 

V.  C().\,  i.  0<M). 

V.  DycT,  ii.  04  ;  iii.  329,  376,  458. 

I'.  Mains,  i.  245. 

V.  Moore,  ii.  351. 

V.  Mosely,  i.  150. 

1-.  Thayer,  i.  484  ;  iii.  125,  612. 

V.  Weatherwa.x,  ii.  570. 

V.  Whiti'hcail,  ii.  220. 

V.  Wilder,  iii.  44.3. 
Kni<jlit's  case,  i.  407. 
Knotis  r.  Hvilrick,  i.  10. 
KnoiilT  r.  Thompson,  iii.  85,  80,  89. 
Knowles  r.  I)nil<,a',  ii.  080. 

1-.  Hull,  i.  501"),  053. 

V.  Law  ton,  ii.  205,  221,  205. 

V.  Hablin,  ii.  222. 

I'.  Toothakcr,  iii.  '.H>,  435. 
Knowlton  »•.  Smith,  iii.  07. 

r.  Walker,  ii.  37,  190. 
Knox  V.  Gyc,  ii.  OS. 

V.  llanlon,  i.  300. 

I'.  Haralson,  iii.  809. 

V.  Hc.xter,  i.  5t)5. 

V.  Hook,  iii.  174. 
Koch  V.  Brings,  ii.  84,  85,  273;  iii.  274. 
Kocourek  v.  .Marak,  iii.  270. 
Koehler  v.  Black  Kiver  Falls  Iron  Co., 

iii.  288,  2S'.). 
Koenig  r.  Branson,  iii.  618. 
Koeni>?'s  Appeal,  i.  89. 
Kocstcr  r.  Burke,  ii.  120. 
Kohl  r.  rnite<l  States,  i.  70. 
Kohler  v.  Kloppinger,  iii.  451, 


Kooystra  r.  Lticaii,  ii.  832 

Koppf  V.  Utter,  ii.  300. 

Korho  V.  Barbour,  i.  5. 

Korncgay  r.  Collier,  i   527. 

Kortright    r.   Ca.lv.    ii.    100.    110,    HI, 

114.  127.  131.  172.  IhO,  240. 
Kortz  r.  Carpenter,  iii   (jOO. 
Kouniz  r.  Holthoiise,  ii.  219. 
Kraemer  r.  Uevalk.  i.  431. 
Kramer  c  Carter,  ii.  2'.iO ;  iii.  401,  500. 

V.  Cook,  i.  471,  10:t,  50t;,  5<;'.). 

I'.  Farmertf'  <sL  Mechanics'  Bank,  ii 
158. 

I-.  Bebnian.  ii.  240.  200. 
Kreiter  /•.  liigler.  iii.  4  JO,  459. 
Kresin  v.  .Man.  i.  302.  .376. 
Knvet  r.  .Meyer,  i.  O.V). 
Krueger  r.  Ferrant,  i   577. 
Kuhn  r.  Kaler.  i.  210. 

I'.  Newman,  ii.  408,  499. 

V.  Huinpp.  ii.  53. 

r.  Wel»ter.  iii.  5<i5. 
Kumler  r.  Ferguson,  iii.  .399. 
Kunckle  v.  Wyiiick.  i.  535. 
Kuiikle  f.  Wolfersberger,  ii.  01,  03,  04, 

143. 
Kurtz  r.  Kilmer,  i.  713. 
Kurz  r.  Brusch,  i.  371.  .388. 
Kutter  r.  Smith,  i.  400. 
Kutz  I'  McCunc,  iii.  41>2,  493,  495. 
Kyger  i'.  Riley,  ii.  110. 
Kyle  V.  Kaveuagl),  iii.  379. 


Labaree  v.  Carleton,  ii.  2,  0  ;  iii.  391. 

I'.  Woodward,  i.  450. 
Lacey,  K.r  jmrti-,  ii.  524. 

i\  Arnett.  i.  008. 
Lackey  r.  llnlbrook,  i.  0.56  ;  ii.  107. 
Lackman  '•.  Wood,  iii.  78,  I'M. 
Lacon  r.  Higgins.  i.  225. 
Ladd  r.  Ladd.  ii.  704.  700,  708, 

V.  Noyes,  iii.  50.J. 

V.  Perley,  i.  715. 
Ladue  i:   Detroit.  &c.    R.    H.,   ii.   112, 

123,  127,  134.  101,  102. 
Lalarge  '•.  Herter,  ii.  227. 

r.  .Mansfield,  i.  470.  oitS. 
La  Farge  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bell,  ii.  156.  215, 

221. 
La  (Tan  i'.  Xaclee,  i.  528. 
Lallin  .-.  Criflitlis.  i.  7.  8  ;  ii.  103. 
Im  Fromhois  r    .Jackson  d.  Smith,  iii 

14'.t,  101'.  170,  171,  174. 
Lagow  i:  Badollet.  ii.  05,  07. 
Tm  Granire  r.  L'.Amoreau.x.  ii.  576. 
Laguerenne  r.  Dougherty,  i.  036. 
I>aing  r.  Cunningham,  i.  419. 
Lake  r.  Craddock.  i.  701. 

V.  Freer,  ii.  54S. 

V.  (;rav,  iii.  341,398. 

r.  Lake,  ii.  459. 


Ixxxviii 


TABLE    OP    CASES    CITED. 


Lake  v.  Page,  i.  o78. 
Lakin  v.  Lakin,  i.  254. 
Lallande  v.  Wuntz,  iii.  492. 
Lamar  v.  Scott,  i.  VJ'J,  314. 
Lamb  v.  Croshind,  ii.  33(3,  345. 

t;.  Danfortli,   i.  01)9;   iii.  489,  493, 
506,  52!),  531. 

V.  Foss,  ii.  116. 

V.  Mason,  i.  426,  456. 

V.  Montague,  ii.  182,  183,  225. 

V.  Shays,  i.  419,  430. 
Lambden  v.  Sharp,  iii.  288. 
Lambert  v.  Blunientlial,  i.  715. 

V.  Carr,  iii.  218. 

V.  Smith,  ii.  479. 
Lambeth  v.  Warner,  i.  .320. 
Lamore  v.  Frisbie,  i.  4.52. 
Lampet's   case,   ii.  677,  787,   790 ;   iii. 

371. 
Lamplugh  v.  Lamplugh,  ii.  459. 
Lampman  v.  Millss,  ii.  331. 
Lamprey  v.  Nudd,  ii.  115,  123. 
Lamson  v.  Falls,  ii.  209. 

V.  Drake,  ii.  222,  235. 
Lamson  Co.  v.  Russell,  i.  499. 
Lanahan  v.  Sears,  i.  42(5. 
Lancaster  i'.  Dolan,  ii.  498. 

V.  Eve,  i.  5. 
Lancaster  Bank  r.  Myley,  i.  702. 
Lancaster  Co.  Bank  v.  Stauffer,  i.  187, 

189. 
Lance's  Appeal,  ii.  54. 
Landers  v.  I3eck,  ii.  53. 

V.  Bolton,  iii.  271,  342,  347. 
Landes  v.  Brant,  iii.  328. 
Landon  r.  Pratt,  i.  6,  31. 
Lane  v.  Bommelmann,  iii.  238. 

V.  Davis,  ii.  129. 

V.  Dickerson,  ii.  54. 

V.  Dighton,  ii.  524. 

V.  Dorman,  iii.  223,  226,  227. 

V.  Gould,  iii.  100,  163,  104. 

V.  Harold,  i.  093. 

V.  Hitchcock,  ii.  141. 

V.  King,  i.  144  ;  ii.  142. 

V.  Shears,  ii.  47. 

V.  Thompson,  i.  101 ;  iii.  408. 

V.  Tyler,  i.  700. 
Lanfair  v.  Lanfair,  ii.  43,  45,  59. 
Lang  y.  Waring,  i.  701,  702. 

V.  Whiddeii,  i.  485. 
Langdon  v.  Ingram,  ii.  9. 

V.  Keith,  ii.  128. 

V.  Paul,  ii.  141,  252. 

V.  Poor,  iii.  237,  242. 

V.  Potter,  i.  63;  iii.  1.35. 

V.  Strong,  ii.  580;  iii.  230. 
Langford  v.  Selmes,  i.  543;  ii.  285. 
Langham  v.  Nenny,  ii.  701. 
Langley  v.  Chapin,  ii.  4. 
Langmaid  v.  Higgins,  iii.  458. 
Langstaffe  i>.  Fenwick,  ii.  05,  244. 
Langston,  Ex  parte.,  ii.  80. 
Langworthy  v.  Myers,  iii.  161. 


Lanigan  v.  Kille,  i.  519,  565. 
Lanoy  v.  Athol,  ii.  207,  22;». 
Lansing  v.  Goelet,  ii.  248,  252. 

V.  Stone,  i.  157. 
Lansingburgh  Bank  v.  Crary,  i.  16. 
Lapere  v.  Lucky,  ii.  364. 
Lapham  v.  Norton,  i.  6. 
Large's  case,  i.  85. 
Larke  i'.  Farren  Hotel  Co.,  i.  571. 
Larkin  v.  Avery,  i.  032,  046. 

V.  Misland,  i.  559. 
Larman  v.  Huey,  i.  691. 
Larned  v.  Bridge,  iii.  565. 

V.  Clarke,  i.  032 ;  ii.  177. 

V.  Larned,  ii.  359. 
Laroe  v.  Gaunt,  iii.  336. 
Larrabee  v.  Lambert,  ii.  129,  244. 
Larrowe  v.  Beam,  i.  301. 
Larson  v.  Reynolds,  i.  435 ;  ii.  263. 
Lasala  v.  Holbrook,  ii.  381,  382,  383. 
Lash  V.  Lambert,  ii.  283. 
Lassell  v.  Reed,  i.  20,  610. 
Lassen  r.  Vance,  i.  230,  430. 
Latham  v.  Morgan,  iii.  524. 
Lathrop  v.  Blake,  i.  23. 

V.  Com   Bank,  i.  81. 

V.  Pollard,  ii.  571. 

V.  Singer,  i.  424. 
Latrobe  v.  Tiernan,  ii.  566,  568. 
Lattimer  r.  Liverniore,  ii.  365. 
Lauck's  Appeal,  i.  425. 
Lauglin  v.  Braley,  ii  43. 
Laugran  v.  Smith,  i.  035. 
Laverty  v.  Moore,  iii.  83,  93,  351. 
Law  V.  Hempstead,  iii.  423. 
Lawley  v.  Hooper,  ii.  51. 
Lawrence  v.  Brown,  i.  316,  317. 

V.  Cornell,  ii.  209. 

V.  Farmers'  Loan  &  T.  Co.,  ii.  80. 

V.  Fletcher,  ii.  105,  252. 

V.  Fox,  ii.  219;  iii.  332. 

V.  French,  i.  557,  559,  560,  561,  564 

V.  Hebbard,  iii.  561. 

V.  Kete,  iii.  536. 

V.  Knap,  ii.  123. 

V.  Knight,  i.  510. 

V.  Lawrence,  ii.  763. 

V.  Miller,  i.  306,  597. 

V.  Pitt,  iii.  14. 

V.  Senter,  iii.  501. 

V.  Stratton,  ii.   65,   122,  197,  253 ; 
iii.  325. 

V.  Towle,  ii.  117,  217. 

V.  Tucker,  ii.  157. 
Lawry  v.  Williams,  iii.  119. 
Lawson  v.  Morton,  i.  214. 
Lawton  v.  Adams,  i.  692. 

V.  Bruce,  i.  389. 

V.  Buckingham,  iii.  399,  526. 

V.  Lawton,  i.  31. 

?,'.  Sagcr,  iii.  317. 

V.  Salmon,  i.  34. 

V.  Savage,  i.  626. 

V.  Ward,  ii.  352. 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Ixxxix 


Lawvcr  r.  SlinptTlnnil,  i.  439  ;  iit.  270. 

I^ny  r.  Ciil)l)<)iis,  i.  4:i.'). 

I^aviiiiin  V.  'llirop,  i.  ({'12. 

Laytoii  f.  IJutUr,  i.  2!>2.  294. 

Liizt'fir  V.  I'ortiT,  i.  2t»G. 

L.i/ell  r.  La/cll,  i.  '-il:\.  ;}!iO,  451. 

Lea  r.  Nt'tliorton.  i.  GOa. 

V.  Tolk  Co.  fopiHjr  Co..  iii.  330. 
Lender  /•.  Ilomewood.  i.  -ui,  4G0. 
I^ake  ('.  Uubinsoi),  ii.  7UL 
Leal  V.  Terbusli,  iii.  KKJ. 
Lear  v.  Lenjiett,  i   .">0J. 

r.  Ttitti'ii,  i.  4.')1. 
Learned  v.  Caller,  i.  2o8,  312;  iii.  272. 

r.  Foster,  ii.  2o8. 

f.  Uiley,  iii.  3.J4. 
T..enry  v.  Durliain,  iii.  408. 
Leavfiis  i-.  Hiiller.  ii.  wy2. 
Leavitt  r.  Fietclier,  i.  521,623,630,637, 
6G«J. 

V.  Lamprey,  1.  2o7,  271.  291,  310. 

V.  Leavitt,  i.  (>i;5 ;  ii.  461. 

V.  reil.  ii.  7Uo,  708. 

V.  Pratt,  ii.  137. 

V.  Towie,  iii.  414,  471. 
Leblanc  r.  Ludrique,  iii.  210. 

r.  St.  Cieriniiin,  i.  414. 
Lec()iiij)t  r.  Wasli,  i.  253. 
Ledbitter  v.  (iasii,  i.  711. 
Ledyanl  r.  Butler,  ii.  108. 

f.  Clia]iin,  ii.  lHo. 

V.  Ten  Kyek,  iii.  437,  446. 
Lee  r.  Hank  of  U.  States,  i.  352. 

I'.  Dean,  iii.  527. 

V.  Kvan.s,  ii.  65. 

t'.  Fo.x,  i.  720,  721. 

r.  Kingsburv.  i.  442;  ii.  2G0,  278. 

V.  Lee,  ii.  7'.»0. 

r.  Lindi-11,  i.  2(i8. 

V.  Mass.  F.  &  M    Ins.  Co.,  iii.  299. 

V.  McI.ieod,  i.  <J<i0. 

r.  Miller,  i.  373,  389. 

r.  Kisdon,  i.  32. 

V.  Stone,  ii.  156. 
T.ceeh  r.  Leecli,  iii.  200. 
Leeds  r.  Cameron,  ii.  157. 

r.  Cheethani,  i.  521,  508. 

I'.  Wakefiel.l,  ii.  718,  723. 
Lees  V.  Mosley,  ii.  05:^. 
Leese  v.  Clark,  iii.  210. 
Lefavour  »•.  lloman,  iii.  154. 
Letevre  r.  .M unlock,  iii.  201,  2G8. 
I^efevre's  Api>e:il,  i.  7nl. 
Lefflngwell  v.  Elliott,  iii.  533. 
lA'ffler  r.  Arnistronjr,  ii.  84. 
Leger  v.  Doyle,  iii.  340. 
Legg  r.  Horn,  ii.  3:)4,  3;10. 
Leggat  V.  I>eggat.  ii.  514 
Leggett  ('.  Builoek,  ii.  151. 

r.  Steele,  i.  301. 
Lehigli  Vallev   H    U.  i'.  McFarlan,  ii. 

3;34,  .3.30,  343,  'Ml. 
Lehman  v.  Kellermnn,  i.  83. 
Leicester  f.  Biggs,  ii.  488. 


U'igli  r.  niikodon,  I  005. 
Leighton  ''.  lA'igliton,  i.  107. 

r.  I'erkinM,  iii.  5(Jo. 

V   I'rentcm.  ii.  107. 
LeiHliman  r.  White,  i.  504,  028. 
lA-laml  V.  (ui^xvH   i   <>,  7. 

I.  Loring,  ii.  252. 
LiMuington  r.  Sievfiis.  i.  471, 
IxMK-h  c.  Lcnch,  ii.  512. 
Lennig's  Eotate,  ii.  Kis,  218. 
Leniion  i-   I'almer,  i.  594. 

I-.  I'ortir,  ii  2Hl. 
Lent  r.  Slii-ar,  ii.  193. 
Lent/  I-    \'iitor,  ii.  40t'i. 
Leonard  r.  Adams,  iii.  508. 

r.  Kingsland,  ii.  770,  771. 

V.  Leonard,  i.  298;  ii.  350;  iii. 

V.  -Mason,  i.  355. 

1-.  Motley,  i.  71f,. 

r.  Qiiinlan,  iii.  4.34,  4.36. 

r.  Storer,  i.  572. 

f.  White,  iii   411,  4ia 
Lerned  r.  Bridge,  ii.  785. 

v.  Morrill,  iii.  435. 

r.  Saltonstall,  ii   608. 
Lerow  r.  Wilmartli,  iii.  3.50. 
Leroy  v.  Charleston,  ii.  597. 
Leshey  v.  (.Jardner,  ii.  5tj0. 
Lesley   v.  Randolph,  i.  633,  034, 

643. 
I^slie  r.  Marshall,  ii.  685,  687,  688, 

742.  743. 
Lessley  v.  Phipps,  i.  356. 
Lester  r.  Young,  i    149. 
Lestrade  v.  Barlh,  iii.  ."W?. 
Lethienllier  r.  Tracy,  ii.  020,  627. 
Letton  r.  (loodi-n,  ii.  ;J06. 
Leupold  V.  Krause,  i.  370. 
LiVL-nthorpe  r.  .\slibie,  ii.  786. 
Levering  r.  Ileighe,  i.  3^33;  iii.  15. 

V.  Langley,  i.  582. 
Levey  v.  Dyess,  i.  507. 
Levy  i;.  Levy,  ii.  489,  570,  790  ;  iii. 
651,  550,  657,  5(58. 

I'.  Lewis,  i.  051,  052. 
Lewes  v  Hidge,  i.  508,  6.30. 
Lewis  V.  Raird,  ii.  652  ;   ii 
339. 

r.  Beall,  ii.  453,  474. 

V.  Beattie.  iii.  452. 

r.  Brnnthwaite,  i.  408. 

V.  BrewstiT.  iii.  31.H5. 

V.  Campbell,  iii.  5.'}3. 

I'.  Cnrstnirs.  ii.  318. 

r.  Coxf,  i.  259,  200,  206;  iii.  2 

V.  De  Forest,  ii.  157. 

r.  .Tames,  i.  214,  311. 

r.  Jom-s,  i.  152,  010. 

V.  Kirk,  ii.  154. 

I'.  Lewis,  i.   337;    ii.  420,  459; 
672. 

V.  Lvman.  i.  20.  0O9,  610;  iii  4 

r.  MoNa-t.  i.  1:^0. 

r.  Meserve,  i.  240. 


157 


635. 
692. 


549. 


101,  122 


74. 


xc 


TABLE    OP   CASES    CITED. 


Lewis   V.   Montgomery    Building,   &c. 
Assoc,  ii.  509. 

V.  Nangle,  ii.  2()y. 

V.  Payn,  i.  55U,  5(51,  504;  iii.  260. 

V.  Scofield,  iii.  537. 

V.  Smith,  i.  262,  2G5,  315,335,  338; 
ii.  249,  270,  776. 

V.  Waters,  ii.  618. 

V.  Willis,  i.  592. 
Lewis  St.,  fie,  iii.  109. 
L'Hussier  v.  Zallee,  i.  475,  565. 
Libbey  v.  Tolford,  i.  522,  569,  576. 
Libby  v.  Cobb,  ii.  181. 
Lick  V.  O'Donnell,  i.  687. 
Liebschutz  v.  Moore,  i.  585. 
Liefe  v.  Saltingstone,  ii.  702. 
Lienow  v.  Ellis,  i.  552. 

V.  Ritchie,  i.  621. 
Lies  V.  De  Diablar,  i.  429,  430,  447 ;  iii. 

250. 
Liford's  case,  i.  13,  16, 113,  143;  ii.  321 ; 

iii.  411. 
Liggins  V.  Inge,  i.  664,  672;  ii.  358,  360, 

370,  396,  397. 
Lightner  v.  Mooney,  iii.  340. 
Lillard  r.  Rucker,  iii.  343,  344. 
Lillie  V.  Dunbar,  iii.  369. 
Lilly  V.  Fiftv  Associates,  i.  517. 

V.  Palmer,  ii.  220. 
Lincoln  v.  Davis,  ii.  390. 

V.  Emerson,  ii.  119,  175  ;  iii.  117. 

V.  Parsons,  ii.  53. 

V.  Purcell,  iii.  178. 

V.  Wliite,  ii.  124. 
Lincoln  Bank  v.  Drmnmond,  ii.  18. 
Lindeman  v.  Lindsay,  ii.  .396. 
Linden  v.  Hepburn,  i.  543. 
Lindley  v  Dakin,  i.  55  ;  iii.  488. 

V.  Sharp,  ii.  53. 
Lindsay  r.  McCormack,  iii.  564. 

V.  Springer,  iii.  96. 
Lindsey  '••  Bates,  ii.  97. 

V.  Miller,  iii.  171,  203,  204,  207. 

V.  Wmona  R.  R.  Co.,  i.  143. 
Lindsley  v.  First  Chr.  Soc ,  ii.  713. 
Line  v.  Blizzard,  iii.  276. 

V.  Stephenson,  iii.  519. 
Lines  v.  Darden,  ii.  499,  550. 
Lines'  Appeal,  i.  396. 
Lingan  r.  Carrol,  iii.  560. 
Lingenfelter  v.  Richey,  ii.  535. 
Link  V.  Link,  ii.  544. 
Linn  v.  Ross,  i.  566. 
Linnell  v.  Lyford,  ii.  65. 
Linslcy  v.  Sinclair,  ii.  513. 
Lint  V.  Wilson,  i.  30. 
Linthicum  v.  Ray,  i.  62. 

V.  Tapscott,  ii.  89. 
Linton  r.  Hart,  i.  550. 
Linzee  »'  Mixer,  ii.  327. 
Lion  V.  Burtiss,  ii.  753,  772. 
Lippencot  »•  Allendar,  ii.  306. 
Lippett  r.  Kelley,  i.  693  ;  iii.  430,  4-58. 
Lipscomb  v.  Nichols,  ii.  511,  512,  518. 


Lipsky  IK  Bergman,  i.  6. 
Liptrot  V.  Holmes,  ii.  538,  540. 
Lisburne  v.  Davies,  i.  589. 
Lisle  V.  Gray,  iii.  282. 
Litchfield  v.  Cud  worth,  i.  189. 

V.  Ready,  ii.  144. 
V.  Scituate,  iii.  447,  448. 
Lithgow  V.  Kavenagh,  i.  91 ;  iii.  269, 

272. 
Littler.  Downing,  iii.  146,  147, 164, 165, 
178. 

V.  Gibson,  iii.  312. 

r.  Heaton,  i.  514. 

V.  Megquier,  iii.  164,  166,  338. 

V.  Palister,  i.  616;  ii.  805. 

V.  Pearson,  i.  G24. 

V.  Woodward,  i.  361. 
Littler  v.  Lincoln,  ii.  321,  348. 
Littleton  v.  Richardson,  iii.  504. 
Lively  v.  Ball,  i.  591. 
Livermore  v.  Aldrich,  ii.  517,  518. 

V.  Maquokota,  iii.  79. 
Liverpool  Wharf  v.  Prescott,  iii.  94,  97. 
Livesey's  Appeal,  ii.  499. 
Livezey  v.  Philadelphia,  i.  10. 
Livingston  v.  Haywood,  ii.  805. 

V.  Livingston,    ii.    506,    509,    517, 
503. 

V.  Monigona  Coal  Co.,  ii.  384. 

V.  Newkirk,  ii.  207. 

V.  New  York,  iii.  109. 

V.  Peru  Iron  Co.,  iii.  293,  351,  352. 

V.  Potts,  i    ibO. 

r.  Prosens,  iii.  351. 

V.  Reynolds,  i.  136,  137, 150,  167. 

V.  Story,  li.  39. 

V.  Tanner,  i.  649.  654. 

V.  Tomkins,  ii.  22. 
Livingston's  Petition,  ii.  577. 
Llewellyn  v.  Jersey,  iii.  426,  427. 
Lloyd  V.  Brookiner,  ii.  082. 

V.  Carter,  ii.  518,  520. 

V.  Conover,  i.  208. 

V.  Cozens,  i.  545,  640,  643. 

V.  Crispe,  i.  503. 

V.  Giddintis,  iii.  310,  318. 

V.  Gordon,  i.  689,  720. 

V.  Jackson,  iii.  564. 

V.  Lloyd,  ii.  10. 

V.  Lynch,  i.  721 ;  ii.  517,  545. 

V.  Spillet,  ii.  419,  420,  505. 
Loaring,  Ex  parte,  ii.  95. 
Lobdell  V.  Hall,  i.  646. 

V.  Hayes,  i.  215,  234 ;  iii.  6. 
Lock  V.  Fulford,  ii.  211,  212,  216. 

V.  Furze,  i.  565. 
Locke  V.  Colman,  i.  497. 

V.  Homer,  ii.  218,  219,  220. 

V.  Palmer,  ii.  52. 

V.  Rowell,  i.  125,  409,  453. 
Lockerson  v.  Stillwell,  ii.  53. 
Lockhart  v.  Hardy,  ii.  165,  207,  251. 
Locks,  &c.  Proprietors  of,  v.  Nashua  & 
L.  R.  R.  Co.,  iii.  145. 


TADLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


XCl 


Ijocks,  &c.  I'roprii'tors  of,  r.  Springer, 

i.  G». 
Lockwoiitl  I'   HuiiL'dii't,  ii.  205. 

c.  Lockwooil.  i.  (').!4,  G4(J. 

V.  Sturdevunt,  ii.  Mi  ;  iii.  222,  4b2, 
•184. 
Lofkwood   Co.    c.    Liiwrciice,   ii.    307, 

•A)\. 
Lnckycr  r.  Siivnm",  ii.  10. 
Lodge  V.  Harnett,  iii.  428. 

I'.  Tiiriiiiin,  ii.  M. 

V.  White,  i.  iVJu,  5h2. 
Loeb  r.  McMiiliDM,  i.  433. 
L(H-bentiinl  i:  Kaleigli.  ii.  707. 
Lu'lir  V.  C'olborn,  ii.  225. 
LuiJiis  r.  Maw,  ii.  515. 
Lott  r.  Dennis,  i.  521. 
Loften  c.  Willioanl,  ii.  510. 
Logan  I'   Anderson,  i.  582  ;  ii.  231. 

r.  Bell.  ii.  O'.K). 

IV  llerron,  i.  t>.!.'),  013. 
LokiTson  r.  Stillwuli.ii.  tU. 
London  r.  (Jreyme,  i.  152. 

I'.  Lontlon,  i.  227. 
London  &  N    W.  U.  K.  Co.  v.  West,  f. 

5!)2. 
London  Loan  Co.  v.  Drake,  i.  31. 
Long  r.  Doliarliide,  iii.  31.J. 

f.  Fit/siniinons,  i.  155. 

V.  (iraeber,  i.  I'.IO. 

V.  Long,  iii.  2H7. 

V.  Ma.xt.  iii.  153,  154. 

V.  Molcr,  iii.  4'.)2,  495. 

I'.  Mostyn,  i.  42'.). 

r.  Murpiiy,  i.  372. 

r.  Kanisay,  iii.  2^)1. 

17.  Steiirer,  ii.  515. 

V.  White,  i.  341. 

V.  Young,  iii.  147. 
Longbottoni  c.  Rirrv,  ii.  163. 
Lon-fellow  v.  Longfellow,  i.  688,  592, 

5'J'J. 
Longford  c.  Kyre,  ii.  707. 
Longwitb  v.  H'utler,  ii.  71,  72,  76. 
Longworth  v.  Bank  of  U.  S.,  iii.  222. 

V.  Flagg,  ii.  258. 
Look  «'.  Norton,  i.  i\'i. 
Looker  r.  I'l-ckweil,  ii.  163. 
Looiner  i".  Wlieelwriglit,  ii.  205. 
Looniis  I'.  Bedel,  iii.  507,  510. 

i;.  Gerson,  i.  417. 

V.  Wilbnr,  i.  1.30. 
Looney  r.  McLean,  i.  577. 
Lord  r.  Carbon  Iron  Mfg.  Co.,  ii.  378, 
3'J4. 

I'.  Conimrs.  of  Sidney,  iii.  410. 

V.  Crowell.  ii.  108,  109,  12.5,  247. 

r.  Ferguson,  i.  553. 

r.  Morris,  ii.  102. 
Lorentz  r.  Lorentz,  ii.  507. 
Loring  r.  Baeon,  i.  18;  ii.  388. 

V.  Cooke,  ii    l')<3. 

V.  Craft,  i.  40:1. 

V.  Eliot,  ii.  012,  614,  010. 


Loring  v.  Mnrsli,  ii.  710;  iii.  W9,  560l 
567,  577. 

V.  DliB.  iii.  lOH,  5(>2,  618. 
I.K)rnian  r.  BenHon,  i.  4  ;  iii.  303,  437. 
Lorniorc  r.  Caiiipbeli,  iii.  355. 
Lo8ey  ('.  Bond,  iii.  2*'>7 

c.  .SinipHon.  ii.  257,  '•Uliy,  330. 
Lotiirop  c.  F'..stor,  i.  258,  28H. 
Loubat  r.  .Nour^e,  i.  210,  703,  704. 
Loud  V.  Darling,  iii.  3.'>0. 

V.  Lane,  ii.  IM,  203,  205. 
I/ondon  I'.  WarMi'ld,  i    l'>7. 
Lough  r.  Maeklin,  iii.  451. 
Loughrain  r.  IJoss,  i    :!2  ;  iii.  507. 
Louisville  Bank  c  Hall.  i.  7(rj. 
Lounsberry  c.  Snyder,  i.  521,  500,  635 
Lounsbury  r.  I'urdy,  ii.  678,  670. 
Lo\i|>e  c.  Wood,  i.  575. 
Love  r   Harbin,  ii.  453,  472;  iii.  386. 

V.  Law,  iii   'J8. 

V.  Wells,  iii.  82,  353. 
Loveaeres  r.  Blight,  ii.  538. 
Lovelaee  r.  Webb,  i.  415. 
Lovell  c.  Smith,  ii.  .358. 
[..over  f.  Bessenger,  i.  442. 
Lover's  ease,  i.  057. 
Lovering  c.  Fogg,  ii.  57,  173. 

r.  Lovering,  i.  510;  ii.  607. 
Lovett  c.  (Jillender,  ii.  'J. 

r.  Lovett,  ii    ''-i'. 
Lovies'  ease,  ii.  78'i. 
Low  V.  Allen,  ii.  r.t3. 

c.  Klwell,  i.  018,  057.  000. 

r.  Henry,  ii.  51,  03. 

r.  Muniford,  i.  Cj'.i'J. 

V.  Tibbetts,  iii.  44'.t. 
Lowe  '•.  Kmerson,  i.  51*7. 

I'.  Griflitb,  i.  4!>2. 

I',  (irinnan,  ii.  81,  85. 

i\  Maceubben,  iii.  16. 

V.  Miller,  i.  •'.05. 

V.  Morgan,  ii.  207. 

r.  Weatherley,  iii.  .309. 
Lowell  I-    Daniels,  iii.  78,  84,  110,  125, 
201. 

V.  Mid.llesex  Ins.  Co.,  ii.  98. 

r.  Robinson,  iii.  443. 
Lowell  M.  U.  r.  Low.ll,  i.  18. 
Lowndes  r.  Chisholni.  ii.  238. 
Lowry  r.  MeKinney,  ii.  04. 

r.  Muldrow,  ii.  702. 

r.  Steele,  i.  18;}. 

V.  Tew,  ii    181  ;  iii.  247. 

V.  Tilleny,  iii.  482. 
Lows  r  Telford,  i   65."). 
Ixiwtlier  r.  Carlton,  iii.  3t)0. 
Loyd  r.  Brookinu,  ii.  1)82. 
Lozier  r.  New  York  Cent.  U.  R.,iii.  451 
I^ozo  r.  Sutlierlanil,  i.  374. 
Lueas  >•   Brooks,  i.  -V.^i. 

V.  Henilrix,  ii.  'M. 

V.  Sawyer,  i.  107,  109.  200.  201 
Luce  »'.  Cariev.  ii  3;W ;  iii.  437. 

(•   Stubbs,  i.  288,  280. 


xcu 


TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 


Luch's  Appeal,  ii.  88. 
Lucier  v.  Marsales,  i.  596 ;  ii.  142. 
Luckett  V.  Townsend,  ii.  63,  112. 
Luddington  v.  Kime,  ii.  625. 
Ludlow  V.  Cooper,  i.  702. 

V.  New  York  &  Harlem  R.  R.,  ii. 
8,  13,  18,  21,  24. 
Luffboroujjli  V.  Parker,  iii.  346. 
Lufkin  V.  Curtis,  i.  257  ;  iii.  272. 
Lumpkin  v.  Eason,  i.  417. 
Lund  V.  Lund,  ii.  36,  46,  47,  55,  57. 

V.  Parker,  iii.  1.36. 

V.  Woods,  i.  314. 
Luning  v.  Brady,  ii.  196,  266. 
Lunsford  v.  Turner,  i.  595,  596. 
Lunt  V.  Holland,  iii.  437.  459. 

V.  Lunt,  ii.  759. 
Lupton  v.  Lupton,  ii.  207. 
Lush  V.  Druse,  iii.  427. 
Lusk  V.  Hopper,  ii.  96. 
Luther  v.  Winnisimmet  Co.,  ii.  347, 376  ; 

iii.  59. 
Luttrel's  case,  ii.  343,  363, ,372,  398. 
Lutwich  V    Mitton,  iii.  378. 
Lux  V.  Hoff,  i.  709. 
Luxford  v.  Cheeke,  ii.  624. 
Lyde  v.  Russell,  i.  32,  33. 
Lydecker  v.  Bogert,  ii.  259. 
Lydick  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  iii. 

494. 
Lydston  i\  Powell,  ii.  80. 
Lyerly  v.  Wheeler,  iii.  242. 
Lyford  v.  Ross,  ii.  120. 

V.  Thurston,  ii.  411,  52-3,  532. 
Lyle  V.  Richards,  i.  40,  116. 
Lyles  V.  Lyles,  i   695. 
Lyman  v.  Arnold,  iii.  409. 

V.  Hale,  i.  14. 

V.  Lyman,  ii.  215. 
Lynch  r.  Allen,  iii.  436. 

V.  Livingston,  iii.  334,  403. 
Lynde  v.  Hougli,  i.  505,  5-39. 

V.  Rowe,  i.  25  ;  ii.  142,  174. 
Lynn's  Appeal,  i.  147,  151. 
Lyon  V.  Kain,  i.  257  ;  iii.  18.  270,  271. 

V.  Mcllvaine,  ii.  203,  205 ;  iii.  298. 

V.  Parker,  ii.  300. 

V.  Reed,  i.  580,  585. 
Lyons,  Ex  parte,  ii.  85. 
Lyster  v.  DoUand,  ii.  170. 


M. 


Mabury  v.  Ruiz,  i.  429. 
Macaulay  v.  Dismal  Swamp,  i.  219. 
MacGregor  v.   Brown,   &c.     See  Mc- 
Gregor, &c. 
Mack  i\  Austin,  ii.  219. 

V.  Grover,  ii.  264. 

V.  Patchin,  i.  519,  565. 

V.  Wetzlar,  ii.  113. 
Mackay  v  Bloodgood,  iii.  288,  297. 
Mackentile  v.  Savoy,  iii.  431. 


Mackey  i-.  Proctor,  i.  183. 
Mackintosh  v.  Trotter,  i.  32,  33. 
Macknet  v.  Macknet,  iii.  501. 
Mackreth  v.  Symmons,  ii.  90,  96,  93. 
Mackubin  i-.  Wlietcroft,  i.  509,  512. 
Macleay,  Re,  i.  85. 
Macloon  v.  Smith,  ii.  270. 
Macomber  v.  Cambridge   Ins.  Co.,  ii 

243. 
Macumber  v.  Bradley,  ii.  654. 
Maddox  v.  Goddard,  i.  093;  iii.  421. 

I'.  White,  i.  578. 
Madgett  v.  Fleenor,  ii.  521. 
Madigan  v.  McCarthy,  i.  7,  154. 
Madison  &  I.  PI.  R.  Co.  v.  Stevens,  iii. 

318. 
Maeder  v.  Carondelet,  i.  519. 
Maffitt  V.  Rynd,  ii.  54,  157. 
Magaw  V.  Lambert,  i.  507. 
Magee  v.  Magee,  i.  417,  418;  ii.  504; 
iii.  138,  146,  149,  152. 

V.  Mellon,  i.  265. 

V.  Young,  i.  201. 
Maggort  V.  Hansbargcr,  i.  567. 
Magill  V.  Brown,  iii.  552. 

V.  Hinsdale,  i.  595;  iii.  296. 
Magniac  v.  Tiiompson,  ii.  501. 
Magnolia,  The,  v.  Marshall,  iii.  440,  443. 
Magoon  v.  Harris,  iii.  409. 
Magor  V.  Chadwick,  ii.  380. 
Magruder  v.  Offutt,  ii.  267. 

V.  Peter,  i.  490. 
Maguire  v.  Maguire,  i.  201. 
Malian  r.  Brown,  ii.  302,  365. 
Mahoney  v.  Van  Winkle,  iii.  90. 
Mahorner  v.  Harrison,  ii.  515. 
Maigley  v.  Hauer,  ii.  420. 
Main  v.  Feathers,  i.  531. 
Main's  case,  i.  566. 
Maine  v.  Cumston,  ii.  299. 
Major  V.  Deer,  ii.  558. 
Makepeace  v.  Bancroft,  iii.  435. 
Malim  v.  Keighley,  ii.  779. 
Mallack  v.  Gallon,  ii.  270. 
Mallett  V.  Page,  iii.  308,  309. 
Malloney  v.  Horon,  :.  201 ;  iii.  80. 
Mallory  r.  Hitchcock,  ii.  204. 

V.  Stodder,  iii.  338,  341. 
Malloy  V.  Bruden,  iii.  156. 
Malone  v.  Majors,  i.  337. 

V.  McLaurin,  i.  183. 
Maloney  v.  Fortune,  ii.  278. 
Maltonner  v.  Dimniick,  iii.  176. 
Manchester  v.  Doddridge,  i.  618,  022, 
683 ;  iii.  155. 

V.  Durfee,  ii.  657. 

V.  Hough,  i.  346. 

I'.  Point  St.  Iron  Works,  iii.  447. 
Manchester  Wareh.  Co.  v.  Carr,  i.  575, 

576. 
Manderson  v.  Lukens,  ii.  592,  594,  697, 

745. 
Mandeville  v.  Welch,  ii.  86,  87. 
Mandlebaum  v.  McDonell,  i.  85 ;  ii.  9. 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


xcm 


Mangum  r.  Piester,  ii.  70:J. 
Maiilmttaii  t'u.  i'.  lOvertsoii,  i.  201. 
Manicf  r.  .Mamce,  ii.  (J2U,  7'.l7. 
Maiiior  v.  Mvcts,  ii.  ."JKl. 
Manly  r.  iViti-e,  i.  7I1». 

r.  Slasoii,  ii.  yj,  Jio. 
Mann  r.  Karli-,  ii.  U^l. 

I-.  IMsun,  i.  'JJo,  *_'45. 

r.  FalciMn.  ii.  ll'J. 

r.  HuttliL-s,  i.  02U. 

V.  lVur»on,  iii.  427,  525. 

I'.  Koj^cTs,  i.  .'507. 

I'.  'riiavLT,  ii.  270. 
Manning  c'Dovc,  i.  378,  3'J7,  425. 

V.  Laboree,   i.   25U,  270,  2yO,  291, 
;J01. 

V.  Markel,  ii.  181. 

V.  Sniiih,  ii.  o3'J,  360,  395,  399;  iii. 
4(!8. 

V.  Wasdalc,  ii.  313,  3(59. 
Manning's  cast.',  i.  1H4  ;  ii.  028,  78(3,  787. 
Mansuil's  K-tate.  ii.  207. 
Man.-ifield  r.  Dyer,  ii  201.  205. 

V.  Mansfic'lil,  ii.  10.  719. 

V.  Mclntyre,  i.  200. 

r.  l\'mliri)ke,  i.  295. 
Mansur  c.  Hlakc,  iii.  437,  443. 

f.  I'ratt.  i.  4W9. 
Mantle  c  Wellington,  i.  491. 
.Man;z  r.  Buchanan,  i   303. 
Manutactiirers'  &  Mecli.  Bank  v.  Bank 

of  I'erni.,  ii.  04. 
Mai)lL'  V.  Ku^^sart,  iii.  91,  130. 
Mai.lL-8  I.-.  Millon,  i.  14;  ii.  174. 
M.i|ips  V.  JSIiarp,  ii.  80. 
.Mara  v.  Pic-rc-e,  iii.  337. 
.M.irhurtr  i:  Cole,  i.  700,  710. 
Marth  c.  Barrier,  i.  35. 
Marty  i:  .M.irey,  iii.  400. 
Marden  r  Babcock,  ii.  67. 

V.  Cliase,  ii.  444,  409;  iii.  395,  396, 
401. 
Marine  Bank  i\  International  Bank,  ii. 

l-_'y. 
Mariner  r.  Crocker,  i.  640. 

r.  Saunders,  iii.  270. 
Mark  r.  Miir|)liy,  i.  207. 

V.  State,  i.  450. 
Markell  c.  Eiclielberger,  ii.  195. 
Marker  /•.  Marker,  i.  102. 
.MMrkliam  c.   .Merritt,  i.  210,  267,  279; 

ii.  271  ;  iii.  207. 
-Markland    r.  Crump,    i.  530;    iii     503, 

51 14,  605. 
Markoe  c.  Wakeman,  iii.  277. 
Marks  r.  .Marks,  ii.  740. 

V.  Marsli,  i.  457. 

V.  Pell,  ii.  189. 

V.  Sewall,  i.  687. 

V.  Tarver,  ii.  715. 
.MarlborouRli  c.  Godolphin,  ii.  720,  734. 
Marlcy  v.  Hodfier?,  i.  693;  ii.  803. 
Marlow  t-.  Smith,  ii.  659. 
Marquette  H.  U.  Co.  i-.  Ilarlow,  i.  G53. 


Marr  r.  Ciilliani,  iii.  150. 
.Marruier  v.  .Sauiulers,  i.  700. 
.MarBeiliii  ('.  Tbalinier,  i.  187. 
.Marsh  c.  Austin,  ii.  70,  145,  147  ;    iii 
50ti. 

I'.  Ilaniinond,  i.  693. 

r.  Lazenby,  i.  ;j59. 

I'.  Lee,  ii.  150. 

V.  Pike,  ii.  220. 

V.  Kice,  iii.  130. 

I'.  Turner,  ii.  91. 
•Marshall  r.  Barr,  i.  433. 

V.  Cave,  ii.  244. 

V.  Chribtnias,  ii.  95. 

V.  Clark,  iii.  19'J. 

V.  Conrad,  ii.  2i:<0,  290,  203. 

V.  I'rehore,  i.  715. 

c.  Fisk,  i.  40;  ii.  409.  470;  iii.  887. 

V.  Green,  i.  0,  13,  15,071;  iii.  305, 
370. 

v.  King,  ii.  594  ;  iii.  17. 

V.  Isiles,  iii.  422. 

I'.  Peters,  i.  4. 

V.  Pierce,  iii.  83. 

V.  Hobertit,  iii.  345. 

V.  Ku.ldick,  i.  430,  460. 

V.  Stewart,  ii.  47,  58,  06. 

I'.  Trumbull,  iii.  278. 

V.  Ulleswater  Steam  Nav.  Co,  iii. 
444. 
Marshall,    &c.    School     v.    Iowa,    &c. 

School,  ii.  2. 
Marston  r.  Gale,  i.  065. 

i:  Hobbs,  iii.  4»2,  483,  601.  620. 

r.  Marston,  259,  200;  iii.  357. 
Martel  v.  Somers,  i.  443,  465. 
Martin  c.  Baker,  iii.  480. 

V.  Ballou,  ii.  8,  11. 

V.  Bealty,  ii.  103. 

V.  Berens,  i.  536. 

v.  Crompe,  i.  651. 

V.  Drinan,  ii.  299;  iii.  493. 

V.  Evansville,  iii.  441. 

I'.  Houghton,  i.  0G2. 

V.  Hughes,  i.  395. 

r.  Kirkpatrick,  i.  355. 

t".  Knowivs,  i.  094. 

V.  Martin',  i.  203,  277,  838.  344,  649, 
555.  657,  500;  ii.  4.38,  520 

i;.  McKevnolds,  i.  705;  ii.  12^3,  127, 
203.'207. 

V.  Mowlin.  ii.  101,  103. 

i".  Nance,  iii.  438,  442. 

V.  O'Brien,  iii.  440. 

r.  O'Conner,  i.  531,  644. 

r.  Quaitlebani.  i.  690;  iii.  844. 

V.  Keed.  ii.  123. 

V.  Smith,  i.  080. 

V.  Tobin,  i.  539.  585. 

V.  Waddell.  i.  68,  09;  iii.  194,  200 
202,  2<t3. 

r.  Wade.  ii.  277. 

V.  Willinmv  iii.  340. 
Martinvau  r.  McColium,  ii.  127. 


XCIV 


TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 


Martyn  v.  Williams,  ii.  300. 

Marvin  v.  Brewster  Iron  Mg.  Co.,  ii.  384. 

V.  Ledwith,  ii.  59i. 

V.  Titswurtli,  ii.  84. 

V.  Trumbull,  i.  701. 
Marwick  v.  Andrews,  ii.  II. 
Marx  V.  McGlyim,  ii.  550,  577. 
Mash  V.  Russell,  i.  442. 
Maskelyne  v.  Maskelyne,  iii.  568. 
Mason  v.  Ains worth,  ii.  73,  74. 

V.  Barnard,  ii.  117. 

V.  Beach,  ii.  110,  115. 

V.  Denison,  i.  660. 

V.  Fenn,  i.  32,  33,  467. 

V.  Hill,  i.  74,  666 ;  ii.  367,  868,  370, 
371. 

V.  Holt,  i.  656. 

V.  Jones,  ii.  5GI. 

V.  Martin,  ii.  570. 

V.  Mason,  i.  255 ;  ii.  474,  561,  577. 

V.  Payne,  ii.  215;  iii.  348. 

V.  Wolff,  i.  600. 
Mason's  Estate,  ii.  207. 
Mass.  Hosp.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wilson,  i. 

596;  ii.  142,  14-3,  144. 
Massey  v.  Goyder,  ii.  385. 
Massie  v.  Watts,  iii.  250. 
Masters  v.  PoUie,  i.  14. 
Masury  v.  Southworth,  i.  528,  530,  533, 

568  ;  ii.  295,  .300. 
Mather  r.  Carless,  iii.  319. 

V.  Chapman,  iii.  60,  446. 

V.  Ministers,  &c.,  i.  63. 
Mathews  i-.  Aikin,  ii.  224. 

V.  Mathews,  i.  338. 
Mathis  V.  Hammond,  ii.  757. 
Matlack  v.  Roberts,  i.  105 ;  ii.  748. 
Matlock  V.  Lee,  i.  313. 

V.  Matlock,  i.  701. 
Matthews  v.  Coalter,  iii.  259. 

V.  Duryee,  i.  216,  217  ;  ii.  174. 

V.  Keble,  ii.  794. 

V.  Tobernor,  i.  583. 

V.  Treat,  ii.  390. 

V.  Wallwyn,  ii.  101,  135,  257. 

V.  Ward,  i.   69,  125,   624 ;   ii.  473, 
535,  573;  iii.  52,  54,  55,  142, 
375,  382. 
Matthewson  v.  Johnson,  i.  488. 

V.  Smith,  i.  239. 
Matthie  r.  Edwards,  ii.  72. 
Mattice  v.  Lord,  i.  509. 
Matti.x  V.  Weand,  ii.  95. 
Mattocks  V.  Stearns,  i.  189,  344. 
Matts  V.  Hawkins,  i.  G94 ;  ii.  386. 
Matzen  v.  Shaeffer,  ii.  201. 
Maulding  v.  Scott,  ii.  787. 
Maule  V.  Aslimead,  i.  619. 

V.  Rider,  i.  720. 

V.  Weaver,  i.  518  ;  iii.  331. 
Maull  V.  Wilson,  i.  157. 
Maund's  case,  i.  512. 
Maundrell  v.  Maundrell,  i.  295,  491 ;  ii. 
692,  697,  703. 


Maupin  v.  Emmons,  iii.  335,  336,  343. 
Maure  v.  Harrison,  ii.  225. 
Maus  V.  Worthing,  iii.  255. 
Maverick  r.  Lewis,  i.  475,  604. 
Maxey  v.  O'Connor,  iii.  210. 
Maxfield  v.  Burton,  ii.  88. 
Maxon  v.  Gray,  i.  312. 
Maxwell  v.  Hosmer,  iii.  433. 

v.  Maxwell,  i.  715 ;  ii.  507. 
May  V.  Adams,  iii.  406. 

V.  Calder,  i.  490. 

V.  Frazee,  ii.  566. 

V.  Gates,  ii.  194. 

V.  Le  Claire,  iii.  378. 

V.  Maj%  ii.  62. 

V.  Rice,  i.  549,  630. 

V.  Ritcliie,  ii.  654. 

V.  Tillman,  i.  249. 
Mayberry  v.  Standish,  ii.  348. 
Mayburry  v.  Brien,   i.  207,   211,   216, 

229,  230,  232,  287. 
Mayer  v.  Mailer,  i.  576. 
Mayfield  v.  Marsden,  i.  371. 
May  ham  c.  Coombs,  ii.  95,  96. 
Mayhew  v.  Hardesty,  i.  554. 
Mayho  v.  Buckhurst,  i.  532. 

V.  Colton,  i.  395. 
Mayn  v.  Beak,  i.  470. 
Maynard  v.  Esher,  ii.  319. 

V.  Hunt,  ii.  105,  133,  168. 

V.  Maynard,  i.  499;  iii.  310,  315. 

V.  Weeks,  iii.  449. 
Mayo  V.  Feaster,  i.  167. 

V.  Fletcher,  ii.  106,  107,  140,  142, 
143,  173,  253. 

V.  Judah,  ii.  67. 

V.  Libby,  iii.  216. 

V.  Merrick,  ii.  217. 
Mayor  of  Carlisle,  &c.    See  Carlisle,  tS;c. 
McAfee  v.  Kiern,  iii.  213. 
McAllister  v.  Montgomery,  i.  703. 
McAlpine  v.  Burnett,  ii.  92. 
McArthur  v.  Franklin,  i.  216,  236,  304, 
310,  312;  ii.  261,266. 

V.  jMorris,  iii.  525. 

V.  Scott,  ii.  538. 
McAuley  v.  Wilson,  iii.  557. 
McAuley's  Appeal,  i.  454. 
IMcBrayer  v.  Roberts,  ii.  45. 
McBride  v.  Patterson,  i.  128. 

c.  Smith,  ii.  500. 
McBryde  v.  Wilkinson,  iii.  342. 
McBurney  v.  Mclntire,  i.  539. 
McCabe  v.  Bellows,  i.  217,  246 ;  ii.  182, 
188,  222. 

V.  Grey,  ii.  121 ;  iii.  338. 

V.  Hunter,  iii.  287. 

V  Ma?zuchelli,  i.  382,  445. 

V.  Swap,  i.  239 ;  ii.  182,  183,  201. 
McCabe's  Petition,  iii.  545. 
McCafferty  v.  McCaffertv,  i.  200. 
McCaieb  v.  Burnett,  i.  407,  439. 
McCall  V.  Carpenter,  i.  713. 

V.  Lenox,  ii.  107,  142,  259. 


TAltLK    OF    CASES    CITKD. 


XCV 


McCall  r.  \celv.  iii.  114. 

V.  Yard,  ii.  'JtH. 
MtCiiliiioiit  r.  WliitiikiT,  ii.  370. 
McCaim  r.  AtliiTton,  iii.  ;I17. 

r.  Kilwards,  iii.  27-'>. 
MfCaiis  r.  Hoard,  i.  ;;;><•. 
McCarroii  r.  t'ansidy,  ii.  5'J,  238. 

r.  O'Coimi'll,  ii."4iH). 
McCartei'  r.  ( )rpliun  Asvluin  Sue,  iii. 
o.VJ. 

V.  Ti'lltT,  1.  3-JO.  327,  328,  330,  838. 
McCartiiy  -•.  White,  ii.  r.t3. 

r.  Vnrk  I'oimty  Hank,  i.  577. 
McCartiu'v  c  Hcistwick,  ii.  o7b. 

V.  Iluiit,  i.  5'Jl. 
McCartv  r.  Kiy,  i.  487.  522. 

r.  Kitcliciiman,  ii.  333. 

V.  I.eK'^'ett,  iii.  i~\). 

V.  I'riiett,  ii.  'Jl. 
^fc^aakill  r.  Latlirop,  ii.  511. 
McCiiiinlial  c.  Uvan,  iii   203. 
M<  Caiik'V  r.  Grinu'M,  i.  228,  220. 
Mc-Caiisland  i'.  Ficminj^,  iii.  45U. 
MeClain  r.  Doe.  i.  4U1. 

1-.  Grt-UfT,  i.  340. 
McClanalian  /•.  Harroii,  iii.  174. 

I'.  Cliambcra.  ii.  128. 

r.  Porter,  i.  2'.»3,  200,  301. 
AfcOlane  i-.  White,  ii.  63. 
McCIary  v.  Hi.xbv,  i.  380,  382,  412,  413, 

■lliO. 
ML'(^learv  v.  Ellis,  ii.  9. 
M'  Ci.'ihin  V.  McClfllan.  ii.  547. 
McCleskiy  v.  Leadbetter,  iii.  112. 
Mc(^lintic  i>.  Wise,  ii.  97. 
McClintock  r.  Hrydeii,  ii.  405. 

r.  Dana,  i.  133. 
Mcriintock's  Ay)pcal,  i.  13. 
Mc(^lo\vrv  r.  Croghan,  i.  621. 
McChmfj'i'.  Ross,  i.  (380,  6".K) ;  iii.  153. 
McClure  v.  Harris,  i.  217,  228,  230,  307. 

V.  Meleiidv.  iii.  665. 
McCombs  r.  Wallace,  i.  628. 
McConiiaughv  r.  Baxter,  i.  3GG. 
McConnel  r.  Hololnifih.  ii.  238,  2.39. 

r.  Reed,  iii.  344,  381. 
McConnell  v.  Blood,  i  22,  27. 

V.  Rowdrv,  i.  o'.to,  (ioO. 

V.  Hrown'iii.  2'.>'.»,  3Uo,  340. 

V.  Downs,  iii.  120. 
Mt-rord  r.  Oakland  (.1  M.  Co.,  i.  604. 
McCornunk  c.  Iviniinel,  i.  449. 
McCorniick  r.  Hishoj),  i.  371 ;  ii.  889. 

V.  C'onnell,  i.  513. 

V.  Digl.y,  ii.  134,  170,  196. 

V.  Fitzniorris,  iii.  260. 

V.  Iloran,  ii.  307,  300. 

V.  McCorniick,  i.  139. 

V.  McMurtrie,  iii.  81. 

V.  Taylor,  i.  285. 

V.  Wilco.x.  i.  433. 
McCorrv  v.   King's  Heirs,  i.  126,  132, 

182.  188.  180. 
McCosker  f.  Brady,  ii.  653,  674. 


McCoy  r.  Oalloway.  iii.  434,  454,  466. 

f.' .Monte,  ii.  407,  472. 
.McCracki-n  r.  Sun  Francisco,  iii.  88. 
McCriidy  I-.  Hriybanc,  iii.  401. 
.Mclraine  r.  Clarke,  iii.  674. 
.McCraney  i-.  .McCraney.  i.  254. 
McCrea  r.  Marsli,  i.  (W«. 

V.  I'unnort,  iii.  31'»i,  401. 
McCreaily  c  Se.xton,  iii.  238. 

V.  ThoinHon,  ii.  347.  365,  306. 

I'.  Virginia,  ii.  .390. 
McCrcery  r.  Fort^on,  i.  426. 
-McCrory  v.  Foster,  ti.  624. 
.McCue  V.  Gallagher,  ii.  513. 
McCulloch  r.  Ku<laly,  iii.  846. 

r.  .Maryland,  iii.  234. 
McCidlock*!'.  Atcn,  iii.  438. 
.McCullou^;ll  V.  Fclton,  ii.  770. 

I',  (iliddon,  ii  053. 

V.  Irvine,  i.  137.  148,  154,  102. 

V.  Wall,  iii.  443. 
McCuUuin  IV  McKensie,  iii.  677. 
.McCullv  r.  Smith,  i.  315. 
McCuniber  ,:  Gilnian.  ii.  2.'J8,  239.  244. 
.McCune  l:  Mc.Miohael,  iii.  ^6,  89. 
.McCurdy  r.  Canning,  i.  706. 

f.  Clark,  ii.  128. 

V.  Smith,  i.  599. 
McCurdv's  Appeal,  ii.  279. 
McCtisker  r.  .McFvey.  iii.  119,  128,  498. 
McDanicl  v.  Grace,  i.  1»2. 

V.  .Mace,  i.  371. 

V.  McDaniel.  i.  298. 
McDaniels  r.  Colvin,  ii.  168,  161. 

r.  Lapliam,  ii.  198. 
.McDermott  r.  French,  i.  706,  708. 
McDevitt  c.  Sullivan,  i.  696. 
McDillr.  McDill,  iii.  :ib6 
McDonald  v.  Askew,  iii.  ;}6.3. 

V.  Badjrer.  i.  367,  416;  ii.  31. 

V.  Bear  River,  &c.  Mg.  Co.,  ii.  406 ; 
iii.  294. 

V.  Crandall,  i.  402,  418,  410,  433, 
434,  440. 

V.  Ej;glcstun,  iii.  255. 

V.  Lindall,  ii.  349  ;  iii.  420,  459. 

V.  McDonald,  ii.  106,  611. 

«•.  .MrKlroy,  iii.  502. 

f.  -MclA'od,  ii.  64. 

V.  Sims,  ii.  536. 
McDonnell  v.  Pope,  i.  580,  581. 
McDonougli  (-.  Gilman,  i.  572,  673. 

i;   Squire,  ii.  63. 
McDougald  v.  Copron,  ii.  181. 
McDowell  r.  Addams.  iii.  10. 

V.  Lloyd,  ii.  79. 

V.  Morgan,  iii.  200. 

V.  .Simpson,  i.  635,  646 
McDiiff  .-.  Heauchamp,  i.  700.  710. 
.McKlderry  r.  Flannagan,  i.  651. 

c.  Smith,  ii.  107. 
McF.lrov  i:  McKlroy,  ii.  6-37. 
.McP^iil.ien  r.  Haley,  i.  609. 
.McFarl.in  v.  Wattun,  i.  646. 


XCVl 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


McFarland  i'.  Chase,  i.  617. 

V.  Febiger,  i.  200. 

V.  Goodman,  i.  261,  445;  iii.  100. 

V.  Stone,  iii.  178. 
McFarliu  v.  Essex  Co.,  ii.  390. 
McGahen  ?:.  Carr,  iii.  2.38. 
McGan  v.  Marshall,  ii.  145. 
McGarrity  v.  Byington,  ii.  406 ;  iii.  86. 
McGary  r.  Hastings,  iii.  500. 
McGaughey  v.  Henry,  iii.  17. 
McGee  v.  Gibson,  i.  631. 

V.  INIcGee,  i.  256. 
McGill  V.  Ash,  i.  692. 
McGillivray  v.  Evans,  i.  718. 
McGinness  v.  Edgell,  ii.  506. 
McGinnis  v.  Porter,  i.  599,  603. 
McGinnis'  Appeal,  ii.  229. 
McGirr  v.  Aaron,  ii.  555. 
McGiven  v-  Wheelock,  ii.  206. 
McGlashan  v.  Tallniadge,  i.  566,  576. 
McGlennery  v.  Miller,  iii.  269. 
McGlynn  v.  Moore,  i.  512,  515. 
McGonigal  v.  Plummer,  ii.  95. 
McGoodwin  v.  Stephenson,  ii.  107,  177. 
McGowan  r.  McGowan,  ii.  513. 

V.  Myers,  iii.  491. 

V.  Way,  ii.  611. 
McGrath  v.  Boston,  i.  482. 

V.  Sinclair,  i.  376. 
McGready  v.  McGready,  ii.  67. 
McGregor  v.  Brown,  i.  15,  147, 148,  152, 
153;  iii.  364. 

V.  Comstock,   i.   102 ;   ii.   449 ;   iii. 
219. 

V.  Gardner,  ii.  513,  570,  719. 

V.  Rawle,  i.  651. 
McGuffey  v.  Finley,  ii.  209. 
McGuire  v.  Benoit,  ii.  107. 

V.  Grant,  ii.  381,  382. 

V.  Ramsey,  i.  701. 

V.  Stevens,  iii.  249,  423. 
Mc Hendry  v.  Keilly,  i.  430. 
McHenry  v.  Cooper,  ii.  224. 
Mcllvaine  v.  Harris,  iii.  416. 

y.  Smith,  ii.  633. 
Mclnnis  v.  Lyman,  iii.  511. 
Mclntier  v.  Shaw,  ii.  117,  125. 
Mclntire  v.  Cross,  iii.  18. 

V.  Parks,  1.  518  ;  ii.  215. 
Mclntire  Poor  School  v.  Zanesville  C. 

&  M.  Co.,  iii.  652,  554. 
Mclnturf  v.  Woodruff,  i.  378. 
Mclntyre  v.  Agricultural  Bank,  ii.  84. 

V.  Humphreys,  ii.  53. 

V.  Mclntyre,  ii.  655. 

V.  Whitfield,  ii.  106. 
Mclver  >:  Cherry,  i.  216;  ii.  266. 

r.  Estabrook,  i.  32. 
McJilton  V.  Love,  iii.  232. 
McJunkin  v.  Dupree,  i.  7. 
McKay  r.  Bloodgood,  iii.  288,  207. 
McKean,  &c.  Land  Imp.  Co.  v.  Mitchell, 

iii.  330. 
McKee  v.  Angelrodt,  i.  554. 


McKee  ?•.  Barley,  i.  689. 

V.  Hicks,  iii.  304. 

V.  Perchment,  iii.  69. 

V.  Pfout,  i.  64,  126,  190. 

V.  Straub,  i.  711. 

V.  Wilcox,  i.  374,  382,  438,  452,  459. 
McKelvey  v.  Truby,  iii.  81. 
McKehvay  t-.  Seymour,  i  95 ;  ii.  6,  14. 
McKenzie  v.  Lexington,  i.  580. 

V.  Murphy,  i.  357. 
McKenzie's  Appeal,  ii   783. 
McKeon  v.  Bisbee,  ii.  406. 

I.-.  Whitney,  i.  552,  553. 
McKeown  v.  McKeown,  ii.  512,  518. 
McKey  v.  Welch,  i.  68» ;  iii.  277. 

V.  Young,  ii.  570. 
McKildoe  v.  Darracott,  i.  503,  516. 
McKinley  v.  Peters,  i.  689. 
McKinney  v.  Miller,  ii.  212,  248. 

V.  Reader,  i.  580,  584.      . 

V.  Rhoads,  iii.  299,  314. 

V.  Settles,  iii.  402. 
McKinster  v.  Babcock,  ii.  158. 
McKinstrj'  v.  Conly,  ii.  62,  66. 

?'.  Merwin,  ii.  156. 
McKinzie  v.  Perrill,  iii.  337. 
MeKircher  v.  Hawley,  ii.  142,  143. 
McKissack  v.  Bullingtou,  i.  624. 
McKissick  v.  Pickle,  ii.  16. 
McKnight  v.  Wimer,  ii.  83. 
McLain  v.  Smith,  ii.  273. 
McLanahan  r.  ]\IcLanahan,  ii.  45. 
McLane  v.  Moore,  iii.  178. 
McLarren  v.  Spalding,  i.  558. 

V.  Thompson,  ii.  153. 
McLaughlin  v.  Johnson,  i.  16,  18;   ii. 
.    164. 

V.  Nash,  i.  7,  27. 
McLaurie  v.  Tiiomas,  ii.  93,  94,  95,  97. 
McLean  v.  Bovee,  i.  12. 

?;.  Lafayette  Bank,  ii.  221,  229. 

V.  McDonald,  ii.  590. 

V.  Nelson,  ii.  568. 

V.  Ragsdale,  ii.  271. 
McLellan  v.  Turner,  iii.  564. 
McLenan  v.  Sullivan,  ii.  511,  515. 
JMcMahan  v.  Bowe,  iii.  327,  349, 350,  351, 

352  533 
McMahill  v.  McMahill,  i.  433,  448. 
McMahon  v.  Burchell,  i.  696. 
McManus  v.  Campbell,  i.  379. 

V.  Carmicliael,  iii.  439. 
McMaugh  V.  Burke,  ii.  394. 
McMillan  v.  Richards,  ii.  101,  109,  113, 
134,  273. 

V.  Robbins,  i.  132. 

V.  Solomon,  i.  577. 
McMillen  v.  Watt,  ii.  381, 
McMinn  v.  Wiielan,  iii.  241. 
McMurphy  v.  Minot,  i.  512,  550,  553. 
McMurray  v.  Baltimore,  iii.  445. 

V.  Connor,  i.  437. 
McNair  v.  Lot,  ii.  189. 
McNamara  v.  Garrity,  ii.  511,  512. 


TAlJLi:    OF    CASklS    CITKI). 


\i-VU 


McXiiiiiet'  I'.  Morlumi,  iii.  IIG,  152,  171, 

17;J. 
iMcNiiuj^Iitoii  I'   MeNiUi(jhton,  iii.  514. 
Mi-.Neiir  c.  .McCoiuLor.  iii.  42;],  508, 600. 
McXeoly  r.  KiukiT,  iii.  -HI. 
Mc-.W-il  r.  lJrij;lit,  iii.  2111. 
Mc.Noill  f.  Call,  ii.  2.VJ. 
McNiel  .•.  Kfii.lall,  i.  52S»,  542,  545. 
McNiali  r.  {iiicTiird,  ii.  557. 

I'.  r<)|K',  ii.  52;>. 
Mcriier.Hiiii  I'.  Fi)8ttT,  iii.  428. 

V.  lloiiht'l,  ii.  15;]. 

I',  .'^l■;^llilu^  i.  (5'.t2. 

I'.  Waltt'is,  iii.  78. 
McC^ua.li-  r.  Wliaiuy.  i.  385. 
Mc(2ia'siify  '■.  liie.sttT,  ii.  2'.i5. 
MfCJiusten  r.  Mori^aii,  i.  513. 
Mcl^uie  r.  IViiy,  ii.  12:J. 
McKae  c  Farnjw,  ii.  7.']4. 
McRavL'ii  «•.  Mcduiri".  iii.  2'.)0,  338,  340. 
McHi'ii  c  (Viitral  IJlv.,  i.  2;]. 
McKee  r.  .Meaii.s,  ii.  7:57,  7.')().  783,  7i)8. 
McKiininon  v.  .Martin,  ii.  'J2. 
McUoborls  r.  Waslibunie,  ii.  304,  305, 

3<)(i,  308,  310. 
McSorley  r.  Larisaa,  ii.  230. 
McTagu'art  /■.  Sinitli,  i.  372. 

r.  'riiornp.ioti,  ii.  Itj8. 
MeTavisli  c.  Carroll,  ii.  328. 
MfVay  r.  Bl<)<).lf,'<>oii,  ii.  120. 
McWliortur  r.  Writ;lu.  iii.  3'.t4. 
McWilliaiiis  r.  Morfjan,  iii.  70. 

V.  Nisly,  i.  85;  ii.  8,  0;  iii.  114. 
Meacliaiii  r.  Steriies,  ii.  575. 
Menil  r.  liik'V,  iii.  44'J. 

c.  Y()rk,"ii.  100. 
Meatier  v.  IMaci',  i.  543. 

r.  Stone,  i.  015,  656. 
Meailor  r.  .Meatlor,  ii  88. 
Meaiiows  v.  I'arry,  ii.  747. 
Mea;iliL'r  r.  Driscoii,  i.  35. 
.Means  r.  Welles,  i.  03;  iii.  155. 
.Mebane  f.  .Mebane,  ii.  533. 

V.  Patrick,  ii.  3:]7,  315. 
Mechanics'   Hank  v.  Bank  of  Niagara, 
ii.  128. 

V.  E.lwanls,  ii.  220. 
Meclianics'   Insurance  Co.   r.   Scott,  i. 

473,  475,  521. 
.Merlielen  r.  Wallace,  i.  11. 
Metlt'onl  V.  Frazier,  i.  OMj. 
Meilford  First  I'ar.  i*.  Meilfi)ri],  ii.  65G. 
.MeiUer  v.  Iliatt,  iii.  4'.t."). 
Medley  '••  KHiot,  ii.  103. 

D.'iMedley,  i.  270. 
Medway  v.  Xeedliani.  i.  223. 
•Meecii  V.  Ensij^n,  ii.  210. 

V.  Meecli,  i.  414. 
Mcelian  v.  Forrester,  ii.  53. 
Meeker  c.  Hreintnnll.  ii.  713,  714. 

r.  Meeker,  iii.  401. 

V.  Wri>,'lit,  i.  710. 
Mestarylee  r.  Naijlee.  ii   500. 
Mejjerie  «•.  Asli,  iii.  210. 
vol..  I. —  g 


Mehaffy  r.  Dohh.s  i.  001. 
.Meier  ('.  Hlunie,  iii.  34b. 
.Meijj's  A]i|ieal,  i.  22. 
.Mei^lien  r.  Strong,  iii.  339. 
Meily  V.  Hmler,  iii.  78. 

I'.  Wood,  i.  7n4. 
Meister  r.  Muniey,  i.  52ft. 
.Meli/et'8  Apped,' i.  I0'.».  200. 
.Meilen  /•.  .M.)rrill,  i.  570. 

c.  Rutland,  &c.  K.  \l.,  ii.  128. 

r,  Whipple,  ii.  210  ;  iii.  332. 
.Mellev  r.  Ca.sev,  i.  4«7. 
Melling  V.  \A.iik,  i  024  ;  iii.  175. 
.Mellon  V.  lA-innmn,  ii   40. 
.Mellon's  Ap|)eal,  ii.  152. 
Mellor  V.  Lees,  ii.  51. 

r.  I'ilgriin,  ii.  378. 
Mellow  r.  May,  i.  580. 
.Melius  r.  Snowman,  i.  180,  344. 
.Melrosa  r.  Scott,  ii.  02. 
.Milslieinier  r.  (Jross,  ii.  (\]0. 
.Mellon  r.  Andrews,  i.  3t><5,  383. 
Meivin  r.  Fellows,  ii.  104. 

V.  I'ropriitors  of  Locks,  &c.,  i.  188, 
IHO,  .ilO,  ;]41  ;  iii.  50,  141,  144. 
150,  150,  272,  283,  310,  422, 
427.  431. 

I'.  Wl.iiinjr,  ii.  313.  310,  345,  346, 
34'.t,  3'.I0  ;  iii.  69,  00. 
.Mendel  r.  Hall,  i.  010. 
.Mendenliall  c  I'ari.sli,  iii.  300. 

V.  Steckel,  iii.  525. 
Meni  i'.  Katlibone,  i.  572;  ii.  151. 
Menkens  r.  Hlnnienthal,  iii.  140. 
.Menou^ib's  Appeal,  i.  5r>0. 
Menude  r.  Delaire.  ii.  45. 
Mcnzies  i:  Hreadalbin.  iii.  02. 

i'.  Li^rhtfoot.  ii.  100. 

V.  McDonald,  i.  085 
-Meraman  v.  Cold  well,  i.  100. 
Mercantile   .Mar.   Ins.  Co.  v.  Clark,  ii. 

241. 
Merce<l  Co.  r.  Fremont,  ii.  400. 
Mercer  v.  Mercer,  iii.  350. 

r.  Selden,  i.  l8l ;  iii.  178. 

V.  Watson,  iii.  224. 

V.  Woo.i>;ate,  iii.  79. 
Merchants'  Hank  r.  Tliomson.  ii.  205. 
.Mereier  i:  Cliace,  i.  373,  380,  300,  405, 

451. 
Meredith  v.  Andres,  i.  000. 

V.  Citizens'  Bank,  ii.  518. 

V.  Holmes,  i.  415. 
Meriam  r.  Brown,  i.  7  ;  ii.  10.3. 

r.  Ilarsen.  iii  275.  401. 
Meriton  v.  Coombes.  i.  0.'>6. 
Merriam  r.  Barton,  ii.  \x\,  2']5. 

V.  Boston,  C!.,  &  F.  Ii.  U.Co.,  iii.  78. 

V.  Merriam,  ii.  254. 

V.  Moore,  ii.  218 

«'.  ."^imonds,  ii.  till. 

f.  Willis,  i.  000. 
Merrick  r.  Wallace,  ii    150;  iii.  340. 
Merrifleld  v.  Cobleinh,  ii  8. 


XCVIU 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Merrifield  v.  Worcester,  ii.  367. 
Merrill  v.  Berkshire,  i.  699. 

V.  Brown,  ii.  4.35. 

V.  Bullock,  i.  650,  6-53. 

V.  Chase,  ii.  180,  l'J8. 

V.  Emery,  i.  337  ;    ii.   11,  20,  787, 
788. 

V.  Harris,  ii.  15. 

V.  Preston,  ii.  537. 

V.  Sherburne,  i.  200;  iii.  22.3. 

V.  St.  Anthony  W.  P.  Co.,  ii.  367. 
Merrills  v.  Swift,  lii.  317. 
Merrimac  River  Locks,  &c..  Proprietors 
of,  V.  Nashua  &  L.  E.  ii.  Co., 
iii.  145. 

V.  Springer,  i.  64. 
Merriman  i-.  Lanfield,  i.  411. 
Merritt  r.  Bartiiolick,  ii.  123. 

V.  Harris,  iii.  509. 

V.  Home,  1.  182. 

V.  Hosmer,  ii.  223. 

V.  Judd,  ii.  406. 

r.  Lambert,  ii.  180. 

V.  Merritt,  i.  370,  416. 

V.  Morse,  iii.  421,  505. 

V.  Wells,  ii.  91. 
Mershon  i-.  Duer,  i.  214. 
Merwin  v.  Camp,  iii.  291. 

1-.  Wheeler,  ii.  347,  392. 
Meserve  v.  Meserve,  i.  283. 
Messenger  r.  Armstrong,  i.  635,  689. 

V.  Uhler,  ii.  368. 
Messer  v.  Oestrich,  iii.  492. 
Messiter  v.  Wright,  ii.  222. 
Mestaer  v.  Gillespie,  ii.  450. 
Metcalf  V.  Gillet,  iii.  242. 

V.  Putnam,  iii.  405. 
Metcalfe  v.  Westaway,  iii.  6,  404. 
Methodist  Church  v.  Jaques,  iii.  304. 

V.  Wood,  ii.  524. 
Metzgar's  Appeal,  ii.  218. 
Meuley  i-.  Zeigler,  iii.  291,  292. 
Mevey's  Appeal,  ii.  279. 
Meyer  v.  Campbell,  ii.  173. 

V.  Claus,  i.  443. 

V.  Meyer,  i.  197,  404. 

V.  Phillips,  ii.  .347. 
Miami  E.x.  Co.  v.  U.  S.  Bank,  ii.  45,  46, 

51,54,6.5,  101,  106,  177,229. 
Micliigan  Air  Line  Ry.  Co.  i-.  Mellen, 

ii.  512. 
Micliigan  Ins.  Co.  v.  Brown,  ii.  158. 
Michoud  V.  Girod,  ii.  77,  80,  570. 
Mickle  V.  Miles,  i.  493,  578. 
Mickles  r.  Dillaye,  ii.  238,  2.39. 

r.  Townsend,  ii.  114  ;  iii.  117. 
Mickley's  Estate,  ii.  770. 
Mid.  Kent  Railway,  In  re,  iii.  547. 
Middlcbrook  v.  Corwin,  i.  20,  010. 
Middlebrooks  r.  Warren,  i.  416. 
Middlesex  Bank  v.  Minot,  ii.  78. 
Middlesex  Sav.  Bank  v.  Bates,  ii.  109. 
Middleton  v.  Findla,  iii.  279. 

V.  Perry,  iii.  453. 


Middleton  v.  Pritcliard,  iii.  4.39,  445. 
Middietown  v.  Sage,  iii.  448. 
Middletown  Sav.  Bank  v.  Bacharach, 

ii.  177. 
Midland  Ferry  Co.  v.  Wilson,  ii.  306. 
Midmer  v.  Midmer,  ii.  512,  514,  518. 
Mildmay's  case,  i.  176. 
Miles  I'.  Barrows,  iii.  435. 

V.  Fisher,  i.  677. 

17.  Gray,  ii.  127. 

V.  James,  i.  476. 

V.  Lingerman,  iii.  263,  267. 

V.  Miles,  i.  136,  137,  409;  ii.  117. 

V.  Smith,  ii.  267. 
Milford  V.  Hoibrook,  i.  570. 
Milhau  V.  Sharp,  ii.  304,  308  ;  iii.  449. 
Mill  Dam  Foundery  v.  Hovey,  iii.  287, 

288. 
Mill  River,  &c.  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Smith,  i.  4 ; 

iii.  363,  437. 
Millard  v.  Hathaway,  ii.  512,  519. 
Milledge  v.  Lamar,  i.  275.  • 

Miller    r.   Auburn,   &c.   R.  R.  Co.,  i. 
063. 

V.  Baker,  i.  13, 

V.  Ball,  iii.  247. 

V.  Beniley,  iii.  427. 

V.  Beverly,  i.  290. 

r.  Blose,  ii.  512,  514. 

V.  Bonsadon,  i.  5!tl,  594. 

V.  Bradford,  ii.  153;  iii.  339. 

V.  Cherrv,  iii.  431. 

V.  Chittenden,  ii.  436,  555,  556,  564, 
756 ;  iii.  282,  344,  554,  557. 

V.  Dennett,  i.  715. 

V.  Donaldson,  ii.  196. 

V.  Evans,  ii.  83. 

V.  Ewing,  iii.  121,  123,  159. 

V.  Finn,  ii.  264. 

r.  Garlock,  ii.  339. 

V.  Gilleland,  iii.  260. 

V.  Goodwin,  iii.  399. 

V.  Harbert,  i.  478. 

V.  Helm,  ii.  195. 

V.  Henderson,  ii.  269. 

I'.  Holman,  iii.  127. 

V.  Lang,  i.  592,  600;  iii.  98. 

V.  Levi,  ii.  25,  27. 

V.  Lincoln,  ii   189,  234. 

V.  Lindse}',  iii.  201. 

V.  Lock  wood,  ii.  158. 

V.  Macomb,  ii.  798. 

V.  Mann,  iii.  437. 

V.  Manwaring,  iii.  260. 

V.  JMarckle,  i.  370,  432,  448  ;  ii.  62, 
256. 

V.  McBrier,  i.  589. 

V.  Menke,  i.  378. 

V.  Miller,  i.  190,  191.  686,  691,  694, 
708,  710,  718  ;  ii.  368,  369,  803, 
804 ;  iii.  14,  17,  142,  382. 

V.  Morris,  i.  567. 

V.  Pearce,  iii.  357. 

V.  Plumb,  i.  27. 


TA15LE    OF   CASES   CITED. 


XCIX 


Miller  v.  U.  &  W.  U.  R,.  ii.  1C4. 

V.  Shacklffonl.  iii.  UH,  7U8. 

w.  Sliiiw,  iii.  ItW,  ItJl. 

V.  Slileids,  i.  iVJ'!. 

I'.  Stump,  i.  "Jl  I,  'JIT. 

i».  Tlmlclicr,  ii.  iVl  1. 

V.  Tlionipsun,  ii.  ld7o. 

V.  Wliiltiir.  ii.  155),  '2'^d. 
Milk-r'.s  Api)e.il,  i.  I'.'.Hi ;  iii.  H'J. 
MilliTsliip  r.  Bruokes,  iii.  oil. 
Miik'tt  r.  Fi.wlf,  iii.  IGV),  435,  458. 

V.  rarkiT,  iii.  HIH,  ;W0,  .Vn. 
Milliuaii  r.  .Miliicaii,  ii.  541. 
Millikeii  r.  MaiJL'V,  ii.  Ib8,  2.i4. 
iMillioii  r.  l{ili-y,"iii.  W. 
Mills  r.  Hai-lir,  i.  574. 

V.  lianks,  ii.  81. 

V.  Ciitlm.  iii.  478,  484,  610. 

('.  ('t)Uiity  (^omiiiissioaerM,  ii.  305. 

V.  Hailing,  ii.  51,  04. 

f.  Deiini.s,  ii.  270. 

V.  i;.>(T.  i.  040. 

I?.  Gore,  iii.  .•]03,;W4,  311. 

V.  Grant,  Estate  of,  i.  3H0. 

V.  llaynes,  ii.  555. 

V.  Lock  wood,  iii.  400. 

V.  Murrvinan,  i.  54*J. 

V.  Mills",  i;5:W;  iii.  488. 

V.  Rcdick,  i.  7. 

V.  Shepard,  ii.  100.  139, 172. 

V.  Smith,  iii.  S.'Jo. 

V.  Spauldinp.  i.  420. 

V.  St.  Clair  Co  ,  ii.  310. 

V.  Van  Voorliies,  ii.  2(!i». 

V.  Vail    Vooriiis,   i.  210,   217.  2;30, 
231,  235,  202,  305,  300  ;  ii.  200. 
Miliier  r.  Freeman,  ii.  5iHi,  507,  50'J. 

I'.  Hylanil,  ii.  510,  535. 
Minis  f.  Lockitt,  ii.  05. 

V.  Mai-on  &  West  R.  H.,  ii.  05,  00. 

i\  Mims,  ii.  150,  204.  205,  200. 
Miner  v.  Stevens,  i.  045,  050  ;  ii.  105. 
Minnesota  Co.  v.  St.  Taiil  Co.,  i.  18; 

ii.  104. 
Minor  r.  Ilill,  ii.  120,  130. 

V.  Natchez,  iii.  235,  237,  242,  243. 

r.  Uoj^ers,  ii.  40;!. 

I'.  Sharon,  i.  570. 
Minot  r.  Hrooks,  iii.  107,  108. 

I'.  Joy,  i.  524. 

I'.  Sawyer,  ii.  250. 

r.  'rai>pan,  ii.  5'.t2,  Oil. 
Minshell  c    Lluyd.  i.  3:'.. 
•Minter  v.  Croiiiim-iin.  iii.  205. 

r.  Wraith,  ii.  770. 
Mirick  r.  Iloppin,  i.  501,  500;  ii.  142. 
.Mississippi   Valiev  &  W.  H.  U.  Co.  v. 
Chienun  U.  U.,  ii.  1G.3. 

r.  U.  S.  K.\.  Co,  ii.  100. 
Mistier  r.  O'Grady,  i.  571. 
Mitciilfe  r.  We-itawav,  iii.  40.3. 
Mitchell  r.  Bartlett.  iii.  300. 

p.  Berry,  ii.  524,  671. 

V.  Bo^-nn,  ii.  72,  110,  115. 


Mitchell  I'.  Biirnliani,  ii.  .30,  4'J,  08,  O'J, 
120.  121,  133,  154,  20». 

V.  Clurk,  ii.  ll»4. 

('.  Home  liiM.  Co.,  iii.  261. 

('.  Kinsman,  i   4^5. 

V.  Ladew,  ii.  l2Vt. 

V.  .Mitchell,  i.  207,  337;  iii.  60.3. 

c.  Morse,  ii.  7H4. 

r.  rilUbury,  iii   4!>2. 

V.  Uyan,  i.  Ib2 ;  iii.  308,  300,  3lo. 
315. 

r.  Seipel,  ii.  33.3. 

I'.  .Sivier,  i.  310. 

I'.  .Shaiiley,  ii.  254. 

V.  Skinner,  ii.  514. 

r.  Speiice,  ii.  717. 

V.  Starbutk,  i.  20,  711. 

V.  Warner,  iii.  470,  480,  487. 

r.  Winslow,  ii.  1(53. 
Mi.x  1-.  Ilotchkiss,  ii.  240,  244. 

1-.  Kin^,  i.  403. 

r.  Smith,  iii.  211. 
.Mi.xer  r.  Keed,  iii.  413. 
.Mizell  r.  Burnett,  ii.  11. 
Mizner  v.  Miinroe,  i.  017. 
.Moale  1-.  Baltimore,  iii.  224,  450. 
.Mol.ile  r.  Kslava.  iii.  203. 
.Mobile  Bank  v.  I'lanters'  Bank.  ii.  128. 
.Mol)ile  Dock  &  I.  Co.  v.  Kuder.  ii.  215. 
•Model  L.   House  Ass.  f.  Boston,  ii.  72, 

7(i,  204. 
Moderwell  i-.  Mullison,  i.  700,  702. 
.Modrell  r.  Riddle,  ii.  510. 
Mndat  v.  Smith,  i.  547.  550. 
Motliitt  V.  South,  i.  i>17. 

i\  Strimn,  ii.  703,  788. 
Moffitt  V.  McDonald,  ii    570. 
.Mohawk  Bridt'e  v.  L'tica  R.  R.,  ii.  310. 
.Mohawk  R.  R.  r.  Clute,  i.  10. 
Mohkr's  Ajjpcal,  ii.  12H. 
.Midir  V.  I'armelee,  ii.  300. 
.Mollett  /•.  Brayiie,  i.  583. 
.Miillineau.x  r.  I'owell.  i.  107. 
.Moltoii  V.  Camrou.x.  i.  4.'^5. 
.Monanjue  r.  Monanpie.  ii.  500. 
Moiiiiifien  r.  Ramsev.  i.  300. 
Monk  r.  Butler,  iii.  302. 

r.  CajH-n,  i.  405,  -lOO. 
.Monmouthshire   Canal    v.  Harford,    ii. 

.3.!0,  312. 
Mononjjahela    Bridge    Co.   r.  Kirk,  iii. 

442. 
Monroe  >•.  Bowen,  ii.  5. 

V.  .May.  i.  372. 
Montague  r   Boston  &  A.  R.  R.,  ii.  4;'., 
2;l.5,  2:;4,  245. 

V.  Dawes,  ii.  70,  78,  79. 

V.  Gav.  i.  640. 

r.  Hayes,  ii.  CAB. 
Montefir)re  '•.  Browne,  ii.  716. 
Montgonurv  r.  Briiere,  i.  210,  247 

V.  Chad'wick.  ii.  67,  235,  '2iU\ 

V.  Crais.  i.  003. 

V.  Dorion,  i.  70 ;  iii.  63,  207. 


TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 


Montgomery  i-.  Hickman,  i.  709. 

V.  Middlemiss,  ii.  251,  263,  274. 

V.  Reed,  iii.  510. 

V.  Tutt,  i.  430;  ii.  249,  261. 
Montgomery  County  Bank  App.,  ii.  159, 

16U. 
Monvpenny  v.  Bering,  ii.  631. 
Moody  V.  Harper,  i.  277. 

V.  Hutchinson,  iii.  212. 

V.  King,  i.  17y,  180,  273,  274,  275. 
Mooers  v.  Dixon,  i.  417. 

V.  Wait,  i.  IGO. 

V.  Wliite,  i.  79 
Moomey  v.  Maas,  ii.  262,  268,  271. 
Mooney  v.  Blanchard,  iii.  611. 

V.  Brinkley,  ii.  141. 

i\  Burcliard,  iii.  532. 
Moore,  Ex  parte,  i.  337. 

V.  Beasiey,  i.  591,  636,  650. 

V.  Beasom,  ii.  181. 

V.  Bennett,  iii.  348. 

V.  Bickliam,  ii.  455,  456. 

V.  Boyd,  i.  617,  630,  636,  657,  659. 

V.  Burnet,  ii.  573. 

V.  Cable,  ii.  189,  235,  238. 

V.  Clarke,  ii.  191. 

V.  Cornell,  ii.  121,  122. 

2'.  Cottingham,  ii.  546,  563. 

V.  Dimond,   ii.   657,   709 ;   iii.  558, 
564. 

V.  Dunning,  i.  447. 

V.  Ellsworth,  i.  163,  164. 

V.  Esty,  i.  204,  231,  282,  237,  245, 
248. 

V.  Farrow,  iii.  98,  101. 

V.  Fletcher,  iii.  412,  421. 

r.  Frost,  i  312,  432. 

V.  Gordon,  iii.  248. 

V.  Hazleton,  iii.  313. 

V.  Howe,  ii.  764,  767. 

V.  Hutchins,  i.  202. 

V.  Jourdan,  iii.  337. 

V.  Kent,  i.  200,  202. 

V.  Littel,  ii.  596,  597,  657 ;  iii.  104, 
122. 

V.  Luce,  i.  132 ;  iii.  177. 

V.  Lyons,  ii.  588,  596,  597. 

V.  Magrath,  iii.  461. 

V.  Mason,  i.  656. 

V.  Mayor,  &c.,  i.  198,  199,  200,  261, 
2«0.  312. 

V.  Merrill,  iii.  480,  501. 

V.  Miller,  i.  479. 

V.  Moberly,  ii.  225,  229. 

f.  Moore,  i.  712;   ii.  244,  544;   iii. 
251,  553,  557. 

V.  Morrow,  i.  649. 

V.  Parker,  ii.  649. 

V.  Pendleton,  iii.  297. 

V.  Pitts,  ii.  4. 

r.  Rake,  ii.  772,  803 ;  iii.  14. 

V.  Rawson,  i.  672;  ii.  340,  358,  360, 
.362,  363,  395. 

V.  Richardson,  i.  249. 


Moore  v.  Rollins,  i  218,  230,  232. 

V.  Sanders,  ii.  9. 

V   Shultz,  ii.  497. 

r.  Smaw,  ii.  407 ;  iii.  200,  418. 

r.  Spruill,  i.  605. 

V.  Tisdale,  i.  257. 

V.  Titman,  i.  432;  ii.  108. 

V.  Townehend,  i.  166. 

V.  Vinten,  i.  341. 

V.  Wade,  ii.  53. 

V.  Ware,  ii.  125. 

V.  Weaver,  ii.  614,  687,  657. 

V.  Weber,  i.  475,  521,  562,  565,  569, 
575. 

V.  Wilkinson,  iii.  204,  206. 

V.  Worley,  iii.  351. 
Moore's  Appeal,  ii.  117,  218. 
Moorecroft  v.  Dowding,  ii.  549. 
Moorehouse  v.  Cotheal,  i.  137,  148. 
Mordecai  v.  Parker,  ii.  566. 
Mureau  v.  Detcheniendy,  i.  102. 

V.  Safferans,  i.  701 ;  iii.  283. 
Morehead  v.  Watkyns,  i.  638,  643 
^loreliouse  v.  Heath,  iii.  530. 
Moreton  r.  Harrison,  ii.  91,  97. 
Morey  v.  Herrick,  iii.  568. 

i".  Maguire,  ii.  106. 
Morgan  v.  Bissell,  i.  480,  482. 

V.  Clayton,  iii.  345. 

V.  Davis,  ii.  133,  179,  198. 

V.  Donovan,  ii.  164,  165. 

V.  Graham,  iii.  128,  251. 

V.  Herrick,  i.  721. 

V.  Johnston,  ii.  164. 

V.  Earned,  iii.  110. 

v.  Moore,  iii.  459. 

V.  Morgan,  i.  173,  176,  177;  ii.  189, 
190,  540,  763,  765. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  iii.  91,  101. 

V.  Reading,  iii.  436,  439. 

V.  Stearns,  i.  380. 
Morice  v.  Bisliop  of  Durham,  iii.  568. 
Moring  v.  Abies,  iii.  154. 
Moritz  V.  Hoffman,  iii.  357. 
Morley  v.  Rennoldson,  ii.  10. 

V.  Saunders,  i.  130. 
Morrell  v.  Fisher,  iii.  425. 
Morrice's  case,  i.  722. 
Morrill  v.  De  la  Granja,  i.  660. 

V.  Hopkins,  i.  442. 

i\  Mackn)an,  i.  646. 

V.  Morrill,  i.  718. 

V.  Noyes,  ii.  164. 

V.  Titcomb,  iii.  457. 
Morris  v.  Bacon,  ii.  118,  125. 

V.  Callanan,  iii.  161. 

V.  Edgington,  ii.  355. 

V.  French,  i   5,  9. 

r.  Harris,  i.  721. 

V.  Henderson,  iii.  312. 

V.  Morris,  i.  703. 

V.  Niles,  i.  051. 

I'.  Ni.xon,  ii.  45. 

V.  Oakford,  ii.  220. 


TAULK    OF    C.\-^i:>    <  1  1  l.l>. 


cl 


Morris  r.  PenroRo,  iii.  K)G. 

V.  I'liiiliT,  ii.  Ti'^o. 

I'.  I'lii'lps,  iii.  6:^7. 

r.  Uuwiin,  iii.  I't^J-J. 

V.  Siirtrfnt,  i.  "JOO.  I.ij,  160;  iii.  3.'J;{. 

I'.  Sti'i)la«ii9,  iii    li!^-'. 

V.  Tiliot8i)n,  i.  h'2\. 

V.  Viinderfii,  iii.  2o8. 

V.  Ward,  i.  420,  4H«J. 

V   Way.  ii.  84. 
Morris  Canal,  &c.  Co.  r.  I^owis,  iii.  89. 

c.  liviTson,  iii.  :{1»'.». 
Morri.soii  r.  Hassett,  iii.  98. 

r.  Mean,  ii.  80.  278. 

V.  Uockwitli,  ii.  210. 

V.  Berry,  i.  10.  2(J. 

I'.  HieriT,  ii.  o.')!. 

f.  Howinaii,  iii.  2^.15. 

r.  niiL-i<iier,  ii.  141,  258. 

V.  Uiici<s]i(irt,  ii.  'A12. 

V.  Chadwiik,  i.  557,  559,  560,  564. 

I'.  Ciiapin,  iii.  161. 

V.  Hays.  iii.  104. 

I'.  Keen,  iii.  4;}tJ. 

!•.  Kelly,  iii.  148,  306,  335,  336,344. 

r.  Kiiii,',  ii.  ;>.U,  33.). 

I'.  Mari|nardt,  ii.  304. 

V.  .MoDaniel,  i.  302,  376.  391,  407. 

V.  .McLeod,  ii.  235. 

V.  Men.leiihall,  ii.  122. 

V.  Morrisdii.  iii.  82. 

V.  Norman,  iii.  108. 

r.  Ho8sij;nol,  i.  409. 

V.  Underwood,   iii.   479,   528,   529, 
630. 

V.  Wilson,   iii.    78,    113,    123,    208, 
42:». 
Morrow  >•.  Scott,  iii.  16. 

V.  Willard,  iii.  424,  450. 
Morse  v.  Aldricli,  i.  531  ;  ii.  295,  300; 
iii.  128. 

V.  Bassett,  ii.  254,  255. 

V.  Carpenter,  iii.  279,  280. 

i".  Cliurcliill,  iii.  147. 

V.  Copeland,  i.  001,  008,  070,  072  ; 
ii.  397. 

V.  Curtis,  iii.  499. 

V.  Goddard,   i.  250.  521,  595,  597, 
018;  ii.  143,  144. 

V.  Hill,  ii.  522,  52:5.  524. 

c.  Maddo.x,  i.  570. 

V.  Marshall,  iii.  410. 

i:  Merritt,  ii.  105,  251. 

V.  Hobcrto,  i.  599. 

V.  Sliattuck.  ii.  420. 

r.  Williams,  ii.  3;>8. 
Morton  i\  Barrett,  ii.  498,  538. 

v.  Blnnkenship,  iii.  209. 

V.  Edwin,  iii.  242. 

V.  Hall.  ii.  75. 

r.  Noble,  i.  201. 

V.  Heeds,  iii.  235. 

V.  Weir,  i.  50<V 

V.  Woods,  i.  485,  605.  018  ;  ii.  143 


Mosby  r.  Mo.tbv,  ii.  551.  555. 
.Mosely  V.  Mursiiall.  i.  129;  ii.  208. 

f.  .Mosely.  ii.  4')3,  472. 

I'.  Uober'ts,  ii.  5tN),  54U. 
Moses  c.  .Miirjjatroyd.  ii.  226. 
Mosiier  r.  .Mor^lier.  i.  209.  Ml. 
Mosluer  r.  .Meek.  ii.  91,  97. 

r.  Kedin^,  i.  479.  591,  690,  630. 
Mosley  v.  Mosley,  ii.  UIK). 
Moss  >-.  (iallimore,  ii.  142. 

V.  (ireeii,  ii.  03. 

I'.  Moss.  ii.  510,  611. 

r.  Kiddle,  iii.  318. 

I'.  Scott,  iii.  U58. 

r.  Shear,  iii.  241. 

V.  Shel.lon,  iii.  408. 

V.  Warner,  i.  357.  430,  440,  457  ;  ii 
203. 
Motley  I'.  Blake,  i.  710. 

I'.  Sar^'eant.  iii.  449.  451. 
Mott  V.  Ackernian,  ii.  407,  717. 

V.  Clark,  ii.  127,  154. 

V.  Palmer,  i.   4.  5,    10.  18,  20,  34 , 
iii.  410,  479,  489,  500. 

V.  N.  Y.,  (Jnt.,  &   W.   Ky.  Co.,  ii. 
705. 
Moughon  r.  Masterson.  i.  431. 
Mimie  r.  (larrelt,  i.  525. 
Moulton  V.  Newburyjjort  Co.,  ii.  307. 

r.  Kohinson,  i.  0(i4.  000,  007,  010. 
Mounce  c.  Byars,  ii   80,  92. 
Mountjoy's  case.  ii.  403. 
.Mount  Pleasant  Bank  r.  Sprigg.  ii.  51. 
Movaii  I-.  Hays.  ii.  547. 
.Mowry  v.  Sheldon,  ii.  357. 
•Moyer's  Appeal,  iii.  248. 
Moynahaii  <•.  Moore,  ii.  180. 
Moyor  V.  .McCullough,  iii.  207. 
Muckleston  i'.  Brown,  iii.  568. 
Mufrford  r.  Richardson,  i.  046,  660. 
Muhlig  V.  Fiske,  ii.  72.  281. 
Muir  r.  Cross,  ii.  91. 
.Muldrow  r.  .Jones,  i.  050. 
Mulford  ;•.  Peterson,  ii.  122.  130. 
.Mullanpliv  r.  Simpson,  ii.  182. 
.Miillany  r.  Mullany,  i.  170. 
.Mullenr.  Strieker."  ii.  304. 
.Midler  t:  Bo^r^'s.  i.  099. 
Mullikin  r.  Mullikin.  ii.  98. 
Mumford  v.  Brown,  i.  509.  097  ;  ii.  889. 

I-.  Whitney,  i.  (KJl.t It •,•_',  0*53,  660. 
Mummy  c.  Johnston,  iii.  232. 
Munchus  I'.  Harris,  i.  'Ml). 
.Mimicipality  No.  2  i-.  Orleans  Cotton 

Press,  iii.  (iO 
Mimn  r.  Worrall.  iii.  414.  403. 
Mimnorlyn  r.  Munnerlyn.  i.  191. 
Munroe  'r.  Luke.  i.  03.  ii'.tO.  O'.t.'i,  717. 

V.  Stickney.  i.  717  ;  iii.  412. 

i>.  Walbridije.  i.  717. 

r.  Wanl.  iii.  137. 
Mun«ell  I-.  Carew.  i.  (Kt8. 
Mun'*on  r.  Berdan,  ii.  713,  714. 

f.  Munson.  ii.  106,  10l»,  139. 


Cll 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Murdock  '■.  Chapman,  ii.  119,  122  ;  iii. 
4o'.t. 

I'.  Gilchrist,  iii.  40J. 

V.  Hughes,  ii.  524,  535,  536. 

V.  Katulift;  i.  497. 
Murdock's  case,  ii.  115,  141. 
Murphv  V.  Callev,  ii.  40,  48,  50,  51. 

V.  Campbell,  iii.  411,  412,  421,  431. 

V.  Copelaml,  iii.  436. 

V.  Craiich,  i.  456. 

V.  McNeill,  i.  424. 

V.  Nathans,  ii.  507. 

V.  Springer,  iii.  165. 
Murray  v.  Barney,  ii.  158. 

v.  Cherrington,  i.  471. 

V.  Emmons,  i.  487. 

V.  Hall,  i.  693. 

V.  Harway,  i.  503,  515. 

V.  bhanklin,  i.  486. 

V.  Smith,  iii.  522. 

V.  Stair,  iii.  318,  319. 

V.  Walker,  ii.  45,  111. 

V.  Welch,  ii.  339  ;  iii.  289. 
Murry  v.  Sell,  ii.  511,  512,  515,  518. 
JMusham  ?•.  Musliam,  iii.  156. 
Muskett  c.  Hill,  i.  662. 
Muskingum  V.  Turnp.  Co.  v.  Ward,  iii. 

281. 
Musser  v.  Brink,  i.  605. 
Mussey  v.  Holt,  i.  527,  548;  iii.  326. 

V.  Sanborn,  i.  715. 

V.  Scott,  i.  657  ;  iii.  294. 

V.  Union  Wliarf,  ii.  361. 
Mutton's  case,  ii.  666. 
Mutual  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Deale,  ii.  507. 
Mutual  Loan,   &c.  Assn.  v.  Elwell,  ii. 

15L 
Muzzy  V.  Knisjht,  ii.  195. 
Myer  v.  Hoblis,  ii.  381. 

V.  Whittaker,  i.  4. 
Myers  v.  Ford,  i.  381,  428. 

V.  Gemmel,  ii.  319,  363,  365. 

V.  Little,  ii.  511. 

V.  Myers,  ii.  599. 

t'.  Ross,  iii.  336. 

V.  Sanders,  iii.  263. 

17.  White,  ii.  101,  103,  108,  143. 


N. 

Nagle  V.  Macy,  ii.  110,  113,  123. 
Naglee  v.  IngersoU,  i.  599. 
Nailer  r.  Stanley,  ii.  215. 
Nairn  v.  Prowse,  ii.  95. 
Napier  v.  Bulwinkle,  ii.  340,  365,  380, 
382,  385. 

V.  Darling,  i.  528. 
Napper  v.  Sanders,  ii.  615,  619,  634. 
Nary  v.  Merrill,  iii.  358. 
Nash  V.  Cutler,  ii.  555. 

V.  Minneapolis  Co.,  i.  570. 

r.  N.  E.  Ins.  Co.,  ii.  354. 

V.  Peden,  ii.  341,  346. 


Nash  r.  Spofford,  iii.  123,  124. 
Nason  v.  Allen,  i.  248. 

V.  Grant,  ii.  65  ;  iii.  344. 
Nathans  v.  Arkwright,  iii.  266. 
National  Bank  v.  Grand  Lodge  of  Mo., 

ii.  219. 
National   Exch.   Bank   v.  Watson,   iii. 

355. 
National  Oil  Ref.  Co.  v.  Bush,  i.  652. 
Naumberg  v.  Young,  i.  520,  576. 
Nave  V.  Berry,  i.  523,  547,  566,  567, 578. 
Nazareth  Inst.  v.  Lowe,  i.  217  ;  ii.  93. 
Neal  V.  Gregory,  iii.  81,  82,  89. 

V.  Sawyer,  i.  359. 
Neale  v.  Hagthrop,  ii.  234,  239. 

V.  Mackenzie,  i.  561. 

V.  Neale,  iii.  248. 

V.  Perkerson,  i.  416. 
Neale's  Appeal,  ii.  500. 
Nease  v.  Capehart,  ii.  535. 
Needham  r.  Allison,  i.  610. 

r.  Bronson,  i.  S4.3. 

V.  .Judson,  iii.  273,  458. 
Neel  r.  Beach,  ii.  715. 

V.  Neel,  i   151. 
Neeley  v.  Sutler,  i.  181,  182. 
Neglcy  1-.  Morgan,  i.  535. 
Neill  V.  Devonshire,  ii.  392. 

r.  Keese,  ii.  518. 

v.  Lacy,  ii.  401. 
Neilson  v.  Lagow,  ii.  538. 
Neimcewicz  v.  Gahn,  ii.  49,  224,  228,  230. 
Nellis  V.  Lathrop,  i.  549. 

V.  Nellis,  ii.  765,  770. 
Nelson  r.  Butterfield,  ii.  341 ;  iii.  443- 

V.  Hall,  iii.  434.  455. 

r.  McCrary,  i.  355,  415. 

V.  Nelson,  i.  6,  15. 

I'.  Pinegar,  ii.  108,  115. 

V.  Sims,  iii.  206. 
Nepean  v.  Doe,  i.  654. 
Nerhooth  v.  Althouse,  i.  599. 
Nestal  V.  Schmid,  ii.  515. 
Nettleton  v.  Sikes,  i.  15,  671. 
Nevell  V.  Nevell,  ii.  437. 
Neves  v.  Scott,  ii.  529,  720. 
Nevil  r.  Saunders,  ii.  498,  501. 
Ncvin's  Appeal,  i.  411. 
Nevitt  V.  Bacon,  ii.  191,  193. 
Newall  V.  Wright,  i.  548;  ii.  105,  145, 

169,  190,  271. 
New  Bedford  Inst,  for  Sav.  v.  Fairhavsn 

Bank,  ii.  225. 
Newbold  v.  Newbold,  ii.  108. 

V.  Ridgeway,  i.  292. 
Newburgh  Turnp.  Co.  v.  Miller,  ii.  307, 

308. 
Newbury  Bank  v.  Eastman,  iii.  325, 326. 
Newcomb  v.  Bonham,  ii.  45,  65,  66. 

V.  Dewey,  ii.  262. 

V.  Harvey,  i.  551. 

V.  Presbrey,  iii.  123. 

r.  Pamcr,  i.  600. 

V.  Stebbins,  i.  549 ;  iii.  6. 


TABLK    OF    CASES    CITED. 


cm 


NVwell  V.  Hill,  i.  r>\H  ■  ii  203;   iii.  331. 

4;i4. 
New  KnuUiiil  Jowrlry  Co.  v.  Meriuiii, 

i.  4'-'0.  JitS;  ii.  17t<.  204,  20o. 
Newliali  V.  IJurt.  ii.  67. 
V.  Ire-soii,  iii.  4;!H,  44H. 
V.  LvMM  Saviii^js  Mank,  i.217,  305; 

"ii.  75,  ISJ,  2(tii,  271. 
i>.  l*icr«'o,  ii.  (U. 

I..  Wlu'eltT,  i.  8'.);  ii.  498,  632.  637  ; 
iii.  l:!(l,  280. 
New    Hniiipsliire   Hank   r.    Willanl,   ii. 

lo'.t,  lltj. 
Xl-w  Haven  St.  Co.  i".  Sarpcnt,  iii.  448. 
Nuw  Ipswich  Factory  i'.  Batclielder.  ii. 

82;  >. 

New  Jersey  Zinc  Co.  i'.  Boston  Frank- 

linite  Co..  iii.  42'J. 
Newkerk  r.  Newkerk,  i.  00. 
Newianil  r.  Ncwland,  ii   783. 

V.  SliepiianI,  iii.  6()(J. 
New  T>. union  Bank  r.  Lee,  ii.  225. 
Newiniin  r.  Anderton,  i.  678. 

c.  ("Iia])ni:in,  ii.  15.3,  175,  17G. 

V.  K.hvanls.  iii.  89. 

I'.  Home  Ins.  Co.,  ii.  206. 

V.  Jackson,  ii.  84. 

i:  Nellis.  ii.  317.  321. 

V.  Hiitter,  i.  (!02,  G03. 

r.  Samuels,  ii.  82. 
Newmarket  r.  Smart,  ii.  650;  iii.  176. 
New  Orleans  r.  De  Armas,  iii.  205. 

V.  United  States,  i.  09;  iii.  0-3,  05. 
New  Orleans,  &c.  U.  R.  Co.  c.  Jourdain, 

iii.  508. 
New  Salem  v.  Eagle  Co.,  ii.  300. 
New  Slioreham  i<   Ball,  iii.  160. 
Newton  i-.  Cook,  i.  238,  246,  308,  310; 
ii.  182. 

V.  Eddv,  iii.  437. 

V.  Griffllli.  ii.  703,  705. 

r.  Harland,  i.  046, 663. 055,  G56,  067. 

V.  Marsden,  ii.  10. 

V.  McLean,  ii.  94,  625,  606. 

V.  Newton,  i.  094. 

V.  Sly,  ii.  112. 

V.  Summev.  i.  369. 

V.  Wilson,' i.  578. 
New  York  i-.  Mabie,  i    493,  619,  620, 

558;  iii.  523. 
New  York  Bank  r.  Cary,  ii.  611. 
New  York  Life  Ins.   Co.  v.  Milnor,  ii. 
320. 

f.  Smith,  ii.  151. 
New   York,  llousutuuic,  &  N.  R.  R.  r. 
Boston,  Hartford.  &  E.  R.  R.,  ii.  308. 
Nice's  Appeal,  ii.  152. 
Nicholas  c.  Chamberlain,  ii.  328,  320. 

r.  Purczell,  i.  300,  404. 
Nicholl  V.  Davidson  Co.,  i.  425,  454. 

r.  Dupree,  iii.  10. 

r.  N.  Y.  &  Erie  H.  R..  i.  628. 
Nicholls  r.  Peak,  ii   575. 
Nichols  V.  Allen,  ii.  600. 


Nichols  V.  Aylor,  ii.  843. 

r.  Ba.xter.  ii.  240.  241,  243. 

V.  Cabe,  ii.  54. 

r.  Denny,  i.  678;  ii.  60-1. 

I'.  Eaton,  ii.  6:]3,  634. 

V.  Luce.  ii.  340. 

V.  Nichols,  i.  716. 

V.  Reynolds,  ii.  54.  176;  iii.  .338. 

r.  Smith,  i.  688. 

)-.  Thornton,  ii.  618. 

f.  Weiiiworth,  ii.  304. 

r.  Williams,  i.  624.  636,  6.39. 
Nicholson  r.  Hulsey.  ii.  660;  iii.  260. 

«'.  Munigle,  i.  557.  027. 
Nickells  r.  Atherstone.  i.  685.  045. 
Nickerson  r.  Buck,  iii.  5.W,  540. 
Nicklin  v.  Williatns,  ii.  384,  .303. 
NicoU  V.  N    Y.  &  Erie   R.  R.,  i.  528 ; 
ii.  13,  15.  10,  802. 

r.  Scott,  ii.  717. 

V.  Walworth,  ii.  570. 
NicoUs  r.  Sheflleld.  ii.  f.OO 
Niedelet  v.  Wales,  i.  660. 
Nightingale  v    Biirrell,  i.  110,  117;  ii. 
740,  741,  745,  748,  753,  772. 

V.  Hidden,  i.  174  ;  ii.  406.  603;  iii. 
400.  470. 
Niles  V.  Grav,  ii.  763. 

V.  Nye.'i   238.  243. 

V.  Patch,  iii.  440. 

V.  Sawtell,  iii.  503. 
Nims  V.  Palmer,  iii.  109. 

V.  Sherman,  iii   98. 
Niver  v.  Crane,  ii.  614,  678. 
Nixon  V  Porter,  iii.  148. 
Noble  r.  Bosworth.  i.  27  ;  iii.  410. 

V.  Enos.  iii.  645. 

V.  Googins.  iii.  620. 

I'.  Hook,  i.  385. 

1-.  McFarland,  i.  001. 

f.  Sylvester,  i.  24. 
Nobleboro  r.  Clark,  iii.  296. 
Noel  r.  Jevon.  i.  213. 

V.  McCrory,  i.  651. 
Noke  »'.  Awder,  i.  485,  693. 
Noonan  r.  Albany,  ii.  .'300. 
Norcross  r.  Xorcross.  ii.  176. 
Norflect  v.  Cromwell,  ii.  298.  .300,  317. 
Norfolk  (Duchees  of)   v.  Wiseman,  i. 

005. 
Norfolk's  (Duke  of)  case,  ii.  780,  787, 

789. 
Norman  i*.  Bellman,  i.  450. 

1-.  Burnett,  ii.  547. 

r.  Towne,  ii.  674. 

V.  Wells,  i.  531 ;  ii.  800. 
Norris  v.  Clark,  i.  330. 

V.  Gould,  i.  695. 

r.  Harrison,  i.  133. 

1-.  Johnston,  ii.  633. 

r.  Laberee,  ii    17. 

V.  Milner.  ii.  1''.. 

V.  Morrill,  i.  014. 

V.  Morrison,  i.  409;  ii.  216. 


CIV 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Norris  v.  Moulton,  i.  377,  382,  392,  393, 
409,  423,440;  ii.  183. 

I'.  Sullivan,  i.  G'JO. 

V.  Wilkinson,  ii.  87. 
Norris'  Appeal,  iii.  249,  428. 
North  r.  Barnum,  i.  598,  602,  603. 

V.  Nichols,  i.  G28. 

V.  Philbrook,  i.  89. 

V.  Shearn,  i.  382,  426. 
Northam  v.  Hurle}-,  ii.  352,  373. 
Northampton  Mills  v.  Ames,  ii.  105, 117, 

144. 
Northcote  i'.  Duke,  ii.  23. 
Northcutt  v.   Whipp,  i.  267,  272,  273, 

275. 
Northern  Bank  of  Kentucky  v.  Roosa, 

i.  494. 
Northern  Cent.  R.  R.  v.  Canton  Co.,  i.  34. 
Northrop  v.  Sumney,  iii.  435. 
Northrup  v.  Brehmer,  iii.  340. 
Northy  v.  Northy,  ii.  105,  127.  256. 
Norton  i\  Babcock,  iii.  529. 

V.  Cooper,  ii.  239. 

V.  Frecker,  i.  127. 

V.  Jackson,  iii.  506. 

t,".  Leonard,  ii.  461,  498,  573;  iii. 
2S0. 

V.  Norton,  ii.  538. 

V.  Ray,  ii.  559. 

V.  Sanders,  iii.  111. 

V.  Stone,  ii.  578. 

r.  Webb,  ii.  116. _ 
Norvell  r.  Johnson,  ii.  97. 
Norwicli  V.  Hubbard,  ii.  109,  133,  172. 
Norwood  V.  Fairservice,  iii.  259. 

V.  Marow,  i.  246,  255,  290,  316. 
Notte's  Appeal,  ii.  96. 
Nottingham  v.  Cnlvert,  i.  262. 

V.  Jennings,  ii.  761. 
Nourse  ".  Meriam,  ii.  631. 

V.  Nourse,  iii.  100. 
NowelUr.  Boston  Acad.  N.  Dame,  ii.  3. 
Noyes  v.  Clark,  ii.  67,  68. 

V.  Dyer,  iii.  164. 

V.  Morrill,  iii.  457. 

V.  Rockwood,  iii.  492. 

V.  Sturdivant,  ii.  175.  192. 
Nudd  V.  Hobbs,  ii.  393  ;  iii.  448. 
Nugent  V.  Riley,  i.  518 ;  ii.  45,  59,  65, 

180;  iii.  331. 
Number    Six   Township,  Props,  of,  v. 

McFarland,  i.  622  ;  iii.  137. 
Nunnally  v.  White,  iii.  117,  125,  532. 
Nutt  V.  Norton,  iii.  57G. 
Nuttall  V.  Bracewell,  iii.  .361. 
Nutter  V.  Russell,  ii.  777. 
Nutting  r.  Dickinson,  iii.  400. 

V.  Herbert,  iii.  337,  526. 


O. 

O'Bannon  v.  Pareraour,  iii.  119. 
O'Brien  v.  Brietenbach,  i.  499. 


O'Brien  i-.  Capwell,  i.  575. 

V.  Kusterer,  i.  5. 

V.  Schayer,  ii.  350. 

t'.  Young,  i.  435. 
O'Connell  v.  Bryant,  iii.  449. 
O'Connor  v.  Daily,  i.  522. 
O'Donnel  v.  Kelsey,  iii.  459. 
O'Donnell  v.  Hitchcock,  i.  5. 
O'Dougherty  v.  Aldrich,  i.  715. 
O'Fallon  v.  Dagsett.  iii.  4.39,  443. 
O'Ferral  v.  Simplot,  i.  197,  200. 
O'Hanlin  v.  Den  d.  Van  Kleeck,  iii.  53. 
O'Hara  v.  Dudley,  ii.  526. 

V.  Richardson,  iii.  140,  160,  165. 
O'Keefe  v.  Calthorpe,  ii.  558. 

V.  Kennedy,  i.  515. 
O'Kelly  V.  O'Kelly,  iii.  306,  319,  328. 
O'Linda  v.  Lothrop,  iii.  108,  450. 
O'Neal  V.  Robinson,  iii.  292. 
O'Neil  V.  Cappelle,  ii.  53. 

V.  Vanderburg,  iii.  125. 
O'Rorke  v.  Smith,  ii.  330. 
Oakes  v.  Chalfont,  ii.  677,  768,  790. 

V.  Marcy,  iii.  117. 

V.  Monroe,  i.  640. 
Oakman  v.  Dorch.  F.  L  Co.,  i.  7. 
Oastler  v.  Henderson,  i.  583. 
Oates  V.  Cooke,  ii.  637. 
Oatman  v.  Fowler,  iii.  160. 
Obert  V.  Obert,  i.  713 ;  ii.  570. 
Ocheltree  v.  McClung,  ii.  453,  467,  473; 

iii.  385 
Odell  r.  Montross,  ii.  53. 

r.  Odell,  ii.  760  ;  iii.  557. 

V.  Solomon,  i.  531. 
Odiorne  v.  Lyford,  i.  694. 

V.  Mason,  iii.  334. 
Odlin  V.  Gove,  iii  85,  86,  91. 
Offutt  V.  Scott,  i.  703. 
Ogburn  v.  Connor,  ii.  378. 
Ogden  V.  Gibbons,  ii.  307. 

V.  Grant,  ii.  59. 

V.  Lucas,  i.  11. 

V.  Porterfield,  iii.  431. 

V.  Stock,  i.  6,  7. 
Ogden's  Appeal,  ii.  500,  648. 
Ogle  V.  Turpin,  ii.  154,  257. 
Ogletree  v.  McQuagg,  ii.  367,  368. 
Ohio  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ledyard,  iii.  344. 

I'.  Winn,  ii.  193,  224. 
Ohling  V.  Luitjens,  ii.  262. 
Okeson  v.  Patterson,  ii.  338,  347 ;  iii.  59, 

60. 
Okison  V.  Patterson,  ii.  456,  475,  476 ; 

iii.  303. 
Gland's  case,  i.  12,  141,  142. 
Olcott  V.  Thompson,  ii.  337,  372. 

V.  Wing,  i.  701. 
Old  Dominion  Bank  v.  Dubuque  &  Pac, 

R.  H.  Co.,  ii.  570. 
Oldenbaugh  v.  Bradford,  ii.  65. 
Oldh.am  r.  Halley,  ii.  63. 

t'.  Henderson,  i.  340. 

V.  Pleger,  ii.  108. 


TAULE    OP   CASES   CITED. 


C'V 


Oi.lli.im  r   Siilc.  i.  2r..  2o7. 
Olils  r.  C!iiiiitiiiti^8,  ii.  7i,  'Jo7. 
Olive  r.  DniinliLTty,  ii.  611. 
Oliver  r.  I'iiitt,  ii.  Wti,  &•;'.»;  iii.  514. 

r.  Stone,  iii.  ;)()f>,  :!11. 
Olliffu  '•.  Wi-llH.  ii.  6<X1.  r.22,  520. 
OltnxtCMil  r.  Kldor,  ii.  12*2. 

r.  Nili"8.  i.  i;l,  178. 
OIney  r.  Hull,  ii.  o'.tH.  fJIO.  ^15. 
Olson  I'.  Nelson,  i.  8.'>t5,  i;]'.) ;   ii.  fl.j. 
OiidiTilonk  r.  Gray,  ii.  2"il. 
Oiiley  r.  (Jimliner,  ii.  ;].!!». :'.  10.  841.343. 
Ontario  Hank  r.  Mnnifonl,  ii.  i>]2. 
Ontli:ink  r.  I.nku  Shore  U.  U.,  ii.  350. 
Opilyke  r.  Stephens,  iii.  428,  453,  465. 
Orliv  r.  'rrii;;;.  ii.  0(5. 
Onl"/-.  MeKce,  ii.  127. 
Orilinary  r.  Tliatclier,  iii.  319. 
Oiilw.iy  r.  Keinini^tiin,  i.  4G7. 
Ortbnl  r.  Benton,  i.  183. 
Oriental  Mank  v.  Ilaskins,  iii.  3.54. 
Orleans  r.  Cliatliani,  ii.  i'l.jl.  5I'J. 
Orleans  Xav.  Co.  r.  Mayor.  &c.,  ii.  313. 
Orman  c.  Day,  ii.  384. 

V.  Ornian,  i.  451. 
Ortnond  r.  Martin,  iii.  147,  174. 
Ornmnd's  case,  ii.  GC7. 
Ornish V  r.  Ihmsen,  iii.  84,  80. 

('.  Taraseon,  ii.  81. 
Orr,  Matter  of,  i.  381,401. 

V.  Hadley.  ii.  Kj'J;  iii.  96,  456. 

r.  Hodgson,  i.  7'.>. 

r.  Hollidays.  i.  181. 

V.  Quinihy,  iii.  225. 

V.  Shraft,  i.  374. 
Ortnian  '•.  DLxon,  ii.  405. 
Orton  r.  Knah,  ii.  505. 
Osborn  v.  Carr,  ii.  156. 

I'.  Osborn,  ii.  503. 
Osborne  iv  Ballew,  iii.  160. 

i;.  Endicott,  iii.  111. 

V.  Ilorine,  i.  257,  287. 

V.  Soley,  ii.  400. 

V.  Wideniiouse,  iii.  10. 
Osbourn  i\  Rider,  iii.  209. 
Osbrey  v.  Bury.  ii.  OfK). 
Osgood  r.  Abbott,  ii.  17,  108. 

V.  Franklin,  ii.  067,  710,  718. 

V.  Howard,  i.  5. 

V.  Stevens,  ii.  249. 

V.  Tiionipson  Bank.  ii.  5.3. 
Oshey  v.  Hicks,  iii.  298. 
Osman  v.  Sheafe,  ii.  443. 
Osmun  r.  Porter,  i.  .338. 
Osterhout  v.  Shoemaker,  i.  248;  iii.  09. 
Ostrander  v.  Spickard,  i.  336. 
Oswald  V.  Sproehale,  iii.  406. 
Oswego  Falls  Bridpo  r.  Fish,  ii.  310. 
Otis  V.  McLellan,  ii.  007. 

r.  Par-<hlev.  i.  204. 

V.  Smith,  i.  18. 

V.  Spencer,  iii.  303.  356. 

V.  Thompson,  i.  005. 

r.  Warren,  i.  290. 


Ott  v.  Kreiter,  iii.  452. 

V.  SpraKue.  i.  4.3t». 
( Ittacineclwe  Co.  r.  Newton,  ii.  305. 
Ottawa  I'lank  Uoail  r.  .Murray,  ii.  t;7. 
( >ttman  r.  .Moak.  ii.  1221. 
Ottuniwa  ("o.  f.  Hawley.  i.  23. 
Ottumwa  Kod^c  r.  Lewis,  ii.  300. 
Otway  I'.  Hudson,  i.  \i',]i. 
Oursler  i^.  Haltinioro  &  O.  R.  R.  Co..  ii. 

394. 
Outcalt  V.  Ludlow,  iii.  158,  174. 
Overdeer  r.  I.iewi»,  i.  C31,  04.5,050. 

i;.  UpdeKrafT,  ii.  331. 
Overfleld  v.  Christie,  iii.  156,  159,  4a3. 
(Overman  r.  Kerr,  iii.  209. 

V.  Sanborn,  i.  530,  610. 
Overman's  Appeal,  ii.  0. 
Overseers,  &c.  v.  Sears,  i.  90. 
Overstreet  v.  Bate,  iii.  174. 
Overton  v.  Bigelow,  ii.  54. 

V.  Williston,  i.  32. 
Oves  V.  Ogclsby,  i.  27. 
Owen  V.  Brackett,  i.  304. 

V.  I)e  Beauvoir,  ii.  .302. 

V.  Field,  i.  605;  ii.  27;  iii.  09,  414. 

V.  Hyde,  i.  130,  140. 

V.  Morton,  i.  OOO;  iii.  153,  155. 

V.  Peacock,  i.  277,  286. 

V.  Perry,  iii.  250. 

V.  Robbins,  i.  234,  250. 

V.  Slatter,  i.  265. 
Owens  V.  Jackson,  iii.  197. 

r.  Lewis,  i.  12. 

r.  Missionary  Society,  iii.  553. 
Owings  V.  .Tones,  i.  571. 

i:  McClain,  i.  720. 
Oxiey  I'.  James,  i.  633.  637. 
Oyster  i:  (Oyster,  ii.  0.54. 
Ozmun  V.  Reynolds,  ii.  193. 


Pace  V.  Chadderdon.  ii.  110,  114,  275. 
Pacific  Mat.  L.  Ins.  Co.  r.  Stroup,  iii. 

151. 
Packard  r.  Ames,  ii.  5,  670. 

r.  Marshall,  ii.  530. 
Packer  c.  Rochester  &  .Syr.  R.  R.,  ii. 
Ill,  114,  181,240;  251. 

V.  Welsteil,  iii.  411. 
Padclfonl  V.  Padelford,  i.  186,  1.37,  149, 

15<X320. 
Page  c.  De  Puy.  i.  058. 

I'.  Fsty.  i.  400. 

V.  Foster,  ii.  00,  239. 

f.  Fowler,  i.  143. 

V.  Gillentine,  ii.  510,  644. 

r.  Hayward,  i.  104. 

V.  Kinsman,  i.  591. 

V.  Page,  i.  257,  288,340. 

r.  Palmer,  ii.  8. 

r.  Parr,  i.  564. 

V.  Pierce,  Ii.  126,  128,  132. 


CVl 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Page  V.  Robinson,  ii.  105,  140,  254. 

V,  Webster,  i.  721. 

V.  Wight,  i.  650. 
Page's  case,  iii.  53. 
Paige  V.  Sherman,  iii.  399. 
Pain  V.  Smith,  ii.  86. 
Paine  v.  Boston,  ii.  365. 

V.  Brockton,  ii.  348. 

V.  Frencli,  ii.  128. 

v.  Wilson,  ii.  48. 

i>.  Woods,  i.  4  ;  ii.l72;  iii.  363,437, 
444,  448. 
Paine's  case,  i.  175,  272. 
Painter  v.  Henderson,  ii.  571. 
Pakenliam's  case,  ii.  296. 
Palairet's  Appeal,  iii.  226. 
Palethorp  r.  Bergner,  i.  509. 
Palmer  >:  Bowker,  i.  593,  594,  614. 

V.  Edwards,  i.  539,  542,  545. 

V.  Fleshees,  ii.  382,  383. 

V.  Flessier,  ii.  329. 

V.  Fletcher,  ii.  319. 

V.  Foote,  ii.  171. 

V.  Forbes,  i.  18;  ii.  164. 

V.  Fowley,  ii.  131,  254,  281. 

V.  Hicks,  iii.  448. 

V.  Mead,  ii.  269. 

V.  Mulligan,  iii.  439. 

V.  Oakley,  ii.  525. 

?;.  Stevens,  ii.  148. 

V.  Waddell,  ii.  372. 

V.  Wetmore,  i.  562, 

v.  Yager,  ii.  270. 
Palmer's  (Sir  Thomas)  case,  iii.  370. 
Palmes  v.  Danby,  ii.  182. 
Panton  v.  Holland,  ii.  381,  382. 

V.  Jones,  i.  600,  651. 

V.  Manley,  i.  432. 
Papendick  v.  Bridgwater,  iii.  457. 
Paradine  v.  Jane,  i.  559,  666. 
Pardee  v.  Lindley,  i.  387,  432, 434  ;  ii.  74. 

V.  Treat,  ii.  219. 
Pargeter  v.  Harris,  i.  693;  ii.  177. 
Pargoud  v.  Tourne,  i.  522. 
Parham  S.  Mach.  Co.  v.  Brock,  ii.  lOfi. 
Paris  V.  Hulett,  ii.  225,  252. 
Parish  v.  Gates,  ii.  62. 

V.  Gilmanton,  ii.  172. 

V.  Ward,  iii.  17. 

V.  Whitney,  ii.  299;  iii.  49.3,  502. 
Park  V.  Baker,  i.  29. 

V.  Castle,  i.  635,  639. 

V.  Pratt,  iii.  3.50,  428. 
Parke  v.  Kilham,  i.  699. 

V.  Mears,  iii.  293. 
Parker  v.  Anderson,  ii.  33. 

V.  Banks,  ii.  175,  192. 

u.  Barker,  ii.  136;  iii.  83. 

V.  Baxter,  ii.  172. 

V.  Bennett,  ii.  320,  330  ;  iii.  419, 459. 

V.  Birks,  ii.  767. 

V.  Boston  &  M.  R.  R.,  ii.  377. 

V.  Brown,  iii.  482,  484,  630. 

V.  Chambliss,  i.  163. 


Parker  v.  Clairborne,  iii.  206. 

V.  Converse,  ii.  557,  565,  599. 

V.  Coop,  ii.  510. 

V.  Dean,  1.  407,  439,  453. 

V.  Foote,  ii.  327,  334,  338,  340,  345, 
362,  365,  366  ;  iii.  57. 

V.  Foy,  ii.  93  ;  iii.  343,  399. 

V.  Framingham,  iii.  450. 

V.  Hill,  iii.  311. 

V.  Hotchkiss,  ii.  .341. 

V.  Johnson,  ii.  569. 

V.  Kane,  iii.  .325,  826,  424.  454. 

V.  Mercer,  ii.  128. 

V.  Merrimac  Locks,  &c.  Props.,  iii. 
121,  155,  351. 

V.  Mitchell,  ii.  345. 

V.  Moore,  iii.  419,  488. 

V.  Murphy,  i.  289. 

V.  Nichols,  ii.  444,  469  ;  iii.  396. 

V.  Nightingale,  ii.  14,  323,  324,327. 

V.  Obear,  i.  313. 

V.  Parker,  i.  295,  298,  316;  ii.  8.  20, 
723,745,747,753,754;  iii.  161, 
811. 

;;.  Raymond,  i.  593. 

V.  Savage,  i.  3-56. 

V.  Smith,  iii.  108. 

V.  Snyder,  ii.  512,  516. 

V.  Staniland,  i.  11  ;  iii.  367. 

V.  Waliis,  iii.  151. 

V.  Webb,  ii.  293. 
Parkhurst  v.  Cummings,  ii.  194. 

V.  Smith,  ii.  594,  618. 

V.  Van  Cortland,  ii.  548;  iii.  247, 
249. 
Parkins  v.  Coxe,  i.  148,  149. 

V.  Dunham,  ii.  350,  357,  361,  395, 
396. 
Parkinson  v.  Sherman,  ii.  219. 
Parkman  v  Welch,  ii.  186,  210,  211,  215, 

221.  357. 
Parks  V.  Bishop,  ii.  350. 

V.  Boston,  i.  558. 

V.  Hall,  ii.  45. 

V.  Hardey,  i.  286. 

V.  Loomis,  iii.  424,  427. 

V.  McClellan,  i.  316. 

V.  Reilly,  i.  390,  405. 
Parmelee  v.  Simpson,  iii.  801,  315,  348. 
Parmenter  v.  Webber,  i.  606,  641,  543, 

546. 
Parmentier  v.  Gillespie,  ii.  162. 
Parret  v.  Shaubliut,  ii.  66, 150. 
Parry  v.  Bowcn,  ii.  725. 
Parsons  '•.  Boyd,  i.  678,  681. 

V.  Camp,  i.  20,  671. 

V.  Copeland,  i.  22. 

)',  Hughes,  ii.  141. 

V.  Johnson,  ii.  330,  .331. 

V.  Livingston,  i.  .360. 

V.  Smith,  iii.  366. 

V.  Welles,  ii.  100,  104, 120, 125, 133, 
178. 

V.  Winslow,  i.  129  ;  ii.  10 ;  iii.  678. 


TAIJLE   OF   CASES   riTKH, 


evil 


Parfcli  c.  Spooner,  iii.  111. 
I'arti-e  r.  SicMvart,  i.  .'JTtJ. 
I'tirtin^toii  f.  Woodwork,  ii    1 11. 
l'!irtriil(.;c  r.  Here,  ii.  17<i. 
t'.  I'olc'^fiiif,  I.  l)^0. 

r.  Dor.xov.  i.  11-J,  113.  IIG. 

I'.  Hiitcli.  iii.  18-',  -181,627. 

V.  Logan,  ii.  tKi. 

i*.  Mckinnev,  iii.  S.'IO. 

V.  Scott,  ii.":{.{H.  3H1,  382. 
I'nsco  i".  Giimble,  li.  110. 
I'lissumpsic  Hiiiik  r.  Weeks,  ii.  188,  227. 
rutcliin  r.  Diokernmu,  i.  684. 
IVitrick  I'.  Keinln-rt,  i.  122. 
I'atien  f.  Deslion,  i.  626,526,527,529, 
641,  616.  660,  6.)2,  6y4  ;  ii.  2'J8. 

I'.  Moore,  iii.  8:i7. 

V.  Pearson,  ii.  77,  19,  120,  252. 
Patterson  r.  Arthurs,  iii.  40.3. 

t:  Blake,  i.  704. 

I'.  I5(jstoM,  i.  668. 

r.  I)e  lii  Roiule,  iii.  335. 

V.  Ksterliiif,',  iii.  85. 

V.  Gelston,  iii.  00. 

r.  Kevstoiie  Min.  Co.,  ii.  400. 

V.  Kreiif,  i.  432,  4.34. 

V.  Lawrence,  iii.  78,  125. 

I".  Nixon,  iii.  340. 

V.  Pease,  iii.  110,  120,  122,  127,291. 

r.  Uohinsoii,  i.  .351. 

V.  Wilson,  ii.  714. 

V.  Winn,  i.  40. 

r.  Yeaton,  ii.  05 ;  iii.  .325,  320. 
Patti3)n  c.  Hull,  ii.  120,  128. 
Patiison's  Ap[)eal,  i.  11,  12;  iii.  367. 
Patton  c.  Axley,  i.  0:W. 

V.  F-beriiart,  ii.  112. 

V.  Moure,  i.  30. 

V.  Paua-,  ii.  207. 

V.  Siewart,  ii.  01,  93. 

V.  Watjner,  i.  712. 
Patty  c.  Pease,  ii.  215,  221. 
Paul  r.  Carver,  iii.  460. 

I'.  Clioiiteaii,  ii.  615. 

V.  Fulton,  ii.  .626. 

r.  Nurse,  i.  525. 
Paulk  r.  Cooke,  iii.  350. 
Paulnian  r.  Clayconib,  iii.  262. 
Pawlet  r.  Clark,  i.  40. 
Pa.xson  V.  Lefferts.  ii.  656. 

i:  Paul,  ii.  133,  134. 
Paxton  1-.  Harrier,  ii.  211,  221. 
Pay's  case,  ii.  761. 
Payne  r.  Attlehury,  ii.  98. 

u.  Avery,  ii.  01. 

('.  Burnhani,  ii.  183. 

V.  liarrell,  ii.  '.'4.  98,  268. 

V.  Payne,  i.  170;  iii.  222. 

r.  Rogers,  i   670. 

V.  Sliedilon,  ii.  369. 

c.  Wilson,  ii.  66,  86. 
Peabody  »•.  Eastern  Methodist  See,  ii. 
6.66. 

r.  Harvard  College,  ii.  606. 


IVabodv  V.  Ilewctt,  iii.  140,  279. 

i:  .Sliiiot.  i.  OSti.  08H.  OMV».  713. 

V.  Tarltell,  ii.  460,  61^.  641. 
Peabody,  &c.  Co.  v.  .Sudtler,  iii.  440 
IVake  V.  'riioniax,  i.  43H. 
Pearce  r.  Ferris,  i.  064. 

r.  McClenaglum,  ii.  309. 

V.  Nix,  i.  600. 

V.  Savage,  i.  705;  ii.  183,  179,  6.39, 
604,  000. 

V.  Wilson,  ii.  46. 
Pearl  v.  McDowell,  iii.  262. 
Pearson  v.  Seav,  ii.  00. 

r.  Spencer"  ii.  3.31,  332. 
Pease  r.  Allis,  iii.  640. 

r.  Kelly,  ii  91. 
Peaslee  i'.  Gee,  iii.  428,  454. 
Peavev  c  Tilton,  iii.  301,  309. 
Peay  (•.  Peay,  i.  208. 
Peck  f.  Batchelder,  i.  26. 

r.  Cari)enter,  i.  005. 

V.  Dennison,  iii.  449. 

r.  Fislier,  i   700. 

V.  Harrington,  ii.  372. 

r.  Ilensley,  iii.  401,  607,  511,  622. 

r.  Ingersol,  i.  547. 

f.  Jones,  i.  668  ;  iii.  .607. 

V.  .Mallanis,  iii.  .'WO,  428. 

I'.  Nortlirof),  i.  549. 

1'.  .Smith,  iii.  414. 

r.  Ward,  i   000. 
Peck's  Ap[)eal,  ii.  272. 
Pederick  r.  Searle,  iii.  177. 
Peebles  r.  Heading,  ii.  617,  520. 
Peele  i:  Ciieever,  iii.  157. 
Peet  c.  Beers,  ii.  00. 
Pegues  f.  I'egues,  ii.  614. 
Peiffer  r.  Lvtle,  ii.  50tt,  610. 
Pelan  v.  De  Bevard,  i.  381. 
Pelham's  case,  ii.  433. 
Pell  -•.  McElroy,  ii.  02. 
Pellatt  r.  Boosey.  i.  509. 
Pellotreau  f.  Jackson,  ii.  763. 
Pells  r.  Brown,  ii.  o'.il,  730,  766. 
Polton  r.  Farmin,  ii   •J70. 
Peinberton  c  I'onilierton,  i.  334. 
Pembroke  r.  Alleiistown,  ii.  507. 
Pence  i:  Armstrong,  ii.  224  ;  iii.  406. 
Pendergast  v.  Young,  i.  476.  606. 
Pendleton  v.  Pomeroy.  i.  229,  282. 

c.  Vandeviir,  i    126. 
Penhev  >:  Hurreil,  ii.  6.37.  6.38. 
I'enhallow  ,■.  Dwight,  i.  11.  12,  139. 
Penn  r.  Railway  Co..  ii.  18*3. 
IVnn  Mut.  J.,.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Semple,  i.  10 
Pennant's  case,  i.  616,  510. 
Peruie  r.  Peacock,  ii.  090. 
Pennel  f.  Weyant.  iii.  310. 
Pennimnn  r.  Cole,  iii.  36;J,  368. 

V.  Mollis,  ii.  131,  266. 
Pennington  r.  Brinsop  Co.,  ii.  367. 
Pennock  r   Lyons,  i.  508. 
Pennock'*  Kttate.  ii.  650. 
Penns  r.  Klyne,  iii.  201. 


CVUl 


TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 


Pennsylvania  Ins.,  &.c.  Co.  v.  Dovy,  iii. 

3U2,  313. 
Penruddock's  case,  ii.  394. 
Pensoneau  v.  Puliani,  ii.  "252. 
Penton  v.  Kobart,  i.  13,  31,  32,  139. 
Pentz  V.  Sinionson,  iii.  275. 
People  V.  Bostwick,  iii.  301,  322. 

v.  Brooklyn,  iii.  224,  284. 

V.  Brown,  iii.  77. 

V.  Canal   Appraisers,  iii.  435,  439, 
442,  443. 

V.  Clarke,  iii.  171. 

V.  Commrs.  of  Taxes,  i.  18. 

r.  Couklin,  iii.  55. 

V.  Cutting,  iii.  63. 

V.  Darling,  i.  634. 

V.  Dudley,  i.  513. 

V.  Field,  1.  660. 

V.  Folsom,  iii.  53,  54,  200. 

V.  Gillis,  i.  481. 

i;.  Goelet,  i.  465,  635. 

V.  Haskins,  ii.  288. 

V.  Henderson,  iii.  439. 

V.  Humphry,  iii.  225. 

V.  Kelsej',  i.  482. 

V.  Law,  iii.  329,  452. 

V.  Livingston,  iii.  197,  206. 

V.  McClay,  i.  363,  376. 

V.  Morrill,  iii.  200. 

V.  New  York,  iii.  352. 

V.  Norton,  ii.  557. 

V.  Organ,  iii.  254. 

V.  Piatt,  iii.  436,  4-39. 

V.  Rickert,  i.  632,  646. 

V.  Salem,  i  70. 

V.  Schakno,  i.  635. 

V.  Snyder,  iii.  298,  346. 

V.  Solomon,  i.  70. 

V.  Stiner,  i.  590. 

V.  Stitt,  1.  4.30,  447. 

V.  Sturtevant,  ii.  308. 

V.  Supreme  Court,  ii.  67. 

V.  Utica  Ins.  Co.,  ii.  305. 

V.  Van  Rensselaer,  iii.  171,  200,  201, 
203. 
People's  Ice  Co.  v.  Stmr.  Excelsior,  i.  4. 
Pepper's  Appeal,  ii.  103. 
Peralta  i-.  Ginochio,  i.  600. 
Perdue  v.  Aldridge,  iii.  342. 
Perkins  v.  Dibble,  ii.  68,  134. 

V.  Nichols,  ii.  611,  517,  618. 

V.  Pitts,  ii.  176. 

V.  Richardson,  iii.  275. 

V.  Sterne,  ii.  102, 110,  123, 127,  192. 

V.  Swank,  i.  6. 

V,  Webster,  iii.  525. 

V.  Woods,  ii.  268. 
Perley  r.  Hilton,  ii.  369. 

V.  Langley,  ii.  392. 
Perminter  v.  McDaniel,  iii.  252. 
Pernam  v.  Wead,  ii.  320. 
Perrin  v.  Blake,  ii.  652. 

V.  Calhoun,  i.  597. 

V.  Lepper,  i.  539,  548. 


Perrin  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  R.,  iii.  451. 

V.  Sargent,  i.  412,  413. 
Perrine  v.  Perrine,  iii.  201. 
Perry  v.  Aldrich,  i.  133,  134,  656. 
V.  Binnej',  iii.  458. 
V.  Carr,  i.  20,  610,  639;  ii.  188. 
V.  Davis,  i.  616.  \ 

V.  Goodwin,  i.  294. 
V.  Grant,  ii.  90. 
V.  Hale,  iii.  580. 

i:  Kline,  i.  107,  112,  116;  iii.  119. 
I'.  McHenry,  ii.  513,  514. 
V.  Meddowcroft,  ii.  62. 
V.  Perrvman,  i.  333. 
V.  Price,  iii.  391,  894. 
V.  Walker,  i.  699. 
V.  Woods,  ii.  779. 
Perryman's  case,  iii.  324. 
Person  v.  Merrick,  ii.  264,  265. 
Persons  v.  Persons,  ii.  608. 

V.  Shaeffer,  ii.  199. 
Peter  v.  Beverly,  ii.  84,  653,  554,  566, 
567,  704,  716,  718. 
i\  Daniel,  ii.  374. 
V.  Kendal,  ii.  305,  307. 
V.  Wright,  iii.  322. 
Peters  r.  Dunnells,  ii.  192. 
V.  Elkins,  ii.  143. 
V.  Field,  iii.  287. 
i\  Jamestown  Bridge,  ii.  123. 
V.  Jones,  ii.  635 ;  iii.  153,  178,  248. 
Peterson  v.  Clark,  ii.  47,  62,  142. 
V.  Edmonson,  i.  562,  566. 
V.  Hornblower,  i.  430. 
V.  Lowry,  iii.  334. 
Peterson's  Appeal,  ii.  541,  598,  628. 
Petre  v.  Espinasse,  ii.  492. 
Pettee  v.  Case,  ii.  70,  253 ;  iii.  109. 

V.  Hawes,  ii.  317  ;  iii.  462,  465,  471. 
r.  Peppard,  ii.  196. 
Pettengill  v.  Evans,  ii.  107,  140,  163 
Pettibone  i-.  Edwards,  ii.  267. 
V.  Rose,  iii.  455. 
V.  Stevens,  ii.  231. 
Pettigrew  v-  Siiirlej",  iii.  211. 
Pettijohn  v.  Beasley,  i.  337. 
Pettingill  v.  Devin,  iii.  345. 

V.  Porter,  ii.  320,  387 ;  iii.  453. 
Pettit  V.  Johnson,  ii.  84,  145. 
Pettus  V.  McKinney,  i.  366,  467. 
Petty  V.  Mailer,  i.  181. 

V.  Petty,  i.  227. 
Peugh  V.  Davis,  ii.  54. 
Pewterers'  Co.  v.  Christ  Hosp.,  ii.  760. 
Peyton  v.  Lambert,  ii.  768. 
V.  London,  ii.  385. 
v.  Stith,  i.  598. 
Pfaffi'.  Golden,  i.  525.  551. 
Phalen,  Estate  of,  i.  456. 
V.  Clark,  ii.  534,  536. 
Phares  v.  Barbour,  ii.  224,  570. 
Pharis  v.  Leachman,  i.  282. 
Phelan  v.  Olney,  ii.  126,  127,  128. 
Phelps  V.  Blount,  iii.  130. 


TAl;l.i:    OF    CASES    CITED. 


CIX 


Plu'Ips  r.  BiitliT,  ii.  iHt,. 

c.  ("Ikmsuii,  ii.  l;>,  IH. 

I'.  CoiiuvLT,  i    117  ;  ii.  'Jo. 

r.  Je|i8(>n,  i.  077. 

r.  Ki-llo^'^r,  iii.  213. 

V.  Now  It'll,  ii.  •'{76. 

i;.  I'liolpH,  ii.  68o;  iii.  31U. 

1-.  Uooiu-y,  i.  :JmI. 

I'.  Siniv,  ii.  lOlt. 
IMieiuf  I'.  I'oppiowi'll,  i.  58;}. 
I'lii'vsey  r.  Viniry,  ii.  ;J22. 
riiihli'lpliiii  r.  (iiriird,  u.  76U,  TOO,  701, 

7'.il  ;  iii.  •')•')•'),  '>')"!. 
riiilaiii-lpliiii  TriHt.  Safe  Dep.,  &c.  Co.'s 

A|ipi-al,  ii.  Wi ,  -ill,  5lH). 
riiila>Klpliia.   W.,  &    H.    U.    U.    Co.  v. 
Ildwanl,  iii.  ;]11. 

I'.  WooipiT,  i.  o7;  ii.  43.  104,  174. 
Philliriclv  V.  Kwinjf,  iii.  41!». 
I'liiilirook   c.   Delano,  ii.  \H).  511,  5r.>; 

iii   401. 
Pliilips  I'.  Cramniond,  ii.  524. 

V.  Dasliiel,  iii.  IS. 

L'.  Lfwistoii  Bank.  ii.  103,  118,  121, 
154 

I'.  Uol)ertson,  i.  501. 
Philico  r.  Smuilev.  i.  370. 
riiiilips  r.  Allen,'!.  130,  1(51. 

i:  Bowers,  iii.  440,  4.j0,  451. 

V.  Covert,  i.  010,  (J30. 

V.  Croft,  ii.  52. 

V.  Doe,  i.  513. 

I'.  Doolittle,  ii.  23. 

V.  (ireen,  iii   2(54. 

V.  Iliiuston,  iii.  308. 

V.  llmison,  iii.  518. 

i;.  Kent,  iii.  177. 

V.  Lewision  Bank.  ii.  127. 

r.  Pliillip.s,  ii.  331,  508. 

I'.  UhoileM,  iii.  01. 

V.  Hobert.soii,  i.  501. 

V.  Kothwell,  i.  5!t2. 

I'.  Sauinlerson,  ii.  06. 

V.  Sliernian,  i.  Oi)0. 

r.  Sinitli,  i.  148,  152,  153. 

V.  Sprin-fiel.l,  i   432,  448.  658. 

I'.  Stevens,  i.  537,  506. 

V.  Sun  Dye  (^o  ,  i.  538. 

I'.  Thompson,  ii.  225 ;  iii.  247,  249. 

V.  Tmlor,  i.  087.  088  ;  iii.  277. 

V.  Wiii.slow,  i.  18  ;   ii.  104. 
Phillips  Aca'leiny  r.  Kinji,  ii.  604. 
Phinney  r.  ^Vatt!<,  iii.  44;5. 
Pllipard  r.  Mansfield,  ji.  (i05. 
Pliipps  r.  Seultliorpe.  i.  502.  023. 

r.  State,  iii.  203. 
Phoenix   Ins.  Co.  i;.  Cont.  Ins.  Co.,  ii. 

317.  327. 
Phyfer.  Rilev.  ii.  114. 
Piatt  V.  Iluhhel.  i.  720. 

V.  Oliver,  i.  701  ;  ii.  524. 

V.  Sinton.  ii.  703. 

V.  St.  Clair,  iii.  241. 
Pibus  V.  Mitford.  ii.  455,  457,  649. 


Picknrd  i'.  Collins,  i.  571. 

r.  Perley.  i.  •■,2*.t.  03U. 

r.  Seur«,  iii.  h2.  85. 
Pickering;  r.  lMl^^•l\^m.  ii.  783. 

V.  Pickeriiij;.  iii.  580. 

f.  Stapler,  iii.  411,414. 
Pieket  v.  Dowdall,  iii.  OH. 
I'iekelt  i:  Barron,  ii.  119,  151,  201. 

('.  .loneH.  ii.  123. 

«■.  Peuy.  i.  3.30. 
Piekniiui  c.  Trinity  Church,  iii.  520. 
Pieo  V.  Colonibet,  i.  095. 
Picot  I'.  Page,  i.  079.  721. 
Pier  c.  Carr,  i.  559.  600,  683. 

r.  DuIT,  iii.  457. 
Pierce  v.  Arin»trong.  ii.  479 ;  iii.  404, 
475. 

V.  Brew,  iii.  399. 

V.  Brown,  i.  590. 

r.  Ciiase,  i.  707. 

V.  Dyer,  i.  577  ;  ii.  ;}89. 

V.  Kinery,  ii.  103. 

V.  Faimee,  ii.  258. 

r.  Georj^e,  i.  10,  26,  20,  27. 

V.  Goddard.  i.  10. 

v.  Hall,  iii.  329. 

V.  Pierce,  ii.  514.  • 

r.  Kobinson,  ii.  5.3. 

V.  Selleck,  ii.  320.  338. 

v.  TriKi,'.  i.  210,  702. 

V.  Wanett,  i.  182. 

V.  Williams,  i.  28.3.  205 
Pierre  i:  Fernald,  ii.  3:]7.  341.  .340,  302. 

305. 
Pierson  »•.  Armstrong,  iii.  287,  391,  402. 

I'.  Turner,  iii.  170. 
Pifer  r.  Ward,  i.  217. 
PiUKot  I'-  Mason,  i.  531. 
Pijllfott  V.  Stratton.  i.  580. 
Pilot's  aise.  iii.  2'.tH. 
Pike  r.  Brown,  i.  518. 

«•.  Dyke.  iii.  217. 

V.  Galvin,  iii.  ll-'.,  121. 

V.  Goodnow,  ii.  117,  130,  133,  215, 
250. 

V.  Witt.  i.  054. 
Pillow  r.  Roberts,  iii.  108,  238,  290. 
Pillsbiiry  I-.  Moore,  i.  0'.t4. 
Pinbnry  v.  I'Ikiii.  ii.  7i'>7. 
Pincli  r.  AnllKMiy,  ii   4  I. 
Pinchain  >■.  Cidlard,  ii.  05. 
I'inekney  v.  Bnrra^e.  iii.  159. 
Pindar  r.  Aiiitiley.  i.  585. 
Pine  r.  I.,eieeHler.  i.  5.35,  5.52. 
Pinero  v.  ,Iu<lson.  i   481,  025. 
Pinjrrey  v.  Watkins,  i.  542,  663. 
Pinhorn  v.  Souster.  i.  019. 
Pinkerton  r.  Sarp-nt.  i.  .'W4  ;  ii.  294. 

V.  Tunilin.  i.  ;}85. 
Pink  ham  c.  Gear,  i   283. 
Pinnin(;ton  v.  (ialland.  ii.  320,  333. 
Pinson  >•   Ivey.  ii.  521.  503. 

r.  Williams,  i.  202. 
Pintard  t;.  Guodlue,  ii.  01,  92. 


ex 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Piper  V.  Johnston,  i.  422,  439. 
V.  Moulton,  ii.  564. 
V.  Smith,  i.  704. 
Piplier  v.  Lodge,  iii.  163,  170. 
Piscatiiqiia  Bridge  Co.  v.  N.  H.  Bridge 

Co.,  ii.  310. 
Pitciier  V.  Tovey,  i.  526;  ii.  294. 
Pitman  v.  Poor,  i.  668. 
Pitt  V.  Petway,  ii.  570. 
Pitts  V.  Aldrich,  i.  262  ;  ii.  266. 

V.  Pitts,  i.  254. 
Pittsburg  Meth.  Ch.  v.  Remington,  iii. 

557. 
Pixley  V.  Bennett,  i.  258. 
Pizzala  v.  Campbell,  i.  366,  399. 
Place  V.  Fagg,  ii.  163. 
Plant  V.  James,  iii.  411,  419. 
Planters'  Bank  v.  Davis,  i.  183,  184. 
V.  Dundas,  ii.  212,  215. 
V.  Johnson,  iii.  222. 
Plate  r.  Koehler,  i.  892. 
Piatt  V.  Johnson,  ii.  372. 
V.  McClure,  ii.  66,  72. 
V.  Sleap,  i.  587. 
Platto  V.  Cady,  i.  445. 
Playter  v.  Cunningliani,  i.  519,  521. 
Pleasant  r.  Benson,  i.  637,  642. 
Pleasanton  >•.  Eaughley,  iii.  248. 
Pleasanton's  Appeal,  ii.  574. 
Pledger  v.  Ellerbe,  i.  248. 
Plenty  v.  West,  ii.  498. 
PHmpton  I'.  Converse,  iii.  119. 
Plowman  v.  Williams,  iii.  492. 
Pluck  V.  Digges,  i.  543. 
Plumb  V.  Cattaraugus  Ins  Co.,  iii.  91. 

V.  Tubbs,  ii.  10. 
Plumer  v.  Lord,  iii.  91. 

V.  Plumer,  i.  592,  610. 
Plumleigh  ?;.  Cook,  i.  527. 
Plummer  v.  Russell,  iii.  285,  297. 

V.  White,  i.  433. 
Plunket  V.  Holmes,  i.  186,  206. 

V.  Penson,  ii.  171. 
Plymouth  v.  Carver,  ii.  295  ;  iii.  493. 
Plvmpton  ?'.  Boston  Dispensary,  i.  130. 
Poage  V.  Chinn,  i.  689. 
Poe  r.  Hardie,  i.  410. 
Poignard  v.  Smith,  ii.  175  ;  iii.  160, 162, 

163. 
Poindexter  i'.  Henderson,  i.  167. 

1}.  McCnnnon,  ii  62. 
Polack  V.  Pioche,  i.  566. 
Poland  V.  Vesper,  i'  408. 
Polden  V.  Bastard,  ii.  3.30  ;  iii.  421. 
Police  Jury  v.  Reeves,  ii.  7. 
Pollard  V.  Barnes,  ii.  344. 
V.  D wight,  iii.  487,  489. 
V.  Hagan,  iii.  200,  203,  446. 
V.  Maddox,  iii.  408. 
V.  Pollard,  i.  3-34. 
V.  Shaffer,  i.  156,  531. 
V.  Somerset  Ins.  Co.,  ii.  173. 
Pollen  V.  Brewer,  i.  055. 
Pollock  V.  Kittrell,  i.  613. 


Pollock  V.  Maison,  ii.  108,  193. 
V.  Morris,  iii.  449. 

V.  Stacey,  i.  541,  543. 
Polyblank  r.  Hawkins,  i.  341. 
Pomeroy  v.  Bailey,  iii.  356 

V.  Buntings,  i.  384. 

V.  Pomeroy,  i.  227. 

V.  Winship,  ii.  271. 
Pomfret  v.  Ricroft,   ii.  315,  320,  355^ 
388;  iii.  411,  518. 

V.  Windsor,  i.  624. 
Pomroy  i\  Rice,  ii.  194. 

V.  Stevens,  iii.  337. 
Pond  V.  Bergli,  ii.  777. 

V.  Clarke,  ii.  195. 

V.  Johnson,  i.  288. 

V.  Pond,  i.  719. 
Ponder  v.  Graham,  i.  201. 
Fool  V.  Alger,  ii.  391. 

V.  Blaikie,  i.  173. 

V.  Marshall,  ii.  210. 
Poole  V.  Bentlev,  i.  481. 

V.  Gerrard,'i.  400,  429. 

V.  Longueville,  i.  341. 

V.  Morris,  i.  114. 

V.  Poole,  ii.  653. 

V.  Whitt,  i.  595,  597. 
Poole's  case,  i.  31. 
Poor  V.  Oakman,  i.  6;  iii.  366,  369. 

V.  Robinson,  iii  105. 
Pope  v.  Biggs,  i.  557 ;  ii.  142,  144. 

V.  Burrage,  ii.  76. 

V.  Devereux,  ii.  357,  358,  359 ;  ilL 
69. 

V.  Elliott,  ii.  533. 

1-.  Garrard,  i.  568. 

V.  Harkins,  i.  585,  596. 

V.  Hays,  ii.  271. 

V.  Henry,  iii.  174. 

V.  Meed,  i.  313. 

V.  O'Hara,  ii.  357  ;  iii.  419. 

V.  Onslow,  ii.  187. 
Popkin  V.  Bumstead,  i.  242. 
Popplewell  V.  Hodkins,  ii.  371. 
Port  V.  Jackson,  i.  535. 

V.  Bobbins,  ii.  194,  225. 
Porter,  Goods  of,  iii.  563. 

V.  Bleiler,  i.  551. 

V.  Bradley,  ii.  767. 

t'.  Buckingham,  iii.  311. 

V.  Chapman,  i.  446. 

V.  Chandler,  i.  604. 

r.  Clements,  ii.  52,  261. 

V.  Doby,  ii.  528. 

V.  Dubuque,  ii.  94. 

V.  Fox,  ii  761. 

V.  Green,  ii.  112,  139. 

V.  Hill,  i.  719;  iii.  121,  277,  530. 

V.  Hubbard,  i.  651,   652 ;    ii.   107, 
141. 

V.  King,  ii.  170. 

V.  Mayfield,  i.  519. 

V.  Merrill,  i.  480,  503. 

V.  MuUer,  ii.  263. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


cxl 


Porter  v.  rerkins,  i.  710. 

V.  I'illslmrv,  ii.  '2>C 

V.  Kiitliiixt  liiink,  i.  -Ml;  ii.  GCl. 

r.  Sfiibor,  ii.  IHC. -jrj. 

V.  Swetnam,  i.  .JJ7  ;  ii.  2"J3. 

r.  'IViite.  i.  -llf,. 
Porti-r's  la.Hi-.  ii   7l;i. 
I'orlinjjtitn's  ciisio,  ii   25,  20. 
I'ortis  /'.  I'lirkiT,  i.  17'J. 
I'ortmore  »•.  Hiiiin,  i.  &'J''! 
ToBey  i:  Hudtl,  i.  117;  ii.  7lJ5;  iii.  l^, 
f>7H. 

r.  Cook,  ii.  4!»8. 
Post  I'.  Ariiof,  ii.  I  HO. 

t'.  Cainpiiii,  iii.  511. 

c.  Kearney,  i.  iVJI,  543. 

V.  Vetter.  i.  .');;7,  iVil). 
PostL-n  V    I'ostfii,  iii.  '-V)!. 
I'otli  '-.  Anstatt,  iii.  :'>iil. 
Potier  r.  Harclay,  i.  287. 
Potomac  Stoamboat  Co.  v.  Up|)er  St. 

Co..  iii.  415. 
Potier  r.  Croiiiwfil,  i.  2.S. 

c.  Kveritt,  i.  ;n4.  :i'M 

V.  Ganlner.  ii.  rj7'i. 

r.  McDowoll,  ii.  127. 

V.  Potter,  iii.  514. 

V.  Tlioriitoii,  iii.  553. 

I'.  'litcoMih,  iii.  17. 

r.  WlK'oier,  i.  208.  711. 
Potts  r.  ('ok-nian,  iii.  154. 

V.  Dowdall,  iii.  50S. 

V.  Gilbert,  iii.  141,  204. 
Powell  c.  IJa';t,'.  ii.  342. 

r.  Hrandon,  ii.  055.  057,  789,  798. 

I',  ('lark,  iii.  427,  625. 

«;.  Glenn,  ii.  780. 

r.  Gossom,  i.  182.  18.3. 

V.  MoM.M)n,  &c.  .Mftr.  Co.,  i  27,21.3, 
25f,,  257, 2U8, 2'.>9,  .300, 301, 310 ; 
iii.  4'Jl. 

r.  Powell,  i.  313,  .'.14. 

V.  Kicli,iii.  307,  410. 

i;.  SiuiiU!!,  ii.  3ti4. 

f.  Smith,  ii.  193,  200. 

V.  Williams,  ii.  100,  170,235. 
Power  V.  Shiel,  i.  ;'».'!1,  .■J.52. 
Powers  r.  lk•r^ten,  iii.  224,  227,  229. 

V.  Clarkson,  iii.  3i')H. 

V.  Dennison,  iii.  4K0. 

V.  McFerran,  iii.  345. 

V.  Patten,  iii.  ijOl,  502,  508. 

V.  Uussell,  iii.  311. 
Powesliiek  r.  Dennison,  ii.  81. 
Powles  f.  Grillith,  ii.  214. 
Poyas  r.  Wilkins,  iii.  352. 
Pratt,  AV,  i.  .'Jh-i. 

r.  Aver.  ii.  548.  .5.50. 

r.  Haeon,  iii.  278. 

r.  HenninKton  Hank,  ii.  205. 

V.  Brown,  iii.  19'J. 

V.  Clark,  ii.  91. 

V.  Douglas,  i.  .'W5  ;  iii.  17. 

V.  Farrar,  i.  017,  018,  020,  6G0. 


Pratt  .-.  Felton,  I.  .337. 
V.  (iodwin,  ii.  1 12. 
V.  IluKginit,  ii.  IKl,  105. 
V.  I<«.'van,  i.  555. 

e.  Myerit,  iii.  ;{.'i7. 

V.  <>K.len.  i.  r,02,  mti,  CG4. 

!•.  I'ratt.  iii.  517. 

r.  .Skolfleld,  ii.  133,  179. 

I'.  Sweetser,  ii.  390. 

r.  Thornton,  ii.  570. 

V.  Vanwyek.  ii.  5^1. 
Pray  r.  (ireat  Falls  .Mj;.  Co.,  iii.  410. 

v.  Pierce,  ii.  444,  409  ;  iii.  151,  3t4. 

v.  StebbiiiH,  i.  709. 
Preachers'  Aitl  Soc.  v.  Kngland,  ii.  479. 
Preiss  r.  Campbell,  i.  ;i55. 
Prent  r.  Hunt,  i.  652. 
Prentice  v.  Urimhall,  ii.  219. 

V.  (Jeijjer,  ii.  H07. 

V.  Wilson,  i.  022. 
Pre.sbrev  v.  Presbrey,  i.  629,  090;   iii. 

422, 424. 
Pre.-ibvterian    Con^?.    i*.    Johnston,    ii. 

57.3' 
I'robylerian  Corp.  r.  Wallace,  ii.  215. 
I'rescid)aker  r.  Feamaii,  ii.  5.J,  05. 
Prescott  c.  Kllinixwood,  ii.  120. 

V.  KUu,  i.  010,  011,043. 

V.  Hawkins,  iii.  406. 

V.  Kyle,  i.  645. 

V.  Nevers,  iii.  137,  155,  1G7. 

V.  Phillips,  ii.  357. 

V.  Prescott,  i.  308  ;  iii.  660,  601. 

V.  Tnieman,  iii.  478,  4«2,  487,  490, 
491.  629. 

V.  Walker,  i.  213. 

V.  White,  ii.  .373.  .374;  iii.  412. 

f.  Williams,  ii.  373;  iii.  4'.tl. 
Presley  c  Striblinn,  ii.  5(>8,  572. 
Preston  v.  \ir'\)i\i»,  i.  32,  407  ;  ii.  1G3. 

V.  Casner.  ii.  544,  548. 

r.  F'linnell,  ii.  77.5. 

V.  Hodneii,  ii.  129. 

V.  Hull.  iii.  254. 

I'.  Kobinson.  i.  G87. 
Pretty  r.  Mickmore,  i.  672. 
Prettyman  r.  Walston,  i.  1.32,  524. 

r.  Wilkey,  iii.  524. 
Prevost  r.  (iralz,  ii.  624. 
I'revot  r.  Lawrence,  i.  487,  692,  GOO. 
I'rewitt  r.  Wilson,  iii.  856. 
Price  r.  Hraytiii),  i.  14. 

I",  ("titts,  ii.  M. 

V.  Deal.  iii.  627.  630. 

V   Hiiey,  iii.  223. 

c.  Hunt,  ii.  7(>0. 

I-.  .Inhnston,  iii.  212. 

V.  Karnes,  ii.  53. 

V.  Pickett,  i.  1.33.  140. 

I'.  Pittsburgh  &  F't.  W.  &  C.  U   K  . 
iii.  320.  .322.  324. 

V.  Price,  i.  20,  218. 

r.  Sisson,  ii.  477,  498,  630,  6^^.  5'.»<5, 
066. 


CXll 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Price  V.  State  Bank,  ii.  273. 

V.  Taylor,  i.  118;  ii.  654,  655. 

t".  Worwoud,  i.  514. 
Prichard  i-.  Atkinson,  iii.  493. 
Pricket  t  v.  Parlier,  iii.  19. 

V.  Hitter,  i.  631. 
Pricknian  v.  Tripp,  ii.  376. 
Pride  v.  Lunt,  iii.  454. 
Priest  V.  Cunnuings,  i.  257. 

V.  Nichols,  i.  577. 
Primm  r.  Walker,  i.  688 ;  iii.  64,  443. 
Prince  v.  Case,  i.  664,  665,  666,  673. 
Prlndle  v.  Anderson,  i.  631,  632,  638, 

639. 
Pringle  v.  Gaw,  i.  315. 

V.  Witten,  iii.  488. 
Prior  &  Convent  case,  ii.  296. 
Pritchard  r.  Brown,  ii.  42U,  474,  518. 
Pritts  r.  Kitcliie,  i.  2.34. 
Private  Hoad,  case  of,  ii.  312,  322 ;  iii. 

420. 
Probert  v.  Morgan,  ii.  721. 
Proctor  i\  Bigelow,  i.  277. 

V.  Bp.  of  Bath,  ii.  778. 

V,  Gilson,  i.  21. 

V.  Green,  ii.  236. 

V.  Hodgson,  ii.  349. 

V.  Keith,  i.  510. 

V.  Putnam  Mach.  Co.,  iii., 97. 
Prodgers  v.  Langliam,  iii.  355. 
Proffitt  V.  Henderson,  i.  147,  148,  152. 
Proprietors,  &c.  Liverpool  Wharf.     See 

Liverpool  Wharf,  &c. 
Prosser  r.  Parks,  ii.  407. 

V.  Wapello  County,  iii.  445. 
Providence   Bank   v.   Billings,  ii.  805; 

iii.  234. 
Providence  Steam-Engine  Co.  v.  Provi- 
dence Steamboat  Co.,  iii.  445. 
Provost  r.  Calder,  i.  494. 
Prutsman  v.  Baker,  iii.  306,  307. 
Pryor  v.  Baker,  ii.  71. 

V.  Coulter,  iii.  294. 

V.  Stone,  i.  379,  455. 

V.  Wood,  i.  171. 
Pryse  v.  McGuire,  iii.  511. 
Puckett  V.  State,  iii.  53,  54. 
Pue  1-.  Pue,  ii.  339,  -357 ;  iii.  58. 
Pugli  V.  Arton,  i.  3.3. 

V.  Bell,  i.  234. 

V.  Holt,  ii.  58. 

V.  Leeds,  i.  467. 

V.  Pugh,  ii.  524. 
Pullen  V.  Bell,  i.  6. 

V.  Rianhard,  ii.  498,  499. 
Pultney  M.  E.  Church  v.  Stewart,  ii. 

565. 
PHnderson  v.  Brown,  ii.  169,  171. 
Purcell  r.  English,  i   577. 

V.  Gosliorn,  iii.  272. 

r.  Wilson,  i.  683. 
Purdy  V.  Havt,  ii.  607,  684. 
V.  Huntington,  ii.  118,  123. 
V.  Purdy,  i.  677  ;  ii.  514. 


Purefoy  r.  Rogers,  i.  205  ;  ii.  636,  638, 
700,  737,  740,  745,  748,  749,  754,  757, 
761,  766,  767,  776;  iii.  104. 
Purington  r.  No.  111.  R.  R.,  iii.  435. 
Purner  v.  Piercy,  iii.  365. 
Purrington  v.  Pierce,  ii.  64. 
Purser  v.  Anderson,  ii.  198. 
Purvis  V.  Wilson,  i.  717. 
Putnam  v.  Bond,  iii.  429. 

V.  Collaniore,  i.  239 ;  ii.  202. 

V.  Dobbins,  ii.  93. 

V.  Putnam,  i.  222,  223 ;  ii.  182. 

V.  Story,  ii.  540,  611,  612,  617,  640, 
718. 

V.  Tuttle,  iii.  473. 

V.  Wise,  i.  479,  604,  605,  606. 
Putnam  Free  School  v.  Fisher,  ii.  552 ; 

iii.  143. 
Putney  i\  Day,  iii.  369. 

V.  Dresser,  i.  677. 
Pybus  V.  Mitford,  ii.  649. 
Pye  V.  Gorge,  ii.  558. 
Pyer  v.  Carter,  ii.  319,  328,  332,  333. 
Pylant  v.  Reeves,  ii.  91. 
Pynchon  v.  Lester,  i.  245.  308. 

V.  Stearns,  i.  137,  147. 
Pyne  o.  Dor,  i.  161. 


Q. 


Quackenboss  v.  Clarke,  i.  525,  534,  535, 

541,  554. 
Quain's  Appeal,  ii.  295. 
Queen  v.  Northumberland,  iii.  417. 
Queen  Ann's  Countj'^,  Trustees  of  Poor 

of,  V.  Pratt,  i.  217. 
Quillman  r.  Custer,  ii.  655. 
Quin  V.  Brittain,  ii.  238. 
Quinby  r.  Higgins,  iii   15. 

V.  Manhattan  Co.,  i.  22,  26. 
Quinebaug  Bank  v.  French,  ii.  122. 
Quinn  v.  Eggleston,  iii.  454. 
Quint  v.  Little,  ii.  100. 
Quirk  V.  Thomas,  iii.  338. 


R. 


Rabe  v.  F^'ler,  i.  681. 
Rabsuhl  v.  Lack,  iii.  399. 
Race  V.  Ward,  ii.  313,  392. 
Rackley  v.  Sprague,  iii.  412. 
Radcliff  V.  Mayor,  &c.,  ii.  377,  381. 

V.  Radford,  ii.  510. 
Rader  v.  Ervin,  ii.  102,  110,  111. 
Ragland  v.  Justices,  &c.,  ii.  101,  110. 

V.  Rogers,  i.  378. 
Raguet  V.  Roll,  ii.  256. 
Rahway  Sav.  Inst.  v.  Bapt.  Church,  i. 

30. 
Rail  v.  Dotson,  ii.  784. 
Railroad  v.  Carr,  ii.  367. 

V.  Scliurmeir,  iii.  443. 


TAllLE    OF    CASPS    riTKD, 


cxm 


Ra'np*  (•  Corl>in.  i.  .1^4. 

f.  WiiikcT,  lii.  L'l»->,  ;}03. 
Kaiiis  r.  Mann,  ii.  I'iO. 
Uiiki'Htraw  r.  Mnwfr,  ii.  1"J5. 
Uiili-y  r.  lvo.H!i,  i.  ;]t)'». 
RhUh  r.  IIii>,'l,tM,  i.  -.'77. 
Kiiiston  I'.  Hiiotly,  i.  4!»9. 

r.  llntfliL'i*.  ii.  17"2. 

V.  Ualst.n.  i.  220. 
liiiins^ay  r.  Miirsli,  ii.  4'J7. 
Unnisilell  r.  Kniery,  ii.  5l'J. 

r.  Uamsdi'll,  ii.  783  ;  iii.  5t')5. 
K  iins  lill  r.  Wontvvortli,  iii.  577. 
Uaiiisev  I'.  Merriam,  ii.  77. 

V.  ■\Van(k'll,  ii.  708. 
Rami  I'.  Cartwrijjlit.  ii    181. 
Ratiilull  o.  Chase,  iii.  :}oO. 

V.  Oleavuliin.l.  i.  IMi. 

r.  Elwfll,  i.  IS;  ii.  lot. 

V.  Kreiis'er,  i.  li).i,  201. 

V.  I..(»wer.  iii.  117. 

V.  Mirl.lo,  ii.  10.  11. 

f.  McLau^iilin.  ii.  ;]-)3. 

V.  I'liillips,  ii.  ll'.i.  321. 

r.  Raniiall,  iii.  400. 

V.  Rich,  i.  582 

V.  Russell,  ii.  788. 

r.  San ilersi>n,  ii.  3t)4 ;  iii.  109. 
Ranl.-il  c.  Mallett,  ii.  212. 
Ran  lulpii  r.  Doss,  i.  210. 

f.  Wenilell,  ii.  703. 
Rands  r.  Kendall,  i.  2:35;  ii.  106. 
Raiiifelcy  '••  Spring,  iii.  82,  108. 
Itiink  V.  Hanna,  i.  255. 
Rankin  i-.  Harper,  ii.  508,  509,  515 

I'.  Iluskisson,  ii.  322. 

V.  Major,  ii.  123,  127,  129. 

V.  Mortimere,  ii.  05. 
Rannells  v.  Cierner,  iii.  202. 
Rapalye  v.  Rapalye,  ii.  208. 
Rathbone  v.  Roonev,  ii.  270. 
Ratiibiin  v.  Rathbun,  iii   311. 
Ratliff  V.  Kllis,  ii.  519,  515. 
Rausch  V.  Moore,  i.  313. 
Ravenswood  r.  Flemings,  iii.  415. 
Raw  V.  Pate,  iii.  91. 
IJawley  v.  Holland,  ii.  440,  400. 
Rawlings  i'.  Ailains,  i.  171. 
Rawlins  v.  IJiittel.  i.  254.  301. 

c.  Lowndes,  i.  232. 

V.  Turner,  i.  04''). 
Rawlyn's  case.  i.  484  ;  iii.  99,  131. 
Rawson  '•.  Uxbridge,  ii.  0. 
Rawstron  v.  Taylor,  ii.  371,  375. 
Way  V.  Adams,  i.  415;  ii.  717. 

t'.  Fletcher,  ii.  347. 

V.  Lynes,  ii.  302.  305. 

t;.  Pung.  i.  179,  213,  268. 

V.  Sweeny,  ii.  SM. 
Raybold  -■.  Raybold.  ii.  549. 
Raymcmd  v.  Andrews,  i.  C52. 
'  I'.  Holborn,  ii.  18*5. 
V.  Holden,  iii.  107.  159.272. 
V.  Raymond,  iii.l23,47ei,482,437,508, 
VOL.  I.  — h 


Raymond  r.  White,  i.  31. 
liaynliam  c.  Wilmarih,  i.  286. 
Ray  nor  r.  Hag^'ard,  i.  041 

r.  Uiiynor.  i.  217. 

r.  Wilnon,  iii.  200. 
Rea  V.  Cn*nvl,  ii.  5<K). 
Read  f.  Kifert,  iii.  1G5. 

r.  Krie  R.  R.,  ii   352. 

V.  ICrringlon.  ii.  45y. 

c.  Fogt'.  lii.  lO;. 

V.  ( iaillard.  ii.  58. 

r.  Hall.  iii.  78. 

V.  Huir,  ii.507. 

r.  Leeds,  iii.  449, 

V.  Rahin,  i.  307. 

I-.  Rubin-on,  iii.  301. 
Reade  u.  Livingston,  iii.  350. 
Rea<ling  v.  Altliouse,  ii    379. 

c.  VVeston,  ii.  51,  01. 
Readman  r.  Coiiwhv,  i.  570. 
Ready  c.  Kearsley,  li.  400,  548;  iii  270. 
Ream  v.  Harnish,  i.  007. 
Reasoner  r.  Edmonson,  ii.  110;  iii.  488. 
Reaume  t'.  Chamlx'rs,  i.   in],   ls2,   r.i7  ; 

iii.  268. 
Reek's  Estate,  i.  367. 
Reckliow  r.  Schanek,  i.  546.  014. 
Hector  I-.  Waugh,  i.  680,  684. 
Redd  r.  Burriis,  ii.  103 
Reddall  r.  Mrvan.  iii.  225. 
Redden  r.  Harker,  i.  500. 
Reddick  v.  (Jressman.  ii.  lOfl,  1.30. 
Redfling  r.  Redding,  iii.  I'M). 
Redfern  r.  Middleton,  i.  125;  ii.  475. 

r.  Redfern,  i.  432. 
Redfleld  v.  Buck,  iii.  .3.')6.  357. 
Rc.llord  r.  Gibson,  ii.  90. 
Redman  r.  Sanders,  ii.  106. 
Redwine  v.  Brown,  iii.  603,  604. 
Reece  v.  Allen,  ii.  83. 
Reed  r.  Bigelow,  ii.  170. 

V.  Dickerman,  i.  329,  330. 

r.  Farr,  iii.  97. 

1-.  Kemp,  iii.  333. 

V.  Kennedy,  i.  208. 

V.  Lansdale,  ii.  45. 

r.  Marble,  ii.  154. 

V.  McCourt,  iii.  97. 

1-.  .Morrison,  i.  2;J0,  2.32,  236,  237. 
241.  264,  260. 

V.  Paul.  ii.  220.  271. 

V.  Reel,  i.  018;  ii.  53,  65,  63.  80, 
238.  246  ;  iii   5<'.6. 

V.  Reynolds,  i.  5t>4. 

r.  Shepley,  i.  592.  690;  ii.  193. 

r.  Spieer.  ii.  314. 

r.  Ward,  i   549. 

V.  Whitney,  i.  215. 
Reed's  Estate,  Matter  of,  i.  385. 
Reeder  r.  Barr,  iii.  212,  :i48. 

r.  Carey,  ii.  12.'i. 

V.  Craig,  iii.  114. 

r.  Purdv,  i.  O.VH. 

V.  Sayrc-,  i.  140,  114.  031,  035,  G39. 


CXIV 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 


Reel  V.  Elder,  i.  254. 
Reese  v.  Jared,  i.  7. 

V.  Smith,  iii.  512,  528. 

?;.  Waters,  i.  190. 
Reeve  v.  Long,  ii.  636. 
Reeves  v.  Hayes,  ii.  153,  154,  258. 

V.  Scully,  ii.  257. 
Reformed  Dutch  Church  v.  Veeder,  ii. 

436. 
Regina  v.  Board  of  Works,  iii.  449. 

V.  Chadwick,  i.  224. 

V.  Chorley,  ii.  357,  360. 
Rehoboth  v.  Hunt,  i.  698. 
Reid  V.  Fitcli,  ii.  518,  579. 

V.  Kirk,  i.  7. 

V.  Sliergold,  ii.  785. 

V.  Stevenson,  i  245. 

V.  Sycks,  iii.  523. 
Reiff  V.  Reiff,  i.  139. 
Reigard  v.  Neil,  ii.  54. 
Reisnolds  v.  Edwards,  ii.  359. 
Reifly  v.  Mayer,  ii.  135,  2^0. 
Reimer  v.  Stuber,  ii.  340,  345,  346  ;  iii. 

178. 
Reinbach  v.  Walter,  i.  370. 
Reinboth  v.  Zeri)e  Run  Imp.  Co.,  i.  721. 
Reinicker  i\  Smith,  i.  688. 
Reitenbaugh  v.  Lndwick,  ii.  54,  57. 
Reitz  V.  Reitz,  ii.  578. 
Remington  i\  Campbell,  ii.  505. 
Remsen  v.  Conklin.i.  512. 
Ren  V.  Bulkeley,  ii.  692,  696,  701.  714. 
Renals  v.  Cowlishaw,  ii.  327. 
Rennie  v.  Robinson,  i.  539,  594. 
Rennyson's  Appeal,  ii.  364,  365. 
Renoud  v.  Daskam,  i.  532. 
Renshaw  v.  Bean,  ii.  354,  362. 
Renziehausen  v.  Keyser,  ii.  538. 
Repp  V.  Repp,  ii.  93. 
Requa  v.  Holmes,  iii.  351. 
Rerick  v.  Kern,  i.  668. 
Revalk  v.  Kraemer,  i.  358,  368,  457  ;  ii. 

263. 
Revere  v.  Leonard,  iii.  458. 
Rex  V.  Collett,  i.  622. 

V.  Creed,  iii.  511. 

V.  Dormy.  i.  657. 
Reynard  v.  Spence,  i.  208. 
Reynolds  v.  Harris,  iii.  232. 

V.  New  Orleans  Canal  &  B.  Co.,  ii. 
232. 

V.  Pitt,  ii.  23,  24. 

V.  Pixley,  i.  367. 

V.  Pool,  i.  605. 

V.  Reynolds,  i.  254.  269,  270. 

V.  Williams,  i.  498. 
Rhea  v.  Tucker,  ii.  545. 
Rhine  v.  Allen,  iii.  399. 
Rhoades  v.  Parker,  ii.  70,  116. 
Rhode  L'.  Louthain,  iii.  297. 
Riiodes  v.  Gardiner  Sch.  Dist.,  iii.  322. 

V.  McCormick,  i.  18,  371,  388,  404. 

V.  Otis,  i.  667  ;  iii.  440,  442, 
V.  Rhodes,  iii.  248. 


Ricard  i\  Saunderson,  ii.  220. 

V.  Williams,  ii.  334 ;  iii.  152,  155. 
Rice  V.  Barnard,!.  702. 

V.  Bird,  ii.  63. 

V.  Boston  &  Wor.  R.  R.,  ii.  19 ;  iii. 
371. 

r.  Bunce,  iii.  85. 

V.  Cleghorn,  ii.  523. 

V.  Dewey,  ii.  102,  225. 

V.  Nelson,  iii.  240. 

V.  Osgood,  ii.  640. 

V.  Parkman,  iii.  226,  229,  230. 

V.  Peet,  i.  485. 

V.  Rice,  ii.  49,  62. 

V.  Tower,  ii.  173. 

V.  White,  iii.  20. 

V.  Wilburn,  ii.  170. 

V.  Worcester,  iii.  449. 
Rich  V.  Bolton,  i.  629,  634. 

V.  Doane,  ii.  50,  60. 

V.  Smith,  i.  538. 

r.  Tubbs,  i.  358,  385,  401. 

r.  Zeilsdorf,  i.  16;  iii.  471. 
Ricliard  v.  Bent,  iii.  480,  490,  492. 
Richards,  Re,  i.  30. 

V.  Holmes,  ii.  78,  82,  85. 

V.  Leaming,  ii.  89,  91,  95. 

r.  Miller,  iii.  579. 

V.  Richards,  ii.  564. 

r.  Rose,  ii.  327,  333,  383,  885. 
Richards  le  Taverner's  case,  i.  578 
Richarilson  v.  Baker,  ii  94. 

V.  Bates,  i.  478  ;  iii.  291. 

V.  Bigelow,  iii.  412. 

i\  Borden,  i.  27. 

V.  Boright,  i.  488  ;  iii.  464,  465. 

V.  Cambridge,  ii.  180;  iii.  410. 

V.  Copeland,  i.  6,  25,  29. 

V.  Dorr,  iii.  478,  482. 

V.  Gifford,  i.  638. 

V.  Hildreth,  ii.  148. 

V.  Landgridge,  i.  621,  623,  634. 

V.  McNulty,  iii.  73. 

V.  Palmer,  iii.  408,  462,  471. 

V.  Pate,  iii  266,  267. 

V.  Richardson,  i.  696. 

V.  Ridgelev,  ii.  95. 

V.  Skoifield,  i.  226,  242. 

V.  Spencer,  ii.  524. 

V.  Stodder,  ii.  467,  488, 499,  500, 501, 
540. 

V.  Tobey,  ii.  297,  299,  300,  317,  386, 
387. 

V.  Vermont  Cent.  R.  R.,  ii.  381,  882; 
iii.  449. 

V.  Wallis,  i.  459 ;  ii.  232,  234,  237. 

V.  Wheatland,  ii.  614,  657. 

V.  Woodbury,  ii.  47,  48,  55,  519. 

V.  Wyatt,  i.  210. 

V.  Wyman,  i.  261. 

V.  York,  i.  122,  136,  160;  ii.  805. 
Richart  v.  Scott,  ii.  383. 
Richburg  r.  Bartley,  i.  514. 
Richraan  v.  Lippincott,  i.  102. 


TAHLr:   OF    TARES    CITED. 


Hiclimoml  i'.  Aikin,  ii.  l!*],  Ht5. 

r.  'rihhleH,  iii.  1U4. 
Hicliinuinl  Mt'g.  Cu.  v.  Atlantic  Dvlaine 

Co.,  ii.  .'KJT. 
Hiclinioiul  U.  II.  I'.  LoiiiHii  It.  U.,  ii.  308, 

.510. 
Kiikunl  r.  Uicknni,  i.  715. 
KickiT  r.  I  lam,  iii.  ;{.')4. 

I'.  llil)liar<l,  iii.  16.'!. 
Uirkirt  r.  .Mailfira.  ii.  1(»S,  127,  134, 1-16. 
Kii.'ki'ts  r.  Dickons,  iii.  f)li.'{. 
Uicki'tt.s  r.  Losti'ttcr,  i.  0'i5. 

r.  .Mimti^Dinorv,  ii.  ttlO. 
IlickH  r.  Kt-ed.  iii.  'Ml,  844. 
KicMcll  r.  .lackH.m,  iii.  4-J7. 
HiiMlf  r.  Howinan.  ii.  '2.'}'.). 

V.  iicoTize,  ii.  lol. 

f.  LittUlieltl,  i.  4t;(J;  iii.  418. 
Rider  r.  Maul,  i.  f);)2,  720. 

c.  Smith,  ii.  ."J.")."). 

r.  Tliompsoii,  iii.  408. 
Riiliiclev  r.  Joliiison,  ii.  Wfi. 
Kidjieway  v.  I..an[)lic'nr,  ii.  0.53. 
Uidnley  c.  Stillwcil,  i.  55«,  ()m,  035. 
Kidgway  r.  .MeAlpinc.  i.  277. 

c.  .Masting,  i.  201. 
Kidley  >:  Ki.lk-y,  ii.  54.'*. 
Hielil  r.  Hiiigcnlieimer,  ii.  4G0. 
Kielile  r.  lleiiliiig.'?,  ii.  350. 
Hiesz's  A|)pc'ai,  iii.  248. 
Rife  r.  (iiyer,  ii.  5.",:?. 
Ril'cncr  v.  Bmvman,  iii.  200. 
Rigilen  c  Vallier.  i.  077  ;  ii.  149. 
RigH  f.  Lonsdale,  i.  17  ;  iii   3. 
Riggan  r.  Green,  i.  485. 
Right  r.  Bucknell.  iii.  123. 

V.  Darhv,  i.  031,  ().33,  635.  643. 

r.  Smith,  ii.  43!t,  497. 

V.  Thomas,  ii.  701. 
Rigk-r  r.  Cloud,  i.  177. 
Rigney  i:  Lovejoy.  ii.  118,  127,  132,  222. 
Riker  v.  Darke,  i.  71.5. 
Rilev  I'.  Garnett,  iii.  585,  580. 

V.  McCord,  ii.  208. 

r.  IVhl,  i.  .367,  .368. 
Rin.lgc  r.  Baker,  ii.  387. 
Rinehart  r.  Ohvine,  i.  t)07. 

!'.  Kineiiart,  iii.  511. 
Ring  r    Billings,  iii.  410. 

V.  Burt,  i.  407,  438. 

V.  Gray,  iii.  343. 
Ringgold  r.  Hinggnid,  ii.  708. 
Kink.r  r.  Bisscll.  ii.  .')t'>4. 
Ripka  r.  Sergeant,  ii.  805. 
Ripley  v   Bates,  ii.  515,  573;  iii.  175. 

i».  Cross,  i.  593. 

f.  Paige,  i.  18. 

I'.  Wightman,  i.  508. 

V.  Yale,  i.  621  ;  iii.  174. 
Riscley  v.  Kyle,  i.  622. 
Rising  r.  Stannard,  i.  617,  018,  620,  630, 

630,  653,  088. 
Ritchie  r.  Glover,  i.  593. 
Ritchtncyer  i:  Morse,  i.  G. 


Ritgcr  r.  I'nrkcr,  ii.  187,  203,  250. 
Kitier's  Appeal,  ii.  49.'{. 
Uivard  r.  Walker,  iii.  301.  .308,  309. 
Rivers  i:  Adams,  ii.  313,  348. 

r.  Bivers,  ii.  545. 
Rivis  (•    NVatf-on,  ii.  30*2. 
Rix  r.  McHenry.  i.  30H. 
Houch  r.  llacki-r,  i.  :I7^,  451. 

I'.  NVadliam,  ii.  r,M»,  Tol. 
Wnarty  v.  Mitchell,  ii.  72,  81  ;  iii.  274. 
Boalh  r.  Driscoll,  ii.  376,  378. 
Wol.b  r.  McBride,  i.  430,  450. 
Uohh's  Appeal,  i.  54'J. 
R(jbbins  r.  Chicago,  i.  572. 

V.  Knton.  iii.  205. 

V.  Jones,  i  572.  570 ;  iii.  79. 

1-.  Robhins.  i.  217,  202. 

V.  Webb.  iii.  4'.t4. 
Robert  r.  Coco,  i.  355. 
Roberts  <•.  Barker,  i.  21. 

V.  Haumgarten,  iii.  151. 

r.  Croft,  ii.  K7. 

c.  I)au|)hin  Bank,  i.  25. 

r.  Davy,  i.  505. 

V.  Fleming,  ii   77. 

V.  Jackson,  iii.  301,  311. 

r.  Karr,  iii.  4.">0. 

V.  Littkfleld,  ii    190. 

V.  Morgan,  i.  0!»0  ;  iii.  1,54. 

V.  Richards,  ii.  225. 

V.  Roberts,    ii.   3.30,   331,  5;J4,  630; 
iii.  408. 

I'.  Robinson,  i.  4.32. 

V.  Rose.  ii.  93. 

v.  Stanton,  ii.  734. 

r.  Ware,  ii.  517,  518. 

<iJs.  Jiickson  d.  Webb,  iii.  242,  243, 
304,311. 

V.  Wi'Icb.  ii.  191  :  iii.  639. 

I'.  Whiting,  i.  1.38,  189. 

I".  Wiifgiii.  i.  4Ni. 

V.  Wilco.xson,  iii.  2(59. 
Robertson  c  Campbell,  ii.  64,  69,  234. 

V.  Corsett,  i.  20. 

V.  Gaines,  ii.  73. 

V.  I  lav,  iii.  257. 

r.  McNeil,  iii.  95,  131. 

V.  Norris.  i   .'i40 ;  ii.  72,  78. 

I'.  Paul,  ii.  73. 

.-.  Piikrell.  iii.  17.  98,99,  101. 

r.  Robertson,  i   710. 

V.  Stevens,  i.  1H». 

!■.  Wilson,  ii.  640;  iii.  100. 
Robeson  r   Pittenger,  ii.  .365. 
Robey  V.  Williams,  iii.  IH). 
Robie  r.  Chapman,  i.  174. 

V.  Flanders,  i.  277,  314. 

r.  Smith,  i.  018. 
Robinett  «•.  Compton,  iii.  3.36. 

r    Preston,  i.  0M'.». 
Robins  r.  Co.x,  i.  A.'ii). 

V.  Kinsie,  i.  268. 

V.  Quinleven,  ii.  066. 
Robinson,  Goods  of,  iii.  608. 


CXVl 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 


Robinson,  Re,  ii.  553. 

V.  Bates,  i.  261. 

V.  Black  Diamond  Coal  Co.,  ii.  367. 

r.  Buck,  ill.  359. 

V.  Cliasse}',  iii.  335. 

V.  Cropsev,  ii  62. 

V.  Cross,  "ii.  109. 

V.  Deering,  i.  557. 

r.  Eagle,  i.  710. 

V.  Fife,  ii.  189. 

V.  Gould,  iii.  309,  312. 

V.  Grev.  ii.  501. 

V.  Hardcastle,  ii.  723;  iii.  239. 

V.  Hathawa}',  i.  591. 

V.  Johnson,  i.  699. 

V.  Justice,  iii.  84,  86,  89. 

V.  Lake,  iii.  144,  149,  203. 

V.  Leavitt,  i.  244;  il.  222,  227. 

V.  Litton,  ii.  141,  782. 

V.  Loomis,  ii.  185. 

V.  Mauldin,  ii.  568. 

V.  McDiarmid,  ii.  506. 

V.  McDonald,  i.  712. 

V.  Miller,  i.  214,  234,  255. 

V.  Verry,  i.  539. 

V.  Preswick,  i.  25. 

V.  Kol)inson,  ii.  37,  48,  653. 

V.  Russell,  ii.  113. 

V.  Ryan,  ii.  120,  240. 

V.  Sampson,  ii.  199. 

V.  Schakett,  i.  217. 

V.  Urquliart,  ii.  89,  198,  201. 

V.  Wallace,  i.  411. 

V.  White,  iii.  437. 

V.  Wilev,  i.  3-56,  410,  424. 

V.  Willfams,  ii.  158,  160,  161. 

V.  Willoughby,  ii.  48. 
Robison  v.  Codman,  i.  173, 174,  204,  213. 
Robson  v.  Flight,  i.  487. 
Rochdale  Can.  Co.  v.  Hadcliffe,  ii.  336. 
Roclie  V.  Knight,  ii.  114. 

V.  Ulman,  ii.  300. 
Rochford  v.  Hackman,  ii.  5.33. 
Rockfeller  v.  Donnelly,  ii.  271. 
Rockhill  I'.  Spraggs,  in.  391,  .396,  401. 
Rockingham  v.  Oxenden,  i.  513. 

V.  Penrice,  i.  133. 
Rockland  W.  Co.  v.  Tillson,  ii.  353,  355. 
Rockwell  '•.  Adams,  iii.  96. 

r.  Baldwin,  iii.  435. 

V.  Bradley,  ii.  109. 

V.  Brown,  iii.  399. 

V.  Hobby,  ii.  89. 

V.  Jones,  ii.  188,  267. 

V.  Servant,  ii.  175. 
Roco  V.  Green,  i.  304. 
Rodgers  v.  Parker,  iii.  108,  459,  618. 

V.  Rodgers,  i.  167. 
Rodman  v.  Hedden,  ii.  193. 
Rodwell  V.  Phillips,  iii.  364,  365. 
Hoe  V.  Baldwere,  i.  114. 

V.  Griffiths,  ii.  640. 

V.  Harrison,  i.  511. 

V.  Jeffery,  ii.  768. 


Roe  V.  Jones,  ii.  640. 

V.  Lees,  i.  634,  635. 

V.  Pattison,  iii.  563. 

V.  Popham,  ii.  459. 

V.  Prideaux,  ii.  725. 

V.  Reade,  ii.  573. 

V.  Sales,  i.  505. 

V.  Tranmer,  ii.  443 ;  iii.  389,  403, 
404. 

V.  Ward,  i.  636. 

V.  Wickett,  ii.  746. 

V.  Wiggs,  i.  642. 

V.  York,  i.  580,585;  iii.  260. 
Roebuck  v.  Dupuy,  iii.  524. 
Roff  V.  Johnson,  i.  359,  401. 
Roffey  V.  Henderson,  i.  32,  671. 
Rogan  V.  Walker,  ii.  7,  45,  54. 
Roger  V.  Foster,  iii.  511. 
Roger's  Appeal,  iii.  537. 
Rogers  v.  Ashland  Sav.  Bk.,  1.  377. 

V.  Blackwell,  iii.  263. 

V.  Brent,  iii.  328. 

V.  Carey,  iii.  300,  301,  302,  315. 

V.  Crow,  i.  29. 

V.  Eagle  Fire  Co.,  iii.  378,  383,  397, 
398. 

V.  Gillinger,  i.  16. 

V.  Goodwin,  iii.  214,  217. 

V.  Grazebrook,  ii.  116. 

V.  Grider,  i.  706,  709. 

V.  Grossnell,  ii.  220. 

V.  Hillhouse,  iii.  881,  391,  394. 

V.  Jones,  iii.  344. 

V.  Marsh,  i.  302. 

r.  Moore,  i.  126. 

V.  Peck,  ii.  329 ;  iii.  419. 

V.  Peebles,  iii   525. 

V.  Pitcher,  i.  600. 

V.  Renshaw,  i.  442. 

V.  Rogers,  ii.  525  ;  iii.  326. 

V.  Sawin,  ii.  365. 

V.  Sinsheimer,  ii.  327,  331,  333. 

V.  Snow,  i.  516;  ii.  18;  iii.  413. 

V.  Soggs,  ii.  405. 

V.  Taylor,  ii.  382,  384. 

V.  Traders'  Ins.  Co.,  ii.  195. 

V.  Trustees,  &c.,  ii.  224. 

V.  Weil,  ii.  200. 

V.  Woodbury,  i.  5. 

V.  Wondy,  i.  260. 
Roguet  V.  Roll,  ii.  246. 
Rolfe  v.  Harris,  ii.  24. 
Roll  V.  Osborne,  iii.  501. 

V.  Smalley,  ii.  264. 
Rollins  )•.  Forbes,  ii.  260. 

V.  Henry,  ii.  171. 

1-.  Riley,  ii.  18,  466,  474  ;  iii.  394 
Rolpb  V.  Crouch,  i.  565. 
Rolt  V.  Hopkinson,  ii.  159,  160. 
Ronaldson  v.  Tabor,  i.  595. 
Ronkendorf  c.  Taylor,  iii.  2.35. 
Roof  r.  Stafford,  i.  486,  488  ;  iii.  264. 
Rooney  v.  Gillespie,  i.  644. 
Roosvelt  V.  Hopkins,  i.  504. 


TAItLK   OP   CASES    CITED, 


cxvn 


Root  V.  Bancroft,  ii.  MO.  17«,  224. 
I'.  HrotluTjion,  iii.  'J.'>(). 
I'.  CotninDinvi-altli,  i.  G02  ;    ii.  33H, 

:mi.;uk. 

V.  Crock,  iii.  101. 

t>.  Wailliiiiiis,  ii.  ;S31. 
Root's  iiisi'.  i.  70. 
Kopor  I-.  MiCook,  ii.  l>4,  97. 
Ku8L>  f.  Davis,  i.  lj'J'2. 

V.  Rosf,  iii.  057. 

V.  Rose  iiunoticcnt  Asso.,  iii.  634. 

I'.  Sliarplcss,  i.  427. 

I'.  Watson,  ii.  OM. 
Rosi'booni  r.  Van  Vei'iiten,  i.  122. 
RosL'wc'll  c.  I'nor,  ii.  3111,  'M',]. 
l{osiii"8  Appoal,  iii.  o'K). 
Ross  I'.  Atianis,  i.  Ill ;  ii.  (jo5;  iii.  375, 
47K 

I-.  Coi)l),  i.  717. 

V.  Drake,  ii.  508. 

V.  Dy.sart,  i.  510,  521. 

V.  Garrison,  i.  .'U-J,  ()32. 

V.  Gill,  i.  480. 

V.  Ilointzen.  ii.  07. 

V.  Norvell,  ii.  54. 

V.  Kcnnison,  ii   2IS,  220. 

V.  Mitcliell,  ii.  I'.i2. 

r.  Overton,  i.  500. 

V.  Ross,  ii.  783. 

V.  Swarinjjer,  i.  608. 

I'.  Treniain,  ii.  12. 

1'.  Wliitson,  ii.  05. 

V.  Wils..n,  ii.  103,  225. 

V.  WortliiiiKton,  iii.  202. 
Rosscel  r.  Jarvis,  i.  002. 
Rossitor  r.  Cossitt,  i.  230,  243;  ii.  182. 
Rotcirs  Wharf  Co.  r.  Jud.l,  iii.  300. 
Rolliwell  r.  Dewees,  i.  710,  721. 
Roiintree  r.  Dennanl,  i.  35'J. 
Koiijie  r.  Carraiiine,  i.  420. 
Roussett  I'.  Green,  i.  385. 
Routledge  v.  Dorrii,  ii.  724,  729,  730. 
Rowan  r.  Lytle.  i.  040. 

r.  Mercer,  ii.  204. 

V.  Sharps'  Rifle  Mfg.  Co.,  ii.    100, 
102. 
Rowbntliam  r.  Wil.son,  ii.  .384. 
Rowe  V.  Beckett,  iii.  345. 

i".  Bradley,  i.  227. 

t'.  Hamilton,  i.  20.5. 

V.  Heath,  iii.  510,  519,  521,  63.3. 

i".  Johnson,  i.  2'.M,  204. 

V.  Ream,  iii.  '.'•'•'>*'>. 

V.  Tahlo  .Mountain  Water  Co.,   ii. 
200. 

r.  Williams,  i.  602. 

r.  Wood,  ii.  214. 
Rowell  r.  Klein,  i.  140. 

V.  Mitchell,  ii.  133. 
Rowland  r.  Rowland,  i.  227. 

i:  Updike,  iii.  15.'). 
Rowletts  r.  Daniel,  ii.  473. 
Rowton  f   Rowton,  i.  214. 
Roy  V.  .Mcl'herson,  ii.  510,  511. 


lloy  r.  liowc,  iii.  601. 

Koval    Bank    of    Liverpool   r.   fJr.ii.l 

./unction  U.  &  D.  Co  ,  iii.  280. 
Royall  r.  Li»le,  iii.  102,  104. 
Royie  r.  (iu(ij!enlieini,  i.  600,  601,  u'^2, 

575;  ii.  301. 
Uoyer  v.  Ake,  i.  523. 

r.  Benlow,  iii.  105. 
lioyston  !■    Koynton,  i.  718. 
Kuhtiis  r.  I'rindle,  ii.  220. 
Rubey  r.  Barnett,  ii.  785,  788. 

I'.  Huiit»nian,  iii.  237. 
Ruby  I'.  Aby^»iman  .Soc,  ii.  233. 
Ivuckman  i'  (Hilwater,  i.  20. 
Rucks  i:  Taylor,  ii.  203. 
Uiiflin);  r.  Tilion,  iii.  355. 
Ruggles  r.  Barton,  ii.  IJO.  122,  131. 

r.  I.awson,  iii.  300,  321,  324. 

V.  Ix'sure.  i.  t>05. 

V.  Williams,  ii.  54,  153. 
Ruland  c.  So.  Newmarket,  ii.  348. 
Rumill  r.  Robbins,  ii.  30O. 
Runlet  r.  Dtis,  iii.  8;i,  I.JO. 
Runnels  r.  Webber,  iii.  4'.K>. 
Runyan  r.  .Mersereau,  ii.  101,  127,  134, 
145. 

r.  Stewart,  i.  241,  244. 
Ruolis  V.  Hooke,  i.  425. 
Rujip's  Appeal,  ii.  510,  511,  610. 
Rush  r.  Lewis,  ii.  0S8,  7(Hi. 
Kusliin  ('.  Shields,  ii.  153. 
Rusk  V.  Fenton,  i.  485. 
Russ  r.  Alp.iuvjb,  iii.  514,  51(5. 

t>.  I'errv,  i.  200;  iii.  4'.KJ. 

V.  Steele,  iii.  40:!,  5<K5. 
Russel  I'.  Russel,  ii.  80,  87. 

V.  Smithies,  ii.  244. 
Russell  /•.  A  Hard,  i.  503. 

c.  Allen,  i.  54(t,  548;  ii.  142,  144. 

V.  .\ustin.  i.  211.  203. 

I'.  Beebe,  iii.  212. 

«•.  Blake,  ii.  238. 

I-.  Carr,  ii.  47. 

V.  Coflin,  ii.  469;  iii.  384. 

r.  Dudley,  ii.  18.3,  18-L 

V.  KIden,  iii.  504. 

r.  Kly.  ii.  114. 

r.  Krwin,  i.  502,  509;   iii.  167. 

V.  Fabvan,  i.  5;J7,  601,  603,  020,  048, 
051,  054. 

r.  Hoar,  iii.  14. 

I'.  Hubbard,  i.  070. 

:•.  .1.1.  kson.  ii.  3.X),  352. 

V.  Ia'wIs,  ii.  50t) 

r.  .Maloney.  iii.  01,  94,  95,  5k3. 

V.  Marks,  iii.  174. 

r.  I'istor.  ii.  220. 

V.  Richards,  i.  5,  0. 

V.  Rumsev,  i.  201,  432;  iii.  224. 

I-.  Southard,  ii.  46,  49,  64,  03,  G<a 
241. 

V.  Sweesey,  iii.  .'13<5. 

f.  'roi>i>injr,  iii.  280. 

I'.  Watt,  ii.  91. 


CXVIU 


TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 


Russell  V.  "Watts,  ii.  332. 

Rust  V.  Boston  Mill  Corp.,  iii.  459. 

V.  Low,  ii.  300. 
Rutlierf(}r(l  v.  Greene,  i.  89. 

V.  Taylor,  iii.  80. 

V.  Tracy,  iii.  81. 
Rutt  V.  Howell,  i.  450. 
Ryall  1-.  Holle,  ii.  36,  41. 
Ryan  v.  Brown,  iii.  441. 

V.  Clark,  i.  473. 

V.  Dox,  ii.  517  ;  iii.  247. 

V.  Dunlap,  ii.  134. 

r.  Wessels,  i.  355. 
Ryder,  Re,  ii.  599. 

V.  Innerarity,  iii.  232. 
Ryer  v.  Gass,  ii.  138. 
Ryerson  v.  Eldred,  i.  595. 

V.  Quackenbush,  i.  550,  551,  552; 
ii.  302. 
Ryerss  v.  Farwell,  i.  594,  597. 
Ryhiner  v.  Frank,  i.  359. 
Rylands  v.  Fletcher,  i.  573. 


Sackett  v.  Sackett,  i.  40,  146,  163. 

Sackner  v.  Sackner,  i.  459- 

Saddler  v.  Lee,  ii.  374,  377. 

Sadler  i^  Pratt,  ii.  723. 

Sadler's  Appeal,  ii.  524,  525. 

Sadlers'  case,  iii.  63. 

SaflFord  v.  Safford,  i.  269. 

Saffyn  v.  Adams,  i.  473. 

Saiiler  v.  Signer,  ii.  114. 

Sailor  v.  Hertzogg,  iii.  152,  170. 

Sainsbury  v.  Matthews,  i.  11. 

St.  Amour  v.  Kivard.  ii.  761. 

St.  Andrew's  Church  v.  Tompkins,  ii. 

157. 
St.  Andrew's  Church  Appeal,  i.  531 ;  ii. 

323.' 
St.  Clair  v.  Williams,  i.  303. 
St.  Clair  County  v.  Lovingston,  iii.  G5, 

66,  438. 
St.  John  i\  Benedict,  ii.  459. 
V.  Kidd,  ii.  406. 
V.  Palmer,  i   563;  iii.  511. 
St.  Louis  V.  Kaime,  i.  570. 

V.  Morton,  i.  591. 
St.  Louis  Court  v.  Griswold,  i.  70. 
St.    Louis    Iron    Mt.,   &c.   Ry.   Co.   v. 

Higgins,  iii.  264,  266. 
St.  Louis  University  ?•.  McCune,  iii.  173. 
St.  Paul  V.  Dudley,  ii.  204. 
St.  Paul  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Schurmeir, 

iii.  438. 
St.  Vincent  O.  Asylum  v.  Troy,  ii.  339, 

395. 
Sale  V.  Pratt,  ii.  392. 
Salem  ?•.  Edgerly,  ii.  135,  186,  209,  214, 

215,  221. 
Salisbury  i-.  Andrews,  ii.  350,  355,  365. 
V.  Great  N.  Ry.  Co.,  iii.  449. 


Salisbury  v.  Phillips,  ii.  51. 
Sallade  v.  Jame.<,  i.  145. 
Salle  V.  Prinun,  iii.  109. 
Sallee  v.  Chandler,  ii.  524. 
Salmon  v.  Bennett,  iii.  356. 

V.  Clagett,  ii.  141,  151. 

V.  Matthews,  i.  578. 

V.  Smith,  i.  498,  559,  860. 
Salmons  v.  Davis,  iii.  159. 
Saltmarsh  r.  Beene,  ii.  569,  570. 

r.  Smith,  i.  313. 
Saltonstall  v.  Sanders,  iii.  549. 
Sammes'  case,  ii.  436,  438. 
Sample  v.  Coulson,  ii.  519,  526. 
Sampson  v.  Burnside,  i.  663,  664,  666. 

V.  Easterbj',  i.  5.33. 

V.  Grimes,  i.  549. 

V.  Henry,  i.  656,  657. 

V.  Hoddinott,  ii.  368,  380. 

V.  Pattison,  ii.  84. 

V.  Schaeffer,  i.  620. 

V.  Williamson,  i.  426,  442 ;  ii.  112. 
Samson  v.  Thornton,  iii.  329. 
Samuels  v.  Borrowscale,  iii.  151,  342. 

343. 
Sanborn  v.  Clough,  iii.  422.  , 

V.  French,  iii.  164,  168. 

V.  Hoyt,  iii.  465. 

V.  Rice,  ii.  327. 

V.  Woodman,  ii.  22. 
Sandback  v.  Quigley,  i.  291. 
Sanderlin  v.  Baxter,  ii.  331. 
Sanders  v.  Merryweather,  i.  505. 

1-.  Partridge,  i.  465,  526,  5-34,  535, 
5.39,  540,  541,  544. 

V.  Reed,  ii.  140. 

V.  Wilson,  ii.  235. 
Sanderson  ?>.  Penn.  Coal  Co.,  ii.  367, 
368,  .393,  394. 

i\  Price,  ii.  106. 

V.  "White,  iii.  551,  557. 
Sandford  r.  Travers,  iii.  517. 
Sandilands,  Be,  iii.  290. 
Sands  v.  Cliurch,  ii.  183. 

V.  Codwise,  iii.  2:-;i,  .353. 

t'.  Hughes,  i.  540;  iii.  149. 

V.  Pfeiffer,  i.  7,  8,  27  ;  ii.  163. 
Saner  (;.  Bilton,  i.  575. 
Sanford  v.  Harvey,  i.  040,  641,  642,  613, 
644. 

V.  Irbj-,  ii.  780. 

r.  Jackson,  i.  335. 

V.  iMcLean,  i.  267. 

V.  Pierce,  ii.  233. 

?'.  Sanford,  iii.  120. 
San  Francisco  v.  Fulde,  iii.   149,  150, 

157. 
Sangamon   R.   R.   Co.   v.   Morgan,   ii. 

164. 
Sanger  v.  Bancroft,  ii.  119. 
Sanhill  v.  Franklin,  i.  041. 
Santa  Barbara  Rank  v.  Guerra,  i.  368. 
Santa  Cruz  Bank  ?•.  Cooper,  i.  447. 
Sarahas  v.  Fenlon,  i.  372. 


TADLE  OF   CASES   CITED. 


CXIX 


Sargent  v.  nallnnl,  ii.  .^ir,,  334, 335,  837, 
342.  343,  ;UG,  .ilU. 

V.  KuIUt,  i.  246. 

i;.  IIowi',  ii.  H'2. 

i:  MeFiirlaiui,  ii.  'J20. 

V.  I'lirsoiis,  i.  tJlto. 

V.  I'iiTco,  iii.  ti42. 

I'.  I'riiy,  i.  i')"J4. 

V.  Simpooii,  iii.  2(t3.  '218. 

I'.  Sniitii,  i.  533,  Uo2. 

V.  Towne,  i.  '.*1  ;  iii.  664. 

V.  Wilson,  i.  430. 
Sarlert  <•.  Sarlfs,  i.  \'M,  137.  152,  154. 
Satterli-e  r.  .Maltliewsoii,  i.  201. 
Satlerwliite  r.  Uos.tiT,  iii.  loO. 
SauU-t  r.  Siu'pliL'nl,  iii.  01.  00. 
Sauiiilers  c.  Cathvfll.  ii.  4bO. 

r.  DelifW.  ii.  .')24 

V.  Edwards,  ii.  528. 

V.  Kvaiis,  ii.  727. 

V.  Frost,  ii.  Ibl,  187,  2:U,  238,  240, 
240,  207. 

V.  Harris,  ii.  552. 

r.  NVwman,  ii.  344,  372,  398. 

I'.  Stewart,  ii.  54. 
Saunders's  ease,  i.  150. 
Saunderson  r.  Stearns,  ii.  555. 
Savagi.-  c.  Dooley,  i.  2:J7 ;  ii.  100,  130, 
100,  173. 

r.  Hall,  ii.  122,  204,  200. 

t'.  Lee,  ii.  007. 

i".  Murpliy,  iii.  350. 
Savery  r.  Hrownin^,  iii.  2'.l8. 
Savile  v.  IJiaeket,  ii.  (iOo. 
Saville  v.  Saville,  i.  12'.(.  131. 
Sawyer  r.  Kendal,  iii.  141,  156. 

v.  Lyon,  ii.  217. 

V.  Peters,  iii.  320. 

V.  I'rickett,  ii.  257. 

V.  Skowhegan,  ii.  573. 

V.  Twiss,  i.  20. 
Sawyer's  Api)eal,  ii.  508. 
Sawyers  r.  t'ator,  i.  722. 
Sa.\l)y  ('.  Manchester  Ii.  R.,  i.  574. 
Say  c.  Stoddard,  i.  (514. 
Say  and  Seal's  case,  iii.  282. 
Saylors  v.  Saylors,  ii.  225. 
Savre  r.  Townsend,  ii.  513. 
Scales  r.  Cockrill,  iii.  147.  158. 
Scanlan  i-.  Wri^flit,  iii.  342. 
Scatterwood  c.  Kd^re.  ii.  022,  623,  740. 
Scliadt  r.  nepi)e,  i.  3sr,. 
SchaftT  r.  jJeiily.  ii   2'>7. 
Schaller  r.  (ireer,  iii.  521. 

V.  Lavretta,  ii.  407,  481.  638. 
Scliaffner  v.  (irutzniacker,  iii.  275. 
Schallr.  Williams  Valley  H.  U.,  iii.  170. 
Sclie'lda  r.  .Sawyer,  iii.  212. 
Sclieerer  r.  Scheerer,  ii.  511. 

r.  Stanley,  i.  548. 
Schenck  r.  Conover,  ii.  251  ;  iii.  232. 

V.  Ellenwood,  ii.  "-'W. 

r.  Kvoy,  i.  087. 
Schernierliurne  r.  Buel.  i.  i'JS. 


Sdiermerliornc   r.  Scliemierliorne,  iii. 

505. 
Sclneffeliii  r.  ('arjH'nter,  i.  684. 
Sdiiie  r.  HrokliauH.  ii.  8«4J,  388.  3'J3. 
Seliillin^  r.  Ilolnus.  i   521,  55'J,  642. 
Schley  <•.  Fryer,  ii.  217. 

r.  Lyon,  ii   4'.t8 
ScldiclitiT  c.  I'lnlli|)8.  ii.  372. 
Schnudt  r.  Iloyt.  ii.  118,  155. 

r.  Cjuinn,  ii.  34'J. 

r.  Willis,  i.  210. 
Scliinitz  '-.  Scluuitz,  iii.  4<i^l. 
Schniuiker  r.  .SiiuTt,  ii    ■J2t). 
Schneider  r.  IlutTnian,  i,  408. 
Sclinorr's  Appeal,  in.  5.'iO. 
Scliolield  V.  luwa   llonieatcad  Co.,  iii. 

480. 
Scliuu!     Directors,    &c.      See    Tyrone 

School  Directors,  &c. 
School  Trustees  r.  llovey,  i.  448. 
Schools,  The,  c  Kisley,  iii.  03. 
Schouler,  Kr  jmrlf,  ii.  508. 
Schouton  V.  Kilmer,  i   424. 
Schrack  v.  Zuhler,  iii.  14S.  150. 
Schrader  v.  Decker,  iii.  207. 
Schreilier  v.  I'ary,  ii.   114. 
Schryver  r.  Teller,  ii.  212. 
Schuisler  i'.  Ames,  i.  584. 
Schulenherg  r.  Uarrinian,  ii.  15. 
Schult  r.  Harvey,  i.  572. 
Schullz  V.  Klliot't,  i.  CKHJ. 
Schultz's  Appeal,  ii.  52t». 
Schumaker  c.  Schmidt,  iii.  538. 
Schurnieier  v.  St.  I'aul  &  V.  K.  U.,  iii. 

43'.t. 
Sihutt  r.  I.rfirge,  iii.  2(jO,  'MA. 
Schuyler  v.  Leggett,  i.  032,  0;{5,  647. 

r.  .Smith,  i.  030,  051,  tii>;5. 
Schuylkill  Co.  i".  Tholmrn.  ii.  100. 
Schuylkill  Nav.,  &c.  Co.  i-.  Frencii,  ii. 

303. 
Schuylkill  H.  R.  v.  Schmoele,  !.  620, 

558. 
Scliwoerer  v.  Boylston  Market,  ii.  323, 

327. 
Scituate  v.  Hanover,  ii.  647. 
Scofield  r.  Lockwood,  iii   423. 

V.  St.  John,  ii.  407.  577. 
Scorell  V.  Hoxall,  iii.  307. 
Scott  I'.  Battle,  iii   78. 

V.  Beutel,  ii.  333. 

V.  Buclianan,  i.  480,  488. 

r.  Douglass,  iii.  100. 

V.  Fields,  ii.  51. 

r.  Freeland,  ii.  77. 

r..(;uernsev,  i.  006,  008;  ii.  760. 

r.  Hancock,  i.  302. 

r.  Henrv,  ii.  52.  57,  03. 

V.  Luni.'  i.  527,  548;    ii.  280,  29Q 
205.  20<5. 

i».  McFarland.  ii.  47.  57.  190. 

r.  McMillan,  ii.  207,  380. 

V.  I'urcell.  iii.  271. 

r.  Scarborough,  ii   542. 


cxx 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Scott  1-.  Scott,  iii.  477. 

V.  Simons,  i.  562,  571. 

I'.  State,  i.  088. 

V.  Wharton,  ii.  141. 

V.  Whipple,  iii.  288. 
Scoville  V.  Hillianl,  i.  716. 
Scranton  v.  Piiillips,  ii.  384. 
Scratton  v.  Brown,  iii.  64,  65. 
Screven  v.  Gregorie,  ii.  320. 
Scribner  i\  Holmes,  iii.  493. 
Scrimshire  v.  Scrimshire,  i.  225. 
Scriver  ;;.  Smith,  ii.  367  ;  iii.  511. 
Scrugham  v.  Wood,  iii.  313. 
Scull  V.  Reeves,  ii.  547,  5-52. 
Seabrook  v.  Moyer,  i.  564. 
Seagram  v.  Knight,  i.  160. 
Seal  V.  Seal.  i.  786. 
Seaman  i-.  Fleming,  ii.  157. 

V.  Nolen,  i.  Syt). 
Searcy  v.  Reardon,  ii.  525. 
Searle  n.  Chapman,  i.  437,  452 ;  ii.  230. 

V.  Sawyer,  ii.  105,  107,  141. 
Sears  v.  Cunningham,  ii.  550. 

V.  Hanks,  i.  441. 

1-.  Russell,  i.  89;  ii.  754,  761,  772, 
773,  783. 

V.  Sellew,  i.  693. 

V.  Smith,  ii.  91. 
Seaton  v.  Jamison,  i.  292. 

V.  Son,  i.  368,  385. 
Seaver  v.  Durant,  ii.  232. 

V.  Phelps,  i.  485. 
Seavey  v.  Jones,  iii.  412. 
Seaward  v.  Willock,  ii.  606. 
Seawell  v.  Bunch,  iii.  178. 
Second   Cong.   Society   v.  Waring,  ii. 

670. 
Second    Nat.    Bank    of    St.   Louis    v. 

Grand  Lodge  of  Mo.,  ii.  219. 
Second  Kef.  Presb.  Church  v.  Disbrow, 

ii.  784. 
Secor  V.  Pestana,  i.  631,  634. 
Section  16  in  Hocking   County,  Trus- 
tees of,  r.  Spencer,  i.  518 ;  ii.  293. 
Sedgwick  v.    Laflin,    i.  88;   ii.  44,  71, 
719.  720. 

V.  Minot,  iii.  578. 

V.  Place,  iii.  357. 
Seeger  v.  Pettit,  i.  23. 
Seek  V.  Haynes,  i.  392,  408,  453. 
Seers  v.  Hinds,  i.  504. 
Seevers  v,  Delashmutt,  ii.  112. 
Seibert  v.  Levan,  ii.  399. 
Seibert's  Appeal,  i.  396. 
Seibold  v.  Christman,  ii.  506,  507,  508. 
Seidensparger  v.  ^\>enr,  ii.  341. 
Seigle  V.  Louderbautrh,  iii.  166. 
Selby  V.  Alston,  ii.  536,  559,  561. 

V.  Stanley,  ii.  94. 
Selden  v.  Del.  &  Hud.  Canal  Co.,  i.  662, 
663,  66.5,  671. 

V.  Vermilyea,  ii.  540. 
Sellers  v.  Staicup,  ii.  54,  63. 
Sellick  V.  Addams,  iii.  131. 


Sellman  v.  Bowen,  i.  293,  304. 
Semple  v.  Burd,  ii.  151. 
Senhouse  i'.  Christian,  ii.  344,  352. 
Sennett  v.  Bucher,  i.  472, 
Sentill  V.  Armor,  i.  367. 

V.  Robeson,  i.  174. 
Sergeant  v.  Steinberger,  i.  679,  701. 
Seventeenth  Street,  Re,  iii.  451. 
Sewall  L-.  Lee,  iii.  52. 
Sewell  V.  Angerstein,  i.  29. 

V.  Cargill,  ii.  436. 

v.  Lee,  i.  252. 
Sexton  V.  Pickett,  ii.  211. 

V.  Wheaton,  iii.  356. 
Seymor's  case,  i.  94,  268 ;  ii.  590. 
Seymour  v.  Carter,  i.  672. 

V.  Courtenay,  iii.  472,  473. 

V.  Darrow,  ii.  158,  195. 

V.  Freer,  i.  35 ;  ii.  513,  535. 

I'.  Lewis,  ii.  314,  320,  330,  332. 
Shackelford  r.  Hall,  ii.  10 
Shackelton  v.  Sebree,  ii.  444,  453,  467, 

479 ;  iii.  385. 
Shackleford  v.  Bailey,  iii.  167,  410. 

V.  Todhunter,  i.  434. 
Sliaefer's  Appeal,  ii.  394. 
Shaeffer  v.  Chambers,  ii.  139,  234,  244, 
246. 

V.  Weed,  i.  217. 
Shafer  v.  Wilson,  ii.  381,  393. 
Shafter  v.  Huntington,  ii.  513. 
Shall  V.  Biscoe,  ii.  97. 
Shanahan  v.  Perry,  iii.  508. 
Shane  v.  Kansas  C.  R.  K.  Co.,  ii.  372. 
Shankland's  Appeal,  ii.  5.'!3,  572. 
Shanks  v.  Lancaster,  iii.  294. 

V.  Lucas,  iii.  20,  206. 
Shannan  v.  Bradstreet,  ii.  104. 
Shannon  r.  Burr,  i.  498,  547. 

i:  Marselis,  ii.  215. 
Shapleigh  v.  Pilsbury,  ii.  436,  444,  470, 

640,  667. 
Shaple}'  V.  Rangeley,  iii.  82. 
Sharkey  v.  Sharkey,  ii.  48. 
Sharon  Iron  Co.  v.  Erie,  ii.  22. 
Sharp  I'.  Brandow,  iii.  163,  164,  166. 

V.  Petit,  i.  293,  294. 

V.  Proctor,  ii.  50. 

V.  Robertson,  iii.  265. 

z'.  Ropes,  ii.  327. 
Sharpe  v.  Kelley,  i.  593,  620. 
Sharpley  v.  Jones,  i.  315. 
Siiarpsteen  v.  Tillou,  ii.  704. 
Shattock  V.  Shattock,  ii.  689. 
Shattuck  V.  Gragg,  i.  283. 

V.  Lovejoy,  i.  505. 
Shaw  V.  Carbrev,  i.  6  ;  iii.  366. 

V.  Coffin,  i.  511. 

V.  Farnsworth,  i.  483. 

V.  Galbraith,  iii.  478. 

V.  Hayward,  iii.  311,  319. 

V.  Hearsey,  i.  706. 

V.  Hoadley,  ii.  188,  265. 

V.  HofEman,  i.  470,  565,  613. 


TAIiLK    OF    CASKS    CITED. 


CXXl 


Sliaw  IV  Kiiy,  i.  470. 

f.  Loud,  ii.  271  ;  iii.  279. 

V.  Neale,  ii.  lo'J,  UU),  101. 

r.  I'lirtriiljji',  i   .'J  10. 

V.  I'oor,  iii.  'iV.i. 

i:  Hend,  ii.  >'>**!. 

V.  Htiss,  i.  2i>7. 

V.  U'ei^'h.  ii.  u.57.  f>3x,  0o3. 
Sliawmiit  Hunk  v.  Uuston,  i.   19,  637, 

5«li»,  677. 
Slit-ate  r.  CiTrv,  ii.  17<5.  178. 

c.  O'NVil,  i.  -Jf^d.  .U.'J. 
Slit'uri.'r  I".  l<anj;er,  iii.  I'Jl. 

V.  Slii-artT,  i.  7iH. 

r.  Winston,  i.  "I-!. 
Slieckell  v.  Hopkins,  ii.  (W. 
Sht'i'ii,  A'.r  /-.(r/< ,  i.  ;5(). 
Sheets  r.  Alien,  ii.  103. 

V.  Cirublis,  ii.  (i'lO ;  iii.  (wS,  577. 

V.  Selden,  i.  •4<)7.  r.Ol.  .51(1,  olil,  521, 
53ti,  GtK),  oils,  570;  iii.  411. 
Slieetz  '•.  Lonj^lois,  iii.  511. 
ShelTey  r.  (iardim-r,  iii.  511. 
Slielliild  i:  Love^in^;,  iii.  l(j. 

r.  Orrery,  ii.  t',;{2.  773. 
Sheliaii  r.  Harnett,  iii  230. 
Sheldon  -•.  Hird.  ii.  181,206. 

V.  ratterson,  ii.  248. 

r.  Sheldon,  ii.  571. 

r.  Wriffht,  iii.  222. 
Shellev  r.  Wright,  iii.  111. 
Shelliv's   case,  ii.  424,  450,  458,  631, 

CI 7,  tH7  ;  iii.  502. 
Slielor  r.  .Mason,  i.  35<>,  425. 
Shelton  r.  Alcox,  iii.  130. 

V.  Armor,  iii.  2^7. 

V.  Carrol,  i.  282.  600. 

V.  Codman,  i.  630,  548. 

V.  Doe,  i.  5'.J2. 

V.  Fieklin,  i.  24. 

V.  Homer,  ii.  560. 
Shelton 's  ease,  iii.  302.  .303. 
Shepard  r.  Hripus,  i.  578. 

v.  -Merrill,  i.  565. 

V.  I'hilbriek,  i.  144. 

r.  Richards,  i.  0'.t5. 

V.  Kyers,  iii.  130. 

V.  Shepard,  ii.  157,  271. 

r.  Spauldin^.  i.  5bO,  585. 
Sheparilson  r   I'erkins,  ii.  379. 
Sheperd  v.  Adams,  ii.  215. 
Sliephard  r.  I.iltle,  ii.  420. 

I'.  Sliejihard,  ii.  761. 
Shepherd  r.  ("assiday,  i.  4.55. 

«•.  Ciimminns,  i.  635. 

V.  Howard,  i.  257  ;  iii.  270. 

V.  .McKvers,  ii.  .547,  oVi. 

V.  Uo83  Co.  Commrs.,  iii.  232. 

i\  Thompson,  iii.  4.>5. 

V.  Union  Ins.  i'n.,  ii    173. 

V.  White,  i.  3b2  ;  ii.  509,  617,  619, 
5«>9. 
Sheppard  r.  Wardell.  i.  2tM). 
Shepperd  v.  Murduck,  ii.  190. 


Sheratz  c   Nicodemud,  ii.  97. 
Sherhurne  r.  JoneH,  i.  141,  616,  628 

I'.  Morse,  ii.  4'.t4. 
Sheridan  r.  Welch,  ii.  81. 
ShcrilT  f.  Wrothoiii,  ii.  776. 
Sherman  r.  Ahhot,  ii.  205. 

V.  Chaniplaiii  Trunsp.  Co.,  i.  597, 
60.3. 

r.  Dod^e,  ii.  478. 

r.  Kane,  iii.  144. 

V.  .McKcon.  iii.  452. 

I'.  Sherman,  ii.  134. 

r.  WililiT,  i.  57".'. 

r.  WilUtt,  iii.  417. 

V.  Williams,  i.  520,  GOO. 
Sherred  r.  Cisco,  ii   .3.H.5. 

I'.  Soiithwick,  i.  421. 
Sherry  r.  Brown,  i.  3H3. 
Sherwood  r.  Harlow,  iii.  3Hl. 

V.  Hiirr,  ii.  334,  •V-to. 

r.  Dunhar,  ii.  2(XJ. 

r.  Sa.xton,  ii.  H5. 

V.  .Seaman,  i.  522. 

V.  .Sutton,  ii.  5.)6. 
Shibia  r.  Klv,  ii.  492. 
Shield  V.  Hatis,  i.  31.3. 
Shields  r.   I.ozear,  i.  594;  ii.   106,  133, 

l.!4,  H.J,  168,  180. 
SIdels  I'.  Stark,  i.  680,  694.  695. 
Shillaber  v.  Uobinson.  ii   82. 
.Shin  r.  Fre<lericks,  ii.  203. 
.Shiiidelheck  r.  .Moon,  i.  571. 
Shine  r.  Dillon,  i.  53'.t. 

r.  Wilco.x,  i.   148. 
Shinn  r.  Smith,  ii.  224. 
Shipley  r.  Fifty  Associates,  i.  670,  673. 
Shipman  r.  Heers,  ii.  .364,  'Mo. 

V.  Horton,  i.  488. 
.S|ii])pen's  Appeal,  i.  30^t. 
.Shirkev  V.  Hanna.  ii.  266,267. 
Shirley  r.  Avres,  iii.  305,  820,  321,  322. 
323,"  324. 

r.  Conpress  Supar  Hefuiery,  ii.  93L 

V.  Fearne,  iii.  2'.M. 

r.  Shirley,  ii.  98. 
Shirras  r.  Caii:,  ii.  157  ;  iii.  459. 
Shirtz  r.  Sliiriz,  i.  294. 
Shiiz  r.  DiclTcnbach,  ii.  88. 
Shively  r.  Hume,  ii.  372,  377. 

V.  .Jones,  ii.  2t>3. 
Shoenjaker  r.  Smith,  ii.  514. 

c.  Walker,  i.  201,  214.^ 
SliiiiMiiakfr's  Appeal,  i.  r53. 
Shoenlier^'cr  r.  Hackman,  iii.  .321. 

I-.  Watts,  ii.  4<1. 

V.  Zook.  iii.  3*)3. 
Shore  r.  Wilson,  iii.  429. 
Shores  r.  Carlev,  i.  is:'..  340. 

r.  Scoft  Kivor  Co.,  ii.  249,  26a 
Short  I-.  Tavlor,  i.  ti73. 
Shortall  r.  llinckley.  iii.  350,  352. 
Shortz  r.  Unaiipst,  ii.  5.)9. 
Shotwell  c.  Harrison,  iii.  836,  343. 

('   Mott,  iii.  552,  654. 


cxxii 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Sliove  V.  Dow,  i.  686. 

V.  Pincke,  iii.  403. 
Showers  v.  Kobiiison,  i.  362,  406,  407, 

452,  459. 
Shrewsbury  First  Par.  v.  Smith,  ii.  556  ; 

iii.  217. 
Shrewsbury's  (Countess  of)  case,  i.  166 ; 

iii.  252. 
Shrickcr  v.  Field,  ii.  249. 
Slirieve  v.  Stokes,  ii.  3S2,  383. 
Shriver  v.  Lynn,  ii.  616  ;  iii,  231. 
Shrunk  v.  Scliuylkill  Nav.  Co.,  iii.  439. 
Shryock  v.  Waggoner,  ii.  526. 
Sliuey  v.  Latta.  ii.  194. 
Sliulelt  V.  Khuielt,  ii.  183. 
Shult  i\  Barker,  i.  150. 
Shults  V.  Moore,  iii.  291,  338,  339. 
Shumway  v.  Collins,  i.  505,  506,  545, 
559. 

V.  Simons,  iii.  59 
Shurtleff  v.  Francis,  iii.  300. 
Shurtz  V.  Thomas,  i   265. 
Shutt  V.  Rambo,  i.  105. 
Sibley  v.  Ellis,  ii.  340. 

V.  Holden,  iii.  449. 

V.  Rider,  ii.  133,  562. 
Sicard  v   Davis,  iii.  164,  285,  844. 
Siceloff  V.  Redman,  ii.  657. 
Sienion  v.  Schurck,  ii.  578. 
Sigmund  u.  Howard  Bank,  i.  475,  565. 
Sigourney  v.  Eaton,  i.  686 ;  ii.  155. 
Sillowav  i:  Brown,  i.  302,  390,406,  421, 

437,  451,  458,  693;  ii.  253. 
Silsby  V.  Allen,  i.  623. 

V.  Bullock,  i.  189. 

V.  Trotter,  ii.  402. 
Silver  Lake  Bank  r.  North,  ii.  240. 
Silver  Sprinsi  D.  &  B.  (^o.  v.  Wanskuck 

Co.,  ii.  367. 
Silvester  v.  Wilson,  ii.  050. 
Simers  v.  Saltus,  i.  595. 
Simkin  r.  Ashurst,  i.  649. 
Simmons  r.  Cloonan,  ii.  331  ;  iii.  421. 

V.  Johnson,  i.  427  ;  iii.  458. 

V.  Norton,  i.  135,  136. 

V.  Simmons,  ii.  768. 

V.  Spratt,  iii.  280. 
Simms  V.  Hervey,  iii.  254. 
Simonds  r.  Powers,  i.  412. 

V,  Turner,  i.  534. 
Simonton  v.  Gray,  i.  216,  238,  239,  244, 
311. 

V.  Loring,  i.  577. 
Simonton's  Estate,  iii.  318. 
Simpkins  r.  Rogers,  i.  142. 
Simpson  v.  Amnions,  i.  681. 

V.  Bowden,  ii.  805. 

V.  Dix,  ii.  105. 

V.  Mundee,  ii.  91  ;  iii.  287,  333,  342. 

V.  Poe,  i.  364. 

V.  Wallace,  i.  364,  410. 
Simpson's  Appeal,  i.  265. 
Sims  V.  Bardoner,  iii.  267. 

V.  Conger,  ii.  621, 


Sims  V.  Everhardt,  iii  266. 

V.  Irvine,  iii.  208. 

1-.  Meacham,  iii.  58. 

V.  Smith,  ii.  405. 
Simson  v.  Eckstein,  ii.  81. 
Sinclair  v.  Armitage,  ii.  48. 

V.  Jackson,  ii.  566,  725,  733;  iii  76, 
116,  120. 
Singer  Mfg.  Co  v.  Lamb,  iii.  267. 
Singleton  v.  Singleton,  i.  303. 
Sip  V.  Lawback,  i.  264. 
Sipes  V.  Mann,  i.  411. 
Sisk  V.  Smith,  i.  266. 
Sisson  V.  Seaburj',  ii.  015. 

V.  Tate,  ii.  282. 
Siter  V.  McClanachan,  ii.  156. 
Sixty-Seventh  Street,  Re,  ii.  709. 
Size  V.  Size,  i.  404,  451. 
Skaggs  V.  Nelson,  ii.  91,  96. 
Skally  V.  Shute,  i.  561. 
Skeel  V.  Spraker,  ii.  212. 
Skerrett  v.  Chille.  Pros.  Soc,  iii.  406. 
Skinner  v.  Beatty,  i.  430. 

V.  Buck,  ii.  263. 

V.  Dayton,  ii.  22. 

V.  Miller,  ii.  45,  53,  63. 

V.  Shepherd,  ii.  2,  325. 

V.  Wilder,  i.  14. 
Skouten  v.  Wood,  i.  408. 
Skraink  v.  Oertel,  ii.  397. 
Skull  V.  Glenister,  ii.  317. 
Slater  v.  Dangerfield,  ii.  658. 

V.  Jepherson,  iii.  161. 

V.  Nason,  i.  79. 

V.  Rawson,  i.  62,  63 ;   iii.  136,  138, 
159,  479,  483,  487.  501. 
Slaughter  v.  Detinev,  i.  434. 

V.  Foust,  ii.  259!^  266. 

V.  Latimer,  i.  429. 

V.  McBride,  i.  415. 
Slavmaker  r.  St.  John,  ii.  518. 
Slay  ton  v.  Mclntire,  ii.  130,  133. 
Slee  r.  Manhattan  Co.,  ii.  43, 53, 81,  206, 

240. 
Sleeper  v.  Laconia,  iii.  4.36. 
Sleigh  V.  Metham,  ii.  443. 
Slice  V.  Derrick,  i.  720 ;  iii.  160,  164. 
Sheer  v.  Pittsburg  Bank,  ii.  189. 
Slim  V.  Croucher,  iii.  90. 
Slingsby  v.  Barnard,  ii.  .383. 
Sloan  V.  Frothingham,  ii.  234. 

I".  HoUida}',  ii.  351. 
Sloane  ;•.  Nance,  i.  401. 

V.  Whitman,  i.  289. 
Slocum  r.  Seymour,  iii.  366,  369. 
Slowey  V.  McMurray,  ii.  53,  62,  63. 
Small  r.  Clifford,  i.  690. 

r.  Jenkins,  i.  687. 

V.  Proctor,  i.  67,  226 ;  iii.  99,  101. 
Smart  r.  Morton,  ii.  384. 

V.  Whaley,  i.  222. 
Sniartle  r.  Williams,  ii.  176. 
Smiles  v.  Hastings,  ii.  350,  356,  396. 
Smiley  v.  Van  Winkle,  i.  585. 


TAIU.K    OF    CASES    CITED. 


cwiii 


Smiley  v.  Wright,  i.  21 1,  liM,  2G1.  304. 
8iiiitli,  (ii)U(ls  of,  iii.  o71. 

I'.  Ailaiiiii,  ii.  ;{77. 

V.  A.l.lleiniin.  i.  HOC. 

V.  Allfii,  i.  7U1 ;  iii.  32!),  356,  3o8, 
:wi. 

V.  Aiiiii-ri>,  ii.  273. 

I'.  Ankriiii.  i.  MiK 

V.  Atkins,  i.  GO-i. 

V.  Hiiltlwin.  i.  :5.{0. 

V.  Barnes,  ii.  35'.t ;  iii.  69. 

V.  Bell.  ii.  783.  7H7.  788. 

I'.  Bennett,  ii.  337. 

V.  Benson,  i.  10;  iii.  '277. 

r.  Brackelt,  i. -lo:*,  410,  421,  141. 

I'.  Brnnnan,  ii.  Di. 

V.  Brinker,  i.  534. 

I'.  Brisson,  ii.  7(15. 

V.  Burijess.  iii.  348. 

V.  Burtis.  iii.  137.  1.38, 1.30, 140, 100, 
170. 

V.  Butler,  iii.  40(5. 

V.  Carney,  iii.  402,  529,  630. 

r.  Cliapin,  iii.  155. 

i^.  C^linpinan,  ii   204. 

V.  ClilTonl,  i.  (!7'.i. 

i;.  Clyfi;>r.i,  ii.  tV.'.A. 

V.  Coluniliia  Ins.  Co.,  ii.  241. 

V.  Common  weiiUI),  i.  20. 

V.  Conipton,  iii.  521. 

V.  Crosland,  i   58H,  504. 

V.  Desciiauines,  i.  :'70. 

V.  Dickinson,  iii.  2'J7. 

V.  Doe,  ii.  KKJ. 

r.  Dyer,  ii.  14t),  147,  268. 

V.  Katon,  i.  404. 

V.  Eppington,  i.  608,  539. 

V.  Estell.  i.  407. 

V.  Eustis,  i.  237,  212,  291,  304. 

V.  Follansbec.  i.  140,  103. 

V.  Forrest,  iii.  457. 

V.  Gaines,  i.  710. 

V.  Ganhier,  i.  202;  ii.  Ill,  200. 

V.  Goodwin,  ii.  140. 

V.  Goiildinn.  i   GOO. 

V.  Hamilton,  iii.  06,  453. 

V.  Hanilv,  i.  2.59. 

r.  Ililenian,  iii.  210,  212. 

V.  Ilosmer,  iii.  Kil,  103,  170,  172. 

r.  Howden,  iii.  452. 

V.  Huglies,  iii.  488.  492,  493. 

V.  Hunt,  iii.  341. 

r.  Hunter,  ii.  750. 

I'.  Infcalls,  i   247. 

r.  Ingram,  iii.  100. 

V.  Jackson,  i.  210.  .300,  703. 

V.  Jewctt,  i.  135,  l.",7,  138. 

I'.  Johns,  ii.  10,'),  130. 

r.  Jolinston,  i.  11  ;  iii.  416. 

r.  Kelly,  ii   10.5,  182.  2.53;  iii.  17 

V.  Kenrick,  ii.  .302,  374. 

V.  Keoliane,  ii.  119. 

»•.  Kni^'lit,  i.  6HH. 

V.  Kniskern,  i.  330. 


Smith  r.  Kncrhel.  ii   01. 
r.  Ladd,  iii.  4i>5 
V.  Lani;i-wal(l,  ii   390. 
V-  Lawrence,  iii.  873. 
r.  Lee,  ii.  3.Vj. 
r    Ix^'wis,  ii.  177. 
I-.  Low.  i.  489. 
c.  Litllefiel.l,  i    (M9,  000. 
('.  Malin>;s,  i   557,  i5<j4. 
r.  .Mallone,  i.  411. 
r.  Manninj;,  ii.  181,  188. 
r.  .Mapieliack,  i    542. 
r.  .Mare,  i.  433. 
r.  .Marrahle,  i.  570. 
r.  .Martin,  iii.  421. 
V.  Met  arty,  i.  229,230. 
IV  .Metiowan,  iii.  2(iO. 
r.  Merritt.  i.  416 
v.  .Metcalf,  ii.  538. 
V.  .Miller,  i.  423.  4.33;  ii.  311. 
r.  Mitcliel,  iii.  10((. 
r.  Monmouth  Ins.  Co.,  ii.  173. 
V.  .Montes,  iii.  121. 
V.  Moodus    Water  Power  Co.,  iii. 

100. 
V.  Moore,  ii.  102,  107,  123,  127,  132, 

1  10,  17f,,  533. 
V.  .Murpiiy,  iii.  434. 
V.  Niver,  i.  681. 
I'.  Omans,  i.  427. 
r.  Packard,  ii.  2.52. 
r.  I'ainter,  ii.  .'>59. 
!•.  Parks,  ii.  6.3,  116. 
V.  Patton,  ii    511.  512. 
»'.  Paysen^er,  i.  2(>4. 
V.  People's  Bank,  ii.  49,  124,  145. 
V.  Porter,  iii.  .3(i4. 
I'.  Powers,  iii.  457. 
r.  Poyas,  i.  14K. 
V.  Pierce,  ii.  275. 
V.  Prewitt,  iii.  455. 
r.  Price,  i.  11  ;  iii.  410. 
c.  Prince,  ii.  195. 
1-.  Provin,  i.  40<i,  421,  438;  ii.  71,  72, 

182,  25.5. 
r.  Putnam,  i.  .504. 
r.  Kaleifih,  i   5(U1,  564. 
r.  Keatl,  iii   623. 
r.  Pice.  ii.  598.  599,  010. 
V.  Pisley,  ii  4'>1. 
I'.  Holierts,  i.  3ti3. 
V.  Saekett.  ii.  515. 
V.  Shaekleford,  iii.  455. 
r.  Shaw,  i    i(32. 
V.  Shepanl.  ii.  142.  144. 
r.  Shulcr,  ii.  10.3,  lO't. 
r.  Simons,  i.  493. 
r.  Sloeomb,  iii.  449,  450. 
V.  Smith,  i.  210.  222.  227,  298.  .3.30. 

3:57.  .382.  038;  ii.  79.  123,  IW; 

iii.  109. 
V.  Snow.  ii.  781 

V.  So.  lioyalton  Bank,  iii.  322. 
V.  Sjiencer,  i.  270. 


CXXIV 


TABLE  OP  CASES  CITED. 


Smith  I'.  Sprague,  iii.  505. 

V.  Stanley,   i.    230,    241,  245 ;    ii. 
190. 

V.  Starr,  ii.  783. 

V.  Steele,  iii.  222. 

V.  Stewart,  i.  370,  627. 

V.  Striihan,  ii.  500,  508,  509,  513. 

V.  Strong,  iii.  102,  424,  487,  527. 

V.  Surman,  i.  13;  iii.  364,  365,  367, 
369. 

V.  Tarlton,  i.  701. 

V.  Taylor,  ii.  142. 

V.  Thackeraii,  ii.  882. 

V.  Uzzell,  i.  455. 

V.  Vincent,  ii.  109,  133. 

r.  Waggoner,  i.  10,  26. 

V.  Wells,  i.  362,  407. 

V.  Whitbeck,  i.  512. 

V.  Williams,  iii.  347. 

V.  Wilson,  ii.  50. 

r.  Wright,  ii.  522. 

V.  Yule,  iii.  338. 
Smith's  Appeal,  ii.  760. 
Smitli  Paper  Co.  v.  Servin,  i.  22. 
Smither  v.  Willock,  ii.  598. 
Smitlmrst  v.  Edmunds,  ii.  163. 
Smithwick  r.  Ellison,  i.  20. 

V.  Jordan,  ii.  499. 
Smyles  ;•.  Hastings,  ii.  396. 
Smyth  V.  Carlisle,  iii.  3.54. 

V.  Tankersley,  i.  605. 
Snape  v.  Turton,  ii.  697. 
Snavely  v.  Pickle,  ii.  54. 
Snedecor  r.  Freeman,  ii.  105. 
Snedeker  v.  Warring,  i.  8,  23;  ii.  163. 
Sneed  v.  Jenkins,  i.  599. 

V.  Osborn,  iii.  96,  97. 
Sneider  v.  Heidelberger,  i.  355,  366. 
Snell  V.  Iowa  Homestead  Co.,  iii.  511, 

530. 
Snively  v.  Luce.  i.  719. 
Snoddy  v.  Kreutch,  iii.  139. 
Snodgrass  v.  Ricketts,  iii.  83,  89,  93. 
Snow  V.  Chapman,  iii.  427. 

V.  Orleans,  iii.  294,  351. 

V.  Parsons,  ii.  367. 

V.  Snow,  iii.  13. 

I'.  Stevens,  i.  239,  241. 
Snowden  v.  Wilas,  i.  663,  665,  669 ;  ii. 

316. 
Snowman  v.  Harford,  ii.  263. 
Snyder  v.  Jennings,  iii.  511. 

V.  Lane,  iii.  495. 

V.  Rilev,  i.  548. 

V.  Snyder,  i.  308;  iii.  24-3. 

V.  Summers,  ii.  218,  219,  220. 
Snyder's  Appeal,  ii.  499,  500,  765,  773. 
Socher's  Appeal,  ii.  525,  526. 
Society  Prop.   Gospel   v.  Hartland,  il. 
478. 

V.  Pawlet,  iii.  149. 
Society  Thenl.  Ed.  v.  Attv.-Gen.,  ii.  29. 
Sohier  r.  Coffin,  iii.  .349,  350. 

V.  Eldridge,  i.  129. 


Sohier  v.  Mass.  Gen.  Hospital,  iii.  226, 
227,  228,  229. 
i;.  Trinity  Church,  i.  35 ;  ii.  3 ;  iii. 
230. 
Sollee  V.  Croft,  ii.  570. 
Solms  V.  McCuUock,  ii.  151. 
Solomon  v.  Vintner's  Co.,  ii.  385. 

V.  Wilson,  ii.  43. 
Somers  v.  Pumphrev,  i.  486 ;   iii.  301, 
302,  303,  309. 
V.  Schmidt,  iii.  505. 
Somersworth  Savings  Bank  v.  Roberts, 

ii.  45. 
Somes  v.  Brewer,  iii.  354,  359. 

V.  Skinner,  i.  484,  699;  ii.  267,  573; 
iii.  105,  117,  119,  128,498. 
Soper  V.  Guernsey,  ii.  69,  70. 
Souder  v.  Morrow,  ii.  152;  iii.  340. 
Soule  V.  Albee,  ii.  158,  265. 
South  i\  AUeine,  iii.  565. 
South  Berwick  ?-.  Huntress,  iii.  255. 
Southbr.  Sav.  Bank  v.  Exeter  Works, 
i.  10,  22,  26. 
V.  Stevens  Co.,  i.  10,  22. 
South  Car.  Bank  v.  Campbell,  ii.  224. 

V.  Mitchell,  ii.  230. 
South  Cong.  Meeting-House  v.  Hilton, 

i.  479. 
South   Metropolitan   Cemetery   Co.  v. 

Eden,  ii.  318. 
South  Sea  Co.  v.  Wymondsell,  ii.  535. 
Southard  v.  N.  J.  Cent,  R.  R.  Co.,  ii. 

16 ;  iii.  658. 
Southcote  V.  Stowell,  ii.  668,  700. 
Souther  v.  Wilson,  ii.  252. 
Southerin  v.  Mendum,  i.  553 ;  ii.  102, 

123,  127,  132. 
Southern  Life  Ins.,  &c.  Co.  v.  Cole,  iii. 

312,  323. 
Southwick  I'.  Atlantic  Ins.  Co.,  ii  122. 
Soutter  V.  Porter,  i.  688. 
Souverbve  v.  Arden,  iii.  298,  303,  313, 

314,  3i5,  322,  358. 
Spader  v.  Lawler,  ii.  56,  151,  159,  162. 
Spalding  v.  Shalmer,  ii.  568,  574. 

V.  Woodward,  i.  715. 
Spangler  v.  Stanler,  i.  203,  2.34,  497. 
Sparhawk  v.  Bagg,  ii.  140,  177;  iii.  352, 
435. 
V.  Sparhawk,  i.  320;  iii.  540. 
V.  Twichell,  ii.  390. 
V.  Wills,  ii.  184,  234,  238. 
Sparks   v.  State   Bank,  i.  27  ;    ii.  151, 

346. 
Sparrow  v.  Hovey,  iii.  144. 

V.  Kingman,  i.  250;  iii.  99,  101. 
Spaulding  v.  Chicago  R.  R.,  i.  157. 

V.  Warren,  i.  64  ;  iii.  104. 
Spear  r.  Fuller,  i.  510,  511. 
Speckels  i\  Sax,  i.  523. 
Speer  v.  Evans,  ii.  153  ;  iii.  335,  343. 

V.  Speer,  iii.  325,  326. 
Spence  v.  Steadman,  ii.  55. 
i  Spencer  v.  Carr,  iii.  90,  309. 


TAHLK    OF   CASES    CITKD. 


cxxv 


Spencer  v.  Gi'is«mnn,  i.  307. 

V.  Lewin,  i.  14*J. 

I'.  Miiiiboruuttli,  ii.  720. 

17.  SiKiKLT.  i.  1H6;  ii.  "JIO,  220. 

I'.  VViitiTiiian,  ii.  222. 

f.  Wi-st(in,  i.  27S,  ;!1H. 
Spencer's  wise,  i.  uiil,  <'>.'J2.  I'i'M. 
Sperrv  r.  .Sperry,  i-  <>1'>,  oHl  ;   li.  II,  18. 
Spi^ieiier  r.  CooDer,  iii.  (12. 
Spiller  r.  ScriliiKT,  iii.  81,424,  464,  46y. 
Spiinlle  r.  .Slireve,  ii.  533. 
Spitts  r    Wells,  i.  712. 
Spivii  r.  Jeter,  i.  332. 
Spoon  V.  \'.iii  Fosscn,  i.  4.35. 
Sprnjrue  r.  Miiker.  iii.  4l»l,  497,  607. 

V.  giiimi,  i.ijlit. 

I'.  Snow,  iii.  4tJ4,  472. 

V.  Spnijriie,  ii.  40G,  4(37. 

I'.  U'ooils,  ii,  457,  475,  470. 
Sprijrg  r.  Mt.  IMeasant  Bunk,  ii.  64  ;  iii. 

401. 
Spring  c.  Fiske,  ii.  185. 
Sl)ringer  r.  Herrv,  ii.  503. 

r.  riiillips,  ii.  2"J4. 
Sprinjjflelil  '•.  Miller,  iii.  217. 
Sprouie  f.  I'oye,  iii.  451. 
Spurjieon  r.  ('oilier,  ii.  GO. 
Spvve  V.  Toplmm,  iii.  408. 
Squire  v.  ('aMipl)ell,  ii.  327,  300. 

V.  ConiptiMi,  ii.  223,  224. 

V.  Mu'lL'ett,  i.  377. 
Squires  i:  Huff,  i.  (331.  643. 
St.  Amour,  &i;.     .Sec  Saint  Amour,  &c. 
Staats  r.  Ten  Eyck,  iii.  520. 
Stackjiole  i\  .Vrnold,  ii.  5.3. 

V.  Uobhins,  iii.  401. 
Staffor.l  .-.  Kliiott.  i.  432. 

V.  Lick.  iii.  336. 

i;.  Koof,  i.  480,  488. 

V.  Van  Kcnsselaer,  ii.  91. 
Stags?  V.  Kuroka  Co.,  i   592. 
Stall  r.  Cincinnati,  ii.  575.- 
Stambauiili  r.  Yeates,  i.  12. 
Stamford  Bank  r.  Benedict,  ii.  228. 
Stamper  r.  (iriffln,  iii.  174. 

r.  Johnson,  ii.  51. 
Standen  r.  (.'Iirismas,  i.  SOS,  639. 
Standish  i-.  Lawrence,  ii.  2!>9,  387. 
Staniford  r.  Fullerton,  i.  088. 
Stanley  v.  Colt.  ii.  3.  538.  5»;7. 

r.  Green,   iii.    287,  314,   408,   427, 
42'J. 

V.  Greenwood,  i.  379. 

V.  Hayes,  iii.  5()7. 

V.  Kempton,  ii.  74,  120. 

V.  Snyder,  iii.  354. 
Stanly  i-.  Stocks,  ii.  210. 
Stansbury  v.  Taggart,  iii.  174. 
Stansell  r.  Uolverts,  ii.  90,  151. 
Stansfield  v.  Habergham,  ii.  678 

f.  Mayor,  &c.,  i.  4(JG. 

V.  Port.<moutli,  i.  34. 
Stantons  r.  Thompson,  ii.  20.3. 
Stanwood  r.  Dunning,  i.  228,  229. 


Staple  r.  Spring,  i.  671. 
Staples  V.  Brown,  i.  189. 

V.  Dean,  iii.  626,  627. 
Stark  r.  Brown,  ii.  114. 

c.  Collin,  i.  -M;  iii.  461. 

V.  Ilniiton.  i.  334. 

f.  MeCioweii,  ii.  304. 

c.  .Mercer,  ii.  269. 
Starke  r.  Starke,  ii.  536,  630. 

r.  U'iition,  ii.  636. 
Starr  r.  Kllis.  ii.  198,  202,  602. 

r.  Jackson,  i.  020,  621. 

V.  I'eaite,  i.  201. 
State  r.  Alstead,  ii.  390. 

t>.  Arledge,  iii.  203. 

V.  Bonliam,  i.  9. 

V.  Brown,  i.  95. 

V.  ChrlMman,  iii.  818. 

V.  Crtitclifiel.l,  iii.  202. 

i:  Ciilvi-r.  ii    3'.H5. 

V.  Franklin  Fails  Co.,  ii.  3G9,  390 

V.  Fry.  i.  201. 

V.  Giiniantun.  iii.  436,  443. 

c.  Glen.  iii.  442. 

r.  Godfrey,  ii.  26. 

V.  Jeiniiiijjs,  iii.  294 

I'.  Jersey  City,  iii.  440. 

t;.  Laval,  ii.  110,  172. 

i".  Lawson,  ii.  170. 

V.  Meiogue,  i.  370,  387,  419,  460. 

V.  Moore,  i.  139  ;  ii.  406. 

V.  Page,  i.  407. 

v.  I'eck,  iii.  287,321. 

V.  I'ottniever,  i.  4;  iii.  363. 

V.  Uaglam'l,  ii.  107. 

r.  Koberta,  ii.  390. 

«•.  Smith,  ii.  784. 

r.  Throup,  ii.  216. 

1-.  Titus,  ii.  215. 

V.  Tolson,  ii.  765,  768. 

V.  Tra.sk,  iii.  80. 

V.  Wiiitbank,  iii.  569. 
State  Bank  v.  Evans,  iii.  819,  321,  322. 

1-.  Kcrcherd.  i.  10,  23. 

V.  Kercheval,  ii.  163. 

IV  Tweedy,  ii.  128. 

State  Reservation  Commrs.,  Re,  iii.  02 

Statham  r.  Bell.  ii.  747. 

Steacv  r   Rice.  ii.  540. 

Stearns  r.  Godfrev,  i.  (303 ;  ii.  28. 

V.  Harris,  ii.  "lO,  18. 

V.  Hender.-tas",  iii.  121. 

V.  Samj)!ion,  i.  057,  (559. 

V.  Swift,  i.  257,  258  ;  iii.  272. 
Stebbins  r.  Duncan,  iii.  341. 

V.  Hall,  iii.  522. 

V  Merritt,  iii.  288. 

r.  Miller,  i.  421,459;  ii.  183. 
I-.  Morri",  ii.  678. 
1-.  Wolf.  iii.  631. 
Stedmnn  r.  Fortune,  i.  282. 
u.  Gassett,  i.  696,  018. 
r.  Mcintosh,  1.  631. 
V.  Smith,  i.  692,  098 ;  iii.  163. 


CXXVl 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED. 


Steedman  r.  Hilliard,  iii.  164. 
Steel  r.  Black,  ii.  54. 

V.  Cook,  iii.  558. 

V.  Frick,  i.  604,  608. 

V.  Johnson,  iii.  158. 

V.  Prickett,  iii.  450. 

V.  Smelting  Co.,  iii.  88,  91. 

V.  Steel,  ii.  45,  147 ;  iii.  325,  326, 
380. 
Steele  v.  Magie,  i.  235. 

V.  Mart,  i.  469. 
Steele's  Appeal,  iii.  565. 
Steere  v.  Steere,  ii.  547. 

V.  Tiffany,  ii.  360,  395,  396. 
Stegall  l:  Stegall,  i.  253. 
Stein  V.  Burden,  ii.  362 ;  iii.  59. 

r.  Hauck,  ii.  365. 
Steinbach  v.  Stewart,  iii.  287,  354. 
Steiner  v.  Coxe,  iii.  205. 

V.  Kolb,  ii.  655. 
Stelle  V.  Carroll,  i.  214. 
Stephen  v.  Beall,  ii.  522,  523. 
Stephen's  Appeal,  ii.  91. 
Stephens  v.  Bridges,  i.  586. 

V.  Gerrard,  iii.  536. 

V.  Hume,  i.  181,  182. 

V.  Huss,  iii.  306. 

V.  Mansfield,  iii.  73. 

V.  Rinehart,  iii.  306. 

V.  Sherrod,  i.  230  ;  ii.  51. 

V.  Stephens,  ii.  749. 
Stephenson  v.  Haines,  ii.  292. 

V.  Osborn,  i.  355. 

V.  Thompson,  ii.  619. 
Sterling  v.  Baldwin,  iii.  367,  309. 

V.  Penlington,  i.  183. 

V.  Warden,  i.  659,  662,  663,  671. 
Sterry  v.  Arden,  iii.  354,  355,  358. 
Stetson  I.".  Day,  i.  160. 

V.  Dow,  iii.  108,  420,  460. 

V.  O'Sullivan,  ii.  33. 

V.  Patten,  iii.  294,  297. 
Stevens,  Re,  i.  32,  33. 

V.  Buffalo  R.  K  ,  i.  17. 

V.  Cooper,  ii.  135,  209,  211,  214. 

V.  Dedham  Sav.  Inst.,  ii.  190,  259. 

V.  Dennett,  ii.  338,  339 ;  iii.  88. 

V.  Dewing,  i.  88. 

V.  Enders,  i.  715. 

V.  Hampton,  iii.  334,  339,  341. 

V.  Hollister,  iii.  138,  161 

V.  King,  iii.  443. 

V.  McNamara,  iii.  83. 

V.  Morse,  iii.  338,  353. 

V.  Myers,  i.  435. 

V.  Owen,  1.  219,  257. 

V.  Patterson,  &c.  R.  R.,  ii.  391. 

V.  Reed,  i.  288. 

V.  Sampson,  i.  645. 

V.  Smith,  i.  208,  233  ;  iii.  199. 

j;.  Stevens,  i.  297,   360,  420.   663, 
666,  670,  673  ;  ii.  506,  607. 

V.  Taft,  iii.  161,  171. 

V.  Thompson,  i.  697. 


Stevens  v.  Winship,  i.  125,  126. 
Stevenson  v.  Black,  ii.  125,  128. 

V.  Glover,  if.  783. 

V.  Gray,  i.  223. 

V.  Jackson,  i.  407. 

i\  Lambard,  i.  552,  557. 

r.  Maroney,  i.  418. 

V.  Wallace,  ii.  381. 
Steward  v.  Harding,  i.  640. 

V.  Winters,  i.  679. 
Stewart  v.  Apel,  i.  477. 

V.  Barrow,  ii.  105. 

V.  Brady,  i.  86 ;  ii.  9. 

V.  Brand,  i.  360,  436. 

V.  Chadwick.  i.  313 ;  ii.  401,   524, 
572 

V.  Crosbv,   ii.  125,   133,   166,   168, 
179." 

V.  Davis,  ii.  253. 

V.  Doughty,   i.   11,   138,   140,   141, 
606  ;  iii.  867. 

V.  Drake,  iii.  511. 

V.  Fitch,  iii.  445. 

V.  Hutchins,  ii.  58. 

V.  Lispenard,  iii.  547. 

V.  Mackey,  i.  426,  442,  443. 

V.  McMartin,  i.  313. 

V.  McSweeney,  iii.  238,   338,   339, 
352. 

r.  Pettus,  ii.  553,  567. 

V.  Putnam,  i.  570,  572. 

V.  Roderick,  i.  595. 

V.  Rogers,  iii.  357. 

V.  Stewart,  i.  266. 

V.  Weed,  iii.  305,  308,  313,  316. 
Stiewell  V.  Burdell,  ii.  224. 
Stiles  V.  Brown,  iii.  299,  322. 
Stilley  V.  Folger,  i.  333. 
Stillman  ;;.  Pleumken,  i.  28. 

V.  Stillman,  ii.  227. 

V.  White    Rock    Manuf.    Co.,    iii. 
171. 
Stillwell  V.  Doughty,  i.  551. 

V.  Knapper,  ii.  10 ;  iii.  18,  578. 
Stilwell  V.  Hubbard,  iii.  311. 
Stimpson  v.  Butterman,  i.  677. 

I'.  Thomastown  Bank,  i.  247. 
Stinde  v.  Beiirens,  i.  354. 
Stinebaugh  v.  Wisdom,  i.  181. 
Stinson  v.  Richardson,  i.  435. 

V.  Ross,  ii.  31. 

V.  Sumner,  i.  262,  266 ;  iii.  530. 
Stipe  V.  Stipe,  iii.  511. 
Stoakes  i\  Barrett,  ii.  405. 
Stobie  V.  Dills,  i.  582. 
Stockbridge  Iron  Co.  v.  Hudson  Iron 

Co.,  ii.  402 ;  iii.  407,  408,  462,  466. 
Stockham  i'.  Browning,  iii.  459. 
Stocking  V.  Fairchild,  ii.  58. 
Stockton  V.  Martin,  i.  107. 

t;.  Williams,  iii.  198,  199,  203,  2^5, 
351,  352. 
Stockton's  Appeal,  i.  652,  653 
Stockwell  V.  Campbell,  i.  23,  30. 


TAHLK    OF    CASKS    flTKI). 


CXXVll 


Stockwell  c.  Couillanl,  lii.  4GI. 

/•.  Hunter,  i.  lit,  :u'. 
Stotlilanl  r.  CliaiiibtTB,  iii.  204,  205. 

c.  (jibbs,  i.  Ib^J. 

V.  Mart,  ii.  55,  HU,  110,  111. 

r.  I'owoll,  iii.  5H. 

I'.  Wiiitiiifr,  ii.  01. 
Stoever  r.  Stoever,  ii.  45. 
Stokes  r.  Mutciier,  i.  410. 

i:  MtKibhin,  i.  173,  177,  000. 

r.  I'liyiie,  ii.  "OH. 
Stokoe  r.  Singers,  ii.  095. 

I'.  Upton,  i.  ;]2. 
Stolp  ('.  lloyt,  iii.  03,  437. 
Stone  V.  Ashley,  ii.  475;  iii.  201. 

r.  AuKUsta,  iii.  430. 

I'.  Hale.  i.  401». 

V.  Hislioii,  ii.  604. 

V.  Boston  Steel,  &c.  Co  ,  iii.  460. 

V.  Clark,  iii.  453. 

V.  Darnell,  i.  420. 

V.  Ellis,  ii.  22. 

r.  Griffin,  ii.  555. 

V.  Jaekson,  i.  573. 

f.  Laliey,  i.  GOO. 

V.  Lane,  ii.  157,  200. 

V.  Montgomery,  iii.  273. 

r.  Myers,  iii.  358. 

V.  Patterson,  i.  553  ;  ii.  142. 

V.  Proctor,  i.  20. 

V.  Spra«ue,  i.  5<J0,  024,  632. 

V.  Welling',  ii.  151. 
Stonebrnker  r.  Zollicoffer,  i.  137. 
Stoneiiewer  r.  Tlionipson,  ii.  IHI. 
St^ner  «•.  llunsicker,  i.  28. 
Stones  V.  Maney,  ii.  745,  705. 
Stoney  v.  Hank  of  Charleston,  i.  205. 

V.  Sliultz.  ii.  212.215,235. 
Stoollbos  V.  Jenkins,  i.  lJ!'2. 
Stoppelbein  c.  Shulte,  i.  210. 
Stoppelkanip  v.  Mangeot.  i.  G31. 
Storer  v.  Freeman,  iii.  440,  447. 
Storm  V.  Mann,  i.  107. 
Storrs  r.  Barker,  iii.  HI. 
Story  I'.  Elevated  U.  H.,  ii.  317,  327. 

V.  Oilin,  ii   355,  303. 

r.  Saunders,  i.  08'J. 
Stotesbury  i-.  Vail,  i.  584. 
Stott  c.  Hutherford,  i.  5!I3. 
Stoughton  r.  Leigh,  i.  U',  150,  151,  217, 

220,  285.  2'J5,  2!»7. 
Stout  V.  Keene.  i.  648. 

V.  Merrill,  i.  5'J5. 
Stoutenburgh  v.  Moore,  ii.  567,  717. 
Stover  I'.  Evcleshimer,  ii.  770,  777  ;  iii. 
102,  370. 

tr.  Jack,  iii.  01.441. 
Stow  V.  Lillie,  i   440. 

r.  Tifft,  i.  230.  232.  237. 

V.  Wyse.  ii.  041  ;  iii.  109,  110. 
Stowell  v.  Flagp,  ii.  370. 

V.  Lincoln,  ii.  308,  398. 

r.  Pike,  ii.  110,  140. 
StraflTord  v.  Wentworth,  i.  183. 


Straight  r.  Harris,  ii.  221. 
.Strail  r.  Brown,  il.  371,  377. 
Strang  f.  .Moog,  ii.  105,  107. 
Straiton  r.  (iulil,  ii.  07. 

r.  .Staples,  i.  571. 
Strauss's  Appial,  ii.  30,  88.  00. 
Strawii  c.  .Sirawn,  iii.  124. 
Streaper  tv  Fisher,  i.  527. 
Stricklanii  v.  Parker,  i.  18,  23. 
Striikier  «,'.  Todd,  i.  008;  ii.  316,  334, 

335. 
Striker  r.  Mott,  ii.  705. 
Strimpfler  v.  Roberts,  ii.  617,  618,  635, 

644. 
Stringer  r.  Young,  iii.  204,  205.  200. 
Strobe  r.  Downer,  ii.  270. 
Strobel,  A'x/«i)7.,  i.  441. 
."Strode  r.  Russell,  ii.  140. 
Stroliecker  v.  Barnes,  i.  522. 
Strong  V.  Blanchard,  ii.  234,  2.'}8. 

V.  Bragg,  i.  314. 

V.  Clem,  i.  200,  318;  ii.  43. 

17.  Converse,  i.  231,  239,  242,  243, 
ii.  117,201, 

V.  Doyle,  i.  21. 

V.  Jackson,  ii.  118,  125. 

r.  .Manufacturers'  Ins.  Co.,  ii.  241. 

V.  Shea,  ii.  01. 
Stronghill  r.  Austey,  ii.  708. 
Strother  r.  Law,  ii.  73,  74,  77. 

V.  Lucas,  iii.  74,  204. 
Stroud  V.  Casey,  ii.  209. 
Stroyan  r   Knowles,  ii.  382. 
Stuart  i:  Baker,  i.  719. 

r.  Clark,  i.   124;    ii.   184;    iii.  247, 
443. 

r.  Ilutchins,  ii.  111. 

V.  Kissam,  i.  341. 

I-.  Walker,  ii.  784. 

r.  Wilder,  i.  345. 
Stubblefield  v.  Graves,  i.  387. 
Stubbs  r.  Parsons,  i.  524. 
Stucker  r.  Stucker,  ii.  207. 
Stucke}'  V.  Keefe,  i.  343. 
Stukely  v.  Butler,  i.  13. 
Stuitz  i".  Dickey,  i.  144. 
Stump  r.  Findlay.  i.  125. 

V.  Jordan,  ii.  0.'>4. 
Sturgeon  r.  Wingfield,  i   484. 
Sturges  r.  Briilgman.  ii.  330,  338,  339. 
Sturgess  v.  Cleveland,  ii    155. 
Sturgion  v.  Dorothy  Painter,  i.  481. 
Sturgif  r.  Ewing,  i.  195. 
Sturtevant  v.  Phelps,  i.  302. 

V.  Sturtevant,  ii   544. 
Stuyvesant  v.  Dunham,  iii.  173. 

V.  Hall.  ii.  154,211,  212,221. 

V.  Hone,  ii.  221. 

c.  Mavor  of  New  York,  ii.  7,  12,  20 
Style  r.  Wardle,  i.  470. 
Suarez  v.  Ptm)ptlly,  ii.  651,  566. 
.Sucier  r.  Marsales.  i.  Oo^). 
Sudbury  Parish  i:  .Tones,  i.  6. 
Suffleld  V.  Baskervil,  ii.  61. 


CXXTlll 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 


Suffield  (•.  Brown,  ii.  332. 

Suffolk  Ins.  Co.  V.  Bovden,  ii.  241. 

Sullivan  c.  Barry,  i.  4ii9;  iii.  2(32. 

V.  Enders,  i.  621,  648. 

V.  McLenans,  i.  721 ;  ii.  514. 

V.  Ryan,  ii.  330 

V.  Sullivan,  iii.  540. 

V.  Winsluw,  i.  419,  434,  450. 
Sullivan  Granite  Co.  r.  Gordon,  iii,  457. 
Summers  v.  Babb,  i.  301,  314. 

V.  Bromlev,  ii.  264. 

V.  Donneli,  i.  311. 

V.  Kilgus,  ii.  154. 
Sumner  v.  Bromilow,  i.  38. 

V.  Coleman,  ii.  265. 

V.  Conant,  i.  259  ;  iii.  273. 

V.  Hampson,  i.  299. 

V.  I'artridge,  i.  186,  276. 

V.  Sawtelle,  i.  374,  375  ;  ii.  520,  576 

V.  Stevens,  iii.  72,  156,  174. 

V.  Williams,  iii.  390,  466,  468,  521, 
522. 
Sumwalt  V.  Tucker,  ii.  107. 
Sunderland  v.  Sunderland,  ii.  507,  511. 
Sunderlin  v.  Struthers,  iii.  109,  127. 
Supervisors    of    Warren   County,   &c 

See  Warren  County,  &c. 
Surman  v.  Surman,  ii.  788  ;  iii.  665. 
Sury  V.  Pigot,  i.  63 ;  ii.  340. 
Sussex  V.  Temple,  ii.  664. 
Sussex  Ins.  Co.  v.  Woodruff,  ii.  241. 
Sutherland  v.  Jackson,  iii.  449. 
Sutliff  V.  Atwood,  i.  526. 
Sutplien  V.  Cushman,  ii.  53. 

V.  Therkelson,  ii.  331,  863,  364,  365. 
Sutter  V.  San  Francisco,  i.  689. 
Sutton  v.  Aiken,  ii.  467,  472,  488,  500. 

V.  Burrows,  i.  316. 

V.  Calhoun,  iii.  236. 

V.  Manby,  i.  17. 

V.  Mason,  ii.  106. 

V.  Temple,  i.  575,  576. 

V.  Warren,  i.  223. 
Sutton  First  Parish  v.  Cole,  i.  81 ;  ii. 

434,  564 ;  iii.  283. 
Suydam  v.  Bartle,  ii.  259. 

V.  Jackson,  i.  523,  537. 

r.  Jones,  iii.  504. 
Swaine  v.  Perine,  i.  181,  227,  242,  255, 

304,  309,  310,  331  ;  ii.  223,  224. 
Swan  V.  Australian  Co.,  iii.  255. 

V.  Hammond,  iii.  575. 

V.  Hodges,  iii.  299. 

I'  Moore,  iii  344. 

V.  Stephens,  i.  406,  452,  459. 

li!  Stransham,  i.  535. 

V.  Wiswall,  ii.  271. 
Swansborough  v.  Coventry,  ii.  319,400. 
Swartz  V.  Leist,  ii.  102,  121,  122,  128, 
199,  200. 

V.  Swartz,  i.  688;  iii.  412,  414,  420. 
Swasey  v.  Brooks,  iii.  479. 

r.  Little,  ii.  36,  294  ;  iii.  565. 
Sweatt  V.  Corcoran,  iii.  209,  210. 


Sweeney  v.  Garrett,  i.  513. 
Sweet  V.  Brown,  iii.  508. 

V.  Harding,  i.  514. 

I'.  Parker,  ii.  53. 
Sweetapple  v.  Bindon,  i.  178,  236. 
Sweetser  v.  McKenney,  i.  469. 
Sweetzer  v.  Jones,  i.  10,  29. 
Swenson  v.  Kiehl,  i.  301. 
Swetland  v.  Swetland,  ii.  51,  53,  57,  63. 
Swett  V.  Sherman,  ii.  203,  228. 
Swift  V.  Edson,  ii.  252,  272. 

V.  Gage,  iii.  164. 

V.  Kraeiner,  i.  430  ;  ii.  201. 

V.  Mendell,  ii.  254. 

V.  Thompson,  i.  28. 
Swigert  v.  Bank  of  Kentucky,  ii.  229. 
Swiney  v.  Swiney,  iii  311. 
Swinton  v.  Legare,  ii.  599. 
Swisher  r.  Williams,  iii.  352. 
Swords  V.  Edgar,  i.  571. 
Svler  V.  Eckhart,  iii.  248. 
Sylvester  y.  Ralston,  i.  624,  627. 
Syme  v.  Sanders,  i.  592,  599. 
Symes  v.  Hill,  ii.  119, 127,  145. 
Symmes  v.  Drew,  i.  319. 
Symonds  v.  Hall,  i  609. 
Syracuse  City  Bank  v.  Tallman,  ii.  106, 

110,  114,  143, 144, 145,  173. 
Syron  v.  Blakeman,  i  663. 


Tabb  V.  Baird,  ii.  473. 

Table  Mountain  Tunnel  Co.  v.  Strana- 

han,  ii.  406,  406,  407. 
Tabler  v.  Wiseman,  i.  713,  715,  716. 
Tabor  v.  Grover,  ii  148. 

V.  Robinson,  i.  29. 
Tadlock  v.  Eccles,  i.  411,  442  ;  ii.  263. 
Taft  V.  Kessel,  ii  98. 

V.  Stevens,  ii.  145. 

V.  Taft,  ii.  698. 
Tainter  v.  Clark,  ii.  553,  554,  555,  695, 
716,717;  iii.  567. 

V.  Cole,  i.  492. 
Talbot  V.  Brodhill,  ii.  239. 

V.  Whipple,  i.  32,  582. 
Taliaferro  r.  Burwell,  i.  175. 

V.  Gay,  ii.  110. 

V.  Pry,  i.  447. 
Tallmadtre  v.  East  River  Bank,  ii.  323, 
327. 

V.  Tallmadge,  i.  367. 
Tallman  v.  Coffin,  i.  511,  632. 

V.  Ely,  ii.  114,  250. 

V.  Snow,  ii.  13,18. 
Tally  r.  Thompson,  i  855. 
Taltarum's  case,  i.  101,  102,  103. 
Tanner  v.  Plicks,  ii.  97. 

V.  Hills,  i.  604,  606. 
Tapley  v.  Tapley,  iii.  276. 
Tapner  v.  Merlott,  ii.  437. 
Tappan  v.  Burnham,  iii.  138,  152,  210. 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


CXXIX 


Tappan  r.  DebluiH,  iii.  Gol,  654. 

«'.  Kviiijs,  ii.  iJ.'j». 

V.  Hfdtiol.l,  lii.  2\)7. 

v.  Th])I»iii,  iii.  155. 
Tarbt'll  r.  liowinun,  iii.  520. 
Tarplt'V  r.  Wiiniv,  ii.  51.'>. 
Tarry  c.  Asliton,  i.  571. 
Tartar  v.  Hall.  iii.  111. 

V.  Spring'  Cri-ek.  ^;c.  Co.,  ii.  406. 
Taskcr  r.  Hartlott,  iii.  2b8,  U«y. 
Tate  V.  (^rtiwsoii,  i.  512. 

V.  Jay.  i.  'J14. 

V.  Suutlianl,  iii.  455. 

V.  Stooltzfoos,  iii.  224. 
Tatein  v.  Cliaplin,  i.  531. 
Taul  i:  Campl>ell,  i.  :i4:J.  700. 
Taunton  v.  Custar,  i.  G45,  055,  066. 
Tayloc  r.  (Jould,  i.  183. 
Taylor  r.  Haili-v,  i.  575. 

1-.  Hal.hviii'  i.  0!)7  ;  ii.  'J3. 

1-.  Bi.l.Uil,  ii.  7.:iO. 

r.  Blaki',  i.  713. 

f.  Huiilware,  i.  357,  466,  461. 

c.  Hoyil,  iii.  232. 

V.  IJroderiuk,  i.  294. 

f.  CalchvL'll,  i.  475. 

I'.  Chowniiijj,  ii.  72. 

r.  Cole,  i.  (i55. 

f).  Cox,  i.  07U. 

V.  Dean,  ii.  184.  253. 

r.  Dickinson,  ii.  600. 

r.  Fickas,  ii.  372. 

V.  KowltT,  i.  237. 

V.  (j laser,  iii.  287. 

r.  Hampton,  ii.  359,  398;  iii.  69. 

V.  HarKous,  i.  384,401,429,447. 

V.  Honle,  iii.  1.J7,  142. 

V.  Hunter,  ii.  '.t.j. 

V.  Kelly,  iii.  352. 

V.  Kinji,  iii   21t8,  3'.»1. 

I'.  Lusk,  i.  310. 

V.  Maris,  ii.  221. 

V.  Mason,  ii.  11,  12. 

V.  McCrackin,  i.  210,  304. 

V.  MiKlvin,  i.  .XI. 

V.  McLain,  ii.  .VJ. 

V.  Morton,  iii.  251. 

V.  Mosely,  ii.  507. 

V.  <^wen,  ii.  295,  300. 

V.  I'aiie,  ii.  25M. 

V.  Porter,  i.   70;  ii.  181,   182;    iii. 
224,  220. 

V.  Robinson,  iii.  329. 

r.  Short,  ii.  213. 

V.  Shun'onl.  iii.  464. 

V.  Sluiin.  i.  626. 

V.  Steele,  iii.  240,  4.'..1 

c.  Sutton,  ii.  8,  it,  24. 

V.  Taylor,  i.  001.  004.  <)07,008,  070; 
ii.  50,  0.55.  755.  707. 

V.  Tuwnseml,  ii.  130,320. 

V.  Wfiil,  ii.  47. 

r.  Wliiteliead,  ii.  365. 

t;.  Zamira.  i.  624. 
Vol..  I.—  i 


Taylor's  case,  i.  24B. 
Tiall  r.  Ufwiil,  i.  24. 
Tiaj{ue  r.  Downs,  i.  100. 
T.al  r.  Walkir.  ii.  60.  143. 
Tebi.  V.  Ho.lK'e,  ii.  103. 
Tebbftts  r.  Filton,  ii.  608. 
Tcetl  r.  ( "iirutlK-rs,  ii.  96 
Tcilc  '■.  Hatliaway,  ii.  592. 
Ti-lfonl  r.  Harney,  ii.  5;{0. 
Teniplenian  r.  HidilU*.  i.  144. 
Tenipleton  »•.  Vosldoe,  ii.  378. 
Tenant  v.  (ioldwin.  ii.  319,  888. 
Ti-nLick  r.  Vlmm,  iii.  321. 
Ten  Kyck  r.  Holmes,  ii.  226. 
Temumt  v.  Sioney,  i.  2(56. 
Tenney  v.  nianchard,  ii.  272. 
Tenny  r.  Moody,  ii.  401. 

I'.  Tenny.  i.  331. 
Ter  Hovcn  r.  Kerns,  ii.  159. 
Terliune  r.  Klinrson,  iii.  410. 
Terrell  r.  Andrew  County,  iii.  339. 

r.  Cunningham,  ii.  054. 
Terrett  v.  Taylor,  i.  78;  iii.  119,  190, 

204,  478.  498. 
Terry  v.  Berry,  i.  370. 

V.  lJrijit;s,  ii.  745,  703,  704,  772. 

I'.  Chandler,  iii.  95,  W,  97, 131,  464. 

V.  Ferguson,  i.  591. 

V.  Koscll,  ii.  107. 

V.  Wiggin,  ii.  784. 

V.  Woods,  ii.  128. 
Teschemacher  i'.  Thompson,   iii.  201, 

447. 
Tew  r.  .Jones,  i.  024,  028. 
Tewksbury  r.  O'Connell,  iii.  310. 

I'.  .MagraO;  i.  0(X>. 
Texira  c.  Kvans.  iii.  2.>1. 
Thacher  c  Churchill,  ii.  101,  167. 

r.  riiinncy.  iii.  291,  ;i55. 
Thacker  c.  (iuardenier,  iii.  109. 
Thallhimer  r.  Hinckerhoff,  iii.  361. 
Tharp  r.  .Mien,  i.  ■■!02. 

c.  Feltz,  ii.  2.>8. 

V.  Fleming,  iii.  228. 
Thatcher  r.  Howlaiul,  i.  257. 

c.  Omans.  i.  04,  344;  ii.  424,  4;>t, 
449,  409;  iii.  275. 

V.  Powell,  iii.  235.  237. 
Thayer  c.  Hacon,  iii.  94,  95. 

V.  Campbell,  ii.  123.  207.  208. 

V.  Clemence.  iii.  479,  VM),  491. 

r.  Cramer,  ii    110. 

r.  .Mann,  ii.  191,  193.  196,266. 

r.  Pavne.  ii.  333. 

I'.  Hichards.  ii.  70,  2,34. 

r.  Uock.  i.  11. 

V.  Society  of  United    Brethren,  i. 
594."5{H3,  (UK). 

V.  Thayer,  i.  2/'i(S. 

V.  Wellington,  iii   573. 
Thellusson  >■.  Woodford,  ii.  739,  794. 
Thomas  v.  Boerner,  iii.  212. 

f.  Connell,  i   6.3.5. 

V.  Cook,  i.  581.  683.  632.  045. 


cxxx 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 


Thomas  ;-•.  Davis,  i.  23. 
V.  Dodge,  i.  390. 
V.  Farmers'  Bank,  ii.  91. 
V.  Freeman,  ii.  776. 
V.  Gammel,  i.  257. 
V.  Garvan,  i.  715. 
V.  Harrow,  iii.  168. 
V.  Hatch,  i.  689. 
V.  Kelsey,  ii.  157. 
V.  McCormack.  ii.  53. 
V.  Marshall,  iii!  208. 
V.  Marshfield,  ii.  284,  392 ;  iii.  145, 

146,  217,  280. 
V.  Nelson,  i.  635. 
V.  Patten,  iii.  459. 
V.  Pickering,  i.  691. 
V.  Poole,  iii.  108,  502,  518. 
V.  Sorrell.  i.  662. 
V.  Standifortl,  ii.  510. 
V.  Stone,  ii.  151. 
V.  Thomas,  i.  225 ;  ii.  373,  399 ;  iii 

459. 
V.  Torrey,  ii.  220. 
V.  Turvey,  iii.  423. 
V.  Vonkapff,  i.  531 ;  ii.  240. 
V.  Walker,  ii.  524. 
V.  Wiggers,  ii.  331. 
V.  Williams,  i.  455. 
V.  Wood,  i.  338. 
V.  Wyatt,  iii.  212. 
Thomas'  Appeal,  ii.  133,  156,  196. 
Thomaston  Bank  v.  Stimpson,  ii.  55. 
Tliompson  v.  Banks,  iii.  412. 
V.  Bostick,  i.  695. 
V.  Bower,  i.  480. 
V.  Boyd,  i.  216,  243,  244,  249,  291, 

304. 
V.  Chandler,  ii.  118,  156,  181,  187, 

204. 
V.  Clark,  i.  592,  599. 
v.  Cochran,  i.  216. 
V.  Colier,  i.  292. 
V.  Davenport,  ii.  54,  65. 
V.  Egbert,  i.  336,  337,  338. 
V.  Gilliland,  ii.  559. 
V.  Gould,  iii.  249. 
V.  Gregory,  i.  666. 
V.  Hey  wood,  i.  239;  ii.  72,  202. 
V.  Hoop,  ii.  782. 
V.  Hudson,  ii.  79. 
V.  Kauffelt,  iii.  155. 
V.  Kenyon,  ii.  254,  256. 
V.  Lav,  i.  488. 
V.  Leach,  i.  486;   ii.  636;   iii.  26.3, 

301.  329. 
V.  Lloyd,  iii.  320,  573. 
V.  Luildington,  ii.  610. 
V.  McGaw,  i.  3.32. 
V.  Merrill,  iii.  125. 
V.  Miner,  ii.  327,  331. 
V.  Morgan,  ii.  56 ;  iii.  346. 
V.  Morrow,  i.  298,  299,  300,  301. 
V.  Rogers,  i.  371. 
V.  Sanborn,  iii.  8.3. 


Thompson  v.  Sanders,  iii.  503,  504. 

V.  Shattuck,  iii.  504. 

V.  Stacy,  i.  316. 

V.  Thompson,  i.  140,  214,  226,  2-36, 
246,  248  ;  ii.  217  ;  iii.  299,  326, 
391. 

V.  Vinton,  i.  2o ;  ii.  107,  140. 

V.  Waters,  i.  81. 

V.  Wheatley,  ii.  524. 
Thompson  Sch.  Dist.  v.  Lynch,  ii.  343, 

iii.  145. 
Thorns  V.  Thoms,  i.  407,  439,  453. 
Thomson  v.  Gilliland,  ii.  514. 

V.  Peake,  ii.  503. 

V.  Waterlow,  ii.  330. 
Thornborough  v.  Baker,  ii.  148. 
Thornby  v.  Fleetwood,  ii   724. 
Thorndike  v.  Barrett,  iii.  217. 

V.  Burrage,  i.  523. 

V.  Richards,  iii.  216. 

V.  Spear,  i.  248. 
Thorne,  Goods  of,  iii.  563. 

V.  Newman,  ii.  239. 

V.  Thorne,  i.  371,  382,  712  ;  ii.  168. 
Thorneycroft  v.  Crockett,  ii.  2.34,  239. 
Thornton  v.  Boydeu,  i.  387,  432;  ii.  82, 
85. 

V.  Irwin,  ii.  85. 

V.  Knox,  ii.  92,  95. 

V.  Payne,  i.  480. 

V.  Pigg,  ii.  170,  259,  266. 

V.  Trammel!,  ii.  2. 

V.  Wood,  ii.  145,  198. 

V.  York  Bank,  i.  689. 
Thoroughgood's  case,  iii.  304,  317. 
Thorp  V.  Keokuk  Coal  Co.,  ii.  217,  219. 
220 ;  iii.  293,  382,  379. 

V.  Raymond,  iii.  178. 
Thrale  v.  Cornwall,  i.  526. 
Thrall  v.  Omaha  H.  Co.,  i.  500,  594. 

V.  Spencer,  ii.  226. 
Thrasher  v.  Pinckard,  i.  286,  -301. 

V.  Tyack,  i.  293. 
Throckmorton  v.  Price,  ii.  153. 
Throp  V.  Johnson,  ii.  15. 
Thruston  v.  Masterson,  i.  720. 
Thunder  r.  Belcher,  i.  652. 
Thurber  v.  Dwyer,  i.  630,  6-35,  641. 

V.  Townshend,  i.  172,  200. 
Thurman  v.  Cameron,  iii.  295,  334,  346, 
351. 

V.  Cooper,  iii.  467. 

V.  Morrison,  iii.  442 
Thursby  v.  Plant,  i.  525,  526,  527,  535, 

5.36,  552,  582 
Thurston  v.  Dickinson,  i.  686  ;  ii.  586. 

V.  Hancock,  ii.  381,  382. 

r.  Maddocks,  i.  373,  382. 
Tibbals  r.  .Jacobs,  iii.  315. 
Tibbetts  V.  Estes,  iii.  451. 

r.  Percy,  i.  523. 
Tibeau  r.  Tibeau,  ii.  53. 
Tice  V.  Annin,  ii.  171. 
Tichenor  i'.  Dodd,  ii.  218. 


TAIILK   (JF   CASES    CITED. 


CXXXl 


Tickle  I'.  Urowii,  ii    :5;51».  .'UO,  342. 
TiiM  i:  CJuiiui,  i.  :Wl.  40l». 
Tidey  /•.  Molk-tt,  i.  ia'd. 
Tieinuti  v.   riiiiiim,  i.  412. 
Ticrniin  <'.  Iliiiiiian,  li.  U7,  186. 

r.  Tliurmiiii,  ii.  '.'2. 
Tiin  >'.  llorton,  i.  10.  20. 
TiUlen  r.  TiMon,  iii.  53J>. 
Tilfonl  v.  FlfUiini;,  i   548. 

r.  TDrrov,  ii.  '>10. 
Tilt,'liiimti  r.  Littlf.  i.  .V.»4,  51M). 
Tilliiiglia.st  c.  HriKlfortl,  ii.  M'd. 

c.  Clitiniplin,  i.  TOi. 

I'.  CoKnoslmll,  j.  174;   ii.  520,  5;J1, 
G57. 
Tillman  c.  Cowanil,  iii.  -V-VJ. 
TilliiK'S  I'.  Miirsli,  iii.  21'.l. 
Tillotson  r.  HdviI,  iii.  fy2.i. 

V.  Milliml.'i.  3t)2,  ;J74,  375,  391,  407, 
422.  4.")2  ;  ii    17U 

17.  rrt'stiin.  i.  0()7. 
Tilson  /'  Thompson,  i.  28(J;  iii.  210. 
Tilton  r.  Knu'ry,  iii.  121. 

/•.  Iluntor,  iii.  ;138. 

1-.  Nelson,  iii.  8'J,  iH. 
Timmins  r.  Uowlin.'^on,  i.  040. 
Tinder  i*.  Diivis,  i.  f)o3. 
Tinicum  Fishing  Co.  v.  Carter,  ii.  390; 

iii.  441. 
Tinkham  v.  Arnolil,  ii.  ;{31,  341. 
Tippett  ('.  Kyres,  ii.  tJ95. 
Tippin  V.  Coson,  ii.  45((,  407. 
Tipping  r  Co/ens,  ii.  4.')5. 
Tisdale  v.  Risk,  i.  217. 

V.  Tisdale,  i.  721. 
Tisher  r.  Heokwurtli,  iii.  .'300,  305. 
Tison  V.  Yawn,  i.  ')'.il. 
Ti.sscn  r.  TisM-n,  ii.  7^0,  787. 
Titeomh's  Kstate,  i.  307. 
Titley  r.  WoUtenholme,  ii.  559. 
Titman  v.  .Moore,  i.  403,  417,  448. 
Titsworth  c.  Stout,  i.  720,  721. 
Titus  c.  Morse,  iii.  Nl,  W,  HI. 

V.  Neilson,  i.  210,  305,  306,  311 ;  ii. 
174. 
Tobey  r.  McAllister,  ii.  91,  95,  96. 

I'.  Moore,  ii.  25.  .327. 

V.  Secor,  iii.  151.  l.')2. 

V.  Taunton,  ii   321 ;  iii.  4G0. 
Toby  V.  Heed,  ii.  1 12. 
Tod  r.  Baylor,  i.  2'.i2.  .300,  301. 
Todd  V.  Campbell,  ii.  54. 

r.  Ilardie,  ii.  03. 

r.  Jackson,  i.  050. 

f.  Korr,  iii.  78. 

r.  Wicklitfc,  iii.  275. 

V.  Zachary,  i.  343. 
Tolo  r.  H.irdy.  iii.  580. 
Toleman  r.  I'ortburv.  i.  514. 
Toll  r.  Ililler,  ii.  Un'j. 
Toll  Bridge  v.  ().«boriie,  i.  19. 
Tolle  V.  Orth.  i.  051. 
Toiler  1'.  Atwood,  ii.  0.'2. 
Toilet  V.  Toilet,  ii.  734. 


Tolman  r.  Enicnon,  iii.  236. 

V.  lA^'atherH.  i.  419. 

V.  Sparhawk,    in.    71,    77,   84,   bH, 
94. 
Tome  r.  Loan  C'o.,  ii.  -01. 
Tomlin  v.  Dubuque  K    K.,  ii.  391  ;  iii 
442. 

r.  Ililyard,  i.  370,  418,  720. 
Tomlinson  c.  Dighton,  ii.  028,  785. 

r.  (ireenliel.l.  ii.  103. 

r.  .Mcintnouth  Ins.  Co.,  ii.  48,  01. 

('.  Tomlinson,  iii.  577. 
Tompkins,  Kstate  of,  i.  38^1,  401,  429. 

r.  Fonda,  i.  314. 

r.  .Mitchell,  ii.  95. 

V.  Wheeler,  iii.  301.  317. 

r.  Wiltlierger,  ii.  212,  213. 
Tomson  v.  Ward,  iii.  320. 
Tondro  c  Cushman,  i.  592. 
Tone  r.  Brace,  i.  519;  iii.  523. 
Tong  r.  .Marvin,  i.  172. 
Tongue  '•.  Nutwell,  ii.  7i">.J;  iii.  85. 
Took  r.  (Jlascock,  i.  .341. 
Tooku  v.  Il.irdeman,  i.  ;W0,  338. 
Toole  V.  Becket,  i.  577. 

r.  McKiernan,  ii.  571. 
Tooley  r.  Dibble,  iii.  320. 

r.  Kane,  iii.  231. 
Tooms  V.  Chandler,  ii.  51. 
Tooniy  I'.  .McLean,  i.  2.39,  245. 
Torr's  Kstate,  ii.  207. 
Torrane  r.  Boyd,  i.  3.'i9. 

v.  Conger,  iii.  303. 
Torrence  v.  Carbry,  i.  245. 
Torrey  r.  Cook,  ii    71.  108.  175. 

i:  Minor,  i.  200,  314:  iii.  498. 

r.  Torrey,  i.  O.jO,  ~(H]. 
Torriano  v.  Young,  i.  1.j5. 
Tottin  v.  StuyvL'sant,  i.  208. 
Touchard  r.  Crow,  iii.  ',]H\. 
Toulmin  r.  Austin,  iii.  ;J42.  394. 

V.  Heidelberg,  iii.  274. 
Tourville  r.  I'ierson.  i.  370,  417,  117 
Tousley  r.  Tousley,  ii.  150. 
Towar  r.  Hale,  iii.  280. 
Towlc  r.  Ayer.  i.  02. 

V.  Uoit,  ii.  180. 

I'.  Swasey.  i.  ;J^14. 
Towne  r.  Ammidown,  ii.  608. 

r.  Buttertield,  i.  593,  020. 

V.  Fiske.  i.  2'.t.  .30. 
Townsend.  lie,  iii.  226. 

r.  Albers,  i.  045. 

r.  Brown,  iii.  202. 

I".  Corning,  iii.  295. 

r.  McDonald,  ii.  339. 

V.  Morris,  iii.  r>(ll. 

V.  Reeves,  iii.  151. 

r.  Townsend,  i.  Mi. 

r   Wanl.  ii.  21S. 

r.  Wilson,  ii.  i'tt'u. 
Townsend  Sav.  Bank  r.  Todd,  ii.   Wi, 

119. 
Townshend  v.  Windham,  ii.  689. 


cxxxu 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Township  No.  6  v.  M'Farland,  i.  622 ; 

iii.  137. 
Township  No.  20,  Trustees  of,  v.  Hove}', 

i.  417. 
Township  No.  24,  Trustees  of,  v.  Beale, 

i.  417. 
Township   No.     33,    Trustees     of,    r. 

Wright,  ii.  91. 
Townson  v.  Tiokell,  iii.  302,  579. 
Toy  r.  Boston  Penny  Sav.  Bank,  ii.  387. 
Tracy  v.  Atherton,  ii.  345,  349  ;  iii.  178. 

V.  Hutchins,  iii.  73. 

V.  Jenks,  iii.  346,  352. 

r.  Kelley,  ii.  509. 

V.  Norwich  &  Wor.  R.  R.,  iii.  IGl. 

V.  Tracy,  i.  167. 
Trafford  v.  Boelim,  ii.  768. 
Trafton  v.  Hawes,  ii.  470,  482 ;  iii.  355, 

358,  377,  392,  396,  399. 
Traip  r.  Traip,  iii.  101. 
Trammell  v  Tranimell,  i.  6,  660  ;  ii.  316. 
Transue  v.  Sell,  iii.  449 
Trapnall  v.  Brown,  ii.  50-5,  516,  547. 

V.  State  Bank,  ii.  145. 
Trappes  v.  Meredith,  ii.  533. 
Trash  v.  White,  ii.  192. 
Trask  v.  Donoghue,  ii.  552. 

V.  Patterson,  i.  340. 

V.  Wiieeler,  i.  500,  508. 
Trawick  v.  Harris,  i.  455. 
Treadwell  r.  Marden,  i.  655. 
Treat  v.  Bates,  ii.  369. 

V.  Pierce,  ii.  253. 
Trent  v.  Banning,  ii.  637. 

V.  Hunt,  ii.  144. 
Trenton    Banking  Co.  v.  Woodruff,  i. 

341 ;  ii.  199. 
Treon  v  Emerick,  i.  688. 
Tress  v.  Savage,  i.  632. 
Trevillian  v.  Andrew,  i   653. 
Trevor  v.  Trevor,  ii.  452. 
Tribble  v.  Anderson,  i.  432. 

r.  Frame,  i.  659. 
Trimleston  v.  Hamill,  ii.  235. 
Trimm  v.  Marsh,  ii.  Ill,  134,  169,  180. 
Trinity  Church  v.  Higgins.  i.  524. 
Tripe  v.  Marcy,  ii.  105,  139,  189,  191, 

192. 
Tripp  V.  Hasceig,  i.  11 ;  iii.  416. 

V.  Riley,  i.  605. 

V.  Vincent,  ii.  51,  196. 
Tritt  V.  Colwell,  i.  342. 
Trotter  v.  Cassady,  iii.  148. 

V.  Erwin,  ii.  91. 

r.  Hughes,  ii.  219,  220 ;  iii.  622. 
Trousdale  ''.  Darnell,  i.  643. 
Trout  V.  McDonald,  i.  489;  ii.  374. 
Trowbridge,  J.,  Opinion  of,  iii.  269. 
Trowbridge,  Reading  of,  ii.  38, 105, 125, 

559. 
Trowell  v.  Castle,  iii.  258. 
Trubee  i-.  Miller,  i.  143. 
Trucks  V   Lindsey,  ii.  53,  60. 
True  V.  Morrill,  i.  380. 


Truebody  v.  Jacobson,  ii.  91,  95. 
Truesdale  v.  Ford,  iii.  337,  338. 
Trull  V.  Bigelow,  iii.  344,  346,  360 

f.  Eastman,  ii.  300;    iii.   118,   119, 
120,  121,  371,  508. 

V.  Fuller,  iii.  29.3,  384. 

V.  Granger,  i.  473,  475,  565. 

V.  Skinner,  ii.  GO,  66  ;  iii.  325. 
Trulock  V.  Robey,  ii.  235. 
Truman  v.  Lore,  iii.  286,  298,  346. 

V.  Waters,  i.  334. 
Truscott  V.  King,  ii.  157,  159. 
Trussel  v.  Lewis,  iii.  94. 
Trustees  v.  Beale,  i.  417. 
Trustees  of  Columbia  College,  &c.    See 

Columbia  College,  &c. 
Trustoe  v.  Yewre,  iii.  130. 
Try  on  v.  Munson,  ii.  109,  115. 
Tubbs  V.  Richardson,  i.  694. 
Tuck  V.  Fitts,  i.  294. 
Tucker  v.  Bufium,  i.  309  ;■  ii.  243. 

V.  Clarke,  iii.  119,526. 

V.  Conwell,  ii.  249. 

V.  Coonev,  iii.  493. 

V.  Crowley,  i.  244  ;  ii.  203. 

1-.  Fenno,  ii.  254. 

y.  Howard,  ii.  350,  364. 

V.  Keeler,  ii.  106. 

V.  Kenniston,  i.  393,  409,  423. 

V.  Moreland,  i.  486,  488;   iii.  264, 
267. 

V.  Palmer,  ii.  568. 

V.  White,  ii.  181. 
Tudor  Ice  Company  v.  Cunningham,  ii. 

355 
Tuft  V.  Tuft,  ii.  784. 
Tufts  V.  Adams,  iii.  490,  491,  496,  507, 
529. 

V.  Charlestown,  iii.  108. 
Tulk  V.  Moxhay,  ii.  299,  323. 
TuU  V.  Royston,  iii.  492. 
Tully  V.  Davis,  iii.  334. 
Tiinilinson  v.  Swinney,  i.  367,  446. 
Turley  v.  Massengill,  ii.  467,  479,  498. 
Turiy  V.  Rogers,  i.  592. 
Turner  r.  Baker,  iii.  95. 

V.  Bouchell,  ii.  80. 

V.  Cameron,  i.  23  ;  ii.  144. 

V.  Coffin,  iii.  91. 

V.  Doe,  i.  616,  617,  620,  637. 

V.  Eford,  ii.  611. 

V.  Field,  iii.  291. 

V.  Horner,  ii.  97. 

V.  Johnson,  ii.  80. 

?j.  Meymott,  i.  655. 

V.  Petigrew,  ii.  524. 

V.  Reynolds,  iii.  415,  416. 

V.  Scott,  iii.  537. 

V.  Stip,  iii.  344. 

V.  Thompson,  ii.  364,  365. 

V.  Watkins,  ii.  107. 

V.  Whidden,  iii.  305,  316. 

V.  Withers,  iii.  562. 
Turney  v.  Chamberlain,  iii.  144,  164 


TAP.l.K    OF   CASES    CITED. 


CXXMll 


Turney  v.  SmitJi,  i.  201.  21>». 
Tiirni|i8ce(l  v.  Cunriiiij;liam,  ii.  03. 
Turnpike  Co.  c  Stati-,  ii.  ',i\0. 
Turrill  r.  Nortliriip,  ii.  To-!. 
Tustin  r.  l-'iiu^jht,  iii.  l'N». 
Tiuliill  r.  'rriuv,  ii.  -M 
Tuttlo  r.  Hiiin'i.  OH. 

V.  Lniic,  ii.  Kto. 

r.  UayinAiU,  i.  rv.M.  .VJ."],  032. 

r.  \Vil8i)ii,  i.  277,  27'J. 
Twainblv  r.  Henley,  iii.  4.^2. 
Twe.l.l.-fl  /•.  Twe.ldell,  ii.  208,  218. 
Twidiell  I',  nrid^e,  ii.  252. 
Twiiiiii;;  r.  Morrice,  ii.  h'O. 
Twiiiiii^^'s  A|ii>eai,  ii.  4'Ji 
Twisdi'ii  r.  Lock,  ii.  005. 
Twoiulily  V.  Cassidy,  ii.  181. 
Twort  V.  Twort,  i.  t)'.(4. 
Twynam  r.  Tickard,  i.  608,  529. 
Tyler  v.  Bennett,  ii.  JUG. 

c.  Davis,  iii.  'JS. 

V.  llainniund,  ii.  30');  iii.  418,  448. 

V.  lleidorn,  il.  280.  204,  205. 

V.  Moore,  ii.  C5.3,  054  ;  iii.  408,  409. 

V.  Tavlor,  ii.  140,  108. 

y.  Wi'lkinson,  i.   718;   ii.  335,  340, 
.3t;H;  iii.  58.  00. 
Tyner  v.  Fenner,  i.  GOO. 
Tyrone  Sell.  Directors  v.  Dunkleberger, 

ii.  573. 
Tyrrel's  case,  ii.  400.  491. 
Tyte  V.  Willis,  ii.  773. 


u. 

L'fTord  V.  Wilkins.  iii.  427. 
Uhler  V.  Iluteliinson,  ii.  155. 

I'.  Seiiiple,  i.  701. 
Ulp  V.  Can)|)bell,  i.  257. 
Uinbenliower  c.  Miller,  ii.  54.  50. 
Underhill   r.   i^aratoga   &   Washington 

R.  K..  ii.  7.  10.  24. 
Underwood  r.  Bireliard,  i.  476,  521. 

V.  Campbell,  ii   476  ;  iii.  247,  287. 

V.  Carney,  ii.  317,  3'.i2. 
Unfried  i'.  Ikborcr,  iii.  78. 
Unger  >:  Lcitner,  i.  217,  306. 
Union  Bank  v.  Emerson,  i.  25,  27. 
Union  College,  Trustees  of,  v.  Wlieeler, 

ii.  258. 
Union    Mut.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Campbell,  iii. 

312. 
Union  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  White,  ii.  82. 
Union  Slate  Co.  r.  Tilton.  ii.  523. 
Unitarian  Society  v.  Woodbury,  ii.  547. 
United  States  i-.  Amedy,  ii.  4;i4. 

r.  Appleton.  ii.  310. 

f.  Arredondo,  ii.  11  ;  iii.  211. 

r.  Bostwiek,  i.  523. 

r.  Crosby,  iii.  100.  640. 

V.  Fitzgerald,  iii.  213. 

c.  Fo.x.  iii.  548. 

V.  llooe,  ii.  167. 


I'nited  States  r.  Iluekabec,  iii.  277. 

r.  Linn,  iii.  'J6M. 

f.  I'ereliman.  iii.  'JOl. 
United   States    Bank  v.  Carrington,  ii. 
512.  544 

V.  Carntll,  ii.  203. 

V.  Covert,  ii.  I'-'H,  120. 

I .  Duiiseth,  i.  2'.i2. 

('.  Ilousinan,  ii.  445;  iii.  401. 
University    of    Vermont  v.  Josslyn,   i 

552  ;  iii.  351. 
Updike  c.  Campbell,  i.  400. 
rpliain    v.    V'arney,    ii.  400,  4G1,    502, 

505. 
Upnian  r.  Second  Ward  Bank,  i.  427. 
Upshaw  V.  Hargrove,  ii.  03. 
Upton  ('.  Archer,  iii.  255. 

r.  Basset,  iii.  3.')8. 

i\  Brazier,  i.  000. 

r.  (ireenlees,  i.  501,  604. 

1'.  So.  Heading  Bank,  ii.  157,  10<3. 
Upwell  I'.  Halsey,  ii.  ~X~,  788. 
Urann  i".  Coates,  ii.  576. 
Uridias  v.  Morrell,  i.  G48,  G49. 
Urquliart  v.  Brayton,  ii.  210. 
Usborne  v.  Usborne,  ii.  141. 
L'slier  V.  Bichardson,  i.  205. 
Utica  Bank  v.  Finch,  ii.  158. 

r.  Mirsereau,  i.  484,  485,  492. 
Utiey  r.  Smitti,  ii.  .50. 
Uvedall  v.  Uvedall,  i.  IGl ;  ii.  018. 


V. 

Vai  V.  Weld,  i.  600. 
Valcnline  r.  Havener,  ii.  201. 

V.  riper,  iii.  50,  447,  448. 

V.  Van  Wagner,  ii.  07. 
Valle  r.  Clemens,  iii.  118,  618. 
Van  Arsdale  r.  Van  Arsdale,  i.  3.30. 
Van  Arsdall  c.  Fauntlerov,  i.  181,  1S2. 

183. 
Van  Brunt  i*.  Mismer,  ii.  61. 
Van  Buren  v.  Olmstead,  ii.  2.34. 
Van  Cott  r.  Heath,  ii.  40. 
V^an  Deusen  v.  Sweet,  i.  480 ;  iii.  2G3. 

V.  Turner,  iii.  4M. 

V.  Young,  ii.  002. 
Van  Doren  v.  Kveriit,  i.  144,  489. 

V.  Todd.  ii.  01. 
Van  Duvne  c  Tliayre,  i.  242,  304  ;  ii. 

100. 
Van  Duzer  r.  Van  Duzer.  i.  189. 
Van  F.tta  r.  Kvenson.  iii.  255. 
Van  (iorden    r.  Jackson  d.  Bogardus, 

iii.  432,  4.'W. 
Van  Hanswyck  v.  Wiese,  iii.  637. 
Van  Horn  v.  Chestnut,  iii.  206. 
\'an  Hoozer  r.  Cory.  ii.  ltJ.3. 
Van  Home  v.  Campbell,  ii.  784. 

c.  Crain,  i.  6-34. 

r.  Dorrnnce.  ii.  3,  11. 

t'.  Emenon,  ii.  621. 


CXXXIV 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED. 


Van  Home  v.  Fond.i,  i.  720. 

Van  Husan  v.  Kanouse,  ii.  180,  247. 

Van  Keuren  v.  Corkins,  ii.  118. 

Van  Kleeck  v.  Kef.  Prot.  DutchChurch, 

iii.  55'J,  5t50,  578. 
Van  Ness  v.  Hvatt,  ii.  171. 

V.  Pacard.'i.  5,  30,  31,  144,  154. 
Van  Nest  v.  Latson,  ii.  205. 
Van  Orden  v.  Jolinson,  ii.  210. 

r.  Van  (_)rtlen,  i.  334. 
Van  Pelt  v.  McGraw,  ii.  141. 
Van  Rensselaer  r.  Ball,  i.  502 ;  ii.  6,  15. 

V.  Bonesteel,  ii.  291,  295,  2D7. 

r.  Brad  163',  i-  534. 

V.  Chadwick,  ii.  286,  302. 

V.  Clark,  iii.  344. 

V.  Dennison,  i.  69  ;  ii.  294. 

V.  Gallup,  i.  548. 

V.  Havs,  i.  58,  59,  69,  472,  507,  527, 
528,  550,  551 ;  ii.  286,  287,  288, 
290,  295,  300 ;  iii.  200,  202. 

V.  Jones,  i.  5-34. 

V.  Kearnev,  i.  67  ;  iii.  109,  115,  119, 
509. 

V.  Pen ni man,  i.  580,  685. 

V.  Plainer,  ii.  284,  290,  295. 

V.  RadcliflF,  ii.  403. 

V.  Read,  i.  531,  551 ;  ii.  284,  285, 
288,  290,  291,  294,  295,  298; 
iii.  565. 

V.  Slingerland,  ii.  294. 

V.  Smith,  i.  69,  502,  523,  527,  528, 
529  ;  ii.  286,  295. 

V.  Van  Rensselaer,  i.  498. 
Van  Rej'negan  v.  Revalk,  i.  431. 
Van  Santvvood  v.  Sandford,  iii.  251. 
Van  Schaick  v.  Third  Avenue  R.   R. 

Co.,  iii.  3.32. 
Van  Sickles  v.  Towne,  i.  43-3. 
Van  Svckle  v.  Kline,  ii.  -509. 
Van  Vronker  >:  Eastman,  i.  217,  308, 

309.  310 ;  ii.  222. 
Van  Wagenen  v.  Hopper,  ii.  152. 
Van  Wagner  v.  Van  Nostrand,  iii.  478, 
489,  493. 

I'.  Van  Wagner,  ii.  47. 
Van  Wicklen  v.  Paulson,  i.  550. 
Van  Wyck  v.  Seward,  iii.  357. 
Van  Wyck's  Petition,  ii.  553,  557. 
Vance  v.  Fore,  iii.  422,  458. 

V.  Johnson,  i.  .589;  ii.  107. 

V.  Vance,  i.  203,  327,  828,  333. 
Vancourt  v.  Moore,  iii.  329,  498. 
VandegraafE  >\  Medlock,  ii.  240. 
Vandenheuvel  v.  Storrs,  i.  624,  628. 
Vanderhaize  v.  Hugues,  ii.  45,  65. 
Vanderheyden  v.  Crandall,  ii.  497,  803 ; 

iii.  14. 
Vanderkarr  v.  Vanderkarr,  iii.  519. 
Vandcrkemp  v.   Shelton,  ii.   118,   262, 

263,  264. 
Vanderpool  v.  Van  Allen,  i.  28. 
Van  der  Volgen  v.  Yates,  ii.  455,  503. 
Vane  v.  Lord  Barnard,  i.  162. 


Vanmeter  v.  McFaddin,  ii.  88. 

i\  Vanmeter,  ii.  157. 
Vannice  r.  Bergen,  ii.  205. 
Vansant  v.  Allmon,  ii.  102,  108. 
Vanzant  v.  Vanzant,  i.  370,  403,  432, 

448. 
Varick  v.  Edwards,  ii.  753. 

V.  Smith,  iii.  224,  438. 
Varney  v.  Stevens,  i.  132. 
Varnuni  v.  Abbot,  i.  688. 

r.  Meserve,  ii.  73,  75  ;  iii.  294. 
Vartie  ?'.  Underwood,  i.  216. 
Vasey  v.  Trustees,  i.  403,  449. 
Vasser  v.  Vasser,  li.  53. 
Vatel  V.  Herner,  i.  563. 
Vaughan  v.  Hancock,  i.  11. 

V.  Vanderstegen,  ii.  689. 

V.  Vaughan,  iii.  539. 
Vaux  V.  Parke,  ii.  5-33,  572. 
Veach  v.  Schaup,  ii.  266. 
Veal  V.  Fortson,  iii.  265. 
Veazie  v.  Dwinel,  ii.  370,  371  ;  iii.  442. 
Veghte  V.  Raritan  Co.,  i  663,  669,  672. 
Venable  r.  Beauchamp,  i.  720,  723. 
Vennum  v.  Babcock,  ii.  65. 
Verges  v.  Giboney,  ii.  200. 
Vermilya  v.  Austin,  i,  564. 
Vermont  v.  Society,  &c.,  ii.  13. 
Vernam  v.  Smith,  i.  528,  631,  632,  691, 

592 ;  iii.  .523. 
Verner  v.  Winstanlej%  ii.  63. 
Vernon  v.  Bethell,  ii.  63,  65. 

V.  Smith,  ii.  240. 
Vernon's  case,  i.  284,  325,  326.  327 ;  ii. 

461. 
Verplank  v.  Sterrv,  iii.  303,  304,  354. 

V.  Wright,  i.  531,  532. 
Very  v.  Watkins,  ii.  258,  259. 
Vetter's  Appeal,  i.  578. 
Vick  V.  Edwards,  i.  682. 
Vickerie  v.  Buswell,  ii.  347. 
Vickery  v.  Benson,  iii.  70,  171. 
Vidal  V.  Girard,  ii.  564;   iii.  548,  66Q 

553,  554. 
Videau  v.  Griffin,  iii.  297. 
Viele  V.  Judson,  ii.  199. 
Villiers  v.  Villiers,  ii.  537. 
Vimont  r.  Stitt,  ii.  127. 
Vincent  v.  Bishop  of  Sodor,  ii.  708. 

V.  Spooner,  i.  332. 
Viner  v.  Francis,  ii.  599. 

V.  Vaughn,  i.  150. 
Vinton  r.  King,  ii.  256. 
Virgie  v.  Stetson,  iii.  261. 
Viser  ik  Rice,  iii.  255. 
Voelckner  i-.  Hudson,  i.  282. 
Vogle  V.  Ripper,  ii.  194. 
Vogler  V.  Gciss,  ii.  300,  395. 
Volentine  v.  Johnson,  i.  695. 
Voorhees  v.  Presb.  Ch.,  i.  344. 

V.  McGinnis,  i.  22,  24,  26,  27,  28 
Voorhies  v.  Burchard,  iii.  413. 
Voorhis  v.  Freeman,  i.  27. 
Vorebeck  v.  Roe,  iii.  366. 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


cxxxv 


Voris  r.  Ui-niilmw,  ii.  8. 

Vosl)ur^'ll  r.  'IVator,  iii.  05,  97.  131. 

Vose  r.  Dolun,  iii.  ->'>;{. 

r.  llai.dy,  ii.  KH,  120.  l.^^ 
Vret'laiiil  i'.  Jac-ohuH,  i.  -17,  ;JiX5. 
Vroiiman  r.  McKiii^,  i.  (SyO,  (350. 

V.  Slit'phiril,  iii.  174. 

V.  Turner,  ii.  -10. 
Vynior's  east.',  iii.  [>'.l'.K 
Vyse  I'.  Wnkefk'l'l,  1.  422. 
Vvvvan  V.  Arthur,  i.  620,  527,  532;  ii. 
2ltli. 


W. 

Wabash  &  Erie  Canal  Trustees  v.  Brett, 

i.  670. 
WaiMington  r.  Mristow,  i.  12  ;  iii.  307. 
Waiidy  r.  Johnson,  ii.  870. 
Wade  V.  (ireeiiwood,  ii.  y2. 

c.  H:(llij{aii,  i   619. 

I'.  Harper,  ii.  85. 

V.  Howard,  i.  2:^8,  241  ;  ii.  130, 133, 
IHO.  205,  381. 

V.  Johnson,  i.  28. 

V.  Lindsev,  iii.  117,  156,  351,  352. 

V.  Wade,  i.  378. 
Wadlei^h  c.  (iiines,  iii.  125. 

r.  Janvrin,  i.  20,  25,  30. 
Wadsworth  v.  Loran^er,  ii.  63. 

V.  Wendell,  iii.  287. 

1-.  Wilhams,  ii.  1:17,  201 ;  iii.  365. 
Wailsvvorthville    School    i>.   Meetze,    i. 

597,  H02. 
Wafer  V.  Moeato,  ii.  23. 
Waffle  V.  N.  V.  Cent.  it.  R.,ii.  3G0. 
Waggoner  v.  Hastings,  iii.  10(i. 
Wagner  c  Cleveland,  &o.  K.  K.  Co.,  i. 
154. 

V.  White,  i.  559. 
Wagstaff  I".  Lowerre,  ii.  575. 
Wainscott  r.  Silvers,  i.  575. 
Wainwright  r.  .McCullough,  iii.  441. 
Wait  c.  Behlina,  i.  91. 

V.  Ma.\well,iii.  202,20.3. 

V.  Wait,  i.  25-1. 
Wakeniin  v.  Banks,  ii.  109. 
Walbrun  v.  Ballen,  iii.  151. 
Walcop  V.  Mclvinney,  ii.  106. 
Walcutt  r.  Spencer,  ii.  2.30. 
Walden  v.  Bodley,  i.  610. 

r.  Brown,  ii.  183. 
Waldo  V.  Hall.  i.  535. 
Waldron  i".  .*>andars,  ii.  509. 
Wales  V.  CotBn,  i.  7tJ0  ;  iii.  78,  125. 

r.  Mellen.  ii.  70,  105, 116. 
Walker  t'.  Armstrong,  ii.  306,  307. 

V.  Barker,  ii.  205. 

V.  Boynton,  iii.  461. 

I'.  Crawford,  iii.  154. 

I'.  Cronin,  ii.  375. 

V.  Deavcr,  iii.  491,  505.  611,  630. 

I?.  Dement,  ii.  128,  257. 


Walker.'.  Eilidge,  ii.  511. 

i:  Fitts,  i.  4;'.t,  (Km. 

f.  Kurhush,  i.  (S.i'.t,  045. 

r.  Huinhert,  i.  Omj. 

V.  King,ii.  IfMl,  lj;5.  17:],  180. 

c.  Locke,  ii.  4.'>9,  518. 

f.  I'aine,  ii.  15M. 

r.  I'hysick,  i.  .')24. 

r.  I'lihlic  Works  Bd.,  iii.  442. 

f.  '^iiigg,  ii.  704. 

f.  Hichardson,  i.  582,  684. 

r.  Schuyler,  i.  300. 

v.  Sedgwick,  ii.  95,  200;  iii.  127. 

r.  Sharpe,  i.  (541,<',42. 

V.  Sherman,  i.  22,  24,  28 

r.  Thayer,  ii.  105,  253. 

r.  Walker,  ii.  469, 671 ;  iii.  800, 313, 
537. 

V.  Williams,  ii.  97. 
Walker's  case,  i.  159,  535.  650,552. 
Wall  V.  Goodenough,  i.  698,  001. 

V.  Hill,  i.  24ti. 

I'.  Hinds,  i.  5.  29,  535,  5.')1.  57  I.  r,9'.i. 

V.  Mason,  ii.  138. 

r.  Wall.  iii.  316. 
Wallace  v.  Berdell,  iii.  312,  31.],  DIG. 

r.  Bowen,  ii.  507: 

V.  Dutlield,  ii.  513,  524. 

r.  Fee,  iii.  4.52. 

V.  Fletcher,  ii.  845;  iii.  57. 

I'.  G(jodall,  ii.  12;J. 

1-.  Harmstad,  i.  71,  472;  ii.  284,  285, 
280,  287  ;  iii.  260. 

V.  Headley,  i.  493. 

c.  Kennelly.  i.  682. 

r.  Lent,  i.  576. 

r.  Lewis,  i.  4b9 ;  iii.  204,  205. 

V.  McCullough,  i.  478. 

V.  Miner,  iii.  110.  126. 

V.  Vernon,  i.  508  ;  iii.  503. 
Waller  >'.  Tate.  ii.  170. 

V.  Von  I'hiil,  iii.  207. 
Wallerhouse  c.  Garrard,  iii.  506. 
Walling  r.  Aiken,  ii.  150. 
Wallinger  r.  Wallinger,  ii   709. 
Wallis  i:  Harrison,  i.  48y,  602,  004,  605, 
(■.ti7. 

V.  Wallis,  ii.  469  ;  iii.  395,  390. 

V.  Woodvear,  ii.  230. 
Walls  V.  Baifd.  ii.  196. 

r.  I'reston,  i.  605,  006;  iii.  408. 
Wallwork  c.  Derby,  iii.  251. 
Wallwvn  I'.  Coutts.  ii.  492. 
Walmselev   i'.  Milne,  i.   10.  16,  25,  27, 

2b  ;  ii.  16.3,  178. 
Walsh  r.  Horine,  i.  418. 

r.  Martin,  ii    164. 

r.  Keis.  i   402. 

V.  Wilson,  i.  2.39. 

V.  Voung.  i.  340,  487. 
Walsinghanrs  case,  i.  94,  90. 
Walter  r.  Klock.  ii.  614. 

r.  post,  i   604. 
Walters  v.  Jordan,  i.  253. 


CXXXVl 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED. 


Walters  v.  People,  i.  370,  448. 

V.  Pfeil,  ii.  385. 
Walthall  r.  Rives,  ii.  71,  177. 
Walton  I'.  Burton,  iii.  312. 

V.  Cody,  ii.  80. 

V.  Cronly,  i.  525,  535,  554 ;  ii.  64. 

V.  Drew,  ii.  767. 

V.  Walton,  iii.  574. 

V.  Waterhouse,  i.  537,  594. 

t'.  Willis,  i.  719. 
Wamesit  P.  Co.  v.  Allen,  ii.  367. 
Wanmaker  v.  Van  Buskirk,  ii.  193. 
Warbass  v.  Armstrong,  ii.  575. 
Ward  V.  Amory,  ii.  537,  650. 

V.  Ashbrook,  iii.  511. 

V.  Armstrong,  ii.  545. 

V.  Bartliolomew,  iii.  156,  171,  216, 
296,  352. 

V.  Bull,  i.  566. 

V.  Deering,  ii.  63. 

V.  Fuller,  i.  64,  248  ;  iii.  342. 

V.  Hulm,  i.  375. 

V.  Kilpa trick,  i.  25. 

V.  Lewis,  ii.  547,  568;  iii.  312,317. 

V.  Lumley,  i.  580  ;  iii.  326. 

V.  Neal,  ii.  365. 

V.  Ross,  iii.  312. 

V.  Sharp,  ii.  269. 

V.  Stuart,  iii.  248. 

V.  Ward,  ii.  356,  357,  396;  iii.  69. 

i:  Warren,  ii.  338. 
Warden  v.  Fosdick,  iii.  477. 
Warden  v.  Adams,  ii.  120,  121. 

V.  S.  E.  Railway,  i.  81. 
Ware  v.  Bradford,  iii.  242,  243. 

V.  Brookhouse,  iii.  456. 

V.  Cann,  ii.  9. 

V.  Lithgow,  iii.  511. 

V.  Polhill,  ii.  729. 

V.  Richardson,  ii.  501. 

I'.  Washington,  i.  203,  286. 
Waring,  Ex  parte,  ii.  226. 

V.  King,  i.  625. 

V.  Smythe,  ii.  101,  134;  iii.  259. 

V.  Ward,  ii.  218. 

V.  Waring,  ii  574. 
Wark  V.  Willard,  iii.  119,  130,  344. 
Warley  v.  Warley,  i.  129. 
Warman  v.  Faithfull,  i.  480. 
Warn  v.  Brown,  ii.  611. 
Warner  v.  Abbey,  i.  608. 

V.  Bates,  ii.  550. 

V.  Beach,  iii.  576. 

V.  Bennett,  ii.  6,  13,  16,  22. 

V.  Blakeman,  ii.  82. 

V.  Bull,  iii.  327,  350. 

V.  Crosby,  i.  432. 

V.  Everett,  ii.  181. 

V.  Hitchins,  i.  567. 

V.  Hoisington,  i.  609. 

V.  Howell,  ii.  723. 

V.  Southworth,  iii.  452. 

V.  Sprigg,  ii,  435,  473, 499,  527,  651, 
652. 


Warner  v.  Van  Alstyne,  i.  217 ;  ii.  93. 

V.  Warner,  iii.  572. 
Warnock  v.  Wightman,  iii.  338. 
Warren  r.  Ba.xter,  iii.  540. 

V.  Blake,  ii.  321,  333. 

V.  Chambers,  iii.  61,  66. 

V.  Cochran,  iii.  142. 

V.  Coggswell,  iii.  424. 

V.  Homestead,  ii.  102,  125,  126. 

V.  Jacksonville,  ii.  339. 

V.  Leland,  i.  16. 

V.  Lovis,  ii.  46,  47,  64. 

V.  Lynch,  iii.  252,  287, 288, 289,  290. 

V.  Mayor  of  Lyons,  ii.  4. 

V.  Shuman,  iii.  211. 

V.  Thomaston,  iii.  440. 

V.  Twillev,  i.  208. 

V.  Warren,  ii.  186,  230. 
Warren  Co.  v.  Patterson,  ii.  5. 
Wartenby  v.  Moran,  ii.  200. 
Warter  v.  Hutcliinson,  ii.  539. 
Warwick  ?•.  Bruce,  iii.  367. 
Washabaugh  v.  Entriken,  iii.  114. 
Washband  v.  Washband,  iii.  356,  391. 
Washburn  v.  Burns,  i.  710. 

V.  Goodwin,  ii.  170. 

V.  Merrills,  ii.  53. 

I'.  Sproat,  i.  5,  154,  .346. 
Washington  v.  Conrad,  i.  600. 

V.  Trousdale,  iii.  343. 
Washington  Bank  v.  Hupp,  ii.  143. 
Washington  Bldg.  Ass.  v.  Beaghen,  iL 

230. 
Washington  Ice  Co.  v.  Shortall,  i.  4; 
'  iii.  443. 

Washington  Park  Commission,  i.  70. 
Wass  V.  Bucknam,  i.  181,  183,  188. 
Wassail  V.  Tunnah,  i.  367. 
Wasson  v.  English,  ii.  570. 
Waterman  v.  Andrews,  iii.  422,  458. 

V.  Curtis,  ii.  245. 

V.  Hunt,  ii.  126,  128. 

V.  Johnson,  iii.  435,  448,  444,  445, 
453. 

V.  Matteson,  ii.  107,  141. 

V.  Smith,  iii.  210. 

V.  Soper,  i.  14. 
Waters  r.  Gooch,  i.  293,  294. 

V.  Groom,  ii.  78. 

V.  Lilley,  ii.  313,  392. 

V.  Randall,  ii.  47,  63,  65,  67. 

V.  Stewart,  ii.  169,  170. 

V.  Tazewell,  ii.  10. 

IX  Waters,  ii.  200. 

t'.  Young,  i.  641. 
Waters'  Appeal,  iii.  83,  89. 
Watertown,  Trustees  of,  v.  Cowen,  ii 

298,  326. 
Watkins,  Matter  of,  i.  286. 

V.  Eaton,  i.  721. 

V.  Edwards,  iii.  336,  343. 

V.  Gregorj',  ii.  62. 

V.  Hill,  ii.  194. 

V.  Holman,  i.  92,  500;  iii.  99,  230. 


TABLE   OP  CASES   CITED. 


CXXXVll 


Walkins  v.  Peck.  ii.  ai6.  342,  345,  347, 
:iT.i ;  iii.  68.  60,  86. 

V.  Slockctt,  ij.  6-'l. 
Watriss  c.  First  Nat.  Bank,  i.  32. 
Watrous  v.  lllair.  iii.  'AM. 

v.  Southwortli.  iii.  103. 
Watson  r.  Bioreii.  ii.  317,  322. 

V.  Clcmli'iiniii,  i.  -4:i. 

V.  Crcdiloi'tt.  i   068. 

17.  Dickons,  ii.  63,  100. 

r.  Koxon,  ii.  GOo. 

V.  Hill,  i.  f,l)y. 

V.  lliiiikins,  i.  520. 

I'.  Hunter,  i.  108. 

f.  Hiitchina,  ii.  123. 

V.  Jc-ffrey,  iii.  145. 

V.  Mercer,  i.  201 ;  iii.  224,  228. 

V.  O'Hcrn,  i.  47U. 

V.  IV'tcrti,  ii.  ."V.tl ;  iii.  438. 

V.  Sa.xer,  i.  417. 

V.  Thompson,  ii.  612. 

V.  Watson,  i.  180, 187, 189. 287,  288, 
28'J. 
Watt  i:  Alvord,  ii.  202. 

r.  Core}',  i.  254. 

V.  Trapi),  ii.  340,  344. 

V.  Watt.  ii.  181. 

V.  Wright,  ii.  189. 
Walters  v.  Breden,  ii.  5 ;  iii.  262,  422, 

4tV.». 
Watts  i:  Bail,  i.  170,  173. 

V.  Cortii),  ii.  143. 

V.  Goriion,  i.  .'jOO. 

I'.  Kelson,  ii.  330.  3:32. 

i>.  Lepgett,  i.  410. 

V.  White,  ii.  400. 
Waugh  i:  Kiley,  ii.  198,  206. 
Way  I'.  Arnold,  iii.  131. 

i:  Keed,  i.  500,  525,  682. 
Wead  V.  Gray,  ii.  745,  703,  705,  784. 

V.  Larkin,  iii.  500,  532. 
Woalu  I'.  Lower,  i.  78 ;  ii.  447,  616,  006, 

000,  0'J7,  673  ;  iii.  104. 
Wtatherby  i:  Smitii,  ii.  210. 
Woathersley  l-.  Weatliersley,  ii.  53,  CO. 
Weaver  c.  Craigheaii.  iii.  U8. 

V.  Crenshaw,  i.  313. 

I'.  Gregg,  i.  201,  208,306. 

V.  Leinian,  ii.  535. 

V.  Wihie,  i.  721. 
Web  V.  Paternoster,  i.  603. 
Webb  V.  Austin,  iii.  101. 

V.  Bird,  ii.  338.  303,  366;  iii.  59. 

t;.  Cowley,  i.  3(54. 

17.  Davin,  i.  307. 

I'.  Flanders,  ii.  133. 

V.  Hearing,  ii.  773. 

r.  Hoselton,  ii.  1 10. 

V.  Maxan,  ii.  201. 

V.  Portland  Co.,  ii.  3<58,  393. 

r.  Uicbardson,  iii.  151.  167. 

17.  Roberts,  iii.  242,  243,  804,  311. 

V.  Robinson,  ii.  92,  93,  97. 

r.  Riusell,  ii.  297. 


Webb  V.  Sadler,  ii.  730. 

r.  'rhoui]i!<on,  iii.  350. 

V.  TowiiHend,  i.  219. 

r.  Webb.  iii.  392.  423. 
Wiliber  f.  Kastern  U    U.,  iii.  421. 
Weber  I'.  Harbor  Commissioners,  ii.  391 ; 

iii.  445. 
Webster  r.  Boddington,  ii.  793. 

V.  Calef,  i.  095. 

V.  Cami.bell,  i.  229,  232. 

V.  Conley,  i.  490. 

V.  Cooper,  ii.   12,  13,  10,  497,018, 
649,  652. 

17.  Gihnan,  iii.  580. 

i;.  Nichols,  i.  50ti. 

V.  Potter,  i.  5,  0;  iii.  413. 

17.  Stevens,  ii.  317,  327,  386. 

i;.  Vandeventer,    i.    677.   079,  681, 
705  ;  ii.  148,  202.  207.  658. 

V.  Webster,  i.  122, 135,  130, 137, 162, 
153;  iii.  384. 
Webster  Bank  v.  Kldridge,  ii.  557,  716. 
Wedge  V.  Moore,  i.  239,  240,  241,  244, 

249;  ii.  201. 
Weed  1:  Beebe,  ii.  264. 

V.  Crocker,  i.  480. 

i:  Weed,  iii.  4(K3. 
Weed  Sewing-Machine  i-.  Emerson,  ii 

183. 
Weeks  v.  Eaton,  ii.  122,  123. 
Weems  v.  McCaughan,  iii.  520. 
Weetjen  i-.  St.  Paul,  ii.  164. 
Weeton  V.  Wuodcouk.  i.  32,  33,  400. 
Wegg  r.  V'illers,  ii.  674,  (i^2. 
Weichselbauni  i-.  Curlett,  i.  689. 
Weide  v.  Gehl,  ii.  63. 
Weider  17.  Clark,  i.  434. 
Weidner  r.  Foster,  ii.  143. 
Weigall  I-.  Waters,  i.  509. 
Weimar  r.  Fath,  ii.  716. 
Weiner  r.  Sterling,  i.  429. 
Weir   V.   Tate,   i.   182,   208,   220,   267, 

295. 
Weis  V.  Madison,  ii.  807. 
Weisbrod  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  R.,  iiL 

274,  452. 
Weiser  c.  Weiser,  i.  721. 
Weisinger  r.  Murphy,  i.  188.  189,  691. 
Welborn  v.  Anderson,  iii.  108. 
Welch  I'.  Adams,  i.  595  ;  ii.  142. 

V.  Allen,  ii.  497.  537. 

V.  ,\nderson,  i.  334. 

V.  Buiicc,  iii.  205 

V.  Chandler,  i.  182,  185. 

I'.  Goodwin,  ii.  125. 

I'.  Phillips,  iii.  433. 

V.  Priest,  ii.  105,  119,  122. 

i:  Snckett,  iii.  801. 

V.  Welch,  i.  342. 
Weld  V.  Nichols,  ii.  298. 

V.  Traip,  i.  409. 
Welland  Canal  Co.  v.  Uathawny,  iii 

72.  70.  80. 
Wellborn  v.  Williams,  ii.  97. 


CXXXYlll 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Weller  v.  Weller,  i.  179,  273,  270,  373, 

405. 
Welles  V.  Castles,  i.  537,  562,  566,  569, 
574,  576. 

V.  Cowles,  i.  20. 
Wellington  v.  Gale,  iii.  242. 

V.  Petitioners,  iii.  223. 
Weilock  V.  Hammond,  ii.  26. 
Wells  V.  Beall,  i.  2s7. 

V.  Banister,  i.  5. 

V.  Calnan,  iii.  249. 

V.  Chapman,  i.  721, 

V.  Doaiie,  iii.  568. 

V.  Heath,  ii.  538,  539. 

V.  Jackson  Iron  Mfg.  Co.,  iii.  164, 
166,  167,  433,  458. 

V.  Lewis,  ii.  567. 

V.  Mason,  i.  519,  597. 

1-.  jSIcCall,  ii.  540. 

V.  Morrow,  ii.  52;  iii.  844. 

V.  Morse,  ii.  189. 

V.  Pierce,  iii.  85. 

V.  Prince,  i.  715;  iii.  142. 

r.  Robinson,  ii.  515. 

V.  Seixas,  iii  266. 

v.  Thompson,  i.  182. 
Welp  V.  Gunther,  ii.  276. 
Welsh  V.  Beers,  ii.  215,  216. 

V.  Buckins,  i.  234. 

V.  Foster,  ii.  445,  451,  484 ;  iii.  395, 
396. 

V.  Phillips,  ii.  105, 119, 120, 122, 202. 

V.  Usher,  ii.  89. 
Welton  V.  Divine,  ii.  419,  506. 
Wendell  v.  Crandall,  ii.  603. 
Wentworth  v.  Portsmouth  &  D.  R.  R. 

Co.,  i.  610. 
Wentz's  Appeal,  i.  133. 
Wenzler  v.  McCotter,  i.  571. 
Werner  v.  Ropiequet,  i.  516. 
Wescott  v.  Delano,  i.  15,  671. 
Wesson  v.  Stevens,  iii.  306. 
West  V.  Berney,  ii.  695. 

V.  Chamberlin,  ii.  252. 

i:  Fitz,  ii.  538,  557,  716. 

V.  Hendrix,  ii.  52,  62,  63. 

V.  Hughes,  iii.  211. 

V.  Stewart,  i.  7  ;  iii.  489,  506. 

V.  Ward,  i.  381. 
Westbrook  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Warren,  ii.  367, 

894. 
West  Cambridge  v.  Lexington,  i.  222. 
Westcott  V.  Campbell,  i.  299. 
Westerfield    v.    Kimmer,  ii.  509,  510, 

511. 
Westerman  v.  Westerman,  i.  351 ;  ii.  97. 
Western  r.  McDermott,  ii.  327. 
Western  Bank  v.  Kyle,  i.  510. 
Western  R.  R.  Corp.  v.  Babcock,  iii. 

305,  316. 
Western  Transportation  Co.  v.  Lansing, 

i.  471,  5.32. 
Wester  velt  v.  Raff,  i.  715. 
Westfall  V.  Hunt,  ii.  348. 


Westfall  V.  Lee,  i.  258. 
Westgate  v.  Nixon,  i.  7. 
Westlake  v.  De  Graw,  i.  576. 

V.  Horton,  ii.  5.3. 
Westminster  Bank  v.  Whyte,  ii.  45,  53 
Weston  V.  Alden,  ii.  368. 

V.  Hunt,  i.  78. 

V.  Weston,  i.  27,  28;  ii.  588. 
West  Point  Iron  Co.   v.  Reymert,  iii. 

462,  473. 
West  Kiver  Bridge  Co.  t-.  Dix,  ii.  808. 
West  Roxbury  v.  Stoddard,  i.  4  ;   iii. 

216,  443. 
West  Shoreham  v.  Bail,  ii.  348. 
Wetiierbee  v.  Bennett,  iii.  530. 

V.  Ellison,  i.  20;  iii.  417. 
Wetherell,  Er  parte,  ii.  88. 
Wetmore  v.  Brooklyn  Gas  Co.,  ii.  392. 

V.  Law,  iii.  452. 

V.  White,  iii.  247. 
Wetter  v.  Walker,  ii.  721. 
Wetz  V.  Beard,  i.  451. 
Weyand  v.  Tipton,  iii.  235,  242. 
Weymouth  v.  Sanborn,  i.  423. 
Whalen  v.  Cadman,  i.  360. 

V.  Gloucester,  i.  571. 
Whaley  v.  Whaley,  i.  604;  ii.  518. 
Whalin  V.  White,  i.  595 ;  ii.  249. 
Whahng  Co.  r.  Borden,  i.  702. 
Whalley  v.  Small,  ii.  153;  iii.  145,  343. 

V.  Tompson,  iii.  411. 
Wharf  I'.  Howell,  ii  49. 
Wharton  v.  Leggett,  i.  364,  410. 

V.  Wharton,  i.  113. 
Wiiatman  r.  Gibson,  ii.  323;  iii.  128. 
Wheatley  v.  Baugh,  ii.  341,  371,  376, 
378. 

V.  Calhoun,  i.  211,  232. 

V.  Chrisman,  i.  668. 
Wlieaton  v.  East,  i.  487,  489 ;  iii.  264, 
265. 

V.  Peters,  i.  40. 
Wheeldon  v.  Burrows,  ii.  332,  333,  364. 
Wheeler  v.  Bates,  iii.  144. 

V.  Clutterbuck,  iii.  19. 

V.  Crawford,  i.  576. 

V.  Dascorab,  i.  511. 

V.  Earle,  i.  509. 

t'.  Feilowes,  ii.  760. 

V.  Hotchkiss,  i.  190. 

V.  Kidder,  ii.  606. 

t'.  Montefiore,  i.  473. 

V.  Moody,  iii.  148. 

V.  Morris,  i.  262  ;  ii.  266. 

V.  Newton,  i.  477. 

V.  Single,  iii.  252,  298,  304. 

V.  Sohier,  iii.  503,  505. 

V.  Spinola,  iii.  151,  444,  445. 

V.  Walker,  ii.  4,  7,  17,  28. 

V.  Willard,  ii.  186. 
Wheelock  v.  Henshaw,  iii.  120. 

V.  Moulton,  iii.  278. 

V.  Thayer,  iii.  488. 

V,  Warschauer,  i.  695. 


TAllLK   OF    CASES   CITED. 


CXXXIX 


WhcehvriRlit  i-.  De  Poygtcr.  ii.  221. 

V.  VVhi'i-lwriKht.  iii.  ;jO«i.  [i\'J. 
Wlielpil:ili''H  lUM-,  iii.  oil). 
Whetstone  r.  lUin-,  ii.  177. 

V.  Davis,  i.  lUio. 
Whilden  v.  Wliil.leii.  i   ;i;]l. 
W'liiplev  r.  I)i-wev.  i.  .'5."l. 
Wliipple  r.  Knir^hii.l,  ii.  Oil,  012,  040. 

r.  Foot,  i.  12:  iii.  ."tfj. 
WhitiikiT  r.  Urowii.  iii.  UV.].  405. 

r.  HhwIcv.  i.  40:{.  oOH,  578. 

V.  SiimiuT,  iii.  24n. 

f.  Wiiitl.iker,  i.  118. 

i:  Wiiliiuim,  iii    HH. 
\Vhitl)e.-k  r.  Cook,  iii.  4^8,  4'J3. 
Whitbred.  /•>  /"i»7.,ii.  87. 
Wliitcoml)  V.  Heitl.  i.  11)7. 

r.  Tiivlor,  i.  30;    ii.  5"J0,  764,  707, 
7tJH. 
White  V.  Alhertson,  ii.  673. 

V.  Anidt,  i.  .'12. 

r.  Bailey,  iii.  •121. 

r.  Baas,  ii.  ;].J2. 

I'.  Bradley,  ii.  .'305. 

V.  Brocaw,  iii.  122,  608. 

V.  Brown,  ii.  240. 

r.  Burnley,  iii.  106. 

V.  Carpenter,  ii.  413,  517. 

V.  Clark,  i.  41M,  447.  44'^. 

I'.  Collins,  i.  lOo  ;  ii.  053. 

V.  Crawtord.  ii.  356,  350,  3'JG. 

V.  Cutler,  i.  130. 

I'.  Cuyler,  iii.  2!H. 

V.  Dennian,  ii.  151.  152. 

V.  Dou^'herty,  ii.  95. 

V.  Dresser,  ii.  381,  ;)'.»4. 

V.  Ehvell,  i.  ((13,  071. 

r.  Fitzgerald,  ii.  547. 

i'.  Flannigain,  iii.  450. 

v.  Foster,  iii.  348.  3i>(J,  370,  473. 

V.  Fuller,  i.  472  ;  iii.  350. 

i*.  Godfrey,  iii.  44'.<,  452. 

V.  Graves,  iii.  ."JOO. 

r.  Hampton,  ii.  202,  553,  656 

V.  Hicks,  ii.  713,  714,  721. 

V.  Huhne.  i.  342 

V.  Hunt,  i.  564. 

V.  Livingston,  i.  480,  622. 

r.  Maynard,  i.  480. 

V.  Molyneau.x,  i.  500. 

V.  Moses,  iii.  222. 

r.  Owen,  i.  440. 

i;.  Patten,  i.  484  ;  iii.  104,  117,  ll'.i. 
128,  4ys. 

V.  Plmnrncr,  i.  432. 

V.  Polleys.  i.  428 ;  ii.  220,  2:30. 

I'.  Rice.  i.  401),  421,  438. 

r.  Ritteninver,    ii     112.    147,    105, 
107.  272. 

V.  Rowland,  ii.  407,  472. 

V.  Savre,  i.  688. 

V.  Shepperd,  i.  412  ;  ii.  519. 

V.  Story,  i.  2!»0. 

V.  Stovvr,  ii.  97. 


White  r.  Tliomnn.  ii.  0. 

r.  Wntts.  li.  I'Ol. 

V.  Wear,  ii    100. 

V.  Weeks,  iii.  393. 

I.  White,  i    2<iO,  335;   ii.  633;  iii. 
5.3,  4(XJ,  407. 

f.  Whitney,  ii    108.  107.  100,  170; 
ill.  [m.  503,  507,  533. 

r.  Wieland,  i.  622. 

r.  Williams,  ii.  95,  97  ;  iii.  431. 

r.  Wilhs.  i.  1M9. 

I'.  Woodlierry,  i.  80. 
Wliite's  Appeal,  V  31. 
White's  Bank  r   Nichols,  ii.  300,  306. 
Whiteacre  r.  Symonds,  i.  0.'30. 
Whitehead  c.  ClitTonl,  i.  583. 

r.  Conkliii,  i.  300. 

I'.  Cummins,  i.  207. 

V.  Lane  &  Bodlev  Co..  ii.  108. 

V.  Middleton.  i.  237,  .•];{3. 

r.  Tajp,  i.  .■]02. 
Wiiite  liiver  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Vt.  Cent. 

R.  K..  ii.  30H. 
Whiteman  r.  Field,  i.  450. 
White  Water  Canal  r.  Comegvs,  i.  107. 
Whithed  r.  Mallory.  i.  2*20. 
Whiting  I'.  Beehe,  ii.  145. 

c.  Brastnw,  i.  31. 

V.  Dewey,  iii.  4i'5,  458.  627. 

I'.  Kdmiuid!..  iii.  98,  09. 

r.  Gould,  ii.  514. 

c.  New  Haven,  ii.  109,  172. 

r.  Stevens,  iii.  273. 

(•  Whiting,  iii.  170. 
Whitluck's  cnse,  i.  550. 
Whitmarsh  i-.  Cutting,  i.  140,  141. 

V.  Walker,  i.  i:3,  071  ;  iii.  304,  300, 
308. 
Whitmore  <•.  Delano,  iii.  274. 

1-.  Learned,  ii.  618. 

V.  Weld,  i.  107. 
Whitney  v.   Alhiire,    i.   409,   474,   476, 
481  ;  iii.  477,  626. 

V.  Allen,  ii.  173. 

V.  Buckman.  ii.  44,  49. 

f.  Dart,  i.  0.53. 

V.  Dinsinore,  iii.  490.  491,  490. 

r.  Dutch,  i.  4Hl;  iii,  L'G4. 

r.  Frenc;h.  ii.  38,  101. 

r.  Gordon,  i.  ('>39. 

r.  Holmes,  iii    95. 

r.  Lee.  ii.  317,  322. 

r.  .McKinney.  ii   269. 

V.  Me  vers.  i'.  581,  045. 

r.  OIney.  iii.  412,  418,  420. 

('.  Smith,  iii.  454. 

V.  Spencer,  ii.  11. 

r.  Union  R.  R.  Co,  ii.  324. 

r.  Whitnev.  iii.  14,  678. 
Whitsel!  r.  Miils.  i.  2.54. 
Whittaker  c  Perry,  i.  060. 
Whittemore  r.  (lihlis,  ii.  127. 

V.  Moore,  i.  <>3<>. 
Wliilten  IV  Peacock,  I.  503. 


cxl 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


Whitten  v.  Wliitten,  i.  712,  715. 
Whittenberg  v.  Lloyd,  i.  379. 
Wliitter  V.  Breinridge,  ii.  779. 
"Whittier  v.  Cocheco  Mfg.  Co.,  ii.  344, 

372,  398. 
WhittingtQD  V.  Flint,  iii.  154. 

V.  Wright,  iii.  138,  338. 
Whittlesey  v.  Fuller,  i.  343,  348,  709. 

IK  Hughes,  ii.  83. 
Whitton   V.  Whitton,  i.   688,  689;   iii. 

277. 
Whitwell  r.  Harris,  i.  601. 
Whitworth  v.  Gaugain,  ii.  87. 
Wiiyddon's  case,  iii.  317. 
Wickersham  v.  Irwin,  i.  535. 

V.  Orr,  i.  669  ;  iii.  471. 

V.  Beeves,  ii.  205. 

V.  Savage,  ii.  722. 
Wickes  V.  Caulk,  iii.  259. 
Wickham  v.  Hawker,  i.  665. 
Wickman  v.  Robinson,  ii.  98. 
Wicks  r.  Smith,  i.  436. 
Widger  v.  Browning,  i.  642. 
Wier's  Appeal,  ii.  381. 
Wiggin  V.  Chance,  i.  418,  448,  449. 

V.  Hey  ward,  ii.  75. 

V.  Swett,  i.  134. 

V.  Wiggin,  i.  628. 
Wiggins  V.  Holley,  iii.  139. 

V.  McCleary,  ii.  321. 
Wigglesworth  v.  Dallison,  i.  144. 
Wight  V.  Shaw,  ii.  599;   iii.  104,   107, 
121,  124,  125,  508. 

V.  Shelby  R.  R.,  iii.  318. 

V.  Thayer,  i.  114. 
Wilbrahara  v.  Snow,  i.  694. 
Wilbridge  v.  Case,  i.  712. 
Wilbur  V.  Alnij",  ii.  566. 
Wilburn  v.  Spofford,  ii.  73. 
Wilcox  V.  Allen,  ii.  68. 

V.  Bates,  ii.  54. 

V.  Jackson,  iii.  199,  204. 

V.  Lewis,  iii.  408. 

V.  Morris,  ii.  45. 

V.  Randall,  i.  209. 

V.  Todd,  ii.  224. 

V.  Wheeler,  i.  90  ;  ii.  474,  539. 

V.  Wilcox,  i.  704. 
Wilcoxon  V.  McGhee,  iii.  412. 

r.  Osborn,  iii.  99. 
Wild  V.  Deig,  iii.  22.5. 

V.  Serpel,  i.  594,  596,  602. 
Wild's  case,  iii.  515,  536. 
Wilde  V.  Armsby,  iii.  259. 

V.  Minsterley,  ii.  381. 
Wilder  v.  Brooks,  i.  344. 

V.  Houghton,  ii.  106,  143,  173. 

V.  Ramsay,  ii.  715. 

V.  St.  Paul's,  ii.  396. 

V.  Wheeldon,  ii.  398. 

V.  Whittemor^,  ii.  70. 
Wildey  v.  Bonney,  i.  711. 
Wiley  V.  Hunter,  ii.  369,  393;  iii.  151. 

V.  Moor,  iii.  255. 


Wilgus  V.  Gittings,  i.  26. 
Wilhelni  v.  Folmer,  ii.  530. 

V.  Lee,  ii.  108. 
Wilhelmi  v.  Leonard,  ii.  202. 
Wilhite  V.  Hamrick,  iii.  78. 
Wilkes  V.  Lion,  ii.  586,  593. 
Wilkins  v.  French,  ii.  146,  147,  169. 

V.  May,  iii.  335. 

V.  Perrat,  ii.  455. 

V.  Sears,  ii.  63. 

v.  Vashbinder,  iii.  416. 

V.  Wells,  iii.  291. 

V.  Wingate,  i.  591. 
Wilkinson  v.  Davis,  iii.  423. 

V.  Flowers,  ii.  106,  139,  175,  193. 

V.  Getty,  ii.  733  ;  iii.  274,  296. 

V.  Hall,  i.  699. 

V.  Leland,   iii.   204,  223,  226,  230, 
579 

V.  Lindgren,  iii.  551,  570. 

V.  Malin,  ii.  567. 

V.  Parish,  i.  208. 

V.  Proud,  i.  19. 

V.  Scott,  ii.  420 ;  iii.  102,  399. 

V.  Wilkinson,  ii.  524. 
Wilks  V.  Back,  iii.  294. 

V.  Burns,  ii.  707. 
Willard  v.  Eastham,  iii.  268. 

V.  Harvev,  ii.  145,  180. 

V.  Henry^  ii.  13,  18. 

V.  Reas,  ii.  96. 

V.  Tillman,  i.  528,  529,  550,  551;  ii. 
298. 

V.  Twitchell,  iii.  482,  483. 

V.  Ware,  ii.  713. 

V.  Warren,  i.  657. 
Willet  r.  Beatty,  i.  216,  306,  307. 
Willett  V.  Brown,  i.  210,  703. 

V.  Winnell,  ii.  65,  67. 
Willetts  V  Burgess,  ii.  65. 
Willey  V.  Connor,  i.  524. 

V.  Haley,  i.  118. 
Williams,  Ex  parte,  ii.  707. 

V.  Angell,  ii.  14,  22,  688,  657. 

V.  Baker,  iii.  77,  124,  347,  350. 

V.  Bemis,  i.  522. 

V.  Birbeck,  ii.  121, 154. 

V.  Bolton,  i.  161. 

V.  Bosanquet,  i.  475,  499,  553. 

V.  Boston  Water  Power  Co.,  ii.  321 ; 
iii.  460. 

V.  Bowden,  i.  415. 

V.  Brown,  ii.  514. 

V.  Burg,  iii.  533. 

V.  Burrell,  i.  519,  630,  535,  665. 

V.  Carle,  i.  135. 

V.  Cash,  iii.  107. 

V.  Caston,  i.  1-32. 

V.  Champion,  iii.  87. 

V.  Cowden,  ii.  10 

V.  Crutcher,  iii.  256. 

V.  Dakin,  ii.  22. 

V.  Davis,  iii.  357. 

V.  Deriar,  i.  634,  635. 


TAHLK   OP  CASES   CITED. 


cxli 


Willinms  c  Karlo,  i.  W'). 

c.  Kast  liidiii  Co  ,  iii.  'Jl'*J. 

I'.  First  I'resli.  Soc,  ii.  030. 

i>.  Fowlo,  ii.  'J71. 

V,  Fuliorton,  ii.  ij;>0. 

V.  (Jarrison,  i.  f)'.»'.>. 

i-   Gilbert,  ii.  ltl"2. 

V.  Groeii,  iii.  317. 

V.  Groucott,  i.  H>. 

V.  Hall,  i.  ;{7S. 

V.  Ilayward,  i.  6*J0,  661. 

V.  IK'iisii'y,  i.  032. 

V.  lliuliljoriie,  i.  118. 

V.  Hi^'J;in.s,  iii.  175. 

V.  Hilton,  ii.  nil, -JIO. 

V.  llolliii(,'s\vortli,  ii.  613. 

V.  Jackson,  ii.  15i. 

V.  James,  ii   361. 

V.  JoiKs,  i   418. 

V.  Miller,  iii.  106. 

I'.  Murland,  ii.  370. 

I'.  Morris,  i.  008,  071. 

V.  Nelson,  ii.  841,  366,  357,  396. 

V.  Nolen,  i.  fiOo. 

r.  Otey,  ii.  (AH. 

V.  Owen,  ii.  t)2. 

V.  Peyton,  iii    235. 

V.  Roberts,  ii.  iH,  1»5. 

i".  Robson,  i.  257,  201. 

V.  Ro«er  Williams  Ins.  Co.,  ii.  227. 

V.  Sorrell,  ii.  151. 

V.  Starr,  ii.  l'J4  ;  iii.  2".)0. 

V.  Stratton,  ii.  W>. 

i".  Sullivan,  iii.  .'WS,  312. 

V.  Swetland,  i.  JitiO,  431),  450. 

V.  'I'lmrlow,  ii.  133. 

i".  Turner,  ii.  524. 

V.  Welberetl,  i.  37!). 

V.  William.s  ii.  57!» ;  iii.  48,  553. 

r.  Wilson,  ii.  210. 

V.  Woods,  i.  217,  202  ;  ii.  93. 

V.  Worthinijton,  ii.  550. 

r.  Yoiin^j.  i'.  3()7.  410  ;  ii.  98. 
Williams'  Apjjoal,  ii.  2!»5. 
Williams'  Kstate,  ii.  4!»!». 
Williamson  >■.  Carlton,  iii.  327. 

c.  Cliamplin,  ii.  25'.). 

V.  Field,  ii.  201,  588,  694,  596,  617. 

V.  Gordon,  i.  4iK5. 

I'.  Mason,  i.  210. 

I'.  Test,  iii.  5(1'.). 

r.  Wilkins,  ii.  572. 

r.  Williamson,  ii.  tj57  ;  iii.  OS.*]. 
Williamston,  &.c.  Ii.  R.  r.  IJattle,  1.004, 

'i69. 
Williman  r.  Holmes,  ii.  501. 
Willinj,Mle  r.  .Maiiland,  ii.  302. 
WiUini^ham  r.  Maynaril,  i.  ;]80. 
Willimiton  r.  Gale',  ii.  10'.). 
Willink  V.  .Morris  Canal,  &c.  Co.,  ii.  45, 

101;  iii.  115. 
Willioii  r.  Herklcv,  ii.  590,  593. 
Willis  r.  Farley,  ii.  127. 

I'.  Hiscux,  ii.  9. 


Willis  V.  Jermino,  iii.  305. 

r.  .Moore,  ii.  112. 

r.  Vallette.  ii.  I2.'5. 

?•.  Watson,  iii.  544. 
Willison   r.    Watkins.  i.  691,  698,  (iOl, 

i.OU,  01'.).  0!K»:  ii.  535,  63«};  iii.  108. 
Willot  r.  Sandford,  iii.  2'Hj. 
Willou^'hby  f.  Horri.lt;e.  li   300,  :i07. 

<•.  Willougliby.  i.  4'.tO. 
Wilmartli    c.    Uuncrutt,    i.    7,    11;    ii. 

liO. 
Wilsey  V.  Dennis,  ii.  118;  iii.  310. 
Wilson,  jy  jiitrtt,  ii.  104. 

r.  Black,  iii.  '247. 

V.  Branch,  iii.  '2»Kl,  207. 

r.  Brown,  i.  355.  300. 

r.  Cassidy,  iii.  301. 

r.  Cliristoplier.son,  i.  435. 

f.  Cluer,  ii.  210. 

V.  Cochran,  iii.  479,  487,  4S)2.  498, 
500,  522,  520. 

V.  Davisson.  i.  202  ;  ii.  91,  93.  98 

V.  Delaplaine,  i.  548. 

I-.  Drumrite,  ii.  45. 

V.  Kdmonds,  i.  156. 

V.  Ki^enbrodt,  ii.  128. 

r.  I",ly,  ii.  535. 

I'.  Kilropcan  &  N.  A.  R.  K.,  ii  lO'J 
172. 

V.  Finch-IIatton,  i.  670. 

V.  Fleminfj,  i.  709. 

V.  Forbes,  iii.  442,  480,  487,  489, 
52t;,  527. 

V.  Fosket,  iii  577. 

I",  (leisler,  ii.  271). 

V.  (libbs,  i.  580. 

I',  (iraham,  ii.  1)6. 

V.  (Jray,  i.  407,4.39. 

r.  (ireen,  i.  735. 

r.  Ilar.lestv,  i.  300. 

V.  Havward,  ii.  127,  128,  129. 

V.  Hildreth,  iii.  428. 

c.  Hill,  iii.  .32.5.  320. 

V.  Hunter,  iii.  421. 

I'.  Irish,  iii.  4'.tl. 

(-.  Kimball,  ii.  121,  154. 

V.  Lvon,  ii.  8'.). 

r.  .M'artin,  i.  4S0. 

v.  McLenanhan,  i.  277. 

i\  Nance,  iii.  3.">2. 

V.  Oatnum,  i.  .'U)l. 

V.  IVele,  iii.  480,  503. 

f.  Haybould,  i.  506. 

V.  Richards,  ii.  64. 

r.  Rinji.  ii.  133,  178. 

r.  Russell,  ii.  85,  157,  100. 

V.  ShoenbcrRcr,  ii.  57,  108. 

V.  Smith,  i.  5.V.t.  500,  664,  693. 

r.  Towie,  ii.  -Vjo. 

r.  Town-shend,  i.  5'Jl. 

r.  Traer,  iii.  3.3;{. 

V.  Troup.  ii.71,  72.  74,  PO,  103,  122. 
123,  127,  002,  0VI7,  701.  719, 
720. 


cxlii 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Wilson  V.  Weathersby,  i.  598. 

V.  Wideuham,  iii.  481. 

V.  Willes,  ii.  393. 

V.  Wilson,   ii.    24,   245,   251,    278 ; 
iii.  IS. 
Wilt  V.  Franklin,  ii.  420,  456,  475 ;  iii. 

317,  401. 
Wiltsliire  c.  Sidford,  ii.  386. 
Wimple  V.  Fonda,  ii.  590. 
Wiiians  v.  Peebles,  iii.  391,  401. 
Winchell  r.  Wincliell,  iii.  247. 
Winehelsea  v.  Wentworth,  ii.  671. 
Winder  v.  Little,  i.  292. 
Windliam  v.  Clietwj'nd,  iii.  540. 

V.  Portland,  i.  316. 

V.  Way,  i.  13. 
Windle  v.  Brandt,  i.  450. 
Windsor's  (Dean  of)  case,  i.  531. 
Windt  V.  German  R.  Cliurch,  i.  35. 
Winfield  v.  Henning,  ii.  298,  323. 
Wing  V.  Ayer,  i.  304,  307,  310. 

V.  Cooper,  ii.  36,  47,  54,  55,  60,  63, 
65,  72. 

I'.  Cropper,  i.  417. 

V.  Davis,  ii.  188. 

V.  Gray,  i.  18,  31. 

V.  Hayford,  ii.  76. 

V.  Scliranini,  iii.  262. 
Wingard  v.  Tift,  i.  664. 
Winlock  i;.  Hardy,  iii.  98,  101. 
Winn  V.  Cabot,  iii.  425. 

V.  Cole,  ii.  13,  15. 

V.  Littleton,  ii.  146,  147. 
Winnington's  case.  ii.  459. 
Winship  v.  Hudspeth,  ii.  346. 

V.  Pitts,  i.  153. 
Winslow  V.  Chiffelle,  i.  703 

V.  Clark,  ii.  262. 

V.  Cooper,  iii.  77,  78. 

V.  King,  iii.  452. 

V.  McOall,  ii.  251. 

V.  Merchants'   Ins.   Co.,  i.  25,  27 ; 
ii   163. 

V.  Noble,  i.  434. 
Winstanley  i'.  Meacham,  i.  699. 
Winsted  Savings  Bank  v.  Spencer,  iii. 

292. 
Winstell  I'.  Hehl,  i.  489. 
Winter  v.  Anson,  ii.  95. 

V.  Brockwell,  i.  672  ;  ii  397. 

V.  Peterson,  iii.  449. 

V.  Stevens,  i.  63,  617,  660. 

V.  Stock,  iii.  280. 
Winterbottom  v.  Ingham,  i.  624. 
Wintermute  r.  Liglit,  i.  11  ;  iii.  416. 
Winters  u.  McGhee,  i.  699. 
Winthrop  v.  Fairbanks,  iii.  465,  473. 

V.  Minot,  i.  712. 
Winthrop  Sch.  Dist.  v.  Benson,  iii.  70, 

72,  176. 
Winton  v.  Cornish,  i.  577. 
Wisconsin  Riv.  Imp.  Co.  v.  Mansur,  ii. 

.304. 
Wiscot's  case,  i.  114. 


Wiseman  v.  Lucksinger,  i.  602, 665, 668, 

670  ;  ii.  389. 
Wiswall  V.  Ross,  iii.  291. 

V.  Stewart,  ii.  569. 

V.  Wilkins,  i.  679,  680. 
Wiswell  f.  Baxter,  ii.  193. 

V.  Marston,  iii.  435. 
Witham  r.   Brooner,  ii.  434,  441,  453, 
467,  479 ;  iii.  385. 

V.  Cutts,  i.  718. 

V.  Perkins,  i.  187. 
Witherill  v.  Wiberg,  ii.  110. 
Withers  v.  Baird,  iii.  333. 

V.  Larrabee,  i.  634,  630,  645,  651. 

V.  Yeadon,  iii.  571. 
Witherspoon  v.  Dunlap,  i.  711. 
Withington  r.  Warren,  iii.  298. 
Withy  V.  Mumford,  iii.  501,  603,  504. 
Witman  v.  Lex,  iii.  550. 
Witt  V.  New  York,  i.  650. 
Witter  V.  Briscoe,  i.  260. 

V.  Harvey,  iii.  450. 
Witts  V.  Horney,  ii.  518. 
Witty  V.  Matthews,  i.  521,  569. 
Wixom's  Estate,  i.  358. 
Wofford  V.  McKinna,  iii.  168,  236,  237, 

405,  410. 
Wolcott  V.  Knight,  i.  237  ;  iii.  127. 

V.  Sullivan,  ii.  154,  188. 
Wolff.  Araent,  iii.  165. 

V.  Banning,  ii.  266. 

V.  Fleischacker,  i.  382. 

V.  Johnson,  i.  594. 

V.  Smith,  ii.  210. 

V.  Van  Metre,  ii.  50. 
Wolfe  V.  Bate,  ii.  558. 

V.  Buckley,  i.  364. 

r.  Dowell,  ii.  133. 

V.  Frost,  i.  661, 665, 667  ;  ii.  312,  313, 
314,  323. 
Wollaston  v.  Hakewell,  i.  534,  541,  542. 

V.  King,  ii.  781. 
Wolverton  v.  Collins,  iii.  312. 
Womack  v.  McQuarrie,  i.  577. 
Wonson  v.  Wonson,  iii.  459. 
Wood  V.  Appal,  iii.  441,  443,  459. 

V.  Bank  of  Kentucky,  ii.  93. 

V.  Bayard,  i.  104. 

V-  Beach,  iii.  393. 

V.  Beard,  i.  630. 

I'.  Chambers,  i.  443 ;  iii.  354. 

V.  Chicago,  R.  I.,  &c.  Ry.  Co.,  iii. 
445. 

V.  Cochrane,  iii.  334. 

V.  Felton,  ii.  145,  246. 

V.  Ferguson,  iii.  212. 

V.  Fleet,  i.  719. 

V.  Foster,  iii.  457. 

V.  Fowler,  i.  4 ;  iii.  442. 

V.  Goodridge,  i.  479;  iii.  295,  297. 

V.  Griffin,  i.  156;  ii.  606,  761,  805; 
iii.  81,  91. 

V.  Ilewett,  i.  5. 

V.  Ilubbell,  i.  472,  475,  566. 


TAULK   OF   CASES   CITED. 


cxliii 


Wood  r.  Ilustiit,  iii.  411. 

f.  Kclli  y.  ii.  ;i4;{,  347;  iii.  4»4. 

V.  LeiulbittiT,  i.  (>(i2,  00;j,  OOl,  007, 
(5(IS,  ()7(),  071,  073. 

r.  Littii',  i.  71H. 

V.  Lor.l.  i.  4r>J. 

i:  Mimli-y,  i   004,  tJ7U,  071. 

f.  .Miuiii,  iii.  liiSl. 

V.  MatlitT,  ii.  o70  ;  iii.  66. 

I'.  Miil(j(-k,  ii.  644. 

V.  I'lii  triiljji',  i.  640,  650,  667. 

r.  Kaho.  ii.  521. 

V.  Uiibiiisoii,  ii  578. 

V.  Sutciiire,  ii.  .•J07. 

r.  Trask,  ii.  37,  110, 128,  129,  270. 

c.  \Vnll)ri(i};o,  i.  5H5. 

V.  Wand,  i.  74  ;  ii.  .'5ii8,  380. 

r.  Wlu'fler,  i.  3.J2,  ;;7i). 

V.  Willard,  iii.  4.'i7. 

V.  Williams,  ii.  207. 

V.  Wood,  ii.  4t51,  570,  700;  iii,  678. 
Wood's  Appeal,  ii.  14'.l. 
Woodbury  r.  Fisher,  iii.  oOl,  315. 

c.  (lartliHT,  iii.  248. 

r.  Luddy,  i.  451. 

r.  I'arslili'V,  i.  004,  007. 

I'.  Sliort,  iii.  02,  0-3. 

V.  Swan,  ii.  177. 

I'.  Wo(jdbury,  i.  023. 
Woodlmil  c.  Uosenthal,  i.  544. 
Woodlie  r.  Towlcs,  i.  425. 
WoodlitT  r.  Dniry,  ii.  45.3. 
Woodman  r.  Francis,  ii.  140. 

V.  (iood,  ii.  573. 

f.  Pease,  i.  24,  .30. 

V.  Smith,  iii.  413.  421. 

i;.  Spencer,  iii.  4.3S,  450,  452,  46.3. 

••.  Woodman,  ii.  55. 
Woodrow  r.  .Michail,  i.  010. 
Woodrufrr.  IJohh,  ii.  H2. 
Woods  r.  Hailcy,  ii.  91. 

1-.  Hanks,  iii.  159,  107. 

f.  l);ivis,  i.  451. 

V.  Ilil.lerbrand.ii.  100, 169;  iii.  200. 

V.  Naninki'aj;  Co.,  i.  577. 

r.  Sanford,  i.  421. 

V.  .Slmrlev,  i.  331. 

V.  WallaJe,  i.  ;504,  .308,  .310 ;  ii.  60, 
03,  04. 
Woodside  v.  Kidneway,  ii.  253. 
Wooilward  i*.  Mrown,  i.  019. 

i:  Clark   iii.  338. 

I'.  (Jates,  i.  103. 

V.  Lazar,  i.  21. 

i:  Lincoln,  i.  390. 

V.  Nims,  iii.  432. 

V.  I'hillips,  ii.  238. 

I.  I'ickett,  ii.  47.  140. 

V.  Sartwell,  iii.  345. 

r.  Seaver,  iii.  273. 

V.  Seeloy,  i.  Om,  070. 

r.  Tudor,  iii.  8'.t. 

r.  Woodwanl,  ii.  02. 
Woodworth  r.  Comstcjc-k,  i.  302. 


Wooihvorih  r.  Guzman,  ii.  45,  151. 

c.  I'uiKi-,  i.  201. 

r.  I'a^ni',  ii.  H. 

r   Kayinond,  ii.  810,346.  840 
Wooilyear  c.  Sciiuefer,  ii.  ;i07.  3ti'J. 
Woold^.l^;e  v.  Wiikinn,  i.  21(1,  210,  229, 

3(11.  3(14. 
WooUy  r.  Grotun,  iii.  413. 
Woolfolk  t:  Ashby,  iii.  9'.i.  107. 
\\'ooli8(roft  r.  Norton,  i.  531. 
Wool!i-y  r.  Holt,  ii.  110. 
WooUton  f.  Wool.Htoii.  ii.  720. 
Woolviridjie  r.  Stewart,  i.  525;  ii.  313. 
Wooster  r.  Hunts  I.viiuin  Iron  Co.,  i. 

313. 
Worcester  r.  Clark,  i.  2i>0. 

c.  Katon,  i.  4bO,  4«7  ;  iii.  27({,  35.3, 
3.39. 

V.  Georgia,  i.  (W  ;  iii.  1V»5,  198. 

V.  fireen,  iii.  415. 

c.  Lord,  iii.  17.3 

r.  Worcester,  ii.  599;  iii.  507. 
WorcfslL-r  Sav.    Hank    i;.   Thayer,  ii. 

13.3.  211. 
Work  r.  Har[n'r.  ii.  152. 
Workman  r.  .MilHin,  i.  658,  559,  609. 
Wormley  r.  Wormley.  ii.  570. 
Wormoatli  c.  Johnson,  ii.  5<)7,  635. 
Worrall  c.  Munn,  iii.  311,  318. 
Worth  r.  Hill,  ii.  215. 
Worthiiifj  r.  Wi'lister.  iii.  2^18. 
Worthin^ton  r.  Ilylvcr,  iii.  422,  427. 

r.  Lee,  ii.  200,"2';h. 
Worthy  I'.  .Johnson,  iii.  222. 
Wortman  r.  Ayles,  iii.  142,  392. 

r.  Skinner,  ii.  571. 
WraRfj  c.  Comptroller-General,  ii.  91. 
Wrifjht  r.  Barlow,  ii.  707. 

r.  Hati's.  ii.  51. 

V.  Blackwood,  iii   273. 

t'.  Brandis,  iii.  3.3.3. 

V.  Burrows,  i.  5().h. 

r.  Cartwri^'ht,  i.  408;  ii.  070. 

r.  Christy,  iii.  2<)0. 

r.  De  GrofT,  i.  204. 

V.  Doheriy,  i.  442. 

r.  Douglass,  ii.  549. 

t'.  Dunham,  iii  2:18. 

r.  Duiming.  i.  449. 

V.  F.aves,  ii.  102.  127.  191. 

V.  Freennin,  ii.  357.  305. 

V.  Henderson,  ii.  112. 

r.  Herron,  i.  IN). 

V.  Holbrook,  ii.  208. 

r.  Ilolfonl,  ii.  005. 

V.  Howard,  ii.  li'Jo. 

V.  IIowill,  iii.  3.34. 

r.  .Tanies.  i.  447. 

r.  .Icnninns.  i.  311. 

V.  Keithler,  iii.  140. 

V.  Lake.  ii.  100. 

V.  Lattin.  i.  52."..  5.3H.  .',,y.i,  .;,01,  5<'.2. 

r.  Nipple,  iii.  4hO,  529. 

r.  Roberts,  i.  025. 


cxliv 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


Wright  V.  Kose,  ii.  75,  168. 

V.  Rutgers,  iii.  206. 

V.  Sadiller,  i.  706. 

V.  Sliumway,  ii.  44. 

V.  Spcrry,  ii.  177. 

V.  Stepliens,  ii.  621. 

V.  Swan,  iii.  206. 

i;.  Tallmadge,  ii.  694,  706. 

V.  Tinsley,  ii.  545. 

V.  Trevezant,  i.  480. 

V.  Tulcey,  ii.  172. 

V.  Waketbrd,  ii.  707. 

V.  Ware,  ii.  148. 

V.  Williams,  ii.  373. 

V.  Wliite,  ii.  598,  599,  628. 

V.  Wriglit,  ii.  346,  548,  758,  775, 776; 
iii.  262,  427,  525. 
W.  River  Bank  v.  Gale,  i.  426,  456. 
Wrotesley  i'.  Adams,  ii.  803 ;  iii.  467. 
Wyatt  V.  Elam,  iii.  336. 

V.  Harrison,  ii.  340,  381,  382. 

V.  Stewart,  ii.  64,  152. 
Wybird  v.  Tuck,  i.  470. 
Wylie  r.  McMakin,  ii.  263. 
Wyman  v.  Babcock,  ii.  190,  281. 

V.  Ballard,  iii.  490,  529. 

V.  Brigden,  i.  92  ;  iii.  530. 

V.  Brown,  ii.  49,  453,  470,  483.  491, 
667  ;  iii.  142,  327,  385,  398. 

V.  Farrar,  i.  575. 

V.  Hooper,  ii.  122. 

V.  Oliver,  ii.  390. 

V.  Symnies,  iii.  540. 
Wyndham  v.  Way,  i.  13. 
Wynkoop  v.  Burger,  ii.  357. 

V.  Cowing,  ii.  65,  66. 
Wynn  i-.  Ely,  ii.  261. 

V.  Ficklin,  i.  431. 

V.  Harman,  iii.  122. 

V.  Sharer,  ii.  520. 
Wynne  v.  Governor,  iii.  254. 
Wythe  V.  Thurlston,  ii.  709. 


Xenos  V.  Wickham,  iii.  300,  301,  307, 
310. 

Y. 

Yale  V.  Dederer,  iii.  268. 

V.  Seely,  i  656. 
Yancy  v.  Smith,  i.  336. 
Yarbrough  r.  Newell,  ii.  45. 
Yard  v.  Ford,  ii.  316. 
Yarnall's  Appeal,  ii.  500,  648. 
Yarnold  i".  >Iooreliouse,  i.  504. 
Yaryan  v.  Shriner,  ii.  91. 
Yater  v.  Mullen,  i.  9,  10. 
Yates  V.  Aston,  ii.  52. 

V.  Clark,  ii.  71.3. 

V.  Judd,  iii.  436. 

r.  Milwaukee,  ii.  391,  445. 

V  Van  de  Bogert,  iii.  278. 
Yearly  v.  Long,  ii.  106. 


Yeates  v.  Briggs,  i.  449. 
Yeaton,  Re,  i.  555. 

V.  Roberts,  ii.  598,  599,  601,  782. 
Yeliand  v.  Fichs,  ii.  697. 
Yelverton  v.  Steele,  iii.  152. 

V.  Yelverton,  ii.  417. 
Yeo  V.  Mercereau,  i.  234,  236. 
York  V.  Jones,  i.  548. 

V.  Stone,  i.  681. 
York  Mg.  Co.  v.  Cutts,  ii.  43. 
York  &  Jersey  Steamboat  Co.  v.  Jersey 

Co.,  ii.  231. 
Yost  V.  Devault,  i.  435 
You  V.  Flinn,  ii.  481,  576. 
Youle  V.  Ricliards,  ii.  53. 
Young,  Re,  ii.  258. 

I'.  Adams,  i.  699. 

V.  Dake,  i.  646. 

V.  De  Bruhl,  i.  686. 

V.  Graff,  i.  433 ;  ii.  279. 

V.  Herdie,  iii.  138,  161. 

V.  Keogii,  iii.  241. 

V.  iMiller,  ii.  102,  104,  120,  125,  127. 

V.  Morgan,  i.  387. 

V.  Ringo,  iii.  342,  393,  403. 

V.  Roberts,  ii.  74. 

V.  Ruth,  ii.  170. 

V.  Smith,  i.  660. 

V.  Spencer,  i.  153,  231,  237,  241. 

V.  Stoner,  ii.  599. 

V.  Tarbell,  i.  285,  288. 

r.  Wolcott,  i.  200. 

V.  Wood,  ii.  95. 

V.  Young,  i.  617,  619;  ii.  156. 
Youngblood  i-.  Vastine,  iii.  345. 
Younge  v.  Guilbeau,  iii.  299,  302,  310, 
311,  342. 

V.  Moore,  iii.  303. 
Youngman  i'.  Elmira  R.  R.,  ii.  164. 
Youngs  V.  Carter,  i.  227. 

V.  Wilson,  ii.  157,  158. 
Younkin  v.  Cowan,  iii.  434. 
Youse  V.  McCreary,  ii.  170. 


Zabriskie  v.  Morris  &  Essex  R.  R.  Co., 

ii.  567. 
Zane  v.  Kennedy,  ii.  708. 
Zane's  Will,  iii.  552. 
Zebach  v.  Smith,  ii.  553,  507,  718. 
Zeiter  v.  Bowman,  ii.  115. 
Zeller  v.  Eckert,  i.  598,  603;   ii.  192; 
in.  153,  175. 

V.  Southern  Yacht  Club,  iii.  65. 
Zellers  v.  Beckman,  i.  458. 
Zent  V.  Picken,  iii.  5.32. 
Ziegler  v.  Grim,  i.  716. 
Zimmerman  v.  Anders,  iii.  550. 
Zinc  Co.  V.  Franklinite  Co.,  i.  19. 
Zorntlein  v.  Bram,  i.  710. 
Zouch  V.  Parsons,  i.  486, 488;  iii.  261, 264. 

V.  WiUingale,  i.  638. 
Zule  V.  Zule,  i.  557. 


LAW    OF   REAL    PROrERTY. 


l^.OOK    T. 
CORPOREAL   HEREDITAMENTS. 

CHAPTER    I. 

NATURE  AND  CLASSIFICATION  OF  REAL  PROPERTY. 

1.  Introductory. 

2.  Dinsion  of  property  by  the  common  law, 
2  a.  Division  of  proju-rty  by  the  civil  law,  &c. 

3.  Land  and  ita  incidents  always  real. 

4-4  a.  Houses,  &c.,  when  pei-sonal  and  when  real. 

5-9.  Crops  and  trees,  when  personal  and  when  reaL 

10.  Chattels  fitted  to  realty,  when  real. 

11.  Of  distinct  projxTties  in  the  same  house. 

12.  Proi)erty  in  mines,  &c. 

13,  14.  Corporate  property,  when  real  and  when  pcrsouaL 

15.  Projierty  in  manure. 

16.  Heirlooms. 

17.  Chattel  interests  in  lands. 

18-32.  Fi.\tures,  when  real  and  when  personaL 

33.  Pews  in  churches  and  burial  rights, 

34.  ^loney,  when  treated  as  realty. 

35.  Definition  of  lands  and  real  estate. 

36,  37.  Lands,  tenements,  and  hereditaments  defined. 

38,  39.  Distinction  between  livciy  and  grant. 

40.  Incorporeal  hereditaments. 

41.  Vested  and  contingent,  executory  and  executed  interests. 

42.  Legal  and  equitable  interests, 

43.  Conclusion, 

1.  In  entering  upon  a  work  like  the  following,  it  seems  un- 
necessary to  speculate,  as  many  writers   have  done, 
upon  the  *  origin  of  the  idea  oi  property.    The  right  of    ['2] 
exclusive  enjoyment  by  some  one  individual,  of  por- 
tions of  what  might,  at  first,  seem  a  common  heritage,  —  the 

VOL.  I.  — 1 


2  LAW   OF   EEAL   PEOPERTY.  [bOOK   I. 

earth,  and  its  products,  —  is  too  well  settled  as  an  elementary 
principle  in  the  organization  of  society,  to  render  it  necessary 
to  go  behind  the  simple  fact  itself  in  discussing  its  laws.i 
This  right  of  property,  however,  is  so  far  limited,  that  its 
use  may  be  regulated  from  time  to  time  by  law,  so  as  to 
prevent  its  being  injurious  to  the  equal  enjoyment  by  others 
of  their  property,  or  inconsistent  with  the  rights  of  the 
community.^ 

2.  The  first  great  division  of  property  is  into  Real  and  Per- 
sonal. This  distinction,  though  now  so  familiar,  seems  not 
to  have  prevailed  until  the  feudal  system  had  lost  its  hold 
upon  the  property  of  England,  and  took  its  rise  from  the  na- 
ture of  the  remedy  sought  by  one  who  had  been  deprived  of 
its  possession.  In  the  case  of  lands,  for  instance,  he  recov- 
ered, if  at  all,  the  real  thing  lost.  But  for  the  abstraction  of 
a  chattel,  his  remedy  was  against  the  person  who  had  taken  it 
away.^  And,  though  the  line  of  distinction  between  these  two 
classes  of  property  might  seem  to  be  easily  drawn,  it  will  be 
found  that  property  often  assumes  the  one  or  the  other  charac- 
ter, according  to  the  circumstances  in  which  it  is  placed.  Thus 
a  house  or  a  standing  tree  may  acquire  the  incidents  of  per- 
sonal estate,  while  articles  of  a  movable  character  may  come 
to  have  qualities  which  belong  to  the  realty,  by  the  nature  of 
the  use  to  which  they  are  fitted  and  applied. 

2  a.  This  division  rests  upon  the  feudal  notions  of  property, 
whereas  the  distinction  recognized  by  the  civil  law  was  into 
res  mancijn  and  res  nee  mancipi,  things  which  might  or  might 
not  be  handled,  or  corporeal  and  incorporeal ;  while  the  first 
class  was  subdivided  into  movable  and  immovable.    Thus  Biens 

1  2  Bl.  Com.  1-10  ;  Kaimes,  3d  Hist.  Tract;  Maine,  Anc.  L.  c.  8.  "Of  all 
subjects  of  property,"  says  Lord  Kaimes,  "  land  is  that  which  engages  our  affec- 
tions the  most,  and  for  this  reason  the  relation  of  property  respecting  land  grew 
up  much  sooner  to  its  present  firmness  and  stability  than  the  relation  of  property 
respecting  movables."     Tracts,  p.  96. 

2  Commonwealth  v.  Tewksbury,  11  Met.  55;  Commonwealth  v.  Alger,  7  Cush. 
53,  86;  Cushmau  v.  Smith,  34  Me.  258;  Bancroft  v.  Coolidge,  126  Mass.  438. 
See  Code  Nap.  §  544.  There  is  a  division  of  things  which  excludes  the  idea  of 
separate  individual  property,  such  as  air,  running  water,  the  sea,  the  sea-shore, 
&c.  In  the  words  of  Bracton:  "  Naturali  vero  jure  communia  sunt  omnia  haec 
aqua  profluens,  aer  et  mare  et  littora  maris  quasi  maris  accessoria."     c.  12,  §  5. 

3  Wms.  Real  Prop.  7. 


(11.   l]      N  ATlIti:    A\I»    CLASiJlFICATION    OF    KICAL    I'KOPKHTV.  .'{ 

cuin|irflirn(lt(l  hoih  ilic  real  estate  ami  personal  chattels  of 
the  coiiunon  law.  The  distiiietioii  hetween  movahle  and  im- 
inovahle  in  the  civil  law  had  reference  tc;  the  doctrine  of  2inn^ 
capiofi,  answerini^'  to  the  niixlern  pri-yrrij>tion,  and  to  the  ex- 
tent to  which  thin<2:s  passed  as  appendant  or  ap|»nrtenant  to 
iinnioval)le  pro|>erty  in  a  conveyance  thereof.'  An  Knirlish 
writer,  in  treatinjrof  this  subject,  retrards  real  and  jurnonal^iiH 
now  applied,  as  descrihinj^  the  quality  of  thintrs,  while  the 
<|uantity  of  estate  therein  is  rejiresented  hy  the  terms //vrAoW, 
and  chattel.^  In  the  Scotch  law,  property  is  divided  int<»  *'  her- 
ital.le"  ami  '' ujovahle.''^ 

-i.  Land  is  always  re^L'arded  as  real  property,  and  so,  ordi- 
narily, is  whatever  is  erected  or  <rrowing  upon  it,  as  well  as 
whatever  is  contained  within  it  or  beneath  its  surface,  such  as 
minerals  ami  the  lil<<'.  upon  the  principle  that  cnj'us  est  solum 

1  Austin  Juris.  .\iiv.  ;  Maine,  Anc.  L.  273-28 4  ;  1  Brown,  Civ.  Law,  160; 
Giitcrbofk's  Hrncton,  Coxc,  86,  87,  an.l  note.  Althougli  res  mancipi  was  applii-d 
only  to  tilings  which  might  be  handled,  all  things  of  that  kind  were  not  neces- 
sarily within  that  class.  The  term  was  applied  to  certain  cla.sses  of  proj)erty 
to  the  transfer  of  which  by  sale  certain  fomialities  were  re(iuired  by  the  early 
Roman  law,  the  omis-sion  of  any  one  of  which  rendered  the  sale  void.  As 
remarked  by  Mr.  Maine  (p.  276),  "An  ancient  conveyance  was  not  written,  but 
acted  ;  gestures  and  words  took  the  jilace  of  written  technical  phmseology." 
Thus,  in  order  to  make  a  good  sale  of  lands  coubisting  of  Italian  soil,  or  of  slaves 
and  ordinarj-  Wasts  of  burden,  all  of  which  were  rai  maiicijn,  the  vendee,  in  the 
presence  of  five  witnesses,  and  a  sixth,  who  was  provided  with  copjier  scales  and 
called  lihrijH-ns,  asserted  his  right  to  the  proprty,  and  struck  the  scales  with  a 
piece  of  coin  and  gave  it  to  the  vendor.  There  must  be  an  actual  deliver}-  of  the 
thing  sold,  and,  if  it  was  land,  it  must  either  be  done  upon  the  land  or  by  deliv- 
ery  of  a  sod  or  brick  or  tile  taken  from  it,  in  the  name  of  the  land.  All  other 
corporeal  things  were  included  in  res  ncc  maiu:i}n,  and  might  l>e  transfem'<l  by 
simple  delivery.  Under  the  code  of  Justinian,  this  di.stinction  was  done  away 
with,  and  delivery  was  the  only  fonn  required  in  making  transfers  of  projierty. 
Maine's  Anc.  L.  276,  277  ;  Aluly  &  Walker's  Gains,  39,  -10,  72,  73  ;  Mackenzie's 
Roman  I^w,  166  ;  Hadley's  Lectures,  ^^.  Uaucnpiun,  or  taking  by  us*',  wa.<i 
a  mode  of  acijuiring  projM  ity  in  a  thing  by  the  possession  and  use  of  it  for  a  time 
prescribed  by  law.  It  applied  to  such  things  only  as  were  acquired  in  good  fnith 
by  gift  or  purchase.  By  the  XII.  Tables,  this  tenn  for  movables  was  one  year; 
for  immovables,  two  years.  Under  the  law  of  Justinian,  three  years  were  rv- 
quind  in  the  case  of  movables,  and  ten  in  that  of  immovables.  Gaiu^  80 ; 
Mackenzie,  187.  Bona,  under  the  Roman  law,  embraced  all  kinds  of  proijcity. 
Mackenzie,  165. 

■^  1  Wood,  Conv.  viii. 

«  Ersk.  Inst,  192.     8<«  2  Sliarsw.  Bl.  Com.  16,  notes. 


4  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [bOOK   I. 

ejus  est  usque  ad  coelum  in  the  one  direction,  and  usque  ad 
Orcum  in  the  otlier.^  The  word  land  includes  not  only  the 
soil,  but  everything  attached  to  it,  whether  attached  by  the 
course  of  nature,  as  trees,  herbage,  and  water,  or  by  the  hand 
of  man,  as  buildings  and  fences.  The  grant  of  land  eo  nomine 
will  convey  buildings  and  fences,  as  well  as  trees  and  herbage 
upon,  or  mines  and  quarries  in,  the  ground.^  Thus  the  road- 
bed, the  rails  fastened  to  it,  and  the  buildings  at  the  depots  of 
railroads,  are  real  property.^ 

4.  But  if  a  man,  by  the  permission  of  another,  erects  a  house 
upon  the  other's  land,  it  will,  if  the  builder  have  no  estate 
in  the  same,  be  the  personal  property  of  the  builder,  if  such 

1  2  Bl.  Com.  17-19.  ;  1  Law  Mag.  271  ;  Co.  Lit.  4.  a ;  Wms.  Real  Prop.  14  ; 
Broom's  Maxims,  290.  Propei'ty  in  respect  to  water  is  predicated  only  of  its  use, 
except  as  connected  with  land.  That  the  propert}'  in  ice  upon  a  stream  or  pond 
of  water  is  in  the  owner  of  the  soil  below,  and  not  in  the  mere  riparian  proprietor 
as  such,  seems  to  be  now  settled  by  the  weight  of  authority.  Mill  Eiver  Co.  v. 
Smith,  34  Conn.  462  ;  Cummings  v.  Barrett,  10  Cush.  186  ;  Paine  v.  Woods, 
108  Mass.  160,  173  ;  Edgerton  v.  Huff,  26  Ind.  35  ;  State  i;.  Pottmeyer,  33  Ind.  402  ; 
Lorman  v.  Benson,  8  Mich.  32  ;  Higgins  v.  Kusterer,  41  Mich.  318 ;  Washington 
Ice  Co.  V.  Shortall,  101  111.  46  ;  Washb.  Ease.  4th  ed.  396  ;  Myer  v.  Whittaker,  55 
How.  (iSr.  Y.)  376,  overruling  Marshall  v.  Peters,  12  id.  218.  Hence  where,  as 
in  Massachusetts,  certain  ponds  —  called  gi-eat  ponds  —  are  public  property,  the 
riparian  owner  acquires  no  title  to  the  ice,  but  any  one  who  can  lawfully  gain 
access  to  the  same  may  cut  and  carry  away  the  ice  formed  thereon,  pro\'ided  he 
do  not  thereby  unreasonably  interfere  with  the  exercise  of  a  similar  right  in 
others.  Paine  v.  Woods,  sw?'.  ;  W.  Roxbury  v.  Stoddard,  7  Allen,  158  ;  Hittinger 
V.  Eames,  121  Mass.  539  ;  Gage  v.  Steinkrauss,  131  Mass.  222.  So  in  Kansas,  on  a 
fresh-water  navigable  stream.  Wood  v.  Fowler,  26  Kans.  682.  On  the  other 
hand,  in  Llichigan,  a  lessee  of  riparian  rights  on  such  a  stream  was  held  entitled 
to  recover  the  value  of  ice  made  thereon  by  his  special  care,  from  one  whose  neg- 
ligent use  of  the  stream  as  a  highway  had  destroyed  it.  People's  Ice  Co.  v. 
Steamer  Excelsior,  44  Mich.  229.  A  similar  rule  was  adopted  in  the  case  of 
manure  collected  in  the  public  streets.  Haslem  v.  Lockwood,  37  Conn.  500. 
Land  is  called  solum,  quia  est  solidum,  as  stated  by  Coke.  It  comprehends  any 
ground,  soil,  or  earth,  as  well  as  castles,  mansion-houses,  or  other  buildings 
erected  thereon,  and  the  mines  under  the  surface.  But  a  grant  of  water  does  not 
include  land,  except  in  the  case  of  salt  pits  or  springs.  Co.  Lit.  4  a  and  b  ; 
1  Atk.  Conv.  2  ;  Green  v.  Armstrong,  1  Denio,  550,  554  ;  Shep.  Touch.  91.  "  In 
its  more  limited  sense,  the  term  land  denotes  the  quantity  and  character  of  the 
interest  or  estate  which  the  tenant  may  own  in  lands."  "  When  used  to  describe 
the  quantity  of  the  estate,  '  land '  is  understood  to  denote  a  freehold  estate,  at 
least."     Johnson  v.  Richardson,  33  Miss.  462,  464. 

2  Per  Bronson,  J.,  Mott  v.  Palmer,  1  N.  \^  564,  572. 

3  Hunt  V.  Bay  St.  Iron  Co.,  97  JLass.  282. 


111.   I.J     NATURE    .VNl)    rL.VSSIFIC.VTlON    OK    HK.VL    PUdPKUiV. 

he  liis  ajrreomont  with  tlio  lantl-owncr.*  If  a  tenant  of  h-asril 
preinisoa  erect  a  structure  thereon,  apjiropriate  to  the  charae- 
ter  of  his  occupancy,  he  has  within  certain  liniitationH  a  rijrht 
to  remove  the  same  while  in  possession  of  the  prem- 
ises.- If  the  *  htiihhM*,  however, have  a  permanent  inter-  [•  -'>] 
est  in  the  hind,  such  as  the  liushand  of  the  t<'nant  in 
fee,'' or  reversioner  or  rcniuiniler-iiKiii  has,'  or  l»c  in  possession 


*  The  earlier  ciuscs  nro  i»crbn)is  not  suiricieutly  exiilieit  as  to  this  Lust  n'<juirc- 
nieiit.  See  Ahlricli  r.  Parsons,  0  N.  H.  S.IS  ;  Osgoo«l  r.  Ilowunl,  G  .Me.  452  ; 
Itussell  I'.  Rieliiinls,  10  Me.  429  ;  coiinnented  on  in  Hinkh-y  Co.  v.  Hhiek,  70  Me. 
473  ;  Lti])linni  v.  Norton,  71  Me.  H'.\  ;  where  the  rule  in  the  te.xt  is  afllrnied  ;  ami 
see  DiUiie  v.  Dame,  38  N.  II.  421»  ;  Korbc  t>.  Barbour,  130  Mass.  2i>C>,  where, 
thougli  the  broailcr  rule  is  not  disjipjiroveil,  the  facts  decided  ujKjn  were  as  in  the 
te.\t.  A  careful  examination  of  the  earlier  cases  will  show  that  wlierever  the 
character  of  personalty  ha.s  attached  to  a  ImiMing  erect<'<l  on  another's  laml,  there 
has  been  either  no  substantial  annexation,  Rogers  v.  Woo<ll)ury,  15  Pick.  16<5  ; 
O'Donnell  i-.  Hitchcock,  118  Mass.  401  ;  Hinckley  v.  Baxter,  13  Allen,  139; 
Mott  r.  Palmer,  1  N.  Y.  564  ;  or  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  existed, 
Doty  V.  (Jorhani,  5  Pick.  487  ;  Washbuni  v.  Sproat,  16  Mass.  449  ;  .\ntoni  r. 
Belkuaj>,  102  Mass.  193  ;  Morris  v.  French,  106  Ma-ss.  326  ;  Van  Ness  v.  Pacanl,  2 
Pet.  137  ;  Dubois  v.  Kelly,  10  Barb.  496  ;  or  there  was  in  substance  an  agn'enient 
for  the  right  of  removal,  — either  in  terms.  Wall  v.  Hinds,  4  (Iray,  273;  Ham 
t'.  Kendall,  111  Mass.  297  ;  Dame  v.  Dame,  supni ;  or  implied  from  a  remincia- 
tion  of  title  by  the  land-owner.  Wells  v.  Banister,  4  Mass.  514  ;  or  from  his 
agreement  to  buy  frtim  the  builder  antl  the  like,  Ashmun  r.  Williams,  S  Pick. 
402.  Such  an  agreement  that  the  structure  shall  Ik-  jM-rsonalty  can  of  course  be 
implied  from  circumstjinces  of  a  general  kind  independent  of  the  acts  of  the  jxirties, 
such  as  the  nature  of  the  article  annexed,  the  relative  situation  of  tlie  jKirties  and 
of  their  proi)erty,  Wood  r.  Hewett,  8  (}.  B.  913  ;  Lancaster  v.  Eve,  5  C  B.  N.  8. 
717  ;  Korl)o  i".  Barltour,  supra;  and  in  fact  such  is  the  foundation  of  the  tenant's 
right,  and  at  the  same  tiuje  sets  the  Hunts  to  that  right.  O'Brien  v.  Kusterer, 
27  .Mich.  289.     And  see  next  note. 

2  Van  Ness  r.  Pacard,  2  Pet.  137  ;  Ilanmhan  i'.  O'Reilly,  102  Mass.  201, 
which  was  the  case  of  bowling-alleys  erected  by  the  tenant  and  removed  during 
the  tenn.  In  Antoni  r.  Belknap,  102  Mass.  193,  a  tenant  for  an  uncertain 
jK-riod,  who  had  erected  buildings,  was  held  to  have  a  right  to  n-move  them 
witliin  a  reasonable  time  after  the  landlord  had  determined  tlie  tenancy.  The 
limitations  are,  in  general  terms,  that  the  structure  shall  bo  for  the  purjwse  of 
trade,  agriculture,  ami  the  like.     Ewell  Fixt.  80  ef  scq. 

'  Olid.len  V.  Bennett,  43  N.  H.  306.  S<'e  Washburn  v.  Sproat,  16  Mass.  449. 
Though  that  more  pro|M>rly  gcM-s  on  the  inability  of  husband  and  wife  to  contract 
with  each  other.     Welister  v.  Potter,  105  .Ma.ts.  414. 

*  Coo|»er  V.  Adams,  6  Cush.  87.  And  where  a  tenant  buys  in  the  reversion 
he  loses  his  tenant's  privilege  of  n-moval,  as  against  an  existing  mortgage.  .lones 
V.  Detroit  Chair  Co.,  38  Mi.  h.  92  ;  Perkins  v.  Swank,  43  Miss.  319  ;  a/nira. 
Globe  Mills  v.  Quinn,  76  N.  V.  23. 


6  LAW  OF  REAL  rnOPEKTY.  [dOOK  L 

under  a  contract  of  purchase ,i  or  if  his  intent  be  referable  to 
a  permanent  holding,  the  structure  becomes  at  once  a  part 
of  the  realty .2  It  is  a  maxim  of  the  law,  quicquid  i)lantatur 
solo,  solo  cedit?  But  a  right  to  erect  a  mill  upon  the  land  of 
another  is  an  incorporeal  hereditament,  which  can  only  be 
created  by  writing.^ 

The  law,  therefore,  in  respect  to  the  property  in  buildings 
erected  by  one  man  upon  the  land  of  another,  seems  to  be 
this  ;  If  the  building,  or  a  permanent  fixture,  be  erected  upon, 
or  attached  to  the  realty  by  the  owner  of  it,  and  intended  to 
remain,  it  is  not  the  subject  of  conveyance  as  personalty, 
even  by  the  owner  of  the  freehold.  And  a  mortgage  of  it  by 
him,  as  personal  property,  without  actual  severance,  will 
not  be  valid  against  a  purchaser  of  the  freehold.  In  one  case, 
A,  the  owner  of  land,  by  an  arrangement  between  him  and  B, 
built  a  barn  on  his  own  land,  which  he  set  upon  stone  posts, 
and  B  was  to  hire  the  same,  and  upon  paying  for  it  was  to 
have  a  right  to  remove  it.  A  sold  the  land  to  C,  who,  by  parol, 
agreed  that  the  barn  should  not  pass  by  the  deed,  C  sold  the 
land  to  another,  but  said  nothing  of  the  barn.  It  was  held  that 
the  title  to  the  barn  passed  with  the  real  estate  unaffected  by  the 
parol  agreement  under  which  it  was  built.^  But  a  freeholder 
can  make  a  valid  sale  of  buildings  and  other  fixed  property 
to  be  immediately  severed  and  removed.^  If  a  building  be 
erected  without  the  assent  and  agreement  of  the  land-owner, 
it  becomes  at  once  a  part  of  the  realty,  and  is  the  property 
of  the  owner  of  the  freehold.'     So  where  a  house  has  stood 

1  Eastman  v.  Foster,  8  Met.  19  ;  Ogden  v.  Stock,  34  111.  522  ;  Poor  v.  Oak- 
man,  104  Mass.  309  ;  Hemenway  v.  Cutter,  51  Me.  407  ;  and  the  cases  of  Russell 
V.  Richards,  10  Me.  429  ;  s.  c.  11,  371  ;  Pullen  v.  Bell,  40  Me.  314,  apparently 
contra,  are  explained  and  limited  by  Hinkley  Co.  v.  Black,  70  Me.  473. 

2  Leland  v.  Gassett,  17  Vt.  403  ;  Lipsky  v.  Bergman,  52  Wise.  256  ;  Ritch- 
meyer  v.  Morse,  3  Keyes,  349  ;  Christian  v.  Dripps,  28  Penn.  St.  279. 

3  Bracton  10  ;  Broom  Max.  295.  *  Trammell  v.  Trammell,  11  Rich.  471. 
5  Burk  V.  Hollis,  98  Mass.  55  ;  Webster  v.  Potter,  105  Mass.  414  ;  Landon  v. 

Pratt,  34  Conn.  517;  Bonney  v.  Foss,  62  Me.  281;  Richardson  v.  Copeland,  6  Gray, 
536;  Gibbs  v.  Estey,  15  Gray,  587;  Deane  v.  Hutchinson,  40  N.  J.  Eq.  83. 

G  Shaw  V.  Carbrey,  13  Allen,  462  ;  Nelson  v.  Nelson,  6  Gray,  385  ;  Hallen  v. 
Runder,  1  C.  M.  &  R.  266;  Marshall  v.  Green,  1  C.  P.  Div.  35.  And  see  x>ost, 
§§  7,  8,  9. 

7  Sudbury  Parish  v.  Jones,  8  Cush.  184  ;  Poor  v.  Oakman,  104  Mass.  309, 
317;  Webster  v.  Potter,   105  Mass.   414,   416;   Howard  v.  Fessenden,  14  Allen, 


(!!.   I.]     NATUUK    AND    CLASSIF!'    VT-'C:    oi     KKAL    I'UOl'KlCTV.  7 

Upon  liuid  for  thirty  years,  it  ua.^  lulil  to  li:iv«'  Ixcoim' u  lixturc, 
ami  ini^Mit  not  Ik-  removed  without  tlie  consent  ol"  tlicowni  r.>f 
the  soil.i  So  it  has  been  hvll  in  INnnHylvania,  that 
stranirt'r  rntcr  npon  the  hind  of  another  and  njakf  inj|.ro\»> 
nu-nts  and  oroct  liuihlinjrs,  they  he(M)nie  tlie  property  of  the 
hind-o\vner.2  So  if  a  tenant  at  will  removes  a  liouse  on  thi- 
premises,  and  phices  it  on  a  eelhir  with  a  stone  fonndation,  he 
makes  it  a  jiart  of  the  freehokl,  and  a  mortpifre  of  it  by  him  as 
personalty  passes  no  title.^  So  where  one,  jiendin*;  a  snit  to  try 
the  title  to  land,  erected  a  house  thereon  by  permission  of  the 
defendant  in  the  suit,  it  was  held  that  the  former  could  not 
remove  it  airainst  the  will  of  the  plaintifT,  who  jirevailed  in  the 
suit.^  So  fixtures  attached  to  premises  by  one  in  possession 
uniler  a  contract  of  purchase,  where  he  fails  to  perf(jrm  on 
his  part  and  thereby  to  accjuire  a  title,  become  a  ])art  of  the 
realty,  like  fixtm-es  annexed  by  a  vendor  or  mortgagor,  and 
may  not  l)e  rcmoveil  by  him.'' 

124  ;«<)iikman  v.  Dorcli.  F.  I.  Co.,  98  Miis,s.  57  ;  Li-laml  t>.  Gassett,  17  Vt.  403  ; 
BouiK-y  V.  Koss,  62  Mc.  248  ;  Guernsey  v.  Wilson,  134  Mass.  486.  So  a  milroaJ 
ert'cting  a  depot  on  land,  or  annexing  mils  thereto,  without  the  consent  of  the 
owner,  or  oondeumation  of  the  land  or  tender  <if  damages,  loses  title  to  what  iji 
so  annexed.  Gndiam  v.  Counereville  K.  K.,  36  Ind.  463  ;  Meriaiu  v.  Brown, 
128  Ma.->s.  391. 

1  Kiid  V.  Kirk.  12  llich.  r.4. 

«  Cn-st  V.  Jack,  3  Watts,  239;  West  r.  Stewart,  7  iVnn.  St.  1'.:::. 

'  Madigan  v.  Maiarthy,  108  Mass.  376. 

*  Henderson  v.  Ownhy,  56  Tex.  647.  So  Hnhs.hman  r.  McIIenrj',  29  WLsc. 
655,  where  the  huilder  relied  on  the  j>emiission  of  one  holding  a  tJix  title  8ul>!>e- 
•luently  adjuilgeil  bad.  The  earlier  case  of  Mclunkin  v.  Duprce,  44  Tex.  500, 
which  iM-rniitted  RMnoval  of  a  cotton  gin  and  stand,  proceeded  rather  on  the 
ground  that  the  articles  were  not  fixtui-es,  —  Cole  ».  Roach,  37  Tex.  413,  —  and 
is  distinguished  in  56  Tex.  647,  supra.     And  see  post,  pi.  4  a. 

6  M.Liuglilin  V.  Nash,  14  Allen,  136;  Daggett  v.  Tracy,  128  Mass.  167; 
We.stijMle  V.  Wixon,  ib.  304;  Hinkley  Co.  v.  Black,  70  Me.  473,  where  the  text 
is  cited;  and  see  nitU,  p.  5,  n.  1,  and  cases  cited.  In  Hartwell  v.  Kelly,  117  M.xih. 
235,  the  |>oint  decided  was  that  a  rejdevin  of  the  building  by  the  tenant  who  had 
contracted  not  to  n-niove  it  was  no  tresjMiss.  For  the  removal  of  such  a  structure 
the  land-owner  may  have  rejdevin  so  long  as  tlie  prop-rty  is  identifiable  aiul  not 
annexed  to  the  realty,  Ogibn  r.  Stock,  34  III.  522  ;  Heese  r.  Janil.  15  Ind.  142; 
Sands  p.  PfeifTer.  10  Cal.  25S;  Liflin  r.  C.rimths,  35  Barb.  58;  Dubuque  StM-ii-ty 
V.  Fh-niing,  11  Iowa,  533;  but  after  annexation,  only  trover,  ib.  In  (Vntr.  R.  R. 
V.  Frit/,  20  Kaus.  430;  Fjives  r.  Hst*e,  10  Kans.  314  ;  Mills  r.  Re<lick,  1  Neb. 
437,  replevin  wa«  held  to  lie  after  annexation,  but  the  law  seems  clearly  other- 
wi.sc;  eases  sitjfra,  Curtis  r.  Riddle,  7  Allen,  185;  Wilmarth  r.  Ikuicroft,  10  Allen, 
848;  Bro.  Abr.  Tresp.  pi,  43. 


8  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   L 

4  a.  The  civil  law  upon  this  subject  is  said  to  be  substan- 
tially this  :  If  one  builds  upon  his  own  land  with  the  materials 
of  another,  the  building  would  follow  the  property  in  the  soil, 
though  by  the  XII.  Tables  the  owner  of  the  materials  might 
recover  double  their  value.  He  might  not  take  away  the 
house  unless  so  placed  as  to  be  easily  removed.  If  one  built 
with  his  own  materials  upon  another's  land  by  mistake,  the 
house  followed  the  property  in  the  soil.  But  if  the  owner  of 
the  soil  insisted  upon  retaining  the  house,  he  was  liable  to 
pay  the  builder  the  value  of  the  materials  and  work.  But  if 
one  knowingly  builds  upon  another's  land,  he  is  presumed  to 
have  given  his  materials  and  workmanship  to  the  owner  of 
the  soil.i  Whereas,  as  stated  by  the  same  writer,  by  the  com- 
mon law,  if  one,  though  ignorant  of  his  title  or  by  mistake, 
builds  upon  the  soil  of  another,  he  cannot  claim  anything  for 
his  materials  or  workmanship.^  While  a  house  standing  upon 
mortgaged  premises  belonging  to  the  owner  of  the  soil  is  a  part 
of  the  realty,  and  passes  with  it ;  yet  in  those  States  where 
a  mortgage  is  a  lien  upon,  and  not  an  estate  in  the  land,  if  the 
mortgagor  in  possession,  and  before  breach,  separates  the  house 
from  the  land,  or  if  he  cut  trees  growing  thereon,  and  carry 
them  away,  the  mortgagee  cannot  follow  them  to  claim  them.^ 
So  if  the  house  be  built  by  one  man  upon  the  land  of  another, 
by  the  consent  of  the  latter,  and  he  sell  the  land,  though  it 
does  not  pass  a  property  in  the  house,  it  would  operate  as  a 
revocation  of  the  license  under  which  the  builder  placed  it 
there.  The  owner  may  always  remove  it  after  notice  of  a 
revocation  of  such  license,  if  done  within  a  reasonable  time.* 
Or  he  might  sell  it  by  oral  agreement  without  writing.^  Nor 
would  it  make  any  difference  if  the  owner  of  the  land  himself 

1  Wood,  Civ.  L.  B.  2,  c.  3,  p.  159,  and  see  Bonney  v.  Foss,  62  Me.  248,  251. 
See  Broom's  Maxims,  295-297.  It  is  otherwise  in  equity.  Bright  v.  Boyd,  2 
Story,  605  ;  Union  Hall  v.  Morrison,  39  Md.  Rep.  281. 

2  Wood  Civ.  L.  uhi  supra. 

8  Buckout  V.  Swift,  27  Cal.  433.  But  it  is  otherwise  after  breach.  Sands  v. 
Pfeiffer,  10  Cal.  258.  And  in  New  York  the  rule  between  mortgagor  and  mort- 
gagee is  declared  to  be  the  same  as  between  vendor  and  vendee.  Laflin  v.  Grif- 
fiths, 35  Barb.  58  ;  Snedeker  v.  Wan-en,  12  N.  Y.  170,  174. 

*  Dame  v.  Dame,  38  N.  H.  429. 

5  Xeyser  v.  School  District,  35  N.  H.  477. 


CII.  I.]     NATfUE    AND    CLASSIFICATION    OF   IlKA!.    !"!■'"  ':TV.  9 

l)uil<ls  llu'  lioiisc,  if  he  do  so  for  aiiolluT  who  \ni\s  liim  for  the 
saiuc  with  a  ri^lit  to  rciuovc  it.'  I>ut  where  a  hniMiii^^  in 
erectoil  uixtn  the  \<x\u\  of  another  uiulrr  an  aj^rceuH'nt  that  the 
huilder  may  remove  it,  it  will  remain  his  personal  property  ; 
nor  would  a  sale  of  the  realty,  under  process  of  hankrujitcy 
against  the  land-owner,  pass  any  title  to  the  buildinjr.'-  The 
following;  case  illustrates  how  a  huildin^  may  retain  its  char- 
acter of  personalty  throu«rh  successive  chani^es  of  ownership 
in  the  land  on  which  it  stands.  J  R,  while  lessee  of  land, 
removed  a  building  on  to  it.  He  thin  sold  it  as  a  chattel  to 
his  li'ssors,  the  owners  of  the  fe(\  who,  at  the  same  tinje,  mort- 
gajxed  it  as  a  chattel  to  F  R.  The  land  was  then  under  a 
mortgage,  and  the  mortgagee  subsccpiently  took  possession  of 
the  premises.  The  mortgagors  of  the  house  in  the  mean  time 
had  released  their  interest  in  it  to  F  R,  who  sold  one-half  of 
it  to  one  B,  and  the  mortgagee  of  the  land  leased  the  same  to 
F  R  and  H,  with  a  proviso  contemplating  his  buying  the  build- 
ing at  the  exj)iration  of  the  term.  The  original  lessors  and 
owners  of  the  land  in  fee,  having  become  bankrupt,  their  title 
to  the  land  was  sold,  and  the  purchaser  paid  olT  the  mortgage, 
he  knowing  at  the  time  that  F  R  and  B  claimed  the  liuihling 
as  personal  proj)crty.  It  was  held  that  the  building  remained 
a  chattel  in  respect  to  its  ownership  through  all  these  changes 
of  title  to  the  land.^  So  where  A,  by  permission  of  B,  l)uilt  a 
mill  on  B's  land  under  an  agreement  to  purchase  the  land  as 
soon  as  B  should  have  paid  an  outstanding  judgment  which 
formed  a  lien  upon  it,  and  in  the  mean  time  to  own  the  mill, 
and  B  having  failed  to  satisfy  the  juijgment,  the  land  was  sold, 
it  was  held  that  the  mill  remained  A's  personal  proj)erty,  and 
did  not  jtass  with  the  estate.*  A  steam  saw-mill  may  be  per- 
sonal |)roj»erty  though  standing  on  another's  land,  and  may 
be  liable  as  such  for  the  owner's  debts,''  and  this  although  it 
was  originally  jilaced  there  conditionally,  if  the  owner  of  the 

>  Coleman  r.  I^owis,  27  Pcnn.  .St.  291. 

2  Ccxxlmnn  v.  Han.  k  St.  J.  U.  U.,  4.1  .Mo.  33  ;  MorrU  r.   French,  106  Mas* 
32G  :  H.iwanl  r.  FossfniK-n.  H  Allen,  124. 

'  Morris  v.  French,  106  Ma.ss.  320.     SiX  post,  •115. 
*  Yatcr  V.  Mullen,  24  Iml.  277. 
»  State  V.  IJonluun,  18  Ind.  233. 


10  LAW  OF  REAL  PEOPERTY.  [bOOK  1. 

land  shall  have  failed  to  perform  on  his  part.^  Where  a 
bridge  belonging  to  a  corporation  was  taken  by  a  flood  and 
carried  upon  the  land  of  a  third  person,  and  deposited  there 
without  their  fault,  they  did  not  thereby  lose  their  property  in 
it.  The  owner  might  remove  it  from  his  premises,  but  he 
could  not  have  an  action  against  them  for  the  act  of  its  being 
deposited  upon  their  land.^  But  if  one  hires  an  article,  like  a 
steam-engine,  and  so  attaches  it  to  a  building  upon  his  own 
premises  that  it  can  only  be  removed  by  destroying  the  build- 
ing, and  then  sells  or  mortgages  the  premises  as  real  estate 
to  one  who  is  not  cognizant  of  the  facts,  it  will  be  held  to  pass 
a  property  in  the  engine,  and  the  original  owner  must  look  to 
the  party  for  compensation  who  thus  converted  the  same.^ 
And  the  same  principle  would  apply,  if  one  takes  another's 
materials  for  building,  and  works  them  into  a  structure  upon 
his  own  land  in  connection  with  his  own  materials,  and  then 
sells  or  mortgages  the  same  to  another  who  is  ignorant  of  the 
fact.^  But  where  a  mortgage  creates  an  estate  in  the  land, 
and  the  mortgagor  removes  fixtures  from  the  premises,  the 
mortgagee  may  have  trespass  against  him,  or  if  he  sell  them 

1  Yater  v.  Mullen,  23  Ind.  562.       2  Livezey  v.  Philadelphia,  64  Penii.  St.  109. 

3  Fryatt  v.  Sullivan  Co.,  5  Hill,  116  ;  Pierce  v.  Goddard,  22  Pick.  559.  See 
also  Early  v.  Burtis,  40  N.  J.  Eq.  501  ;  Penn  Mut.  L.  lus.  Co.  v.  Sample, 
38  N.  J.  Eq.  575;  Furbush  v.  Chappell,  105  Penn.  St.  187. 

*  Ibid.  A  building  or  chattel  annexed  by  one  to  another's  land,  but  with  a  right 
of  removal,  may  remain  personalty  even  as  against  the  vendee  or  mortgagee  of  the 
land-ov?ner  so  long  as  it  is  identifiable  and  severable;  Mott  v.  Palmer,  1  N.  Y.  571; 
Ford  V.  Cobb,  20  N.  Y.  344;  Smith  i;.  Benson,  1  Hill,  176;  Tifft  v.  Horton,  53  N.  Y. 
377;  Eaves  v.  Estes,  10  Kans.  314  ;  Dame  v.  Dame,  38  N.  H.  429  ;  Hinckley  v. 
Baxter,  13  Allen,  139  ;  but  when  the  structure  or  chattel  is  permanently  annexed 
by  the  land-owner,  who  simply  gives  a  mortgage  or  other  lien  thereon  as  personal 
property,  this  passes  as  realty  to  the  mortgagee  of  the  land,  or  other  party  entitled 
thereto,  who  is  without  notice  of  such  lien,  and  he  will  hold  it  free  from  liability 
for  it  or  its  value  to  the  lien  holder.  Hunt  v.  Bay  St.  Iron  Co. ,  97  Mass.  279 ;  Curtis  v. 
Riddle,  7  Allen,  185  ;  Pierce  v.  George,  108  Mass.  78  ;  South br.  Sav.  Bk.  v.  Exeter 
"Wks.,  127  Mass.  542  ;  Same  v.  Stevens  Co.,  130  Mass.  547;  State  Bk.  v.  Kercheval, 
65  Mo.  682  ;  Smiths?.  Waggoner,  50  Wise.  155,  161;  Walmesley  v.  Milne,  7  C.  B. 
N.  s.  115  ;  Morrison  v.  Berry,  42  Mich.  389.  So  far  as  the  New  York  cases  are 
contra,  they  may  proceed  on  the  ground  that  in  that  State  a  mortgage  is  a  lien 
and  not  an  estate.  Tifft  v.  Horton,  53  N.  Y.  385.  So  see  Hendy  v.  Dinkerhoff,  57 
Cal.  3.  Where,  however,  the  chattel  owner  was  deprived  of  it  by  fraud  or  with- 
out his  consent,  his  title  is  not  divested  by  its  annexation.  Cochran  v.  Flint,  57 
N.  H.  514  ;  D'Eyncourt  v.  Gregory,  L.  E.  3  Eq.  382,  397. 


Lll.  1.]     NATL'lJi:    \M>    <  i,\<-.irir.vT10X   OF   IlKAL   l'!:"i"''V  11 

to  a  third  jhtsoii,  the  inortLra^'oe  may  rofiuiri'  tin-  [.uichusor 
to  pay  him  lur  thorn.  Nor  wouM  jt  make  any  ililVcrence  if 
the  lixtmcs  were  parts  of  a  buiUlinir  which  hail  been  ileMtroyed, 
and  which  had  been  saved,  such  as  dijors,  window-blinds,  and 
the  like.' 

5.  (Irowing  crops  standinj;  ujxjn  the  soil  when  this  is  con- 
veyed pass  as  part  of  the  realty,  if  plant<'d  l)y  the  jrrantor.* 
This  princi|»lo  was  held  to  extend  to  crops  of  corn  standing 
in  the  held,  unharvested,  in  December.^  And  the  same  prin- 
ciple applies  to  trees  planted  for  sale  by  tlie  owner  of  the  land.* 
And  if  he  devises  his  fiirm,  the  crops  then  irrowiuL''  pass  witji 
it.''  And  in  this  resjicct  the  ct)mMion  law  coincides  with  the 
law  of  France,  by  which  such  cro|ts  are  considered  to  cc^mc 
within  the  class  of  immovables.''  It,  however,  they  are  grown 
and  lit  for  harvest  at  the  owner's  death,  the  annual  cro|)S  will 
go  to  the  executor  or  administrator,  and  not  to  the  luir." 
And  when  they  have  been  sold  standing,  l)y  a  valid  sale,  and 
the  title  has  j)a.ssed,  the  i»urcha.ser  has  a  rea.sonable  time  after 
they  arc  ripe  to  gather  them ;  nor  can  the  land-owner  inter- 
fere  with  them  until  after  such  time.^  Indeed  it  seems  well 
settled  in  this  country,  notwithstanding  .some  earlier  cases  in 
England,  that  growing  annual  croj)s,  as  well  as  those  ri|)C 
already,  can,  as  frudus  induxtrice,  be  the  subject  of  a  valid 
oral  sale  l)y  the  owner,  with  an  implied  license  to  the  vendee 
to  enter  and  take  them.®      So  if  such  crops  arc  planted  iiy  a 

»  Wiliiiiuth  V.  Bancroft,  10  Allen,  348. 

«  Falmouth  r.  Thonjas,  1  Cr.  &  M.  89;  Mechelen  r.  Wallace,  7  A.l.  &  E.  -19  ; 
Vaughan  r.  Hancock,  3  C.  IJ.  TOG  ;  Hrantoni  v.  Orimts,  1  C.  P.  Div.  349  ;  linnk 
of  Penn.  t>.  WUe,  3  Watts,  394,406  ;  Wintcnnute  v.  LiRht,  46  Rarb.  278,  283  ;  Bull 
V.  Griswold,  19  111.  631;  contra.  Smith  r.  .Johnston,  1  Punu.  471.  St'i:  jtost,  vol.  2, 
•625  ;  also  Thayer  v.  Hock,  13  Wend.  53. 

»  Kittredge  r.  Woods,  3  X.  H.  503  ;  Tripp  r.  Ilasceig,  20  Mich.  254,  261  ; 
though  one  judge,  dissenting,  held  that  the  field  was  the  storchouac  of  the  crop  ; 
as  to  whiih  .sc<r  Parker  v.  Staniland,  11  Ka.st.  362. 

«  Smith  V.  Priee,  39  111.  28. 

'  Bnulncr  c.  Faulkner,  34  N.  Y.  347  ;  Dennett  r.  Hopkinson,  63  Me.  350. 

•  C«lc  Nap.  art.  520. 

T  Penhallow  r.  Dwight,  7  Mass.  34  ;  Kingaley  r.  Holbrook,  45  X.  H.  313,  319  ; 
Howe  r.  Baehehler,  49  X.  H.  2ii4  ;   Pattison"s  App.,  61  Penn.  St.  294. 

•  Ogden  V.  LxicaA,  48  111.  492  ;  Stewart  v.  Doughty,  9  .lohna.  108,  112. 

»  See  Kvans  r.  KolvrtA,  5  B.  &  '.  829  ;  .lone*  v.  Flint,  10  Ad.  &  K.  753;  Snin«- 
bury  V.  Matthews,  4  M.  &  W.  343,  overruliug  ElmmcrsoD  v.  Ilcelia,  2  Taunt  iS  ; 


12  LAV7  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

tenant  "who  holds  under  the  owner  of  the  soil,  and  are  fit  for 
harvesting,  or  by  one  whose  tenancy  is  for  an  uncertain  period 
of  time,  they  are  regarded,  in  many  respects,  as  personal  prop- 
erty, liable,  indeed,  to  become  part  of  the  realty,  if  the  tenant 
voluntarily  abandons  or  forfeits  possession  of  the  premises.^ 
And  by  this  principle,  where  one  entered  upon  land  under  an 
agreement  of  the  owner  to  sell  it  to  him,  and  planted  crops,  and 
then  the  land-owner  refused  to  execute  his  agreement  to  con- 
vey, it  was  held  that  the  tenant  might  claim  the  crops  as  person- 
alty .^  Where,  during  the  pendency  of  a  process  to  foreclose  a 
mortgage,  the  mortgagor  let  the  premises  to  a  tenant  who  raised 
a  crop  upon  the  same,  and  the  crop  had  been  cut  and  stacked 
upon  the  land  when  the  premises  were  sold  to  foreclose  the 
mortgage,  and  the  purchaser  at  this  sale  took  the  crops  and 
carried  them  away,  he  was  held  liable  in  trespass  therefor  to 
the  tenant  as  owner  of  the  crop.^  Where  a  tenant  in  the 
autumn  sowed  a  crop  of  barley,  and  in  the  following  spring 
gave  up  possession  to  a  new  tenant,  who  took  charge  of  the 
crop  for  him,  it  was  held  that  a  mortgage  of  the  crop  by  the 
first  tenant,  while  the  premises  were  in  possession  of  his  suc- 
cessor, was  valid  to  pass  the  same.*  So,  in  favor  of  cred- 
itors, crops  fit  for  harvesting  may  be  levied  on  as  personal 
chattels.^  But  where  crops  were  planted  during  the  pen- 
dency of  a  suit  in  ejectment  to  recover  the  land,  and  were 
standing  upon  the  land  when  the  plaintiff  in  the  suit  took  pos- 
session under  a  judgment  in  his  favor,  it  was  held  he  became 
thereby  entitled  to  the  same  as  a  part  of  the  realty.^ 

6.  Trees  also,  growing  on  the  freehold,  may  acquire  the 
character  and  incidents  of  j)ersonal  property,  if  the  owner  sell 

Waddington  v.  Bristow,  2  B.  &  P.  452.  So  see  Craddock  v.  Eiddlesburger,  2 
Dana,  205  ;  Stambaugh  v.  Yeates,  2  Rawle,  161  ;  Dunne  v.  Ferguson,  1  Hayes, 
540  ;  Pattison's  App.,  61  Penn.  St.  294  ;  Whipple  v.  Foot,  2  Johns.  423  ;  Green 
t'.  Armstrong,  1  Denio,  550  ;  Howe  v.  Bachelder,  49  N,  H.  204  ;  Owens  v.  Lewis, 
46  Ind.  488. 

1  Gland's  Case,   5  Rep.   116  a;   Debow  v.  Titus,  5  N.  J.  128  ;   Co.  Lit.  55  ; 
Whipple  V.  Foot,  2  Johns.  418,  and  421,  n. ;  Chandler  v.  Thurston,  10  Pick.  210. 

2  Harris  v.  Frink,  49  N.  Y.  24,  30. 

8  Johnson  v.  Camp,  51  HI.  220.  *  Fry  y.  Miller,  45  Penn.  St,  441. 

*  Penhallow  v.  Dwight,  7  Mass.  34  ;  Heard  v.  Fairbanks,  5  Met.  111. 
®  McLean  v.  Bovee,  24  Wise.  295. 


cii.  1.]    NAirui:  AM)  cLS'^-irK  \Tii»N  or  i:kai,  ri;(iiM:i:TV.         ]:', 

them  to  he  cut  and  removed,  wltliout  a  riglit  on  the  part  of 
the  vendee  to  oeeiipy  the  vcndor'n  hind  for  arrowing  or  hujh 
portiiiir  them  tliereoii '  So  if  trees  are  sohl  or  ronerved  to  Im* 
cut  and  etirried  away  without  any  riLdit  to  keep  them  frrowini; 
upon  tlje  hind,  and  the  one  who  has  a  ri^ht  to  the  trees  dies, 
the  i>rop('rty  in  them  iroes  to  his  personal  representatives,  and 
not  to  his  heirs.*  And  although  the  tenant  phint  trees,  they 
may  hf  regarded  as  his  eliattels,  if  he  has  no  frechoM  estate 
in  the  premises,  and  it  is  done  for  the  purpose  of  triii-iil.-nif- 
ing  and  sale,  as  in  the  case  of  nurserymen.^ 

7.  The  law  as  to  growing  trees  may  he  regarded  so  far 
peculiar  as  to  call  for  a  more  extended  statement  of  its  rules 
as  laid  down  hy  different  courts.  And  much  of  what  is  here 
stated  may  be  properly  apj)lied  to  the  case  of  growing  grass 
and  other  j)roducts  which  are  not  of  annual  |)lanting  and  cul- 
tivation. In  the  first  j)laee,  trees  which  stand  wh(jlly  within 
the  boundary  line  of  one's  land  belong  to  him,  alth(nigh  their 
roots  and  l)ranches  may  extend  into  the  adjacent  owner's  land. 
And  such  would  be  the  case  in  respect  to  the  ownershiji  of 
the  fruit  of  such  trees,  though  grown  upon  the  branches 
which  extend  beyond  the  line  of  the  owners  land.  An<l  tres- 
pass for  assault  and  battery  would  lie  Ijy  the  owner  of  the 
tree  against  the  owner  of  the  land  over  which  its  branches 
extended,  if  he  prevented  the  owner  of  the  tree,  by  personal 
violence,  from  reaching  over  and  picking  the  fruit  growing 
upon  these  branches,  while  standing  upon  the  fence  which 
divided  the  parcels.*  But  the  adjacent  owner  may  lop  off  the 
branches  or  roots  of  such  trees  up  to  the  line  of  his  land.  If 
the  tree  stand  so  nearly  ujion  the  dividing  line  between  the 
lands  that  portions  of  its  body  extend  into  each,  the  same  is 

»  Claflin  r.  Caqienter,  4  Met.  530  ;  Smith  r.  .Surraan,  9  B.  &  C.  501  ;  Stukcly 
r.  Butkr,  Hoi).  173.  S*-e  1  Atk.  175  ;  Olmstrnd  r.  Niks,  7  N.  H.  522  ;  Lifonln 
Case,  11  Rep.  50;  Marshall  v.  Green,  1  C.  P.  Div.  35.  The  limitation  in  the 
text  is  made  to  avoid,  in  this  sta^e  of  in'iuin',  the  difficult  (juestion  of  what 
constitutes  an  interest  in  lands  within  the  4th  section  of  the  Statute  of  Frauda, 
29  Car.  II.  c.  3;  post,  vol.  3,  •599. 

»  McClintock's  Apjnal,  71  Peiin.  St.  365. 

•  Millir  V.  Baker,  1  Met.  27  ;  Whitmarsh  r.  Walker,  1  Met.  813  ;  Penton  • 
Robart,  2  Fji^t,  88  ;  Windham  r.  Way,  4  Taunt.  816,  per  ll<>atb,  J. 

*  Uolfmuu  p.  Annstroug,  48  N.  V.  201. 


14  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

the  property  in  common  of  the  land-owners.  And  neither  of 
them  is  at  liberty  to  cut  the  tree  without  the  consent  of 
the  other,  nor  to  cut  away  the  part  which  extends  into  his 
land,  if  he  thereby  injures  the  common  property  in  the 
tree.^ 

8.  Trees  growing  upon  land  constitute  a  portion  of 'the 
realty,  and  pass  by  a  mortgage  of  the  land,  and  the  mortgagee 
could  not  otherwise  sell  them  to  another,  than  the  land  itself.^ 
So  they  cannot  be  levied  on,  on  a  fi.  fa.  or  personal  property 
execution.^  And  if  nursery-trees  are  planted  by  the  owner  of 
the  land,  they  would  pass  by  a  mortgage  of  the  land,  though 
planted  after  the  mortgage  is  made.*  A  different  rule  would 
apply  between  landlord  and  tenant  if  they  were  planted  by  the 
tenant  for  purposes  of  tra'de.^ 

Trees  cut  and  lying  upon  the  soil,  as  well  as  trees  thrown 
down  by  the  wind,  would  pass  with  the  land  as  a  part  of  the 
realty.  It  would  be  otherwise  if  the  trees  had  been  cut  into 
logs  or  hewed  into  timber.^ 

Many  cases  have  seemed  to  treat  a  sale  of  growing  trees  as 
if  they  were  chattels,  and  as  being  effectual  to  pass  a  property 
in  them  before  they  are  cut,  although  not  evidenced  by  a  deed. 
But  it  is  apprehended  that  this  doctrine,  which,  at  first  thought, 
would  seem  to  be  incompatible  with  the  Statute  of  Frauds, 
may  be  reconciled  by  treating  such  sale,  if  by  parol,  as  a 
license  rather  than  a  grant  of  an  interest  in  real  estate,  and 
which,  though  liable  to  be  revoked,  if  executed  carries  the 
property  in  such  of  the  trees  as  shall  have  been  severed  from 

1  Dubois  V.  Beaver,  25  N.  Y.  123  ;  Waterman  v.  Soper,  1  Lrl.  Raym.  737  ; 
Skinner  v.  Wilder,  38  A^t.  115  ;  Lyman  v.  Hale,  11  Conn.  177;  Griffin  v.  Bixby, 
12  N.  H.  454  ;  Masters  v.  Pollie,  2  Roll.  Rep.  141  ;  Holder  v.  Coates,  Moody 
&  M.  112  ;  3  Kent  Com.  438.  See,  on  same  subject.  Dig.  47,  7,  6,  2  ;  Inst.  2,  1, 
31 ;  Bracton,  10  ;  Code  Nap.  §§  670,  673.  Among  the  Greeks,  by  the  laws  of 
Solon,  olive  and  fig  trees  might  not  be  planted  nearer  the  owner's  line  than  nine 
feet,  and  other  trees  nearer  than  five  feet,  in  order  to  guard  against  this  spreading 
of  the  roots,  &c.,  into  the  lands  of  the  adjacent  owner.     1  Potter's  Antiq.  166. 

2  Hutchins  v.  King,  1  Wall.  53,  59. 
8  Adams  v.  Smith,  Breese,  221. 

*  Maples  V.  Millon,  31  Conn.  598  ;  Price  v.  Brayton,  19  Iowa,  309  ;  Adams  v, 
Beadle,  47  Iowa,  439. 
^  Price  V.  Brayton,  sup. 
6  Bracket  v.  Goddard,  64  Me.  309,  313  ;  Cook  v.  Whiting,  16  111,  480. 


CII.  I.]     NATfUK    AND    ci  \-~r in.vTIDN    OF   UKAL   rHnlMI'TV.  15 

the  frcfliold.  Sudi  a  |i;iiul  stile  nf  trees,  (ill  aetiially  jmt- 
fected  \>Y  a  severance  of  them  from  the  frei-hold,  is,  moreover, 
to  be  deemed  an  executory,  and  muy  be  defeated  by  a  eonvey- 
ance  of  the  freehold.  Thus,  a  sale  of  such  trees,  beiii^r  within 
the  Statute  of  Frauds,  must  be  evidenced  by  writing:.'  And, 
if  rejrarded  as  suflieient  to  vest  an  interest  in  them  between 
the  parties,  and  possibly  third  parties  cognizant  of  the  sale 
liaving  been  made,  it  would  not  be  of  any  validity  against  the 
punhaser  of  the  freehold  without  notice,  but  the  trees  and 
crops  W(tuM  pass  tlien-with.-  Hut  if,  under  such  sale,  the  pur- 
chaser has  executed  the  license  by  which  he  was  permitted  to 
cut  the  trees,  the  license  becomes  irrevocable,  and  the  pur- 
chaser may  enter  and  remove  them.  If  it  has  not  been  exe- 
cuted, the  whole  rests  in  contract,  and,  so  long  as  the  tiujber 
or  other  product  of  the  soil  continues  in  its  natural  condition, 
and  no  act  is  done  by  the  vendee  towards  its  separation  from 
the  soil,  no  property  or  title  thereto  jiasses  to  the  vendee.  A 
revocation  of  the  license  to  enter  on  the  land,  whether  by  a 
deed  of  the  freehold  or  otherwise,  does  not  defeat  any  valid 
title,  or  deprive  the  owner  of  chattels,  that  are  upon  the  same, 
of  his  projierty  in  or  possession  of  them.  But  if  the  contract 
for  the  sale  of  the  trees  be  executory  only,  no  title  has  passed 
to  the  vendee.^  The  same  effect,  however,  of  passing  property 
in  trees,  may  be  accomjtlishcd  by  conveyance  of  them  by  deed 
as  growing  trees, if  done  l)y  the  owner  of  the  freehold.  It  is  so 
far  considered  a  severance  of  the  property  in  the  trees  from 
that  in  the  soil,  that  the  vendee  may,  after  that,  sell  and  pass 

•  McGregor  v.  Brown,  10  X.  Y.  114  ;  Green  i*.  Armstrong,  1  Denio,  650;  Car- 
ringtin  r.  RooU,  2  M.  &  W.  248. 

3  Wescott  V.  Delano,  20  Wise.  514  ;  Gardiner  ilg.  Co.  ».  Heald,  5  Me.  381  ; 
Drake  r.  Wells,  11  Allen,  141. 

»  Drake  v.  Wells,  11  Allen,  141  ;  Nettleton  v.  Sikes,  8  Met.  35  ;  Douglas 
r.  Shumway,  13  Gray,  498  ;  Nelson  v.  Xflson,  Q  Gray,  335.  In  the  late  case  in 
England,  of  Marshall  i'.  Green,  1  C.  P.  Di%-.  35,  &n  oral  sale  of  t>tanding  trees  wu 
held  good  as  a  sale  of  chattels,  and,  after  part  had  l«en  cut,  to  vest  title  to  the 
whole,  with  an  irrevocable  license  to  enter  and  cut  the  remainder.  If  such  a  solo 
is  gocKl  at  all,  it  is  not  very  appannt  why  this  latter  result  should  not  follow  ;  u 
delivery  of  part  of  a  lot  of  chattels  sold  as  one  whole  vests  al>solutely  the  title  to 
the  remainder  ;  and  the  doctrine  of  revocable  liccns«>  obtaining  in  this  country 
would  seem  a  relic  of  the  exploded  notion  of  the  insusceptibility  of  "-•'■'"•  -afu- 
rales  to  pass  by  an  oral  sale.     But  see  ante. 


16  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

title  to  them  by  a  mere  writing,  though  they  have  not  been 

actually  severed  from  the  soil.^ 
[*4]  *  9.  But  if  the  owner  of  land  grants  the  trees  grow- 
ing thereon  to  another  and  his  heirs,  with  liberty  to 
cut  and  carry  them  away  at  his  pleasure,  forever,  the  grantee 
acquires  an  estate  in  fee  in  the  trees,  with  an  interest  in 
the  soil  sufficient  for  their  growth,  while  the  fee  in  the  soil 
itself  remains  in  the  grantor.^  And  a  like  effect  is  produced 
in  favor  of  the  grantor  by  reserving  the  trees  in  granting  the 
land,  giving  him  a  life  estate  or  a  fee,  according  to  the  terms 
of  the  reservation.^  But  the  grant  of  the  use  of  the  timber 
upon  land  is  an  incorporeal  hereditament,  and  does  not  con- 
vey a  title  to  the  timber,  or  to  the  soil.'^ 

10.  On  the  other  hand,  things  in  themselves  movable,  and 
having  the  character  of  personalty,  may  acquire  that  of  realty, 
by  being  fitted  and  applied  to  use  as  a  part  of  the  realty, 
though,  at  the  time,  temporarily  disannexed  therefrom ;  and 
they  would  pass  accordingly  with  the  land,  upon  a  sale  thereof, 
or  go  to  an  heir  or  devisee  as  realty.^  Among  these,  for  illus- 
tration, would  be  keys  of  locks  upon  doors,  fire-frames,  doors, 
window-blinds,  mill-stones,  and  irons  taken  out  of  a  mill  for 
repair,  bolts  and  other  machinery  of  a  flour ing-mill,^  and  frag- 
ments of  a  house  destroyed  by  a  tempest.^  So,  upon  the  sale 
of  a  "  saw-mill,"  with  the  land  on  which  it  stood,  the  iron  bars 
and  chains  then  in  it,  and  used  for  operating  it,  passed  as  a 
part  of  the  realty.^  So  by  the  civil  codes  of  France  and  Louis- 
iana, many  things  in  their  nature  movable  acquired  the  char- 

1  Kingsley  v.  Holbrook,  45  N.  H.  313 ;  Lansingburgh  Bk.  v.  Craiy,  1  Barb. 
542  ;  Warren  v.  Leland,  2  Barb.  613.  See  the  subject  of  the  sale  of  trees  and  the 
like,  further  considered,  x>ost,  voL  2,  *599, 

2  Clap  V.  Draper,  4  Mass.  266  ;  Knotts  v.  Hydrick,  12  Rich.  314. 

8  Knotts  f.  Hydrick,  siqh  ;  Rich  v.  ZeilsdorfF,  22  Wise.  544;  and  such  a  reserva- 
tion enures  to  the  benefit  of  a  prior  parol  vendee  of  the  trees.  Heflin  v.  Bingham, 
56  Ala.  566. 

*  Clark  V.  Way,  11  Rich.  621. 

6  1  Wms.  Ex'rs,  613-615  ;  Sweetzer  v.  Jones,  35  Vt.  317. 

6  Colegrave  v.  Dios  Santos,  2  B.  &  C.  76  ;  Walmsley  v.  Milne,  7  C.  B.  N.  s. 
115;  Liford's  Case,  11  Rep.  50;  House  v.  House,  10  Paige,  158;  McLaughlin 
V.  Johnson,  46  111.  163. 

7  Rogers  v.  Gilinger,  30  Penn.  St.  185.     See  Dudley  v.  Foote,  63  N.  H.  67. 

8  Farrar  v.  Stackpole,  6  Me.  154. 


en.   I.]     NATIUK    AM)    CLASSIFICATION    Of    UKAL    riJOl'Kin  V.  IT 

actrr  mill  i|iialitics  of  (liinirs  iiiiiiinvalilc  liv  iv-asoji  n|  tin-  u>c8 
forwliicli  tlicv  wrru  (U-stiiicd  ami  aiijilitd.  Aninng  tlu-su  were 
aniiiKils  employed  in  liitshaiidrv,  fat'iiiiii^'  iiteiisilH,  plants, 
manure,  doves  in  a  j»ip'on-lioiise,  and  all  Kueli  movniilert  an 
the  ownei*  has  permanently  attaelie(l  to  property  that  is  itself 
inniiox  ahlc.  In  England  it  has  lately  been  held  that  the  owner 
of  land  has  a  pro|»erty  in  the  wild  pime  thereon  ralioin-  nolt^ 
for  the  killing  of  whieh  he  may  have  an  aetiun  airainst  a 
8trani;er.'  And  this  rijrht  of  property  attaehes  eo  ingtaiiti  that 
the  animal  is  killed,  but  not  until  then  :  nor  does  it  make  any 
dilTerence,  in  this  respeet,  whether  it  is  killed  by  the  owner  of 
the  hind  or  a  trespasser  upon  it.  There  can  be  no  pro|H'rty 
in  animals/<;ra?  natnrce  runninj^  wild,  so  long  as  they  are  alive  ; 
and  if  such  animal  voluntarily  pass  from  the  land  of  one  on 
to  that  of  an(»ther,  the  latter  may  at  once  kill  it,  and  thrreby 
aecjuire  a  property  in  it.^  Ami,  in  Louisiana,  slaves  were  con- 
sidered as  immovables,  and  tliey  jiartook  of  the  inheritable 
quality  of  real  property  in  some  (tther  of  the  States.^  It  was  for- 
mi'rly  held  in  \'ir<i:inia  that  slaves  mi.Lrht  be  conveyed  to  uses, 
and  were  within  the  Statute  of  Uses.'*  Hy  the  Scotch  law, 
materials  collected  for  tho  erection  of  houses  are  not  heritable 
pro|)erty  until  united  to  the  surface  of  the  earth  by  actual 
buildinir.  I>ut  the  materials  of  a  buildintr  which  has  been  torn 
down  with  an  intent  to  rebuild  the  same,  retain  the  character 
of  beinir  heritable^  thoujrh  actually  severed  fnjm  the  land.* 
Tlie  sul)ject  is  considered  (juitc  at  length  by  the  court  of  New 
York  in  connection  with  the  question  wlu-ther  the  rollinir- 
stock  of  railroads,  such  as  cars,  engines,  and  tlie  like,  passed 
under  a  mortgage  of  the  same  as  real  estate  ;  and  it  was  held 
that  they  did.  The  decisi(ms  in  New  York,  until  lately,  left 
the  (luestion  doubtful  whether  the  rolling-stock  of  a  railroad 
was  fixture  or   mere  jiersonal  proi>erty.'^     But    the   latest    re- 

»  lUaiL's  V.  Higgs,  13  C.  B.  N.  8.  844  ;  Kigg  v.  Unsdale,  1   Ilurlst.  &.  N.  i»l'3. 

a  Blaiiis  V.  Higgs,  11  H.  L.  Caa.  621,  631MJ41  ;  Sutton  c.  Manby,  1  IaI.  Hayni. 
250. 

•  Cwh-  Nap.  art.  524  ;  Loui.s.  Col.  art.  459,  461  ;  Chinn  c.  Rcsposs,  1  Mon.  25. 

•  Cu.stU  r.  Fitzlmgh.  .IiirirH.  Hop.  72. 
»  Krsk.  In.st.  20n  ;  Wmxl,  civ.  L.  114. 

•  Fiiniiem"  Iawii  Co.  r.  IIiMidrii'k.Hon,  25  Barl>.  484  ;  Stevens  r.  r,i;!T.il..  i:    \\., 
81  Barb.  51tO ;  Hoylo  r.  IMattsburg,  &c  K,  K.,  51  Barb.  45,  63. 

v.. I.  1.-2 


18  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  L 

ported  case  seems  to  settle  the  law  by  declaring  it  personal 
estate,  and  no  part  of  the  realty.^  But  in  Illinois  it  is  held 
that  rolling-stock,  rails,  ties,  chairs,  and  spikes,  and  other  like 
materials,  brought  upon  the  land  of  the  railroad  company, 
whose  railroad  is  covered  by  a  mortgage,  if  the  same  is  pro- 
cured and  designed  to  be  attached  to  the  realty,  are  to  be 
regarded  as  a  part  of  the  realty,  though  not  actually  attached 
thereto,  and  to  be  held  by  the  mortgage  accordingly."  The 
subject  of  the  rolling-stock  being  a  fixture  to  a  railroad  was 
discussed  by  the  court  of  the  United  States,  and  held  to  be 
such,  in  technical  language,  "  so  far  as  in  its  nature  and  use 
it  can  be  called  a  fixture."  It  is  such,  not  upon  any  particular 
part  of  the  road,  but  attaches  to  every  part  and  portion.^  Hop- 
poles  also  are  a  part  of  the  realty,  though  taken  down  for  the 
purpose  of  gathering  the  hops,  or  piled  in  the  yard  ;  as  well 
as  rails  of  a  Virginia  fence,  or  the  loose  stones  of  which  a 
wall  is  constructed.*  But  peat  cut  for  fuel,  lying  on  land,  is 
personal  estate.^ 

11.  A  dwelling-house  may  be  the  subject  of  ownership  in 
fee,  although  its  owner  may  have  no  further  interest  in  the 
land  on  which  it  stands  than  a  right  to  have  it  remain  there. 
So  one  ma.y  have  an  estate  in  a  single  chamber  in  a  dwelling- 
house,^  and  may  have  a  seisin  of  such  house  or  chamber,  and 
maintain  ejectment  therefor,  if  deprived  of  its  posses- 
[*5]     sion,^  *  although,  if  such  house  or  chamber  be  destroyed, 

1  Hoyle  V.  Plattsburg,  &c.  R.  R.,  54  N.  Y.  314.  See  also  Randall  v.  Elwell, 
52  N.  Y.  521  ;  People  v.  Commrs.  of  Taxes,  101  N.  Y.  322  ;  post,  *542. 

2  Palmer  v.  Forbes,  23  111.  301  ;  M'Laughlin  v.  Johnson,  46  111.  163.  See  post, 
*542.     See  also  Strickland  v.  Parker,  54  Me.  263,  267. 

3  Minnesota  Co.  v.  St.  Paul  Co.,  2  Wall.  609  ;  and  see  note  of  the  reporter,  645- 
649. 

*  Bishop  V.  Bishop,  UN.  Y.  123,  case  of  hop-poles  ;  Mott  v.  Palmer,  1  N.  Y. 
564,  case  of  rails  of  fences  ;  Goodrich  v.  Jones,  2  Hill,  142.  See  also  Phillips  v. 
Winslow,  18  B.  Mon.  431,  as  to  rolling-stock  of  a  railroad  ;  Y.  B.  14  Hen.  VIIL 
25,  pi.  6,  case  of  a  millstone.  See  Broom's  Maxims,  295  et  seq.  ;  Wing  v.  Gray, 
36  Vt.  261,  269  ;  Glidden  v.  Bennett,  43  N.  H.  306  ;  Papley  v.  Paige,  12  Vt.  353. 

5  Gile  V.  Stevens,  13  Gray,  146. 

«  Doe  V.  Burt,  1  T.  R.  701  ;  Lowell  M.  H.  v.  Lowell,  1  Met.  538  ;  Cheese- 
borough  V.  Green,  10  Conn.  318  ;  Co.  Lit.  48  b  ;  Loring  v.  Bacon,  4  Mass.  576  ; 
1  Prest.  Est.  214  ;  Humphries  v.  Brogden,  12  Q.  B.  739,  747,  756  ;  Rhodes  v. 
McCormick,  4  Iowa,  368,  375. 

7  Doe  V.  Burt,  ub.  sup. ;  Otis  v.  Smith,  9  Pick.  293. 


'  II.   I.J     .N.VTUKK    AND    CLAS.SIFK  ATION    OF    liKAL    I'UOl'KIlTY.  1    ' 

all  int('rc.><t  of  the  owner  theroof  in  tlu*  luml  un  which  it  >tu  h| 
lui^^ht  thcrt'hy  In'  h)st.* 

\'2.  Where  there  are  mines,  shiteH|uarries,  and  the  like,  in 
land,  there  may  he  a  doiihle  owner.ship  of  nneh  land,  one  <i| 
the  mines,  the  other  of  the  soil,  and  these  may  he  held  h\  dif- 
ferent per.sons  hy  separate  an«l  imlependent  titles,  eaeh  havimr 
a  fee  or  les.ser  estate  in  his  respective  part,'-  And  an  incident 
to  the  ownership  of  a  mine,  where  another  owns  the  snrfaee. 
is  the  duty  of  keepinir  tiu!  entranee  to  it  so  trnarde*!  as  not  to 
endanirer  the  safety  of  the  ;iiiini:ils  lawfully  upon  the  surface.^ 
The  ipiestion  in  such  eases  oidinarily  is,  whether  the  interest 
of  the  one  elaimin;^  the  minerals  is  that  of  a  corporeal  here- 
ditament, or  a  mere  easement  in  another's  land.  It  th<'  jj-rant 
he  of  the  minerals  in  a  particular  locality,  it  carries  an  estati* 
in  the  minerals  as  a  part  of  the  realty.  From  the  nature  of 
these  inheritances,  the  laws  of  projierty  in  them  must  ho  so 
adapted  as  to  jrive  to  each  the  enjoyment  of  what  helongs  to 
him.  While,  therefore,  the  mine-owner  may  not  remove  the 
necessary  subterranean  support  of  the  suiface,  the  surface- 
owner  may  not  impose  additional  huidens  by  artificial  struc- 
tures erected  thereon,  to  he  sujiporteil  hy  the  mine-owner.* 

V'l.  If  a  corjtoration  owns  land  as  a  part  of  its  i)roperty, 
and  its  capital  stock  he  divided  Into  shares  whiih  are  held 
hy  individuals,  such  lands  would  he  the  real  estate  of  the 
artificial  j)erson  —  the  corporate  body,  while  the  interest  of 
the  individual  stockholders  in  the  same  wouM  ordinarily  be 
personal.'' 

»  Stookwcll  V.  Hunter,  11  Met.  448  ;  f^hawmut  Bk.  r.  Baston.  118  Ma.-is.  125. 

*  .Stoiijfliton  V.  U»i>,'h,  1  Tiiunt.  402  ;  Hftirisr.  HyainR,  5  M.  &  W.  00;  Hnrker 
r.  Birkln-ck,  3  Burr.  155(J  ;  Grueu  v.  Piitimtn,  8  C'ush.  21  ;  Adam  v.  Briggs  Iron 
Co.,  7  C'ush.  361. 

»  Williiims  r.  Oroucott.  4  Best  &  S.  1 10. 

*  Harri.s  r.  Ky.UiiK.  5  .M.  A:  W.  (50  ;  Wilkin.son  v.  Prou.l,  11  M.  &  W.  33  ; 
Brown  v.  Robins,  4  Hurl.st.  &  N.  \s6  ;  ^\u'\>.  Touch.  8t»  ;  Curtin  r.  Piuii.-l.  10 
liist,  273 ;  Humphries  v.  BroKtltn,  12  Q.  B.  739  ;  f'nlihvcll  r.  Fulton.  31  Pmn. 
St.  475  ;  GruW)  r.  Bjiyiml,  2  Wall.  Jr.  81  ;  Zinc  Co.  r.  Fmuklinit.'  Co.,  13  N.  J. 
322,  341,  the  emu:  of  ii  mine  of  two  di.stinct  niinvmls.  Clenicnt  r.  Youngnian,  40 
Tcnn.  .St.  341. 

'  BniJloy  p.  IloUlsworth.  3  M.  A:  W.  422  ;  Bligh  r.  Brent,  2  Yo  &  C.  2rt$  : 
4n)?.  k  Am.  Coq».  §  557,  655-658  ;  .Mohawk,  4c.  R.  R.  r.  Clulo,  4  I'aigi',  31*3  ; 
Toll  Bridge  r.  Osborn,  35  Conn.  7. 


20  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  1. 

14.  If,  however,  the  corporation  be  created  solely  for  the 
purpose  of  holding  and  making  use  of  real  estate,  the  shares 
therein  may  be  real  estate.  In  one  case  it  was  so  held  where 
the  object  was  to  make  a  canal,  erect  water-works,  and  the 
like,^  in  another  to  construct  a  turnpike,^  and  in  another  to 
construct  and  manage  a  railroad. ^  But  these  were  clearly 
exceptions,  under  the  construction  of  the  statutes  creating 
them,  to  the  general  rule  applicable  to  shares  in  incorporated 
companies.  There  was  an  early  statute  of  Massachusetts, 
whereby  owners  of  lands  in  common  were  authorized  to  act 
as  a  corporate  proprietary  in  the  management  or  disposal  of 
the  same,  but  where  the  interest  of  each  proprietor  still  re- 
tained its  character  of  realty.* 

15.  Manure  made  upon  a  farm  in  the  ordinary  manner, 
from  the  consumption  of  its  products,  is  regarded  in 

[*6]  this  country  as  *  belonging  to  the  realty,  and  would 
pass  with  the  farm  if  sold,  and  may  not  be  removed 
by  a  tenant  in  the  absence  of  any  special  contract  to  the 
contrary  ;  ^  especially  if  it  be  upon  the  farm  where  it  was 
dropped.^  But  in  New  Jersey  it  is  held  to  be  personal  prop 
erty,  and  not  to  pass  with  the  realty  as  an  incident,  or  part  of 
it.'^  The  law  of  New  Brunswick  coincides  with  that  of  New 
Jersey.  In  North  Carolina  a  tenant  for  years  may  claim  the 
manure  made  by  him  upon  a  farm  as  personal  property,  and 
remove  the  same  upon  leaving  the  premises.  But  if  he  leave 
it  upon  them,  he  loses  the  right  to  remove  it.^  In  other  States 
the  circumstances  under  which  it  has  been  made  may  render 

1  Drybutter  v.  Bartholomew,  2  P.  Wms.  127. 

2  Welles  V.  Cowles,  2  Conn.  567. 

3  Price  V.  Price,  6  Dana,  107. 

*  Prov.  Law,  402;  Codman  v.  Winslow,  10  Mass.  146;  Mitchell  v.  Starbuck, 
Id.  5. 

5  Daniels  v.  Pond,  21  Pick.  367  ;  Lewis  v.  L3'man,  22  Pick.  437 ;  Kittredge  v. 
Woods,  3  N.  H.  503  ;  Lassell  v.  Pveed,  6  Me.  222  ;  Stone  v.  Proctor,  2  Chip. 
108  ;  Parsons  v.  C'amp,  11  Conn.  525  ;  Fay  v.  Muzzey,  13  Gray,  53  ;  Wetherbee 
V.  Ellison,  19  Vt.  379  ;  Middlebrook  v.  Corwin,  15  Wend.  169  ;  Goodrich  v. 
Jones,  2  Hill,  142  ;  Sawyer  t-.  Twiss,  26  N.  H.  345  ;  Perry  v.  Carr,  44  N.  H.  118  ; 
Wadley  V.  Janwin,  41  N.  H.  519  ;  Chase  v.  Wingate,  68  Me.  204. 

6  Hill  V.  De  Rochmont,  48  X.  H.  87  ;  French  u  Freeman,  43  Vt.  93. 

7  Ruckman  v.  Cutwater,  28  N.  J.  581, 

8  Smith  wick  v.  Ellison,  2  I  red.  326. 


CM.  I.J     NATURE    AND    rLASSIFICATlON    OF    UK.KL    rimi'KKTV.  »1 

it  personalty.  Thus  viioro  a  teamster,  owniiifr  a  lionso  and 
stable,  sold  tlioin  with  a  small  yard  around  Ihem,  it  was  lieM 
not  to  pass  a  tpiantity  of  manure  in  the  eellar  <»f  the  stahle, 
that  Iteing  personal  estate.*  So  if  the  manure  i)e  made  from 
hay  jiurehased  and  hrotitrht  npnn  the  promises  by  a  t«'nant,  it 
Avill  he  reirarded  as  j»er.sonal  jirojiorty.-  So  in  Veiinont  and 
Ma.ssachu8etts,  a  sale  of  mannre  hy  the  owner  of  the  farm 
passes  a  title  to  it  as  personal  property,  and  a  suhsecpient 
conveyance  of  the  farm  would  not  j)ass  the  manure  uj>on  it, 
or  divest  the  title  of  the  jmrchaser  to  the  sarae.^  The  rule  in 
Eufiland  seems  to  be  so  far  different  in  the  case  of  a  tenant 
for  years,  that  the  way-goine  tenant  may  claim  compensation 
for  the  same  by  the  custom  of  the  country."' 

16.  There  is  a  class  of  chattels  which  in  England  are  known 
as  "  heirlooms,"  which  by  custom  descend  to  the  heir  with 
the  real  estate,  and  thereby  are  regarded  as  belonging  to  it. 
Among  th(>m  are  articles  of  household  stuff,  furniture,  <jr  im- 
plements.^ But  they  do  not  seem  to  be  recognize(l  by  the  law 
of  this  country.  A  name  attached  to  an  hotel  by  a  tenant  is 
not  such  a  fixture  that  the  landlord,  (in  his  leaving  it,  has  an 
exclusive  right  to  use  it  as  the  desiirnation  of  that  hotel,  al- 
though the  name  of  an  hotel  may  be  a  trademark  in  which  the 
proprietor  has  a  valuable  interest.^ 

17.  There  are  interests  in  lands  which,  from  their  not 
being  inheritable,  are  regarded  as  chattels,  though  in  their 
nature  partaking  of  the  character  of  the  realty,  from  the  pro|>- 
erty  itself  being  fixed  and   immovable,  such  as  estates  for 

»  Proctor  r.  Gilson,  49  X.  H.  G2. 
■•'  Carey  v.  Fiishop,  48  X.  11.  146. 

*  Strong  V.  Doyle,  110  Ma.s».  92  ;  French  r.  Frceraau,  43  Vt  93. 

*  Kobi-rt-s  V.  F^rker,  1  Cr.  &  M.  809. 

*  Tenues  de  la  Lov,  "Heirlooms;"  Jacob's  Ijiw  Diet.  "Heirlooms;"  2  F^l. 
Com.  227.  Some  writers  trace  the  original  of  "heirlooms"  to  the  implemenlA  in 
household  economy  in  which  cloth  was  woven,  and  hold  that  from  thes**  tliey 
were  extended  to  any  household  articles,  such  as  tables,  cnplioards,  bedstcAds, 
wainscot,  and  the  like,  which  by  custom  went  to  the  heir  of  the  owner  at  his 
decease,  with  the  house  in  which  it  had  been  used.  The  term,  however,  pnuwrly 
applies  only  to  such  things  as  cannot  U*  n^moved  without  injur>'  to  the  fr  " 
except  where  other  articles  are  regarded  as  such  by  custom.  Cowel  ;  In: 
"Heir-loom  ;"  Co.  Lit.  18  b;  2  Bl.  Com.  423  ;  Sliep.  Touch.  432. 

*  Woodward  p.  Lazar,  21  Col.  443. 


22  LAW   OF   EEAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

years,  which  go  to  executors  or  administrators  npon  the  death 
of  the  tenant,  rather  than  his  heirs.  Nor  is  their  character 
affected  by  the  number  of  years  by  whicli  their  duration  is 
measured,  except  in  those  States  where  inheritability  is  at- 
tached by  statute  to  long  terms.^ 

18.  The  class  of  articles  which  may  assume  the  character 
of  realty  or  personalty,  according  to  the  circumstances  in 
which  they  are  placed  and  come  most  frequently  under  the 
consideration  of  the  courts,  is  what  are  called  Fixtures.  The 
word  is  used  here  in  its  technical  sense  as  "  something  sub- 
stantially and  permanently  affixed  to  the  soil,"  though  in  its 
nature  removable.^  But  the  old  notion  of  physical  attach- 
ment, as  the  principal  test  in  determining  whether  a  given 
thing  is  a  fixture  or  not,  may  now  be  regarded  as  exploded. 
"Whether  it  is  a  fixture  depends  upon  the  nature  and  char- 
acter of  the  act  by  which  the  structure  is  put  in  its  place,  the 
policy  of  the  law  connected  with  its  purpose,  and  the  intent 
of  those  concerned  in  the  act.^  And  while  courts  still  refer 
to  the  character  of  the  annexation  as  one  element  in  deter- 
mining whether  an  article  is  a  fixture,  greater  stress  is  laid 
upon  the  nature  and  adaptation  of  the  article  annexed,  the 
uses  and  purposes  to  which  that  part  of  the  building  is  ap- 
propriated at  the  time  the  annexation  is  made,  and  the  rela- 
tions of  the  party  making  it  to  the  property  in  question,  as 
settling  that  a  permanent  accession  to  the  freehold  was  in- 
tended to  be  made  by  the  annexation  of  the  article.^     If  two 

1  Post,  *310  ;  1  Atk.  Conv.  5  ;  1  "Wood,  Conv.  xx. 

2  Per  Parke,  B.,  2  M.  &  W.  459  ;  Walker  v.  Sherman,  20  Wend.  656  ;  Bishop 
V.  Elliott,  11  Exch.  113  ;  Broom's  Maxims,  295  et  seq.  The  law  of  fixtures,  as  a 
distinct  branch  of  study,  is  quite  modern.  The  word  "fixture  "  is  said  not  to  be 
found  in  Viner  or  Bacon,  or  in  the  Tei-mes  de  la  Ley.  It  occurs  in  Comyns's 
Digest,  but  only  in  the  addenda.  The  substance  of  the  law  of  fixtures,  however, 
may  be  found  in  these  books  under  diff"erent  heads.     3  Alb.  L.  J.  407. 

8  Meigs's  Appeal,  62  Penn.  St.  28  ;  Quinby  v.  Manhattan  Co.,  24  N.  J.  Eq. 
260. 

*  Capen  v.  Peckham,  35  Conn.  94  ;  Voorhees  v.  McGinnis,  48  N.  Y.  282  ;  citing 
the  text,  pi.  20,  post.  This  seems  in  substance  the  rule  as  settled  by  the  weight  of 
American  decisions.  Parsons  v.  Copeland,  38  Me.  537  ;  Hinkley  Co.  v.  Black,  70 
Me.  473  ;  McConnell  v.  Blood,  123  Mass.  47  ;  Allen  v.  Mooney,  130  Mass.  155  ; 
Smith  Paper  Co.  v.  Servin,  id.  511  ;  Southb.  Sav.  Bk.  v.  Exeter  Works,  127  Mass. 
542  ;  Samev.  Stevens  Co.,  130  Mass.  547;  Hubbell  i;.  E.  Camb.  Sav.  Bk.,  132  Mass. 


CM.  I.]    NATrni-:  and  fLA^PincATiON  OF  RHAL  rRormiv         -.'■■; 

adjacent  owners  of  land  huild  a  division  fence  lx.'t\vcen  them, 
"it  is  a  dedication  of  the  materials  to  the  realty,"  and  neither 
can  remove  it.  It  would  pass  l»y  a  sale  of  the  land  as  nuiih 
as  the  soil  itself.* 

18  a.  As  illustrative  of  whrtlicr  the  sam<'  thin^^s  may  ho 
fixtures  or  otherwise,  dei)en(nng  ujton  circumstanecs ;  if  one 
gets  out  fencing-stulY  upon  his  farm  to  be  used  elsewliere  than 


4J7  ;  Ariiolil  i'.  ( 'niw.li  r,  81  111.  56;  Sei-fjer  v.  IVttit,  77  Peiin.  St.  437  ;  MorrU's 
Ai>]Mal,  83  Pemi.  St.  :<68  ;  State  Hk,  v.  Kcicheval,  05  Mo.  CS2  ;  Thonins  r.  Oavin, 
7«5  Mil.  72,  citing  IVsimtch  Line  v.  Bellamy  Co.,  12  N.  H.  205  (an.l  holding  Uth- 
roj)  V.  lUake,  23  N.  II.  46,  66,  to  bo  controlled  by  Hurnside  v.  Tvvichell,  43  N.  II. 
390,  &c.);  Centr.  U.  H.  v.  Fritz,  20  Kans.  430  ;  Ottumwa  Co.  v.  Hawley,  44  Iowa, 
57  ;  llutchins  v.  Ma.sterson,  46  Tex.  551.  It  is  here  held  to  be  a  (juestion  of  inten- 
tion chiilly  as  ascertained  from  the  adai)tal)ility  and  actual  adaptation  of  the  articles, 
and  from  the  relative  situation  of  the  i)arties,  and  that  the  mode  of  annexation  Is 
nier<'ly  one  element  towards  deteiinining  the  intent.  This  intent  is  a  question  for 
the  jury.  Allen  v.  Mooney,  supra.  But  it  is  the  intent  inferable  at  law  from  all 
the  facta,  and  not  the  mere  private  intent  of  the  i>arty  annexing.  State  Bk.  r. 
Kercheval,  supra,  where  a  building  on  blocks  was  held  a  fixture  and  passed  to 
a  mortgagee  l>ecause  intended  and  used  as  an  office  for  a  lirick  mill  on  the  premises, 
though  the  builder  meant  ultimately  to  remove  it.  In  Hinkley  Co.  r.  Black, 
supra,  the  rule  laid  down  in  SIcUea  v.  Centr.  Bk.,  66  N.  Y.  489,  that  there 
should,  besides  adaptability  and  intention,  be  "actual  annexation  to  the  realty  or 
something  .ippurtenant  thereto,"  is  denied,  and  it  is  said  that  annexation  may  !« 
constructive  as  well  as  actual,  and  this  is  sustained  by  great  preponderance  of 
authority.  Cases  supra.  Thus  in  New  York,  in  the  leading  case  of  Snedeker  v. 
Warring,  12  X.  Y.  170,  178,  a  statue  held  in  place  only  by  its  own  weight  was  de- 
cided to  be  a  fixture.  So  D'Eyncourt  i-.  Gregory,  L.  R.  3  Eq.  382  ;  and  the  "  phy- 
sical annexation  "  stated  in  Alvord  Co.  v.  Gleason,  36  Conn.  86,  as  a  requirement, 
was  in  Stockwell  r.  CampWU,  39  Conn.  362,  365,  held  satisfied  by  annexation  by 
mere  weight.  And  the  better  statement  seems  to  be  "  pennanent  and  habitual 
annexation."  Strickland  r.  Parker,  64  Me.  263,  266.  In  Ewell  Fixt.  22,  it  is  said, 
"  the  clear  tendency  of  modem  authorities  gives  prominence  to  the  question  of 
intention  to  make  a  permanent  accession,  &o.,  and  the  othei-s  derive  their  chief 
value  as  evidence  of  such  intention."  In  the  English  courts,  however,  the  ques- 
tion  of  the  mode  of  annexation  seems  still  held  of  prime  importance  ;  and  the  testa 
as  stated  by  Parke,  B.,  in  Hellawell  v.  Eastwood,  6  Exch.  295,  were  (juoted  and  fol- 
lowed in  Turner  v.  Cameron,  L.  R.  5  Q.  B.  306  ;  Holland  r.  Hodgson.  L.  R.  7  C. 
B.  328,  337.  A  rule  partly  derived  from  these  cases  is  suggested  in  Arnold  c. 
Crowder,  81  111.  56,  as  follows,  "  that  articles  not  otherwise  nttflrhed  to  the  land 
than  by  their  own  weight  are  not  to  be  considerecl  as  part  of  the  land  unless  the 
circumstances  are  such  as  to  show  that  they  were  intended  to  be  jvirt  of  the  land  ; 
and  that,  on  the  contran,',  an  article  which  is  affixed  to  the  land  even  slightly  ia 
to  be  considered  as  part  of  the  land,  unless  the  circumstances  are  such  u  to  show 
that  the  article  was  all  along  intended  to  continue  aa  a  chattel." 
1  Stoner  v.  Hunsicker,  47  Peuu.  St.  514. 


24  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

upon  the  farm  on  which  it  is  cut  and  is  lying,  and  then  sells 
the  farm,  it  would  not  pass  with  the  freehold.  Whereas,  if 
cut  to  be  used  upon  the  farm,  it  would  pass  with  it.i  The 
same  would  be  true  of  timber,  and  of  stone  raised  from  a 
quarry,  and  severed  from  the  freehold.  But  if  there  be  noth- 
ing to  indicate  where  the  stone  is  to  be  used,  and  nothing  is 
said  by  the  grantor  or  grantee  when  the  land  is  conveyed,  the 
stone  would  pass  with  the  land.  It  would  be  otherwise  if  the 
grantor  should  give  notice  of  the  purposes  for  which  the  stone 
has  been  quarried  when  he  conveys  the  land.  Thus,  where 
a  land-owner  quarried  and  raised  a  large  stone  designed  for  a 
tomb  outside  of  his  farm,  and  sold  his  land,  giving  the  pur- 
chaser notice  of  the  purposes  of  the  same,  it  was  held  that  it 
remained  the  personal  property  of  the  vendor,  though  he  suf- 
fered it  to  remain  where  it  was  for  thirty-two  years,  and  he 
might  maintain  trover  for  a  conversion  thereof  by  the  owner 
of  the  farm.2 

19.  The  persons  between  whom  questions  ordinarily  arise 
in  relation  to  these  are :  1.  Vendor  and  Vendee,  including 
Mortgagor  and  Mortgagee.  2.  Heir  and  Executor.  3.  Land- 
lord and  Tenant.  4.  Executor  of  Tenant  for  Life,  and  Re- 
versioner or  Remainder-man. 

20.  In  respect  to  the  first,  little  need  be  added  to 
r*7]  what  has  *been  said  above.  If  the  owner  of  lands 
provides  anything  of  a  permanent  nature  fitted  for  and 
actually  applied  to  use  upon  the  premises  by  annexing  the 
same,  it  becomes  a  part  of  the  realty,  and  passes  to  the  pur- 
chaser, though  it  might  be  removed  without  injury  to  the 
premises.^    This  principle  was  applied  to  the  case  of  window 

1  Jenkins  v.  McCurdy,  48  "Wise,  628,  where  slabs,  sawdust,  and  other  refuse 
used  for  filling  are  held  to  be  realty,  but  slabs  for  firewood  personalty  as  between 
vendor  and  vendee.  So  Conklin  v.  Parsons,  1  Chamll.  240,  rails  laid  along  the 
line  of  a  fence,  and  intended  to  be  used  for  the  fence,  are  realty,  as  manifestly  so 
appropriated. 

2  Noble  V.  Sylvester,  42  Vt.  146. 

8  Farrar  v.  Stackpole,  6  i\Ie.  154,  157  ;  Walker  v.  Sherman,  20  Wend.  636  ;  TeafiF 
V.  Hewett,  1  Ohio  St.  511  ;  Buckley  v.  Buckley,  11  Barb.  43,  2  Smith  L.  C 
5th  Am.  ed.  252  ;  Woodman  v.  Pease,  17  N.  H.  282  ;  Voorhees  v.  McGinnis,  48 
N.  Y.  278,  282  ;  Arnold  v.  Crowder,  81  111.  56,  citing  the  text ;  Green  v.  Phillips. 
26  Gratt.  752  ;  Shelton  v.  Fieklin,  32  Gratt.  727,  735.  Also  see  cases  cited  ante 
pi.  18.      In  Fratt  v.  Whittier,  58   Cal.   126,  where  vendor  of  a  hotel  retained 


CII.   I.]     NATCUr.    AMI    <I.A>-IlirATI')N    or    I'KAL    riiKl'KinV.  25 

blinds  iiml  doiihle  windows  which  the  owner  of  a  house  had 
priK-iiicd  fur  it,  and  Imd  in  it  at  the  time  he  Ki)ld  it.  The 
blimls  had  ni'v».'i'  ln'cn  altaeluMl  to  the  biiildinir,  but  were 
sittinir  in  thr  house  at  thi-  time  of  the  saU'.  The  double  win- 
dows would  fit  into  the  cxistinir  window-frames,  and  had  been 
used  one  winter  by  merely  setting  them  into  the  frames  without 
beinj?  fastened  in  any  way,  and  were  ur)t  in  sight  when  tho 
sale  was  nuide.  It  was  held  that  they  had  not  been  so  far 
fitted  and  fastened  to  the  house  as  to  pass  with  it  as  fixtures.' 
21.  The  same  rule  applies  between  mortgagor  and  mort- 
gagee, whether  the  article  in  (lue.stiou  be  annexed  to  the 
premises  before  or  after  making  the  mortgage.'-'  And  this 
doctrine  was  held  to  apply,  although  the  mortgagor  was  one  of 
a  partnership  who  occupied  the  i)remi.sc8,  and  made  the  attach- 
ment of  the  fixture  to  the  premises.^  But  even  a  mortgagor 
may  make  temporary  erecti(jns  if  they  are  not  attached  to  the 
freehold,  and  may  rcnujve  them  before  the  mortgage  is  fore- 
closed, if  he  does  not  depreciate  the  value  of  the  security  as  it 
existed  when  the  mortgage  was  given.  In  this  case,  a  jiart- 
nership  jdaced  upon  the  land  of  one  of  the  partners  a  tempo- 
rary building  upon  bbjcks,  and  in  no  otherwise  annexed  to 
the  realty.  It  was  held  not  to  be  bound  by  the  mortgage,  as 
it  would  have  been  if  annexed  to  the  soil.*     In  one  case  the 

the  "furniture,  pictures,  and  carpets,  but  none  of  the  permanent  fixtures,"  gaa 
fixtures,  kitchen-mnge,  boiler,  and  water-tank,  were  held  to  pass  to  the  vendee, 
mainly  on  the  intent  ini[>lit'd  from  the  enumeration  of  what  was  retained. 

1  Peck  V.  Batchelder,  40  Vt.  233. 

a  Gardner  v.  Finley,  19  Barb.  317;  Walnisley  r.  Milne,  7  C.  B.  N.  ».  115  ; 
jHiat,  p.  *5i'2  ;  Union  Bunk  i^.  Emerson,  15  Mass.  159  ;  Winslow  v.  Merch.  Ins. 
Co.,  4  Met.  306  ;  Roljerts  v.  Dauphin  Bunk,  19  Penn.  St.  71  ;  Robinson  v.  Prcs- 
wick,  3  Edw.  Ch.  2-1(3  ;  Wadl.'igh  r.  Janvrin,  41  N.  H.  514;  Bumside  r.  Twitch- 
ell,  43  N.  H.  390  ;  Hoskin  v.  Womhvard,  45  Penn.  St.  42  ;  I'rnne  r.  Brighnm, 
11  N.  J.  Eq.  29,  limiting  and  defining  the  riK'ht  ;  Richanlson  v.  Copeland,  6 
Gray,  536  ;  Pierce  v.  George,  108  Majis.  78.  In  NVard  v.  Kilivitrick,  85  N.  Y.  413, 
mirrors  fastened  into  a  wall  and  fitted  with  hat  rack.<«,  whose  r«'niovnl  would 
leave  the  wall  unfinished,  were  held  to  go  with  the  realty.  See  also  D'Eyncourt 
r.  Gregorj-,  L  R.  3  Eq.  382. 

•  Cullwick  r.  Swindell,  L.  R,  3  E<].  249  ;  £ur  parU  Cotton,  2  M.  D.  k  De  G. 
725  ;  Lynde  r.  Rowe,  12  Allen,  100  ;  Kelly  v.  Austin,  46  III.  156.  So  in  Thomp- 
son V.  Vinton,  121  Mass.  139,  the  mortgagee's  right  was  held  superior  to  the  claim 
of  tho  mortgagee's  jwrtner,  who  paid  in  i^irt  for  the  fixturea  and  look  a  lease  of 
them. 

*  Kelly  V.  Austin,  46  111.  150. 


26  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK  L 

court  held  a  steam-engine,  put  into  the  mortgaged  premises 
by  the  mortgagor,  not  to  pass  under  the  mortgage,  from  the 
nature  of  the  property,  it  being  a  water-mill,  and  the  engine 
being  only  placed  there  in  a  dry  time  to  supply  power.i  So 
it  is  held  that  if  the  machinery,  though  adapted  to  the  mill  of 
the  mortgagor,  is  merely  so  affixed  as  to  be  held  steadily  in 
place,  and  has  nothing  in  its  character  special  to  the  mort- 
gagor's business,  but  could  be  equally  well  used  in  any  manu- 
facturing business,  it  is  personalty .^  In  New  York  and  some 
other  States  the  doctrine  obtains  that  if  the  land-owner  agrees 
with  the  vendor  of  chattels  sold  to  be  annexed  to  the  land, 
and  actually  annexed  thereto,  that  he  shall  be  secured  thereon 
until  paid,  this  will  give  him  precedence  over  a  mortgage  of  the 
land,  whether  prior  or  subsequent.^  But  in  Massachusetts 
and  other  States,  the  contrary  rule  prevails,  unless  such  mort- 
gagee of  the  land  had  notice  of  this  agreement  when  taking 
his  mortgage.*  This  diversity  arises,  perhaps,  from  the  dif- 
ferent views  taken  of  the  mortgagee's  interest  in  these  differ- 
ent jurisdictions,  —  in  the  former  it  being  held  only  a  lien,  while 
in  the  latter  it  is  regarded  as  in  the  nature  of  an  estate.^  So 
if  the  fixtures  are  removed  by  the  original  vendor  by  consent 
of  the  mortgagee,  and  he  subsequently  assigns  his  mortgage, 
it  would  not  pass  the  fixtures.^  So  if  the  second  mortgagee 
has  a  chattel  mortgage  only,  he  is  estopped  to  deny  the  title 
of  the  vendor,  who  had  the  first  chattel  mortgage.'' 

22.  Also  between  the  heir  and  executor  of  the  owner  of  the 


1  Crane  v.  Brigham,  11  N.  J.  Eq.  30. 

2  Hubbell  V.  E.  Cambr.  Sav.  Bk.,  132  Mass.  447  ;  Robertson  v.  Corsett,  39 
Mich.  777  ;  and  see  post,  §  25. 

3  Mott  V.  Palmer,  1  N.  Y.  564 ;  Tifft  v.  Horton,  53  N.  Y.  377  ;  Dame  v. 
Dame,  38  N,  H.  429  ;  Eaves  v.  Estes,  10  Kans.  314  ;  Jones  v.  Scott,  id.  33  ; 
Crippen  v.  Morrison,  13  Mich.  23.     But  see  Morrison  v.  Berry,  42  Mich.  389. 

*  Clary  v.  Owen,  15  Gray,  322  ;  Hunt^-.  Bay  St.  Iron  Co.,  97  Mass.  279  ;  Pierce 
V.  George,  108  Mass.  78,  82  ;  Southbr.  Sav.  Bk.  v.  Exeter  Works,  127  JIass.  542  ; 
Quinby  v.  Manhattan  Co.,  24  N.  J.  Eq.  260  ;  Smith  v.  Waggoner,  50  Wise.  155, 
161.  So  in  England.  Climie  v.  Wood,  L.  E.  3  Exch.  257,  and  see  a^ite,  pi.  4  a  and 
note.  And  a  vendee  of  land  is  bound  by  like  notice.  Wilgus  v.  Gittings,  21 
Iowa,  177. 

6  TifiFt  V.  Horton,  53  N.  Y.  385. 

6  Voorhees  v.  McGinnis,  48  N.  Y.  27'8 ;  Bartholomew  v.  Hamilton,  105  Mass.  239. 

^  Smith  V.  Waggoner,  50  Wise,  155. 


ril.  I.]     NATrUE    AND    CLASSIFICATION    OF   IJEAL    PROPFRTV.  JT 

freehold,  unless  regulated  by  statute,  as  is  the  case  in  N<'\v 
Yoik.i 

23.  Also  between  dehtiip  and  creditor,  wherr  tlir  l:itti  i- 
levies  upon  the  hnul  ot  the  former  for  deht.^ 

24.  Also  between  heir  or  vendee  of  hushand  and  his  widow 
in  respeet  to  the  premises  set  to  her  as  dower.'' 

25.  Amonir  the  articles  to  which  this  rule  has  been  h'ld  to 
apjfly,  in  addition  to  those  above  enumerated,  have  been  rolls 
in  an  iron-mill,  thouirh  lying  loose  in  the  mill  ,*  steam-engine 
and  boiler ;  engines  and  frames  designed  and  adapted  to  be 
moved  and  use<l  by  such  engine  ;^  dye-kettle  set  in  brick  ;^  the 
main  mill-wheel  and  geariiiir  of  a  faet(jry  necessary  to  operate 
it;"  a  cotton-gin  or  sugar-mill  fixed  in  its  jdace.*  A  trijn 
hammcr  attached  to  a  block  set  in  the  ground,  the  bhjwer  of 
a  forge,  a  force-jjump  and  jiipes  for  raising  water,  and  shaft- 
ing annexed  to  the  freehold  and  adai)ted  to  be  used  with  it, 
are  fixtures.  So  a  windlass  attached  to  a  butcher  shop  is  a 
fixture.^  Also  a  bell  hung  in  the  cujiola  of  a  barn  so  as  to  be 
rung  for  farm  purposes  ;  and  a  church  bell  while  hung  in  a 
temporary  frame,  pending  the  rebuilding  of  the  belfry,  arc 
fixtures,  and  will  ])ass  as  such  with  the  realty.*'^  So,  where 
one  having  a  mill  and  steam-engine,  with  works  to  be  carried 
by   it,  procured  and  placed  in  it  a  portable  grist-mill,  which 

•  2  Ki-nt  Com.  8th  ed.  345  and  note  ;  House  v.  House,  10  Paige  <,h.  15S  ; 
Fay  V.  Muzzey,  13  Gray,  53  ;  Wnis.  IVrs.  Prop.  14. 

'  Farrar  v.  Chauiretete,  6  Denio,  527  ;  Goddurd  v.  Chase,  7  Ma.s8.  432. 

•  Powell  r.  &Ionson  Co.,  3  Vinson,  459. 

•  Voorhis  v.  Freeman,  2  Wntts  &  S.  116  ;  Hill  r.  Sewald,  53  Penn.  St.  271. 

'  Simrksf.  State  Bank,  7  Blackf.  469;  Winslow  r.  Mi-reh.  Ins.  Co.,  4  Mot. 
306  ;  Sands  v.  PfeitFcr,  10  Cal.  258 ;  Walmsley  v.  Milne,  7  C.  B.  n.  8.  115  :  Voor- 
hees  V.  McGinnis,  48  N.  Y.  278,  285  ;  Pierce  v.  George,  108  Mass.  78,  82  ;  Mc- 
Connell  v.  Blood,  123  Ma*s.  47;  Kelly  r.  City  Mills,  126  Mass.  148;  Greeu  v. 
Phillips,  26  Gratt.  752  ;  Ove-s  v.  Ogelsby,  7  Watts.  106. 

•  Nol.le  V  Bosworth,  19  Pick.  314  ;  Union  Bank  r.  Emerson.  15  Mas-s.  150. 
Desi>ntoh  Line  i-.  Bellamy,  12  N.  H.  205.  So  jwtash  kettles.  Miller  r.  Plumb, 
6  Cow.  665. 

7  Powell  V.  Monson  Co.,  3  Mason,  459  ;  Buckley  r.  Buckley,  11  Barb.  43. 

»  Brntton  v.  Clawson,  2  Strobh.  478  ;  Richardson  c.  Borden,  42  Miss.  71  ; 
Fairis  c.  Walker,  1  Bailey,  540  ;  Hutchins  r.  Masterson,  46  Tex.  651. 

»  McLaughlin  r.  Nash,  14  Allen,  136  ;  Capen  r.  Peckhain,  85  Conn.  88,  98. 

«>  Weston  c.  Weston.  102  Mass.  514.  519  ;  Alvord  Co.  v.  Gleason,  86  Conn.  86  • 
Dabaque  Soc.  r.  Fleming,  11  Iowa,  533. 


28  LATV   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

he  fixed  firmly  and  securely  in  it,  but  it  could  be  taken  out 
without  injury,  it  was  held  that  it  passed  as  a  part  of  the 
realty  upon  a  sale  of  the  latter,  as  it  had  been  annexed  with 
an  intention  of  its  being  a  permanency  in  carrying  on  the 
business  of  the  mill.^ 

26.  On  the  other  hand,  machines,  and  the  like,  which 
[*8]  may  be  *  used  in  any  other  building  as  well  as  that  in 
which  they  are  placed,  such  as  carding-machines  in  a 
factory,  are  ordinarily  deemed  to  be  personal  chattels,  though 
fastened  securely  to  the  freehold,  if  the  same  can  be  removed 
without  material  injury  to  the  freehold. ^  So  marble  slabs 
laid  upon  brackets  in  a  house,  and  mirrors  hooked,  but  not 
otherwise  fastened,  to  the  wall,  are  not  fixtures,  but  furniture, 
and  do  not  pass  from  vendor  to  vendee  of  the  realty .^  So  a 
steam-engine  and  boiler  set  upon  frames  and  portable,  a  plan- 
ing-machine  and  anvils  resting  on  the  ground  but  not  fastened, 
forge  tools  and  a  vice  annexed  by  screws  to  a  bench  in  the 
shop,  and  a  grindstone  in  a  movable  frame,  are  chattels  and 
not  fixtures.*  And  it  is  stated  as  a  rule  of  law,  in  respect  to 
mills  and  manufactories,  that  in  the  absence  of  agreement  or 
custom,  anything  that  can  be  removed  without  essential  injury 
to  itself  or  the  freehold  is  a  chattel  between  a  purchaser  of 
the  realty  and  a  mortgagee  of  the  personalty.^ 

26  a.  Before  dismissing  a  topic  where  the  rules  of  law  are 
to  be  derived  from  such  a  great  variety  of  conditions  of  fact, 
it  may  not  be  improper  to  illustrate  the  foregoing  propositions 
by  some  further  instances.  It  may  be  stated,  in  the  first  place, 
that  whether  a  thing  which  may  be  a  fixture  becomes  a  part 
of  the  realty  by  annexing  it,  depends,  as  a  general  proposition, 
upon  the  intention  with  which  it  is  done.^     Between  vendor 

1  Potter  V.  Cromwell,  40  N.  Y.  287-296  ;  Stillman  v.  Flenniken,  58  Iowa,  450. 

2  Cresson  v.  Stout,  17  Johns.  116  ;  Gale  v.  Ward,  14  Mass.  352  ;  Swift  v. 
Thompson,  9  Conn.  63  ;  Vanderpoel  v.  Van  Allen,  10  Barb,  157. 

8  Western;.  Weston,  102  Mass.  514  ;  McKeage  v.  Han.  F.  I.  Co.,  81  N.  Y.  38. 

*  Hubbell  V.  E.  Cambr.  Sav.  Bk.,  132  Mass.  447  ;  but  Christian  v.  Dripps,  28 
Penn.  St.  271,  seems  contra. 

5  Wade  V.  Johnson,  25  Ga.  331.  See  more  fully  on  this  subject,  Walker  v. 
Sherman,  20  Wend.  636-657  ;  Walmsley  v.  Milne,  sup. 

8  Hill  V.  Sewald,  53  Penn.  St.  271  ;  Hill  v.  Wentworth,  28  Vt.  428,  436  ; 
Voorhees  v.  McGinnis,  48  N.  Y.  278,  233  ;  Hutchins  v.  Masterson,  46  Tex.  551. 


Ca.  I.]     NXTI'KK    ASM    r-|,\>-n-Ii- \TI()V    or    nV.W     PUnl-riri  v.  2^' 

and  viuili'c,  (jr  luortLMiriH-  nr  mortirap-c,  it  li:i.-^  Iiciii  lnlil  lliut 
pJis-lixturt's,  iucliKiinp  a  jrasniiu'trr  and  apparatus  for  pcntrat- 
ing  gas,  would  pass  with  the  liouse  in  which  they  were  in  use, 
hut  not  liotwecn  tenant  and  hmdlord  if  put  in  hy  the  tenant.' 
But  it  seems  now  settled  that  gas-lixtuies  other  than  gas- 
j)iping  within  the  walls  arc  chattels  «)nly;^  though  this  may 
ho  controlled  hy  the  agreement  of  the  parties.'  Steam  hollers 
and  enirines  used  in  a  marhle  mill,  and  supjilying  the  power 
hy  which  it  is  carried  on,  pass  as  a  part  of  the  realty  hy  a  mort- 
gage of  the  estate  hy  the  owner.  But  the  saw-frames  in  such 
mill  were  held  to  he  personal  chattels.*  So  )>latform  scales  on 
a  hay  and  grain  farnj  an-  fixtures.''  If  a  steam-engine,  for 
instance,  l)e  placed  in  a  shop  or  factory  to  create  the  moving 
power  hy  which  it  is  carried  on,  the  engine  and  shaftinir  neces- 
sary to  conununicate  the  motive  power  to  the  machinery  would 
he  as  much  a  part  of  the  realty  as  a  water-wheel,  and  would  pass 
with  the  realty  l>y  (h'ed  or  mortgage.''  The  shelves,  drawers, 
and  counter-taldcs  fitted  in  a  store  j)ass  with  the  store  as 
realty."  An  ice-chest  used  in  a  tavern  is  not  a  fixture,  al- 
though so  large  in  its  dimensions  as  to  render  it  necessary  to 
take  it  in  pieces  to  remove  it  from  the  house.  It  would  he  of 
the  nature  of  a  hedstead  or  hook-case  in  that  resj)ect.*  But 
a  stone  sink,  set  in  a  frame  and  used  for  domestic  purj)ose8, 
and  placed  there  hy  the  owner  of  the  premises,  is  a  part  of 
the  realty  and  goes  to  the  heir.  But  if  it  is  put  in  l)y  a 
tenant,  it  W(juld  Ixjlong  to  him,  and  might  he  removed  hy  him 
during  the  teriu.^     A  jtortahle  furnace  for  warming  a  liouse, 

»  Hays  r.  Doane,  11  X.  J.  96  ;  KocUrw.  Kclcr,  31  N.  J.  Eq.  l&l ;  Wall  r.  IliiuU, 
4  Gray.  2:>6  ;  Sewell  c.  Angi-rstfin,  18  I..  T.  x.  8.  300. 

«  Guthrie  r.  Jones,  108  Mass.  191  ;  Towiu-  c.  Fiskc,  127  Mass.  125  ;  McKeagv 
r.  Han.  F.  I.  Co.,  81  N.  Y.  38  ;  Jarcclii  v.  I'hilh.  Soc.,  79  IVnn.  St,  403  ;  Mi-y- 
shain  V.  Dittri',  89  IVnn.  St  506  ;  Smith  r.  Commonwealth,  14  Bush,  31  ;  Rogi-rs 
V.  Crow,  40  Miss.  91. 

•  Funk  r.  BripiMi,  4  Daly,  359  ;  Fratt  r.  Whitticr,  58  CaL  126. 

•  Swietzer  r.  Jones,  35  Vt.  317 ;  Fullam  r.  Su>arna,  30  Vt.  443. 
»  AmoM  r.  Crowdir,  81  111.  56. 

»  Hill  c.  Wcntworth,  28  Vt.  428  ;  Harris  r.  Ha)-n<%  34  Vt.  220  ;  Swc«t2er  r. 
Jones,  sup. ;  Kicluinlson  r.  Cu|>vlanil,  6  Gray,  536  ;  C'limie  r.  Wootl,  L.  R.  3 
Exch.  257. 

T  Talmr  r.  Robinson.  36  Bar!..  4«^3.  •  Park  r.  Baker,  7  Allen,  78. 

•  Baiuway  v.  Cobb,  99  Mass.  457. 


30  LA"\T   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   1. 

together  \vitli  the  stove-pipe  belonging  to  the  same,  was  in  one 
case  held  to  be  a  fixture  because  set  in  the  cellar  in  a  pit  dug 
for  it.i  But  in  another  case  a  like  preparation  for  the  position 
of  such  a  furnace  was  held  not  to  be  decisive  ;  ^  and  undoubt- 
edly the  increasing  tendency  of  the  law  is  to  hold  all  house- 
hold conveniences  to  be  chattels.^  Things  which  may  be  fix- 
tures often  become  so,  or  otherwise,  from  the  circumstance 
that  they  have  been  actually  fitted  for  and  applied  to  the  realty. 
Thus,  a  stone  procured  by  the  owner  of  a  house  for  a  door- 
step, and  brought  upon  the  premises,  but  never  actually  ap- 
plied to  use,  was  held  to  be  a  chattel  not  passing  vrith  the 
realty.*  So  rolls  procured  and  intended  for  an  iron-mill,  and 
brought  to  it,  do  not  become  a  part  of  the  realty  until  fitted 
and  actually  applied  to  use.^  Portions  of  a  cider-mill,  which 
was  in  process  of  repair,  had  been  detached  from  it  at  the 
time  the  land  upon  which  it  stood  was  conveyed  by  the  owner. 
Some  of  these  were  laid  up  for  safety ;  while  others,  such  as 
the  stanchions  and  tie-chains  for  the  cattle,  and  the  door- 
hinges,  were  lying  loose  upon  the  premises.  It  was  held  that, 
notwithstanding  their  separation,  these  articles  all  passed  by 
the  conveyance  as  parts  of  the  realty.^  So  the  saws,  crank, 
and  mill-gear  of  a  saw-mill  form  a  part  of  the  freehold  and 
inheritance.^ 

27.  The  rule  of  law  as  to  removing  fixtures  is  most  lib- 
eral when  applied  between  tenant  and  landlord.^  And,  as  a 
general  proposition,  whatever  a  tenant  affixes  to  leased  prem- 
ises may  be  removed  by  him  during  the  term,  provided 
the  same  can  be  done  without  a  material  injury  to  the  free- 
hold.    Nor  will  a  conveyance  of  the  premises  by  the  land- 

1  Stockwell  V.  Campbell,  39  Conn.  362. 

2  Railway  Sav.  Inst.  v.  Bapt.  Ch.,  36  N.  J.  Eq.  61  ;  and  see  Towns  v.  Fiske,  127 
Mass.  123. 

3  Ex  parte  Sheen,  43  L.  T.  N.  s.  638. 

4  Woodman  v.  Pease,  17  N.  H.  282. 

6  Johnson  v.  MehafFey,  43  Penn.  St.  308  ;  In  re  Pachards,  L.  R.  4  Ch.  App. 
630.     See  18  Am.  L.  Reg,  143-146. 

6  Wadleigh  v.  Janvrin,  41  N.  H.  503.  So  Patton  v.  Moore,  16  W.  Va.  428  ; 
and  see  Dubuque  Soc'y  v.  Fleming,  11  Iowa,  533. 

7  Lint  V.  Wilson,  1  Kerr,  X.  B.  223. 

8  Elwes  V.  Maw,  3  East,  38  ;  Van  Ness  v.  Pacard,  2  Pet.  137 ;  2  Smith  L.  C. 
5th  Am,  ed.  240  ;  Crane  v.  Brigham,  11  N,  J.  Eq.  30. 


CII.  r.]     NATURE    AND   CLASSinCATION   OF    I'.'   '  :     ■"•  iIM:i:TV.  ;]1 

lord  iiitcifi'ic  with  the  rijrhts  of  IIh-  truant  iu  ivhiKJcl  to  such 
fixtures.* 

*2H.  And  altlioiitrli  some  of  the  Miiudisli  cuscs  disrriiuinntc 
in  this  rrsiK'ct  hrtwccn  Ktructinr.s  for  tin*  juiriiosoH  uf  trade 
and  nianufai'turc  and  those  of  aj^rieulture,  the  American  courts 
do  not  recoL'ni/.e  the  ilistinction  as  applicable  hi  n-."-'  A  harn, 
however,  standing;  upon  stone  piers  u|)on  the  irround,was  held 
to  form  a  part  of  the  realty.'' 

2\K  Among  what  are  considered  as  trade  fixtures  are,  vats 
and  coppers  of  a  8oai>-l)oiler,^  green  and  hot  houses  of  nursery- 
men or  irardenei's/'  lire-enLMues  set  up  to  work  a  colliery, 
and  salt-kettles  in  salt-works.''  In  the  case  of  a  lea.se  of  an 
oyster  saloon,  it  was  luM  iliat  a  glass  case,  a  case  uf  drawers, 
a  mirror,  and  gas-lixtures  fastened  to  the  wall  hy  the  tenant, 
were  furniture  rather  than  fixtures,  and  if  the  landlord  clo.sed 
the  saloon  and  refused  to  let  the  tenant  remove  them,  he  was 
liable  in  trover  for  their  conversion.  IJut  it  would  he  other- 
wise with  a  long  counter  secured  to  the  lloor.  This  woulil  l)C 
a  fixture  which  the  tenant  may  remove  during  the  term,  but 
not  afterwards.'^  A  boiler  and  steam-engine,  placed  l»y  a  ten- 
ant in  leased  jtremises,  were  held  to  be  fixtures,  but  liable  to 
be  removed  by  him  or  to  be  attached  as  the  personal  property 
of  the  tenant.** 


»  Rajmoiiil  r.  White,  7  Cow.  319  ;  Davis  r.  BufTuni,  51  Mo.  ltV2,  1G3  ;  Fuller 
r.  Talwr,  39  Mc.  519. 

'  2  Smith  L.  C.  5th  .iVm.  cd.  240  ;  Van  Noss  r.  I'acard,  sup.  ;  Iloltncs  r. 
Trcmiwr,  20  Johns.  29  ;  Whiting  v.  Brastow,  4  Pick.  310  ;  Wing  r.  Gray,  36  Vt 
261,  a  onsc  of  hop-poles. 

•  Laniioii  r.  Pmtt.  34  Conn.  517. 

•  Poole's  C'as.',  1  Salk.  368,  an.l  noto.  »  Ponton  r.  Holwrt,  2  Fjust,  88. 

•  Lawrton  r.  I>awton,  3  Atk.  13  ;  P'ord  r.  Cobb,  20  N.  Y.  344.  In  the  case  of 
Van  Ne.s.s  i".  Pacnnl,  ubi  sup.,  a  tenant  erected  on  the  UuLsetl  pn'tui.H«'9  a  woo«len 
dwelling-house,  two  stories  high,  with  a  shed  of  one  storj",  having  a  cellar  of 
stone  or  brick  foundation,  and  a  brick  chimney  foi  his  business  as  a  dairyman, 
and  tlio  residence  of  his  family  and  ser^•ants  employed  by  hin>,  and  it  was  held  he 
might  remove  it.  In  Iowa  the  court  divided  ujKjn  the  question  whether  a  store 
erected  by  a  lessee  under  a  jwirol  agnnnient  by  the  les.sor,  who  was  m»)ngngor  of 
the  premises,  was  a  tnnle  fixture.  Cowden  v.  St.  John,  16  Iowa,  590.  The  doc- 
trine of  the  text  was  applied  to  an  engino-houac  erected  U]Kin  a  stone  founda* 
tion,  in  White's  Ap]Kal,  10  Ponn.  St.  252.  See  a\ao  Hill  r.  Sewald,  53  Peuu.  SU 
271. 

»  Guthrie  c.  Jones,  103  Mass.  191.         »  Hey  r.  Bruucr,  61  Pcnn.  St-  87. 


32  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

30.  But  if  the  tenant  suffer  the  fixture  erected  by  him  to 
remain  annexed  to  the  premises  after  the  expiration  of  his 
term,  or  rather  of  his  authorized  holding,  it  becomes  at  once 
a  part  of  the  realty,  and  he  may  not  afterwards  sever  it ;  ^  and 
a  subsequent  severance  by  the  landlord  will  not  revest  the  title 
in  the  tenant .^  And  this  rule  applies  in  the  case  of  nursery- 
trees  planted  by  the  tenant.^  So  where  the  tenant  erected  a 
building  upon  the  premises,  which  was  fastened  by  iron  bolts 
to  rocks  in  the  ground,  and  had  a  machine  weighing  six  tons 
placed  upon  a  stone-and-mortar  foundation  in  the  cellar,  and 
extending  up  into  the  second  story,  it  was  held  that  by  aban- 
doning the  premises  the  tenant  ceased  to  have  a  right  to  remove 
these  as  fixtures.*  So  an  assignment  by  one  tenant  at  will 
to  another  defeats  the  right  to  remove.^  And  where  a  lessee 
for  years  erected  buildings  upon  the  premises,  and  at  the  ex- 
piration of  his  term  took  a  new  lease  of  the  premises  for  years, 
but  nothing  was  said  of  the  buildings,  it  was  held  to  be  an 
abandonment  of  his  right  to  remove  them,  and  that  they  be- 
came a  part  of  the  freehold,  inasmuch  as  the  new  lease  carried 
the  buildings  and  fixtures,  and  the  lessee,  accepting  the  lease, 
was  estopped  to  claim  them  as  his  own.^     Nor  will  equity 

1  White  V.  Amdt,  1  Whart.  91  ;  Gaffield  v.  Hapgood,  17  Pick.  192  ;  Lyde  v. 
Russell,  1  B.  &  Ad.  394  ;  Lee  v.  Pdsdon,  7  Taunt.  188  ;  2  Smith  L.  C.  5tli  Am. 
ed.  240;  Bliss  v.  Whitney,  9  Allen,  114;  Ewell  Fixt.  138  ;  Davis  v.  Moss,  38 
Penn.  St.  346,  353  ;  post,  *114  ;  and  Holmes  v.  Tremper,  20  Johns.  29;  Penton  v. 
Robart,  2  East,  88  ;  Preston  v.  Briggs,  16  Vt.  129,  &c.,  so  far  as  they  support  a 
right  to  a  reasonable  time  after  the  term  ends,  are  not  law.  The  case  of  Burk  v. 
Holhs,  98  Mass.  55,  sometimes  cited  to  the  same  effect,  proceeded  on  the  special 
agi-eement  of  the  parties.  See  2}ost,  pi.  30  a.  The  earlier  rule  was  stated  to  be  that 
the  tenant  must  remove  his  fixtures  before  the  term  ended ;  but  the  modern  rule  is 
that  given  in  Weeton  v.  Woodcock,  7  SI.  &  W.  14,  19  —  "  that  the  tenant's  right 
to  remove  fixtures  continues  during  his  original  term,  and  during  such  further 
period  of  possession  by  him,  as  he  holds  the  premises  under  a  right  still  to  consider 
himself  tenant."  Heap  v.  Barton,  12  C.  B.  274  ;  Roffey  v.  Henderson,  17  Q.  B. 
574  ;  Mackintosh  v.  Trotter,  3  M.  &  W.  184,  per  Parke,  B.;  Re  Stevens,  2  Lowell, 
496,  500  ;  Dubois  v.  Kelly,  10  Barb.  496  ;  Mason  v.  Fenn,  13  111.  525  ;  Overton  v. 
Williston,  31  Penn.  St.  155  ;  Cromie  v.  Hoover,  40  Ind.  49. 

'^  Stokoe  V.  Upton,  40  Mich.  581. 

8  Brooks  V.  Galster,  51  Barb.  196.  *  Talbot  v.  Whipple,  14  Allen,  177. 

6  Dingley  v.  Buffum,  57  Me.  351. 

6  Loughi'an  v.  Ross,  45  N.  Y.  792  ;  Watriss  v.  First  ]^at.  Bk.,  124  Mass.  571; 
Mclver  v,  Estabrook,  134  Mass.  550.  But  see  Kerr  v.  Kingsbury,  39  Mich.  150, 
contra. 


CII.  I.]     NATUUK    AND    CLASSIFICATION    OF   RKAL    PKOI'KKTY.  :V^ 

interposo  in  favor  of  a  tcnnnt,  on  tho  promul  tliat  he  lias 
made  cxiH'nsivc  iniprovonicnts  on  tho  estate,  and  wcurc  to 
him  the  rijrht  to  enjoy  tljem  after  tljo  expiration  of  the  term.' 
But  where  the  tenant  was  prevented  from  removing;  hiiihlin'^rs 
from  the  premises  hy  injimetion  from  the  court,  he  was  hehl 
cntitU'd  to  a  reasonalde  time  in  wliicli  to  remove  them.nftfr  the 
injunction  was  dissolved.'- 

80  rt.  Where,  however,  the  termination  of  ihr  i« mini  >  nw 
ful  possession  occurs  liy  the  act  i»f  the  hindh)rd,  as  hy  entry 
for  forfeituri',  more  dilliculty  arises  in  <letermininjr  the  true 
rule.  It  lias  heen  said  that  the  ri^dit  of  the  tenant  to  remove 
fixtures  after  tlie  termination  of  his  hiwful  jjossession  is  alike 
gone,  whether  it  determines  hy  effluxion  of  time  or  hy  re- 
entry for  forfeiture.*'  Thus  where  a  tenant  held  over  after 
the  expiration  of  his  term,  and  became  at  suiTerancc,  it  was 
held  that  he  could  not  remove  fixtures  after  his  landlord  h:id 
actually  entered  for  the  purpose  «jf  detcrmininir  the  tenancy.* 
IJut  that  the  tenant's  ri<rht  to  remove  is  eo  imttanti  determined 
hy  the  landlord's  re-entry  for  any  forfeiture  during  the  term 
can  hardly  be  considered  as  settled.''     If,  however,  the  jKiriod  of 

»  Corning  r.  Troy  Iron  Co.,  40  N.  Y.  '219. 

«  Goclnmn  r.  Haii.  &  St.  J.  R.  U.,  45  Mo.  33  ;  Mnson  r.  Fenn,  13  111.  5*25  ; 
Bircher  r.  Tarkir,  4<)  Mo.  113  ;  lU  Stex-ens,  2  Lowell,  41»0.  So  where  he  is 
dclnyed  beyond  his  term  by  nigotintions  with  the  Ininllord.  Hulleu  v.  Kunder,  1 
C.  M.  k  R.  266  ;  Sumner  r.  Hroiiiilow.  34  L.  J.  Q.  H.  130. 

'  Pu^jh  r.  Arton,  L.  R.  8  E.|.  626  ;  Whijilcy  v.  Dewey,  8  Cal.  36. 

*  U'ader  v.  Hi)incwoo<l,  5  C.  M.  N.  8.  546  ;  Weeton  r.  Woodcot-k,  7  M.  &  W. 
14  ;  ILilli.k  r.  Stolwr,  11  Ohio  St.  482  ;  4  C.  B.  .v.  h.  135,  Am.  ed.  note. 

*  In  ail  tho  cases  prior  to  Tugli  r,  Arton,  supra,  where  this  effect  is  given  to 
the  landlord's  re-entry,  the  tenant's  term  had  already  exjiired  by  fflluxion  of  time. 
See  cases  in  jm-cediiig  notes ;  also,  Lyde  v.  Russell,  1  U.  &  .\d.  3U4  ;  Davis  r. 
Eyton,  7  Bing.  154;  Whijiley  p.  Dewej*,  8  Cal.  36;  or  it  was  terminated  by  a  judg- 
ment in  ejectment,  ilinshall  v.  Lloyd,  2  il.  &.  W.  450  ;  Mackintosh  r.  Trotter,  3 
M.  k.  W.  184  ;  and  see  Keogh  r.  Daniell,  12  Wise.  163,  whioh  pie-sume<l  nulico. 
That  the  same  result  would  occur  from  the  exjiiration  of  a  notice  to  iinit,  (w-oms 
clear,  notwithstanding  the  doubts  expressed  oiitfr  in  lie  Stevens,  2  IajwcU,  496. 
Id  Pugh  r.  Arton,  supra,  tliough  the  term  had  not  run  out,  yet  the  bre«t.h  was 
that  the  lessee  conveyed  a  secontl  time  his  term  in  trust  for  crwlitors  ;  and  on  the 
first  buch  conveyance,  two  years  l)efore,  a  yearly  tenancy  had  U-en  sulxititute^l  for 
the  term  ;  so  that  there  the  tenant  had  notice  that  he  might  forfeit  his  right  to  re- 
move, but  to«jk  the  risk.  But  this  hardly  sustains  the  position  that  by  a  re-i-ntry 
for  any  brr-ach,  whatever  the  act  conditione<l  for.  the  tenant  may  be  divested  of  ht« 
fixtures  without  prior  notice,  and  immediately  on  the  Undlord'a  entry. 

Vou  I.—  8 


34  LAW   OF   EEAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

the  tenant's  holding  is  uncertain,  he  has  a  reasonable  time 
after  it  comes  to  an  end  in  which  to  remove  his  fixtures. 
Thus  where  a  lessee  of  premises  for  an  indefinite  period 
erected  an  ice-house  thereon,  and  the  lessor  determined  the 
lease  when  the  tenant  had  a  large  quantity  of  ice  in  the  house, 
and  the  tenant  sold  this  as  soon  and  as  fast  as  he  could,  tak- 
ing nearly  two  months,  and  then  removed  the  house  which 
was  set  upon  blocks,  it  was  held  to  be  within  a  reasonable 
time,  and  that  he  had  a  right  to  remove  it.^  And  in  a  later 
case  it  was  held  that  it  did  not  lie  in  the  power  of  a  tenant, 
after  having  annexed  fixtures  to  the  premises  and  then  mort- 
gaging them,  to  defeat  the  title  of  his  mortgagee  by  surrender- 
ing possession  of  the  premises  to  his  lessor,  and  his  mortgagee, 
after  such  surrender,  might  enter  and  remove  them.^  So 
where  his  agreement  with  the  lessor  gives  him  the  right  to 
remove  fixtures  "  at  the  expiration  of  his  holding ;  "  this  im- 
plies within  a  reasonable  time  after,  as  the  express  provision 
is  construed  to  intend  more  than  the  law  would  imply  from 

the  mere  fact  of  a  tenancy.^ 
[*9]        *  31.  What  has  been  said  as  to  trade  fixtures,  &c., 
applies  also  to  those  for  ornament  and  convenience, 
such  as  marble  chimney-pieces,  grates,  stoves,  bells  and  their 
hangings,  and  the  like.* 

32.  If  fixtures  are  removed  from  the  freehold  to  which  they 
have  been  annexed  by  their  owner,  they  at  once  resume  their 
character  of  simple  chattels.^ 

83.  Pews  in  churches  are,  in  some  States,  declared  by  stat- 
ute to  be  real,  in  others  personal  estate.  In  the  absence  of 
such  statute  they  partake  of  the  nature  of  realty,  although 
the  ownership  is  that  of  an  exclusive  easement  for  special 

1  Antoni  v.  Belknap,  102  Mass.  193  ;  N.  Cent.  R.  R.  v.  Canton  Co.,  30  Md. 
347. 

2  Lond.  Loan  Co.  v.  Drake,  6  C.  B.  N.  s.  798,  and  note  to  s.  c.  Am.  ed.  p. 
811  ;  Co.  Lit.  338  b. 

8  Stansfeld  v.  Portsmouth,  4  C.  B.  N.  s.  120  ;  and  Burk  v.  Hollis,  98  Mass.  55, 
reallj'  proceeds  on  this  ground. 

*  3  Atk.l5  ;  Gryraes  v.  Boweren,  6  Bing.  487  ;  2  Smith  L.  C.  5th  Am.  ed. 
241  ;  Mott  V.  Palmer,  1  N.  Y.  570  ;  Lawton  v.  Salmon,  1  H.  Black.  260,  note  ; 
ante,  pi.  26,  and  note. 

5  Heaton  v.  Findley,  12  Penn.  St.  304.  What  has  been  said  above  of  fixtures 
is  rather  by  way  of  example  than  as  a  summary  of  the  law  on  the  subject. 


ni.   I.  I     NATUKi:    AM)    CLASSiriCATloN    OF    ItKAL    rROPFRTY.  3o 

purposes,  since  the  general  proj)ei'ty  in  the  house  usually  hc^ 
longs  to  the  parish  or  corj)oratiou  that  erected  it.'  Of  the 
same  charact<'r  is  the  right  of  burial  in  a  public  huryiug- 
grouud.  It  is  not  a  property  in  thf  soil,  nor  to  coni|M>nKation 
for  (he  same,  if,  upon  tin-  grunnd  having  ceased  to  U*  used  for 
burial  pur|)oS('s,  the  friends  of  the  persons  buried  fbenlu  :i!i« 
required  to  remove  the  renuiins.'^ 

84.  It  nniy  be  rcnienilx'red  that,  in  eipiity,  money  has  some- 
times tlic  incident.s  and  attributes  of  real  estate,  though  it  is 
unnecessary,  for  the  purposes  of  this  work,  to  do  more  than 
refer  to  the  cases  cited  below  to  illustrate  and  explain  the 
proposition.^  In  the  first  of  these*  there  was  a  devi.se  that  the 
land  of  a  testator  should  be  sold  and  the  money  paid  over 
to  an  alien,  and  effect  was  given  to  the  devise,  although  an 
alien  could  not  take  real  estate.  In  the  second,  money, 
directeil  to  be  laid  out  in  land,  was  treated  as  land,  and  land 
directed  to  be  sold,  as  money  ;  and  in  the  last,  curtesy  was 
nllo\ve(l  to  a  husliand  out  of  money,  the  proceeds  of  his  wife's 
land  which  had  lieen  sold, 

34  a.  Kipiity  treats  that  as  done  wbieli  is  atrreecl  to  be  done. 
So  that  money  which,  according  to  a  will  or  agreement,  is  to 
be  invested  in  land,  is  regarded  in  cipiity  as  real  estat<\  and 
land  which  is  to  he  converted  into  money  is  to  be  regarded  as 
money  accordingly.*  And  in  Massachusetts  the  courts  treat 
a  .sura  of  money  as  real  estate  under  the  following  circum- 
stances, viz. :  One  having  mortgaged  an  estate,  an  action  was 
commenced  against  him  l)y  a  third  party  to  rocover  the  seisin 

»  Daniel  v.  Wood,  1  Tick.  10'2;  Itlmc.i  Ch.  v.  Bi>low,  16  WemL  28  ;  Cny  v. 
Baker.  17  Mass.  435  ;  Jackson  v.  IlounesvilK',  5  Mtt.  127  ;  Church  t>.  Wills  -.'4 
Penn.  St  241). 

'  KincMul's  Ai)ival,  66  Pi-nn.  .«;t.  411  ;  Wimlt  r.  Comi.  Rof.  Ch.,  4  .<?an.lf.  Ch. 
471  ;  Soliiur  v.  Trinity  Ch.,  109  Mnss.  21.  Hut  then"  is  sufticifnt  lej^il  jMivsi-ssion 
to  niaintnin  trespass  quare  clatutum  agninst  a  tort-fensor.  Mcnghcr  r.  I>ri-«>coll, 
99  Muss.  281. 

•  Craig  r.  I^eslie,  3  Wheat.  577  ;  Fletclu-r  r.  Ashbumor,  1  Bro.  C.  C.  497  ; 
Foreman  v.  Foreman,  7  Ikrb.  215  ;  March  r.  llorrier,  6  Iri'«l.  Eq.  524  ;  Houghton 
f>.  HapgiMxl,  13  rick.  154.  So,  where,  on  a  mortgage  with  power  of  sale,  property 
was  sold,  after  the  mortgagor's  death,  for  more  than  the  debt,  the  surjihiM  was  held 
to  be  realty,  and  to  go  to  the  mortgagor's  heirs.  Duuuiug  v.  Ocean  Bank,  61 
N.  Y.   497! 

«  Seymour  v.  Freer,  8  Wall.  202,  214. 


36  LAW    OP    REAL    PROPERTY.  [BOOK    I. 

of  the  land.  The  demandant  recovered  judgment,  but  was  re- 
quired to  pay  a  certain  sum  of  money  into  court  for  better- 
ments made  upon  the  estate  by  the  tenant.  It  was  held  that 
the  mortgagee  was  entitled  to  this  money,  under  bis  mortgage 
of  the  real  estate.^ 

35.  It  has  sometimes  been  attempted  to  define,  authorita- 
tively, what  is  meant  by  the  term  "  land,"  or  "  real  estate." 
Thus,  in  Massachusetts,  by  statute,  "  land,"  and  "  real  es- 
tate," are  said  to  "  include  lands,  tenements,  and  heredita- 
ments, and  all  rights  thereto  and  interests  therein."  But  as 
all  these  statutes  refer  to  the  common  law  for  the  definition 
of  their  own  terms,  it  has  not  seemed  expedient  to  occupy  any 
more  space  in  citing  them  in  this  connection.^ 

36.  In  speaking  of  real  estate,  the  ordinary  terms  made  use 
of  are,  lands,  tenements,  and  hereditaments ;  the  first  implying 

something  that  is  of  a  permanent,  substantial  nature, 
[*10]   such  *  as  the  soil  itself,  houses,  trees,  and  the  like ;  the 

second,  tenements,  including  anything  of  which  tenure 
or  a  holding  may  be  predicated,  if  of  a  permanent  nature,  in- 
cluding, under  the  English  law,  many  things  besides  lands, 
such  as  franchises,  rights  of  common,  rents,  and  the  like ;  the 
third,  hereditaments,  being  of  a  broader  signification,  and  in- 
cluding anything  which  may  by  law  be  inherited.^  Under  the 
latter  were  embraced,  among  other  things, "  heirlooms,"  which 
are  mentioned  above.* 

37.  This  broader  term,  hereditaments,  is  itself  divided  into 
two  classes,  namely,  corporeal  and  incorporeal.  The  former 
include,  as  the  term  implies,  what  is  of  a  substantial,  tangible 
nature.^  The  latter  is  defined  to  be  "  a  right  issuing  out  of  a 
thing  corporate  (whether  real  or  personal),  or  concerning  or 
annexed  to  or  exercisable  within  the  same."  ^  Thus,  one  may 
grant  the  future  accretions  or  increments  of  what  he  owns  at 
the  time  he  makes  such  grant,  as  a  tenant  may  the  crops 

1  Stark  V.  Coffin,  105  Mass.  332  ;  Whitcomb  v.  Taylor,  122  Mass.  243. 
3  Mass.  Pub.  St.  c.  3,  §  3,  pi.  12. 
8  2  Bl.  Com.  16  ;  Co.  Lit.  20  ;  1  Prest.  Est.  12,  13. 
<  Ibid.  5  9  Bl.  Com.  17. 

»  2  Bl.  Com.  20  ;  Co.  Lit.  20  ;  Hays  v.  Richardson,  1  Gill  &  J.  378  ;  Washb. 
Easements,  10. 


CIl.  I.]     NATUHK    AND    CLASSIFICATION    OF   RKAL    PROPEItTY.  37 

which  will  \)v  «rro\vin<^  al  tlu'  end  ul"  his  Ici-iu,  or  the  fruits  lo 
be  ^n-o\vn  iiijoii  hiiul  which  ho  owns,  and  may  mortgage  tho 
same.' 

SS.  And  the  dilTerent  modes  of  creating  or  possessing  these 
gave  rise  to  another  mode  of  distinguishing  them,  namely, 
such  as  lie  "in  livery''  and  such  as  lii-  "in  grants  The 
early  mode  nf  transfeiring  hinds  from  one  to  another  was  l»y 
jtiitting  tlu^  j)urchaser  in  actual  possession  hy  entering  upon 
the  land,  or  some  eciuivak'ut  act,  which  was  called  livery  of 
seisin — no  di'cd  heing  necessary,  in  such  case,  to  pass  the 
title  to  the  i)urchaser.''^  But  as  a  sale  or  conveyance  of  an 
incorporeal  thing  could  not  be  accomj)anied  by  any  such  overt 
act  of  j)osscssion,  it  was  efTected  by  means  of  a  deed  from  the 
vendor  to  the  purchaser,  evidencing  the  fact  of  his  having 
granted  the  same.  This  was  called  a  grant,  as  distinguished 
from  livery  of  seisin.  Consequently,  corporeal  hereditaments 
are  said  to  "  lie  in  livery,"  incorjtoreal,  "  in  grant."  ^ 

39.  At  the  common  law  the  conveyance  of  a  corporeal  here- 
ditament was  technically  a  feoffment^  that  of  an  incorporeal 
one  a  grant.^  But  this  distinction  in  England  is  j)rac- 
tically  done  *  away  by  the  act  8  and  9  Vict.  c.  lOti,  [*11] 
§  '1,  whereby  all  corporeal  hereditaments,  so  far  as  re- 
<;ards  the  conveyance  of  the  immediate  frcehtjld  thereof,  are 
deemed  to  lie  in  grant  as  well  as  in  livery.^ 

40.  Among  the  classes  of  property  which  come  under  the 
head  of  incorj)oroal  hereditaments,  and  at  common  law  lay  in 
grant,  may  be  mentioned  remainders  and  reversions  dependent 
upon  an  intermediate  freehold  estate,^  which  will  be  treated 
hereafter ;  and  easements,  such  as  a  right  of  way,  or  passage 
of  water  through  another's  land,"  or  of  light,  and  the  like.^ 

41.  If  the  nature  of  the  interest,  ownershij),  or  estate  which 

1  r.  W.  &  B.  R.  R.  V.  Wool  per,  61  Poiin.  St.  371  ;  Grantliain  r.  Hawl.-y, 
Hob.  132. 

^  Deeds,  as  a  mode  of  conveyinjij  coqiorcal  hereditaments,  were  first  rc4uiR*J 
by  tlie  Statute  of  Frauds,  in  the  time  of  Cliarlcs  II.     1  Atk.  Conv.  399. 

8  1  I'rest.  P:st.  13,  14  ;  Wins.  Real  Prop.  195. 

<  1  Law  MajT.  279.  *  Wms.  Real  Prop.  146. 

0  1  Uw  Mag.  274,  275  ;  Doc  r.  Were,  7  P.  &  C.  2 43  ;  Wms.  R«il  Prop.  197. 

•  1  Law  Mag.  276,  277  ;  Hewlins  v.  Shippam,  5  li.  &  C.  221. 

8  Cross  V.  Lewis,  2  B.  6:  C.  6SG. 


38  LAW    OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK  L 

may  be  had  in  real  property,  as  above  described,  is  considered, 
it  will  be  found  that  it  is  divided  into  vested  and  contingent, 
executed  and  executory,  according  as  it  is  absolute  or  uncer- 
tain, or  the  subject  of  present  or  future  possession  and  enjoy- 
ment. Without  undertaking  to  discriminate  nicely,  as  some 
writers  have  done,  as  to  the  precise  meaning  of  these  terms  in 
all  their  relations,  it  will  be  sufficient,  in  this  stage  of  the 
work,  to  give  their  more  usual  and  generally  received  sense. 
An  estate  is  vested  when  there  is  an  immediate,  fixed  right  of 
present  or  future  enjoyment.  An  estate  is  contmgent  when 
the  right  to  its  enjoyment  is  to  accrue  on  an  event  which  is 
dubious  and  uncertain.^  Executed,  applied  to  estates,  seems 
to  be  used  as  substantially  synonymous  with  vested,  while 
executory,  though  it  relates  to  the  future  enjoyment  of  the 
property,  is  not  necessarily  contingent.  A  contingent  interest, 
as  above  defined,  would  be  executory.  So  might  a  vested  one 
be,  and  would  be,  if  future  in  its  enjoyment,  so  far  as  relates 
to  the  possession.^  Though  an  executory  interest  may  be 
taken  to  intend  a  future  estate  which  is  in  its  nature  inde- 
structible, like  the  future  interest  in  an  executory  devise  of 

lands  under  a  last  will.^ 
[*12]       *42.  There  is  also  another  familiar  classification  of 

estates  into  legal  and  equitable,  whereby  it  is  intended 
to  describe  such  as  derive  their  origin  from  and  are  governed 
by  the  rules  of  the  common  law,  and  those  created  and  gov- 
erned by  a  system  of  rules  devised  and  adopted  by  courts  of 
chancery,  which  will  be  hereafter  explained.  It  is  the  former 
of  these,  however,  to  which  ihis  work  is  to  be  understood 
chiefly  to  relate. 

43.  In  view  of  a  work  to  which  this  chapter  may  be  taken 
as  introductory,  the  language  of  Chief  Justice  Gibson  may 
with  propriety  be  adopted.  "  The  system  of  estates  at  the 
common  law  is  a  complicated  and  an  artificial  one,  but  still 
it  is  a  system  complete  in  all  its  parts,  and  consistent  with 
technical  reason."  * 

1  Fearne,  Cont.  Eem.  2  ;  1  Prest.  Est.  65  ;  lb.  6L 

2  2  Bl.  Com.  163  ;  1  Prest.  Est.  88  ;  lb.  62-64  ;  Hoff.  Leg.  Stud.  2.51  ; 
2  Prest.  Abs.  118. 

«  Wms.  Ileal  Prop.  241.  *  Evans  v.  Evans,  9  Penn.  St.  190. 


CIl.  II.J  FEUDAL   TENURES,   SEISIN,   ETC.  89 


ClIAITKIJ    II. 

FEUDAL  TENURES,  SEISIN,  ETC. 

1.  lutroilurtory. 

2—1.  English  liiw,  how  far  applicable  here. 

6.  Origin  of  I'uiuJal  law. 

6.  lutroduction  of  feuds  into  England. 

7.  Saxon  laws  as  to  lands. 

8.  Sa.xon  tenures  referred  to  in  colonial  charters. 

9.  Allodial  lands  changed  to  feuds. 

10.  Feudal  system  in  Nomiandy. 

11.  Theorj'  of  feuds. 

12.  Investiture  of  feuds. 

13-15.  Feudal  services.     Fealty.     Homage. 

1(3,  17.  Proiier  and  improper  feuds. 

18.  Feudal  oliligation  of  the  lord. 

19.  Feudal  condition  of  England  after  the  Conquest. 

20.  Change  of  allodial  lands  into  feuds. 
21,  22.  Tenures  defined. 

23-25.  Manors,  how  constituted  and  divided. 

26-33.  Feudal  services  and  fruits  of  tenure. 

34.  Tenure  in  capUc. 

35,  36,  Sei-vice  free  and  base,  certain  and  uncertain. 

37-39.  Military  service.     Free  and  common  socage. 

40,41.  Villeins  and  villeinage.     Co]iyhold. 

42,  43.  Free  and  common  socage  tlie  tenure  of  English  lands. 

44-49.  Alienation  of  feuds.     Attoniment  —  use  of  "  heirs  "  in  grants. 

50.  Law  of  this  countiy  as  to  "  heirs  "  in  deeds,  &c. 

51-54.  Of  freehold  estates,  how  created. 

55.  Creation  of  new  manors  abolished. 

56-59.  Subinfeudation,  how  introduced  and  applied. 

60-62.  Alienation  of  lands  under  Magna  Charta  and  Quia  Emplorcs. 

63.  Devises  of  lands,  when  allowed. 

64,  68.  Investiture  and  delivery  of  seisin,  how  made. 

69.  Feoffment. 

70-72.  Seisin.     Its  theoretical  imjiortance,  how  acipiircd. 

•73-82.  Seisin  in  fact  and  in  law,  what  and  how  nc(iuin*d.  [*!•*] 

83,  84.  Seisin  by  statute  of  uses,  an<l  deliverj'  and  recording  of  deeds. 

85-95.  Seisin  of  reversions  and  remainders,  how  made. 

96.  One  dis.seised  cannot  convey. 

97.  Seisin  cannot  be  in  a])eyance. 

98.  How  far  tenure  is  in  force  in  this  country. 


■iO  LAW    OF   REAL    PROPERTY.  [BOOK    I. 

1.  In  order  to  trace  the  origin  of  much  of  the  law  relating 
to  real  property,  it  is  necessary  to  go  back  to  the  period  when 
the  feudal  system  was  in  its  vigor  in  England,  from  whence  the 
American  common  law  was  derived,  and  to  examine  into  some 
of  the  characteristics  of  that  system  and  the  laws  and  institu- 
tions to  which  it  gave  rise.  In  this  way,  too,  may  be  traced  the 
origin  of  many  terms  in  daily  use  in  treating  of  the  ownership 
of  real  property,  and  the  modes  of  acquiring  and  transmitting 
the  same.i  If,  therefore,  a  considerable  space  in  this  work  is 
allotted  to  a  system  which  never  prevailed  here,  and  is  sub- 
stantially obsolete  in  most  of  its  parts  in  England,  let  it  not 
be  deemed  a  matter  of  mere  curious  learning,  since  it  serves 
to  throw  light  upon  modern  jurisprudence,  and,  while  necessary 
in  order  to  understand  it,  can  be  learned  in  no  other  way. 

2.  As  a  preliminary  inquiry,  it  may  be  well  to  understand 
how  far  the  common  and  statute  law  of  England  have  been 
adopted  as  the  law  of  this  country.  As  a  general  proposition, 
so  much  of  these  as  was  suited  to  the  condition  of  a  people 
like  that  of  the  early  settlers  of  this  country,  was  adopted  by 
common  consent  as  the  original  common  law  of  the  colonies. 
They  brought  it  with  them  as  they  did  their  language,  and 
regarded  it  as  a  heritage  of  inestimable  value,  by  which  their 
rights  of  person  and  property  were  to  be  regulated  and  se- 
cured.2     Especially  was  this  true  in  regard  to  the  law  of  real 

property.^ 
[*15]     *  3.  To  these  were  afterwards  added  a  few  English 

statutes  enacted  after  the  emigration  to  this  country .^ 
And  the  construction  put  upon  those  by  the  English  courts  by 

1  In  the  language  of  Ch.  J.  Tilghman,  in  Lyle  v.  Richards,  9  S.  &  R.  333, 
"the  principles  of  the  feudal  system  are  so  interwoven  with  our  jurisprudence, 
that  there  is  no  moving  them  without  destroying  the  whole  texture." 

2  Wheaton  v.  Peters,  8  Pet.  659  ;  Pawlet  v.  Clark,  9  Cranch,  292  ;  Patterson 
V.  Winn,  5  Pet.  241  ;  1  Kent  Com.  343  ;  lb.  473  ;  Helms  v.  May,  29  Ga.  124  ; 
Commonwealth  v.  Chapman,  13  Met.  68,  69  ;  Commonwealth  v.  Leach,  1  Mass. 
60,  61. 

8  Sackett  v.  Sackett,  8  Pick.  309,  315-318  ;  Marshall  v.  Fisk,  6  Mass.  31  ;  Com. 
mon wealth  v.  Knowlton,  2  Mass.  535.  Oliver,  J.,  in  Baker  v.  Mattocks,  said  : 
"Till  the  statute  De  Bonis,  tails  were  fees  simple  conditional;  by  that,  estates 
tail  were  created.  We  brought  over  the  common  law  and  statute  with  us  " 
Quincy  Rep.  72. 

*  Morris  v.  Vauderen,  1  Dall.  64  ;  Blankard  v.  Galdy,  4  Mod.  222. 


CII,  II. J  FEUDAL   TENURES,   SEISIN,    ETC.  41 

tlit'ir  luljiidications  up  to  the  lime  of  the  Hcvoliiti  )ii  also  lie- 
cainc  a  i)art  of  the  systoin  of  colitiiial  law  wliich  prevailed 
lK'n>  at  the  time  of  the  separation  of  the  colonies  from  the 
mother  country,  and  constituted  tlieir  common  law  when  they 
became  indt-jjendent  States.  In  speaking  of  adoptin^^  IJritish 
statutes  in  this  country,  C'h.  J.  Marshall  says  :  "  Uy  adojiting 
them,  they  hocamc  our  own  as  entirely  as  if  they  had  been 
enacted  by  the  legislature  of  the  State.  The  received  con- 
struction in  Hngland  at  the  time  they  arc  admitted  to  oj)eratc 
in  this  eciuntry,  indeed  to  the  time  of  our  sej)arati(Mi  from  the 
Jhitish  empire,  may  very  projjcrly  be  considered  as  accom- 
jtanying  the  statutes  themselves, and  forming  integral  parts  of 
them.  Hut,  however  we  may  respect  the  subsc(iuent  decisions. 
Me  do  not  admit  their  absolute  authority." ^ 

4.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  such  frequent  reference  is  made, 
while  discussing  the  matter  of  American  law,  to  English  au- 
thorities, both  in  the  form  of  decided  cases  and  books  of  estab- 
lished reijutation. 

5.  The  origin  of  the  feudal  system  is  generally  ascribed  to 
the  (icrman  tribes  who  overran  the  Western  Empire  at  its 
decline,''^  though  Spence  and  some  other  writers  discover  in 
the  dominium  directum  and  the  dominium  utile  in  lands,  under 
the  Roman  law,  the  original  of  that  relation  of  lord  and  vassal 
which  characterized  the  feudal  tenures.^ 

G.  Notwithstanding  history  is  so  full  of  the  accounts  of  this 
institution  during  the  Middle  Ages,  u|»on  the  Continent,  it  is 
singular  that  it  is  so  uncertain  to  this  day  when  it  was  first 
introduced  into  England,  and  whether  even  it  prevailed  there 
at  all  until  after  the  Conquest,  A.  D.  lOOG.  M.  Oui/.ot  regards 
the  feudal  age  as  embracing  the  eleventh,  twelfth,  and  thir- 
teenth centuries.* 

1  Ciithcart  v.  Robinson,  5  Pet.  280  ;  Baring  v.  Reeder,  1  Ilcn.  &  M.  154. 

2  Daliynip.  Feud.  1;  Co,  Lit.  191  a,  n.  77;  lb.  64  a,  n.  1. 

8  1  Spence,  Eq.  Jur.  30-34  ;  Co.  Lit.  64  a,  n,  1,  by  Hargrave.  See  also 
Maine,  Anc.  L.  300-303;  Irving,  Civ.  L.  201  d  scq.;  Ersk.  Inst.  204,  205,  foL  ihL 
Till'  reader  is  referred  to  the  following  works  which  treat  of  this  subject.  Pome- 
roy's  Introd.  248,  who  controverts  the  doctrine  of  Sir.  S[)en(;e.  11  Ijiw  Map. 
&  Rev.  Ill,  which  traces  the  system  to  Roman  customs  and  law.  3  fJuizot,  Mist, 
Civil  (Hohn's  ed. ),  20,  21,  wlio  ascrilx-s  it  to  a  German  origin.  Maine  .iVuc.  Law, 
22I»,  230  ;  Maine's  Early  Hist,  of  Inst.  171. 

<  3  Hist.  Civil,  4. 


42  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I, 

It  has  led  to  much  learned  discussion,  and  names  of 
[*16]  the  highest  respectability  are  *  found  upon  both  sides 
of  the  question,  whether  the  Saxons  had  adopted  the 
system  of  feuds  in  the  tenure  of  their  lands  prior  to  that 
period.  Among  those  who  have  maintained  the  affirmative 
are  Coke,  Selden,  Sir  William  Temple,  Dalrymple,  Millar, 
Turner,  and  Spence.^  The  writers  who  maintain  the  negative 
are,  among  others,  Ch.  J,  Hale,  Craig,  Spelman,  Camden,  Sir 
Martin  Wright,  Somner,  and  Blackstone.^  A  modern  writer 
of  much  consideration,  in  speaking  of  this  subject,  says  :  "  We 
are  in  a  great  degree  ignorant  of  the  nature  of  their  (the 
Saxon)  laws  of  landed  property.  The  most  profound  writers 
are  at  variance,  the  one  side  asserting  the  law  of  feuds  and 
tenures  to  have  been  acknowledged  ;  the  other  that  it  was 
not."  ^  It  is  of  no  practical  importance  to  settle  this  disputed 
point ;  but  probably,  as  in  most  other  controversies,  neither 
party  is  wholly  right.  The  Saxons  were,  originally,  a  German 
tribe,  and  probably  brought  with  them  many  of  the  feudal 
customs  that  prevailed  on  the  Continent,  and  among  them  the 
relation  of  lord  and  vassal ;  but  it  would  seem  that  the  doctrine 
of  tenures  in  relation  to  lands,  as  afterwards  understood,  never 
did  prevail,  at  least  to  any  considerable  extent,  prior  to  the 
Conquest.*^ 

7.  Enough,  however,  of  the  Saxon  polity  was  subsequently 
wrought  into  the  system  of  English  estates  which  grew  up 
after  the  Conquest  to  justify  a  brief  notice  of  some  of  its 
peculiarities.  A  large  proportion  of  their  lands  were  held  as 
allodial,  that  is,  by  an  absolute  ownership,  without  recog- 
nizing any  superior  to  whom  any  duty  was  due  on  account 

1  Co.  Lit.  76  b;  Seld.  Tit.  of  Hon.  510,  511  ;  Dalrymp.  Feud.  15  ;  2  Millar's 
Eng.  Gov.  20  ;  1  Spence,  Eq.  Jur.  9;  3  Kent  Com.  501,  8th  ed.,  n. 

2  Wright,  Ten.  49,  50  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  48  ;  Spelman,  Feud.  Chart.  111.  See  also 
Wms.  Pteal  Prop.  3,  4  ;  2  Hallam,  Mid.  Ag.  23  (ed.  of  1824);  2  Law  Mag.  608. 
Mr.  Barrington  maintains  the  negative,  Stat.  p.  69  ;  while  Dr.  Irving  (Civ.  L. 
p.  223)  considers  that  the  system  prevailed  to  a  certain  extent  among  the  Saxons, 
but  not  with  the  rigor  that  it  subsequently  attained. 

2  Coote,  Mortg.  4. 

*  2  Sulliv.  Lect.  105  ;  Id.  113  ;  Co.  Lit.  191  a,  Butler's  note  ;  Wms.  Real 
Prop.  4;  2  Hallam,  Mid.  Ag.  21  ;  Dalrymp.  Feud.  8,  9  ;  Gilb.  Stuart,  in  1  Sulliv. 
Lect.  xxviii. ;  3  Kent,  Com.  503,  8th  ed.  n.  The  opinion  of  Lord  Coke  is  en- 
titled to  little  consideration,  if  Hargrave  is  correct.     Co.  Lit.  64  a,  n.  1. 


til.  11. ]  FEUDAL    TKNURES,   SEISIN,   ETC.  .\:\ 

thcivof.'  These  lands  were  alienahle  at  the  will  of  the 
()\vii('i\  l»y  siilc,  •  iritt,(>r  lasit  will.  Tlicy  wci-c,  iiKticdxcr,  [*17  J 
liable  lor  his  (k'i)ts,  and  on  his  death,  if  nnd('\  ised,  dr- 
sceiided  to  his  heirs,  and  were  ei|ually  dividctl  anudiL'  his  K<»ns.- 
These  allittlial  lands,  or,  as  Ihcy  wvvv  eallrd  in  Saxon,  /»,,' 
landx,  niiirht  be  jirantcd  npon  sneh  tt-rnis  and  conditions  as  the 
owner  saw  lit,  by  a  greater  or  less  I'state,  to  take  elTeet  jire.s- 
ently  or  at  a  luture  time,  or  on  the  hai>|ieninj;  of  any  event,  in 
which  respect,  as  will  hereafter  appear,  they  differed  essen- 
tially from  fends  or  lands  hehl  nnder  tiie  fendal  tennre.*^  The 
mode  of  convey injr  these  lands  was  either  by  delivering  pos- 
session, or  some  syml)ol  of  possession,  such  as  a  twig  or  turf; 
or  it  might  be,  and  was  most  commonly  done,  by  a  writing  or 
charter,  called  a  land-hoe,  which,  lor  sale-keej)ing,  was  gener- 
ally dej)Osite(l  ill  some  monastery.'* 

8.  This  subject  has  an  importance  beyond  its  mere  historical 
interest  in  two  ways:  1st,  as  explaining  some  of  the  changes 
wrought  by  William  the  ('oii(|ueror,  in  respect  to  the  property 
in  lands  ;  2d,  from  the  circumstance  that  in  the  settlement  of 
the  terms  u|)on  which  the  lands  in  the  kingdom  were  to  l)e 
held,  Kent  obtained  more  favor  than  other  parts  of  it,  in  being 
allowed  to  retain  what  were  deemed  Saxon  rights  and  privi- 
leges. And  when  the  charters  of  most  of  these  Colonies  were 
granted,  reference  was  therein  made  to  the  tenure  that  jtre- 
vailed  in  Kent,  whereby  the  slavish  and  military  part  of  the 
ancient  feudal  tenures  was  prevented  from  takiuL''  root  in  the 
American  soil.*^     This  subject  will  be  more  intelligible  when 

>  Sulliv.  Lect.  265,  and  n.  ;  2  Id.  105  ;  Gilh.  Ten.  2  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  60  ;  Wood, 
Civ.  L.  76  ;  Irving,  Civ.  L.  210,  n.,  whero  the  etymology  of  the  term  ia  variously 
traced.     3  Guiz.  Hi.st.  Civil  (Bohn's  cd.),  22. 

2  1  Si)enee,  E(i.  Jur.  20  ;  Sulliv.  Lcct.  264  ;  2  Id.  106. 

8  1  S|n'nce,  Eq.  Jur.  21. 

*  1  Spmce,  K<i.  Jur.  22,  and  n.  The  rentier  may  be  reminded  of  the  sym- 
bolical transfer  of  land.s  among  the  ancient  Israelites,  of  which  there  is  an 
account  in  Huth,  iv.  7,  by  the  jiluoking  off  and  deliver)-  of  the  vendor's  shoe. 
The  symliolic  form  used  from  a  very  early  period  among  the  Romans  was  for 
the  vendor  and  vendee  to  go  through  with  certain  forms  of  expn'ssions  in  each 
other's  presence,  which  five  persons  witnes-sed,  and  a  sixth  was  pn\s«'nt  with  a 
pair  of  sralcii,  by  which,  originally,  the  uncoined  cojuyr  money  of  the  Homaus 
was  weighed.     Maine,  Anc.  L.  204;  Thnipji,  L.  Tracts,  205. 

*  1  Spcuce,  Eq.  Jur.  105,  n. ;  1  Story,  Const.  159. 


44  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

Socage  and  other  tenures  are  explained.  But  it  may  be  re- 
membered here,  that  wherever,  after  the  Conquest,  lands  were 
devisable  by  will,  it  was  a  relic  of  the  old  Saxon  law  which 
had  prevailed  at  the  time  of  Edward  the  Confessor.^ 

9.  It  should  be  remembered  that,  prior  to  the  introduction 

of  the  feudal  system,  all  lands  were  allodial,  but  from 
[*18]  the  *  unsettled  state  of  Europe  during  the  tenth  and 

eleventh  centuries,  most  of  these  were  voluntarily 
changed  into  feudal  estates  by  their  proprietors,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  obtaining  the  protection  of  some  neighboring  baron  or 
chieftain  by  becoming  his  vassals. 

10.  In  no  part  of  Europe  had  the  feudal  system  obtained  a 
stronger  hold  than  in  Normandy,  and  it  was  little  more  than 
a  matter  of  course  that  William  should  have  early  taken 
measures  to  introduce  it,  in  all  its  vigor,  into  a  country 
which  he  had  acquired  partly  by  claim  of  title,  and  partly 
by  conquest.^ 

11.  The  theory  of  this  system  was,  that  the  property  in,  as 
well  as  dominion  over  all  lands,  in  any  country,  was  originally 
in  the  king  or  chief  who  ruled  over  it ;  that  the  use  of  these 
was  granted  out  by  him  to  others,  who  were  permitted  to  hold 
them  upon  condition  of  performing  certain  duties  and  services 
for  their  superior,  who  theoretically  retained  the  property  in 
the  land  itself.^  The  one  who  had  the  use  of  the  land  by  this 
arrangement  was  said  to  hold  of  or  under  his  superior,  the 
one  taking  the  name  of  lord,  the  other  of  vassal,  and  this 
right  to  hold  was  designated  by  the  term  seisin.'^  This  right 
which  the  vassal  acquired  to  hold  his  land,  having  been,  at 
first,  granted  to  him  as  a  gratuity  or  gift  of  his  lord,  took  the 
name  of  benefice  in  the  early  writers.  Benefices  were  not  in 
any  sense  hereditary.  They  were  holden  for  tlie  life  of  the 
grantor,  or,  at  most,  for  the  life  of  the  grantee.  It  was 
through  the  feebleness  of  the  successors  of  Charlemagne  that 
this  benefice  gradually  transformed  itself  into  the  hereditary 
fief.     And  the  doctrine  of  primogeniture,  whereby  the  entire 

1  2  Sulliv.  Lect.  105. 

2  See  Maine,  Anc.  L.  231. 

8  1  Rpence,  Eq.  Jur.  34,  135  ;  2  Law  Mag.  605  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  53  ;  Ayliff,  442. 
4  1  Spence,  Eq.  Jur.  135  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  53. 


en.  II.]  FICl'DAL    TFXrRE.S,   SEISIN,   ETC.  45 

fief  wont  to  the  olde.st  son  by  iiiln'ritMurc,  tlmii;:!)  not  univfr- 
sal  at  first,  became  bo  by  custoiiiaiy  law.'  I!iit  the  nmrc  conj- 
ni')u  and  apt  name  in  jreneral  u.se  apiihed  to  it,  was  fend, 
feud,  fief,  or  fee-  The  words  by  whieh  tliey  were  orijfinally 
confern'd  —  ihiii  et  coriressi  —  are  still  retained  as  ojM'rativo 
words  in  modern  deeds.'*  This  hoIdinL'"of  lands  under  another 
was  called  a  trnure,  and  was  not  limited  to  the  relation  of  the 
first  or  paramount  lord  and  vassal,  but  extended  to  those  to 
wliom  such  vassal,  within  the  rules  of  the  feudal  law,  may 
have  parted  out  his  own  feud  to  his  own  vassals, 
whereby  he  *  became  the  mesne  lord  between  his  va.s-  [*19] 
sals  and  his  own  or  lonl  paramount.  Tlir)se  who  held 
directly  of  the  king  were  called  his  "  tenants  in  capite^^  or  in 
chief.^ 

12.  The  act  of  confcrrin<r  a  feud  or  fee  upon  a  va.ssal 
was  called  a  feoffment^^  while  that  by  whieh  he  was  in- 
ducted into  and  admitted  to  its  actual  enjoyment  was  an 
investiture.^ 

13.  Every  vassal,  when  invested  with  the  feud,  became 
bound  to  perform  some  acts,  or  render  some  return  to  his 
lord  for  the  privileges  of  holding  the  same,  which  were  called 
the  services  of  his  tenure.  These  might  be  varied  according 
to  the  whim  or  caprice  of  the  lord.  But  there  was  always 
fealty  or  an  oath  of  fidelity  required  from  the  tenant  to  the 

»  Maine,  Anc.  L.  230,  232  ;  1  Montesq.  334  ;  iwst,  •29. 

'■'  1  Sulliv.  \ject.  128  ;  Tcmies  de  la  Ley,  *' Feod  ;"  1  Spcnce,  Eq.  Jur.  34  ; 
Dalr)nip.  Feud.  199  ;  Wright,  Ten.  19  ;  lb.  4;  Irving,  Civ.  L.  200,  for  the  ety- 
mology of  the  word  "feud."  It  is  mentioned  by  Somner,  and  adopted  by  the 
autlior  last  cited,  that  they  took  the  name  of  feuds  when  they  began  to  be 
granted  in  perpetuity,  about  A.  D.  1000. 

«  2  Bl.  Cora.  53. 

«  2  Bl.  Com.  59,  60.  In  a  work  styled  Lihrr  (k  Antiquis  Lcgibua,  p.  xlix., 
published  by  the  Camden  Society,  there  is  an  inquisition  respecting  the  manor 
of  Xewenham,  in  which,  among  ^he  franchises  belonging  to  the  manor,  were 
"view  of  frunk  pledge,  infangthief,  and  gallows,  to  execute  ju<lgmcnt  upon  him 
who  should  be  taken  with  stolen  gomls  within  the  manor  ;  also  fines  for  brtaches 
of  the  assise  of  bread  and  beer,  and  for  shedding  of  bloo<l,  with  hue  and  cry 
V  ithin  the  manor."  "  Also  the  lord  had  park  and  warren,  and  the  water  of  the 
Thames  with  the  bank."  This  is  referred  to  by  way  of  illustrating  the  character 
of  the  grants  by  which  manors  wen-  early  held. 

'  Termes  de  la  Ley,  "  Feoffment." 

•  Wright,  Ten.  37. 


46  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

lord,  as  incident  to  all  tenures,  without  which  no  feud  could 
subsist.' 

14.  This  fealty  should  be  distinguished  from  the  oath  of 
allejiiance,  which  is  the  obligation  which  a  subject  owes  to  his 
sovereign.^ 

15.  If  the  feud  granted  was  an  hereditary  one,  the  vassal 
was  required  to  do  homage  for  the  same,  which  consisted  in 
kneeling,  in  the  presence  of  his  fellow-vassals,  before  his  lord, 
and  declaring,  in  the  formula  prescribed,  that  he  became  his 
homo  {devenio  vester  homo'),  or  man.^  Homage  could  only  be 
done  to  the  seignior  himself ;  fealty  might  be  made  to  the 
bailiff  of  the  seignior.^ 

16.  If  the  feud  was  what  was  called  a  proper  one,  the  ser- 
vices to  be  rendered  by  the  vassal  were  of  a  military  character, 
and  originally  of  an  uncertain  duration.^ 

17.  Proper  feuds  were  the  only  ones  known  to  the  law  at 
first.  But  in  the  progress  of  society  and  the  arts  of  peace, 
improper  feuds,  as  they  were  called,  arose,  where  services  of 
a  peaceful  character,  such  as  cultivating  the  lord's  land,  an 
annual  return  of  agricultural  products,  and  the  like,  were 

substituted  for  those  of  chivalry .^ 
[*20]       *  18.  There  were  certain  obligations  of  a  high  and 

solemn  nature,  assumed  by  the  lords  on  their  part  to- 
wards their  vassals,  which  will  be  more  fully  stated  hereafter. 
But  among  them  was  that  of  protecting  the  vassal  in  the 
enjoyment  of  his  feud,  and  supplying  him  with  a  new  one 
of  equal  value  if  deprived  of  the  same,  —  the  latter  being  the 
origin  of  the  doctrine  of  "  warranty."  "  It  is  unnecessary,  for 
the  purposes  of  this  work,  to  attempt  to  settle  how  and  when 
feuds,  from  being  mere  gratuities  held  at  the  will  of  the  lord, 
became  hereditary  in  the  family  of  the  feudatory.^ 

1  "Wright,  Tett.  35.     For  its  form,  see  Termes  de  la  Ley,  "  Fealty." 

2  Termes  de  la  Ley,  "Allegiance." 

8  1  Sulliv.  Leet.  223  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  54  ;  Termes  de  la  Ley,  "  Homage  ;  "  Co.  Lit. 
64  a;  Barringt.  Stat.  182,  for  the  details  of  this  ceremony. 
4  3  Guizot  Hist.  Civil  (Bohn's  ed.),  155,  156. 

6  Wright,  Ten.  5,  27,  and  n. ;  1  Sulliv.  Lect.  157. 
8  Wright,  Ten.  32,  33. 

7  Wright,  Ten.  38  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  57  ;  1  Sulliv.  Lect.  228. 

*  See,  on  this  subject,  Dalryrap.  Ten.  44  ;  2  Montesq.  334,  B.  30,  c.  16. 


CH.  II.]  FKl'DAL    TKNURE8,   SEISIN,    ETC.  17 

ll».  Ill  the  foroiroiiiLr  skcldi  is  jircscntrd  the  outline  of  that 
system  wliicli  \ViHi;iiii  the  CoiKiucror  introduced  and  estah- 
IisImmI  in  Kii'jfland  in  its  lull  vi^ior,  altliouLdi  jiarts  of  it  may 
have  been  in  force  there  pi'ior  to  the  CoiKjuest.  Those  who 
fouirht  on  the  side  oi  Harold  at  the  battle  of  Hastings,  he 
alTccti'd  to  reL'ard  as  traitors,  who  by  their  treason  had  for 
fcited  their  lands,  and  these  hr  seized  uj»on,and  after  reserving' 
extensive  domains  to  himself,  divided  them  amonj^  his  Nor- 
man followers,  his  men  or  barons,  as  his  vassals  uj)on  a  strict 
feudal  tenure.  Nor  was  it  dillicult,  l)y  a  systematic  course  of 
indiirnity  and  opj)rcssion,  to  drive  still  others  to  a  state  of  open 
resistance  to  his  power,  and  thereby  to  create  a  pretence  for 
seizinir  u|)on  their  lands  as  rebels,  and  disj)osing  of  them  in 
the  same  manner.^  And  in  order  the  more  effeetually  to  carry 
out  his  plans,  it  is  said  that  he  seized  upon  and  destroyed  all 
the  f>oc8  or  written  evidences  of  title  which  he  could  lay  his 
hand  upon,  in  the  various  monasteries  of  the  kingdom,  in 
which  they  had  been  deposited  for  safe-keeping.^ 

20.  But  still  this  could  afTect  only  a  part  of  the  lands  in 
England  ;  and  as  a  very  large  jiroportion  of  them  were,  soon 
after  the  Conquest,  held  of  the  crown  by  feudal  tenure,  writers 
insist  that  there  was  something  like  a  general  surrendering 
up  by  the  landholders  of  their  lands,  and  an  accejjting  and 
agreeing  to  hold  the  same  under  the  king  as  his  vassals. 
The  time  *  and  circumstances  of  doing  this  arc  de-  [*21] 
tailed  l)y  more  than  one  writer.  The  reason  for  this 
measure,  as  stated  by  Sir  Martin  Wright,  was  that  "  the 
feudal  law  was  at  that  time  the  prevailing  law  in  Europe,  and 
was  then,  says  Sir  Henry  Sjiclman,  considered  to  be  the  most 
absolute  law  for  supporting  the  royal  estate,  preserving  the 
union,  confirming  peace,  and  suppressing  incendiaries  and 
rebellions."  3  Sir  Martin  Wright  adds,  that  about  the  twen- 
tieth year  of  his  reign,  William  summoned  all  the  great  men 
and  landholders  in  the  kingdom  to  London  and  Salisbury,  to 
do  their  homage  and  swear  their  fealty,  and  that  this  was 
brought  about  through  the  consent  of  the  commune  concilium, 

»  2  Sulliv.  Lect  115,  117  ;  1  Spence,  E.i.  Jur.  89,  90  ;  Wright,  Ten.  62. 

^  1  Spence,  Eq.  Jur.  22. 

«  Wright,  Ten.  63  ;  ^laiue,  Anc.  L.  231. 


48  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

and  he  quotes  the  52d  law  of  William  I.  as  confirming  his  state- 
ment.^ Hallam  ascribes  to  this  measure  of  William,  by  which 
all  the  landholders  of  England,  as  well  those  who  held  in  chief 
of  the  king  as  others,  acknowledged  fealty  to  the  crown, 
the  difference  in  the  condition  of  the  English  and  French 
aristocracy.  The  vassals  of  the  latter  owed  dependence  to 
their  feudal  lords  only,  and  not  to  the  crown.^  Whatever 
may  have  been  the  circumstances  under  which  this  change 
was  wrought,  the  52d  and  58th  laws  of  William  I.  are  said  to 
have  effectually  reduced  the  lands  of  England  to  feuds,  which 
were  declared  to  be  inheritable,  and  from  that  time  the  maxim 
prevailed  there  that  all  lands  in  England  are  held  from  the 
king,  and  that  they  all  proceeded  from  his  free  bounty.^  The 
lands  which  had  been  granted  out  to  the  barons  —  principal 
lands  —  were  again  subdivided,  and  granted  by  them  to  sub- 
feudatories  to  be  held  of  themselves.  Thus,  every  freeholder 
of  lands  became  the  permanent  feudatory  of  some  superior 

lord,  ascending  in  regular  gradations  to  the  head  of 
[*22]  the  State,  each,  in  addition,  being  bound  by  the  *  oath 

of  allegiance  to  the  king  to  which  his  duties  to  his 
immediate  lord  were  made  to  bend.  The  reciprocal  duty 
of  fidelity  and  devotion  on  the  one  hand,  and  protection  of 
the  person  and  warranty  of  the  estate  on  the  other,  was 
of  the  essence  of  this  connection.* 

1  Wright,  Ten.  52  ;  Id.  64-67  ;  2  Sulliv.  Lect.  118,  119.  The  Saxon  Chron- 
icle  thus  graphically  describes  this  process  of  feudalizing  England  :  "  A.  D.  1085 
—  At  mid-winter,  the  king  was  at  Gloucester  with  his  JVitcm  "  (council  or  assem- 
bly), "and  he  held  his  court  there  five  days.  After  this  the  king  had  a  great 
consultation  and  spoke  very  deeply  with  his  TVitan  concerning  this  land,  how  it 
was  held  and  what  were  its  tenantry."  "A.  D.  1086  —  This  year  the  king  wore 
his  crown  and  held  his  court  at  Winchester  at  Easter,  and  he  so  journeyed  forward 
that  he  was  at  Westminster  during  Pentecost,  and  there  dubbed  his  son  Henry  a 
knight.  And  afterwards  he  travelled  about  so  that  he  came  to  Salisbury  at  Lani- 
ma-s,  and  his  Witun  and  all  the  land-o\vners  of  substance  in  England,  whose 
vassals  soever  they  were,  repaired  to  him  there,  and  they  all  submitted  to  him 
and  became  his  men,  and  swore  oaths  of  allegiance  that  they  would  be  faithful  to 
him  against  all  others."  —  Ingram's  ed.  pp.  289,  290.  And  see  Consuetudines 
KanticE,  ed.  by  Sandys,  London,  1851. 

2  2  Hallam,  Mid.  Ages,  31. 

8  2  Sulliv.  Lect.  118-121  ;  Wright,  Ten.  68  ;  Id.  136  ;  1  Spence,  Eq. 
Jur.  48. 

*  1  Spence,  Eq.  Jur.  92,  93  ;  Id.  95. 


en.  II.]  FEUDAL    TENURE.^,   SEISIN,   ETC.  !'.» 

21.  The  reader  is  now  prepared  to  understand  and  a|i|il\ 
what  formed  so  important  a  eircumstancc  in  resprct  to  the 
lands  of  KiiLdand  for  ii  lonir  piriod  Mftn- the  Conquest — the 
doetrine  of  Tiimres.  And  allhoiiirh,  in  the  hmjrua^'e  of  a 
writer,  "  tentii-f  has  hceome  an  empty  name,"  '  so  many  of 
the  terms  in  daily  use  ni"e  derixcd  tinm  what  it  once  was,  as 
well  as  so  miu'h  <jf  tiie  jrt'nius,  it  may  be  said,  of  tii<'  modn-n 
law  of  real  projicrty,  that  it  eannot  l^e  properly  omit  fed  alto- 
gether in  a  woi-k  like  this. 

22.  Tennre  implied  not  only  the  aetnal  holdinir  l»y  <»ne  of 
or  nndei-  another,  hut  also  the  terms  njion  whieh  he  held  his 
lands.  These  were  j)reserihed  when  the  feud  was  first  granted, 
unless  it  was  purely  a  military  one,  where  the  services  belong- 
ing to  it  were  implied  hy  law.  And  in  the  course  of  time 
these  terms  or  services  jtrescribed  became  so  various  that  it 
became   a  maxim  in  the  law  of  feuds,   Tmor  inventiturce  eat 

23.  The  ancient  manors  were  divided  and  occupied  as  f(d- 
lows.  The  loid  reserved  for  liimself  a  demesne  contiguous  to 
his  castle  sullieient  for  the  j»uriK)ses  of  his  house,  his  cattle, 
A'C.  The  remainder  was  divided  into  four  ]»arts.  Upon  (Jiie 
of  these  were  settled  a  numl)er  of  militai-y  tenants  suflicient 
to  do  that  part  of  the  service  whieh  was  due  to  his  superior 
lord.  Another  was  for  the  use  of  his  socage  tenants,  who 
ploughed  his  lands  or  returned  to  him  the  prescribed  quantity 
of  corn,  cattle,  &c.  One  part  was  for  the  lord's  villeins,  who 
did  the  servile  offices  upon  the  manor,  of  carrying  out  manure, 
building  fences,  <tc.,  at  the  pleasure  of  the  lord.  The  re- 
maining part  was  reserved  as  waste  land,  out  of  which  tiie 
tenants  oi  the  manor  sup|>licd  themselves  with  wood, 

<tc.,  for  their  tires,  fences,  and  repairing  *  their  l»uild-    [*  23] 
ings,  and  pasturage  for  their  cattle  upon  what  were 
called  the  commons.'' 

24.  It  is  said  that  William,  when  lie  first  parted  his  lands 
amonir  his  followers,  gave  some  as  many  as  seven  hundred  of 
these  manors,  others  a  less  nundier,  and  some  less  than  one 

»  1  Liw  Mag.  281. 
2  AViijrht,  Tin.  iy-21. 

«  2  Sulliv.  Lect.  62,  63  ;  1  Spcnce,  E-i.  Jur.  95  ;  Wms.  Real  Prop.  96. 
VOL.  I. —  4 


50  LAW    OF   REAL    PROPERTY.  [BOOK    1. 

hundred.^     Those  who  received  six  or  more  were  called  the 
greater  barons ;  those  who  received  less,  the  lesser. ^ 

25.  Each  of  these  manors  had  a  domestic  court  of  its  own, 
made  up  of  the  several  vassals  of  the  lord  who  were  freehold- 
ers, and  were  called  the  paries  curice.  But  the  words  co-citizen 
or  co-patriot,  and  tlie  like,  were  unknown  to  the  feudal  lan- 
guage.^ These  had  important  parts  to  perform,  and  among 
them,  when  feuds  became  alienable,  of  witnessing  the  cere- 
mony of  homage,  investiture,  and  the  like,  by  which  lands 
were  transferred.*  These  courts  took  the  name  of  courts 
Baron,  although  the  lords  of  the  manors  in  which  they  were 
held  were  of  no  higher  rank  than  gentlemen.^  With  the  ex- 
ception of  those  in  the  Counties  Palatine,  these  courts  had  but 
a  trifling  extent  of  jurisdiction  over  civil  causes,  and  a  limited 
one  only  over  criminal  ones.^ 

26.  Although  services  were  not  necessarily  incident  to  ten- 
ure, for  the  lord  originally  might  not  have  required  them,  or 
might  have  released  them,  they  were  the  usual  accompaniments 
of  \V 

27.  Among  the  fruits  rather  than  services  which  per- 
tained to  military  tenures,  were  relief,  wardship,  marriage, 
fines,  and  escheats,  and  though  most,  if  not  all  of  them,  were 
abolished  with  knight-service  by  Statute  12  Charles  11.  c.  24, 
they  require  a  few  words  of  explanation. 

28.  And  first  as  to  reliefs.  As  fiefs  were,  originally,  vol- 
untary gifts,  it  was  common,  upon  a  vassal's  first  entering 
upon  his  fief,  for  him  to  make  a  gift  of  some  kind  to  his  lord. 
And  this  afterwards  came  to  be  a  duty  imposed  upon  the  heir 
upon  taking  possession  of  his  inheritance.^  This  took  the 
name  of  relief,  and  became  exceedingly  oppressive  in  its  opera- 
tion.^   It  is  treated  as  a  feudal  service,  though,  as  remarked, 

1  1  Sulliv.  Lect.  291,  Henry  IL  retained  in  his  day  1,422  manors  in  his  own 
possession.     2  Lyt.  Hist.  Henry  IL  288,  cited  151  No.  Westm.  Rev.  59. 

2  1  Spence,  Eq.  Jur.  94. 

8  3  Guizot,  Hist.-  Civil  (Bohn's  ed.),  108. 

4  Bl.  Com.  54.  5  Herbert,  Inns  of  Court,  36. 

6  2  Hallani,  Mid.  Ages,  33. 

7  Wright,  Ten.  138. 

8  2  Sulliv.  Lect.  124  ;  Wright,  Ten.  15  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  56. 

9  Wright,  Ten.  99. 


cii.  II.]  FKUDAL  ti:nlui:s,  skisin,  rrr.  ol 

more  tcclinii-ally  iK'rlia|)S,ii  iruit  oi'  Initial  ti'iiun-,*  ami 
thou^li  oriiriually  *  ja-culiar  to  military  loads, extended,   [•  '2\] 
in  time,  to  tenants  in  socage.^ 

'2\K  As  feuds  were  granted  u])()n  the  express  or  implied 
condition  of  performing  tlic  services  re(iuired  by  the  nature 
or  terms  of  the  tenure j*^  it  became  customary,  after  feuds  were 
hereditary,  for  the  lord  to  take  the  lands  into  his  own  custody, 
and  provide  for  the  performance  of  the  services  during  the 
minority  and  consequent  inability  of  the  heir  to  perform  them, 
instead  of  resuming  the  feud  as  having  been  forfeited.^ 

30.  The  right  to  do  this  was  known  as  wardship,  and  em- 
braced also  the  custody  of  the  person  of  the  minor.''  As 
the  loi'd  was  under  no  obligation  to  acc<Miiit  for  the  jtrolits 
of  the  land,  it  was  practii-ally  a  most  oppressive  burdt-n  upon 
his  ward.*' 

31.  Growing  out  of  and  akin  to  the  last,  was  the  right  of 
disposing  of  his  ward  in  marriage,  or,  upon  a  refusal  to  carry 
Dut  the  lord's  l)argain,  the  infant  forfeited  the  value  of  such 
a  marriage  to  the  lord.  And  if  the  infant  married  without 
the  lord's  consent,  the  forfeiture  was  double  that  amount." 

32.  After  feuds  became  alienable  by  consent  of  the  lord,  he 
required  his  vassal  to  pay  a  sum  of  money  for  the  {jrivilege  of 
exercising  this  right,  and  this  was  called  a  fine.^ 

33.  The  other  incident  of  tenures  to  be  noticed  was  escheat 
(^eschcoir,  to  happen),  by  which,  for  failure  of  heirs  or  corru|>- 
tion  of  lilood  l)y  conviction  of  certain  crimes,  the  feu<l  fell 
back  int(j  the  lord's  hands  ])y  a  termination  of  the  tenure. 

34.  There  were  other  burdens  besides  these,  incident  to  an 
immediate  tenancy  under  the  crown,  which  arc  referred  to 
not  to  enumerate  them,  but  to  ex])lain  the  reason  why 

the  charters  *  of  Plymouth  and  other  of  the  American    [*  2o] 
colonies,  in  describing  the  tenure  by  which  they  were 

•  Wright  Ten.  97. 

3  Dulryinp.  Feud.  58  ;  Wright,  Ten.  104,  ascribes  it  to  the  40th  law  of  Wm.  I. 

8  2  Diilryinp.  Feud.  44.  «  Id.  45. 

6  Wright,  Ten.  90-92.  «  2  Bl.  Com.  68,  69. 

^  2  HI.  Com.  70  ;  Wright,  Ton.  97  ;  Wms.  Real  Prop.  97.  In  one  ca*e  the 
Eari  of  Warwick  extorted  £10,000  for  his  consent  to  the  marriage  of  his  female 
ward.     SuJliv.  Lect  248. 

8  2  Bl.  Com.  72. 


52  LAW   OF  REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

to  be  held,  expressly  exclude  tliat  in  capite  and  "knight-ser- 
vice," the  terms  of  these  charters  being  "  to  be  holden  of  us, 
our  heirs  and  successors,  as  of  our  manor  of  East  Greenwich 
in  the  County  of  Kent,  in  free  and  common  socage,  and  not 
in  capite,  nor  by  knight-service."  ^ 

35.  There  were  two  kinds  of  services  by  which  lands  were 
held,  distinguished  as/ree  and  hase^ihQ  free  being  such  as  free 
men  could  perform  without  being  thereby  degraded  in  the  scale 
of  honor  and  respect,  the  base  being  such  as  were  performed 
by  the  peasants  and  persons  of  servile  rank.^ 

36.  These  were,  moreover,  divided  into  certain  and  uncer' 
tain,  according  as  they  were  fixed  and  ascertained  in  quantity, 
or  depended  upon  contingencies,  and  liable  to  be  greater  or 
less,  according  to  circumstances.^ 

37.  Military  services  were  always  regarded  as  theoretically 
the  most  honorable.  But  as  the  arts  of  peace  obtained  among 
the  people,  and  it  was  discovered  to  be  quite  as  honorable  to 
promote  the  comfort  of  the  citizen  and  the  prosperity  of  the 
community,  as  to  engage  in  useless  brawls  and  local  quarrels, 
it  came  to  be  regarded  quite  as  becoming  to  the  dignity  of  a 
free  man  to  hold  his  lands  upon  condition  of  his  paying 
a  certain  quantity  of  corn  or  cattle,  or  performing  a  certain 
amount  of  rural  labor,  like  ploughing  his  lord's  lands,  as  to 
be  following  him,  harnessed  up  in  armor,  on  some  madcap 
expedition.  And  in  process  of  time  these  came  to  be  the  com- 
mon services  by  which  lands  in  England  were  held,  being,  in 
the  first  place,  certain  and  defined,  and  second,  not  military 
in  their  character.^ 

38.  This  was  what  was  called  socage  tenure.  The  lords 
often  compounded  with  their  military  tenants  and  accepted 
the  one  class  of  services  for  the  other,  till  the  term  free  and 
common  socage  came  to  define  a  tenure  where  the  services  were 
honorable  and  certain,  and  yet  not  military.^ 

1  Col.  Laws  of  Mass.  3.  2  2  Bl.  Com.  62. 

8  Id.  61. 

*  1  Sulliv.  Lect.  157.  In  the  reign  of  Henry  II.  a  pecuniary  payment  had 
been  substituted  in  the  place  of  the  personal  attendance  of  the  military  vassal, 
and  the  custom  had  already  prevailed  of  hiring  soldiers  of  fortune  to  do  the 
service.     Stuart's  Dis.  in  1  Sul.  Lect.  xxxviii. 

'  1  Spence,  Efi-  Jur.  52  j  Dulrymp.  Feud.  ch.  2,  §  1. 


CII.  II.]  FEUDAL    TKNURES,   SEISIV,    ETC.  'A 

39.  The  origin  ami  otymnlojry  of  (lio  word  socage  have 
led  to  much  ingenious  spccuhxtion,  scjnic  insisting  tliat  its 
root  was  Saxon  (^noe),  implying  liherty  or  privilege, 
others  that  it  was  *  derived  frcjm  gnra,  an  old  Latin  [*  i'i] 
■word  meaning  plouyh',^  or  60<\  a  French  word  for 
ploughshare.  It  is,  at  any  rate,  as  (»ld  as  (Ilanvillc,  who 
wrote  in  the  time  of  Henry  II.,  and,  as  is  contended,  was  in 
use  long  prior  to  that.-  And,  as  staled  hy  more  than  one 
writer,  "  the  lands  in  which  estates  in  fee-simjjle  were  thus 
held  appear  to  have  hcen  among  those  which  eseajied  the 
grasp  of  the  conqueror,  and  remained  in  the  possession  of 
their  ancient  Saxon  proprietors,"  —  which  may  account  for 
its  prevalence  in  Kent  before  knight-service  was  abolished.^ 

40.  Besides  the  freemen  or  freeholders  who  held  by  the 
tenure  and  services  ali'cady  mentioned,  there  was  a  class  of 
persons  attached  to  every  manor,  who  were  substantially  in  the 
condition  of  slaves,  who  performed  the  base  and  servile  work 
upon  the  man(jr  for  the  lord,  and  were,  in  most  respects,  the 
subjects  of  property,  and  belonged  to  him.'  Tlicse  were 
called  villeins,  the  etymology  of  which  W(jrd  is  somewhat 
doubtful,'^  and  many  of  them  were  employed  to  till  tlu."  land 
without  having  any  interest  in  or  right  to  the  soil  they  culti- 
vated. By  being  permitted  to  occupy  certain  parts  of  the 
manor,  and,  at  last,  allowed  to  do  fealty  for  these,  there  grew 
up  a  kind  of  tenure  of  lands  which  was  called  villeinage.  At 
first  its  services  were  not  only  base,  such  as  above  described, 
but  wholly  uncertain,  dejiendent  on  the  will  of  the  lord. 
The  next  step  was  in  case  of  the  more  favored  ones,  to  de- 
fine and  limit  what  the  amount  of  these  services  should  be, 
and  a  tenure  thus  improved  in  its  character  took  the  name  of 
villein  socage  —  the  services,  though  base,  being  certain!^  As 
a  matter  of  hi.story,  more  than  half    the  lands  in  England 

1  2  Bl.  Com.  80  ;  Wms.  Real  Prop.  98,  nnil  n.  ;  2  Hallam,  Mid.  Ages,  Pt.  21, 
p.  59  ;  Cowel,  Interp.  "socage  "  and  "soc." 

•^  Wright,  Ten.  141,  and  n.;  1  Si>ence,  E.j.  Jur.  98  ;  Dalrynip.   Feud,  cL.  2,  §  1. 

8  Wms.  IJcal  Prop.  93  ;  2  Hallam,  Jlid.  Ages,  Pt.  2d,  p.  60. 

<  Wright,  Ti-n.  213;  1  ."^^iK-nce,  E.p  Jur.  95. 

^  Cowel,  Interpret.  "  Villaino  ;"  Wright,  Ten.  205,  n.  Some  deriving  it  from 
vilis,  othei-s  viUn,  a  country  farm. 

«  1  Spence,  Eq.  Jur.  9i  ;  Wright,  Ten.  212-215;  2  Bl.  Com.  61. 


54  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

were  at  one  time  held  in  villeinage,  and  the  greater  part  of 
the  people  were  in  a  state  of  vassalage  connected  with  such  a 
tenure,  and,  what  is  remarkable,  it  owes  its  extinctior  to  no 
act  of  legislation.  It  gradually  yielded  to  the  force  of  public 
sentiment  and  the  influence  of  the  courts,  till  it  practically 
ceased.  The  last  case  of  the  kind  reported  was  decided  in 
the  15th  James  I.^  And,  as  stated  by  Lord  Mansfield  in  Som- 
erset's case,  there  were  but  two  villeins  remaining  in  all  Eng- 
land when  tenures  were  abolished  in  the  reign  of  Charles  11.^ 

41.  Out  of  this  class  of  tenure  grew  up  the  modern  copy- 
holds, which,  though  they  form  an  important  branch  of  the 
English  law  of  real  pi-operty,  have  no  direct  application  in 

the  United  States. ^ 
[*  27]  42.  *  Free  and  common  socage  is  the  tenure  by  which, 
at  this  day,  all  the  freehold  lands  in  England  are 
held.'^  And  although  theoretically  all  these  lands  are  held  of 
the  crown,  this  could  only  be  through  a  seisin  bond  from  the 
king  as  lord  paramount,  since  a  tenant  in  free  and  common 
socage  could  not,  originally,  have  held  immediately  of  the 
king.^ 

43.  The  commissioners  upon  the  English  law  of  real  prop- 
erty, while  they  oppose  the  idea  of  abolishing  tenure  by  law, 
speak  thus  of  free  and  common  socage,  by  which,  as  they  say, 
the  great  bulk  of  the  land  in  England  is  now  held :  "  It  has 
all  the  advantages  of  allodial  ownership.  The  dominium  utile 
vested  in  the  tenant  comprises  the  sole  and  undivided  interest 

1  Noy,  27  ;  Barringt.  Stat.  272  ;  Hargrave,  Argument,  11  State  Trials,  342. 

2  Lofft,  Kep.  8. 

^  Wms.  Ileal  Prop.  287,  288,  and  note  by  Rawle.  Some  of  the  above  proposi- 
tions —  such,  for  instance,  as  the  alleged  origin  of  copyhold  estates  —  have  indeed 
been  controverted.  But  those  writers  have  been  followed  whose  authority  has 
been  supposed  to  be  reliable,  without  occupying  any  more  space  in  what  must  at 
best  be  useful,  if  at  all,  in  the  way  of  explanation  and  introduction  to  the  more 
practical  parts  of  the  work.  Lord  Loughborough  maintained  that  the  tenure  of 
copyhold  was  derived  from  Germany,  and  that  the  copyholder  was  a  freeman,  and 
the  tenure  had  no  connection  with  villeinage.  Doug.  Eep.  679,  n.  2.  "Wilinot, 
J.,  on  the  other  hand,  insists  that  copyhold  estates  were  tenancies  at  will,  a  mid- 
dle estate  between  freeholders  and  villeins.  3  Bur.  R.  1543.  See  also  Gilb.  Ten. 
5th  ed.  197. 

*  Wms.  Real  Prop.  98  ;  1  Spence,  Eq.  Jur.  98 ;  Stat.  12  Char.  II.  ch.  xxiv. 

5  2  Bl.  Com.  86  ;  Jackson  v.  Schutz,  18  Johns.  186,  per  Piatt.  J- 


CIl.  II.]  KHUDAL    TKXURES,  SEISIN,    KTC.  ')') 

in  tlic  soil.  r]scli»':it  is  the  uniy  iiiatfri;il  incitlciit  of  this  ten 
urc  bciH'liciiil  to  the  lord,  mihI  while  thni'  is  an  heir  or  ii 
devisee  he  can  in  no  way  iutiTlere.  Tlie  tenant  in  fee-simple 
of  soeaue  himls  can  of  his  own  anthority  create  in  it  any  es- 
tates and  interests  not  contrary  to  the  general  rules  of  law. 
lie  can  alien  it  entirely,  or  devise  it  to  whom  he  |tleas<'s,  and 
the  alienee  or  devisee  takes  directly  from  him,  so  that  the  title 
is  complete  without  concurrence  or  priority  of  the  lord."  Nor 
has  tenure  any  lonjrer  any  reference  to  the  profession  or  rank 
of  the  tenant,  or  the  purposes  to  which  the  lands  are  ajjplied.^ 

44.  To  recur  to  the  extent  of  ownershij*  or  (piantity  of  es- 
tate which  the  vassal  might  acquire  in  his  feud,  it  was  a  part 
of  the  oriirinal  arraniremont  between  William  and  his  <rrcater 
barons,  that  they  might  reward  their  followers  by  dividing  out 
to  them  smaller  portions  of  land  to  be  held  by  their  grantees, 
as  vassals,  in  the  manner  already  mentioned.- 

45.  For  a  considerable  peri<jd  after  the  Conquest,  no  vassal 
could  alien  his  feud,  although  an  inheiitable  one,  with- 
out *  consent  of  his  lord,  lest  he  might  bring  in  an    [*  28] 
enemy  to  share  in  the  domain ;  nor  was  it  subject  to 

his  debts  until  the  Stat,  of  Westm.  2,  c.  18,  A.  D.  1285.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  lord  could  not  alien  his  seigniory  without 
the  consent  of  his  feudatory,  which  was  called  an  attormnent.^ 

46.  But  it  was  as  competent  for  the  lord,  in  parting  with  his 
feud  to  a  vassal,  to  prescribe  the  duration  of  his  ownership  and 
to  whom  it  should  pass  afterwards,  as  it  was  to  dictate  the 
terms  and  services  subject  to  which  he  was  to  hold  it. 

47.  For  this  reason,  great  strictness  was  observed  in  con- 
struing and  applying  the  language  made  use  of  in  making  the 
donation  of  the  feud,  "  nc  quis  plus  donasse  presumatur  quam 
in  donatione  expresserit." 

48.  Thus  if  the  donation  was  made  to  a  man  and  his  sons, 
all  the  sons  succeeded  to  the  feud  in  capite,  and  upon  the 
death  of   one   of   them,  his   share,  instead   of  going   to   his 

1  Rep.  Eng.  Comm'rs  Real  Prop.  6-8.  ^  1  Sjiencc,  E>j.  Jur.  93,  94. 

8  2  Bl.  Cora.  57  ;  1  Spence,  Eq.  Jur.  137  ;  Wright,  Ten.  16S  ;  IJ.  170.  This 
attornment  was  originally  jierfomicd  in  the  presence  of  the  jm res  curiar,  and  signi- 
fied the  turning  over  from  the  former  lord  to  a  new  one.  1  Suiliv.  Lect  227  ; 
Lindley  v.  Dakin,  13  Ind.  388. 


56  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

brothers,  reverted  to  the  lord.^  So  if  the  gift  was  to  one  with- 
out any  words  of  limitation,  it  was  only  for  such  a  term  of 
time  as  he  could  personally  hold  it,  namely,  for  his  own  life.^ 

49.  But  if  given  to  one  and  his  heirs^  it  was  understood  to 
pass  in  succession,  after  his  death,  without  being  subject  to 
his  control  by  any  act  done  by  him,  to  his  descendants,  who 
were  recognized  by  the  feudal  law  as  heirs.  All  the  males  at 
first  took  equally,  but  afterwards,  in  analogy  to  the  military 
feuds,  the  oldest  son  took  the  whole,  to  the  exclusion  of  the 
rest.^  In  this  way  it  is  not  difficult  to  understand  the  origin 
and  reason  of  the  rule  which  requires  at  common  law  the  use 

of  the  word  "  heirs  "  in  a  deed  of  grant,  in  order  to 
[*  29]    pass  a  fee  or  *  estate  of  inheritance  in  the  land  granted, 
for  which  no  synonym  can  be  substituted.^ 

50.  Such  in  this  respect  is  the  common  law  of  this  country. 
But  it  has  been  altered  by  statute  in  many  of  the  States,  giv- 
ing to  deeds,  in  effect,  the  same  construction  as  has  long  been 
given  to  wills,  and  passing  an  estate  of  inheritance  where 
such  appears  from  the  instrument  to  be  the  intention  of  the 
grantor.^     And  in  case  of  a  contract  to  convey  lands  without 

1  Wright,  Ten.  16,  17  ;  Id.  151,  152. 

2  Id.  152  ;  Wms.  Real  Prop.  47  ;  Co.  Lit.  42  a. 

3  2  Bl.  Com.  56,  57  ;  Wms.  Real  Prop.  18 ;  1  Spence,  Eq.  Jur.  175,  176,  3  Rep. 
Eng.  Comra'rs  Real  Prop.  137.  Dalrymple,  p.  205,  states  that  the  right  of  primo- 
geniture was  established  by  William  I.  It  would  seem  that  primogeniture  did  not 
obtain  in  respect  to  socage  lands  until  the  reign  of  Henry  III.  Co.  Lit.  191  a, 
Butler's  note,  77;  Maine,  Anc.  L.  230,  231. 

*  2  Prest.  Est.  11,  12. 

s  "  Heirs,"  or  words  of  inheritance  by  statute,  are  not  requisite  to  create  or 
convey  an  estate  in  fee  in  grants  or  devises  in  the  following  States  :  Alabama, 
Code,  1867,  §  1569.  Ai'kansas,  Rev.  Stat.  1837,  ch.  31,  §  3.  California,  Hittel 
Codes,  1876,  §  6072.  Colorado,  Gen.  L.  1877,  ch.  18,  §  7.  Dakota,  Civ.  Code, 
1866.  Georgia,  Code,  §  2248;  Adams  v.  Guerard,  29  Ga.  651.  Illinois,  Rev.  Stat. 
1874,  p.  275.  Indiana,  Stat.  1876,  ch.  82,  §  14.  Iowa,  Code  1873,  §  1929  ;  Kar- 
muUer  v.  Krotz,  18  Iowa,  358.  Kansas,  Comp.  L.  1879,  §  1025.  Kentucky,  Rev. 
Stat.  1834,  p.  443.  Minnesota,  Stat.  1878,  ch.  40,  §  4.  Mississippi,  Code,  c.  52, 
§  2285.  Missouri,  Gen.  Stat.  1866,  p.  442.  Maryland,  1  Gen.  L.  133.  Mon- 
tana, Rev.  Stat.  1879,  p.  444,  §§  220,  221.  Nebraska,  Gen.  Stat.  1873,  p.  881. 
So  in  New  Hampshire,  by  judicial  construction.  Cole  v.  Lake  Co.,  54  N.  H.  242, 
289.  In  New  Jersey  and  North  Carolina  this  is  limited  to  wills.  New  York, 
1  Stat,  at  Large,  699.  Tennessee,  Stat.  1851;  Cromwell  v.  Winchester,  2  Head, 
389.  Texas,  Paschal  Dig.  258.  Virginia,  Code  1860,  p.  559.  Wisconsin,  Rev. 
Stat  1878,  §  2206. 


ril.  II.]  FKl'PAL    TKNUUE.S,   SEISIN,    ETC.  57 

Specifying  the  estate  to  be  granted,  equity  always  construes  it 
to  mean  a  conveyance  to  the  purchaser  and  his  hi'irs.' 

.51.  In  reference  to  the  dignity  and  importance  <»f  tlic 
estates  or  (piantitics  of  interest  in  socage  hinds  which  might 
be  created,  some  were  denominalcd  rrechoid,  and  others  less 
than  frreliold, —  the  one  being  sui-h  as  a  freeman  might  con- 
sistently hold,  the  other  of  less  duration  or  amount.  The 
first  of  these  must  have  been,  at  least,  for  the  life  of  the 
tenant,  though  afterwards  extended  to  an  estate  for  the  life 
of  another,  and  finally  to  any  estate  of  uncertain  duration, 
not  depending  upon  the  will  of  another,  and  which  might 
last  for  the  term  of  a  life.^ 

52.  The  word  freehold  has  now  come  to  imply  the  (piantity 
of  estate,  rather  than  the  quality  of  tenure  or  dignity  of  person 
of  the  holder.^ 

53.  Such  estates  as  these  could  originally  be  created  only 
by  livery  of  seisin,  and  at  this  day  seisin  can  only  be  predi- 
cated of  what  are  called  freehold  estates.  Beyond  its  eiTect 
upon  the  quality  of  tenure,  as  originally  understood, 

the  quantity  or  *  duration  of  ownership  in   lands  be-  [*30] 
longs  to  the  sul)ject  of   Estates,  and  will  be  further 
treated  in  that  connection. 

54.  Although,  as  has  been  stated,  no  vassal  could  alien  his 
feud,  under  the  system  established  by  William  I.,  and  although 
in  1290,  as  will  be  shown,  all  restraints  \\\)on  alienation  were 
removed  by  statute ;  in  order  to  understand  what  has  been 
said,  as  well  as  the  reasons  for  so  decided  a  change,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  recur  to  some  of  the  steps  by  which  it  was  brought 
about.  The  doctrine  of  tenures  proper  is  thus  far  to  be  un- 
derstood as  chiefly  relating  to  the  lords  to  whom  the  manors 
were  originally  allotted  by  the  crown,  and  their  representa- 
tives, and  the  vassals  to  whom  these  lords  had  parted  out  their 
lands,  or  who  had  come  into  tlu-ir  place  by  descent  or  aliena- 
tion by  the  lord's  consent. 

65.  And  it  may  be  remarked,  in  jtassing,  that  the  creation 

1  Tud.  Ciu«.  587. 

2  Wms.  Real  I'rop.  22  ;  1  Prest.  Est.  203  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  104  ;  1  Uw  Ma«.  650. 
Mr.  Pomeroy  msists  that  no  feud  was  at  any  time  granted  for  less  than  a  frwhold. 
Introd.  256.     AiUt,  p.  *18. 

8  1  Law  Mag.    551;  2  131.  Com.  103  ;  1  Pros.  Est.  200;  Wms.  Real  Prop.  22. 


58  LAW   OF   REAL    PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

of  anv  new  manors  was,  in  effect,  abolished  by  the  statute  of 
Quia  Umptores,  passed  in  the  year  above  mentioned.^ 

56.  But  it  would  have  been  strange  if,  as  these  vassals-  and 
their  descendants  became  more  settled  and  intelligent,  they 
should  not  have  resorted  to  some  means  for  evading  the  rigors 
of  such  a  system.  This  they  did  with  great  effect,  by  means 
of  subinfeudation. 

57.  The  vassal  parted  out  his  land  to  under-tenants,  who 
held  them  of  him  instead  of  his  lord,  and  thus  created  a 
feudal  tenure  between  the  tenant  and  his  feoffor,  although  it 
was  not  regarded  in  the  light  of  an  alienation  by  the  vassal, 
or  transfer  of  the  tenure  itself,  but  as  something  to  which  they 
gave  the  name  of  subinfeudation,  or  carving  a  new  and  inferior 
feud  out  of  the  old  one  still  subsisting.^ 

58.  And  it  is  said  that  such  a  thing  as  an  absolute  sale  of 
land  for  a  sum  of  money  paid  down,  was  scarcely  to  be  met 
with.  The  alienation,  such  as  it  was,  assumed  rather  the 
form  of  a  perpetual  lease,  granted  in  consideration  of  certain 

services  or  rents.  The  old  conveyances  almost  uni- 
[*31]  formly  gave  the  *  lands  to  the  grantee  and  his  heirs  to 

hold  as  tenants  of  the  grantor,  and  his  heirs,  at  certain 
rents  and  services.^ 

59.  This  subinfeudation,  though  it  did  not  relieve  the  vassal 
from  the  services  he  owed  to  his  lord,  operated  unfavorably 
upon  the  latter,  since  the  vassal  had  little  inducement  to  pay 
a  fine  for  the  privilege  of  doing  what  he  could  accomplish  in 
another  way,  and  it  besides  seriously  impaired  his  other  fruits 
of  tenure.  The  consequence  was,  when  the  barons  extorted 
the  Magna  Charta,  A.  D.  1215,  a  clause  was  inserted  prohib- 
iting the  subinfeudation  of  an  entire  feud,  and  requiring  the 
vassal  to  retain  enough  of  it  to  secure  the  services  due  on 
account  of  such  feud.* 

1  "Wms.  Real  Prop.  96  ;  Van  Rensselaer  v.  Hays,  19  N.  Y.  72  ;  post,  pi.  61  ; 
Kitchen  on  Courts,  ed.  1675,  p.  7.  For  the  grounds  upon  which  manons  were 
established  and  manorial  rights  sustained  in  New  York,  see  post,  vol.  2,  p.  *524, 
pi.  23. 

2  Wright,  Ten.  154,  155,  andn.;  Dalrymp.  Feud.  60  ;  1  Spence,  Eq.  Jur.  137; 
Van  Rensselaer  v.  Hays,  ubi  sup. 

8  Wms.  Real  Prop.  3. 

*  Dalrymp.  Feud,  60 ;  Wright,  Ten.  157  ;  1  Spence,  Eq.  Jur.  137  ;  Magna 
Charta,  ch.  xxxii. 


(11.  II.]  FEUDAL    TENURES,   SEI.SIN,   ETC.  69 

GO.  And  yet  it  i.s  said  thai  tlii.s  (•laii.><f  in  flie  Ma^na  f'harta 
was  the  first  authoritative  jnovi.siou  hy  hiw  for  aUowin;.^  the 
free  ali(Miatioii  of  Uinds,' 

Gl.  The  filial  hlow  to  the  custom  of  suhiiifeudation  was  ^Mvcn 
hy  the  Stat.  18  Edward  1.,  calh'<l  the  Statute  Quid  JCtiipton'H, 
j)asscd  in  12II0.  It  was  done  hy  ^nvinjr  I'vory  frcclidlih;!*  a 
right  to  sell  a  |)art  or  all  of  his  lands,  and  siihstitutfd  the 
purchaser  in  the  place  of  his  vendor  in  respect  to  the  chief 
h)rd  of  the  fee,  retjuiriin;  him  to  |»erforui  the  services  wliieh 
had  hcen  due  from  his  vendor,  or,  if  part  only  of  a  feud  was 
granted,  the  services  were  api)ortioned.''*  This  statute  did 
not  extend  to  the  king's  tenants,  nor  did  it,  as  will  he  jjcr- 
ceived,  relieve  the  lands  of  the  kingdom  from  the  l)urdens  of 
tenure.^ 

*  G2.  Every  owner  of  a  fee-simple  estate  has  now  [*32] 
full  liherty  to   dispose  of    it  hv   deed,  since   military 
tenures  were  abolished   by  statute,  Charles  II.,  ])efore  men- 
tioned.* 

G3.  It  may  in  this  connection  be  ol)scrvcd,  that  there  was 
originally  the  same  restriction  as  to  devising  lands  hy  last  will 
as  there  was  to  aliening  them  inter  vivos  by  deed,  nor  could  it 
be  done  excejtt  by  the  contrivance  of  uses,  until  the  32d  and 
34th  Henry  VUL,  A.  D.  1543.5 

64,  Having  thus  considered  the  doctrines  of  tenure  and 
alienation  of  lands,  it  may  be  well  to  inf|uire  into  the  jiiode 
by  which  tenants  acquired  their  property  therein  before  the 
nature  and  qualities  of  their  estates  are  examined.     This  was 

1  2  SiiUiv.  Lect.  283,  289. 

2  Wright,  Ten.  160  ;  2  Sulliv.  Lect.  289,  290;  "Wms.  Real  Prop.  56  ;  Smith, 
Land.  &  Ten.  5. 

*  Wright,  Ten.  161  ;  Van  Rensselaer  r.  Hays,  19  X.  Y.  72-75.  This  statute 
takes  its  name  from  the  first  words  of  the  first  chapter,  "  Quia  cm])lorcs  terra nitn." 
Lonl  Coke  says  :  "  .Many  e.vccllent  things  are  enacted  by  this  statute,  and  oil  tho 
doubts  upon  this  (32)  chapter  of  Magna  Charta  were  cleared,  l>oth  statutes  having 
both  one  end,  tliat  is  to  say,  for  tlie  upholding  and  preservation  of  the  tenures 
whereby  the  lands  were  holden,  this  aot  being  enacteil  ad  instantiain  magnatum 
rcgni."  Coke,  2d  Inst.  66.  And  Hargravo  (Co.  Lit.  43  a,  note  251)  says  :  "In 
fact,  the  hi.story  of  our  law,  with  resjiect  to  the  powers  of  alienation  before  the 
statute  of  Quia  Erttptorcs,  is  very  much  involved  in  obscurity." 

«  Wms.  Real  Prop.  80. 
»  Wright,  Ten.  172. 


60  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

done  by  what  was  called  an  investiture  or  livery  of  seisin.  It 
was  borrowed  from  the  Roman  law  in  the  time  of  tiie  empire, 
by  which  no  donation  of  a  feud  could  be  ^od  without  corpo- 
real investiture  or  open  and  notorious  delivery  of  possession 
in  the  presence  of  the  neighbors.^  The  Mexican  law  required 
a  formal  delivery  of  possession  of  real  property,  after  grant 
made,  for  the  investiture  of  the  title.^ 

65.  The  mode  of  doing  it  was  by  the  lord,  or  some  one  em- 
powered by  him,  going  upon  the  land  with  the  tenant,  and 
giving  him  actual  possession  by  putting  into  his  hand  some 
part  of  the  premises,  like  a  turf  or  twig,  in  the  presence  of 
the  pares  curiae,  the  peers  of  the  lord's  court,  who  were  the 
tenants  and  vassals  of  the  lord.  This  was  technically  livery 
of  seisin,  —  the  term  seisin  having  a  technical,  complex  mean- 
ing, and  being,  in  the  sense  of  the  law,  "  the  completion  of 
the  feudal  investiture  by  which  the  tenant  was  admitted  into 
the  feud  and  performed  the  rights  of  homages  and  fealty." 
He  then  became  tenant  of  the  freehold.^ 

66.  If  the  lands  were  all  in  one  manor,  though  consisting  of 
different  parcels,  entry  upon  one  was  sufficient  as  to  all,  since 
the  same  pares  curice  were  witnesses  in  respect  to  all  the  lands 
in  that  manor.  But  if  the  parcels  were  in  different  manors, 
the  entry  must  be  made  upon  each,  that  it  might  be  witnessed 

by  the  pares  of  each.     And  this  was  the  origin  of  an 
[*33]  existing  rule  *  of  law,  and  if  lands  are  situated  in  dif- 
ferent counties,  there  must  be  an  entry  upon  those  in 
each  county  to  give  an  actual  seisin  thereof.* 

67.  No  deed  or  writing  was  necessary  to  complete  the  title 
of  the  tenant,  though  it  was  common  as  a  mode  of  preserving 
the  evidence  of  the  transaction,  as  well  as  the  terms  and  ser- 
vices upon  which  he  was  to  hold,  to  have  it  written  in  what 
were  called  brevia  testata,  which  answered  to  modern  deeds. 
These  were  authenticated  by  the  seal,  and  name  or  mark  of 
the  lord,  attested  by  some  of  the  pares.^ 

1  1  Speuce,  Eq.  Jur.  139  ;  Green  v.  Liter,  8  Cranch,  229  ;  Thrupp,  L.  Tracts, 
205  ;  Giiterbock,  Bract,  by  Coxe,  114. 

2  Graham  v.  United  States,  4  "Wall.  259. 

8  1  Sulliv.  Lect.  142  ;  Co.  Lit.  266  b,  n.  217  ;  Steams,  Real  Act.  2. 

*  1  Sulliv.  Lect.  142,  143. 

6  Id.  145  ;  1  Atkinson,  Conv.  11  ;  1  Spence,  Eq.  Jur.  160. 


CII.  11.]  I'ELDAL    TENURES,   SEISIN,    ETC.  61 

G8.  Another  I'uriu  uf  iit'cuiu|ili.sliin;^  tlie  suiuc  end,  wirn-h 
was  sometimes  used,  Jiiul  supplied  tiie  etyniulotry  of  the  term 
investiture,  was  for  tlie  lord  to  m;ike  livery  of  the  land  by  a 
symbol,  such  as  delivering  to  the  tenant  a  stall',  a  ring,  or 
a  sword,  or,  what  was  mure  common,  putting  a  robe  ujxjn 
him.' 

(>1>.  The  transfer  of  tith*  and  jMJSsession  U)  the  tenant  by 
either  of  these  modes  constituted  a  feolVment,  a  term  still  re- 
tained to  cxju'ess  the  thing  signified,  though  the  f<jrm  of  ac- 
complishing it  has  long  since  given  place  to  modern  deeds  of 
conveyance. 

70.  In  the  theoiy  of  the  law  there  was  and  could  be  but  one 
seisin  of  lands.  He  who  had  that  became  one  of  the  pares 
curue,  did  the  services,  and  was  recognized,  at  least  for  the 
time  being,  as  the  rightful  owner.  If  there  were  several  in 
possession,  and  one  of  them  had  the  legal  title,  he  aloue  had 
the  seisin.- 

71.  This  feudal  idea  of  seisin  is  so  inwrought  into  the  whole 
theory  of  the  law  of  real  estate,  and  especially  of  ac(juiring 
and  transferring  titles  thereto,  that  it  is  diflficult  to  understand 
and  apjdy  the  language  and  reasoning  of  our  own  courts  u])oii 
the  subject,  without  a  somewhat  intimate  kn(jwledge  of  what 
the  early  law  was  u\Hm  the  subject. 

*  72.  This  must  serve  as  an  explanation  why  still  fur-  [*34] 
ther  space  is  allotted  to  it  in  this  work,  although  livery 
of  seisin  is  done  away  with  in  England  by  the  8th  and  9th 
Victoria  (1845),  and,  if  it  ever  was  made  use  of  iu  this  coun- 
try as  a  mode  of  conveying  land,  it  long  since  became  merely 
symbolical  in  its  nature.* 

1  1  Stilliv.  Lect.  143. 

2  Lit.  §  701.  Cornell  v.  Jackson,  3  Cush.  506.  So  essential  was  liven-  of 
seisin  to  the  transfer  of  lands,  that  one  reason  why  lands  were  not  devisable 
after  they  had  become  alienable  was  that  the  devisor,  beinp  dead  when  his  will 
was  to  take  effect,  could  not  make  the  necessary  livery.     1  Sj>enee,  V.i\.  Jur.  136. 

'  1  Spence,  Eq.  Jur.  156,  Sullivan,  in  his  treatise  on  Land  Titl«-s,  says  that 
when  tlio  country  was  first  settled  the  ceremony  of  livery  of  sei.sin  wa.s  in  use, 
and  mentions  an  instance  where  the  council  of  Plymouth  made  livery  to  Vines 
aiiil  Oldham  of  their  patent  on  Saco  River,  in  1642,  and  that  from  that  time  the 
ceremony  was  observed  in  York,  Me.,  until  1692.  Ma.s.sa<husetts  dis|iens<Hl  with 
thi«  form  by  statute  in  1642,  and  in  Plymouth  it  was  veri'  early  8U|>erso«led  by 
deed  acknowledged  and  recorded.     Colony  L.  p.  85,  86.     Judge  Kent  asserts  that 


62  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPEETY.  [BOOK  L 

73.  Seisin,  as  now  understood,  is  either  in  fact  or  in  law. 
The  first  has  been  ah-eady  described.  The  other  occurs,  for 
example,  where  an  ancestor  or  devisor  dies  leaving  his  lands 
vacant ;  the  heir  in  the  one  case  and  the  devisee  in  the  other 
are  deemed,  by  the  law,  to  have  a  seisin,  which  may  at  any 
time  be  converted  into  a  seisin  in  fact.^ 

74.  To  constitute  a  seisin  in  fact,  there  must  be  an  actual 
possession  of  the  land ;  for  a  seisin  in  law,  there  must  be  a 
right  of  immediate  possession  according  to  the  nature  of  the 
interest,  whether  corporeal  or  incorporeal.^ 

75.  Seisin  in  fact,  necessarily  implies  possession,  there  being 
"no   legal   difference   between  the  words    seisin   and 

[*35]  *  possession,"  ^  if  the  possession  be  with  an  intent  on 
the  part  of  him  who  holds  it  to  claim  a  freehold  in- 
terest.^ And  if  one  be  in  possession  of  land  under  color  of 
title,  any  one  claiming  adversely  to  him  must  prove  a  better 
title,  in  order  to  justify  disturbing  him  in  his  possession.^ 
So  one  in  possession  of  land,  though  he  is  not  able  to  show 

"  we  have  never  adopted  in  this  country  the  common-law  conveyance  by  feoffment 
livery,"  &c.  4  Kent  Com.  84.  Judge  Sharswood,  of  Pennsylvania,  a  high  au- 
thority, says,  "It  is  obvious  that  prior  to  the  act  of  frauds  and  perjuries  of  21st 
of  March,  1772,  a  parol  feoffment  with  livery  was  a  valid  conveyance  of  lands." 
He  quotes  the  language  of  Ch.  J.  Tilghraan  :  "  What  would  be  the  effect  of  a 
feoffment  with  livery  is  another  question,  and  I  give  no  opinion  on  it.  It  is  a 
kind  of  conveyance  out  of  use  ;  indeed  1  have  never  heard  of  one  in  Pennsyl- 
vania ;  "  and  adds,  "  I  have,  however,  seen  an  early  deed  for  a  lot  in  Philadelphia, 
with  an  indorsement  of  livery,  and  in  anotlier  chain  of  title  met  with  a  letter 
of  attorney  to  make  livery."  Fide  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  Am.  ed.  6,  n.  A  stat- 
ute of  Massachusetts  in  1652  declares  that  a  sale  of  land  and  giving  possession 
shall  not  be  good  unless  it  be  by  deed,  acknowledged  and  recorded  according  to 
law.  Colony  L.  85.  In  Kentucky,  livery  of  seisin  is  unheard  of.  Davis  v.  Ma- 
son, 1  Pet.  503.  In  Connecticut  it  is  said,  "although  in  the  early  settlement  of 
this  State  there  were  instances  where  livery  of  seisin  was  formally  confirmed,  none 
of  recent  date  can  be  found,  and  it  has  never  been  the  general  practice  here  to 
accompany  a  conveyance  of  land  with  that  ceremony."  Per  Storrs,  J.,  Bryan  v. 
Bradley,  16  Conn.  480.     See  also  4  Dane  Abr.  60,  61,  85. 

1  Stearns,  Real  Act.  2  ;  Co.  Lit.  266  b,  n.  217;  Banister  v.  Henderson,  Quincy, 
123. 

2  Co.  Lit.  266  b,  n.  217  ;  Cowel,  Interp.  "Seisin;"  Cora.  Dig.  "Seisin,"  A. 
I  &  2;  2  Prest.  Abs.  282. 

3  Slater  v.  Rawson,  6  Met.  439  ;  Co.  Lit.  153  a. 

*  Towle  V.  Ayer,  8  N.  H.  57.     But  that  seisina  and  ^ossesszo  are  used  "  promis- 
cuously," see  Giiterbock  Bract,  by  Coxe,  90. 
6  Linthicum  v.  Ray,  9  Wall.  241. 


cii.  II.]  ri;ri)AL  inNURrs,  rftisin,  ctc.  OH 

any  title,'  may   have  trespass  against  a  stranger  \\\u)  enters 
u|i<jn  it. 

7<;.  If  one  enters  u|Mtii  an  estate  having  title  thereto,  the 
law  jti-esunies  the  jiosscssion  to  lie  aeeording  to  his  titli-,  \vith- 
ont  re(|uirinir  any  (tther  prttof  of  intent.^  So  if  several  persons 
have  a  nuxid  possession,  as  it  is  called,  of  land,  and  one  of 
them  has  title  to  it,  the  seisin  l^elongs  to  him  only.-'  For 
though  tiierc  may  he  a  concurrent  possession,  there  cannot  he 
a  concurrent  seisin  of  lands.*  But  if  one  have  possession 
without  title,  an  intent  therehy  to  gain  the  seisin  must  l»e 
proved  in  order  to  give  it  that  effect.'' 

77.  If  a  seisin  hy  one  is  proved  or  admitted,  it  will  he  pre- 
sumed to  continue  till  the  contrary  is  shown.^ 

78.  No  one  who  has  a  seisin  and  title  to  land  will  lose  his 
seisin  l>y  any  entry  hy  a  stranger,  so  long  as  he  retains  the 
possession.'^  Accordingly,  if  a  man  entered  and  made  a  feofV- 
ment,  the  owner  heing  upon  the  land,  the  fei>n'ment  was  void.^ 

7S>.  Xor  will  one  gain  a  seisin  hy  occupying  lands  hy  jier- 
mission  of  the  owner.  And  if  he  enter  hy  such  permission, 
nothing  short  of  open  and  uncipiivocal  acts  of  disseisin  done 
hy  him  and  known  to  the  owner  can  deprive  the  latter  of  his 
seisin.'-' 

80.  In  respect  to  the  modes  of  acquiring  actual  seisin  or 
seisin  in  fact,  if  one  has  a  freehold  title  to  lands  and  enters 
upon  any  ])art  of  them,  he  hy  that  simple  entry  gains  a  seisin 
of  all  the  lands  in  the  possession  of  the  same  tenant  to  which 
he  has  title  in  the  county.  And  where  one  has  heen  disseised 
and  wishes  to  convey  the  lands,  which  he  cannot  do  till  he 
regains  his  seisin,  it  is  the  usual  way  to  go  upon  some  part 

'  IxHjk  V.  Norton,  55  Me.  103. 

a  Means  v.  Welles,  12  ilet.  356  ;  Barr  r.  Gratz,  4  WTicat.  213;  Green  r.  Liter, 
8  Crnnch,  229  ;  Gardner  v.  Gooch,  48  Me.  487. 

«  Slater  v.  Haw»on,  6  Met.  439  ;  Barr  v.  Gratz,  4  Wlicat.  213  ;  Matlur  r.  Miu- 
istei-s,  &<.-.,  3  S.  &  R.  511  ;  Winter  r.  Stevens,  9  Allen,  526. 

♦  Monroe  r.  Luke,  1  Met.  459,  466  ;   Ijingdon  r.  Potter,  3  Mass.  21.''>. 

"  Brailstreet  r.  Huntington,  5  Pet.  402;  Ewing  r.  Burnet,  11  iVt.  41,  52. 

•  Brown  v.  King,  5  Met.  173. 

^  2  Prest.  A1.9.  293  ;  Slater  r.  Rawson,  6  Met.  439  ;  Anon.,  1  Salk.  246. 

'  Surry  v.  Pigott,  Popli.  170,  171. 

»  Hull  r.  Stevens,  9  Met.  418;  Clark  v.  McClurc,  10  Gratt.  305. 


64  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  L 

of  the  premises  and  there  deliver  his  deed  to  his  vendee,  the 
seisin  in  such  case  passing  with  the  deed.^ 

[*36]  *  81.  If  a  freehold  title  descends  to  one  as  heir,  the 
law  invests  him  with  the  seisin  without  entry  upon  the 

land  .2 

82.  If  wild  or  vacant  lands  are  devised,  the  law  gives  the 
devisee  a  constructive  seisin,  and  he  may  maintain  a  writ  of 
entry  for  the  same.  But  if  they  are  otherwise  situate,  he 
must  make  an  entry,  or  do  some  equivalent  act  to  gain  a 
seisin.^ 

83.  The  acts  necessary  to  create  a  seisin  in  a  grantee  of 
lands,  using  the  word  grant  in  its  broad  modern  signification, 
are  generally  prescribed  by  statute  in  this  country,  or  borrowed 
from  the  English  Statute  of  Uses.  Thus,  in  conveyances  by 
bargain  and  sale,  covenant  to  stand  seised,  and  lease  and  re- 
lease, forms  once  in  use,  under  the  English  Law  of  Uses,  the 
statute  created  a  seisin  in  the  grantee  without  any  formal 
entry,  though  how  this  was  done  will  be  explained  in  connec- 
tion with  uses.* 

84.  As  a  general  proposition,  by  the  law  in  this  country, 
the  making,  delivery,  and  recording  of  a  deed  of  land  passes 
the  seisin  thereof  without  any  formal  entry  being  necessary. 
This  is  generally  by  force  of  the  statutes  of  the  several  States ; 
in  some,  such  a  deed  being  in  terms  declared  to  be  equivalent 
to  livery  of  seisin,  and  in  others  dispensing  with  any  further 
act  to  pass  a  full  and  complete  title.^ 

85.  It  is  somewhat  more  difficult  to  make  the  application 
of  the  doctrine  of  seisin  clear  when  it  is  considered  in  relation 
to  estates  of  which  present  possession  cannot  be  predicated. 
Thus,  there  may  be  an  estate  for  years  in  one,  and  the  re^'er- 


^  Proprietors  v.  Springer,  4  Mass.  416;  Stearns,  Real  Act.  44;  Ellicott  v. 
Pearl,  10  Pet.  412  ;  Spaulding  v.  Warren,  25  Vt.  316  ;  Green  v.  Liter,  8  Crauch, 
247,  250  ;  Giiterbock  Bract,  by  Coxe,  90,  95. 

2  Brown  v.  Wood,  17  Mass.  68  ;  Green  v.  Chelsea,  24  Pick.  71. 

8  Jackson  v.  Howe,  14  Jolins.  405  ;  Ward  v.  Fuller,  15  Pick.  185  ;  Brown  v. 
Wood,  17  Mass.  68  ;  Green  v.  Chelsea,  24  Pick.  71. 

4  See  2  Bl.  Com.  237  ;  Welsh  v.  Foster,  12  Mass.  96  ;  Thatcher  v.  Omans,  3 
Pick.  521  ;  4  Greenl.  Cruise,  45,  n. 

6  4  Greenl.  Ci-uise,  45,  n.  and  47,  n.  ;  Smith,  Laud.  &  Ten.  Am.  ed.  6,  n.  ; 
McKee  v.  Pfout,  3  Dall.  48G. 


(II.   II.]  rKl'DAL    TENURES,   SEISIN,    vrVC.  05 

sioii  ur  romaiiultT  in  ffc  in  iiiiodicr,  or  an  estate  for  lifo  in 
one  with  a  reversion  or  romiiintler  in  fee  in  anotlier ;  and  the 
question  arises,  liow  are  these  several  estates  affrcted  liy  the 
matter  of  seisin,  sinee,  to  repeat,  every  freeliold  nuist  have 
a  seisin,  ami  there  ean  Ite  only  (jne  seisin  at  a  time  of  an 
estate. 

*8t).  In  the  case  of  a  reversion  after  an  estate  for  [*37] 
years,  there  would  he  no  dilVieulty,  since  the  one  who 
creates  the  lease  and  <rives  the  tenant  i)ossession  reserves  the 
rest  of  the  estate  to  himself,  and  with  it  the  seisin,  hecause, 
though  a  tenant  for  years  holds  the  possession,  he  cannot  hold 
the  seisin  of  lands.  In  such  case  the  tenant's  possession  is 
suhordinatc  to  the  right  of  the  reversioner,  and  does  not  dis- 
turb the  seisin  which  he  had  before  he  made  the  lease. 

87.  In  the  case  of  a  vested  remainder,  inasmuch  as  the  lease- 
hold estate  or  term,  and  the  remainder,  or  the  estate  after  its 
exi)iration,  are  created  at  one  and  the  same  time,  and  by  one 
and  the  same  act,  the  possession  given  to  the  lessee  or  termor 
enures  to  the  benefit  of  the  remainder-man,  under  whom  he 
is  henceforth  to  hold  his  estate,  the  lessor  and  grantor  having 
parted  with  his  entire  interest.  So  that  the  livery  of  posses- 
sion to  the  lessee,  in  such  case,  oi)crates  as  a  livery  of  seisin 
to  the  remainder-man,  and  vests  it  in  him,  the  lessee  being,  as 
it  were,  his  bailiff  to  accept  livery  for  him. 

88.  If  the  estate,  prior  to  the  reversion  or  remainder,  tech- 
nically called  the  particular  estate,  is  a  freehold,  or  one  for 
life,  the  seisin,  as  well  as  the  possession,  passes  to  and  stops 
in  the  tenant  of  the  freehold,  because  there  must  be  a  livery 
of  seisin  to  him  to  create  his  own  estate,  and  he  must  continue 
to  hold  the  seisin.  "  The  fee  is  entrusted  to  him."  In  such 
case,  the  livery  made  to  the  tenant  of  the  freehold  enures  to 
the  benefit  of  the  reversion  or  remainder,  and  passes  to  the 
reversioner  or  remainder-man  instantaneously  upon  the  deter- 
mination of  the  particular  estate. 

89.  Such  would  be  the  case  if  there  were  ever  so  many 
practicable  successive  vested  estates  in  remainder,  the  seisin 
attaching  to  the  estate  of  each  as  it  successively  came  to  be 
entitled  to  the  possession. 

90.  In  all  these  cases,  whether  the  particular  estate  or  term 

VOL.  I.— 5 


66  LAW    OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK    1. 

be  for  years  or  for  life,  the  act  of  livery  of  seisin  is  done  to 
the   one  who  takes  the  first  estate  with  the  right  of   pos- 

session.i 
[*38]       *  91.  But  if  the  reversioner  or  remainder-man  wishes 

to  dispose  of  his  interest  which  the  law  regards  an 
actual  estate,  though  to  be  enjoyed  in  future,  and  if  the  land 
itself  is  in  the  possession  of  the  tenant  for  years  or  for  life,  he 
obviously  cannot  make  an  actual  livery  of  seisin  to  his  grantee, 
because  to  do  so  he  must  enter  and  commit  a  trespass  upon 
the  lands.  And,  besides,  as  abov.e  stated,  if  the  tenant  have 
a  freehold,  the  remainder-man  or  reversioner  has  no  seisin 
which  he  can  pass  to  a  third  person. 

92.  But,  inasmuch  as  he  has  the  seisin,  if  the  possession  be 
in  a  tenant  for  years,  he  may,  by  consent  of  the  latter,  enter 
upon  and  make  effectual  livery  of  seisin  of  the  land,  the  pos- 
session of  the  tenant  thereafter  enuring,  so  far  as  the  seisin  is 
concerned,  to  the  benefit  of  the  grantee.^ 

93.  The  only  way,  therefore,  by  which  a  reversioner  or 
remainder-man  can  convey  his  estate,  if  it  be  expectant  upon 
an  estate  of  freehold  in  another,  or  upon  an  estate  for  years, 
where  the  tenant  refuses  to  permit  livery  of  seisin  to  be  made, 
is  by  a  deed  of  grant  without  livery,  the  grantee  being  thereby 
substituted  in  respect  to  the  estate  to  all  the  rights,  includ- 
ing the  enuring  of  the  benefit  of  seisin  which  belonged  to  his 
grantor.^ 

94.  This  may  serve  to  explain  the  expressions  "  seisin  in 
law  of  a  reversion  or  remainder,"  "  seised  in  possession,"  and 
"  seised  in  reversion  or  remainder,"  as  well  as  "  vested  in 
reversion  or  remainder,"  which  are  found  in  books  treating  of 
this  subject.^  And  without  adverting  to  what  constituted,  in 
the  ancient  law,  a  seisin  in  law,  as  contradistinguished  from  a 
seisin  in  deed,  it  is  sufficient  to  say  that  for  centuries  the  lan- 

1  Spence,  Eq.  Jur.  156,  157  ;  2  Flint,  Real  -Prop.  258,  259  ;  Id.  572  ;  1  Atk. 
Conv.  16  ;  Lit.  §  60  ;  Co.  Lit.  49  ;  1  Law  Mag.  274,  275  ;  Co.  Lit.  266  b,  Butler's 
note,  217  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  166. 

2  1  Atk.  Conv.  16  ;  2  Flint.  Real  Prop.  572  ;  Co.  Lit.  48  b,  n.  318  ;  Id. 
15  a. 

8  1  Atk.  Conv.  16  ;  2  Flint.  Real  Prop.  576  ;  2  Prest.  Abs.  283  ;  Wms.  Real 
Prop.  208. 

*  2  Prest.  Abs.  282. 


rii.  II.]  FEUDAL  TrNURn!?,  snsiN,  ETC.  r,7 

ji^iiage  of  tlic  law  has  hccii  (hat  a  rovcM'sioiicr  is"^>iM<i  nf 
the  reversion,  althuu'^h  (h'peiidcnt  ii|mhi  an  estate  for  life.  I5v 
this,  no  more  is  meant  than  (hat  he  has  a  lixed,  vested  right 
of  future  enjoyment  of  it.' 

1>.").  This  results  from  the  rule  of  law,  that  where  lands  of 
iidieritanee  are  earve(l  into  dilVerent  estates,  the  tenant  of  the 
freehold  in  possession  ami  the  persons  in  remainder  or  rever- 
sion, are  eciually  iti  the  seisin  of  the  fee,  except  that  the 
tenant  in  possession  has  the  aetnal  .seisin  of  the  lands.^ 

I'G.  For  the  reasons  already  stated,  if  from  any  eause  one 
should  lo.sc  his  seisin  of  land,  he  could  not,  at  common 
law,  convey  *  the  freehold  thereof,  his  deed  would  be  [*'il>] 
void  if  made  before  he  regained  it.^ 

07.  Xor  by  the  theory  of  the  common  law  could  the  seisin 
be  in  abeyance  or  suspense ;  it  must  always  be  in  some  one 
as  freeholder,  because  of  the  feudal  maxim  that  tlie  freehold 
must  always  be  full,  in  order  that  there  should  be  some  one 
always  ready  to  do  the  services  of  the  tenure,  and  to  answer 
to  any  action  of  law  which  any  claimant  of  the  lands  might 
bring  to  try  the  title  to  the  same.^  If  one  is  wrongfully  de- 
jirived  of  his  seisin,  it  is  technically  called  a  dis)<fi)<in,  the  one 
who  does  the  act  being  a  disseisor,  ami  the  one  who  thereby 
loses  the  seisin,  a  disseisee.  But  how  this  may  be  done,  and 
the  consequences  u|)on  the  rights  of  the  parties,  come  more 
properly  into  consideration  when  treating  of  the  modes  of 
ac(piiring  titles  to  lands. 

08.  This  subject  would  be  manifestly  incomplete  in  a  w<iik 
professing  to  be  American  in  its  character,  without  S(jmethintr 
being  .said  of  tenure  as  an  incident  to  the  ownershij)  of  lands 
in  this  country.  And  although,  in  the  opinion  of  JudL^*  Kent, 
"  the  (piestion  has  become  wholly  immaterial  in  this  country, 
where  every  real  ve-stige  of  tcnnre  is  aimihilated"  (4th  Com. 
25),  it  cannot  but  be  regarded  as  an  interesting  subject  of  in- 

>  Cook  V.  Hammond,  4  Mason,  467.  48S  ;  Plowil.  191. 

^  Co.  Lit.  266  b,  Butler's  note,  '217  ;  Van  Rensselaer  r.  Kearney,  11  How. 
300.  319. 

"  Small  V.  Procter,  15  Mass.  495  ;  4  Dane's  Abr.  16. 

♦  1  .\tk.  Cnnv.  11  ;  1  Prest.  Est.  255.  The  latter  waa  technically  called  the 
"  tenant  to  the  Prcecipc."     1  Prest.  Est.  203. 


68  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

qiiiry  as  a  matter  of  lepral  history,  if  nothing:  more.  The  nature 
of  the  title  of  the  crown  to  the  lands  of  this  country  in  the  pos- 
session of  the  Indian  tribes,  and  in  whom  the  seisin  was  before 
the  extinguishment  of  their  possessory  right,  have  come  up 
for  discussion  in  several  cases  to  which  the  reader  is  referred.^ 
The  grant  of  lands  by  the  crown  to  the  early  colonies,  pre- 
scribed as  the  tenure  by  which  they  were  to  be  held  of  the 
crown,  "  free  and  common  socage  and  not  in  capite  by  knight- 
service."  ^  In  some  of  the  charters,  at  least,  there  was  a  res- 
ervation in  the  nature  of  rent  of  a  certain  part  of  the 
[*40]  gold  and  *  silver  ore  that  should  be  found  in  the  terri- 
tory granted.^  When  these  lands  were  again  granted 
out  to  actual  settlers,  they,  as  grantees,  by  virtue  of  the  stat- 
ute Quia  Emptores,  would  hold,  it  is  to  be  supposed,  directly 
of  the  king,  the  lord  paramount.  But,  as  has  before  been 
shown,  the  holding  by  common  socage  in  fee  did  not  imply  the 
necessary  payment  of  any  of  the  feudal  services,  except  fealty. 
If  Massachusetts  may  be  taken  by  way  of  illustration,  the  char- 
ter from  the  king  not  only  passed  the  property  in  the  lands  of  the 
colony,  but  the  right  of  framing  a  government  over  the  terri- 
tory. And  to  the  grants  and  acts  of  that  government  all  titles 
to  real  property  in  Massachusetts,  with  their  incidents  and 
qualifications,  are  to  be  traced  as  their  source.*  In  the  case 
of  Chisholm  v.  Georgia,  Ch.  J.  Jay  says :  "  Every  acre  of  land 
in  this  country  was  then  (prior  to  the  Revolution)  held  medi- 
ately or  immediately  by  grants  from  the  crown."  And  he 
adds :  "  From  the  crown  of  Great  Britain  the  sovereignty  of 
their  country  passed  to  the  people  of  it."  ^  Great  Britain 
relinquished  all  claim  not  only  to  the  government  but  to  the 
proprietary  and  territorial  rights  of  the  United  States.     And 

1  Clark  V.  AYilliams,  19  Pick.  499  ;  Brown  v.  Wenham,  10  Met.  495  ;  Martin 
V.  Waddell,  16  Pet.  409  ;  Fellows  v.  Lee,  5  Denio,  628  ;  Johnson  v.  Mcintosh,  8 
Wheat.  543  ;  Worcester  v.  Georgia,  6  Pet.  515  ;  Comm'th  v.  Koxbury,  9  Gray, 
451. 

2  Wms.  Real  Prop.  6,  n.  ;  2  Sharsw.  Bl.  Com.  77  ;  1  Story,  Cons.  159  ;  Sulliv. 
Land  Tit.  35. 

8  1  Storj',  Cons.  47. 

4  Comm'th  v.  Charlestown,  1  Pick.  180  ;  Comm'th  v.  Alger,  7  Cush.  53,  68, 
71,  82. 

<>  Chisholm  v.  Georgia,  2  Dall.  419,  470. 


CII.  II.]  FKUDAL   TKNURES,   SEISIN,    KTC.  60 

these  vested  in  the  several  States  within  which  they  weir 
situate.^  It  is  dillieult,  in  view  of  these  now  familiar  prin 
eiples,  anil  of  the  fart  that  each  State  was  independent,  l)y 
the  Kevohition  and  the  treaty  of  peaee,  in  its  dominion  over 
its  own  tei-ritory,  to  see  when  ami  how  the  feudal  tenure  l»y 
which  the  hmds  had  Ijeen  indirectly  held  (d'  the  cniwii  was 
transfei'red  to  the  State.  The  State  was  substantially  these 
very  land-owners  acting  as  a  corporate  body.  Nor,  it  is  be- 
lieved, did  the  States  or  cither  of  them  assert  the  claim  of 
tenure  or  fealty.  (,)n  the  contrary,  New  York,  New  Jersey, 
South  Carolina,  and  Michiiran,  expressly  ne^rative  the  exist- 
ence of  tenure.^  No  guardianship  in  socage  has  existed  in 
New  York  since  1776,  of  lands  granted  by  the  Statc.^  Ami 
it  is  now  held  that  the  duty  of  allegiance,  the  only  duty  n<jw 
owed  to  the  State,  is  common  to  every  citizen,  and  has  no 
connection  with  the  land.  "  lie  no  more  holds  his  laud  by 
that  tenure  than  he  does  his  horse."*  And  where  a  grantor 
grants  an  estate  in  fee,  no  reversion  or  possible  reversion  by 
escheat  or  otherwise  remains  in  the  grantor.  No  imjilied 
feudal  conditions  remain,  although  conditions  made  ex]»ressly 
by  the  parties  will  be  enforced.^'  Connecticut,  in  17lt3,  de- 
clared every  proprietor  in  fee-simj»le  of  land  to  have 
*  an  absolute  and  direct  dominion  and  projierty  in  it.'^  [*41] 
Service  and  feudal  tenures  were  abolished  in  Virginia 
in  1779."  And  the  courts  of  Pennsylvania  and  Maryland 
have  declared  their  lands  to  be  allodial,  tenure  and  service 
having  no  existence  since  the  Revolution.^  Wisconsin,  by 
her  constitution,  declared  all  land  within  the  State  allodial.'' 

1  Coinm'th  i-.  Algi-r,  7  Tush.  S2,  93  ;  Martin  v.  Waiklell,  10  IVt.  410  ;  John- 
son V.  Mcintosh,  8  Whcjit.  584. 

■■»  Smith,  Land.  &  Ton.  Am.  cil.  6,  n.  ;  N.  Y.  Kcv.  Stat.  4th  e.l.  vol.  2,  p. 
125,  and  Kev.  Laws,  p.  70,  §  2-6  ;  Cornell  v.  Lamb,  2  Cow.  652  ;  Van  Rcussclacr 
V.  Mays,  19  N.  Y,  91,  92  ;  1  Rt-v.  Stat.  718,  §  3. 

'  Coonitw  V.  Jackson,  2  Wend.  155. 

*  Van  Ucns.sclaer  v.  Smith,  27  Barb.  157. 

^  Van  Rensselaer  v.  Dennisou,  35  N.  Y.  393. 

'  Rev.  Laws,  1849,  \\  454. 

'  Acts  of  Virginia,  1785. 

»  Desilver's  Estate,  5  Rawle,  111-113  ;  Matthews  v.  Ward,  10  Oill  &  T.  443  ; 
New  Orleans  v.  United  .States,  10  Peters,  6G2,  717  ;  CooiK-r,  Just,  note  455. 

»  Rev.  Stat.  "Wise.  1849,  art.  1,  §  14. 


70  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

Judge  Cooper,  in  liis  notes  upon  Justinian's  Institutes,  says  : 
'•  Our  (Pennsylvania)  tenure  being  free  of  any  suit  or  service  but 
what  the  State,  that  is  the  great  mass  of  the  citizens,  imposes 
by  common  consent,  seems  to  be  allodial"  (p.  455).  A  writer 
in  the  American  Jurist,  in  speaking  of  the  North-Western  Ter- 
ritory covered  by  the  Ordinance  of  1787,  says  :  "  The  doctrines 
of  tenure  do  not  here  exist  even  in  theory  "  (vol.  11,  p.  94). 
And  Judge  Story  says  :  "  Strictly  speaking,  therefore,  there 
has  never  been  in  this  country  a  dependent  peasantry.  The 
yeomanry  are  absolute  owners  of  the  soil."  ^  It  is  neverthe- 
less true  that  every  man  holds  his  estate,  however  absolute  his 
property  therein,  subject  not  only  to  the  right  of  eminent  do- 
main,^ but  to  the  right  of  the  government  to  control  the  use 
of  it  by  such  rules  and  limitations  as  the  public  good  requires;^ 
though  it  is  apprehended  this  is  not  a  feudal  burden  in  its 
character.  Yet  writers  of  high  authority  maintain  that,  theo- 
retically at  least,  there  is  a  tenure  in  this  country  whereby 
every  man  holds  his  lands  of  the  State,  as  they  did,  before  the 
Revolution,  of  the  crown,  and  among  these  is  Judge  Sharswood 
of  Philadelphia,  who  finds  evidence  of  this,  among  other 
things,  in  the  forms  of  conveyances  made  use  of  here.  And 
Judge  Jones,  of  the  same  State,  holds  that  fealty  is  still  a  ser- 
vice, and  escheat  a  perquisite  of  a  feudal  character.  And 
Mr.  Morris,  the  annotator  upon  Smith's  Landlord  and  Tenant,^ 
says :  "  It  would  not  be  safe  to  assert  that  any  property  is 
allodial."     But  Mr.  Pomeroy  says,  that  all  lands  in  America 

^  1  Story,  Const.  160  ;  Cook  v.  Hammond,  4  Mason,  478  ;  Stearns,  Real 
Act.  61. 

2  Holt  V.  Somerville,  127  Mass.  408,  413  ;  Heyward  v.  The  Mayor,  7  N.  Y. 
314 ;  He  Wash.  Pk.  Comm.,  52  N.Y.  131  ;  Be  Centr.  Pk.  Comm.,  50  N.  Y.  493  ; 
Root's  Case,  77  Penn.  St.  276  ;  St.  Louis  Court  v.  Griswold,  58  Mo.  175  ;  People 
V.  Salomon,  51  111.  37.  And  the  State  is  the  sole  judge  of  the  exigency,  and  the 
courts  have  no  i:iower  to  revise  its  conclusion.  lb.  So  the  United  States  govern- 
ment may  exercise  the  right  within  the  States  without  the  agency  of  the  State. 
Kohl  V.  United  States,  24  Am.  Law  Reg.  514,  517,  519. 

8  Comm'th  v.  Alger,  7  Cu.sh.  "92-102,  where  this  point  is  illustrated  and  ex- 
plained. Taylor  v.  Porter,  4  Hill,  140,  143  ;  Comm'th  v.  Tewksbury,  11  Met.  55  ; 
People  V.  Salem,  20  Mich.  479-482,  per  Cooley,  J.  Thus  the  exercise  of  the 
police  power  by  filling  to  abate  a  nuisance  gives  no  action.  Bancroft  v.  Cam- 
bridge, 126  Mass.  438. 

*  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  Am.  ed.  6,  n.  ;  2  Sharsw.  Bl.  Com.  77,  n. 


t  II.  11.]  FEL'D.VL   TENURE.-^,  SEISIN,    ETC  71 

an-  alldtlial,  cxcrpf  tin-  few  iiiaimr  laiid.s  in  New  Vurk.'  Ami 
Wiv  |M)iiit  .scciiis  til  lia\('  luTii  I'uUy  scuttled,  so  fur  as  IVnnsvl- 
vania  is  cnm-cnicd.  llcr  i-ourts  now  Imlil  that  the;  estutcH  in 
that  State  are  aUixlial  ami  not  feudal,  that  eseheat  i.s  a  nioro 
feudal  name  for  a  statute  ineident,  aile^rianee  is  merely  what 
is  due  from  the  citizen  to  tlic  government,  and  the  State  is 
lord  paiamount  as  to  no  man's  land.-  And  in  New  Jersey 
and  South  Carolina,  free  and  eonnnon  soeage  is  declareil  to 
exist  hy  express  statute.^  It  is  undnuljtcdly  true,  as  has  al- 
ready been  saiil,  that  many  of  the  jirineiples  of  our  law  of 
real  estate,  iiududing  its  forms  of  conveyanee,  as  well 
as  many  ol'  the  terms  *  in  use  in  applying  thesi',  were  [*  1-] 
borrowed  originally  from  the  feu(hil  .system.  It  is 
i)eeause  this  is  thi-  case,  and  because  they  could  not  be  so  in- 
telligildy  applied  as  was  d(siial)le  without  a  brief  outline  of 
this  system  and  its  operation,  that  so  much  space  has  l)een 
assigned  to  it  in  this  work.  But  it  is  apjtrehended  that  the 
adoption  of  forms  of  expression  or  forms  of  process  borrowed 
from  a  once  existing  system  of  laws,  docs  not  necessarily  im- 
ply that  that  system  has  not  become  obsolete.  Even  the  doc- 
trine of  allegiance,  which  is  said  to  be  but  fealty  to  the  State, 
there  is  good  authority  for  saying, "  is  a  service  from  every  snl)- 
ject  to  the  crown  or  state  irrespective  of  any  land  tenure  there- 
b}  manifested  or  maintained.""'  And  this  chapter  cannot, 
perhaps  be  more  suitably  closed,  in  view  of  the  v.irious  topics 
cmltraced  in  it,  than  by  adopting  the  language  tA'  .Judge  Kmt  : 
'•  Thus,  by  one  of  those  singular  revolutions  incident  to  human 
affairs,  allodial  estates  once  universal  in  lOurnpe,  and  then 
almost  universally  exchanged  for  feudal  tenures,  have  now, 
after  the  lajise  of  many  centuries,  regained  their  jtrimitive 
estimation  in  the  minds  of  freemen."''  There  is  a  class  of 
tenures  which  exist  between  landlord  and  tenant,  reversioner 

1  Intnxl.  272. 

a  Walluce  f.  Ilarmstad,  44  Tenn.  St.  492. 

•  S.  C.  Hev.  Stat.  671;  Ni-xon,  Dig.  129;  Stat.  New  Jersey,  1795.  Sec  Arrow- 
smith  r.  Murlington,  4  M'Lean,  497. 

*  1  Hale,  I*.  C.  62  ;  Tennes  ile  la  Lov,  "Allegiance." 

'  3  Kent,  Coin.  513.  If  there  an-  instiuues  of  nianorial  rights  ami  wrviies  in 
New  York,  or  any  other  of  the  States,  they  arc  so  far  local  a:>  not  to  alTect  tho 
general  course  of  the  above  remark. 


72  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  1, 

and  tenant  for  life  or  dowcr  and  tenant  in  tail,  reversioner  and 
tenant  in  dower  or  curtesy,  and  the  like.  These  are  recog- 
nized as  fully  in  this  country  as  in  England.  But  they  do  not 
properly  come  within  the  idea  of  feudal  tenures,  though  indi- 
rectly derived  from  them.*  And  the  same  remark  applies  to 
the  relation  of  grantor,  owner  in  fee-simple,  to  grantee  in  tail, 
the  latter  estate  being  carved  out  of  the  former ;  the  grantee 
is  considered  as  holding  of  his  grantor,  who  has  a  reversionary 
interest  remaining  in  him.  And  if,  in  such  case,  the  grantor 
grant  away  his  reversion,  the  tenant  in  tail  or  for  life  will 
hold  of  the  grantee  of  the  reversion,  notwithstanding  the  stat- 
ute Quia  Emptorei,  because  that  statute  only  applies  to  cases 
where  the  grantor  parts  with  his  entire  estate.^ 

»  Smith,  Land,  k  Ten.  6-3.  *  1  Cruise,  Dig.  72. 


CH.  III.l 


ESTATES   IN    FEX-t^IXPLX. 


73 


1- 
2,3. 

7,  «. 
^11. 
12-15. 
l»-ld. 
20,  21. 
22-28. 

29. 
8f>-34. 
35,  36. 
37-44. 
45-47. 
4ft-50. 
61,  52. 
63-63. 
64-69. 
71,  72. 
73,  74. 
75-77. 
78-^i. 

81. 

82. 
83-85. 

86. 
87,  88. 
89,  90. 
91-93. 


CIIAITER   III. 

ESTATES  IN   FEEr^SIMPLE. 

Diitinr*i.,n  between  property  and  title. 
1  rhe  rv&lt7  dedneiL 

T.  .       ., ..ed. 

EAtatf.  ilefine<l. 

l>  -  '     '  ■  rurt^rutics  of  «itat<». 

i  :.  aD<l  bow  crwited. 

•  ait:,.,'  t»:  .  'if  law. 

IHatkin  ai.  -^tata. 

..oliitfi,  —  aiitnj,  corporationa. 
i  1. 

1,  —  ita  incidenta. 
r 

Alienation  inci'lent  to  eatntea  in  fee,  —  ita  history, 
{{ow  far  alienation  may  he  reatricte^L 
Power  of  deviaing  lan<la  in  fee,  —  ita  history. 
Fee  in  incorporeal  bereditamenta. 
"  Heirs,"  how  far  nef^enaary  to  create  a  fee-simple  by  deed. 

r  ■    ■  '■■■.-. 

I  ;>:nt  to  fee-aimple. 


.  leterminable. 


lees. 


•  'omlitional  fees  at  common  law. 

Determinable  fees,  —  what  are  and  what  are  not. 

Tenant  of  atich  fee  ha.«  the  rights  of  one  in  fee-simple. 

Determinable  fee  with  or  without  a  reversion. 

Such  estate*  descend  as  fees,  are  defeasible  by  condition. 

Sach  estates  may  become  fee-simple  abaoIuU.-. 


1.  Ah  the  law  of  real  prof»orty  naturally  divides  it.'ielf  into 
different  heads,  it  in  well  to  cla^wifv  an<l  fix  these  as  distinctly 
as  may  be,  in  order,  if  f>o8sihle,  to  have  them  presented 
in  their  *  natural  order.  There  is,  then,  a  pro[»erty  or  ['44] 
int^'rest  in  lands  or  other  tliin^rs  coming  within  the 
class  of  realty,  which  is  something  distinct  from  the  title  by 
which  it  is  held,  or  the  mmle  by  which  it  is  acquired.* 


^  See,  a[ion  this  subject,  Maine,  Anc.  L.  290  et  teq. 


74  LAW  OF  REAL  PKOPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

2.  It  is,  in  its  very  nature,  abstract,  being  predicated  alike 
of  what  is  corporeal  and  incorporeal,  and  independent  of  pos- 
session or  actual  enjoynaent.  It  is  capable,  moreover,  of  as- 
suming various  forms  and  of  existing  under  such  different 
relations  as  often  to  give  rise  to  complex  rules  and  subtle  and 
refined  distinctions,  which  it  becomes  the  business  of  a  lawyer 
to  detect  and  explain.^ 

3.  A  man  may  be  the  sole  owner  of  an  acre  of  land  as  his 
absolute  property,  subject  to  his  right  of  using,  abusing,  or 
doing  what  he  will  with  it,  without  any  present  or  future 
right  in  another  to  exercise  any  control  over  it.  Or  he  may 
have  a  right  to  a  temporary  use  and  enjoyment  of  it,  while 
another  may  have  a  right  to  it  after  a  term  of  years  or  after 
the  death  of  some  one.  Or  he  may  simply  have  a  right  to 
have  the  land  and  the  full  possession  and  occupation  thereof 
at  some  future  period,  certain  or  uncertain.  Or  he  may  have 
the  possibility  of  owning  it  and  enjoying  it  if  a  certain  contin- 
gent event  shall  happen  ;  or  he  may  be  liable  to  lose  the  pres- 
ent enjoyment  of  it  if  such  event  occurs,  and  the  like.  And 
these  are  but  a  few  of  the  different  forms  in  which  property 
in  or  ownership  of  what  is  called  realty  may  present  itself  to 
the  mind.^ 

4.  And  this,  it  will  be  readily  perceived,  as  already  remarked, 
is  something  distinct  from  the  title  by  which  such  property  is 
held,  or  the  mode  in  which  it  may  be  acquired.     A  man  may 

1  For  the  doctrine  of  property  in  running  waters, ' see  ^jos<,  vol.  2,  p.  *64  ct  scq. 
Erabrey  v.  Owen,  6  Exch.  353,  368  ;  Mason  v.  Hill,  5  B.  &  Ad.  1,  25  ;  Wood  v. 
Waud,  3  Exch.  748,  775  ;  Washb.  Ease.  207,  213,  307. 

2  Among  the  attempts  to  define  what  this  property  is,  and  in  what  it  consists, 
the  following  may  serve  as  an  example  :  The  civil  code  of  Louisiana,  §  480,  defines 
ownership  {hi  jwoprUti)  to  be  "the  right  by  which  a  thing  belongs  to  some  one 
in  exclu.sion  of  all  other  persons."  In  "West's  Symboliography,  printed  in  1622, 
§  31,  it  is  said,  "An  estate,  status,  dominium,  iJToprictas,  is  that  right  and  power 
whereby  we  have  the  property  or  possession  of  tilings,  that  is,  whereby  we  be 
owners  or  possessors  thereof."  See  Code  Nap.  §  544.  A  writer  in  2  Bench  and 
Bar,  N.  s.  251,  illustrates  the  difference  in  the  habits  and  customs  of  the  Engli.sh 
and  French  in  the  matter  of  holding  lands  in  fee,  and  as  tenants  of  a  landlord,  by 
the  respective  numbers  of  land-owners  in  the  two  countries,  as  given  in  the  census 
of  1861.  In  England  there  were  30,766,  in  France  3,799,759,  who  cultivated  their 
own  land.  There  were  in  France  5,000,000  small  rural  proprietors,  3,000,000  of 
these  owning  about  two  acres  each,  and  2,000,000  about  thirteen  acres;  50,000 
were  proprietors  of  five  hundred  acres  eacli. 


fll.  III.]  ESTATES    IN    FKK-SIMPLB.  75 

be  ro;_Mrik'd  as  the  iilisoluti-  owner  of  a  farm,  l>iit  that  doeK 
not  iiulicate  liow  lie  anjuired  it,  or  what  the  nature  of  his 
title  to  it  is.  lie  may  have  obtained  it  by  a  deed  of  ^'rant 
fn»m  a  former  owner,  by  his  hist  will  and  testament,  or  by 
inheritimr  it  as  his  lu'ir;  or  he  may  have  entered  ui>on  it 
without  any  riirht,and  held  it  long  enough  to  give  him  a  valid 
legal  title  to  it.' 

5.  The  division  of  the  sulijeet  therefore  is  intt),  Ist,  the  na- 
ture and  extent  of  the  i)roj)erty  or  interest  which  one  may 
have  in  lands  or  the  realty;  and  2d,  the  title  by  whieh  that 
property  is  aeipiired  and  held. 

*G.  To  treat  of  the.se  in  their  order,  it  may  be  well,  ['45] 
first,  to  consider  property  in  reference  to  its  durati(jn 
or  extent  as  to  time;  second,  in  reference  to  the  circum- 
stances under  which  it  may  be  held  and  enjoyed,  whether  in 
severalty  or  in  connection  with  others  and  the  like  ;  third,  in 
refei'encc  U)  its  being  al)solute  or  conditional;  f(jurth,  in  refer- 
ence to  its  being  the  sulijeet  of  present  or  future  enjoyment,  of 
possession  or  expectancy  ;  an«l  lastly,  in  icfcrmce  to  its  l)eing 
regarded  as  legal  or  einiitalde  in  its  clua'actcr,  that  is,  fixed 
and  regulated  by  the  rules  of  the  conunon  law  or  by  tho.se  of 
equity. 

7.  The  jiroperty  or  interest  which  one  has  in  lands,  tene- 
ments, or  hereditaments,  is  expressed  by  the  word  eatate. 
And  the  extent  or  degree  of  this  interest  is  indicated  by  the 
terms  by  which  different  estates  arc  designated.  Thus  an 
estate  in  fee-simple  conveys  at  once  the  idea  of  an  interest  of 
an  unlimited  duration,  without  any  words  of  explanation. 
It  is  called  estate,  from  status^  signifying  the  condition  or 
circumstances  in  which  the  owner  stands  with  regard  ti»  his 
property  .2 

8.  In  popular,  and  often  even  legal,  use  of  the  word  estate, 
the  thing  itself,  rather  than  the  interest  in  it,  is  understood. 
"Still,  the  word  in  its  pro])crest  sense,  imjiorts  the  interest."* 

1  Si'C  post,  vol.  2,  p.  •  398. 

»  2  Bl.  Com.  103  ;  Co.  Lit.  345  ft  ;  Hurton,  Heal  Prop.  §  12.  It  i.4  said  by 
Lor<l  Holt,  "  Estato  comes  from  stmulo,  because  it  is  fixed  and  pcmumcot.'' 
Briti^jc water  v.  Boltou,  6  Mwl.  Iu6,  lOD  ;  Co.  Lit.  9  a. 

»  Id. 


76  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  1. 

This  is  so  -where  "  real  estate  "  is  spoken  of.     It  is  used  as 
synonymous  with  lands  and  tenements.^ 

9.  The  first  division  of  estates  is  into  those  of  freehold  and 
those  less  than  freehold,  which  was  partially  considered  in 
connection  with  the  subject  of  tenure. 

10.  These  estates  of  freehold  are  again  divided  into  those 
of  inheritance  and  those  not  of  inheritance.  All  estates  of 
inheritance  in  tenements  are  freehold,  but  the  converse  of  the 
proposition  is  not  true,  since  freeholds  embrace  estates  for 
life  and  those  of  indefinite  duration,  which  may  endure  for  a 
life.  And  now,  in  ordinary  use,  without  explanatory  words, 
the  term  "  freehold "  would  be  understood  as  denoting  an 
estate  for  life  as  distinguished  from  an  estate  of  inheritance, 

or  one  that  goes  to  the  owner's  heirs  at  his  death.^ 
[*46]       *11.  Estates  less   than  of  freehold,  such  as  estates 

for  years,  are  called  chattel  interests  or  estates  ;  if  they 
continue  for  a  longer  period  than  the  life  of  the  tenant,  they 
go  like  chattels  to  his  personal  representatives,  his  executor 
or  administrator.^ 

12.  A  freehold  answers  to  the  liherum  tenementum  or  frank 
tenement  of  Bracton  and  the  early  writers  upon  the  law,  which 
implied  an  estate  which  could  be  created  only  by  livery  of 
seisin,*  and  one  which  a  freeman  might  consistently  hold  in 
reference  to  its  tenure,  and,  of  course,  excluded  all  lands  held 
in  villeinage,  even  though  held  for  the  term  of  a  life.^  The 
term,  moreover,  is  used  in  two  senses ;  first,  as  indicating  the 
quantity  of  interest,  and  second,  the  quality  of  the  tenure.^ 

13.  And  although  no  estate  of  freehold  could  be  created 
without  livery  of  seisin,  and  of  which  livery  might  be  predi- 
cated, including  reversionary  interests  as  well  as  those  in  pos- 
session,^ and  though  under  the  feudal  law  a  freeholder  was 
one  of  the  pares  curice,  and  at  common  law  might  be  a  juror, 

1  Carpenter  v.  Millard,  38  Vt.  9,  16  ;  a^ite,  p.  *  3  ;  Johnson  v.  Eicliardson,  33 
Miss.  462. 

2  Co.  Lit.  266  b,  n.  217  ;  1  Law  Mag.  551  ;  Burton,  Real  Prop.  §  17  ;  1  Prest. 
Est.  203. 

8  Burton,  Real  Prop.  §  1  ;  1  Prest.  Est.  203. 

*  2  Bl.  Com.  104  ;  1  Prest.  Est.  209. 

5  1  Prest.  Est.  209  ;  Id.  213  ;  Wms.  Real  Prop.  22. 

«  2  Woodd.  Lect.  5.  ^  2  Prest.  Abs.  282  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  104. 


(11.  III.]  E.ST.\TES   IN    FEE-.«;iMPLR.  77 

1111(1  ill  the  c'lul  hccomc  oiititk-d  to  v((t(.'  Un-  incnilxTs  (jf  Parliu- 
iiKMit  for  the  comity;'  yet,  in  view  of  the  doctrine  of  uses 
liavintr  (lone  away  with  actual  livery  of  seisin,  the  proper 
delinitiiin  of  the  term  seems  to  he  "  an  estate  of  inheritance  or 
for  life  in  real  properly,  whether  it  he  a  corporeal  or  ine«»rpo. 
real  hereditament."  ^ 

14.  Yet,  when  speaking  of  an  estate  in  reversion,  ihoiij.^ii  it 
is  what  is  called  a  vested  one,  the  owner  is  said  to  he  entitled 
to,  aiiij  not  to  he  seised  of  such  estate,^  unless  it  he  exj)ectant 
upon  a  term  of  years,  in  which  case  the  j)ossessi»jn  of  the  ter- 
mor is  the  possession  of  the  reversioner  or  remainder-man, 
who  has  the  seisin  accordingly.* 

lo.  There  may  be  a  seisin  of  a  reversion  or  remain- 
der *  expectant  upon  a  freehold  estate,  in  the  manner    [*  47] 
and  for  the  reasons  explained  in  the  previous  chapter.^ 

V).  It  will  be  suflicicnt  to  repeat  that,  for  reasons  which 
must  be  obvious  from  what  has  gone  before,  a  first  and  im- 
mediate estate  of  freehold  cannot  be  put  in  aheyaiv:e^  by  the 
act  of  the  owner,  that  is,  waiting  for  any  event,  however  near, 
or  the  lai)se  of  time,  however  short.^  This  embraces  the  prop- 
osition that  a  freehold  caniujt  be  created  by  deed  to  commence 
in  future.  And  among  the  illustrations  that  might  serve  to 
explain  this,  would  be  a  conveyance  of  a  freehold  to  a  person 
unborn  or  unascertained.  It  would  be  void.'  But  this  does 
not  apply  to  cases  of  remainders,  or  estates  in  reversion.  A 
reversion  is  of  course  an  estate  in  expectancy,  after  the  ex- 
piration of  an  intermediate  estate,  and  a  remainder  is  not  only 
an  estate  in  expectancy,  but  it  may  be  ever  so  contingent  and 
uncertain,  and  be  good,  if,  until  the  contingency  is  determined 
so  as  to  have  it  vest  or  fail  altogether,  there  be  an  intermediate 
estate  of  freehold  in  some  third  person.^  And  where  one 
holding  a  freehold  in  reversion  conveys  it  in  terms,  from  the 
expiration  of  the  intermediate  estate,  courts  will  construe  it  a 

1  Prcst.  Est.  207. 

'■'  Bl.  Cora.  104,  Christinii's  note  ;  1  Law  Mng.  555. 

'  2  Cruise,  Dig.  330.    But  quaere,  see  Plowd.  191  :  "A  mnn  may  say  of  a  re- 
version dependent  upon  nn  estate  for  life,  that  he  was  Rcised  a.s  of  ffo." 
*  Co.  Lit.  15  a;  Plowd.  191.  "  Plo\v,l,  191  ;  4  Kent,  eom.  8S6. 

«  1  Prest.  Est.  216  ;  Id.  250.  ^  1  Preat  Est.  220. 

«  1  Atk.  Conv.  IL 


78  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

present  conTeyance  of  a  present  freehold,  the  enjoyment  of 
which  is  postponed  till  the  expiration  of  the  prior  estate.^ 

17.  So  a  freehold  must  be  continuous.  If  limited  ^  to  A 
every  Monday,  B  every  Tuesday,  and  so  on,  it  would  be  void. 
And  one  reason  for  this,  among  others,  is,  that  there  could  be 
no  tenant  to  the  prcecipe  as  heretofore  explained  ^  to  answer 
to  and  defend  suits  for  the  recovery  of  the  land ;  tlie  party 
proper  to  be  sued  to-day  would  cease  to  be  the  one  to  defend 

to-morrow.* 
[*48]  *  18.  The  abeyance  into  which  a  glebe  or  parson- 
age land  is  put  by  the  death  of  the  incumbent  is  deemed 
to  be  an  act  of  the  law,  and  the  freehold,  though  suspended 
during  a  vacancy  in  the  office,  revives  in  favor  of  his  suc- 
cessor.^ 

19.  But  a  freehold  cannot  be  put  in  abeyance  by  the  act  of 
the  party,  for  reasons  stated  in  a  former  chapter.^ 

20.  It  was  a  part  of  the  freeholder's  duty  at  common  law, 
as  more  than  once  expressed,  to  defend  the  estate  against 
claims  which  a  stranger  might  make  upon  it.  And  if  a 
tenant  of  a  less  estate  than  a  freehold  was  disturbed  by  one 
claiming  the  land,  he  depended  upon  him  who  had  the  imme- 
diate freehold  to  protect  and  maintain  his  interest,  and  might, 
to  this  end,  "  pray  the  aid  "  of  him  who  had  the  title,  to  de- 
fend suits  brought  to  recover  the  land.  So  where  the  tenant, 
of  whom  the  inlieritance  was  demanded,  was  himself  a  mere 
freeholder,  he  had  a  right  to  pray  aid  from  the  reversioner  or 
remainder-man,  and  bring  him  forward  to  defend  the  title.^ 
As  the  prcecipe  was  a  process  to  recover  a  freehold,  no  one 
having  a  less  estate  could  defend  against  it,  and  therefore 
none  other  could,  in  the  language  of  the  law,  be  "  tenant  to 

1  1  Law  Hag.  555,  cites  Weale  v.  Lower,  Pollexf.  66  ;  1  Prest.  Est.  225. 

2  This  tei-m  has  a  technical  meaning,  iniplying  not  only  the  conveying  of 
lands,  but  the  fixing  of  the  limits  or  extent  of  the  interest  conveyed,  as  limiting 
lands  to  A  B  for  life,  and  the  like. 

*  Ante  p.  »39. 

<  1  Prest.  Est.  218  ;  Id.  252,  253  ;  1  Law  Mag.  561. 

6  1  Prest.  Est.  217  ;  Terrett  v.  Taylor,  9  Cranch,  43,  47  ;  "Weston  v.  Hunt,  2 
Mass.  500. 

6  Ante,  p.  »39  ;  1  Prest.  Est.  216  ;  1  Law  Mag.  557. 
^  1  Prest.  Est.  207. 


en.  lll."j  ESTATES    IN    FEE-SI.MPLK.  79 

the  pnTiripe."'' ^  "  Tlic  l:i\v  will  rnther  ^rivc  llic  laml  t<j  lliu 
first  comer,  wliicli  we  call  an  occupant,  than  want  a  tenant  to 
a  ileniandant's  action."^ 

21.  The  tenant  for  life  was  entrusted  with  the  protection 
of  the  possession  for  the  benefit  of  the  reniainder-nian  in  fee. 
And  a  judirment  against  him  on  demand  of  right  and  inherit- 
ance was.  in  elTect,  a  judgment  against  him  in  reversion  or 
reniaintler,  and  tt)ok  away  the  seisin  from  them,  rendering  it 
necessary  that  they  should  hecome  demandants  instead  of 
being  defendants  of  the  right. ^ 

•22.  As  to  who  may  be  freeholders,  there  is  no  exception  in 
this  country,  beyond  the  disaliility  in  some  States  arising 
from  alienage.  By  the  common  law,  the  cliief  diflieulty,  in 
this  respect,  is  in  acquiring  title  rather  than  in  holding  the 
estate  when  acquired.  Thus  an  alien  may  purchase  lands  and 
hold  them  against  all  the  world  but  the  State.  Nor  can  he  be 
divested  of  his  estate,  even  by  the  State,  until  after  a  formal 
proceeding  called  "  office  found  ; "  and,  until  that  is 
done,  may  *  sell  and  convey  or  devise  the  lands,  and  [*40] 
pass  a  good  title  to  the  same* 

23.  But  an  alien  cannot  take  lands  by  descent,  nor  transmit 
tliem  to  others  as  his  heirs  by  the  common  law.^ 

24.  And  in  Massachusetts,  upon  the  death  of  an  alien  intes- 
tate, his  lands  formerly  vested  at  once  in  the  Commonwealth 
without  office  found.^ 

2').  But  if  the  alien  purchase  of  the  State,  with  cove- 
nants of  warranty,  the  latter  cannot  claim  the  land  of  the 
alien  nor  of  his  heirs."      But  the  disability  of  alienage  is 

»  1  Prest.  Est.  206-208  ;  Stearns,  Real  Act.  100-102;  Tennesde  la  Ley,  "Aid." 
See  post,  p.  •95. 

2  1  Bacon's  Tracts,  331. 

*  1  Prest.  Est.  207  ;  1  Atk.  Conv.  11. 

*  Montgomery  v.  Dorion,  7  N.  H.  475  ;  Orr  r.  Hodgson,  4  Wheat.  453  ;  Fox 
V.  Southack,  12  Mass.  143  ;  Mooers  v.  White,  6  Johns,  Ch.  860,  365  ;  Wuis.  Keal 
Prop.  53  ;  1  U.  S.  Dig.  "  Alien,"  §§  62,  63,  66. 

*  Orr  t?.  Hodgson,  4  Wheat.  453  ;  Mooers  \\  White,  uhi  ntpra,  where  it  is  said 
"the  law  qua  nihil  fr\atrn  never  casts  the  freehold  upon  an  alien  heir  who 
cannot  keep  it."  Jackson  r.  I.unn,  3  Johns.  Ca*.  109;  1  U.  S.  Dig.  "Alien," 
5  61  ;  Doe  i-.  Lazenby,  1  Smith  (InJ.),  203. 

«  Slater  v.  Noson,  15  Pick.  345. 

T  Comm'th  v.  Andre,  8  Pick.  224  ;  Goodell  ».  Jackson,  20  Johns.  6P8,  707. 


80  LAW  OF  REAL  PEOPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

removed,    in    whole    or    in   part,   in    most    of    the    United 
States.i 

^  Connecticut,  aliens,  if  resident,  maj-  purchase,  hold,  inherit,  and  transmit  as 
native-born  citizens.  Gen.  St.  1866,  p.  537.  —  In  Delaware,  aliens  may  take  by 
purchase  if  they  have  declared  their  intention  to  become  citizens,  and  by  descent 
if  residents  in  the  United  States  at  the  death  of  intestate.  Eev.  Code,  1852, 
c.  81,  §  1.  — Alabama,  Code,  1867,  §  1896.  — Arkansas,  substantially  the  same 
as  Delaware.  Rev.  St.  c.  7,  §  1.  —  California,  aliens  may  take  and  hold  estates 
as  citizens,  if  residents  ;  if  not,  they  may  inherit  if  they  come  and  claim  within 
five  years  after  the  inheritance  falls  to  the  heir.  Const,  art.  1,  §  17,  Act  1856, 
c.  116.  —  Florida,  they  may  purchase,  hold,  enjoy,  sell,  or  devise  lands  as  citizens. 
Thompson's  Dig.  2  Divis.  tit.  2,  c.  1,  §  3.  —  Georgia,  they  may  purchase  and 
convey  lands  if  they  have  given  their  declaration  of  intention  to  become  citizens. 
Code,  1873,  p.  465.  The  acts  of  1866  provide  that  aliens  may  own  and  convey 
lands.  —  Illinois,  widows  of  aliens  are  entitled  to  dower.  Rev.  Stat.  1856,  c.  34, 
§  2.  And  aliens  may  take,  transmit,  and  devise,  in  all  respects,  as  native-bom 
citizens.  Rev.  Stat.  1874,  p.  136. — Iowa,  all  disability  is  removed.  Const,  art. 
1,  §  22.  —  Kentucky,  aliens,  not  enemies,  may  recover,  inherit,  hold,  or  pass  by 
descent,  devise,  or  otherwise,  after  they  have  declared  their  intention  of  becoming 
citizens.  Gen.  Stat.  1873,  191.  —  Maine,  they  may  take,  hold,  convey,  or  de\'ise. 
Rev.  Stat.  1857,  c.  73,  §  2. — Maryland,  disabilities  removed  by  Stat.  1859. 
Code,  vol.  1,  art.  4,  §  1,  &c,  —  Michigan,  there  is  no  disability.  Rev.  Stat.  1846, 
c.  66,  §  35.  —  Mississippi,  the  same  as  to  aliens  resident  in  the  State.  Rev.  Code, 
1857,  c.  36,  §  9,  art.  65.  —  Missouri,  the  same  as  to  aliens  resident  in  the  State. 
As  to  aliens  resident  in  the  United  States  the  same  rule  applies  if  they  have 
declared  their  intention  to  become  citizens  and  taken  the  requisite  oath.  Gen. 
Stat.  1866,  c.  448,  §§  1,  2. — New  Hampshire,  resident  aliens  may  take,  pur- 
chase, hold,  convey,  or  devise  real  estate.  Gen.  Stat.  1867  c.  121,  §  16.  — New 
Jersey,  aliens  may  purchase,  hold,  and  convey  real  estate.  Rev.  Stat.  1847,  c.  1, 
§  1.  —  Neiv  York,  aliens  who  have  taken  incipient  steps  to  becoming  citizens, 
may  be  enabled  to  take  and  hold  lands  to  him  and  his  heirs  and  assigns,  and  if  he 
make  oath  in  prescribed  form,  may  within  six  years  thereafter,  sell,  assign,  or 
devise  it.  1  Stat,  at  Large,  668.  Heirs  and  widows  of  aliens  may  take  by  descent 
and  dower.  4  Do.  301. — North  Ca.rolina,  aliens  may  take  and  hold  lands  as 
citizens.  Gen.  Stat.  1873,  p.  78.  —  Ohio,  all  disability  removed.  Rev.  Stat. 
1854,  c.  3,  §  \.  —  Massachusetts,  the  same.  Pub.  Stat.  c.  126,  §  1. — Penn- 
sylvania, the  same.  Dunlop's  Laws,  p.  173. — Rhode  Island,  aliens  may  hold 
and  dispose  of  real  estate.  Gen.  Stat.  1872,  p.  348.  —  South  Carolina,  aliens 
may  hold,  convey,  or  devise  lands  if  they  have  declared  their  intention  of  becom- 
ing citizens.  Stat.  vol.  5.  p.  547.  —  Tennessee,  they  may,  if  residents,  acquire 
and  hold  real  estate  by  descent  or  purchase,  if  they  have  declared,  or  shall  within 
one  year  afterwards  declare,  their  intention  of  becoming  citizens.  Carruthers 
&  Nicholson's  Dig.  1836,  p.  87.  c.  36.  —  Texas,  all  disability  removed  if  a  resident, 
and  he  has  made  declaration  of  bis  intention  to  become  a  citizen.  Stat.  1854,  c.  70, 
§  2.  —  Vermont,  every  person  of  good  character  who  comes  to  settle  in  the  State 
may  take  and  hold  lands.  Constitution,  §  39.  —  Virginia,  aliens  may  hold  lands 
who  have  made  oath  of  intent  to  continue  to  reside  in  the  State,  if  a  resident. 
Code,  1860,  p.  557.  —  IVisc&nsin,  all  disabilities  removed.     Rev.  Stat.  1849,  c.  62, 


CU.  III.]  ESTATES   IN    FEE-SIMPLE.  81 

•20.  At  comiuon  law,  corjMjratioiis  ini^lit  lake  and   [••'>0] 
hold  and  diKpusc  of  real  estate  for  any  imrjioses  not 
inconsistent  with  those  for  which  they  were  created.' 

27.  In  Knirland,  from  the  time  of  the  Mairna  Charta,  (!or- 
I»oratiiins  have  been  restrained  from  holdiiiir  lands  by  what 
are  called  statutes  aj^ainst  mortmain,  or  holdinj^  in  dead  hands. 
But  these  seem  not  to  have  been  iidojitcd  in  any  of  the  United 
Statt's  except  Pennsylvania,  where  no  corpoiation  may  liold 
lands  unless  specially  authorized  by  act  of  the  lep.slature.* 
This  power  to  hold  land,  it  .seems,  may  belong  to  corporati<jns 
created  l»y  States  other  than  where  the  lands  are  situate,  un- 
less the  laws  of  the  latter  State  restrain  it.^ 

28.  Corporations  in  this  country  are  generally  limited  in  the 
acts  creating  them  as  to  the  value  or  amount  of  real  estate 
they  may  hold.  And  the  (juestion  has  been  made  as  to  the 
effect  of  their  holding  a  larger  amount  than  that  prescribed. 
The  rule  seems  to  be  this  :  If  the  jirojicrty,  when  jiurchased, 
does  not  exceed  the  sum  limited,  their  title  to  it  cannot 

be  *  affected  i)y  its  rising  in  \aluc  to  a  greater  amount  [*ol] 
than  that ;  if  of  greater  vahu'  at  first,  nobody  can  dis- 
turb their  title  to  it  excejtt  the  State.'* 

29.  Different  writers  upon  tlie  suliji-et  have  adoj)ted  different 
orders  of  arrangement  in  treating  of  estates.  Ihit  as  st-em- 
ingly  the  UKJst  natural  one,  it  is  proposed  to  consider  first  that 
out  of  which  the  others  arc  derived  or  carved,^  and  then  to 
treat  of  these  in  their  order  of  importance  as  measured  by 
quantity  or  duration. 

30.  Adopting  this  order,  the  first  of  these  is  an  estate  in 
fee-simple. 

31.  Fee,  as  is  originally  used,  signified  land  holden  of  some 

§  35.  Also  in  Nebraska,  Rev.  Stat.  1866,  p.  292.  And  in  Dnh^a,  Civ.  (\>.l.., 
1866.  So  in  Nemtda,  Laws,  1867.  —  West  Virginia,  aliens  who  hnvo  niado 
oath  of  intent  to  become  citizens  may  holil  real  estate.     Code,  1868,  p.  458. 

»  Sutton  I'ari.sh  v.  Cole,  3  Pick.  232,  239  ;  Ang.  k  Anii-s,  Coq..  ch.  v.  §  1  ; 
Warden  v.  S,  E.  IJailway,  21  L.  J.  x.  8.  Ch.  8S6. 

'  Ang.  &  Anus,  Corp.  ch.  v.  §  1  ;  2  Kent,  Com.  282.  283,  and  note  ;  Ijithrop 
r.  Com.  Bank,  8  Dann,  119.  The  English  statute  of  mortmain  (9  Ceo.  II.  c.  26) 
did  not  extend  to  Ma.<i.sacLu8etts.     Jackson  r.  Phillips,  14  Allen.  539,  591. 

'  Ang.  &  Ames,  Corp.  ch.  v.  §  1  ;  Thomi>son  v.  Waters,  25  Mi.h.  214. 

«  liognnlus  V.  Trinity  Church,  4  Sand.  Ch.  633,  757.  '  1  Treat.  E«L  424. 

VOL.  I.  — 6 


82  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  L 

one  as  distinguished  from  allodial  lands,  fee  and  feud  being 
synonymous  terms.  But  now  it  is  ordinarily  used  to  denote 
the  quantity  of  estate  in  land,  and  is  confined  to  estates  of  in- 
heritance, or  those  which  may  descend  to  heirs.  So  that  fee 
may  he  considered  as  in  itself  implying  an  inheritance.^ 

32.  When  the  term  "  simjyle  "  is  applied,  it  means  no  more 
than  fee  when  standing  by  itself,  as  understood  in  respect  to 
modern  estates.  But  it  excludes  all  qualification  or  restric- 
tion as  to  the  persons  who  may  inherit  it  as  heirs,  to  distin- 
guish it  from  a  fee-tail,  which,  though  an  inheritable  one, 
will  descend  only  to  certain  classes  of  heirs,  as  well  as  from 
an  estate  which,  though  inheritable,  is  subject  to  condition  or 
collateral  determination.^ 

33.  A  fee-simple,  therefore,  is  the  largest  possible  estate 
which  a  man  can  have  in  lands,  being  an  absolute  estate  in 
perpetuity.  It  is  where  lands  are  given  to  a  man  and  to  his 
heirs  absolutely,  without  any  end  or  limitation  put  to  the 
estate.^  And  a  fee-simple  absolute  simply  means  a  "  fee- 
simple."  The  word  "  absolute  "  adds  nothing  to  its  meaning 
or  effect.* 

34.  It  gives  him  the  fvillest  power  of  disposing  of 
[*52]  the  estate,  *  and,  if  he  fails  to  do  this,  it  descends  to 
such  of  his  kindled,  however  remote,  as  the  law  marks 
out  as  his  heir.^ 

35.  It  is  not  necessary,  however,  that  the  estate  should  be 
absolutely  indefeasible,  if,  until  it  is  defeated,  it  is  subject  to 
unlimited  alienation  and  descent,  as  would  be  the  case  with 
lands  acquired  and  held  by  disseisin.  The  disseisor,  so  long 
as  he  holds,  has  in  law  a  fee-simple  estate,  though  liable  to 
be  defeated  by  the  rightful  owner  recovering  his  seisin,^  and 

1  Co.  Lit.  1  a,  n.  ;  Termes  de  la  Ley,  "  Fee  ; "  Wright  Ten.  149  ;  Lit.  §  1  ;  2 
Bl.  Com.  106. 

2  Wright,  Ten.  146  ;  Co.  Lit.  1  b  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  106  ;  1  Brest.  Est.  420  ;  Lit. 
§293, 

8  2  Bl.  Com.  106  ;  Plowd.  557  ;  1  Brest.  Est.  425  ;  Lit.  §  1  ;  Atkinson 
Conv.  183. 

4  Clark  V.  Baker,  14  Cal.  612,  631. 

6  Burton,  Eeal  Prop,  §  14  ;  1  Atkinson,  Conv.  179,  183  ;  Currier  v.  Gale,  9 
Allen,  522. 

«  1  Prest.  Est.  426, 


Ill    111.]  R'^TATKS   IN    FEK-SIMPLE.  88 

OHO   rcnsoii    is,  iIktc  ciiimut   Itc  twu   fcH-.s-sinijilf  in  'Ih-   -   h  • 
luml.' 

30.  So  an  estate  is  p-nerally  called  a  fee-simple,  liiiiuv:li  it 
may  l>o  jrranteii  on  condition,  liable  to  be  defeated  on  the 
happening  of  some  futnre  event.  I'ntil  that  iia])i»ens,  and 
until  the  grantor  or  his  heirs  or  devisees  enter  an<l  put  an  end 
to  the  estate,  it  luis  all  the  (puilities  of  a  fee-simple,  'i'his  is 
also  true  in  respect  to  an  estate  which  is  subject  to  be  de- 
feated l>y  something  collateral  to  it  which  may  never  ha)>pen, 
but  if  it  happens,  the  estate  is  at  an  eml  ;  whi(di,  as  will  be 
seen,  is  regard«'<l  as  a  base  fee  as  distinguished  from  a  tetdmi- 
cal  fee-simple,  as  if,  for  instance,  the  grant  Ijc  to  one  and  his 
heirs  till  A  returns  from  Rome.- 

37.  One  (jf  the  most  important  incidents  to  a  fee-simple  is 
the  rigiit  of  free  ami  unlimitecj  alienation.*' 

3S.  This  right  of  alienation  seems  to  have  been  gradually 
ac([uired,  feuils  for  some  time  after  the  Conquest  being  inalien- 
able. When  first  allowed,  it  could  only  be  done  by  con.sent  of 
the  lord,  hjr  which  a  fine  had  to  be  paid.* 

30.  And  when  feuds  were  first  granted  to  a  man  and  his 
heirs,  the  heirs  were   considered  as   having  been   in- 
cluded as  donees  *  of   the  estate,  and  the  feudatory  [*o3] 
could   not  alien  the  land  without  con.scnt  of  the  heir 

'  Id.  423.  The  relation  of  the  dissc-i.sor  to  the  estate,  so  far  as  the  di&scisee 
is  concenied,  is  this  :  The  dis-seisee  may  have  an  action  of  trespass  against  the 
disseisor  for  the  act  of  entry,  but  after  the  dis-seisin  made,  he  cannot  recover  for 
the  mesne  profits,  since  they  follow  possession,  until  the  disseisee  regains  his 
possession  by  entry,  when  the  disseisor  becomes  a  trespasser  ab  initio,  and  liable 
in  trespass  for  the  mesne  profits.  CiiUtcrt,  Ten.  41  ;  2  Holle,  Ab.  553,  554  ; 
Bigelow  r.  Jones,  10  Pick.  1(U  ;  AbUtt  i'.  Al.lwtt,  51  Me.  575,  579  ;  Allen  r. 
Thayer,  17  Mass.  2l»9  ;  Lehmiin  v.  Killerman,  65  Penn.  St.  489. 

*  1  Cniise  Dig.  55  ;  1  I'rest.  Kst.  431.  Though  the  term  frf-ximpk  is  applied 
in  the  munner  aliove  stated,  and  Coke  divides  it  into  fee-simple  absolute,  fee- 
simple  conditional,  and  fee-simple  qualified  or  ba.se  fee,  yet  in  jwint  of  accu- 
racy it  cannot  Ih'  pro|>erly  a  fee-simple  if  it  ia  eitlier  base,  conditional,  or  (]ualifie<L 
It  is  also  often  used  by  way  of  c«intnist  with  fee-tail.  The  reader  may  thertfore 
have  to  refer  to  the  context  in  onler  to  determine,  in  some  cases,  in  whiih  of 
these  senses  the  t4>rm  may  be  used  in  the  following  pages.  Vide  1  Prest.  Kst. 
42'),  431  ;  Co.  Lit.  1  b.  and  note. 

*  Lit.  §  360  ;  1  Prest.  HsL  430.  .Se  IS  Am.  Uw  Keg.  393,  as  to  what  re- 
stniints  may  be  enforced  ui>oii  the  alirnation  of  estates, 

*  1  Spence,  E<i.  Jiir,  137  ;  Wright,  Ten.  167  ;  1.  W.  Bl.  134  ;  Main©,  Anc 
L.  230. 


84  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  1, 

presumptive.!  The  "  Mirror "  (p.  11)  gives  an  ordinance  of 
one  of  the  early  kings,  whereby  "  socage  lands  should  be  part- 
able  among  the  heir's  rights,  and  that  none  might  alien  but  a 
fourth  part  of  his  inheritance  without  the  consent  of  his  heir, 
and  that  none  might  alien  his  lands  by  purchase  from  his 
heirs,  if  assigns  were  not  specified  in  the  deeds." 

40.  The  right  of  defeating  the  expectation  of  collateral 
heirs  by  alienation  had  been  acquired  as  early  as  the  time  of 
Henry  I.  so  far  as  it  related  to  estates  obtained  by  purchase. 
In  the  time  of  Henry  II.  this  right  was  extended  to  a  reason- 
able part  of  his  family  inheritance,  though  he  could  not  disin- 
herit his  oldest  son.^  Bacon  says  that,  "  in  Glanville's  time 
(Henry  II.  1154-1190)  the  ancestor  could  not  disinherit  his 
heir  by  grant  or  other  act  executed  in  time  of  sickness,  neither 
could  he  alien  land  that  had  descended  to  him,  except  it  were 
for  a  consideration  of  money  or  service,  but  not  to  advance 
any  younger  brother  without  the  consent  of  the  heir."  ^ 

41.  In  the  reign  of  Henry  III.  (1216-12T2),  the  right  to 
alien  had  so  far  obtained  a  hold  upon  this  kind  of  estate,  that 
an  ancestor  might  convey  the  lands  in  his  possession,  and 
thereby  cut  off  his  heirs,  whether  of  his  body  or  collateral, 
and  this,  whether  he  held  them  to  him  and  his  heirs  or  to 
him  and  the  heirs  of  his  body.^ 

42.  And  although  the  custom  of  subinfeudation  had  be- 
come general  before  the  time  of  Magna  Charta  (1215),  lands 
were  not  freely  alienable  until  the  time  of  Edward  I.,  when, 
by  the  statute  Quia  Umptores,  the  18th  of  that  reign  (1290), 
ch.  1,  every  free  man  was  at  liberty  to  sell  his  lands,  or  any 
part  of  them,  though  the  Magna  Charta  itself  incidentally 
recoo-nized  it  as  an  existing  right.     But  until  the  statute  of 


1  !  Spence,  Eq.  Jur.  137  ;  Wright,  Ten.  167  ;  1  W.  Bl.  134.  Mr.  Thrupp,  in 
his  historical  Law  Tracts,  informs  us,  that  after  the  arrival  of  the  Normans  in 
England,  there  existed  amongst  them  two  kinds  of  estates,  one  of  which  they 
were  forbidden  to  part  with  without  consent  of  their  relatives,  answering  to  the 
family  estate  among  the  Jews.  The  other  were  alienable  at  pleasure,  provided  the 
owner,  by  so  doing,  did  not  thereby  leave  his  children  destitute.  The  last  were 
known  as  "  acquired  "  or  earned  estates,  p.  226. 

2  1  Spence,  E(].  Jur.  138  ;  Wms.  Real  Prop.  33,  and  note. 
»  Bacon's  Tracts,  328. 

*  Wms.  Eeal  Prop.  35  ;  Bracton,  b.  2,  c.  6,  fol.  17  a. 


CII.  III.]  ESTATES    IN    ri:E-SIMPLE.  R") 

18  Eilwnnl  1.,  Ilaciii  says,  "  tljo  lord  was  not  forced  tu 
destrucl  or  disincnilM'r  his  scignioiT  or  service"  ' 

4^5.  Now  the  rii^lit  of  dis|iosiij<r  in  fcc-siiiipir  liy  act  Intir 
rirus  is  the  iiU(lis|iut<'d  privilc^'c  of  every  tenant  of  such  an 
estate.  Ill  the  laii^ua^re  of  Lord  Coke,  "All  his  heirs  arc  so 
totally  ill  hiiu,  he  may  ^'ivc  the  lands  to  whom  he  will." 2 

*  1 1.  This  l)rief  history  is  hut  one  of  the  many  illus-  [•54] 
trations  which  the  chanp'S  in  the  law  afl'ord,  of  how 

the  wants  of  a  community  supply  sometimes  by  statute,  hut 
oftener  Ity  the  irrcsistihle  force  of  public  sentiment  in  th«' 
form  of  unwritten  law,  the  moans  of  overcoming  rules  and  in- 
stitutions incompatible  with  the.sc  wants.  The  growing  spirit 
of  trade  and  commerce,  though  feeble  at  that  day  in  com- 
parison with  the  days  of  Holt  ami  Mansfield,  who  were 
respectively  chief  justices  of  the  King's  Bench  in  1<)89  and 
from  1T<!()  to  1787,  broke  through  the  iron  bonds  in  which 
the  real  estate  of  the  kingilom  had  l»een  locked  uj»,  and  made 
it  liable  for  the  debts  of  its  owners,^  and  the  suliject  of  trade 
and  exchange. 

4o.  Though  it  is  true,  as  already  stated,  that  the  power  of 
free  alienation  is  incident  to  an  estate  in  fee-sim|ile,  and  a 
condition  altogether  preventing  alienation,  in  a  grant  of  lands 
or  devise  of  the  same  in  fee-simple,  would  be  void,  as  beimr 
repugnant  to  the  estate  ;*  yet,  if  it  be  only  to  a  limited  extent, 
as  to  A  B  and  the  like,  or  for  a  certain  time,  jirovided  it  be 
a  reasonable  time,  the  condition  may  be  a  valid  one.  and  the 
grantee  may  forfeit  his  estate  by  violating  it.""  A  devise  to 
one  in  fee,  but  restricting  him  from  aliening  it  in  any  wav 
until  the  devisee  should  arrive  at  the  age  of  thirty-five,  was 
held  to  be  a  valid  restriction.^  But  "no  one  can  create  what 
is  in  the  intendment  of  the  law  an  estate  in  fee,  and  deprive 
the  tenant  of  those  essential  rights  and  privileges  which  the 

1  Wnis.  Kent  Prop.  56  ;  Bacon's  Tracts,  330.  «  Co.  Lit.  43  b. 

J  3tl  .Stilt.  Edw.  E,  Dc  Mcrcatoribu.s,  A.  D.  12S5. 

*  Lit.  §  360  ;  1  Prcst.  Est.  477  ;  Blackstoiip  Hk.  v.  Davis.  21  Tick.  42  ;  Bra-l- 
liy  r.  PL-ixoto,  3  Ves.  324  ;  Tud.  Cns.  794  ;  Hall  r.  Tufts,  18  Pick.  455. 

'  Lit.  §  361  ;  1  Prest.  Est.  478  ;  Tiul.  Cns.  71*4,  795  ;  McWiHiains  r.  Nisly.  2 
S.  &  H.  507.  513.  See  Largo's  Case,  2  Leon.  82.  Kc  Macleay,  L.  K.  20  1ca\.  186,  189. 
See  piist,  "447  <•/  scq. 

«  Stewart  v.  Brady,  3  Bush,  623.    But  see  Mandlebauni  v.  McDonell,  27  Mich.  73. 


86  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

law  annexes  to  it.     He  cannot  make  a  new  estate  unknown 
to  the  law.^ 

46.  So,  in  a  devise  to  A  B  and  his  heirs,  there  may  be  a 
limitation  that  if  he  fails  to  convey  it  in  his  lifetime,  it  shall 
go  over  to  another  devisee  named,  and  the  limitation  be  a 
valid  one.2 

47.  But  a  condition  restricting  the  right  to  alien  to  a  single 
person  only  will  be  void  as  repugnant,  since  the  person  so 
selected  by  grantor  or  devisor  might  be  one  of  known  inca- 
pacity to  purchase.  And,  in  short,  conditions  as  to  time 
when,   and   persons  to  whom,  alienations  cannot   be   made, 

must  be  reasonable  in  order  to  their  being  valid.^ 
[*55]       *48.  The  power  of  devising  lands  by  will  is  of  a  much 

later  origin  than  of  conveying  them  by  deed,  except  in 
certain  localities  in  England.  The  only  mode  in  which  it 
could  be  done  prior  to  the  statute  of  Henry  VHI.,  hereafter 
mentioned,  was  by  means  of  uses.  One  way  of  doing  this 
was  by  conveying  them  to  some  one  to  hold  to  such  uses  as 
the  grantor  should  declare  by  his  last  will.  And  when  he 
had  made  such  declaration,  it  operated,  by  the  interposition 
of  chancery,  to  give  the  beneficial  interest  in  the  lands  to 
such  devisee.^ 

49.  In  the  words  of  Lord  Bacon,  "  Lands  by  the  common 
law  of  England  were  not  testamentary  or  devisable ; "  ^  and 
one  reason  for  this  was,  that  the  alienation  by  will  could  not 
be  consimimated  by  livery  of  seisin  by  devisor  to  devisee.^ 

50.  As  the  statute  27  Henry  VIIL  united  the  seisin  and 
the  use  in  the  one  who  was  entitled  to  the  use,  its  effect  was 
to  defeat  the  customary  mode  of  making  devises  by  the  way 
of  use.     And  there  was  no  way  of  disposing  of  lands  by  will 

1  Doebler's  Appeal,  64  Penii.  St.  917. 

2  Doe  V.  Glover,  1  C.  B.  448.  But  see  Ide  v.  Ide,  5  Mass.  500  ;  and  j^ost,  vol. 
2,  p.  *374,  where  this  subject  is  more  fully  considered. 

8  Attwater  v.  Attwater,  18  Beav.  330,  overruling  Doe  v.  Pearson,  6  East,  173  ; 
1  Prest.  Est.  478.  The  reader  will  observe  that  the  conditions  and  restrictions 
above  referred  to  are  of  a  distinct  class  from  those  which  affect  the  mode  or  pur- 
poses of  occupation  of  estates,  which  belong  to  another  part  of  this  work. 

*  Co.  Lit.  Ill  b,  n;  138  ;  Wright,  Ten.  172,  173  ;  1  Spence,  Eq.  Jur.  136,  441 ; 
Bacon's  Tracts,  152  ;  Perkins,  §  538.     Post,  vol.  2,  p.  *103. 

»  Bacon's  Tracts,  316. 

«  Co.  Lit.  Ill  b.  u.  138  ;  1  Spence,  Eq.  Jur.  136,  441. 


en.  111.]  ESTATES    IN    riT.-SI.MrLE,  87 

in  fee  from  tliat  time  till  tlic  statute  32  Ilciirv  \'II1.  rli;i|,.  1, 
whieh  wjis  cxphiiiinl  by  the  ntiitute  -W  and  ■'>■'>  Ilmiv  \  ill. 
chap.  5,  by  which  any  uorson  liavinL""  an  intere.st  in  lan<ls  held 
in  sucaf^c  might  devi.st'  it  by  hi.s  last  will  to  any  jierson  except 
a  body  corporate  or  )tolitic.  And  as  this  power  had  been  en- 
joyed b(jth  under  the  Saxons  and  Danes,  it  justified  the  remark 
of  a  writer,  that  "o  will  of  lands  thus  again,  after  an  interval 
of  nearly  live  hundred  years,  became  a  legal  mode  of  aliena- 
tion of  lands  and  hereditaments."  * 

51.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  add  that  in  respect  to  the  hu m 
of  aliening  estates  in  fec-simj)le,  what  was  said  in  res|)ect  to 
passing  freehold,  by  livery  or  deed,  and  liy  the  means  of  the 
doctrine  of  uses,  a])])lies  to  these  also.  And  though,  borrow- 
ing from  the  common  law,  the  owner  of  such  an  estate  "  is 
called  a  tenant  because  he  holdeth  of  some  sui)erior 

lord  by  some  *  service,"^  the  term  tenant  is  now  used  [*5(3] 
only,  in  its  popular  sense,  as  synonymous  with  owner. 

52.  A  fee-simple  may  be  had  in  incorporeal  as  well  as  cor- 
poreal hereditament^,  though  in  s])eaking  of  the  one  or  the 
other,  the  owner  is  said  to  be  seised  "  in  his  demesne  as  of 
fee  "  of  corporeal,  and  "  seised  as  of  fee  "  of  incorporeal  here- 
ditaments ;  the  distinction  being  that  the  latter  issue  out  of 
lands  which  belong  to  another  than  him  who  owns  the  right 
of  way,  for  instance,  or  whatever  the  hereditament  may  be, 
and  in  such  case  the  owner  of  the  easement,  as  such  a  right 
would  be  called,  has  no  dominion  over  or  ownership  of  the 
land  itself,  though  he  may  own  the  easement  to  himself  and 
his  heirs  as  fully  as  he  could  the  land.^ 

53.  The  origin  of  the  use  of  "heirs"  in  creating  an  estate 
in  fee  by  grant  has  already  been  exjilained,''  though  it  has  ob- 
viously become  a  mere  arbitrary  rule.  Still,  unless  changed  by 
statute,  it  is  as  imperative,  as  a  rule  of  law,  now  as  ever.  Xo 
synonym  will  supply  its  place.  Even  a  grant  to  one  and 
"  his  heir  "  will  give  him  only  a  life  estate,^  or  to  one  "  or  his 

>  1  Spence.  Eq.  .Tur.  469;  Co.  Lit.  Ill  b,  n.  138. 

2  Co.  Lit.  lb.  8  2  Bl.  Com.  106,  107.  *  Ante,  pp.  •27,  •28. 

6  Co.  Lit.  8  b ;  2  Prest.  Est.  8  ;  Id.  10  ;  Com.  Dig.,  Estate,  A.  2.  Though 
this  is  questioned  by  some  authorities,  see  4  Kent,  Com.  6,  note,  and  cases  cited  ; 
Tud.  Cas.  .')86  ;  especially  if  "heir  "can  b«  construed  to  be  nomtn  coUcclivum. 
Hargrave,  Co.  Lit.  8  b,  u.  \o. 


88  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

heirs,"  ^  or  to  one  "  and  his  heirs  during  the  life  of  another,"  2 
or  to  one  "  forever,"  or  to  one  "  and  his  assigns  forever,"  and 
the  words  "  forever,"  or  "  assigns,"  have  no  effect  at  this  day 
in  limiting  or  defining  what  estate  is  granted.^  So  to  one 
"  and  his  successors,"  *  or  to  one,  his  successors  and  assigns, 
is  a  life  estate  only,  although  coupled  with  a  power  to  sell  and 
convey  a  fee,^  or  to  one  and  his  "  seed,"  or  "  his  offspring,"  or 
to  one  "  and  the  issue  of  his  body,"  ^  or  to  one  in  "  fee-sim- 
ple," "  or  to  one,  "  his  executors,  administrators,  and  as- 
signs." ^     No  circumlocution  has  ever  been  held  sufficient  to 

create  a  fee.^ 
[*57]  *  54.  There  are  what  might  seem  at  first  sight  ex- 
ceptions to  this  rule.  Thus,  if  an  estate  be  granted 
clearly  in  fee,  and  the  deed  by  which  it  is  again  granted,  in- 
stead of  being  to  the  grantee  and  his  heirs,  be  to  him  as  fully 
as  it  was  granted  in  the  former  deed  referring  to  it,  it  is  only 
borrowing  the  words  of  limitation  from  the  former  deed,  and 
conveys  a  fee.^^ 

55.  In  the  case  of  conveyances  in  trust,  the  trustee  will  take 
the  legal  estate  in  fee,  although  limited  to  him  without  the 
word  "  heirs,"  if  the  trust  which  he  is  to  execute  be  to  the  cestui 
que  trust  and  his  heirs.  The  words  of  limitation  and  inherit- 
ance in  such  case  are  connected  with  the  estate  of  the  cestui 
que  trust,  but  are  held  to  relate  to  the  legal  estate  in  the  trus- 
tee, because  without  such  a  construction  the  trustee  would 
not  be  able  to  execute  the  trust.  His  estate  would  be  com- 
mensurate with  the  trust,  and  that  only,  even  though  it  were 
to  him  and  his  heirs,  and  the  trust  was  for  life  only  in  the 

1  Co.  Lit,  8  b  ;  Com.  Dig.,  Estate,  A.  2.  M  Prest.  Est.  479. 

8  2  Bl.  Com.  107  ;  2  Prest.  Est.  3  ;  Id.  5  ;  1  Spence,  Eq.  Jur.  139  ;  Adams  v. 
Ross,  30  N.  J.  505,  511. 

*  Co.  Lit.  St.  6  Sedgwick  v.  Laflin,  10  Allen,  430. 

6  Wms.  Eeal  Prop.  120. 

'  Bridgewater  v.  Bolton,  6  Mod.  106,  109  ;  2  Prest.  Est.  5. 

^  Clearwater  v.  Rose,  1  Blackf.  137.  In  the  case  of  Foster  v.  Joice,  3  "Wash. 
C.  C.  498,  the  deed  was  "  to  J.  M.  and  his  generation  to  endure  so  long  as  the 
waters  of  the  Delaware  run,"  and  held  to  be  a  life  estate  only.  But  in  Vermont 
a  lease  for  1,000  years,  or  as  long  as  wood  grows  and  water  runs,  was  held  to  be  a 
fee.     Arms  v.  Burt,  1  Yt.  303  ;  Stevens  v.  Dewing,  2  Vt.  411. 

9  Adams  v.  Ross,  30  X.  J.  512. 

10  Com.  Dig.,  Estate,  A.  2,  n. ;  Shep.  Touch.  101  ;  2  Prest.  Est.  2. 


CU.  III.]  ESTATES   IN    FEE-SIMPLE.  89 

cestui  que  trust}  Thus  a  jrrant  to  A  11  in  trust  to  sell  curri(>8 
a  fee.-  So,  if  to  A  ami  his  heirs  in  trust  for  l>  till  In-  attains 
twenty-one  years,  the  trustee  takes  a  ehattil  interest  only, 
anil  though  the  trust  is  to  "heirs,"  if  the  trustee  dits,  his  <\- 
ecutor  is  to  execute  the  trust,  and  not  his  heirs.' 

56.  Leirislative  grants  may  convey  lands  without  making 
use  of  technical  wor's  n^juired  in  a  deed.* 

57.  But  still  it  is  essential,  in  all  cases,  to  the  creation  of  a 
fee,  that  it  may  continue  forever.^ 

58.  A  limitation  to  one  and  his  "right  heirs"  is  the  same 
as  to  his ''heirs"  simply;  and  a  limitation  directly  to  the 
"  right  heirs  "  of  one  carries  a  fee  without  adding  the  words 
"  and  their  heirs."** 

*o'.'.  There  may,  too,  be  such  a  joint  interest  in  the  [*o8] 
fee  in  lands  between  two  persons,  that  if  one  simply 
releases  to  the  other  without  words  of  inheritance,  the  latter 
becomes  owner  in  fee  of  the  entire  estate ;  as  if  a  i)arcener  or 
joint  tenant  releases  to  his  co-parcener  or  co-tenant,  he  extin- 
guishes his  own  right,  leaving  the  other  the  sole  owner.  So  if 
a  disseisee  release  to  his  disseisor ; "  so  if  one  have  a  right  in 
fee  out  of  lands  owned  by  another  in  fee,  like  a  right  of  way, 
and  he  release  to  the  latter. ^ 

60.  And  where  tenants  in  common  have  partition  made  ol 
their  estate  by  act  of  law,  each  is  in,  in  the  part  set  ofT  to  him, 
in  severalty,  of  the  same  estate  as  he  had  in  his  undivided 
share  before.     But  if  they  make  partition  by  deeds  of  mutual 

»  Ncwhall  V.  "Wheeler,  7  Mass.  189  ;  White  i'.  Woodbern-,  9  Pick.  136  ;  Fisher 
V.  Fields,  10  Johus.  495,  50.5  ;  p<:)st,  vol.  2,  pji.  'ISG,  *1S7  ;  Jenkins  r.  Young,  Cro. 
Car.  230  ;  North  v.  Philbrook,  34  Me.  532,  537  ;  1  Sand.  Uses,  107  ;  Gould  r. 
Lamb,  11  Met.  84  ;  Brooks  r.  Jones,  lb.  191  ;  Tiff.  &  Bill.  Trust.  783  it  seq.  ; 
Hill,  Trust.  239  ;  Tud.  Cas.  459.  But  see  Jackson  v.  Myers,  3  John,  888,  396  ; 
Sears  v.  Russell,  8  Gray,  86  ;  Koenig's  Appeal,  67  Penn.  St.  352,  355  ;  Doe  r. 
Considine,  6  Wall.  458,  471  ;  2  Jami.  Wills,  156. 

2  AngcU  r.  Rosenburj-,  12  Mich.  241,  266  ;  Sears  f.  Russell,  8  Gray,  86. 

•  2  Law  Mag.  82  ;  Doe  r.  Considine,  6  Wall.  470. 

•  Rutherford  v.  Greene,  2  Wheat.  196. 

8  1  Prest.  Est.  480.  The  "Rule  in  Shelley's  Case"  forms  atopic  for  special 
consideration  hereafter.     See  post,  p.  '77. 

•  Co.  Lit.  10  a,  22  b  ;  Com.  Dig.,  Estate,  A.  2  ;  1  Rolle,  Abr.  "  Estate, "  L.  8  j 
4  Cniise,  276. 

T  Com.  Dig.,  Estate,  A.  2  ;  Lit.  §§  519,  520.  «  2  Past.  Est,  58. 


90  LATT    OF    REAL    PKOPERTY,  ["bOOK    I. 

grant  and  release,  nothing  more  than  a  life  estate  in  severalty 
would  pass  thereby  without  words  of  inheritance.^ 

61.  So  if  one  having  an  estate  in  fee  in  remainder  or  rever- 
sion, releases  to  the  tenant  for  life  without  words  of  inherit- 
ance, it  would  give  him  no  more  than  a  life  estate.^ 

62.  If  lands  are  conveyed  to  a  corporation  aggregate,  it 
will,  from  the  nature  of  such  corporations,  be  understood  as  a 
fee  without  any  words  of  limitation.^  But  if  it  be  to  a  cor- 
poration sole,  it  must  be  limited  to  such  corporator  and  his 
"  successors,"  which  in  case  of  corporations  answers  to  "  heirs  " 
in  case  of  grants  to  natural  persons,  or  it  would  be  only  an 
estate  during  the  life  of  such  corporator.* 

63.  One  seised  of  glebe  lands  as  parson  is  considered  as  a 
corporation  sole,  and  if  land  be  granted  to  him  in  his  political 
or  artificial  capacity,  but  without  being  limited  to  his  "  suc- 
cessors," he  would  take  but  a  life  estate,  although  the  grant 
were  to  him  and  his  heirs. ^ 

64.  Another  broad  class  of  cases  form  exceptions  to 
[*59]  the  rule  *  requiring  a  limitation  to  "  heirs  "  to  create  an 
estate  of  inheritance,  and  that  is  where  the  estate  is 
created  by  devise.  In  these  cases,  the  intention  of  the  testa- 
tor, if  clearly  expressed  by  his  last  will,  will  be  sufficient  to 
create  a  fee  without  the  use  of  the  word  "  heirs."  ^  Among 
the  illustrations  may  be  mentioned  a  devise  of  one's  estate  in 
such  lands,  and  he  owns  a  fee,"  or  "  all "  his  "  right,"  ^  or 
"  all "  his  "  property,"  or  "  all "  his  "  inheritance,"  ^  or  to  one 
"  in  fee-simple."  ^° 

65.  So  if  it  is  necessary,  in  order  to  give  effect  to  a  charge 

1  2  Prest.  Est.  56,  58.  The  reasons  for  the  difference  in  this  respect  between 
tenants  in  common  and  joint  tenants  will  appear  hereafter. 

2  2  Prest.  Est.  62. 

3  Wilcox  V.  Wheeler,  47  N.  H.  488. 

*  Ang.  &  Am.  Corp.  ch.  v.  §  1  ;   Overseers  v.  Sears,  22  Pick.  122,  126  ;   Com. 
Dig.,  Estate,  A.  2  ;  2  Prest.  Est.  43  ;  Id.  7  ;  Wilcox  v.  Wheeler,  47  N.  H.  488. 
6  Co.  Lit.  8  b ;  2  Prest.  Est.  6. 

6  Jarrn,  Wills,  c.  34,  p.  229,  1st  ed.  ;  Tud.  Cas.  588. 

7  2  Bl.  Com.  108  ;  Bridge  water  v.  Bolton,  6  Mod.  106,  109  ;  Godfrey  v.  Hum- 
phrey,  18  Pick.  537. 

8  Xewkerk  v.  Newkerk,  2  Caines,  345. 

9  Jackson  v.  Housell,  17  Johns.  281  ;  Wms.  Real  Prop.  189. 
10  Bridgewater  v.  Bolton,  6  Mod.  106,  109. 


en.  III.]  ESTATE.i   IN    FEE-SIMI'Li:.  1 

or  trust  ciTiilcd  hy  tlic  snnic  will,  to  lidld  tin-  <lcvi.sc  u  fct-,  ii 
will  bu  HO  held.' 

GO.  So  a  foe  may  be  inferred  from  tbe  nature  of  the  use 
wliieli  devisee  is  to  make  of  the  land  ;  as,  a  devise  of  wild 
hinds  to  one,  without  any  words  of  inheritanee,  will  be  con- 
strued to  be  a  fee  because  a  mere  tenant  for  life  could  make 
no  use  of  such  land.  The  very  using  of  it  by  cutting  off  its 
timber  would  work  a  forfeiture.^ 

in.  And  upon  the  same  principle,  if  lands  are  given  to  one 
by  will,  who  is  by  the  same  will  personally  charged  with  the 
I)ayment  of  money  on  account  of  such  devise,  it  will  l>e  held 
to  be  a  fee,  for  the  testator  intended  to  make  him  the  object 
of  his  bounty;  and  if  he  only  takes  a  life  estate,  he  might  die 
the  day  after  paying  the  money,  and  so  lose  the  whole  benefit 
of  the  devise.® 

G8.  But  if  the  payment  is  charged  ui>on  the  lands  only,  and 
not  upon  the  devisee  personally,  the  rule  does  not  apply.' 

60.  To  obviate  any  question   in  cases  like  the  foregoing, 
there  is  now  a  provision  in  the  English  statutes  as  well 
as  in  those  *  of  many,  if  not  all  the  States,  whereby  a  [*G0] 
devise  of  land  carries  whatever  estate  the  devisor  had 
in  them,  unless  the  same  is  restricted  or  qualified  by  the  lan- 
guage of  the  will.'* 

70.  With  far  more  questionable  wisdom  in  disturljing  a 
well-<lefined  and  familiar  rule  of  conveyancing,*^  the  States 
mentioned  in  a  former  page"  have  by  statute  dispensed  with 
words  of  inheritance  in  creating  a  fee. 

71.  Among  the  incidents  other  than  the  right  of  alienation 

1  BnkiT  V.  Bridge,  12  Pick.  27  ;  Wait  v.  Belding,  24  Pick.  129,  138  ;  Godfrey 
V.  Hunii.hr.'V,  18  Pick.  537. 

^  Sargent  v.  Towne,  10  Mass.  303. 

»  2  Bl.  Com.  108,  n.;  Doe  r.  Richards,  3  T.  R.  356;  Jackson  r.  Merrill.  6 
Johns.  185  ;  Lithgow  r.  Kavenngh,  9  Mass.  161  ;  Wait  v.  Belding.  24  Pick.  139. 

♦  Jackson  r.  Bull,  10  Johns.  143. 

»  7  Wm.  IV.  and  1  Vict.  c.  26,  §  28  ;  Mass.  Pub.  Stat.  c.  127.  §  24.  Such  is 
the  law  in  Alabama,  Arkansas,  Georgia,  Iowa,  Illinois,  Kentucky,  Mississippi,  Mis- 
souri, New  York,  Tennessee,  Texas,  Virginia,  New  Jersey,  and  North  Curolinn. 
Sceaji^,  p.  •ai,  n.  2.  Bell  Co.  v.  Alexander,  22  Tex.  350,  358.  So  in  Nebraska, 
Rev.  Stat.  1866,  p.  291. 

«  2  Prest.  Est.  67  ;  2  Law  Mag.  72. 

1  AnU,  p.  •29,  n.  2. 


92  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY,  [BOOK  L 

belonging  to  estates  in  fee-simple  at  the  common  law,  are 
curtesy  and  dower ;  the  one  being  the  right  which  a  husband 
has  in  the  estate  of  his  wife,  if  he  survive  her,  the  other  the 
right  which  a  wife  has  in  the  husband's  lands  if  she  survive 
him,  which  will  be  explained  in  their  proper  places.^ 

72.  Another  incident  has  already  been  anticipated,  and  that 
is,  that  if  not  aliened  by  deed  or  last  will  of  the  owner,  estates 
in  fee-simple  descend  without  restriction  to  whoever  is  by  law 
his  legal  heir  or  heirs,  and  this,  whether  the  estate  be  corpo- 
real or  incorporeal,  in  possession,  reversion,  or  remainder,  and 
whether  vested  or  contingent.^ 

73.  Lands  held  in  fee-simple  are  also  subject  to  the  debts 
of  the  owner,  both  in  England  and  this  country,  and  as 
well  after  his  death  as  while  living.  This  was  not  an  origi- 
nal incident  to  lands  so  held.  They  were  first  made  subject 
to  execution  by  the  statute  13  Edward  I.  c.  18,  though  if  the 
ancestor  bound  his  heirs  by  specialty  debts,  his  lands  which 
had  descended  to  his  heirs  might  have  been  taken  in  execu- 
tion at  common  law  in  an  action  against  the  heir,  unless  he 

had  conveyed  away  those  lands  before  suit  brought. 
[*  61]    Among  the  modes  of  taking  a  *  debtor's  lands  were 

those  by  statute  merchant  and  statute  staple,  forms 
prescribed  by  statute,  one  in  Edward  I.,  the  other  in  27 
Edward  III.3 

74.  This  is  not  the  place  to  speak  of  the  effect  of  bankrupt 
or  insolvent  laws,  nor  the  modes  of  levying  executions  upon 
estates  of  debtors,  though  it  may  be  said,  in  general  terms, 
that  lands  in  this  country  are  liable  for  debts  of  the  owner, 
whether  due  by  matter  of  record,  by  specialty,  or  by  simple 
contract.  Aiid  if  they  descend  to  the  heir  or  go  to  a  devisee, 
he  holds  them  subject  to  be  taken  for  the  payment  of  the  debts 
of  the  ancestor,  according  to  the  laws  of  the  State  in  which 
they  are  situate.* 

*  Tud.  Cas.  694.  The  law  as  to  dower  has  been  materially  altered  by  statute 
in  England  and  in  several  of  the  States,  as  will  be  shown  hereafter. 

2  Tud.  Cas.  594.     The  rules  of  descent  depend  upon  the  local  statutes  of  the 
several  States,  and  come  under  another  head  of  this  work. 
8  1  Spence,  Eq.  Jur.  173,  174.     See  post,  c.  15. 

*  Watkins  v.  Holman,  16  Pet.  25,  63  ;  1  Greenl.  Cruise,  60,  n.  ;  "VVyraan  v. 
Brigden,  4  Mass.  150. 


CH.  111.]  ESTATES   IN   FEE-SIMPLE.  Il3 

75.  From  the  dclhiilions  lu- ret  of  ore  given,  it  would  seem  to 
follow  tluit  no  e.state  eoukl  be  limited  to  take  elTeet  after  a 
fee-8im|)le,  as  that  in  its  nature  is  indeterminable.  IJut  it  will 
be  seen  that,  under  the  doetrine  of  uses  and  exeeutory  tlevises, 
this  is  often  done  by  UKikinj^  a  fee-simj)l»'  determinalile  upon 
the  hapiiening  of  some  event,  ami  substituting  a  new  estate 
in  its  stt'ad.' 

70.  As  every  estate  whieh  may  be  of  perjtetual  cnnf inuancc 
is  deemed  to  be  a  fee,  and  may  come  within  tbr  ilrlinition  of 
Lord  Coke,  of  a  fee-simple  nljsolute,  conditional,  (piaiilitMl, 
or  base  fee,-  this  seems  to  be  a  j)roper  connection  in  which  to 
treat  of  them. 

77.  Though  it  will  be  found  dillicult  to  classify  these  by 
any  intelligible  line  of  discrimination,  the  limit  beyond  which 
one  may  depart  from  the  settled  forms  of  the  comuKJU  law  in 
creating  estates  with  new  (pialities  of  inheritance  is  extremely 
restricted.  Thus  an  estate  to  one  and  his  "  heirs  male,"  or 
"  heirs  female,"  or  to  one  and  his  heirs  on  the  i)art  of  his 
father  or  of  his  mother,  would  be  regarded  as  a  fee-simi»le, 
the  limitation  to  the  particular  class  of  heirs  being  regarded 
as  surplusiige.^ 

*  78.  A  base  fee  is  illustrated  in  "  Termes  dc  la  Ley  "  [*62] 
(Base  Fee)  by  an  estate  in  land  so  long  as  another  » 
shall  have  heirs  of  his  body  ;  so  in  Plowd.  oo7  a.  And  Flin- 
tolT,  following  Blackstonc,  speaks  of  "  a  base  or  qualified  fee," 
using  them  as  convertible  terms,  and  explains  it  by  the  famil- 
iar illustration  of  a  grant  to  A  and  his  heirs,  tenants  of  the 
manor  of  Dale,  the  grant  being  defeated  by  his  heirs  ceasing 
to  be  such  tenants.* 

70.  The  term  determinable  fee  .seems  to  be  more  generic  in 
its  meaning,  embracing  all  fees  which  are  liable  to  be  deter- 
miiu'd  by  some  act  or  event  cxprcs.sed   in  their  liniitatiou  to 

'  Com.  Dig.  (Day's  ed.)  Estate,  A.  4,  nnd  noti- ;  To.  Lit.  IS  a  ;  2  Law 
Mag.  82. 

■i  IVst  E-st.  480  ;  Co.  Lit.  1  I. ;  2  Flint.  Il.al  Trop.  137.  Jmlge  Kent  uses 
qualified,  last;  ami  (Ictcrminahlc  fi-t-s  iiidis.  riiuiiiately.     4  Kent,  Com.  9. 

8  Lit.  §  .31  ;  Com.  Dig.,  Estate,  A.  6  ;  1  Pnst.  Est.  472  ;  Id.  461  ;  Co.  Lit.  27; 
Id.  130  ;  2  Uw  Mag.  68  ;  I.l.  2fiO. 

«  2  Flint.  Real  Prop.  136  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  109  ;  1  SiH?nce,  Eq.  Jur.  144  ;  1  PrvsL 
Couv.  299. 


94  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

circumscrihe  their  continuance,  or  inferred  by  law  as  bounding 
their  extent.^ 

80.  Plowden  uses  the  following  language :  "  Such  perpetu- 
ity of  an  estate  which  may  continue  forever,  though  at  the 
same  time  there  is  a  contingency  which,  when  it  happens,  will 
determine  the  estate,  which  contingency  cannot  properly  be 
called  a  condition  but  a  limitation,  may  be  termed  a  fee- 
simple  determinable."  ^ 

81.  This  description  in  Plowden  answers  to  what  is  now 
denominated  "  a  conditional  limitation,"  as  distinguished  from 
an  estate  upon  condition,  the  estate  in  one  case  determining 
ijjso  facto  by  the  happening  of  the  event  by  which  its  limita- 
tion is  measured ;  in  the  other,  though  liable  to  be  defeated, 
not  being  in  fact  determined  until  he  who  has  a  right  to  avail 
himself  of  the  condition  enters  and  determines  the  estate.^ 

82.  And  it  may  be  well  also,  in  this  connection  to  observe 
that,  at  the  common  law,  the  term  "  conditional  fee "  often 
had  a  technical  meaning,  and  was  something  different  from 
an  estate  upon  condition,  as  above  explained.  It  was  applied 
to  those  fees  which  were  restricted  to  some  particular  heirs, 
as  limitations  to  one  and  the  heirs  of  his  body,  or  heirs  male 
of  his  body,  and  the  like,  which,  as  will  be  seen  hereafter,  were, 

by  the  statute  de  Donis,  converted  into  estates  tail.* 
[*  63]        *83.  But,  in  its  broader  sense,  a  determinable  or 
qualified  fee  may  embrace  what  is  properly  a  condi- 
tional fee.^ 

84.  Among  the  instances  put  by  way  of  illustrating  a 
determinable  fee,  is  a  limitation  to  one  and  his  heirs,  peers  of 
the  realm  or  lords  of  the  manor  of  Dale,  or  so  long  as  a  cer- 
tain tree  stands,  or  until  the  marriage  of  a  certain  person,  or 
till  a  man  shall  go  to  or  return  from  Rome,  or  till  certain  debts 
are  paid,  or  so  long  as  A  or  his  heirs  shall  pay  B  a  certain  sum 
per  annum,  or  so  long  as  St.  Paul's  shall  stand,  or  until  a  pre- 
scribed act  shall  be  done,  or  until  a  minor  shall  attain  the  age 

1  1  Prest.  Est.  466  ;  Id.  431  ;  Sej'inour's  Case,  10  Rep.  97. 

2  Walsingham's  Ca.se,  Plowd.  557. 

8  Brattle  Sq.  Church  v.  Grant,  3  Gray,  142,  146,  147  ;  1  Prest.  Est.  475. 
♦  2  Bl.  Com.  110  ;  2  Prest.  Est.  289  ;  1  Prest.  Abs.  378. 
5  1  Prest.  Est.  475. 


CU.  Ill]  ESTATES   IN    FEE-SIMPLE.  [)') 

of  twenty-one  years,  and  the  like.'  So  a  ^M'ant  to  a  canal 
eorporatiun,  "  as  lon^  as  used  for  a  caual,"  was  held  to  Itr  a 
(lualified  fee.- 

H5.  Hut  a  limitation  to  A  and  his  licirs,  durin;(  the  \s  itlnw- 
hood  of  15,  or  whik-  ('  resides  at  liunie,  would  only  he  a  lif(' 
estate  and  not  a  fee,  hi-cause  it  is  nu'a.surcd  liy  the  life  of  a 
person  in  t'stn'.^ 

8tl.  So  louL'  as  the  estate  in  fee  remains,  the  owner  in  po.s- 
ses.sion  has  all  the  riirhts  in  respect  to  it,  which  he  would  have 
if  tenant  in  fee-simpl(>,  unless  it  l)e  so  limiti'd  that  there  is 
properly  a  reversionary  ri^ht  in  another,  something  more  than 
a  possihility  of  reverter  helonging  to  a  third  person,^  when, 
perhaps,  chancery  mij^ht  interpose  to  prevent  waste  of  the 
premises.^ 

87.  An  estate  to  one  ami  his  heirs,  so  lonjjr  as  a  tree  stands, 
would  be  one  of  those  where  there  is  a  reversion,  })ecausc  the 
law  contemplates  as  certain  the  destruction  of  the  tree  at 
some  future  time,  and,  therefore,  that  there  will  certainly  he 
an  estate  in  some  one  other  than  the  tenant  and  those  hold- 
intr  under  him,  after  the  ha]t|)enin<r  of  that  event. ^ 

88.  On  the  other  hand,  if  it  he  to  A  and  his  heirs  till  B 
comes  back  from  Rome,  the  riglit  to  have  it  when  he 
comes  back  is  *  not  a  reversion  but  a  mere  poHsibility;   [*04] 
he  may  and  may  not  come  back,  and  if  he  were  to  die 
before  he  came  back,  the  estate  would  become  absolute  in  the 
grantee.' 

8i>.  A  fee  determinable  will  descend  in  the  line  of  succes- 
sion of  the  purchaser,  and  will  determine  upon  the  happening 
of  the  event  upon  which  it  was  first  limited,  into  whosesoever 
hands  it  may  have  come.^ 

»  1  l'R'8t.  Kst.  442  ;  Id.  43*2  ;  Com.  Dig.  (Day's  ed.)  Estate,  A.  C,  n.;  Cook  V. 
Bibhet',  18  Pick.  529  ;  Tud.  Cos.  605. 

■•'  State  I'.  Brown,  27  N.  J.  20. 

8  1  Prest  Est.  442  ;  McKclway  v.  Seymour,  29  X.  J.  329  ;  State  r.  Brown. 
27  N.  J.  13,  20. 

«  Plowd.  557  ;  Smith,  Real  &  Pcrs.  Prop.  103  ;  1  Cruise,  Dig.  65  ;  1  Atkin- 
son,  Conv.  183. 

'  This  remark  should  not  l)c  undcrstoo<I  as  intending  to  embrace  estates  tail. 
Tud.  Ciis.  613.  «  1  Prest.  Est.  440  ;  Ayies  r.  Fulklund,  1  Ld.  Kayni.  326. 

■»  1  Pn-st.  Est.  441  ;  M.  440  ;  1  Atk.  Conv.  183. 

5  1  Prist.  Est.  440  ;  Tud.  Cas.  606. 


96  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  L 

90.  And  the  same  rule  applies  in  cases  of  estates  upon  con- 
dition ;  they  are  liable  to  be  defeated  by  a  breach  thereof,  in  the 
same  manner  as  they  would  have  been  in  the  hands  of  the 
original  grantee  as  long  as  the  condition  may  affect  them.^ 

91.  These  estates  often  may  become  fee-simple  absolute  by 
uniting  them  with  the  reversionary  or  possible  interest  in  the 
inheritance,  which  would  arise  or  come  into  possession  if  they 
were  to  determine,  or  by  extinguishing  such  a  possibility. 

92.  Thus  in  the  case  of  an  estate  to  A  and  his  heirs  so  long 
as  he  has  heirs  of  his  body,  where  if  he  dies  without  issue  his 
estate  determines,  being  a  determinable  fee.  But  if  the  one 
who  has  this  contingent  reversionary  right  or  possibility  release 
it  to  the  tenant  in  possession,  it  would  change  his  fee  deter- 
minable into  a  fee-simple  absolute.^  If  it  had  been  to  A  and 
his  heirs  till  B  returned  from  Rome,  and  B  had  died  at  Rome, 
the  estate  in  A  would  have  become  absolute  at  once.  The 
event  in  such  case  is  not  a  condition  but  a  limitation,  —  the 
estate  is  to  endure  until  he  returns.^ 

93.  So  if  the  estate  be  expressly  one  upon  condition,  and 
the  condition  be  performed,  the  condition  is  gone  and  the 
estate  is  thereby  al)solute.  Having  originally  been  as  to  its 
duration  a  fee,  liable  to  be  defeated  if  the  condition  was  not 
performed,  it  becomes  by  the  performance  at  once  a  fee-simple 
absolute*  The  subject  of  estates  in  fee  upon  condition,  and 
the  familiar  conditional  estates  in  mortgage,  will  be  resumed 
in  its  proper  order. 

1  1  Prest.  Est.  475  ;  1  Atk.  Conv.  183  ;  1  Prest.  Abs.  378. 

2  "Walsingham's  Case,  Plowd.  557  ;  Ld.  Raym.  1148  ;  1  Prest.  Est.  482. 
8  1  Prest.  Est.  440-442  ;  Tud.  Cas.  606. 

*  1  Prest.  Est.  476 ;  1  Atk.  Conv.  183. 


CH.  IV.  1  ESTATES   TAIL. 


C'llArTKIl     IV. 

ESTATKS   TAIL. 

1-3.  Origin  of  estatos  taih 

4,  5.  Such  estates  at  first  c-oiulitional  fees. 

6-8.  Orij^n  of  stjxtiito  Dc  iJonis. 

9.  EsUites  in  frank  iniirriage. 

10.  Provisions  of  the  statuto  De  Donis. 

11-13.  Effects  of  tliat  statute  Ufwu  estates,  real  and  i>ersonal. 

14-16.  Construction  put  \\\nn\  the  statute,  and  its  effect. 

17.  Attempts  to  defeat  the  statute. 

18.  Statute  evatled  by  fines  and  recoveries. 

19.  Common  recoveries  ;  form  of  proceeding. 

20.  Right  to  bar  them  incident  to  estates  taiL 

21.  No  jH'rmanciit  entail.s  of  estates  now. 
22-24.  t^tates  tail  di-tined  and  illustrated. 

25.  Estates  tail  distinguisheil  from  estates  determinable. 

86,  27.  Estates  in  fee-simple  or  fee-tail  as  effected  by  terms  of  deeds. 

23.  Fees-tail  with  conditional  limiuuiou. 

29.  No  estate  tail  in  a  freehold  or  chattel  interest. 

30.  Heirs  of  donee  in  tail  take  by  descent  and  not  by  purcliase. 

31.  Heirs  in  tail  must  be  named  as  heirs  of  the  body. 

32.  Limitation  may  be  to  heirs  begotten  or  to  be  begotten. 
83,  34.  Estates  tail  general  and  sinicial. 

85,  36.  If  special,  there  must  by  possibility  be  such  heirs. 

37.  In  special  tail,  the  descent  must  be  by  the  prescribed  line. 

88—42.  Words  of  inheritance  in  deeds  and  wills. 

43.  Rule  in  Shelley's  Case. 

44,  45.  Rule  applied  to  estates  in  husband  and  wife. 

46.  Remainders,  when  contingent. 

47.  Effect  ujKjn  devise  of  donee  dying,  living  devisor. 
48,  49.  Incidents  to  estates  tail.     Waste,  dower,  curtesy,  &c. 

60.  As  to  tenant  in  tail  laying  charges  on  the  estate. 

51.  Doctrine  of  merger  dm-s  not  apply  to  estates  tail. 

62,  53.  Successive  descents  follow  the  rule  of  the  first. 

54-57.  Entailments  practically  avoided  by  usag<>  or  statute  conveyances, 

68,  59.  Estates  tail  after  possibility  of  issue  extinct. 

60,  61.  Estates  tail  in  the  United  States,  how  far  recognized. 

*  1.  The  history  of  estates  tail  sliows  that  they  were   ["'j^'] 
in  use  among  the  J>axons,  liaving  been  borrowed  from 
the  laws  of   Rome,  where,  by  way   of  Jidei-comrniaga,  lands 

VOL.  I.—  7 


96  LAW  OP  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

might  be  entailed  upon  children  and  freedmen  and  their 
descendants,  with  restrictions  as  to  alienation.  Under  the 
Saxons  the  owner  of  allodial  or  hoc-lands  might  convey  them 
absolutel}-,  or  grant  a  limited  interest  in  them,  reserving  the 
residue  of  the  ownership  to  himself,  which  he  might  convey 
to  another  at  his  pleasure.  So  he  might  settle  them  upon 
any  particular  class  of  descendants  in  succession.  And  the 
custom  of  settling  lands  upon  males  in  preference  to  females 
was  in  use  before  the  time  of  Alfred.^ 

2.  The  custom  of  conveying  lands  to  a  man,  or  a  man  and 
his  wife,  and  the  issue  of  a  particular  marriage,  or  to  a  man 
and  the  heirs  of  his  body,  or  some  particular  class  of  issue,  or 
heirs,  was  continued  after  the  Conquest.^ 

3.  Such  a  fee  or  feud  as  above  described  was  called  a 
feudmn  talUatum,  from  tailler,  to  cut  or  mutilate.^ 

4.  Where  an  estate  was  given  in  such  a  form,  it  was  held  to 
be  a  conditional  fee,  that  is,  if  the  donee  should  not  have  heirs 
or  issue  according  to  the  prescribed  description,  the  land  should 
revert  to  the  donor ;  but  if  the  condition  was  performed  by  the 
birth  of  such  heirs  presumptive,  or  issue,  the  donee  was  held 
to  have  a  fee-simple,  so  far  that  he  might  charge  or  alien  the 
land  as  a  fee-simple  estate.* 

5.  Such  was  the  case  up  to  the  time  of  Edward  I. 
[*67]  These  *  were  called  fees-simple  conditional.  But 
though  liable  to  be  changed  into  fees  absolute  in  the 
manner  above  stated,  if  they  descended  to  the  issue,  and  the 
issue  became  extinct  before  alienation  made,  they  reverted  to 
the  donor.^ 

6.  Previous  to  this  time,  too,  the  nobility  and  great  landed 
proprietors,  in  order  to  preserve  their  lands  within  their  own 

1  Spence,  Eq.  Jur.  21  ;  Barringt.  Stat.  113. 

2  1  Spence,  Erj.  Jur.  140.  »  2B1.  Com.  112,  n. 

*  1  Spence,  Eq.  Jur.  141  ;  Co.  2d  Inst.  333  ;  Tud.  Cas.  607;  Co.  Lit.  19  a  ;  2  BL 
Com.  111.  Lord  Mansfield  said:  "  I  cannot  agree  with  the  argument  that  on  the 
performance  of  the  condition  by  birth  of  a  child,  the  estate  becomes  absolute.  It 
was  so  by  a  subtlety  in  odium  of  perpetuity  and  for  the  special  purpose  of  aliena- 
tion, but  for  no  other.  It  otherwise  reverted  to  the  donor,  on  failure  of  the  issue, 
according  to  the  original  restriction."  Buckworth  v.  Thirkell,  3  B.  &  P.  652,  n.  ; 
Ford  V.  Flint,  40  Vt.  382,  392  ;  Finch,  121,  122.  "But  if  the  issue  fail  before  the 
alienation,  the  donor  or  giver  shall  have  it." 

5  1  Spence,  Eq.  Jur.  141 ;  Co.  Lit.  19  a,  and  note  110;  2d  Inst.  332. 


(11.  IV.]  ESTATES    TAIL.  '.lO 

families,  had  lioon  acciistoniod  to  st'ttle  tlu-in  upon  their  oldest 
sous  and  (lieir  is.suc,  and,  upon  the-  failure  of  .such  issue,  upon 
the  second  sons  and  their  issue,  hy  way  of  renuiinder,  and  so 
on,  with  restrictions  aLCainst  alienatiiju.  Jhit  the  adoption  of 
the  doctrine  of  eouditionid  fees  tended  to  defeat  this  intended 
entailment,  and  caused  the  harons  to  appeal  to  Edward  1.  to 
restoi-e  the  ancient  law  of  Alfi'ed  for  the  preservation  of 
entails.' 

7.  This  led  to  tlic  enactment  of  the  famous  statute  De 
Donix  CouJitionalif'US  (13  Edw.  I.  8tat.  1,  c.  1,  §  li).  Hut 
hcfore  stating  the  suh.stance  (jf  this  statute,  a  hrief  explanation 
is  necessary. 

8.  In  tracing  the  history  of  the  descent  of  estates,  we  find 
that  children  first  succeeded  to  the  feud  in  place  of  their 
fathers,  and  grand-children  in  the  plac(!  of  children.  If  no 
children,  brothers  might  succeed  to  brothers,  if  tlie  feud  was 
an  ancient  one.  The  admission  of  collateral  relations  of  the 
blood  of  the  first  feudatory  was  the  last  step  in  the  law  of  de- 
8cent.2  "  Heirs,"  therefoi-(%  as  at  first  used,  meant  the  issue  of 
the  tenant  or  vassal,  to  the  exclusi(;n  of  all  collateral  relations. 
But  by  the  time  of  Henry  11.,  collateral  kindred  had  been 
admitted  as  lieirs,  and  if  a  donor  wished  to  confine  the  inher- 
itance to  the  ofTspring  of  the  donee,  he  was  obliged  to  limit  it 
expres.sly  to  him  and  the  heirs  of  his  body.^ 

9.  This  was  construed  a  conditional  fee,  as  is  above  state<l. 
And  there  was  one  other  conditional  estate  of  inheritance 
which  is  referred  to  in  tlic  statute,  and  it  is  mentioneil  here  in 
order  to  explain  it,  and  that  wha  frank  marriage^  which 
applied  to  a  case  *  where  a  father  or  kinsman,  upon  a  [*'>8] 
person  marrying  his  daughter  or  cousin,  gave  thcMU 
lands,  and  it  was  understood  to  be  ujjon  the  condition  that 
these  were  to  descend  to  the  issue  of  such  marriage,  if  any. 
If  the  donees  had  issue,  the  condition  was  considennl  as 
having  been  performed,  and  the  estate  theiebv  J»ecame  alien- 
able.* 

10.  The  statute  De  Donis  recites,  liy  way  of  preamble,  the 
custom  of  giving  lands  to  a  man  and  his  wife  and  to  the  heirs 

>  1  Spence,  Eq.  .Tur.  141.  "  Wri^lit,  Ten.  16-18  ;  2  BI.  Com.  220-222. 

•  2  Bl.  Com.  221  ;  Wins.  Real  Prop.  31,  32.  <  1  Cruise,  Dig.  71. 


100  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

begotten  of  their  bodies,  with  an  express  condition  of  reverter 
upon  the  faihn-e  of  such  heirs.  Also  the  custom  of  giving 
lands  in  frank  marriage  which  contains  an  implied  condition 
of  reverter  if  the  husband  and  wife  die  without  heirs  of  their 
bodies,  and  also  of  giving  land  to  another  and  the  heirs  of  his 
body  issuing.  It  then  recites  the  custom  above  referred  to, 
of  aliening  lands  after  issue  born,  "  to  disinherit  their  issue 
of  the  land  contrary  to  the  minds  of  the  givers,  and  contra 
formam  in  dono  exjjressam.^^  It  then  declares,  in  substance, 
that  the  will  of  the  giver,  according  to  the  form  in  the  deed  of 
gift  manifestly  expressed  (^secundum  formam  in  charta  doni 
8ui),  should  from  henceforth  be  observed,  so  that,  among  other 
things,  they  to  whom  the  land  was  given  under  such  condition 
should  have  no  power  to  alien  the  land  so  given,  but  it  should 
remain  unto  the  issue  of  them  to  whom  it  was  given  after  their 
death,  or  should  revert  unto  the  giver  or  his  heirs,  if  issue 
fail,  &C.1 

11.  The  effect  of  this  w^as,  to  divide  the  entire  inheritance 
into  two  parts  or  estates,  namely,  the  estate  tail  and  the  re- 
version or  remainder  in  fee  expectant  upon  the  failure  of  the 
estate  tail.^ 

12.  In  translating  this  statute  from  the  Latin  in  which  it 
was  written,  the  word  lands  is  used  where  the  original  word 
was  tenementiim,  which,  in  fact,  embraces  not  only  corporeal 
hereditaments,  but  incorporeal  also,  which  issue  out  of  or  are 
annexed  to  those  that  are  corporeal,  such  as  rents,  estovers,  and 

commons,  though  they  cannot  be  said  to  lie  in  tenure.^ 
[*69]       *  13.  But  an  ownership  merely  personal,  or  such  as 

is  to  be  exercised  about  chattels,  cannot  be  the  subject 
of  entailment.* 

14.  The  statute  Be  Bonis  was  regarded  by  the  courts  as  a 
remedial  one,  and  instead  of  confining  it  to  the  precise  cases 
enumerated  in  it,  they  regarded  these  as  put  by  way  of  ex- 

1  2d  Inst.  332,  333  ;  2  Prest.  Est.  378. 

2  Atk.  Conv.  194.  This  statute,  commonly  known  as  that  of  Westmin- 
ster 2,  is  generally  supposed  to  have  introduced  estates  tail  into  the  English  law. 
But  it  would  be  more  accurate  to  say  that  it  established  them  there.  Barringt. 
St.  113. 

8  2  Bl.  Com.  113  ;  Co.  Lit.  19  b. 

*  2  Bl.  Com.  113  ;  Co.  Lit.  20  a,  and  note  120. 


Cii.  IV.]  ESTATKS   TAIL.  101 

ani|)lo.  And  tlio  rffcct  of  it  \va.->  to  introduce  a  now  cliLs.s  of 
estates  or  jrive  u  dilVerent  iiuality  to  iin  old  one.'  It  wa.s  con- 
sidered as  dcsi^nied  to  preserve  the  property  and  maintain  tin' 
Ifrandeur  of  e.xistinir  powerful  families,  by  securing:  to  owners 
of  estates  the  liherty  to  dis|)o.se  of  sueh  jiarts  tln-reof  as  came 
under  the  denomination  of  tenements^  in  such  manner,  aM<l 
bv  such  an  order  of  succession,  as  their  own  inclination  oi- 
in<::enuity  might  devise.'-^ 

15.  The  statute,  in  its  several  hearinLTS,  was  slowly  devel- 
oped, and  it  was  not  until  the  time  of  Edward  111.  that  it  was 
settled  that  an  estate  limited  to  one  and  the  heirs  male  of  his 
body,  would  be  confined  in  its  descent  to  males  alone.  And 
it  was  long  doubted  whether  an  entailment  to  heirs  female 
could  kcej)  the  succession  in  the  line  of  females  tracing 
descent  through  females.'^ 

1().  The  fruits  of  these  entailments  at  la.st  began  to  mani- 
fest themselves.  Children,  being  independent  of  their  pai-ents, 
grew  disobedient.  Creditors  could  no  longer  enforce  payment 
outof  the  lands  of  their  debtors.  Lands  weie  withdi'awn  from 
connnerce,  or  purchasers  were  defrauded  by  secret  entails. 
And  the  crown  even  lost  its  restraint  upon  treasonable  prac- 
tices through  the  terror  of  forfeitures,  until  at  length  the  de- 
sire grew  general  to  rid  tin,'  land  of  a  law  fraught  with  so 
many  evils. 

17.  Every  attempt,  however,  to  change  tlic  law  was  met  by 
the  resistance  of  powerful  landholders,  for  whose  benefit  it 
had  been  made,  and  it  was  only  after  an  endurance  of  two 
hundri'd  years  that,  by  a  contrivance  of  the  courts  and  a  bold 
measure  of  judicial  legislation,  this  act  of  Parliament  was 
evaded  by  enabling  the  tenant  to  change  his  fee-tail  into  a 
fee-simple.* 

*  18.  This  was  accomplished,  to  a  limited  extent,  by  [*T0] 
means  of  levying  fines,  Ijut  fully  and  completely  by 

»  2  Prest,  Est.  380;  Id.  453. 

»  2  Bl.  Com.  116  ;  2  Prust.  Est.  4.^3.  «  2  Prcst.  Est  4:.3. 

*  Tiiltaruiirs  Case,  Year  Book,  12  K.hv.  IV.  19  ;  2  PI.  Com.  116  ;  Wnis.  \\ca\ 
Pmp.  39  ;  2  Prcst.  Est.  454  ;  Tuil.  Cos.  608  ;  10  Hep.  37  a.  This  wa-s  done,  .says 
Spence,  by  the  judges  in  the  roipn  of  Edw.  IV.,  "in  the  exercise  of  their  Pre- 
toriau  authority."     1  Spence,  Et^.  Jur.  143. 


102  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

means  of  common  recoveries.  These  were  borrowed  from  the 
"  cessio  in  jure"  of  the  Roman  law.^  These,  though  now  abol- 
ished in  England  by  the  statutes  3  &  4  Wm.  IV.  c.  74,  and, 
so  far  as  fines  are  concerned,  having  prevailed  in  this  country 
in  but  very  few  of  the  States,  and  as  to  recoveries  to  a  certain 
extent  only,  have  played  too  important  a  part  for  centuries,  in 
English  conveyancing,  to  be  passed  over  unnoticed.  Fines  are 
said  to  have  been  in  use  from  a  very  early  period  of  the  Eng- 
lish history.  They  consisted  of  a  suit  brought  between  actu- 
ally litigating  parties,  where,  by  permission  of  the  court,  they 
entered  a  final  agreement,  finalis  concordiay  upon  the  record, 
which  was  binding  upon  them  like  any  judgment  of  court. 
When  applied  to  bar  entails,  the  person  to  whom  it  was  to  be 
conveyed,  acting  in  collusion  with  the  tenant,  brought  a  feigned 
action  against  him  for  the  land.  The  finalis  concordia,  of 
course,  was  thereupon  entered  into  between  them,  for  form, 
and  became  a  matter  of  record,  whereby  the  claimant's  right 
to  the  land  was  admitted  and  established.  The  statute  Be 
Bonis  declared  that  sucli  fines  should  not  bar  entails.  But 
one  passed  4  Hen.  VII.,  and  one  in  32  Hen.  VIII.,  allowed 
them  to  bar  heirs  claiming  under  the  entail.^ 

19.  The  process  above  described  was  called  "  levying  a 
fine,"  and  was  much  in  use  in  barring  adverse  claims  by  "  non 
claim,"  as  it  was  called.  But  the  mode  of  barring  estates  tail 
which  came  into  use  after  Taltarum's  Case  (12  Edw.  IV.  a.  d. 
1472),  and  the  only  effectual  mode,  was  a  common  recovery. 
This,  too,  it  seems,  had  been  in  use  before  the  statute  Be 
Bonis,  and  had  been  contrived  as  a  mode  of  evading  the  stat- 
utes of  mortmain  ;  but  was  put  an  end  to  for  that  purpose  by 
the  statute  13  Edw.  I.  c.  32.^     This  was  a   fictitious   suit 


1  M.iine,  Anc.  L.  289  ;  Gains,  C.  L  §  134,  n.;  C.  II.  §  24. 

2  1  Spence,  Eq.  Jur.  143  ;  2  Flint,  Real  Prop.  673  ;  Shelf.  R.  P.  Stat.  275  ; 
Tud.  Cas.  689.  A  case  of  the  levy  of  a  fine  occurred  in  New  York  in  1827. 
Fines  were  abolished  there  in  1830.  McGregor  r.  Comstock,  17  N.  Y.  162.  Fines 
and  recoveries  were  abolished  in  New  Jersey  in  1799  ;  Croxall  v.  Shererd,  5 
Wall.  268  ;  but  fines  were  in  force  in  Pennsylvania  in  1837  ;  4  Kent,  Com.  497, 
note  ;  Ricliman  v.  Lippincott,  29  N.  J.  44.  They  never  were  known  in  Missouri. 
Moreau  v.  Detchemendy,  18  Mo.  527. 

8  Wms.  Pical  Prop.  39  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  271;  1  Spence,  Eq.  Jur.  144,  n.;  Tud. 
Cas.  607. 


CM.  I  V.J  ESTATES   TAIL.  I(l3 

broujrht  ill  the  nanio  of  the  jtcrson  who  was  to  purchaso  the 
estate,  a<;:iiust  tht*  tenant  in  tail  who  was  willinj^  to  convey. 
The  t(nant,  instead  of  resisting  this  ehiim  hinjHelf, 
under  the  pretence  that  lie  had  •ae(|uired  his  title  of  ['71] 
some  third  peison  who  had  warriiiitcd  it,  vouched  in, 
or,  hy  a  process  from  tlie  court,  called  this  third  person,  tech- 
nitidly  the  vouchee,  to  come  in  ami  defend  the  title.  'I'he 
vouchee  came  in  as  one  of  the  ilnnndtin  ptrsoncc  of  this  judi- 
cial farce,  and  thru  without  sayim^  a  word  disappeared  and 
■was  dffaidtcil.  It  was  a  princijde  of  the  feudal  law  adopted 
thence  hy  the  common  law,  that  if  a  man  conveyed  lands  with 
a  warranty,  and  the  grantee  lost  his  estate  by  eviction  l»y  one 
liavinir  a  better  title,  he  should  }.^ive  his  warrantee  lands  of 
c(pial  value  l»y  way  of  recompense.  And  as  it  would  be  too 
barefaced  to  cut  olT  the  riirhts  of  reversion  as  well  as  of  the 
issue  in  tail,  by  a  judirment  between  the  tenant  and  a  stranger, 
it  was  gravely  adjudged,  1st,  that  the  claimant  should  have 
the  land  as  having  the  better  title  to  it;  and  2d,  that  the  ten- 
ant should  have  judgment  against  his  vouchee  to  recover  lands 
of  e(pial  value  on  the  ground  that  he  was  warrantor,  and  thus, 
theoretically,  iioliody  was  harmed.  If  the  issue  in  tail  or  the 
reversioner,  or  remainder-man,  lost  that  specific  estate,  he  was 
to  have  one  of  eipial  value  through  this  judgment  in  favor  of 
the  tenant  in  tail,  whereas  in  fact  the  vouchee  was  an  irre- 
sponsible man,  and  it  was  never  expected  that  he  was  anything 
more  than  a  dummy  in  the  game.^  The  result  of  this,  wliich 
iJlackstonc  calls  '*  a  kind  of  y>/a  fraus  to  elude  the  statute  De 
Doni)*"^  and  another  writer  "  a  piece  of  solemn  juggling,"^ 
was  that  the  lands  passed  from  the  tenant  in  tail  to  the  claim- 
ant in  fee-simple,  free  from  the  claims  of  reversioner,  re- 
mainder-man, or  issue  in  tail,  and  he  either  paid  the  tenant 
for  it  as  a  purchaser,  or  conveyed  it  back  to  him  again  in  fee- 
simjtle."* 

'  2  Flint,  Real  Prop.  673,  674  ;  1  Sj)oncp,  E.].  Jur.  143. 

»  2  HI.  Com.  117.  »  Wms.  Real  Prop.  41. 

*  1  Silence,  Ecj.  Jur.  144.  Taltarum's  C"a.se  U  reported  in  Year  Book,  12  Edw. 
IV.  H»,  and  is  translated  into  EnRlish  in  Tud.  Cnj».  562.  See  Shelf.  R.  P. 
Stat.  276.  A  similar  proieeilinj.;  juev.iiled  in  the  Roman  law  und<T  th<'  name 
of  cessio  in  jure,  and  with  the  same  clTect  as  at  common  law.  Elaine,  Auc  L. 
289. 


104  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

19  a.  A  common  recovery  by  a  tenant  in  tail  has  the  effect 
to  bar  his  estate  tail  and  all  remainders  over  and  the  rever- 
sion depending  on  that  estate,  and  all  conditions  and  collateral 
limitations  annexed  to  the  same  estate.^  And  it  is  held  that 
an  executory  devise  may  be  destroyed  by  a  common  recovery 
suffered  by  the  tenant  in  tail,  which  enlarges  his  estate  into  a 
fee,  and  excludes  all  subsequent  limitations,  whether  in  re- 
mainder or  by  way  of  springing  use  or  executory  devise.^  So 
a  recovery  suffered  by  a  tenant  for  life  will  cut  off  a  contin- 
gent, but  not  a  vested  remainder.^ 

20.  The  right  thus  acquired  of  barring  them  seems  to  have 
become,  in  the  theory  of  the  law,  an  inherent,  inseparable  in- 
cident to  estates  tail,  so  that  any  attempt  to  restrain  the 

[*72]  exercise  *of  it  by  the  tenant,  by  covenant  or  condition, 
was  futile,  as  such  restraint  was  held  to  be  void.* 

21.  The  consequence  was,  that  the  possibility  of  entailing 
estates  in  England  for  any  considerable  length  of  time  was 
and  still  is  practically  done  away  with.  To  accomplish  it  re- 
quires frequent  resettlements  of  the  estate  on  successive  gene- 
rations, by  means  of  marriage  settlements,  which  have  become, 
in  consequence,  a  very  common  measure  there.  In  this  coun- 
try, estates  tail,  as  a  distinctive  class,  are  abolished  in  many  of 
the  States.  In  others,  where  they  are  still  retained,  they  may 
be  barred,  usually,  by  a  simple  deed  by  the  tenant,  —  it  being 
the  policy  of  the  law  in  both  countries  to  favor  the  free  aliena- 
tion of  all  kinds  of  property.^  The  deed  of  an  infant  or  non 
compos  tenant  in  tail  may  be  impeached,  but  a  judgment 
against  such  tenant  in  suffering  a  recovery  could  not  be 
collaterally.^ 

22.  Estates  tail,  then,  are  estates  of  inheritance,  which,  in- 
stead of  descending  to  heirs  generally,  go  to  the  heirs  of  the 
donee's  body,  which  means  his  lawful  issue,  his  children,  and 
through  them  to  his  grandchildren  in  a  direct  line,  so  long  as 
his  posterity  endures  in  a  regular  order  and  course  of  descent, 

1  2  Piest.  Est.  460  ;  Pigott,  Recoveries,  21  ;  Page  v.  Hayward,  2  Salk.  570. 

2  Taylor  v.  Taylor,  63  Penn.  St.  481. 
8  Doe  V.  Gatacre,  5  Biiig.  N.  C.  609. 

4  Co.  Lit.  379  b,  n.  300  ;  1  Spence,  Eq.  Jur.  144,  n. 

6  Wms.  Real  Prop.  45,  46.  «  Wood  v.  Bayard,  63  Penn.  St.  320. 


ClI.  IV.]  ESTATES    TAIL.  lO.j 

and,  iijtnii  ilic  extinction  of  such  issue,  the  estate  doternjiiws  ' 
A  devise  to  one's  sons,  and,  in  case  any  one  <tf  them  dies  unnjai- 
lied  or  without  issue,  his  sliare  to  he  tiivided  anion^  the  sur- 
vivors, creates  an  estate  tail  in  each  son,  witli  remainders  o\cr 
to  the  survivors.-  So  wliere  the  devise  was  to  a  dau^diter,  liut 
if  she  died  without  lieirs,  then  to  <^i>  to  her  hrother,  it  was  held 
to  mean  heirs  of  her  body,  because  if  to  her  heirs  generally, 
her  brother  would  be  one  of  these,  and  take  by  descent.-* 

23.  The  one  who  makes  the  estate  is  called  the  donor ;  he 
to  whom  it  is  nnule  the  donee.  In  order  to  create  an  estate 
tail  there  must  be  a  limitation  in  express  terms  or  by  direct 
reference  not  only  to  heirs,  but  to  heirs  of  the  donee's  body. 
If  it  be  to  a  man  and  his  heir,  it  will  not  ordinarily  |)as8  an 
estate  of  inheritance,  thoutdi  in  a  will  it  may,  on  the  {ground 
of  carryint^  out  the  devisor's  intention.* 

24.  An  instance  of  an  estate  tail  by  construction,  where 
there  is  no  direct  limitation  to  the  heirs  of  the  donee's  body, 
would  be  an  estate  to  A,  with  a  proviso  that  if  he  shall  die 
without  heirs  of  his  body,  the  estate  shall  revert  to  the  donor 
or  go  over  to  one  in  remainder.  Here,  it  will  be  perceived, 
there  was  no  direct  limitation  to  the  heirs  of  A,  and  it 

is  too  j)lain  for  doubt  *  that  the  donor  intended  the  ['73] 
lieirs  of  his  body  should  take  it  at  his  decease,  for  he 
gives  it  over,  or  reserves  it,  in  case  he  has  no  such  heirs,  and 
only  in  that  continirency.^ 

25.  But  if  the  gift  be  to  A  and  his  heirs,  so  long  as  ho,  or 
some  other  jtcrson  named,  has  heirs  of  his  body,  it  is  a  fee- 
simple  determinable,  and  not  an  estate  tail.  The  heirs  who 
may  take  are  unlimited,  but  the  duration  of  their  estate  is 
limited  and  measured  by  the  length  of  time  that  the  line  of 
8ucc«'Ssion  ni  heirs  of  the  donee's  body,  or  of  the  other  j)erson 
named,  may  last.*^ 

20.  And  a  deed  to  A  and  his  heirs  of  lands,  to  have  and  to 


»  2  Prest.  Est.  360,  374  ;  1  M.  451  ;  Wms.  Real  Prop.  30. 

«  Matlack  v.  Rolierts,  54  Pciin.  St.  148  ;  Allen  v.  Trustees,  102  M.-Uks.  262. 

»  Fahrney  r.  Holsinger,  65  reiin.  St  388  ;  Shutt  r.  Rainlw,  57  IViiii.  St.  lift 

«  1  Prest.  Est.  451  ;  2  Prest.  Est.  397,  398  ;  White  v.  Collins,  Com.  289. 

6  Perkins,  §  173  ;  Allen  r.  Trustees,  102  -Moas.  262. 

•  2  Prcst.  Eat,  353-360  ;  Id,  301  ;  2  Ml  Com.  113. 


106  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

hold  (^habendum),  to  the  heirs  of  his  body, limits  and  qualifies 
the  estate  otherwise  a  fee-simple,  and  reduces  it  to  an  estate 
tail,  defining  in  effect  in  the  second  clause  what  was  meant 
by  "  heirs  "  in  the  first.^  So  a  limitation  to  A  B  and  his 
heirs,  and  if  he  die  without  issue  of  his  body,  then  remainder 
over  to  some  other  person,  it  would  by  this  clause,  as  to  issue 
of  his  body,  be  understood  as  restricting  the  general  word 
heirs  to  heirs  or  issue  of  the  donee's  body.^ 

27.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  first  grant  had  been  to  A  and 
the  heirs  of  his  body,  with  the  habendum  to  A  and  his  heirs, 
without  any  terms  of  restriction,  the  courts,  in  order  to  give 
effect  to  both  clauses,  if  possible,  would  hold  that  he  first 
creates  an  estate  tail,  and  that  so  long  as  he  has  issue  to  take 
they  will  take  as  tenants  in  tail.  But  if  at  any  time  such  line 
of  issue  fail,  then  the  estate  would  go  to  his  heirs  generally, 
so  that  he  is  said  to  take  an  estate  tail  in  prcesenti,  with  an 
estate  in  fee-simple  in  expectancy.^ 

28.  Much  that  has  been  said  in  a  former  chapter  in  relation 
to  fees  being  determinable  upon  the  happening  of  some  event, 

applies  to  fees  tail,  as  where  an  estate  is  limited  to 
[*74]   one  and  the  heirs  of  his  *  body,  so  long  as  a  tree  shall 

stand,  or  until  A  shall  return  from  Rome,  or  until  the 
donee  or  some  third  person  shall  do  some  prescribed  act.  So 
the  estate  may  be  defeasible  by  the  happening  of  some  con- 
dition. So  it  may  be  limited  to  one  and  the  heirs  of  his  body, 
tenants  of  the  manor  of  Dale,  and  the  like.  The  same  rule 
applies  in  these  cases  as  has  been  stated,  heretofore,  in  relation 
to  fees-simple  determinable  and  upon  condition,  as  to  the  estate 
being  defeated  or  defeasible  thereby.^ 

29.  It  has  already  been  stated  that  an  estate  tail  is  one  of 
inheritance,  and  therefore  cannot  exist  in  respect  to  a  mere 
freehold  estate  for  life  or  in  a  chattel  interest.  And  a  limi- 
tation in  terms  which  would  create  an  estate  tail  if  applied 

1  2  Prest.  Est.  509  ;  Altham's  Case,  8  Rep.  154  b. 

2  Per  Ld.  Holt,  Idle  v.  Cooke,  2  Ld.  Raym.  1152;  Brice  v.  Smith,  Willes,  1; 
Hulburt  V.  Emerson,  16  Mass.  241  ;  2  Prest.  Est.  519  ;  Hay  ward  v.  Howe,  12 
Gray,  49  ;  Gilford  v.  Choate,  100  Mass.  343,  345. 

3  Perkins,  §  168  ;  Co.  Lit.  21  a  ;  Altham's  Case,  8  Rep.  154  b ;  Corbin  v. 
Healy,  20  Pick.  514. 

4  2  Prest.  Est.  362  ;  Id.  446. 


en.  IV.]  ESTATES  T.ML.  lOT 

to  real  ostutc  would  vest  the  wliolr  mitn-.^t  ni)Soliit«ly  in  the 
first  taker  if  eiuployed  as  to  chattels  or  chattel  interests  in 
lands,  and  a  limitation  of  chattels  over  to  the  issue  of  the  lirst 
taker  would  ho  void,  hecause  the  statute  I)c  Duuitt  apjdics 
only  to  lands  and  tenements.' 

30.  In  all  cases  whcic  the  heirs  of  a  donee  in  tail  fak<'  the 
estate,  they  do  so  hy  descent  and  n<»t  l»y  jmrchasi'.  Ihit  the 
heirs  in  such  case  do  ni»t  cdaim  the  estate  as  comin^^  from  their 
ancestor  as  its  source,  hut  as  an  estate  coming  tlu'outrh  him 
as  special  heir,  which  he  cannot  intercept  excejjt  in  the  mode 
provided  hy  law.^  IJut  if  the  limitation  were  to  the  heirs  of 
the  hody  of  A,  whoever  answers  to  that  description  would 
take  as  purchasers,  antl  the  estate  would  then  descend  to  the 
same  issue  and  in  the  same  order  of  succession  as  if  the  estate 
had  heen  limited  to  A  and  the  heirs  of  his  hody.'' 

31.  Under  the  doctrine  of  entails,  the  form  of  the  g^ift, 
rather  than  the  general  canons  of  descent  of  estates,  is  to  he 
refi'rred  to,  to  determine  the  line  of  succession  in  which  the 
estate  is  to  pass.'*  It  is  therefore  requisite,  in  order  to  create 
such  an  estate,  that,  in  addition  to  tin;  word  heirs,  there  should 
be  w(jrds  of  procreation  which  indicate  the  hody  from  which 
these  heirs  are  to  proceed,  or  the  j)erson  l)v  whom 
hegotten.  If  this  is  *  done,  it  may  not  he  necessary  [*75] 
to  make  use  of  the  words  "  of  the  body,"  if,  by  the 
description,  it  aj)pear8  that  they  are  to  be  the  issue  of  a  par- 
ticular jjcrson.^  A  general  limitation  to  a  man  and  the  heirs 
of  his  body  is  sufficient,  it  being  immaterial  of  whom  be- 
gotten.^ 

32.  The  form  of  limiting  the  estate,  whether  it  be  to  one 

•  2  Bl.  Com.  113  ;  Whitinore  r.  Weld,  1  Vern.  326  an<l  343,  n.  ;  Co.  Lit.  20  r, 
and  n.  120  ;  ('liild  v.  Bay  lie,  Cro.  Jac.  461  ;  Atkin.son  r.  Hutchinson,  3  P.  Wms. 
258  ;  2  Jurui.  Wills,  489,  and  Perkins's  note  ;  Biitton  v.  Twining,  3  Mt-r.  176, 
183  ;  Stockton  t'.  Martin,  2  Bay,  471  ;  Wms.  Ex.  565  ;  Id.  949  ;  ante,  pi.  12,  13. 
Albee  V.  Carpenter,  12  Cush.  382.  But  see  Forth  r.  Chnpnian,  1  P.  Wms.  663  ; 
Hall  r.  Priest,  6  Gray,  18,  22  ;  that  a  dilFerent  con.struction  may  U-  given  to  tho 
words  "  leaving  no  issue."     I'tvit,  vol.  2  •365. 

'  Perry  v.  Kline,  12  Cush.  127.  »  2  Prest.  Est.  360  ;  Id.  375. 

•  2  Prest  Rst.  375. 

•  2  Prest.  Est.  478  ;  Co.  Lit.  20  b  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  115. 

•  2  Prest.  Est  412. 


108  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

and  the  heirs  of  his  body  begotten,  or  to  such  heirs  to  be 
bcg-otten,  is  immaterial,  for  in  the  former  case  it  would  extend 
to  children  born  after  the  gift,  and  in  the  latter  would  em- 
brace those  already  born.i 

33.  The  estates  thus  far  spoken  of  come  within  the  class  of 
estates  tail  general,  which  are  such  as  are  limited  to  a  man 
and  the  heirs  of  his  body  without  any  further  specification. 
But  there  is  a  class  of  these  which  are  called  estates  tail  spe- 
cial, where  the  limitation  is  to  some  particular  class  of  heirs 
of  the  body  of  the  donee,  as  to  those  begotten  on  his  wife 
Mary,  and  the  like.  So  it  may  be  to  tlie  heirs  male  or  female 
of  the  body  of  the  donee,  making  an  estate  tail  male  or  an 
estate  tail  female.  Such  limitations  as  these  confine  the 
inheritance  to  the  special  issue  prescribed,  and  none  other 
can  succeed  to  it.  Thus,  if  the  estate  be  limited  to  a  man 
and  the  heirs  of  his  body  by  his  first  wife,  and  she  die  with- 
out issue,  no  issue  by  any  other  wife  could  claim  the  inheri- 
tance.^ 

34.  If,  for  instance,  the  gift  be  to  A  and  the  heirs  of  his 
body,  on  his  wife  Mary  begotten,  it  presupposes  that  he  then 
has  a  wife  of  that  name.  And  if  such  is  not  the  case,  the  gift 
would  fail.  But  if  it  be  to  A  and  the  heirs  of  the  body  of  B 
his  wife,  who  is  dead,  it  is  an  estate  tail,  if  there  are  any  issue 
of  that  wife  living  when  the  gift  is  made.  But  if  there  are 
no  such  issue  living,  instead  of  his  becoming  tenant  in  tail,  he 
is  merely  tenant  for  his  own  life.  He  is  not  even  tenant  in 
tail  after  possibility  of  issue  extinct,  which  will  be  hereafter 
explained.^ 

35.  In  order  to  have  a  limitation  in  special  tail  good 
[*76]  where  *the  issue  is  to  be  begotten  of  some  woman 
named,  she  must  either  be  the  donee's  wife  or  one  who 
by  possibility  may  become  such.  If,  for  instance,  she  was  so 
near  akin  to  the  donee  as  to  render  it  unlawful  for  them  to 
marry,  the  estate  would  be  in  him  only  for  life.^ 

1  2  Prest.  Est.  449,  450. 

2  2  Bl.  Com.  113,  114  ;  1  Spence,  Eq.  Jur.  141  ;  2  Prest.  Est.  413,  414, 
420. 

8  2  Prest.  Est.  414  ;  Co.  Lit.  27  a,  n.  155  ;  2}ost,  p.  *83. 
4  2  Prest.  Est.  417. 


CIl.  IV.]  ESTATFS   TAIL.  100 

3n.  But  it  is  imnuitrriul  how  inji»i(tlialili»  it  may  lio  lliat  the 
donee  iimy  ever  marry  the  woman  named,  or  imposhiMe  that 
if  married  tliey  should  ever  have  issue.  Thus,  supiiose  the 
donee  i.^  married  at  the  time,  and  the  woman  named  is  tlie  wife 
of  anntlier,  it  is  enough  that  possibly  his  wife  and  the  hus- 
haiid  i>f  (hr  other  wom;iM  may  die,  and  he  and  she  may  inter- 
marry and  have  issue,  li(»wt'ver  imjirolialih'.  So  if  th«"  done*? 
and  the  woman  named  are  married  at  the  time  of  tlio  ^'ift, 
and  the  estate  is  limite<l  ((»  liini  and  the  heirs  of  his  hody  on 
such  wife  heirotten,  it  would  l)e  an  estate  tail,  thonirh  she  was 
at  the  time  an  iiundred  years  old,  and  would  not  be  an  estate 
tail  after  possibility  of  issue  extinct  so  long  as  the  parties 
named  are  livin<r.^ 

37.  Where  the  limitation  is  to  one  and  the  heirs  male,  or 
to  him  anil  the  heirs  female  of  his  body,  it  confines  the  inher- 
itance to  the  one  line  and  exeludes  the  other  from  the  suc- 
cession. So  that  whoever  claims  by  descent  must  be  able  to 
trace  his  or  her  line  back  to  the  donee  through  males  alto- 
gether or  females  altogether.  And  this  case  is  put  by  way  of 
illustration.  Estate  to  A  and  the  heirs  male  of  his  body, 
remainder  to  the  heirs  female  of  his  body.  Here  there  are 
two  lines.  If  the  males  run  out,  the  estate  will  then  go  by 
way  of  remainder  to  his  heirs  female.  If  then  the  donee  were 
to  have  a  son  who  has  a  daughter  who  has  a  son,  this  son  last 
named  could  take  nothing,  since,  being  a  male,  ho  cannot 
trace  through  his  mother,  and  she,  lieing  a  female,  could  not 
trace  through  her  father,  and  the  land  in  such  a  case  would 
revert  to  the  donor.  Hail  the  remainder  been  to  the  heirs  of 
his  body  generally,  it  might  have  descended  in  the  case  sup- 
posed to  the  great-grandson  of  the  donce.^ 

88.  In  regard  to  making   use  of   proper   technical 
terms  in  •creating  estates  tail  by  deed  and  by  will,  the  [*TT] 
same  rules  of  strictness  or  latitude  apply  as  in   the 
manner  of  estates  in  fee-simple.     Thus  a  grant  to  a  man  and 
his  heirs  male,  by  deed,  would  be  construed  to  create  a  fee- 
simple  for  want  of  the  requisite  words,  "of  his  body,"  or  their 

1  Id.  395. 

«  Co.  Lit.  25  b  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  114  ;  2  Prest.  Est  402,  403;  Wms.  Real  Prop.  80; 
Holburt  V.  EroersoD,  16  Mass.  241. 


110  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK  L 

equivalent.  But  if  it  had  been  by  will,  the  law,  to  carry  out 
testator's  intention,  would  supply  these  words  and  regard  it  a 
fee-tail.^ 

39.  Among  the  illustrations  given  of  estates  tail  having 
been  created  by  deed  without  the  use  of  the  words,  "  of  the 
body,"  but  with  words  regarded  as  equivalent,  are  —  to  A 
and  his  heirs,  namely,  the  heirs  of  his  body  —  or  of  himself 
lawfully  issuing  or  begotten  —  or  of  his  flesh,  or  of  his  wife, 
begotten,  —  or  which  he  shall  happen  to  have  or  beget.^ 

40.  And  yet  if  the  word  "  heirs  "  is  wanting,  the  estate  is 
only  one  for  life,  though  terms  of  entailment  even  stronger 
than  those  above  mentioned  were  used.  Thus  a  grant  to  A 
and  his  issue  of  his  body,  or  to  him  and  his  seed,  or  to  him 
and  his  children  or  offspring,  would  only  create  an  estate  for 
life,  provided  the  estate  be  created  by  deed.^ 

41.  So  a  gift  to  A  and  his  eldest  son  and  heir  male  of  the 
said  A  begotten  was  held  not  to  be  an  estate  tail,  the  words 
"heir  male"  being  qualified,  explained,  and  limited  to  be  the 
same  thing  as  son,  a  description  of  the  person  to  take,  and 
not  a  term  of  limitation  and  inheritance.* 

42.  But  where  the  gift  was  by  devise  to  a  man  and  his  seed, 
or  his  heirs  male,  or  his  children,  if  he  then  have  none,  or  to 
him  and  his  posterity,  or  by  other  words  showing  an  intention 
to  restrain  the  inheritance  to  the  descendants  of  the  devisee, 
it  would  create  an  estate  tail.^  Thus  a  devise  to  J  S  and 
his  heirs  if  he  should  have  lawful  issue,  but  if  he  die  without 
issue  then  over,  would  create  an  estate  tail  in  J  S.^ 

43.  There  is  a  rule  in  respect  to  the  nature  of  estates,  which 
prevails  in  England  and  in  several  of  these  States,  though 
abrogated  by  statute  in  others,  called  the  Rule  in  Shelley's 

Case,  which  has  given  rise  to  questions  of  no  little 

[*78]  nicety  and  *  refinement  in  respect  to  estates  tail,  which 

it  seems  proper  to  allude  to  here,  although  it  is  treated 

1  2  Bl.  Com.  115  ;  Co.  Lit.  27  a  ;  2  Prest.  Est.  536, 

2  Co.  Lit.  20  b  ;  2  Prest.  Est.  485. 

8  2  Prest.  Est.  480.  *  2  Prest.  Est.  481,  482. 

6  2  Bl.  Com.  115;  Id.  381  ;  2  Prest.  Est.  537;  Nightingle  v.  Burrell,  15  Pick. 
104.  But  if  the  first  gift  is  for  life,  the  children  take  only  a  remainder.  Taylor 
V.  Taylor,  63  Penn.  St.  481,  488. 

6  Arnold  v.  Brown,  7  K.  L  188. 


CU.  IV.]  ESTATES   TAIL.  Ill 

more  at  larjxe  in  iinotlu'r  jiart  of  the  work.  Thus,  if  an  c-.statc 
lie  ^'iven  to  a  man  for  life,  remainder  to  his  heirH  or  to  the 
heirs  of  his  hudy,  instead  of  this  being,  as  it  aiiparenfly  is, 
and  as,  hy  statute,  it  is  declared  to  he  in  many  of  the  L'nite<i 
States,  an  estate  for  life,  renuiiuder  to  the  heirs  of  the  tenant 
for  life,  it  is  held  that  the  word  heirs  is  intended  to  denote  the 
(>\tent  and  character  of  the  estate  which  the  first  taker  has, — 
in  other  words,  that  it  is  a  term  of  limitation  and  not  of  pur- 
chase, and  if  the  heir  takes  it  all,  he  takes  by  descent  and  not 
by  purchase.^  It  was  held  in  New  Jer.sey  that  a  grant  to  a 
married  woman  for  life,  and  at  her  death  to  lier  children,  of 
her  by  her  iiusliand  begotten,  was  an  estate  tail  in  tin-  wife, 
nor  woulil  it  enlarge  it  to  a  fee,  although  the  covenants  in  the 
deed  were  to  her  and  her  heirs  generally.'"^  Of  course,  to  bring 
a  case  within  the  rule,  the  limitation  to  the  heirs  must  be  to 
heirs  who  would  take  the  entire  estate  limited  to  the  first 
taker.  For  if,  for  instance,  the  first  estate  be  limited  to  A 
and  B,  and  the  limitation  over  be  to  the  licirs  of  B,  it  turns 
the  estate  of  A  and  B  at  once  into  a  joint-life  estate,  and  the 
heirs  of  B  would  take  as  purchasers  or  remainder-men,  for 
they  could  not  take  by  descent,  being  heirs  only  of  one.^ 

44.  Now,  to  apjtly  this  rule  in  cases  of  limitation  of  an  es- 
tate to  husband  and  wife  and  their  heirs  in  tail,  the  question 
usually  is,  arc  these  heirs  the  heirs  of  the  body  of  the  two  or 
of  one  only  of  them,  because  in  one  case  the  heirs  take,  if  at 
all,  by  descent  within  the  rule  in  Shelley's  Case,  —  in  the  other 
as  nuuainder-men  and  purchasers.  If  the  gift  is  to  the  hus- 
]>and  and  his  lieirs  which  lie  shall  beget  on  the  body  of  his 
wife,  it  creates  in  him  an  estate  tail,  while  his  wife  takes  no 
estate  by  the  gift.  If  the  remainder  be  limited  to  the  heirs  of 
the  body  of  the  wife  by  the  husband  to  be  begotten,  she  is  the 
one  who  takes  an  estate  tail,  and  not  the  husband.  But  if  it 
be  to  A  and  his  wife,  and  their  heirs  on  the  body  of  the 
wife  begotten,  they  both  take  estates  tail.     And  in  all  these 

1  The  reader  will  bear  in  mind  that  there  are  only  two  ways  oi  u  ■.imrmg  rvnl 
estate,  one  by  dtxcnt,  the  other  hy  purchasf.  If  a  niau  does  not  take  as  heir,  bo 
takes  by  purchase,  no  matter  how  he  acquires  hia  title. 

2  Rom  r.  Adams,  28  N.  J.  160,  168. 
«  2  Prest.  Est.  441,  442. 


112  LAW    OF   REAL   rROPERTY.  [BOOK   1. 

[*79]  cases  the  heirs  take,  if  at  all,  by  descent,^  *  and  not  by 
purchase,  while  the  limitation  to  the  heirs  will  vest  an 
estate  tail  in  that  ancestor  with  reference  to  whom  the  word 
heirs  is  used.  If  the  estate  is  given  to  both  husband  and  wife, 
each  has  a  life  estate,  and  if  the  one  whose  heirs  are  to  take 
dies  first,  his  heirs  take  an  estate  tail  in  remainder  after  the 
death  of  the  other  tenant.^ 

45.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  estate  be  to  husband  for  life, 
or  wife  for  life,  remainder  to  the  heirs  of  the  bodies  of  hus- 
band and  wife,  the  heirs  take  as  purchasers  and  not  by  de- 
scent ;  and  the  same  would  be  the  case  if  the  limitation  were 
to  husband  or  to  wife  and  the  heirs  of  the  bodies  of  husband 
and  wife.^ 

46.  And  it  may  be  remarked,  in  passing,  that  for  reasons 
hereafter  explained,  such  a  remainder  would  be  a  contingent 
one,  so  long  as  the  parent  whose  heirs  were  to  take,  lived,  be- 
cause, as,  nemo  est  hceres  viventis,  the  person  who  is  to  take 
as  heir  could  not  be  ascertained  till  the  parent's  death.* 

47.  And  it  may  be  further  remarked  that  at  common  law, 
if  by  a  devise  an  estate  is  so  limited  to  heirs  that  they  will 
take  it,  if  at  all,  by  descent  from  one  to  whom  the  life  estate  is 
given,  and  the  estate  to  the  latter  fails  by  lapsing  in  conse- 
quence of  his  dying  during  the  life  of  the  testator,  the  estate 
to  the  heir  fails  also ;  whereas,  if  it  had  been  to  them  as  pur- 
chasers, the  death  of  the  ancestor  would  not  affect  the  gift  to 
the  heirs  of  the  body.^ 

48.  Among  the  incidents  of  estates  tail,  the  tenant  may  freely 
commit  waste  upon  the  premises  as  if  he  were  tenant  in  fee- 
simple,^  though  he  cannot  by  selling  growing  timber,  authorize 

1  The  term  descent,  as  used  in  this  chapter  in  connection  with  the  transmission 
of  an  estate  to  the  issue  in  tail  upon  decease  of  the  ancestor,  tenant  in  tail,  is  in- 
tended to  indicate  that  he  takes  it  as  an  estate  of  inheritance  in  tail,  and  as  being 
of  the  prescribed  line  of  issue  or  inheritance,  and  not  simply  from  his  intermedi- 
ate ancestor,  since  he  t&kes  per  formam  doni  from  the  person  who  first  created  the 
estate.  1  Cruise,  Dig.  83 ;  Partridge  v.  Dorsey,  3  Har.  &  J.  302  ;  Perry  v.  Kline, 
12  Cush.  118,  127. 

2  2  Prest.  Est.  443,  483  ;  Denn  v.  Gillot,  2  T.  R.  431. 
»  2  Prest.  Est.  441,  442. 

*  Frogniorton  v.  Wharrey,  2  W.  Bl.  728,  730  ;  s.  c.  3  "Wils.  144. 

5  2  Prest.  Est.  442  ;  Burrage  v.  Briggs,  120  Mass.  103. 

6  Co.  Lit.  224  a ;  1  Atk.  Conv.  195  ;  Jervis  v.  Bruton,  2  Vem.  251. 


(11.  IV.]  ESTATES   TAIL.  11,'i 

it  to  bo  cut  alter  liis  doccatto,  it  being  a  right  belonging  to  bini 
only  as  toniint.' 

49.  Dower  ami  curtesy  are  also  incidents  of  this  as 

of  estates  *  in  frc-.siiujilt','  an«l  althou'^h  the  tenant  may  ['80] 
not  charge  tlu*  estate  by  his  agre«'nients  or  with  his 
debts  or  incunil)rances,  so  as  to  alTect  it  after  his  death,'  it  is 
now,  by  statute,  made  liable  to  a  limited  extent  for  the  debts 
of  the  tenant,  and  may  be  sold  by  assignees  in  bankruptcy  or 
insolvency  of  the  tenant,  to  the  same  extent  as  he  could  have 
disposed  of  it.* 

50.  If  tlu're  are  outstanding  charges  <»r  iiiciiiiiiiraiice.s  upon 
the  estate,  the  tenant  is  not  bound  in  pay  them  olT ;  and  it  has 
l>een  held  that  he  was  not  compellable  by  the  reversioner  or 
remainder-man  to  keeji  down  the  interest,  except  in  special 
cases,  although  it  is  incumbent  upon  a  tenant  for  life  to  do  so. 
And  the  reason  appears  to  be  that  e(piity  considers  the  estate 
as  his  own,  and  that  he  may  keej»  down  the  incumbrance  or 
lose  the  estate  as  he  please.s.  Uut  if  he  does  pay  it  oft",  he 
is  considered  as  doing  it  on  his  own  account,  and  cannot  by 
so  doing  make  himself  creditor  of  tlu;  estate  for  the  amount, 
unless  he  takes  an  as.signment  to  himself  of  the  incumbrance 
which  he  pays.** 

51.  As  a  proposition  almost  universal,  where  a  greater  and 
less  estate  come  together  in  one  jierson  by  the  same  right, 
without  any  intervening  estate,  they  will  unite  in  one,  the  les- 
ser being  merged  or  swallowed  up  in  the  greater.  IJut  this  does 
not  apply  in  case  of  estates  tail.  If  the  tenant  ac(piire  the 
reversion  or  remainder  in  fee-simple,  it  does  not  merge  the 
limited  estate  which  he  has  as  tenant  in  tail.  And  this  grows 
out  of  thi'  statute  iJf  Douia,  which  meant  to  restrain  him  as 
tenant  from  passing  this  estate  out  of  him,  which  he  might 

»  Liford's  Cuae,  11  Rt-p.  50.  »  Co.  Lit.  224  a. 

•  Wliurton  V.  Wharton,  2  Vom.  3,  nml  n.  ;  1  Atk.  Conv.  ly"  ;  Ht-rtHrt  r. 
Frcwii,  2  Va[.  Cius.  Abr.  28,  §  34  ;  PurtriJf^u  r.  I)on.«;y,  3  Ilur.  &  J.  302  ;  1  CruUe, 
DiK-  S4. 

*  Tud.  Ciw.  fll4  ;  1  Atk.  Conv.  lys. 

»  1  Cniis*.,  Diff.  7r.  ;  Tu.1.  Cn«.  638  ;  Chnpliu  r.  Chaplin,  3  P.  Wm«.  229  ;  2 
Ijiw  .Miif;.  26.''),  2t5«,  270.     Soe,  an  to  o-jiiity  iippointing  m-fivpn.  to  collect  ivnU 
and  kp»'p  ilown  the  inten'st  on  incumbranci-H  «ipon  estates  tail.  Story"*  ¥a\.  $  835  ; 
Jertniy,  K.i.  Jur.  251,  252  ;  Bertio  r.  Abingdon,  3  Mer.  560. 
YOU  I.— 8 


114  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

easily  have  done  if  by  his  acquiring  the  reversionary  interest 
it  had  merged  in  the  reversion.^ 

52.  So  long  as  an  estate  retains  the  character  of  an 
[*81]  estate  *  tail,  it  will  descend,  in  due  course  of  law,  to 
the  issue  of  the  donee,  who  answer  the  requisite  de- 
scription, however  remote  in  degree,  from  the  person  to  whom 
the  gift  may  have  been  originally  made,  each  of  whom  in  suc- 
cession will  be  tenants  in  tail,  with  all  the  powers  and  rights 
which  the  common  ancestor,  the  donee,  had  in  respect  to  the 
estate,  so  long  as  there  may  by  possibility  be  issue  to  answer 
to  this  description.^ 

53.  In  England,  the  course  of  descent  of  estates  in  fee- 
simple  and  fee  tail  general,  is  the  same  by  the  common  law ; 
as  for  example,  to  the  oldest  son,  if  the  ancestor  have  sons.^ 
And  the  same  rule  applies  in  this  country,  where  the  subject 
is  not  regulated  by  statute,  the  oldest  son  of  the  donee  and  his 
oldest  son,  and  so  on,  taking  in  succession.* 

54.  And  yet  this  theoretic  perpetuity  of  succession  has 
practically  little  effect.  By  the  ease  with  which  estates  tail 
may  be  barred  and  converted  into  fees-simple,  strict  and  con- 
tinuous entails  have  long  since  been  virtually  abolished  in 
England ;  and  the  remark  applies  with  greater  force  in  this 
country,  where,  as  will  be  seen,  not  only  may  they,  where  they 
exist,  be  barred  with  equal  facility,  but  in  many  States  such 
estates  have  been  wholly  abolished.^ 

55.  The  mode  of  effectually  barring  these  estates  or  con- 
verting them  into  estates  in  fee-simple  was  formerly  by  com- 
mon recoveries,  which  has  already  been  spoken  of.  Since 
these  have  been  abolished  in  England,  it  may  be  done  by  deed 
executed  by  the  tenant  in  tail  and  enrolled  in  chancery  within 
six  months  after  its  execution.  The  form  and  effect  of  this  is 
regulated  by  the  statute  3  and  4  Wm.  IV.  c.  74,  which  makes 
provision,  in  certain  cases,  for  guarding  against  injustice  be- 
ing done  to  parties  in  interest,  by  requiring  the  assent  of  a 

1  Wiscot's  Ca.se,  2  Rep.  61  ;  1  Atk.  Conv.  194 ;  Roe  v.  Baldwere,  5  T.  R.  104, 
110;  Poole  V.  Morris,  29  Ga.  374. 

2  2  Prest.  Est.  394;  Wms.  Real  Prop.  53  ;  Corbin  v.  Healy,  20  Pick.  514. 
8  Wms.  Real  Prop.  63  ;  Id.  45. 

'•  Corbin  v.  Healy,  20  Pick.  514  ;  Wight  v.  Thayer,  1  Gray,  284. 
6  Wms.  Real  Prop.  64 ;  post,  *84, 


ClI.  IV.]  ESTATES   TAIL.  11.", 

person  calltMl  a  protector  to  such  sale,  in  order  to  its  \if\wj 
an  rllVctiial  bar.     J!ut  il.s  gn-at  Iciiirtli  renders  it  neces- 
sary to  reler  the   reader  to  the   *  statute  itself  for  its   [•>'l^J 
vari(jus  j)rovisions.'     The  mode  of  barring  estates  tail 
in  this  country  will  be  noticed  by  it.sj.df. 

6(>.  Althoui,di  this  may  n<jt  be  the  place  to  treat  of  it  at 
large,  it  may  bo  i)ro|ier,  in  this  connection,  to  say  that  it  is 
very  common  in  Englaml  to  create  a  temporary  entailment 
of  lands  in  the  donor's  family  by  means  oi  marriage  settle- 
ments, which  may  extend  through  one  generation,  and  until 
the  person  in  the  second  who  is  to  succeed  to  the  estate, 
usually  an  oldest  son,  is  of  age,  to  bar  it  l>y  his  deed,  as  he 
may  do  by  consent  of  the  tenant  actually  in  j)Ossession.  This 
he  generally  dues  by  making  a  new  settlement,  u.-iually  in 
favor  of  an  oldest  son  ;  and  so  primogeniture,  as  it  obtains 
among  the  gentry  there,  is  a  matter  of  custom  rather  than  of 
legal  right,  since  these  conveyances  might  always  be  made  to 
strangers.  To  explain  this,  one  form  of  making  these  settle- 
ments is  to  convey  lands  to  the  use  <jf  the  husband  for  life, 
Avitli  provisions  for  the  wife  and  daughters  therein,  and  then 
to  the  oldest  son  who  might  be  born  of  the  marriage,  in  tail, 
and,  in  case  of  his  dying  without  issue,  then  to  the  second 
son,  and  so  on  to  the  third  ;  and  to  daughters  in  default  of 
son.s.  And  in  this  way  the  estate  is  locked  up  from  alienation 
till  some  tenant  in  tail  is  twenty-one  years  of  age,  and  sees  lit 
to  bar  the  entail  in  the  manner  above  stated.- 

57.  Still  the  pidicy  of  the  law  is  against  clogging  the  free 
alienation  of  estates,  and,  as  will  be  shown  hereafter,  it  has 
become  an  imperative,  unyielding  rule  of  law,  first,  that  no 
estate  can  be  given  to  the  unl)orn  child  of  an  unborn  child  ; 
and  second,  that  lands  cannot  be  limited  in  any  mode  so  as 
to  be  locked  up  from  alienation  beyond  the  ])eriod  of  a  life 
or  lives  in  being  and  twenty-one  years  after,  allowing  the 
period  of  gestation  in  addition,  of  a  child  en  ventre  sa  mere, 
who  is  to  take  under  such  a  limitation.  This  is  borrowed 
from  the  rule  above  stated  as  to  settlements  where  the  first 

1  Wins.  Real  Prop.  42,  43;  Id.  47,   43  ;  Tu.l.  Cns.   «514  ;  1  Atk.    Coiiv.   240- 
250  ;  2  Sug.l.  Ven.l.  282-290. 

2  Wuis.  Heal.  Prop.  45.     See  vol.  2,  Appendix,  p.  •702. 


116  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

[*83]  tenant  in  tail,  after  an  *  estate  for  life,  as  soon  as  he 
arrives  at  twenty-one  years,  could  convey  the  entailed 
estate.^ 

58.  From  the  very  definition  of  estates  tail  special,  as  above 
given,  it  must  be  obvious  that  cases  may  occur  where  it  may, 
even  while  the  tenant  is  still  alive,  have  become  impossible  for 
any  one  to  take  as  issue  in  tail.  The  estate  may  be  limited  to 
the  heirs  of  his  body  of  his  wife  Mary  begotten,  and  she  may 
have  died  without  issue.  As  no  other  heirs  can  take,  he  be- 
comes what  is  known  as  "  tenant  in  tail,  after  possibility  of 
issue  extinct."  It  can  apply  only  in  cases  of  special  tail ;  for 
if  heirs  of  his  body  general  might  take,  the  law  would  not 
(ieem  the  possibility  of  issue  extinct  so  long  as  he  lives.^ 

59.  Such  an  estate  is  one  of  a  peculiar  character.  It  has 
ceased  to  be  one  of  inheritance,  and  yet  retains  many  of  the 
qualities  of  an  inheritable  estate.  The  tenant  is  not  punish- 
able for  waste,  like  a  tenant  for  life,  and  yet  may  be  restrained 
by  chancery  from  malicious  waste,  although  a  proper  tenant 
in  tail  could  not  be.  He  cannot  any  longer  bar  the  entail, 
and  if  the  remainder  or  reversion  in  fee  were  to  descend  upon 
him,  it  would  merge  his  estate  as  tenant,  as  it  would  if  he 
were  a  mere  tenant  for  life.^ 

60.  Estates  tail  were  introduced  into  the  English  colonies 
with  other  elements  of  the  common  law,  and  in  some  of  the 
colonies  the  mode  of  barring  them  by  common  recovery  ob- 
tained before  the  Revolution.^  Common  recoveries,  as  a 
mode  of  barring  estates  tail  in  Massachusetts,  though  formerly 
in  use,  were  abolished  in  1792.^     Recoveries  were  also  once 

1  Wms.  Real  Prop.  46  ;  Cadell  v.  Palmer,  1  Clark  &  Fin.  372.  Also,  Tud. 
Cas.  331,  358-361.     Post,  vol.  2,  *358. 

2  3  Prest.  Est.  394  ;  Wms.  Real  Prop,  49. 

8  2  Wms.  Real  Prop.  49  ;  1  Cniise,  Dig.  137  ;  Co.  Lit.  27  b,  28  a  ;  Burton, 
Real  Prop.  §  747  ;  2  Sharsw.  Bl.  Com.  125,  n. 

*  Walker,  Am.  Law,  299  ;  4  Kent  Com.  14;  Lyle  v.  Richards,  9  S.  &  R.  330; 
Jackson  v.  Van  Zandt,  12  Johns.  169.  Story,  1  Const.  165,  says  that  Virginia 
adopted  entails,  but  did  not  fines  and  recoveries.  Ami  see  Hawley  v.  Northamp- 
ton, 8  Mass.  34  ;  Partridge  v.  Dorsey,  3  Har.  &  J.  302  ;  Den  v.  Smith,  5  Halst. 
39  ;  Sullivan,  Tit.  77  ;  4  Dane,  Abr.  624  ,  2  Sharsw.  Bl.  Com.  119,  n.  ;  Baker  v. 
ilattocks,  Quiucy  R.  73.  Pu'coveries  were  in  use  in  New  Jersey  till  abolished  by 
statute  in  1799.     Croxall  v.  Shererd,  5  Wall.  283. 

5  4  Dane,  Abr.  82  ;  Periy  v.  Kline,  12  Cush.  118,  126. 


CU.  IV.]  ESTATKS   TAIL.  117 

in  use  in  Now  TIanipsliiro  in  l)!irriii^  ostatrs  tail.  Bell,  J.,  ui 
a  recent  case,  lit-ld  that  (ho  .statute  of  1TH1>  repealed  the  Htat- 
ntc  De  Donia  and  abidi.shed  estates  tail.  And  this  was  subse- 
(luently  reanirmed  by  the  same  conrt.*  * 

01.  Hut  now  the.se  estates  arc  cither  chanj^ed  into 
fees  *  simple  or  reversionary  (^states  in  fee-simple,  and   [*^  1] 
do  not  exist  at  all  a.s  estates  tail,  or  may  be  eonvcrted 
into  estates  in  fee-sini])l<'  by  familiar  forms  of  conveyance,  in 
the  several  States,  l»y  force  of  their  respective  statutes.- 

•  Ndte.  —  No  nllusiou  socnis  to  Ik-  inudo  directly  to  •■.sUitt-H  tail;  or  tiiu's  ninl 
recoveries  iu  the  SUU.  1789.  lu  1791  an  act  wiis  jias-seJ  limiting  the  time  within 
which  "  writa  o{ J'onncdun  in  (IckchcUt,  remaiiuUr,  aiul  reverter,"  may  be  brought. 
An  action  oi  /ormedon  lu  descfiuUr  was  XtuhI  in  the  same  court,  in  1867,  without 
objection.  Ami  in  18.37  an  act  was  \mssod  authorizing  any  person  8eise<l  of 
lanils  in  fee  tail,  and  having  jiower  to  convey  by  tine  and  recover}-,  to  convey  the 
lauds  by  ibrd,  and  thereby  l<ar  all  remainders,  reversions,  kc,  2  l^iws,  310  ; 
Dennett  v.  Dennett,  40  N.  H.  Hep.  498,  503  ;  Frost  p.  Cloutman,  7  X.  H.  9. 

>  Jewell  V.  Warner,  35  N.  H.  176  ;  Dennett  v.  Dennett,  40  N.  H.  .'iOO. 

'  Nightingales.  Burndl,  15  Pick.  116.  Alabama,  fees-tail  are  converted  into 
fees-simple  in  the  hands  of  the  one  to  whom  the  conditional  estate  is  given,  (ode, 
1867,  §  1570.  —  Arkmiaas,  the  tenant  in  tail  is  made  tenant  for  life,  with  remainder 
in  fee-simple  to  the  jwrson  to  whom  at  common  law  the  estate  would  first  de- 
scend. Rev.  Stat.  1838,  c.  31,  §  5.  — Cnli/omin,  the  constitution  prohiliits  i»er- 
potuities.  Art.  11,  §  16.  —  Colorndo,  fees-tail  give  a  life  estate  to  the  first  taker 
and  a  n-mainder  in  fee  to  his  chiblren.  Gen.  L.  1877,  c.  18,  §  6.  —  Connecticut, 
the  issue  of  the  first  donee  in  tail  takes  an  absolute  fee-simple.  Oen.  Stat.  1875, 
p.  352.  —  /khiwarc,  estates  tiil  may  W  barred  by  fine  an<l  common  recovery,  or 
by  deed.  So  tenants  iu  tail  may  alien  their  lamls  in  fee-simple  by  die«l  in  the 
same  way  as  if  the  estate  were  owned  in  fee-simple,  if  the  same  is  acknowle<lgi<l 
and  duly  proved.  Laws,  ed.  1874,  p.  507.  —  Florida,  entails  arc  prohibiteil. 
Thompson,  Dig.  2d  Divis.  Tit.  2,  c.  1,  §  4.  —  Georgia,  estates  tail  are  alwlished. 
A  grant  to  one  and  the  heirs  of  his  Iwdy  cn*ates  an  absolute  fee.  Cotle,  1873, 
p.  391.  — IlfinoLi,  an  estate  tail  is  an  estate  for  life  in  the  tenant  in  tail,  with  a 
remainder  in  fee-sim[ilo  to  the  one  to  whom,  on  the  <leath  of  tlie  first  gnintee,  it 
wouhl  jMiss  according  to  the  course  of  the  common  law.  Hev.  St.  1874,  p.  273. 
—  Indiana,  estates  tail  are  alK)lished,  ami  if  no  valid  remainder  is  limited  upon 
what  in  fonn  is  an  estate  tail,  the  tenant  hn.«  .i  fei-simple.  Stat.  vol.  1,  p.  266.  — 
Iowa,  all  limitations  void  which  susjiond  the  a)is<ilute  jwwer  of  alienation  longiT 
than  lives  in  Wing  and  twenty-one  years.  Ctxle,  1873,  p.  355.  — Knnaaa,  "heirs" 
is  not  rc<iuin'«l  as  a  wonl  of  limitation,  and  lands  d<>.scend  to  children  in  enual 
shares.  Ocn.  St.  1868,  jip.  135,  394.  —  Kentuckti,  estates  which  would  othonnsc 
be  deemed  estates  toil  are  hehl  to  be  fees-simple.  Gen.  St.  1878,  p.  585.  —  '^  ■  ■ , 
tenant  in  tail  may  convey  in  fee-simple.  Rev.  Stat.  1871,  p.  5.59.  — .1/ 
same  as  Maine,  and  estates  in  fee  tail  general  will  descend  to  heirs  like  e;-!.!  ■  -  u, 
fee-simple.     Chelton  t>.  Henderson,  9  Gill,  438  ;  Posey  p.  Budd,  21  Md-  477,  487. 


118  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK    L 

[*85]  The  reader  will  find  what  is  *  believed  to  be  the  sub- 
stance of  the  existing  laws  of  the  several  States  on  the 
subject  in  the  accompan3-ing  note.  The  doctrine  of  entail- 
ment of  estates  in  families  was  never  consonant  to  the  genius 
of  the  people  of  this  country,  and  even  in  the   few  States 

Code,  1860,  pp.  136,  330.  — Michigan,  estates  tail  are  abolished,  and  such  as 
would  be  at  common  law  are  declared  fees-simple.  Comp.  L.  vol.  2,  §  2587.  — 
Minnesota,  persons  holding  what  would  be  an  estate  tail  are  to  be  "  adjudged 
seised  thereof  as  an  allodium."  Rev.  St.  1866.  —  Mississijypi,  estates  tail  are  pro- 
hibited and  declared  to  be  estates  in  fee-simple  except  that  lands  may  be  limited 
to  a  succession  of  donees  then  living,  not  exceeding  two,  and  to  the  heirs  of  the 
body  of  the  remainder- man,  and  in  default  thereof  to  the  heirs  of  the  donor  in 
fee-simple.  Code,  1871,  §  2286.  The  statute  Z)c  Donvs  was  never  in  force  here. 
Jordan  v.  Roach,  32  Miss.  482.  — Missouri,  tenant  in  tail  takes  an  estate  for  life, 
remainder  to  his  children  in  fee  as  tenants  in  common.  Gen.  Stat.  1866,  p.  442. 
—  Massachusetts,  Pub.  Stat.  c.  120,  §  15,  tenant  in  tail  may  convey  an  estate  in  fee- 
simple  by  deeds  in  common  form.  But  a  tenant  in  tail  in  remainder  cannot,  by 
deed,  convey  any  estate,  either  by  way  of  grant  or  estoppel.  Whittaker  v.  Whit- 
taker,  99  Mass,  366  ;  Holland  v.  Cruft,  3  Gray,  183  ;  Allen  v.  Trustees,  102  Mass. 
262,  265.1  Nor  can  a  married  woman  bar  an  entail  by  deed  in  which  her  hus- 
band does  not  join.  Whittaker  v.  Whittaker,  sup.  367.  But  the  estate  of  a 
tenant  in  tail  may  be  taken  on  execution,  or  may  be  sold  by  license  of  court 
after  the  death  of  a  tenant  in  tail  in  possession,  but  not  of  a  tenant  in  tail  in  re- 
mainder. Holland  v.  Cruft,  sujy.  ;  Allen  v.  Trustees,  sup.  Where  land  is  held 
by  one  as  tenant  for  life,  with  a  vested  remainder  in  tail  to  another,  the  tenant  for 
life  and  remainder-man  may  convey  the  same  in  fee-simple  by  their  deed,  which 
deed  will  bar  the  estate  tail  and  all  remainders  and  reversions  expectant  upon  it. 
Gen.  Stat.  c.  89,  §  5.  Under  the  Mass.  statute  of  1791,  a  deed  made  bona  fide, 
for  a  valuable  consideration,  executed  in  the  presence  of  two  witnesses,  barred  en- 
tails. Williams  v.  Hichbome,  4  Mass.  189  ;  CuflFee  v.  Milk,  10  Met.  366  ;  Willey 
V.  Haley,  60  Maine,  176.  — Nebraska,  "heirs"  not  necessary  to  create  a  limita- 
tion of  an  estate  in  fee-simple.  Gen.  Stat.  1873,  p.  383.  — New  Jersey,  the  first 
taker  has  an  estate  for  life,  and  fee-simple  vests  in  the  heirs.  4  Kent,  Com.  15,  n.; 
Nixon,  Dig.  p.  214.  —  New  York,  estates  tail  abolished,  and  if  no  valid  remairder 
is  limited  thereon,  the  tenant  in  tail  takes  a  fee  absolute.  Stat,  at  Large,  vol.  1, 
p.  670.  —  North  Carolina,  tenant  in  fee-t;iil  is  seised  in  fee-simple,  and  for  a  valu- 
able consideration,  may  convey  it  in  fee.  Gen.  Stat.  1873,  p.  383.  —  Ohio,  the 
issue  of  the  first  donee  in  tail  takes  a  fee-simple  absolute.  1  Rev.  Stat.  S.  &  C. 
p.  550.  —  Pennsylvania,  fines  and  recoveries  have  the  same  effect  to  bar  estates 
tail  as  in  England.  Tenants  in  tail  may  convey  lands  of  which  they  are  seised  in 
the  same  manner  as  if  seised  in  fee,  and  thereby  bar  the  entailment,  as  by  a  re- 
covery. 1  Bright.  Purd.  Dig.  1872,  p.  619  ;  Price  v.  Taylor,  28  Penn.  St.  107  ; 
Haldeman  v.  Haldeman,  40  Penn.  St.  36.  —  Rhode  Island,  tenant  in  tail  may  bar 
it  by  fleed  or  devise,  by  limiting  a  fee-simple  to  his  grantee  or  devisee,  the  deed 
to  be  acknowledged  before  the  Supreme  Court  or  Court  of  Common  Pleas.  Gen. 
Stat.  1872;  Cooper  v.  Cooper,  6  R.  I.  264  —  South  Carolina,  statute  De  Bonis 
never  in  force  there  ;  estates  in  fee-simple  conditional  remain  as  at  common  law. 
1  Cf.  Coombs  r.  Aiiderson,  138  Mass.  376. 


CII.  IV.]  ESTATES   TAIL.  119 

whciT  the  loriii  of  ostatL's  (ail  rciiiaiiis,  the  apiilioution  of  it  is 
compaiativoly  rare.  And  the  facility  with  which  even  tlicHC 
may  l)0  harrod  l>y  aliciiiiiLT  thcin,  reiulcrs  the  possibility  of 
creating  thcni  of  little  practical  importance,  thongh  it  does 
not  do  away  with  the  necessity  of  understanding  the  rules  by 
which  such  estates  arc  governed. 

Stat.  vol.  3,  p.  3-11.  —  Teniussie,  all  tenants  in  tail  are  sciacA  in  fcc-simple.  — 
Texiui,  by  Constitution,  art.  1,  §  IS,  m-ithtT  ])rimogi-niturt!  nur  entailment  can  ever 
be  in  forco.  — I'cnnont,  the  iloiifo  in  tail  takes  an  t-state  for  life,  remainder  in  fco- 
simple  absolute  to  him  to  whom  the  estate  would  imiss  uihih  IiIh  death,  fieri.  St. 
1862,  p.  446.  — irixoHsin,  all  estates  tail  changed  into  fee-simple  in  the  U-nant 
in  tail.  15ev.  SUit.  1858,  p.  524.  — Virginia,  estJites  tail  were  aliolished  08  early 
OS  1776.  4  Kent,  Com.  5,  n.  And  now  estates  tail  arc  converted  into  estates  in 
fee-simple,  whidiever  fonu  is  adopted.  Cotle,  1860,  p.  559.  Ami  the  sjime  rule 
prevails  in  Jf'cst  Virginia.  Code,  1868,  p.  460.  —  Dukuta,  estates  liiil  alMi]i-,hid. 
Civ.  Code,  186«. 


120  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 


CHAPTER   V. 

ESTATES   FOR  LIFE. 

Sect.  1.  Their  Nature  and  Incidents. 

Sect.  2.  Of  Estovers. 

Sect.  3.  Of  Emblements. 

Sect.  4.  Of  Waste. 

SECTION   I. 

THEIR   NATURE   AND   INCIDENTS. 

1,  2.  Estates  for  life  — what  and  how  created. 

3,  4.  Estate  jser  autre  vie  —  less  than  for  tenant's  own  life. 

5-7.  What  constitutes  an  estate  for  life,  and  what  not. 

8.  How  far  referable  to  tenant's  natural  life. 

9.  Such  estates  are  freeholds. 

10,  11.  When  and  how  far  affected  by  merger. 

12.  Estate  for  tenant's  own  life  changed  to  one  jjer  autre  vie. 

13-18.  How  great  an  estate  tenant  for  life  may  convey.     Effect  of  ex- 
ceeding this. 

19.  Effect  of  tenant's  disclaiming  landlord's  title. 

20-22.  Doctrine  of  occupancy  in  case  of  death  of  tenant  per  autre  vie. 

23.  Of  gi-ant  and  devise  by  tenant  2Kr  autre  vie. 

24.  Duties  incident  to  estates  for  life.     Defending  the  title. 
24  a.  Tenant  cannot  claim  for  improvements. 

25-27.     As  to  paying  incumbrances  ;  apportionment,  &c. 

28.  As  to  paying  taxes. 

29.  His  possession  that  of  reversioner. 

30-32.     When  rent  is  apportionable,  and  to  whom  payable. 
33.     As  to  possession  of  title-deeds. 

1.  The  next  estate  in  importance,  as  computed  in  the  scale 
of  gradation,  is  an  estate  for  life,  because  ordinarily  measured, 
as  to  its  duration,  by  the  term  of  a  human  life,  and  regarded 
as  a  freehold.  This  is  rather  a  class  of  estates,  and  embraces 
all  freeholds  which  are  not  of  inheritance,  including  estates 
held  by  the  tenant  for  the  term  of  his  own  life,  or  for  the  life 
or  lives  of  one  or  more  other  persons,  or  for  an  'indefinite 


CIl.   V.  §   1.]  KSTATKS    l-OK    LITK.  121 

period  which  may  cmhire  for  tlio  life  or  lisr.-.  .ii  j.-  o-m^.  in 
beinjr,  and  nut  hcyond  the  period  of  a  life.'  Nor  docH  it 
chauLrt'  the  charaelcr  <»f  a  life  estate  so  loiif?  as  it  remains 
such,  that  it  may,  upon  the  happenintr  of  a  eontin^^eiiey,  he- 
come  enl:ir'-''ed  into  a  fee.  Thus,  where  a  (k'vise  was  to  A 
for  Hfe,  remainder  to  testator's  widow  lor  Ufe  if  she  survived 
A,  and  iin  (h-eease  of  Inttli  to  the  heirs  male  of  the  body  of  A, 
it  was  held  that  A  surviving  the  widow,  his  life  estate  then 
beeame  an  estate  tail.^ 

2.  These  estates  may  be  created  by  the  act  of  some  party, 
as  by  a  deed  or  devise,  or  by  act  of  the  law  as  in  case  of 
dower  and  curtesy,  as  being  incident  to  relations  like  that  of 
marriairo,  which  arc  created  by  law. 

3.  Where  the  estate  is  in  one  during  the  life  of  another,  it 
is  technically  called  an  estate  per  autre  vie,  and  he  whose  life 
is  the  measure  of  its  duration  is  styled  cestui  que  vie.^ 

4.  An  estate  for  the  tenant's  own  life  is,  in  the  estimation 
of  the  law,  a  better  one  and  of  a  higher  nature  to  him  than 
one  for  the  life  or  lives  of  another  or  others.  And,  as  in  con- 
struing grants  wlu.'re  the  language  is  equivocal,  that  construc- 
tion is  given  which  is  most  favoralde  to  the  grantee,^  where  a 
grant  is  made  to  one  with  no  other  words  of  limitation,  he 
will  be  entitled  to  an  estate  during  his  own  life,  if  the  estate 
of  the  grantor  will  allow  him  to  C(jnvey  such  an  estate.^ 

6.  Among  the  instances  of  what  will  be  deemed  a  grant  of 
an  estate  for  life  are  those  above  put  of  a  grant  to  one  ex- 
pressly for  life  or  to  him  without  words  of  limitation,  or  to 

»  Hcwlins  V.  Shippiim,  5  B.  &  C.  221  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  121. 

a  A.lains  r.  Atlams,  6  q.  B.  860. 

'  2  Bl.  Com.  120  ;  Co.  Lit.  41  b.  For  what  is  evidence  of  the  death  of  n  uMui 
que  vu,  see  Clark  v.  0\ven.s,  18  N.  Y.  434.  It  is  stated  in  Garland  v.  Crow,  2  liai- 
ley,  24,  that  "  in  contemplation  of  law  an  estate  for  life  is  c(iual  to  seven  years' 
jiurchase  of  the  fee.  To  estimate  the  present  value  of  an  estate  for  life,  interest 
must  be  computed  on  the  value  of  the  whole  property  for  seven  years,  and  jxr- 
haps  interest  on  the  several  sums  of  the  annual  interest,  from  the  jtre.sent  time  to 
the  periods  at  which  they  would  res|)ectivcly  fall  due,  ou^ht  to  be  abate«l."  And 
with  the  rate  of  interest  at  seven  jier  cent,  the  present  value  of  an  estate  for  life 
is  a  fiaction  more  than  thirty-five  jx-r  cent  of  the  value  of  the  abstdute  estatv. 
But  these  absolute  assumptions  have  now  generally  given  way  to  computations 
based  on  average  probabilities  of  life.     See  post,  309. 

♦  Broom.  Max.  457  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  121. 

»  Co.  Lit.  42  a  ;  Broom,  Max.  458  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  121. 


122  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

him  during  the  life  of  another,  or  to  a  woman  so  long  as  she 
shall  remain  a  widow,  or  to  a  man  and  woman  during  cover- 
ture, or  so  long  as  a  man  shall  live  in  a  certain  house, 
[*89]  or  shall  pay  a  *certain  sum,  or  until  ^100  be  paid  out 
of  the  income  of  the  estate,  even  though  the  income  of 
the  estate  be  £10  by  the  year ;  ^  or  so  long  as  the  grantee 
shall  maintain  salt-works  on  the  land.^  So  the  reservation 
by  a  grantor  of  the  use  and  control  of  the  granted  premises 
during  his  life,  creates  in  him  a  life  estate  with  all  its  inci- 
dents.^ The  importance  of  the  distinction  between  freeholds 
of  inheritance,  simple  freeholds,  and  estates  less  than  freehold, 
is  obvious  when  the  incidents  are  considered  which  belong  to 
the  one  or  the  other  of  these. 

6.  Among  the  exceptions  to  the  above  is  a  devise  of  lands 
to  executors  until  testator's  debts  are  paid,  which  will  pass  a 
chattel  and  not  a  freehold  interest.  So  if  the  grantor  himself 
have  only  an  estate  for  life,  or  is  tenant  in  tail,  the  grant,  if 
indefinite,  shall  be  held  to  be  for  the  life  only  of  the  grantor. 
And  in  the  construction  of  wills,  as  well  as  of  deeds  by  statute 
in  several  of  the  States,  as  heretofore  stated,*  it  is  often  held 
that  the  devisor  or  grantor  passes  whatever  estate  he  has, 
whether  a  fee-simple  or  less,  as  the  case  may  be,  though  he 
do  not  make  use  of  words  of  limitation  and  inheritance  in  his 
will  or  deed.^  It  matters  not  how  contingent  or  uncertain 
the  duration  of  the  estate  may  be,  or  how  probable  is  its  de- 
termination in  a  limited  number  of  years,  if  it  is  capable  of 
enduring  for  the  term  of  a  life,  it  is  within  the  category  of 
estates  for  life.^ 

7.  In  many  cases  estates  for  life  are  held  to  be  raised  by 
implication,  especially  under  devises,  as  where  A  devises  his 
land  to  his  heir  after  the  death  of  B.  Here,  as  no  one  but 
the  heir  could  take  except  by  the  will,  and  by  that  he  is 

1  Co.  Lit.  42  a  ;  Tud.  Cas.  31  ;  Jackson  v.  Myers,  3  Johns.  388  ;  Roseboom  v. 
Van  Vechten,  5  Denio,  414.  And  to  these  may  be  added  the  rights  of  "home- 
stead "  in  some  of  the  States,  which  will  be  hereafter  treated.     See  c.  8,  §  2. 

2  Hurd  V.  Gushing,  7  Tick.  169. 

3  Webster  v.  Webster,  33  N.  H.  18,  22  ;  Richardson  v.  York,  14  Me.  216. 
*  Ante,  p.  *29. 

6  Co.  Lit.  42  a.     See  Stat,  of  Wills,  1  Vict.  c.  66,  §  28  ;  2  Jarm.  WUls,  181. 
6  2  Flint.  Real  Prop.  232  ;  Co.  Lit.  42  a. 


CH.  V.  §  1.]  ESTATES    FOR    LIFE.  1  J.". 

postjxniftl  till  the  (\o:\\]\  of  I),  it  is  lidd  that  II  is,  In  con- 
structiou,  inade  tenant  for  lifr.  Hut  if  it  had  hern  to  a 
stranger,  after  the  death  of  1>,  no  sn<  h  inference  would  be 
raised,  for  the  estate  in  the  mean  time  would  go  to  the  heir.' 

8.  It  was  eustonuiry  in  Kngland,  while  mojuisteries  were  in 
existence  there,  to  limit  estates  for  life  to  ]>erson8  durinir  their 
natural  lives,  lest  their  civil  deaths  might  terminate  the  estate. 
But  there  is  no  occasion  in  this  country  io  make  use  of  this 
expression,  as  there  is  no  civil  death  nor  practical  for- 
feiture of  *  lands,  it  is  lidieved,  for  felony,  ami  to  a  ['00] 
very  limited  extent  for  treason.- 

9.  It  has  been  more  than  once  stated  that  estates  for  life 
were  considered  under  the  feudal  law  fieeholds,  were  created 
by  livery  of  seisin,  and  for  them  the  tenants  owed  fealty  to 
the  lord,  hut  not  homage,  as  that  was  due  only  from  the  one 
who  had  the  inheritance.  And  it  may  be  added  that,  accord- 
ing to  strict  feudal  notions,  a  tenancy  per  autre  vie  was  not 
deemed  of  suflicient  importance  to  be  considered  a  freehold 
interest.^ 

10.  In  measuring  the  duration  of  a  life  estate  where  the 
life  of  more  than  one  person  is  referred  to,  the  (|uesti(jn  is 
sometimes  affected  l)y  the  doctrine  of  merger,  which  applies 
where  a  greater  and  less  estate  unite  in  the  same  person,  — 
the  less  being  extinguished.*  Thus  an  estate  to  A  during 
life  and  the  lives  of  B  and  C,  is  considered  cumulative,  and 
will  continue  during  the  lives  of  all  three.^'  Hut  if  it  had 
been  to  A  during  the  life  of  H,  remainder  to  A,  the  estate  to 
himself  would  i)e  considered  a  greater  estate  than  that  during 
the  life  of  the  cestui  que  vie,  and  would  therefore  merge  this 
80  that  A  would  simjily  have  an  estate  for  his  own  life  in 
him.sclf.'^     And  in  conformity  with  the  doetrine  of  merL'-er,  if 

»  1  Jarm.  "Wills,  406,  476. 

2  Wilis.  Hi-al  Prop.,  Iljiwle's  note,  p.  103  ;  5  Dnne,  Abr.  11.  This  is  not  in- 
teiuUtl  to  aj)ply  to  cases  of  alleged  forfeiture  by  the  tenant  for  life,  convej-ing 
the  lands  in  fee,  and  the  like. 

»  2  Bl.  Com.  120  ;  1  Si)ence,  Eq.  Jur.  144  ;  Wni.s.  Real  Prop.  17,  22.  Jlr. 
Williams  is  of  the  opinion  that  feuds  were  not  originally,  as  some  liave  supiMsed, 
held  at  the  will  of  the  lord. 

*  2  Bl.  Com.  177.  »  Co.  Lit.  41  b  ;  .3  Pr.st.  r..„v.  CiS. 

•  3  Prest.  Conv.  225  ;  Smith,  Real  &  Pers.  Prop.  939. 


124  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY,  [BOOK  I. 

the  owner  of  a  reversion  immediately  expectant  upon  an  estate 
for  life,  grant  his  reversion  to  the  tenant  for  life,  it  will  merge 
the  estate  for  life,  even  though  the  grant  be  a  conditional 
one.^  And  this,  whether  the  reversion  he  in  fee,  in  tail,  or 
for  life  only.^ 

11.  But  if  the  tenant  surrender  to  the  reversioner,  and  this 
be  on  condition,  and   then  an  entry  be  made  for  condition 
broken,  the  tenant  for  life  is  in  again  of  his  original  estate, 
and  the  estate  for  life  survives.     The  effect  of  such  an  opera- 
tion is  not  a  complete  merger,  since  a  surrender  is  but 

[*91]  "  the  consent  of  a  *  particular  tenant  that  he  in  remain- 
der or  reversion  shall  presently  have  possession."^  If 
the  tenant  for  life  lease  the  premises  to  the  reversioner  for 
his,  the  reversioner's  life,  his  estate  does  not  merge  in  the  re- 
version, because  he  parts  with  a  less  estate  than  he  is  sup- 
posed to  have  ;  and  if  he  outlives  the  reversioner,  he  will  take 
the  estate  again  for  the  balance  of  his  own  life.* 

12.  Though  there  are  some  peculiarities  in  the  nature  of 
estates  ^:)er  autre  vie,  which  will  be  hereafter  explained,  it 
may  be  here  remarked,  that  if  a  tenant  for  his  own  life,  as, 
for  instance,  a  dowress,  conveys  that  estate  to  another,  the 
latter  becomes  thereby  a  tenant  for  life  per  autre  vie.^ 

13.  A  tenant  for  life  is  regarded  as  so  far  the  owner  of  an 
independent  estate,  that,  unless  restrained  by  the  terms  of  his 
grant,  he  may  convey  his  entire  interest,  or  carve  any  lesser 
estate  out  of  the  same  in  favor  of  another.  In  other  words, 
he  may  assign  his  entire  estate  or  underlet  the  whole  or  any 
part  of  the  same  for  a  longer  or  shorter  period,  not  exceeding 
that  of  his  own.^  He  cannot,  however,  convey  his  estate 
except  by  deed.'^ 

14.  The  conveyance  by  a  tenant  for  life  of  a  greater  estate 
than  he  has  in  the  premises  —  a  fee,  for  instance  —  has  been 
allowed  to  have  a  different  effect  at  different  times  in  England 
and  in  this  country.     While  conveyances  by  feoffment  were 

1  Burton,  Real  Prop.  §  764  ;  Co.  Lit.  218  b.  2  Smith,  Real  Prop.  939. 

8  Burton,  Real  Prop.  §  764  ;  Smith,  Real  &  Pers.  Prop.  939  ;  Termes  de  la  Ley 
"Surrender." 

*  Co.  Lit.  42.  6  Co.  Lit.  41  b. 

8  1  Cruise,  Dig.  108  ;  Jackson  v.  Van  Hoesen,  4  Cow.  325. 
"  Stewart  v.  Clark,  13  Met.  79. 


Cll.  V.   §   l.J  ESTATES    Foil    LIFF-:.  125 

in  usi',  siifh  II  CDUVi'N aiici"  was  drcinnl  tu  woik  a  forfriturc 
of  the  tenant's  untire  estate,  upon  the  feudal  notion  that  hy 
making:  it  he  hail  renounoed  the  feudal  eonneetion  between 
him  and  his  huil,  and  the  estate  in  renjainder  or  reversion 
had  thereby  been  divested  by  the  wrongful  transfer  of  the 
seisin  to  a  8tranj;ei",  and  the  reniainder-ujan  or  reversioner 
niiirht  at  once  enter  for  the  forfeiture  upon  his  orijrinal  ri^dit, 
inasnuieh  as  the  tenant  of  the  particular  estate  ha<l  by  his 
own  act  put  an  entire  i-iul  tu  his  original  estate.  And 
the  same  piinci|)le  ajiplied  in  all  cases  'where  the  ten-  [**•'-] 
ant  of  a  particular  estate  cdnveyed  a  greater  one  than 
he  was  entitled  to.'  I5ut  it  has  never  been  held  a  ^rround  of 
forfeiture  that  tenant  fnr  lit'i-  had  made  a  lease  of  the  premises 
for  years .2 

15.  But  if  the  conveyance  be  by  deed  of  bargain  and  sale, 
lease  and  release,  or  any  form  of  dee<l  under  the  Statute  of 
Uses,  w  hich  is  not  accomplished  by  the  transmutation  of  jkjs- 
session,  it  would  not,  though  in  form  a  fee,  convey  any  more 
than  the  grantor  had  to  part  with,  and  conseciuently,  as  it  did 
not  disturb  the  seisin  of  the  reversioner  or  remainder-man,  it 
would  n(»t  work  a  forfeiture."^ 

It").  And  now  under  the  statute  of  8  «fe  9  Vict.  c.  10(5,  sect. 
4,  which  iK'clares  that  no  feolTment  made  in  wrong  shall  aet 
tortiously,  it  would  seem  that  this  ground  of  forfeiture  is 
removed  in  England.' 

17.  In  this  country  the  law  seems  to  have  l)eon  generally 
regarded  as  the  same  in  this  resj)ect  as  in  England,  in  those 
States  wliere  conveyances  have  the  effect  of  feoflfments,  ac- 
companied by  livery  of  seisin,  or  may  be  made  by  common  re- 
coveries, it  seems  that  a  tenant  for  life  may  work  a  forfeiture 
of  his  land  l>y  conveying  a  greater  estate  than  he  lias.'' 

18,  I5ut  it  is  apprehended  that  this  is  rather  a  theoretic 
than  a  jjractical  princijile,  since  the  deeds  ordinarily  in  use  in 

>  1  Cruise,  Dig.  I(i8  ;  2  Bl.  ('run.  274,  275  ;  5  Dane,  Ahr.  6-8  ;  Co.  Lit  S.'il, 
2j2  ;  Wright,  Ten.  2(il  ;  Wins.  Keal  Prop.  25  ;  Jackson  v.  Mancius,  2  Wt-nJ.  305. 

2  '.ocke  V.  Kowell,  47  N.  H.  46. 

»  1  Cruise,  Dig.  109  ;  Steams,  Ileal  Act.  11  ;  Stevens  r.  Winbhin,  1  Pick.  318. 

«  Wni.H.  Kwil  Prop.  122. 

»  2  Sliarsw.  151.  Com.  121,  n.;  H.'.lfern  r.  Mi-lJleton,  1  Rice,  S.  C  459  ;  Stump 
V.  Fiudlay,  2  Kawle,  1(38.     See  Matthews  v.  Ward,  10  Gill  i  J.  44y. 


126  LAW   OF  EEAL   PROPERTY.  [bOOK   I. 

the  conveyance  of  lands,  though  recorded,  do  not  operate  to 
produce  a  forfeiture,  though  the  tenant  thereby  affect  to  con- 
vey a  larger  estate  than  he  has.     Such  deeds  convey  what  the 

grantor  has  and  nothing  more.^ 
[*93]       *19.  Immediately  connected  with   the  doctrine    of 

forfeiture  by  granting  a  larger  estate  than  the  tenant 
for  life  has,  is  that  of  forfeiture  by  disclaiming  the  title  of 
him  under  whom  he  holds,  or  affirming  in  a  court  of  record 
that  the  reversion  is  in  a  stranger,  by  pleading,  and  the  like. 
Although  such  was  the  common  law,  it  has  not,  it  is  believed, 
ever  obtained  in  this  country .^ 

20.  The  estate  for  life  j^er  autre  vie,  presented,  at  the  com- 
mon law,  several  noticeable  peculiarities  in  certain  contin- 
gencies. Thus,  if  the  tenant  died,  living  the  cestui  que  vie, 
land  was  left  open  without  any  one  having  a  legal  right  to 
claim  it,  —  neither  the  reversioner,  because  the  previous  es- 
tate had  not  expired  ;  nor  the  heir  of  the  tenant,  for  his  estate 
was  not  one  of  inheritance ;  nor  his  executor,  because  it  was  a 
freehold  and  not  a  chattel  interest.  Nor  was  it  deemed  to  be 
devisable.  The  consequence  was,  any  one  who  first  chose  to 
take  possession  might  do  so,  and  was  called  a  general  occupant.^ 

1  McKee  v.  Pfout,  3  Dall.  486  ;  Pendleton  v.  Vandevier,  1  Wash.  381  ;  Ptogers 
V.  Moore,  11  Conn.  553  ;  Bell  v.  Twilight,  22  N.  H.  500  ;  Stevens  v.  Winship,  1 
Pick.  318  ;  Walker,  Am.  Law,  277  ;  Steams,  Keal  Act.  11  ;  4  Kent,  Com.  84. 
In  Maine  it  is  held  that  if  tenant  by  curtesy  conveys  in  fee,  he  forfeits  his  estate, 
and  reversioner  may  enter,  French  v.  Rollins,  21  Me.  372  ;  and  in  Xew  Jersey, 
a  similar  principle  prevails  both  as  to  tenants  by  curtesy  and  in  dower,  4  Kent, 
Com.  84.  See  also  5  Dane's  Abr.  11-13,  where  a  case  is  cited  that  a  conveyance 
in  fee  in  Massachusetts  in  1784  worked  a  forfeiture.  Also  a  dictum  of  Judge 
Jackson,  in  Grant  v.  Chase,  17  Mass.  446,  to  same  effect.  But  it  is  probably 
true,  that  unless  the  case  of  dower  or  curtesy  forms  an  exception,  a  tenant  for 
life  does  not  in  any  case  work  any  forfeiture  by  conveying,  in  form,  a  greater 
estate  than  he  has,  since  only  what  estate  he  has  passes  by  such  deed.  This  is 
declared  to  be  the  law  by  statute  in  many  of  the  States,  namely  :  Alaha'nw,,  Code, 
1852,  §  1317  ;  Maine,  Rev.  Stat.  1871,  p.  559  ;  New  York,  1  Stat,  at  Large,  689; 
Wisconsin,  Rev.  Stat.  1858,  c.  86,  §  4  ;  Massaxhusetts,  Pub.  Stat.  c.  126,  §  9  ; 
Minnesota,  Stat.  1866,  p.  328  ;  Michigan,  Comp.  Stat.  1857,  c.  88,  §  4  ;  Grout  v. 
Townshend,  2  Hill,  554  ;  McCorry  v.  King's  Heirs,  3  Humph.  267,  271,  277 ; 
Dennett  v.  Dennett,  40  N.  H.  498,  505  ;  Hotel  Co.  v.  Marsh,  63  N.  H.  230. 

2  Co.  Lit.  251,  252  ;  1  Cruise,  Dig.  109  ;  5  Dane,  Abr.  11.  How  far  this  ap- 
plies in  cases  of  terms  for  years,  it  is  not  necessary  here  to  discuss.  See  Jack- 
son V.  Vincent,  4  Wend.  633. 

8  2  BI.  Com.  258  ;  Co.  Lit.  41  b ;  Wms.  Ex'rs,  570. 


en.  V.  §   1.]  ESTATES    FOR    LIFE.  127 

But  the  doctrine  of  general  occupancy  was  jiractically  aliol- 
ishc-d  by  the  statute  20  Charles  II.  c.  8,  and  It  (i.-...  11.  o.  10, 
authori/.inir  tlie  tenant  to  devise  it,  or,  if  undevised,  giving  it 
to  his  executors  to  be  administered  as  his  assets. ^ 

21.  But  there  were  many  ca.ses  at  the  common  l;i\v  where 
j)ersons  became  what  were  called  special  occupantn  of  lands, 
under  the  circumstances  supposed,  growing  out  of  the  relation 
of  such  occupant  to  the  estate,  and  took  the  land  to  the  exclu- 
sion of  a  mere  stranger.     As,  for  instance,  if  tenant 

per  autre  vie  *made  a  lease  at  will  to  another  and  dicil,  [•'•'4] 
his  lessee,  being  in  pos.session,  became  the  occupant  of 
the  land.2  But  the  application  of  the  term  as  well  as  the 
title  of  "  s[)ecial  occujiant  "  of  such  an  estate  chiefly  ari.ses 
out  of  the  form  in  which  the  original  limitation  of  the  estate 
was  made.  Thus  if  A  takes  an  estate  to  himself,  his  heirs  or 
the  heirs  of  his  Ixidy  and  his  assigns  during  the  life  nf  another, 
and  dies  in  the  lifetime  of  cestui  que  vie,  his  heirs  would  take 
not  strictly  as  heirs,  but  as  special  occupants  or  persons  who 
are  indicated  to  take  what  is  left  of  the  ancestor's  estate.  If 
the  limitation  had  been  to  him  and  his  executors  and  adminis- 
trators, they  would  take,  in  like  case,  instead  of  his  heirs.^ 

22.  But  though  "  heirs,"  or  "  heirs  of  the  body,"  in  such  a 
limitation  are  not  properly  words  of  inheritance,  and  it  might 
at  first  sight  appear  that  they  would  take  as  purchasers,  if 
at  all,  yet  it  is  well  settled  that  the  ancestor  becomes  the 
absolute  owner  of  the  entire  term  which  he  may  alien  at  his 
pleasure,  and  the  heir  only  takes  what  he  may  have  left  un- 
disposed of.  Thus  where  the  estate  was  to  A  and  his  heirs  for 
the  lives  of  B,  C,  and  D,  and  A  devised  to  J  S  without  terms 
of  limitation,  and  J  S  died  l^efore  cestuis  que  vie,  it  was  held 
that  the  heirs  of  A  should  take  the  residue  of  the  estate,  and 
not  the  representatives  of  J  S.*  And  the  quasi  tenant  in  tail 
in  possession  has  complete  power  to  i)ar  the  entail  and  the 
remainder  over.^ 

»  2  Bl.  Com.  259  ;  Tui  Cas.  83. 

«  Co.  Lit.  41  b,  n.  237  ;  Com.  Di«.  "Estate  by  Grant,"  F.  1. 
»  2  BL  Com.  359  ;  Atkinson  v.  Baker,  4  T.  R.  229  ;  Wma.  Ex'rs,  570  ;  Tu(L 
Cas.  33. 

«  Doe  r.  Robinson,  8  B.  &  C.  296  ;  All.n  r.  Allen.  2  Dm.  &  W.  307. 

'  Doe  V.  Luxton,  6  T.  R.  289  ;  Allen  v.  Allen,  2  Dru.  i  W.  307  ;  Norton  ft 


128  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

[*95]  *23.  But  though  the  tenant  for  life  joer  autre  vie,  with 
a  quad  estate  tail  to  the  heirs  of  his  body  may  convey 
the  estate  by  deed,  it  seems  that,  at  common  law,  he  cannot 
do  it  by  will.  The  heirs  of  his  body  will  take  as  special  occu- 
pants, by  virtue  of  the  gift  that  created  the  life  estate,  in 
preference  to  the  devisee  of  the  tenant.^ 

24.  There  are  duties  as  well  as  rights  incident  to  every  estate 
for  life  which  the  tenant  thereof  is  bound  to  observe,  among 
which  was  that  of  defending  the  title  if  it  was  attacked  in  any 
of  the  real  actions  at  common  law  which  concluded  the  title, 
because  the  interest  of  the  reversioner  or  remainder-man 
might  be  affected  by  the  judgment  rendered  against  the  life 
tenant.  But  in  order  to  enable  him  to  do  this,  he  might  call 
upon  the  one  who  had  the  inheritance  after  the  determination 
of  his  estate,  to  come  in  and  aid  him  in  making  the  defence. 
This  was  called  "  praying  in  aid."  Or  he  might,  if  he  saw 
fit,  go  on  and  defend  without  resorting  to  the  owner  of  the 
inheritance,  or  those  whose  estates  were  dependent  on  his,  he 
being  in  law  the  proper  tenant  to  the  prcecipe?    The  custom  of 

Frecker,  1  Atk.  524.  The  subject  is  uow  regulated  by  statute,  1  Vict.  c.  26,  §  3,  in 
England,  2  Wms.  Ex'rs,  574,  and  generally  by  the  statutes  of  the  several  States. 
"Walker's  Am.  Law.  275  ;  Wms.  Real  Prop.  21,  note  by  Piawle  ;  4  Kent,  Com. 
27.  In  cases  where  there  is  an  estate  in  A  for  the  life  of  B,  A  has  a  freehold. 
But  if  he  die  before  B,  the  residuum  of  the  estate  is  declared  to  be  a  chattel  in- 
terest, and  treated  as  such  in  Alabama,  Code,  1852,  §  1594  ;  New  York,  1  Stat, 
at  Large,  p.  671  ;  Wisconsin,  Rev,  Stat.  1858,  c.  83,  §  6  ;  Minnesota,  Stat.  1866, 
p.  349  ;  Michigan,  Comp.  Law,  1857,  c.  85.  In  Arkansas  it  is  embraced  and 
treated  as  real  estate,  in  the  law  of  descents  and  distribution,  though  all  real 
estate  is  assets  in  the  hands  of  executors  and  administrators,.  Dig.  Stat.  1858, 
c.  56,  §  19.  In  North  Carolina  it  is  deemed  an  inheritance  of  the  deceased  tenant 
per  autre  via  for  purposes  of  descent.  Gen.  Stat.  1873,  p.  363  ;  McBride  v.  Pat- 
terson, 78  N.  C.  412.  In  Rhode  Island  and  Indiana  it  is  made  devisable,  Rev. 
Stat.  1857,  c.  154,  §  1  ;  2  Rev.  Stat.  1852,  p.  208,  §  2.  In  Massachusetts  it  is 
devisable  and  descendible  as  real  estate,  Pub.  Stat.  c.  125,  §  1.  In  New  Jersey 
it  is  devisable  ;  but  if  not  devised,  it  goes  to  executors  or  administrators,  to  be 
applied  and  distributed  as  personal,  Nixon,  Dig.  1855,  p.  873,  §  1.  And  the 
same  in  Texas,  Oldham  &  White,  Dig.  1859,  p.  454,  art.  2117.  In  Maryland  it 
forms  a  part  of  personal  assets,  unless  expressly  limited  to  him  and  his  heirs, 
Code,  1860,  art.  93,  §  220. 

1  Dillon  V.  Dillon,  1  Ball  &  B.  95  ;  Grey  v.  Mannock,  2  Eden,  341,  and  note 
as  to  Lord  Kenyon's  dictum  in  Doe  v.  Luxton,  6  T.  R.  289  ;  Campbell  v.  Sandys, 
1  Sch.  &  Lef.  281  ;  Tud.  Cas.  34  ;  Allen  v.  Allen,  2  Dru.  &  W.  307. 

2  1  Brest.  Est.  207,  208  ;  Stearns,  Real  Act.  99  ;  Termes  de  la  Le}',  "  Aid ; " 
ante,  *48. 


en.  V.  §   1.]  KSTATES    Foil    LIIR.  1 -JM 

"  pnivini;  ill  aid"  hy  a  tenant  in  a  n-al  action  once  oxiHtod  in 
Massaclinsetts,  l)ul  hy  the  abolition  of  writs  of  right  it  Iiuh  lifcn 
discoiitiiuu'il.'  And  the  same  ciTcct,  it  wonUl  Kccin,  has  been 
produced  in  EiiLrhmd  by  aboHshint^  all  real  actions,  except 
quare  impedit,  dower  and  ejectment,  by  the  statute  3  <i:  4  Win. 
IV.  c.  27,  §  30.2 

24  a.  As  a  general  proposition,  if  a  tenant  for  life  makes 
improvements  ni)on  the  premises,  he  caniujt  claim  compensa- 
tion therefor  from  the  leversioiu-r  or  remainder-man,  though 
he  is  under  no  legal  obligation  to  do  more  than  keep  the 
premises  in  repair.-'^  It  is  also  generally  true  that  he  cannot 
make  repairs  or  permanent  improvements  at  the  expense  of 
the  inheritance.  But  he  may  com|)lete,  at  the  expense  of  the 
estate,  a  mansion-house  which  has  been  begun  by  a  testator 
under  whom  he  holds.  So  the  expense  of  putting  a  building, 
at  first,  into  a  tenantalde  ccmdition,  is  a  charge  upon  the  estate, 
but  that  of  kee|)iug  it  in  repair  is  upon  the  tenant  for  life.^ 

25.  An  important  duty  imposed  upon  every  tenant  for 
life  is  *  that  of  keeping  down  the  interest  upon  existing  [*96] 
incuml)rance8  upon  the  estate,  though,  as  a  general 
jiroposition,  he  is  not  bound,  as  between  himself  and  the 
reversioner  or  remainder-man,  to  pay  the  i»rincipal  of  any 
moneys  charged  upon  it ;  and  if  he  is  oljlig -J  to  do  so,  he 
becomes  a  creditor  of  the  estate  for  the  amount  so  paid,  de- 
ducting the  value  of  the  interest  he  would  have  had  to  pay 
as  tenant  for  life  during  his  lifc.^  On  the  other  hand,  if  a 
tenant  for  life  purchase  in  an  outstanding  incumbrance  upon 
an  estate,  it  is  regarded  as  having  been  done  for  the  benefit 
of  the  reversioner  as  well  as  himself,  if  the  latter  will  con- 
tribute his  proportion  of  the  sum  paid  therefor.^ 

1  Stearns,  Real  Act.  103  ;  Mass.  Pub.  Stat.  c.  173,  §  1. 

2  Wins.  Real  Prop.  371  ;  1  Spencc,  Ei\.  Jur.  225. 
8  Corbett  v.  Laurens,  5  Rich.  Eq.  301. 

4  Sohier  v.  Eldridge,  103  Mass.  345,  351  ;  Parsons  v.  Winslow,  16  Mass.  361. 

6  1  Story,  Eq.  §  4S6  ;  Id.  §  488  ;  Warley  v.  Wurley,  1  Bailey,  Eq.  397  ;  4  Kent, 
Com.  76  ;  Saville  v.  Saville,  2  Atk.  463  ;  Mosely  r.  Marshall,  27  Bfirb.  42,  44. 
And,  it  seems,  ho  will  not  be  obliged  to  pay  towards  the  interest  anything  ' 
the  amount  of  the  rents  accniiug,  antl,  if  he  does,  he  will  be  a  cn-ditor  of  • 
tate  for  such  excess.     Kensington  v.  Bouverie,  7  De  G.  M.  k.  G.  134  ;  TuJ.  Cj^. 
60  ;  Doane  r.  Doane,  46  Vt.  485. 

«  Daviess  v.  Jlyers,  13  B.  Men.  511. 
VOL.  I.— 9 


130  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   L 

25  a.  As  between  tenant  for  life  and  the  remainder-man, 
ordinary  taxes  are  to  be  paid  by  the  tenant  for  life  ;  but  where 
the  whole  estate  is  subject  to,  or  to  be  benefited  by  the  dis- 
charge of  an  incumbrance  not  created  by  either  of  them, 
equity  apportions  it  between  both,  the  tenant  for  life  having  to 
keep  down  the  interest  during  his  life.  A  betterment  charge 
comes  within  this  category,  being  laid  in  view  of  the  perma- 
nently increased  value  of  the  premises.  The  tenant  for  life 
must  pay  the  accruing  interest  upon  the  amount  during  his 
life,  and  the  remainder-man,  after  that,  must  pay  the  princi- 
pal.^ But  though  the  tenant  for  life  would  be  liable  to  the 
remainder-man  for  contribution  at  the  rates  above  stated,  if 
he  pays  the  charge  in  full,  he  is  not  personally  liable  to  the 
incumbrancer  himself  who  holds  the  charge  upon  the  estate. 
Thus  a  mortgagee  could  not  make  a  personal  claim  upon  the 
tenant  for  life  of  the  mortgaged  estate  if  the  charge  was  not 
created  by  him.^ 

26.  Formerly,  the  mode  of  apportioning  the  payment  of  an 
incumbrance  between  tenant  for  life  and  remainder-man  was 
one  third  upon  the  former  and  two  thirds  upon  the  latter.  But 
that  is  now  discarded  as  unreasonable.^  In  North  Carolina, 
it  is  said,  the  courts  do  not  recognize  any  arbitrary  rule  in  ap- 
portioning such  a  payment,  each  case  being  generally  referred 
to  the  master  to  settle  by  itself.* 

27.  The  rule  stated  by  Story  is  this  :  "  The  tenant  shall  con- 
tribute beyond  the  interest  in  proportion  to  the  benefit  he 
derives  from  the  liquidation  of  the  debt,  and  the  consequent 
cessation  of  annual  payments  of  interest  during  his  life 
(which,  of  course,  will  depend  upon  his  age  and  the  computa- 
tion of  the  value  of  his  life)."^  To  make  a  practical  illustra- 
tion of  this  rule,  which  is  only  vague  from  an  almost  necessary 
want  of  definiteness  in  the  application  of  the  terms  employed, 
suppose  a  tenant  for  life,  a  dowress,  for  instance,  has  been 
obliged,  in  order  to  save  her  estate,  to  pay  the  whole  of  a 
mortgage  thereon,  and  the  heir  or  reversioner  wishes  to  re- 

1  Plympton  v.  Boston  Dispensary,  106  Mass.  544. 

2  Morley  v.  Saunders,  L.  R.  8  Eq.  594.  »  1  Story,  Eq.  §  487. 
*  Jones  V.  Sherrard,  2  Dev.  &  B.  Ch.  179  ;  Atkins  v.  Kron,  8  Ired.  Eq.  1. 
6  Eq.  Jur.  §  487. 


.11.  V.  §  1.]  ESTATI'S    roil    LIFE.  1  .'U 

(loom  from  licr  l»y  CDntiihiitiuLT  liis  hIiuto  of  tho  iiiortL'iij.'o  dt-lit. 
Or  supposo  ho  has  j»ai<l  tho  wholo,  mid  sho.  in  <»nl<'r  to  save 
her  estate,  wishes  to  contrilmto  hor  share  of  tlie  debt.  Assiim- 
int;  tliat  she  is  to  [lay  tho  intorost  as  h)npr  as  sho  lives,  except 
that  sho  is  to  anticipate  and  j)ay  it  all  at  onoo  in  a  jrross 
sum,  hor  share  would  ho  what  the  |trrs('nt  worth  nf  an 
annuity  oijual  to  that  *  intorost  would  amount  to,  oom-  [*'.*T] 
j)utod  lor  as  many  years  as  l>y  the  tallies  of  the  (dianccs 
of  life,  regard  being  had  to  hor  statt;  of  health,  sho  may  bo 
sujiposod  to  live.  Of  course  the  share  of  tho  heir  or  rever- 
sioner would  be  the  residue  of  the  sum  paid  for  the  redomf>- 
tioii.  And  if,  by  reason  of  tho  mortgage  being  upon  the  whole 
of  her  husband's  estate,  she,  as  dowress,  would  only  be  liable 
to  contril)ute  the  interest  of  one  third  of  the  debt  to  correspond 
with  her  life  interest  in  that  proportion  of  the  land,  it  can 
make  no  difference  in  the  rule,  but  merely  affects  the  form  of 
the  computation.^  The  same  rule  is  applied  upon  the  sale  of 
an  estate  in  which  a  tenant  for  life  and  a  reversioner  are 
interostod,  in  aitjtortioning  the  jirocecds  between  thmi.  S(j 
whore  a  mortgage  was  devised  to  one  for  life,  with  remainder 
to  another,  and  the  same  was  redeemed,  the  redemittion  money 
was  divided  pro  rata  liy  the  same  rule.  The  value  of  tho 
life  estate,  in  such  cases,  is  fixed  at  the  time  of  sale  or  con- 
version of  the  estate  into  money,  by  reference  to  the  com- 
mon tables  of  the  chances  of  life.  Nor  would  the  result 
be  affected,  though  the  tenant  for  life  were  to  die  after  such 
conversion  before  any  part  of  the  proceeds  had  been  paid 
over.2 

28.  In  New  York,  where  a  tenant  for  life  neglected  to  pay 

1  Swaine  v.  Ferine,  5  Johns.  Ch.  482  ;  Gibson  i'.  Crchore,  5  Pick.  146  ;  Saville 
r.  Snville,  2  Atk.  463  ;  Bell  v.  The  Mayor,  10  Paige,  49,  71  ;  House  v.  House, 
10  Paige,  158  ;  Cogswell  v.  Cogswell,  2  Edw.  Ch.  231.  This  computation  would 
be  made  by  a  master  or  officer  of  the  court.  In  Massachusetts,  the  courts  have 
made  use  of  Wigglesworth's  Tables,  Eastabrook  r.  Hapgood,  10  Mass.  315,  n.  ; 
though  tables  have  l)een  adopted  in  general  use  more  full  and  accurate  than  these, 
such  as  tho  Carlisle  or  Combined  Experience  Tables.  Si^  the  table  pn-scrilxnl 
by  English  statute.  Matthews'  Ex'rs,  218,  Appendix  B.  In  New  York  also,  by 
Laws  1870,  c.  717,  §§  1,  5,  the  Portsmouth  or  Northampton  Tables  an-  prcscril>ed. 
See  also  Abercrombie  v.  Riddle,  3  Md.  Ch.  Dec.  320  :  Dorsey  r.  Smith,  7  Har. 
&  J.  366  ;  Fost-r  v.  Hilliard,  1  Story,  77,  nuil  post,  •248  and  note. 

^  Foster  v.  Hilliard,  )  Stoiy,  77. 


132  LAW    OP    REAL    PROPERTY.  [bOOK    I. 

the  taxes  upon  the  land,  a  receiver  was  appointed  to  take  so 
much  of  the  rent  as  might  be  necessary  to  pay  the  taxes.^ 
And  it  may  be  laid  down  as  a  duty  uniformly  incumbent  upon 
a  tenant  for  life,  to  pay  all  taxes  assessed  upon  the  land  during 
his  life.2  In  Ohio,  if  tenant  for  life  fail  to  pay  the  taxes  as- 
sessed upon  the  estate,  he  forfeits  the  same  to  the  reversioner 
or  remainder-man  who  may  enter.  But  this  is  under  the  pro- 
visions of  a  statute  of  that  State.^ 

29.  The  possession  of  a  tenant  for  life  is  never  deemed  to 
be  adverse  to  his  reversioner.^  Nor,  if  he  be  disseised,  are 
the  rights  of  the  reversioner  thereby  affected,  and  he  may 
enter  or  sue  an  action  to  recover  possession  within  twenty 
years  after  the  death  of  the  tenant  for  life,  without  regard  to 
the  lapse  of  time  during  which  the  disseisor  may  have  held 
the  premises.^  And  if  one  who  enters  upon  land  under  an 
agreement  with  a  tenant  for  life  continue  to  hold  possession 
after  his  death,  he  becomes  as  to  the  reversioner  a  mere  tres- 
passer.^ It  has  been  further  held  that  if  the  tenant  for  life 
do  any  act  with  the  property  which  works  a  forfeiture  of  the 
same,  it  only  affects  his  interest,  but  not  that  of  the  rever- 
sioner.' So  if  the  tenant  does  an  act  by  which  he  incurs  a 
forfeiture  of  the  estate,  the  reversioner  is  not  bound  to  treat 
the  estate  as  merged  in  his  own,  and  enter  immediately ;  he 
may  have  his  action  after  the  death  of  the  tenant  for  life, 
without  being  affected  by  the  previous  possession.  Nor  can  a 
tenant  for  life  who  creates  an  estate  by  grant  or  otherwise 
defeat  his  grant  by  surrender  to  his  landlord  or  reversioner.^ 

30.  It  is  a  principle  in  the  law  of  landlord  and  tenant,  that 
if  the  tenant  is  evicted  before  the  expiration  of  his  lease  by  a 
better  title  than  that  of  his  lessor,  he  will  not  be  liable  for  rent 

1  Cairns  v.  Chabert,  3  Edw.  Ch.  312. 

2  Varney  v.  Stevens,  22  Me.  331,  334  ;  Prettyman  v.  Walston,  34  111.  192. 
8  ]iIcMillan  v.  Robbins,  5  Ohio,  28. 

*  Grout  V.  Townshend,  2  Hill,  554  ;  Austin  v.  Stevens,  24  Me.  520,  526 ;  Var- 
ney  v.  Stevens,  22  Me.  331. 

^  Jackson  v.  Mancius,  2  Wend.  357  ;  McCorry  v.  King's  Heirs,  3  Humph.  267, 
375  ;  Jackson  v.  Schoonmaker,  4  Johns.  390  ;  Foster  v.  Marshall,  22  N.  H.  491  ; 
Guion  V.  Anderson,  8  Humph.  298,  325. 

6  Williams  v.  Caston,  1  Strobh.  130. 

'  Archer  v.  Jones,  26  Miss.  583,  589. 

8  Moore  v.  Luce,  29  Puna.  St.  260. 


rn.  V.  §  1.]  F.STATF.S    nut    UVK.  1?A 

lor  llie  uiu'Xi)iri'il  ItTiii  dui-inir  whirli  lio  had  oiijoycti  it  ;  und 
one  p:n»iind  is,  that,  the  contract  liciii;;  entire,  such  rent  is  nut 
apportionahle.  So  if  a  tenant  for  life  underlet  the  premises 
for  a  certain  term,  reserving;  rent  payal)le  at  a  certain  day,  ami 
die  hefore  that  day,  his  executors  coulil  not,  at  commoit  law, 
recover  the  rent  accrninjr  between  the  last  rent-day  and  the 
day  of  his  death  ;  which  they  mi^ht  have  done  had  he  survived 
to  the  he^'inninir  of  the  day  on  which  the  rent  fell  due.'  In 
Alal)ama,  if  a  life  estate  falls  in  liefore  the  end  of  the  year,  the 
remainder-man  has  the  rent  accruing  from  the  death  of  the 
tenant  for  life  to  the  end  <jf  the  year,  subject  to  the  right  ui 
emldements.''^ 

*31.  Where,  however,  as  was  sometimes  the  case,  a  [*98] 
tenant  for  life  had  a  power  to  lease  for  a  term  beyond 
the  period  of  his  own  life,  and  made  such  a  lease,  and  died 
before  the  last  moment  of  the  day  on  which  the  rent  was  due, 
though  within  an  hour  oi  midnight,  the  rent  went  to  the  rever- 
sioner, and  was  not  app()rtionaldc,and  no  part  was  recoverable 
by  the  representatives  of  the  tenant  for  life.  For  as  the  lease 
continued  after  the  life-tenant's  death,  the  rent  did  not  become 
fully  «lue  till  the  last  moment  of  the  day  on  which  it  was 
reserved. "^ 

32.  But  now  these  defects  as  to  apportioning  rents  are  sup- 
})lied  by  the  statute  11  Ceo.  II.  c.  10,  §  15,  giving  in  the  first 
case,  a  right  of  action  to  the  executors  of  tenants  for  life  to 
recover  pro  tanto  for  the  time  the  tenant  actually  enjnyi'd 
the  premises  under  his  lease;  and  in  the  latter  case,  liy  the 
statute  4  k  5  Wm.  IV.  c.  22,  §  2,  apportioning  the  rent  be- 
tween the  tenant  for  life  and  the  reversioner  pro  rata  as  to 
time.*    The  statute  of  11  CJeo.  II.  has  been  re-enacted  in  some 

1  dun's  Case,  10  Rep.  12S  ;  Fitclibiirg  Co.  v.  Melvin,  15  Mn-ss.  268  ;  rcrrj-  r. 
Aldrioh,  13  N.  H.  343  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  124  ;  3  Cruise.  Dig.  233,  30(5. 

2  Pri.e  V.  Pickett,  21  .Via.  741. 

«  Stmirord  v.  Wentworth,  1  P.  Wins.  ISO  ;  Ro<kinghnm  v.  Penrice.  M.  178  ; 
Norris  V.  Harrison,  2  .Mailtl.  208  ;  Wnis.  Ex'rs,  709.  Royalfii-s  from  a  coal  Ica-w 
go  to  tenant  for  life.  W.iitz's  Apji.,  100  IVnn.  St.  .101  ;  MeClinuHk  v.  Dana, 
Id.  3<*6  ;   Shwinaker's  .\|.p..  Id.  392. 

*  Wni.s.  Kx'rs,  709  ;  Wms.  Rial  Prop.  27.  Tlies*'  statuten  apiHirtion  tlie  r.-n* 
a.s  to  time.  The  effect  of  tenant  l>eing  deprivtHl  of  jMirt  of  tlie  j«niiiiH.  i,  or  «( 
lessor  conveying  the  revrrsion  of  |>art  of  the  estate  upon  the  rent,  remains  as  at 
common  law,     3  Kent,  Com.  409,  470. 


134  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

of  the  States,  and  practically  adopted  through  the  courts  in 
others.^  If  the  lessee  be  tenant  per  autre  vie,  and  the  term 
come  to  an  end  by  the  death  of  the  cestui  que  vie  before  the  day 
of  payment  of  rent,  it  is  not  within  the  language  of  the  statute 
of  11  Geo.  II.,  and  the  rent  is  not  apportionable,  and  cannot  be 
recovered  for  the  time  the  tenant  may  have  occupied  between 
the  last  time  of  payment  and  the  death  of  the  cestui  que  vie? 
And  a  like  principle  applies  in  the  case  of  annuities.  If  an 
annuitant  die  before  the  expiration  of  the  period  at  which  the 
annuity  is  payable,  it  is  lost ;  his  representatives  can  recover 
no  part  of  what  is  in  arrear  since  the  prior  day  of  payment. 
Hence  the  importance  of  providing  for  such  contingencies  by 
the  terms  by  which  the  lease  or  annuity  is  created.^ 

33.  A  question  of  some  interest  has,  at  times,  been  made  in 
England,  how  far  a  tenant  for  life  has  a  right  to  possession  of 
the  title-deeds  of  the  estate.  But  it  is  believed  that  under  the 
American  system  of  registration  no  such  question  can  arise.* 

[*99]  *  sectio:n'   IL 

OF   ESTOVERS. 

1.  Tenant's  right  to  estovers. 

2.  What  are  estovei-s. 

3,  4.  Effect  of  tenant  exceeding  his  right  in  taking  estovers. 

5-9.  How  timber,  &c.,  must  be  cut  and  used. 

10.  What  trees  constitute  timber,  and  what  firewood. 

11.  Right  to  take  estovers  assignable. 

1.  Among  the  incidents  of  all  estates  for  life,  and  the  same 
is  true  of  estates  for  years,  is  that  to  take  estovers  or  hotes 
from  the  premises,  if  they  are  capable  of  supplying  them,  in 
the  way  of  compensation  for  the  duty  of  occupying  and  man- 
aging the  same  in  a  prudent  manner,  and  keeping  the  parts 
thereof  in  suitable  repair.^ 

1  3  Greenl.  Cruise,  306,  n.  Re-enacted  in  Massachusetts,  St.  1869,  c.  368, 
§  1 ;  Pub.  Stat.  c.  121,  §  8  ;  and  extended  to  all  contingent  determinations  of  the 
lessor's  estate.  2  pgny  v.  Aldrich,  13  N.  H.  343. 

8  Wiggin  V.  Swett,  6  Met.  194  ;  Dexter  v.  Phillips,  121  Mass.  178. 

*  Wms.  Real  Prop.  375,  Rawle's  note. 

6  Hubbard  v.  Shaw,  13  Allen,  120,  122;  Cowel,  Interp.  (Estovers),  derives  the 
word  from  the  French,  estouvcr,  equivalent  to  fovere,  to  nourish  or  maintain. 


CH.  V.  §  2.]  ESTATnS    F(Ml    LIFE.  ]:]', 

2.  Those  CBtovors  arc  of  three  kinds:  1,  liousc-Kut. •;  li, 
plou«rh-lKite  ;  niul  ;J,  hay-hote.  The  first  of  these  is  a  siifli- 
cieiit  allowunee  of  wood  to  repair  nr  hum  in  thr  liuiisc  This 
hitter  is  often  ealh-d  lirc-hote.  The  second,  for  niai<inj;  and 
rej)airin|^  all  instruments  of  hushandrv.  The  third,  for  rc- 
pairin<^  hedges  or  fences ;  "hay"  nieanin;r'*u  liedge.*'  And 
these  estovers  must  he  reasonahle  in  (juantity  or  anioinit.' 
It  was  held,  in  applying  this  doctrine  in  oiu'  case,  that  sncli 
tenant  might  take  a  reasonahle  (piantity  of  wood  for  fuel,  for 
the  supply  of  himself  and  family,  upon  the  premises,  to  ho 
cut  in  a  prudent  and  i)roper  manner,  and  might  include  a 
reasonal)le  supply  for  necessary  servants  employed  nj>on  the 
farm,  and  living  in  the  same  house,  or  another  uimju  the  same 
premises."-^ 

3.  As  the  destruction  of  growing  timher  and  wood  afTects 
the  vahie  of  the  inheritance,  if  the  tenant  exceed  what  is 
reastmably  necessary  in  cutting  for  the  jmrposes  ahove  stated, 
he  would,  to  the  extent  of  such  excess,  he  guilty  of  waste, 
the  consequences  and  nature  of  which  will  be  hereafter  ex- 
plaine(l.'5 

4.  In  the  first  place,  he  must  only  cut  such  timber  or  wood 
as  he  needs  for  present  use.  To  cut  tliese  in  anticipation  of 
future  use  would  he  waste.*  So  he  nnist  cut  only  such  as  is 
fit  for  the  purpose.  It  would  he  waste  to  cut  what  was  unlit, 
though  he  exchanged  it  for  what  was  suitable.'' 

5.  In  the  next  place,  the  tenant  nnist  only  cut  such 
•timi)er,  <tc.,  as  is  necessary  for  use,  and  it  must  also  [*100] 
be  used  by  him  upon  the  premises,  and  not  elsewhere. 

He  may  not  cut  timber  and  exchange  it  for  firewood  or  fenc- 
ing-stuff, nor  cut  wood  or  timlu-r  and   si.-ll  it,  though  needed 

"The  name  estovers  contaiiieth  house-botc,  hay-boU>,  and  plouffh-boto."     "Bote," 
Bays  tlif  sjime  author,  "sipuifieth   coiiUH-iisntion  ;  lu'iice  also  comes  our  coiniiion 
phnuM-,  •  to  give  to  boot,  that  is,  coinjtfn»i/i"ni.s  gratia.'  "    Sec  also  Co.  Lit.  41  l>. 
Blackiitoiie  di-rivcs  estovers  from  cstojTcr,  to/iirni.'Ji.     2  HI.  •"om.  35. 
1  Co.  Lit.  41  b;  2  BL  Com.  35  ;  Cowel,  luterp.  "Have." 

•  Smith  r.  Jewett,  40  N.  H.  530. 

»  2  m.  Com.  122.  .See  this  sul.j.ot  cxnminea,  3  Dane,  Abr.  238,  239.  I\ul^ 
p.  "lO?  ;  We»»ter  v.  WeJister,  33  N.  H.  21. 

*  (Jorges  V.  StanficM,  Cro.  El.  5y3. 
'  Simuions  v.  Nortou,  7  Biug.  640. 


136  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [EOOK  I. 

for  his  comfort  or  support.^  Nor  can  he  cut  and  sell  wood  to 
pay  the  expense  of  cutting  and  drawing  that  which  he  needs, 
and  used  for  his  own  comfort  upon  the  premises.^  Nor  could 
a  dowress  cut  and  sell  wood  from  the  premises,  though  she 
procured  as  much  for  actual  consumption  upon  the  same  from 
other  sources,  and  to  that  extent  relieved  the  estate  from  the 
charge  of  supplying  fire-wood.^ 

6.  Where  a  widow  had  dower  out  of  two  distinct  estates, 
with  a  dwelling-house  on  both,  but  no  woodland  upon  one  of 
them,  it  was  held  that  she  could  not  cut  wood  upon  one  of 
these  to  burn  in  the  house  upon  the  other,  though  she  occu- 
pied the  latter  as  her  dwelling-place.*  But  in  other  cases 
it  has  been  held  that,  if  dower  consist  of  several  parcels, 
and  she  takes  wood  from  one  to  make  repairs  upon  another, 
or  to  burn  in  her  dwelling-house  upon  another,  it  will  not 
be  deemed  waste,  though  these  parcels  are  the  inheritances  of 
different  reversioners.^  So  where  there  was  a  farm  and  out- 
lands,  and  it  had  been  customary  for  the  tenant  to  cut  the  wood 
for  the  dwelling-house  upon  the  out-lands,  it  was  held  not  to 
be  waste  in  the  tenant  for  life  to  cut  it  upon  the  farm,  if  such 
cutting  did  not  essentially  injure  the  farm  as  an  inheritance.^ 

7.  As  an  example  of  the  extent  to  whicli  estovers  would 
be  deemed  reasonable,  we  find  that  it  is  held  that  upon  a  farm 
of  165  acres  the  tenant  might  not  take  firewood  for  two 
houses,  one  the  principal  one,  the  other  that  of  the  farmer  or 

1  White  V.  Cutler,  17  Pick.  248  ;  Padelford  v.  Padelford,  7  Pick.  152  ;  Richard- 
son V.  York,  14  Me.  216  ;  Elliott  ■;;.  Smith,  2  N.  H.  430  ;  Sarles  v.  Sarles,  3  Sandf. 
Ch.  601  ;  Livingston  v.  Reynolds,  2  Hill,  157  ;  Simmons  v.  Norton,  7  Bing. 
640  ;  Webster  v.  Webster,  33  N.  H.  21  ;  Miles  v.  Miles,  32  N.  H.  147.  In  a  hard 
case  Judge  Story  adopted  somewhat  different  rules  of  law,  in  Loomis  v.  AVUbur, 
5  Mason,  13. 

2  Johnson  v.  Johnson,  18  N.  H.  597.  ^  Phillips  v.  Allen,  7  Allen,  115. 
*  Cook  V.  Cook,  11  Gray,  123.     And  such  seems  to  be  the  law  in  New  Hamp- 
shire.    Fuller  V.  Wason,  7  N.  H.  341  ;  Miles  v.  Miles,  32  N.  H.  147. 

5  Owen  o  Hyde,  6  Yerg.  334  ;  Dalton  v.  Dalton,  7  Ired.  Eq.  197.  And  so  in 
an  early  case  in  Massachusetts.  Padelford  v.  Padelford,  7  Pick.  152.  And  in  New 
Hampshire,  by  Stat.  1842,  c.  165,  §  7,  and  Maine,  by  Rev,  St.  1857,  p.  606,  §  15, 
a  widow  is  authorized  to  take  necessary  fuel  from  her  dower  lands  to  supply  her 
own  residence,  though  not  upon  the  dower  lands.  This  difference  of  view  in  the 
cases  in  New  England  from  that  held  in  other  States  may  perhaps  be  due  to  the 
doctrine  oVjtaiiiing  in  the  former  in  respect  to  dower  in  wild  lands. 

«  Webster  v.  Web:.ter,  33  N.  H.  26. 


CU.  V.  §   2.j  KSTMIs    K)U    LIFK.  1  .".7 

laborer  who  did  the  work   ujioii  it,  ultlioii<^h  it  liiid  liecu  fus- 
tomarv  to  tlo  so.^ 

8.  r|)on  the  princijiles  above  stated,  a  tenant  luis  not  a 
rij?ht  to  dit^  chiy  upun  a  farm  and  make  it  into  liricks  for  sale, 
nor  to  use  Wood  from  the  farm  for  their  manufacture.*'' 

1>.  In  Knjrhmd  a  striett-r  ruh-  is  aii|»ned  in  res|K'ct  to  aUow- 
in«r  estovers  than  that  in  use  in  this  country,  from  tlie  difl'er- 
ent  condition  of  the  two  countries  in  resjiect  t«>  the  economical 
manapiuent  of  estates.  l'rol»aMy  the  same  rule  woidd  be 
a{»i>lied  here  as  there,  that  if  the  tenant  sufl'crs  liouses  to  go 
to  decay  and  then  cuts  timber  to  rejtair  them,  it  would  be 
deemed  double  waste."'  Hut  it  is  doul)tful  if  the  ten- 
ant here  would,  as  there,  be  *  restricted  in  nil  eases  [*1'*1] 
from  cuttin<^  timber  for  construct in^r  new  walls  or 
fences,  though  in  both  lie  may  t:ike  sullicient  to  keep  such 
fences,  Arc,  in  repair,  as  were  upnn  the  incmises  when  lie  to<jk 
them*  And  while  he  is  not  bound  to  rejiair  a  house  already 
ruinous,  he  may  do  so  with  tind)er  taken  from  the  premi.ses.'' 

1<>.  Hut  the  (luestions,  what  is  tind>er  and  what  nuiy  be 
used  for  firewood,  and  wliether  the  cutting  of  trees,  thougli 
for  neither  of  these  uses,  would  be  waste,  dei)end  ujton  the 
usages  of  this  country,  the  customary  mode  of  numaging 
hinds,  and  the  manner  in  wliich  the  inheritance  would  be  af- 
fected by  such  cutting,  rather  than  ui)on  the  rules  of  the  Kng- 
lish  connnon  law,  the  rule  here  as  to  waste  being  that  nothing 
which  docs  not  prejudice  the  niheritancc  or  those  who  arc 
entitled  to  the  remainder  or  reversion,  can  be  d«'emed  waste.** 
Thus  to  cut  oak-trees  here  for  firewood  is  not,  necessarily, 
waste,  though  it  might  be  in  England." 

»  Siirli's  f.  Sarlcs.  3  SnnJf.  Ch.  GOl.  See  Smith  v.  Jcwett,  40  N.  H.  530,  53'2; 
Ganlitier  v.  Deriiig,  1  Taigc,  573. 

3  Livingston  v.  ItrynoUK  2  Hill,  157.  •  Co.  Lit  63  b. 

«  Co.  Lit.  53  li ;  .Mil.-s  r.  Mil.-s.  32  N.  IL  147,  163.  »  Co.  I,it.  54  1.. 

•  Pynchon  r.  Stenrnn,  11  Mit.  304  ;  Morthousc  v.  Cotheal,  22  X.  J.  521. 

'  Piulelfonl  c.    Pmlelforil,   7   Pi<k.    152.      Svo  nl.so,    uiwn   the   nl)ove  {Miintx, 
Jnckson  r.  Brownson,  7  .Johns.  227  ;  Kiihl  r.  IX-nniMon,  6   lUirh.  9  ;  (nx  ki-tt  r. 
CtxKkett,  2  Ohio  St.   180  ;  McCuUouKh  r.   Ininc,   13  Penn.  St.  4as  ;   W 
r.  \Vtl«,ter,  33  N.  H.  26.     And  when;  timber  is  blown  flnnn.  th"  lif'    V  • 
absolutely  entitled  to  smh  a.s  would  hnvv  Ix-en  rwi*"  ••<"\. 

and  to  interest  on  the  proceeds  of  the  n-siduc,     St:  ^  r,  52 

Md.  15t. 


138  LAW   OF  EEAL   PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

11.  It  may  bo  remarked  that  any  right  of  estovers  belong- 
ing to  a  tenant  would  pass  to  bis  or  ber  grantee  of  tbe  estate, 
or  one  who  should  leyy  thereon  for  debt.^ 


SECTION     III. 

OF    EMBLEMENTS. 

1.  Tenant's  right  to  emblements. 

2-4.  What  are  emblements,  and  what  right  of  occupancy  incident. 

5,  6.  Origin  of  the  doctrine  of  emblements.     Exception  as  to  widows. 

7-9.  What  is  essential  to  claim  of  emblements. 

10.  Tenant  at  sufferance  has  no  right  to  emblements. 

11,  12.  Right  to  take  emblements  assignable,  when. 

13,  14.  When  growing  crops  not  emblements. 

15.  Effect  of  disseisor  or  his  grantee  taking  crops. 

16-18.  What  right  of  occupancy  belongs  to  a  right  to  emblements. 

19,  20.  Usage  as  affecting  right  to  emblements. 

21,  22.  Emblements  claimed  against  mortgages  or  judgments. 

1.  Another  of  the  important  rights  which  a  tenant  for  life 
has,  as  also  other  tenants  of  estates  of  uncertain  duration,  is 
that  of  emblements.^  or  profits  of  the  crop  (^emblavenee  de  bled), 
which  the  law  giyes  to  him,  or  if  he  is  dead,  to  his  executors 
or  administrators,  to  compensate  for  the  labor  and  expense  of 

tilling,  manuring,  and  sowing  the  land.^ 
[*102]       *2.  These   crops   are   such  as   are  the  growth  of 

annual  planting  and  culture,  and  the  right  to  take 
them  after  the  termination  of  the  tenancy  rests  partly  upon 
the  idea  of  compensation,  but  chiefly  upon  the  policy  of 
encouraging  husbandry,  by  assuring  the  fruits  of  his  labor  to 
the  one  who  cultiyates  the  soil.^  The  term  emblements  is 
applied  also  at  common  law  to  annual  crops  growing  upon  the 
land  of  one  who  dies  before  they  are  haiwested.  At  common 
law,  they  go  to  his  personal  representatives  rather  than  his 
heirs.     But  in  Mississippi,  such  crops  go  to  the  heir,  unless 

1  Fuller  V.  Wason,  7  N.  H.  341  ;  Roberts  v.  Whiting,  16  Mass.  186  ;  Smith 
V.  Jewett,  40  N.  H.  533  ;  Cook  v.  Cook,  11  Gray,  123. 

2  Wms.  Ex'rs,  597  ;  Co.  Lit.  55  a. 

8  2  Bl.  Com.  122;  Co.  Lit.  55  b;  Stewart  v.  Doughty,  9  Johns.  108  ;  1  RoUe, 
Abr.  726,  c.  9. 


ClI.  V.  §  ;').]  ESTATES    FOR   LIFE.  189 

tho  jiidcrc  of  probate   npiiropriatcs  tlicni   to  tli.    ■  •..  .  ui.-i    ..i 
administrator  to  he  administiTi'd.' 

3.  It  will  lie  still,  licrcaftcr,  that  tho  rijrlit  to  cinljlonifntrt 
carrirs  with  it  that  (tf  nitcrinir  nj>on  and  i-nltivatin^:  the  hmd, 
and  harvest inj;  the  oroi»s  when  lijic- 

4.  Anmug  tlio  crops  which  arc  considered  to  he  letrally  the 
snbjcct  of  cnihlenicnts  arc  corn,  pease,  beans,  tares,  hemp, 
Ihix,  safTrtMi,  nadons,  potatoes,  and  the  like,  and  j^rasscs,  such 
as  sainfoin,  which  are  annually  renewed.  And,  by  way  of  ex- 
ception to  the  trcneral  rule,  hops,  thonirh  p-own  on  j»crmanent 
roots,  and  turpentine,  though  taken  from  trees,  are  the  subject 
of  emblements,  because  they  re(piire  annual  trainiufj:  and  cul- 
ture to  produce  or  gather.^  IJut  clover  or  other  grasses  that 
endure  more  than  one  year  are  not  included,  nor  the  fruits 
of  trees  growinj^  upon  the  land,  though  planted  by  the  tenant, 
because  he  knows  when  he  jilants  them  that  they  cannot  come 
to  maturity  and  produce  their  fruit  in  a  single  year  to  rcjiay 
the  labor  bestowed  upon  their  jilanting  and  culture.^  Th<»ULdi 
it  seems  that  trees,  sliiiibs,  Ac,  plauteil  by  n;ardeners  and  nur- 
sery-men simply  for  sale,  may  be  considered  as  eml)race(l 
under  emblements  as  between  executor  of  tenant  ft>r  life  and 
remainder-man  or  reversioner.'' 

5.  This  doctrine  of  eml)lements  was  borrowed  from  the 
feudal  law,  whereby,  if  the  tenant  died  between  the  1st  of 
September  and  the  1st  of  March,  the  lord  took  the  profits  of 
the  land  for  the  year  ;  if  between  the  1st  of  March  and  the 
Ist  of  Se[)tember,  the  heirs  of  the  tenant  had  them.'^ 

6.  There  was   an   exception,  at   common  law,  in    resj)ect 

*  McCormiok  v.  McConnick,  40  Miss.  760  ;  Penhallow  v.  Dwight,  7  Mass.  34  ; 
1  Wms.  Ex'rs,  594  ;  2  Redfu'ld,  Wills,  143. 

a  Co.  Lit.  56  a  ;  post,  p.  '105. 

«  Wilis.  Ex'rs,  697  ;  2  Slmrsw.  Rl.  Com.  123,  n.;  Cora.  Dig.,  "  Bicns,  T,.  1  ; " 
Co.  Lit.  55  b,  n.  364  ;  Lewis  t?.  McNatt,  05  N.  C.  63  ;  State  p.  Moore,  11  In^«l.  70. 
Fobes  V.  Shattuck,  22  Barb.  568,  that  wheat  straw  ia  emblements,  and  belongB 
to  the  tenant. 

*  Wnis.  Ex'rs,  598,  599  ;  Evans  v.  Inplehart,  6  C.  A;  .1.  171,  188  ;  Reiff  r.  Rt-iff, 
64  IVnn.  St.  134, 137.  So  a  tenant  who  has  liarvesttMl  his  crop  in  .lune  rannnt  take 
as  emblements  stubble  plouj;hed  in  ami  f;ri>\vin;{  in  Xovcinljcr,  when  tho  tenancy 
ended  in  S<'ptemlM>r.     Hendrixson  r.  Ciirdwi-ll,  9  Baxt.  3S9. 

«  r<iitoii  r.  Holmrt,  2  Ea^t,  83  ;  Taylor,  Laud,  k  T.  81. 

*  2  Bl.  Com.  123. 


140  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  L 

[*103]  to  *Gmblements  in  case  of  a  dowress,  because  it  was 
presumed  that  when  her  husband  died  she  took 
the  estate  with  the  crops  upon  it,  and  therefore,  though  she 
died  after  having  planted  a  crop,  it  went  to  the  rever- 
sioner. But  by  the  statute  of  Merton,  20  Hen.  III.  c.  2, 
the  growing  crop  might  be  devised  by  her,  or  would  go  to 
her  executors.^ 

7.  But  it  is  essential  to  the  claim  of  emblements,  at  the 
common  law,  that  the  crop  should  have  been  actually  planted 
during  the  life  and  occupancy  of  the  tenant.  No  degree 
of  preparation  of  the  ground  will  give  to  one  the  fruits  of 
seed  planted  by  another  after  the  determination  of  his  ten- 
ancy.2 

8.  In  order  to  entitle  tenant  or  his  executors  to  emblements, 
the  estate  which  he  has  must,  in  the  first  place,  be  uncertain 
in  its  duration.  If  he,  knowing  it  will  terminate  before  he 
can  gather  his  crop,  plants  it,  it  is  his  own  folly  or  generosity 
to  his  successor  who  will  take  it.^  So  where  one  entered 
under  an  agreement  of  purchase  and  sale  of  the  land  between 
him  and  the  owner,  and  planted  crops,  and  the  land-owner 
then  refused  to  convey  the  land,  the  tenant  was  held  to  be  en- 
titled to  the  same  as  emblements  on  the  ground  that  he  had 
been  occupying  as  a  tenant  at  will.*  But  where  one  in  pos- 
session of  land,  for  the  recovery  of  which  a  suit  was  pending 
against  him,  let  the  same  to  one  cognizant  of  the  suit,  who 
planted  crops,  and  before  they  were  gathered  the  claimant 
in  the  suit  prevailed  and  expelled  the  tenant,  it  was  held  that 
the  latter  could  not  claim  the  crop  as  emblements.^ 

1  Co.  2d  Inst.  80. 

2  Price  V.  Pickett,  21  Ala.  741  ;  Gee  v.  Voung,  1  Hayw.  17  ;  Stewart  v. 
Doughty,  9  Johns.  108 ;  Taylor,  Land.  &  T.  82  ;  Thompson  v.  Thompson,  6 
Munf.  514. 

8  Debow  V.  Colfax,  5  Halst.  128  ;  Kittredge  v.  Woods,  3  N.  H.  503;  Whit- 
marsh  V.  Cutting,  10  Johns.  360  ;  Taylor,  Land.  &  T.  81  ;  Chesley  v.  Welch,  37 
Me.  106  ;  Harris  v.  Carson,  7  Leigh,  632  ;  Termes  de  la  Ley,  "  Emblements." 
Hence  a  tenant  for  a  single  year  has  been  held  not  entitled.  Pieeder  v.  Sayre,  70 
N.  Y.  180.  But  where  the  tenancy  was  an  oral  one  for  two  years  with  a  right  to 
emblements,  it  was  held  that  this  was  not  cut  off  by  an  insufficient  notice  to  quit, 
lb. 

*  Harris  v.  Frink,  49  N.  Y.  24. 

fi  Rowell  V.  Klein,  44  Ind.  290. 


en.  V.  §  3.]  ESTATES   FOR   LIFE.  1  1 1 

9.  So,  in  the  second  place,  the  tenancy  nuist  l»e  <l«-t«Tniine<l 
by  the  act  of  CJod,  as  l>y  death  of  the  tenant,  or  tlie  act  of 
the  lessor  in  cxpellinir  him  or  ternjinating  his  lease  ;  for  if 
the  tenant  abandons  the  premises,  or  volnntarily  jints  an  end 
to  the  tenancv,  he  has  no  liirht  to  claim  emlilrnn-nts.'  Thns, 
if  a  wonKiii,  tenant  during  widowhood,  marry,  she  loses  her 
right  to  cmMenients.-  And  these  pi-inciples  ajjply  in  eases  of 
tenancies  at  will.^ 

10.  IJut  a  tenant  at  snfTerance  is  not  entitled  to  emble- 
ments.' Where,  however,  a  jjurehaser  under  a  foreclosure  sale 
su  lie  red  the  tenant,  cither  the  mortgagor  or  one  claiming 
under  him,  to  occupy  the  premises  without  interference  for  the 
term  of  three  months,  and  in  the  mean  time  to  go  on  and 
manage  it,  and  jdant  crops,  it  was  held  to  give  the  tenant  a 
right  to  claim  these  as  emblements.^ 

*  11.  This  right  to  emblements  is  not  limited  to  the  [*104] 
original  lessee  or  tenant  for  life,  unless  he  is  restricted 

bv  the  terms  of  his  lease  from  underletting  or  assigning  his 
term.  His  assignee,  grantee,  or  sub-lessee,  not  only  has  a 
claim  for  the  same  emblements  as  the  original  tenant,  Ijut  in 
some  cases  may  claim  these  where  the  former  could  not  him- 
self have  made  such  claim.  Thus  if  the  original  tenant  were 
to  forfeit  his  estate  by  failing  to  perform  a  condition,  or  by 
committing  a  breach  of  a  condition  prescribed  in  his  lease,  he 
would  thereby  lose  all  right  to  the  emblements.  But  if,  be- 
fore such  breach  on  his  part,  he  should  assign  or  underlet  to 
another,  and  the  estate  should  be  defeated  by  such  breach, 
his  under-tenant  or  assignee  would,  nevertheless,  be  entitled 
to  the  growing  crop  which  he  had  planted.  As,  for  instance, 
if  a  tenant  during  widowhood  should  underlet  and  then 
marry,  though  she  would  l)y  so  doing  lose  her  own  right  to 

1  Cases  supra;  Whitmarsh  r.  Cutting,  10  Johns.  360  ;  Chesley  r.  Welch,  37 
Me.  106  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  123;  Oknds  Cose,  5  Rep.  116  ;  Chandler  r.  Thurston,  10 
Pick.  205,  210. 

a  Hawkins  r.  Skeggs,  10  Humph.  31  ;  Debow  v.  Colfax,  5  Halst.  128. 

'  Tenncs  de  la  Ley,  "Emblements  ; "  Davis  v.  Thompson,  13  Me.  200  ;  Dans  r. 
Brockleliank,  9  N.  H.  73  ;  Sherburne  v.  Jones,  20  Me.  70  ;  Stewart  v.  Dou^rhty,  9 
Johns.  lOS  ;   Gland's  Case,  5  Hep.  116  ;  Chandler  v.  Thurston,  10  Pick.  205. 

*  Doe  V.  Tunier,  7  M.  &  W.  226. 

*  Alien  V.  Carpenter,  15  Mich.  25,  33. 


142  LAW    OF    REAL    PROPERTY.  [dOOK    1. 

emblements,  lier  tenant  would  not,  because  he  was  not  in 
fault.i 

12.  But  if  the  tenant,  having  planted  the  crop,  sell  it  as  a 
growing  crop,  and  then  terminates  his  estate  by  his  own  act, 
the  vendee  will  have  no  better  right  in  respect  to  such  crop 
than  the  lessee  himself,  and  cannot  claim  them  as  emble- 
ments.2 

13.  If  the  owner  of  land  on  which  he  has  planted  a  crop 
sells  the  land,  it  passes  a  complete  title  to  the  crop.  And  if 
he  convey  a  reversion,  subject  to  an  existing  particular  estate, 
it  carries  with  it,  as  incident  to  such  reversion,  the  same 
rights  in  respect  to  crops  growing  on  the  premises  which  the 
grantor  himself  has.^ 

14.  If  the  owner  of  land  plant  crops  and  then  conveys  the 
estate  to  one  for  life,  with  remainder  over  in  fee,  and  the  ten- 
ant for  life  dies  before  the  crop  is  gathered,  it  will  not  go  to 

the  personal  representatives  of  the  tenant  for  life,  be- 
[*105]  cause  *  he  did  not  plant  it,  but  to  the  remainder-man 

as  a  part  of  the  inheritance.*  So  if  a  woman  seised 
for  life  or  in  fee  sow  her  land  and  marry,  and  her  husband 
die  before  the  crop  is  severed,  she  and  not  his  representatives 
shall  have  the  crop.^  But  if  the  husband  of  tenant  for  life 
sow  crops,  and  she  dies,  he  will  be  entitled  to  the  emblements.^ 
And  in  the  case  above  supposed,  if  the  grant  for  life  had  been 
to  husband  and  wife  and  the  survivor,  and  the  husband  had 
died,  the  wife  would  have  taken  the  crops  instead  of  the 
representatives  of  the  husband.''' 

15.  It  was  held  in  Liford's  Case  that,  if  a  disseisor  take  the 
crops  growing  upon  the  premises,  and  the  disseisee  recover 
possession  of  the  land,  he  may  have  trespass  for  such  taking 
against  the  disseisor,^  but  that  if  the  disseisor  make  a  feoff- 

1  2  Bl.  Com.  124  :  Bevans  v.  Briscoe,  4  Har.  &  J.  139  ;  Taylor,  Land.  &T.  81  ; 
Davis  V.  Eyton,  7  Biiig.  154  ;  Tud.  Cas.  62  ;  Bulwer  v.  Bulwer,  2  B.  &  A.  470. 
Cmilra,  Gland's  Case,  5  Rep.  116  ;  Bittinger  v.  Baker,  29  Penn.  St.  6Q. 

2  Debowv.  Colfax,  5  Halst.  128. 

3  Foote  V.  Colvin,  3  Johns.  216  ;  Burnside  v.  Weiglitman,  9  Watts,  46. 
*  Wms.  Ex'rs,  602  ;  Grantham  v.  Hawley,  Hob.  132. 

5  Tud.  Cas.  62,  cites  Yin.  Abr.  "  Emblements." 

8  Spencer  v.  Lewis,  1  Houst.  223.  ^  Haslett  v.  Glenn,  7  Har.  &  J.  17. 

8  In  Simpkins  v.  Rogers,  15  111.  397  ;  Crotty  v.  Collins,  13  111.  567,  it  was 


ClI.  V.  §  3.]  ESTATES   FOR  LIFE.  143 

ini'iit  or  louse  of  the  prt'inisfs,  ami  tlio  feofTco  or  lessee  take 
the  crops,  the  ilisseiscc  cannot  hiive  trespass  for  such  tak- 
ing', even  after  re-j'ainin^''  i>ossession,  for  the  tenant  eanie  in 
by  title.'  13nt  this  hitter  pro})osition  has  often  been  tjues- 
tioned,  and  is  in  some  States  expressly  denied  to  be  law,  and 
the  disseisor's  lessee,  as  well  as  his  heirs,  held  liable  to  the 
disseisee.^ 

IG.  To  avail  himself  of  the  eniljlements,  it  is  ol)vions  that 
the  tenant  or  his  representative  must  have  some  ri^ht  of  entry 
or  occui)ancy  of  the  land  itself ;  and  if  the  tenancy  is  deter- 
mined by  death  or  otherwise  soon  after  the  plantinjr  of  a  crop, 
this  right  may  of  necessity  be  continued  for  some  months. 
The  extent  of  this  right  may  be  stated  to  be  this:  lie  may 
enter  upon  the  land,  cultivate  the  crop  if  a  growing  one,  cut 
and  harvest  it  when  fit,  and  if  interfered  with  in  the  reason- 
able exercise  of  these  privileges  by  the  landlord  or  reversioner, 
or  if  the  crop  be  injured  by  him,  he  may  have  an  action  for 
the  same.^ 

17.  But  this  docs  not  give  him  a  right  to  exclusive  posses- 
sion of  the  land,  but  merely  tiie  right  of  ingress  and  egress  for 
the  purposes  above  mentioned,  while,  for  all  other  purposes, 
the  landlord  or  reversioner  is  in  exclusive  possession.* 

18.  A  question  has  been  raised  whether  for  this  qualified 
occupation  of  land,  the  tenant  or  his  executors  would  be 
chargeable  for  rent,  or  be  bound  to  make  compensa- 
tion. Plowdcn  raises  *  the  query  and  seems  to  incline  [•lOOj 
to  the  opinion  that  they  would  be,  except  in  case  of 
executors  of  tenant  in  fee.  And  this  query  is  repeated  by 
Williams  in  his  treatise  on  Executors.^ 

19.  Though  the  question,  what  are  lawful  estovers  and  em- 
blements, is  pretty  well  defined  by  the  common  law,  it  is  held 

held  that  trover  lay.  In  Lindsey  v.  Winona  R.  R.,  29  Minn.  411,  however,  the 
liability  to  the  disseisee  was  limited  to  crops  planted  by  the  latter,  or  for  gra-ss  or 
other  /rudu3  naluraks;  while  in  Page  r.  Fowler,  39  Cal.  412,  a  liability  for  cropa, 
even  of  hay,  was  denie<l. 

*  Liford's  Case,  11  Rep.  51,  and  see  Tennos  de  la  Ley,   "  Emblements." 

2  Trubee  v.  Miller,  48  Conn.  347  ;  Emerson  v.  Thompson,  2  Pick.  478,  485. 

*  Forsythe  r.  Price,  8  Watts,  2S2. 

*  Humphries  r.  Humphries,  3  Ired.  302  ;  Wms.  Ex'rs,  605  ;  Lit.  g  63. 
»  Plowd.  Queries  (at  the  end  of  his  Report*),  239  ;  Wms.  Lx'rs,  605. 


144  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

in  this  country  that  they  often  depend  upon  the  usages  and 
customs  of  different  localities  ;  and  though  this  will  be  further 
discussed  in  connection  with  the  subject  of  waste,  it  may  be 
proper  here  to  refer  to  some  of  these  customs  ;  usage,  wliere 
it  is  applied,  being  considered  as  entering  into  and  forming 
a  part  of  the  contract  or  title  by  which  the  the  tenant 
holds.^ 

20.  Thus  it  is  held  a  good  and  valid  custom  in  Pennsyl- 
vania, New  Jersey,  and  Delaware,  that  if  the  tenant  sows 
crops  in  the  autumn,  which  will  not  be  ready  for  harvesting 
till  the  next  autumn,  he  may  claim  them  as  emblements,  al- 
though, in  the  mean  time,  his  lease  may  have  expired.^  So 
it  was  held  in  Ohio  that  the  parties  to  a  lease  in  which  noth- 
ing is  said  of  the  way-going  crop  will  be  governed  by  the 
custom  of  the  place  in  which  the  land  is  situate.  Thus  where 
a  lease  ended  on  the  1st  of  April,  the  tenant  was  held  to  be 
entitled  to  a  crop  of  wheat  then  growing  thereon.^  And  the 
same  doctrine  is  applied  in  Maryland.* 

21.  Although  the  principle  that  the  tenant  who  sows  a  crop 
shall  reap  it,  if  the  term  of  his  tenancy  is  uncertain,  is  so 
broad  and  so  nearly  universal  in  its  application,  yet  if  a  mort- 
gagee forecloses  his  mortgage,  whatever  crops  are  then  growing 
upon  the  mortgaged  premises,  if  planted  after  the  mortgage  is 
made,  become  the  mortgagee's,  whether  planted  by  the  mort- 
gagor or  by  his  tenant,  free  from  any  claim  upon  them  by 
such  tenant.^     But  a  foreclosure  after  the  crops  are  severed 

1  Van  Ness  v.  Pacard,  2  Pet.  137,  148;  Taylor,  Land.  &  T.  82,  83  ;  Stultz  v. 
Dickey,  5  Binn.  285. 

2  Gordon  v.  Little,  8  S.  &  E.  533  ;  Van  Doren  v.  Everitt,  2  South,  460  ;  Temple- 
man  V.  Biddle,  1  Harringt.  522  ;  Smith,  Land.  &  T.  258,  Am.  ed.  n.  But  this  is 
not  uniformly  true,  for  a  tenant  could  not  thus  sow  his  ground  with  oats  and 
claim  to  occupy  till  they  were  ripe  after  the  natural  expiration  of  his  lease,  if 
sown  for  instance  in  March,  and  the  lease  expires  in  April.  Howell  v.  Schenck, 
24  N.  J.  L.  89.  But  no  such  custom  exists  in  N.  Y.  Reeder  v.  Sayre,  70 
N.  Y.  180. 

8  Foster  v.  Robinson,  6  Ohio  St.  90,  95,  where  the  court  cite,  as  to  custom 
making  law,  Wigglesworth  v.  Dallison,  Doug.  201  ;  Huttou  v.  Warren,  1  M.  &  W. 
466. 

4  Dorsey  v.  Eagle,  7  G.  &  J,  321. 

6  Lane  v.  King,  8  Wend.  584  ;  Shepard  v.  Philbrick,  2  Denio,  174  ;  Crews  v. 
Pendleton,  1  Leigh,  297  ;  Gillett  v.  Balcom,  6  Barb.  370  ;  Jones  v.  Thomas,  8 
Blackf.  428  ;  Howell  v.  Schenck,  24  N.  J.  89. 


CH.   V 


b^  •!•] 


ESTATES    FOR    LIFE. 


i\'> 


(loi'S  nut  carry  an  inti'n^t  in   ilniu   tu  the   nmrtgagce  or  \niv- 
chaser.' 

2'2.  The  foregoinj^  iloctrint;  in  res)K'ct  to  the  ri^^lits  of  a 
mortgagee  wouKl  jirobahly  he  limited  to  ca.ses  where  a  mort/- 
gage  creates  an  estate  in  the  hmd.  JJiit  in  the  case  of  a  judg- 
ment lien,  a  dilTerent  rule  prevails.  A  tenant  who  hires  lan<l 
suhjt'ct  to  such  a  lien,  and  plants  crops  upon  the  same  before 
a  sale  of  the  j)remises  made,  may  claim  them  against  a  pur- 
chaser under  a  sherilTs  sale.- 


•  SECTION  IV. 


OF    WASTE. 


[•107] 


1.  Tcnftnt  mny  not  cotmnit  waste. 

2,  3.  What  constitutes  waste. 

4.  English  Rules  nut  always  applicable  here  as  to  waste. 

5.  Waste  in  cutting  or  injuring  trees.     What  are  tinilwr  trees. 
6,  7.  Rules  ixs  to  cutting  trees  l>ting  waste,  in  this  country. 

8.  Where  wood  cut  Injlongs  to  tlic  one  who  cuts  it. 

9.  Otlier  iinprovfujcnts  (ju  an  estite  no  defence  as  to  waste  done. 
10.  What  acts  of  cutting  trees  are  or  are  not  waste. 

11-14.  Rights  of  dowTess  to  cut  timber,  &c. 

15.  When  <utting  trees  is  trespa.ss  and  not  waste. 

16-19.  Wiuste  in  oiM-ning  pits,  mines,  ijuarries,  &c 

20-22.  Waste  by  improiH-r  cultivation  of  laud. 

23-25.  Waste  in  buildings,  wliat. 

26.  Rule  as  to  what  is  waste  to  builduigs. 

27.  Instances  of  alleged  acts  of  waste. 

28.  Waste  by  removing  buildings. 

29.  Waste  in  resiHJct  to  fences  and  liouses  going  to  decay. 
30-33.  To  what  extent  tenants  bound  to  rejiair. 

34.  For  wliat  acts  of  waste  tenant  is  excused. 

35.  Tenant  liable  for  acts  of  waste  by  strangers. 

36,  37.  How  far  tenant  is  liable  for  wa.ste  by  accidental  fires. 

38-42.  Of  tlie  remedy  against  tenant  for  waste. 

43.  If  tenant  reiMiirs  Itefore  suit,  it  bars  the  action. 

44-47.  EITeet  of  want  of  privity  ujm)!!  action  of  wa.ste. 

48.  Action  on  the  case,  &c.,  for  waste. 

49,  50.  As  to  property  in  trees  cut  in  committing  waste. 

51.  Chancery  restrains  wilful  waste,  though  tenant  is  without  im- 
|K'achment. 

»  Ruckout  r.  Swift,  27  Pal.  433  ;   Codrington  r.  Johnstone,  1  I5»'av.  .liO. 
'  Rittinger  r.    R.aker,    29   Pfun.  St.   66,  overruling  the  cases   of  SaUadc   v. 
James,  6  Reun.  St.  144,  and  Groffp.  Levan,  16  Pcnu.  St.  179. 

VOL.  I. — 10 


146  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

52.  Ministers  liable  for  waste  on  glebe  lauds. 

53-57.  How  far  statutes  of  Gloucester,  &c.,  adopted  here. 

58.  Actions  on  the  case,  rather  than  of  waste,  in  use. 

59.  Ordinary  remedy,  now  sought  in  chancery. 
60,  61.  In  what  cases  ec^uity  will  enjoin  acts  of  waste. 

62.     In  what  cases  equity  gives  compensation  for  waste. 
63,  64.     Provisions  for  cutting  timber,  making  improvements,  &c. 

1.  An  important  disability  to  which  all  tenants  for  life  as 
well  as  for  years  are  subject,  is  that  of  not  committing  waste, 
or  doing  or  suffering  that  to  be  done  upon  the  premises  which 
essentially  injures  or  impairs  the  inheritance  of  the  estate 
occupied  by  the  tenant.  This  restriction  existed  at  common 
law  in  respect  to  estates  in  possession  of  tenants  in  dower 
and  curtesy,  because,  as  these  were  created  by  the  law  itself, 

*it  was  thought  that  the  law  was  bound  to  protect  the  rever- 
sioner or  remainder-man  from  being  thereby  injured.  But 
where  the  estate  of  the  tenant  was  created  by  act  of  the  par- 
ties, it  was  held  that  if  the  grantor  or  lessor  failed  to  protect 
the  estate  by  stipulations  in  his  deed  or  lease,  the  law  was  not 
bound  to  supply  the  omission.  To  remedy  this  defect  the 
statute  of  Marlbridge,  52  Hen.  Ill,  c.  24,  was  passed,  whereby 
"fermors  during  their  terms,  shall  not  make  waste,  sale,  nor 
exile  of  house,  woods,  and  men,  nor  of  anything  belonging  to 
the  tenements  that  they  have  to  ferm,"  and  were  made  liable 
to  "  yield  full  damage  "  for  so  doing.  And  it  is  said  '■'■  firmarii 
do  comprehend  all  such  as  hold  by  lease  for  life  or  lives  or 
for  years,  by  deed  or  without  deed."  By  this  statute  only 
single  or  actual  damages  were  recoverable  for  waste  committed. 
But  by  the  statute  of  Gloucester,  6  Edw.  I.  c.  5,  the  party  com- 
mitting the  injury  in  an  action  of  waste  lost  the  place  wasted 
and  treble  damages,  or  "  thrice  so  much  as  the  waste  shall  be 
taxed  at."  ^ 

2.  In  respect  to  what  is  embraced  under  the  term  waste,  it 
is  divided  into  that  which  is  voluntary  and  that  which  is  per- 
missive, the  one  being  by  some  act  done  which  injures  the 
inheritance,  the  other  by  omitting  some  duty  which  causes 
an  injury  to  result  to  the  inheritance.  To  tear  a  house  down 
is  voluntary  waste  ;  to  suffer  it  to  go  to  decay  for  want  of 

1  Co.  2  In.st.  144,  145  ;  Id.  299  ;  Sackett  v.  Sackett,  8  Pick.  309,  312-315. 


ril.  V,  §  4.]  K<T.\TtS    Vnli    LIFE.  1  !? 

necessary  repair,  is  |)erinissive.     This   will   l»e  found   ;iii    im- 
portaut  distinction  in  its  conseijuences.' 

•3.  IJut  whatever  the  act  or  omission  is,  in  ord<r  to  [*l*i*^J 
its  constitntinj;  waste,  it  must  either  diminish  tlie  vahie 
of  the  estate,  or  increase  the  burdens  upon  it,  or  impair  th"- 
evidence  of  title  of  him  who  has  the  inheritance.-  Wa^te,  in 
short,  may  ho  defined  to  be  whatever  does  a  lustint;  damage 
to  the  freehold  or  inheritance,  and  tends  to  the  j)erman(nt 
loss  of  the  owner  in  fee,  or  to  destroy  or  lessen  the  value  of 
the  inheritance.^ 

4.  In  a|»j»lyin,iz;  this  rule  it  will  lie  found  that  maiiv  acts 
which  in  Enirland  would  be  waste  will  not  be  such  ln-ic,  in 
consequence  of  the  difference  in  the  condition  of  the  two 
countries.  And  it  often  becomes  a  (juestion  iov  a  jury  to 
determine  whether  a  certain  act  be  or  be  not  waste,  without 
referring  to  a  criterion  drawn  from  any  other  country.  The 
rule  as  to  what  constitutes  waste  is  uniform.  Its  ajijilication 
dei)ends  ujion  the  condition  and  usages  of  the  j)lace  where  it 
is  to  be  made.* 

5.  The  first  branch  of  the  subject,  as  it  is  generally  treated, 
relates  to  felling,  lopping,  or  injuring  growing  trees  upon  the 
premises.  The  rule  of  the  common  law  is  that  to  fell  timber, 
to  lop  it,  or  to  do  any  act  which  causes  it  to  decay,  is  uniformly 
waste.^  "Dak,  ash,  and  elm  be  timber  trees  in  all  jilaces," 
beeches  in  IJuekinghamshire,  and  birches  in  JJerkshire,  are  so 
regarded;  but  hornbeams,  hazels,  and  willows,  are  never  tim- 
ber ;  and  yet  if  standing  in  defence  or  safeguard  of  the  house  or 
land,  it  woulil  be  waste  to  cut  them  ;  as  it  would  be  to  ''  stub 
up  "  a  quickset  hedge  of  white-thorn.*'    The  same  would  be  the 


1  3  Dane,  Abr.  214  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  281. 

2  Huntley  v.  Hiis,>l-I1,  13  Q.  B.  572,  5S8  ;  2  Bl.  fom.  281  ;  3  Dane,  ALr.  215. 
•t  M.Crif^or  v.  Brown,  10  X.  Y.  114,  117  ;  Pi-.tTitt  v.  H.Mulcrson,  29  Mo.  325. 

*  3  Dane,  Abr.  232  ;  Tynchon  v.  Stpamx,  11  Met.  304  ;  Kec-ler  r.  Fjistnian,  11 
Vt.  2y3  ;  Jackson  r.  Til)bits,  3  W.-nd.  341  ;  .Tackson  r.  Brown.wn,  7  .b.hns.  227  ; 
Walker,  Am.  Law,  278  ;  Kiild  v.  Donnison,  a  Barb.  9  ;  3  Dane,  Abr.  '214 :  Lynn's 
Api>.,  31  Penn.  St.  44  ;  Drown  r.  Smith,  .52  Me.  141. 

*  Co.  Lit.  53  a  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  281  ;  Taylor,  Unil.  &  T.  166. 

*  Co.  Lit.  53  a  ;  3  Dane,  Abr.  218,  233  ;  TnJ.  Caa.  65  ;  Honywoo.1  r.  Hony- 
wood,  L.  R.  18  Eq.  306,  limits  oak,  ash,  or  elm,  as  timK^r,  to  their  being  twenty 
years  of  age,  and  not  too  old  to  have  usable  wood  in  them. 


148  LAW   OF   EEAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

rule  as  to  shade  and  ornamental  and  fruit-trees,  unless  past 
bearing.! 

6.  In  the  United  States,  whether  cutting  of  any  kind  of 
trees  in  any  particular  case  is  waste,  seems  to  depend  upon 
the  question  whether  the  act  is  such  as  a  prudent  farmer 
would  do  with  his  own  land,  having  regard  to  the  land  as  an 
inheritance,  and  whether  the  doing  it  would  diminish  the  value 

of  the  land  as  an  estate.^ 
[*109]  *  7  Questions  of  this  kind  have  frequently  arisen 
in  those  States  where  the  lands  are  new  and  covered 
with  forests,  and  where  they  cannot  be  cultivated  until  cleared 
of  the  timber.  In  such  case  it  seems  to  be  lawful  for  the  ten- 
ant to  clear  the  land  if  it  would  be  in  conformity  with  good 
husbandry  to  do  so,  the  question  depending  upon  the  custom 
of  farmers,  the  situation  of  the  country,  and  the  value  of  the 
timber.  The  jury  are  in  each  case  to  determine  whether  by 
clearing  the  lands  the  tenant  has  cut  so  much  timber  as  to 
injure  the  inheritance.^ 

8.  Wood  cut  by  a  tenant  in  clearing  the  land  belongs  to 
him,  and  he  may  sell  it,^  though  he  cannot  cut  the  wood  for 
purposes  of  sale  ;  it  is  waste  if  he  does.^ 

9.  Nor  can  the  tenant,  when  sued  for  cutting  and  selling 
timber,  recoup  or  make  counter-claim  for  improvements  made 
by  him  upon  the  premises  at  another  time.^ 

10.  In  applying  these  rules  it  has  been  held  in  Vermont  not 
to  be  waste  to  cut  and  remove  dead  or  decaying  timber  in 
order  to  clear  the  land  and  give  the  young  trees  a  chance  to 

1  3  Dane,  Abr.  217  ;  Id.  233. 

'^  Givensi).  McCalmont,  4  Watts,  460;  Chase  v.  Hazelton,  7  N".  H.  171  ;  Keeler 
V.  Eastman,  11  Vt.  293  ;  Shine  t;.  Wilcox,  1  Dev.  &  B.  Eq.  631  ;  Smith  v.  Poyas, 
2  Desaus.  65  ;  Hickman  v.  Irvine,  3  Dana,  121  ;  Parkins  v.  Coxe,  2  Hayw.  339 
(Martin  &  Hayw.  517).     See  Phillips  v.  Smith,  14  M.  &  W.  594,  n.  to  Am.  ed. 

3  Walker,  Am.  Law,  278  ;  Jackson  v.  Brownson,  7  Johns.  227  ;  Morehouse  v. 
Cotheal,  2  N.  J.  521  ;  Keeler  v.  Eastman,  11  Vt.  293  ;  McCullough  v.  Irvine,  13 
Penn.  St.  438  ;  Hastings  v.  Crunckleton,  3  Yeates,  261  ;  Harder  v.  Harder,  26 
Barb.  409  ;  McGregors.  Brown,  10  N.  Y.  114  ;  Proffittt).  Henderson,  29  Mo.  325; 
Davis  V.  Gilliam,  5  Ired.  Eq.  308. 

*  Crockett  v.  Crockett,  2  Ohio  St.  180  ;  Davis  v.  Gilliam,  mp. 

s  Parkins  v.  Coxc,  2  Hayw.  339  (Martin  &  Hayw.  517)  ;  Smith,  Land.  &  T. 
192,  n.  Am.  ed.  ;  Chase  tJ.  Hazelton,  7  N.  H.  171  ;  Clemence  v.  Steere,  1  R.  I.  272. 

^  Morehouse  v.  Cotheal,  22  N.  J.  521  ;  Kidd  v.  Denuison,  6  Barb.  9. 


en.  V.  §    1.]  ESTATES    FOU    LIFE.  1  10 

prow.i  In  Massachusetts,  ciittinir  uak-trccs  for  fuel  is  not  in 
itself  waste,  because  of  the  common  usii^c  ;  thou^rli  it  wouM 
he  so  if  they  were  sold  for  timber,  even  if  the  ninney  was  aj>- 
plied  to  piurliase  firewood  for  the  use  of  the  tenant.^  And 
where  land  was  appendant  in  its  use  to,  and  let  with,  a  fur- 
nace, it  was  held  not  to  be  waste  to  cut  wood  from  the  prem- 
ises to  sujjply  the  furnace.  And  the  same  rule  was 
ajiplied  in  *  the  case  of  .salt-works  upon  the  premi.ses,  [*110] 
where  wood  was  cut  to  carry  on  the  manufacture.^  So 
in  Pennsylvania  it  was  held  not  waste  for  the  mortjra^or, 
thouirh  insolvent,  to  cut  and  sell  timber,  and  di^'  and  sell  coal 
and  minerals ;  because  products  of  this  kind  are  usually  so 
intended.^ 

11.  Althougli  it  is  not  proposed  to  consider  the  ri<_dits  of  a 
dowress  to  her  lands  to  any  considerable  extent  here,  it  may 
be  observed  that  her  rijfhts  in  the  matter  of  cutting  timber 
are  by  no  means  uniform  in  the  dilTerent  States.  At  common 
law  she  could  only  have  estovers,  and  if  she  went  beyond  that 
she  was  liable  to  forfeit  the  premises  wasted.  For  this  reason 
it  was  held  in  Massachusetts  that  she  could  not  be  dowablc  of 
wild  lands,  because  the  very  act  of  clearing  for  cultivation 
would  be  waste  and  work  a  forfeiture.^  But  this  does  not  ex- 
tend to  a  wood-lot  or  other  land  used  with  a  barn  or  dwelling- 
house,  althougli  such  wood-lot  or  other  land  has  never  been 
cleared.*^ 

12.  In  other  States  she  is  dowaldc  of  wild  lands,  and  may 
clear  a  reasonable  proportion  of  the  lands  set  out  to  her,  for 
the  j)urposes  of  cultivation."  In  Maine,  waste  does  not  lie 
against  the  tenant  in  dower,  though  an  action  in  the  nature  of 
waste  will.^ 

^  Keeler  v.  Enstnian,  11  Vt.  293. 

2  Pncl.-lforJ  V.  Piuklfonl,  7  Pick.  152  ;  Babb  v.  Perley,  1  Mc.  6.  So  in  Rhode 
Island.     Lester  v.  Young,  14  R.  I.  579. 

»  Den  V.  Kinney,  2  South.  552  ;  Findlay  v.  Smith,  6  Munf.  134. 

*  Angier  v.  Agnew,  98  Penn.  St.  587. 

'  Conner  r.  Shepherd,  15  Mass.  164.  «  Pub.  Stat.  c.  124,  §  4. 

'  Haatings  v.  Crunckleton,  3  Ycates,  261  ;  Findlay  v.  Smith,  6  .Munf.  134  ; 
Alexander  i'.  Fisher,  7  Ala.  514.  Such  i.s  the  law  in  New  York  and  IVnn.syl- 
vaiiia.  4  Kent,  Com.  76.  And  in  North  Carolina.  Balh-ntiiie  v.  Poyner.  2 
Hayw.  110  (Martin  &  Hayw.  268);  Parkins  v.  Coxe,  2  Ha\-w.  339  (Martin  k 
Hayw.  517).  So  iu  Tennessee,  but  not  to  im|)air  the  estate.  Owen  r.  Hyde,  6 
Yerg.  334.  8  Smith  v.  FoUansbce,  !3  Mc.  273. 


150  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK    L 

13.  And  if  the  mode  of  using  the  land  has  consisted  in 
cutting  the  growth  upon  it  as  the  customary  source  of  profit, 
the  widow  may  continue  to  do  so.  Thus  to  cut  and  sell  staves 
and  shingles/  or  hoop-poles,^  under  the  circumstances  above 
supposed,  would  not  be  waste. 

14.  Where  the  entire  dower  lands  set  off  to  a  widow  consist 
of  different  parcels  of  the  same  original  estate,  but  the  rights 
of  reversion  in  the  different  parcels  are  in  different  persons, 
her  right  of  cutting  upon  any  one  of  them  is  not  thereby  af- 
fected, if  she  fairly  treat  it  as  one  estate,  and  is  not  guilty  of 

partiality  or  malice  towards  any  one  of  the  reversioners.^ 
[*111]       *  15.  If  a  tenant  cut  trees  upon  leased  premises 

which  are  excepted  in  his  lease,  he  is  guilty  of  tres- 
pass, but  not  waste  ;  *  and  if  tenant  carry  away  trees  that  have 
been  blown  down,  he  would  be  liable  for  them  in  trover,  but 
not  in  waste.^ 

16.  Another  species  of  waste  consists  in  opening  gravel  pits 
in  the  land,  and  digging  and  selling  gravel  therefrom,  or  dig- 
ging up  and  selling  the  soil  or  clay,  or  digging  clay  and  mak- 
ing it  into  bricks  for  sale ;  for  a  tenant  for  life  may  neither 
dig  clay  nor  cut  wood  upon  land  for  the  purpose  of  making 
bricks  for  sale.^ 

17.  But  if  digging  and  selling  gravel,  clay,  &c.,  from  pits 
in  the  land  has  been  the  usual  mode  of  improving  the  same, 
it  would  not  be  waste  to  continue  to  do  so  in  pits  alread}^ 
opened^ 

18.  To  open  lands  to  search  for  mines,  unless  mines  are 
expressly  demised  with  the  lands,  would  be  waste ;  so  it  would 
be  to  open  new  mines,  unless  the  demise  includes  them.^     But 

1  BalleBtine  v.  Poyner,  2  Hayw.  110  (Martin  &  Hayw.  268). 

2  Clemence  v.  Steere,  1  R.  L  272. 

8  Padelford  v.  Padelford,  7  Pick.  152  ;  Dalton  v.  Dalton,  7  Ired.  Eq.  197. 

4  1  Cruise,  Dig.  116. 

6  Shult  V.  Barker,  12  S.  &  R.  272. 

6  Huntley  v.  Russell,  13  Q.  B.  672,  591  ;  Taylor,  Land.  &  T,  164  ;  Livingston 
V.  Reynolds,  2  Hill,  157  ;  Co.  Lit.  53  b  ;  Tud.  Cas.  65. 

T  Huntley  v.  Russell,  13  Q.  B.  591  ;  Knight  v.  Mosely,  Amb.  176  ;  Tud. 
Cas.  65  ;  and  see  Angier  v.  Agnew,  98  Penn.  St.  587  ;  ante  *  110. 

8  Co.  Lit.  53  b ;  2  Bl.  Com.  282;  Com.  Dig.  "Waste,"  D.  4  ;  Saunders's  Case, 
5  Rep.  12  ;  Stougliton  v.  Leigh,  1  Taunt.  402,  410  ;  Darcy  v.  Askwith,  Hob, 
234  ;  Viner  v.  Vaughau,  2  Beav.  466. 


ClI.  V.  §    I.]  KSTATKS    FOU    LI  IK.  l.'l 

if  the  inim'S  arc  alri'Jidy  ojmmumI  wIkii  tlio  tenant  takfs  ilic 
estate,  it  is  not  waste  to  continue  to  work  them  even  to  ex- 
haustion. It  is  hut  taking'  the  aecruinj^  profits  of  the  8oil.* 
Nor  wouKl  it  l)e  waste  to  o]»cn  new  shafts  or  jiits  to  follow  th«i 
same  vein.-  And  this  riglit  he  may  sell  to  others.  The  per- 
sons thus  entitled  may  mine  and  sell  the  mineral,  and  for  this 
purpose  may  make  new  openings,  build  railroads,  and  supply 
all  ordinary  facilities  for  carrying  on  the  husine.s.s.  But  the 
improvements  tlius  made  become  the  property  of  the  rever- 
sioner upon  the  termination  of  the  life  estate.^ 

ll>.  The  sarac,i)rincij>le  apjjlies  to  salt-works,  as  to  minerals. 
If  there  is  an  existing  salt  well  on  the  premises  and  a  numu- 
factory  of  salt,  it  would  not  be  waste  to  dig  a  new  salt  well  in 
connection  with  it.* 

*20.  Waste  may  be  committed  by  the  manner  in  [*112] 
which  land  is  managed  in  the  way  of  cidture.  And 
in  Enirland,  the  early  cases  at  least  adopt  a  very  stringent 
rule,  holding  it  waste  to  change  one  kind  of  land  to  another, 
as  wood  or  meadow  or  pasture  into  arable  land,  and  tin-  like. 
And  one  ground  upon  which  this  is  held  is,  that  changing  the  de- 
scription of  lands  might  endanger  the  evidence  of  ownership.^ 

1  2  Bl.  Com.  282  ;  Neel  v.  Neel,  19  Penn.  St.  324  ;  Taylor,  Land.  &  T.  IfiS  ; 
S  tough  ton  V.  Leigh,  1  Taunt.  410. 

'-  Clavering  v.  Clavering,  2  P.  Wms.  388  ;  Findlay  v.  Smith,  6  Munf.  134  ; 
Crouch  r.  Puryear,  1  Rand.  258  ;  Billings  i-.  Taylor,  10  Pick.  460  ;  Coates  r.  Clu-c- 
ver,  1  Cow.  460.  There  is  a  tendency  in  the  courts  of  Pennsylvania  to  extend 
the  right  of  lessees  to  open  new  mines  without  subjecting  themselves  to  the  con- 
sequences of  waste,  where  the  lands  leased  are  chielly  valuable  for  the  minerals 
they  contain.  See  Smith,  Land,  k  T.  192,  193,  Am.  ed.  n.  And  see  Angier  c. 
Agnew,  98  Penn.  St.  587. 

■  Irwin  V.  Covode,  24  Penn.  St.  162  ;  Lynn's  App.,  31  Penn.  St.  44  ;  Kicr  r. 
Peterson,  41  Penn.  St.  357. 

*  Findlay  v.  Smith,  6  Munf.  134  ;  Kier  r.  Peterson,  41  Penn.  St.  357.  This 
case  presented  a  novel  question  under  the  application  of  the  principle  of  the  text. 
The  defendant  leased  to  the  plaintiff  the  right  to  bore  salt  wells  for  the  plaintiffs 
business,  and  to  manufacture  salt  thereon  for  an  indefinite  period  of  time,  paying 
therefor  every  twelfth  barrel  of  salt  manufactured.  After  a  while  |M?troli-um  be- 
gan to  rise  in  the  wells,  in  connection  with  the  salt  water,  and,  being  valuable, 
both  parties  claimed  the  right  to  take  it.  It  was  held  that  the  proinrty  in  the 
jMitroleum  remained  in  the  lessor,  to  be  accounted  for  by  the  lessee,  if  u»c«l  or  ap- 
propriated by  him. 

»  2  Bl.  Com.  282  ;  3  Dane.  Abr.  218  ;  Com.  Dig.  "  Waste,"  D.  4  ;  Diircy  r. 
AskwiUi,  Hob.  234  a  ;  Co.  Lit.  53  b. 


152  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

21.  But  it  is  apprehended  that  the  usages  of  this  country 
are  such,  that  no  such  change  in  the  mode  of  culture  would, 
of  itself,  be  waste.  The  question  would  depend  upon  whether 
it  was  in  conformity  with  the  rules  of  good  husbandry  or  not, 
and  would  injure  the  inheritance.^  Reference  is  often  had  in 
this  kind  of  waste,  as  in  that  by  cutting  timber,  to  the  usages 
of  the  place.2  And  where  it  was  customary  to  sell  the  hay 
from  farms,  it  would  not  be  waste  to  do  so,  though  esteemed 
so  elsewhere. 

22.  But  it  would  be  waste  to  suffer  pastures  to  become  over- 
grown with  brush ;  ^  or  to  impoverish  fields  by  constant  tillage 
from  year  to  year ;  *  or  to  remove  the  manure  made  upon  the 
premises  in  the  ordinary  course  of  husbandry  ;  ^  or  to  suffer  a 
bank  to  become  ruinous,  whereby  the  water  of  the  sea  or  a  river 
overflows  and  spoils  meadow  ground.^  But  where  in  altering 
the  course  of  a  creek,  which  was  in  itself  an  act  of  good  hus- 
bandry, the  water  had  the  effect  to  destroy  growing  timber, 
which  had  not  been  anticipated,  it  was  held  not  to  be  an  act 
of  waste.^ 

23.  In  respect  to  buildings,  waste  may  be  either  voluntary 

or  permissive.  By  the  law,  as  understood  in  England, 
[*113]  *  removing  wainscots,  floors,  or  things  fixed  to  the 

freehold  in  a  house,  pulling  down  or  unroofing  a 
building,  changing  it  from  one  kind  to  another,  as  a  corn-mill 
to  a  fulling-mill,  a  dwelling-house  into  a  store,  two  chambers 
into  one,  or  e  converso,  and  the  like,  would  be  waste  at  the 
common  law.^ 

24.  In  applying  these  rules,  it  has  been  held  that  pulling 
down  a  house  and  building  another  even  upon  a  more  favora- 

1  3  Dane,  Abr.  219  ;  Crockett  v.  Crockett,  2  Ohio  St.  180  ;  Taylor,  Land.  &  T. 
170,  171  ;  Clemence  v.  Steere,  1  R.  I.  272  ;  Keeler  v.  Eastman,  11  Vt.  293  ;  Phil- 
lips V.  Smith,  14  M.  &  W.  594  ;  McGregor  v.  Brown,  10  N.  Y.  114,  118  ;  Proffitt 
V.  Henderson,  29  Mo.  325. 

2  Jones  V.  Whitehead,  1  Parsons,  304;  Smith,  Land,  k  T.  192,  n.  Am.  ed.; 
Sarles  v.  Sarles,  3  Sand.  Ch.  601  ;  "Webster  v.  Webster,  33  N.  H.  18,  25. 

8  Clemence  v.  Steere,  1  R.  L  272. 

*  Sarles  v.  Sarles,  3  Sandf.  Ch.  601.  5  Lewis  v.  Jones,  17  Penn.  St.  262. 

6  Com.  Dig.  "  Waste,"  D.  4;  Co.  Lit.  53  b. 
'  Jackson  v.  Andrew,  18  Johns.  431. 

8  3  Dane,  Abr.  215;  Com.  Dig.  "Waste,"  D.  3;  Taylor,  Land.  &  T.  166;  Lon- 
don V.  Greyme,  Cro.  Jac.  181;  Co.  Lit.  53  a,  n.  344;  2  Rolle,  Abr.  815. 


CII.  V.  §  4.]  ESTATES    FOR    LIFK.  l')3 

blu  .sUl-  ui)oii  tlie  same  farm,  would  be  wuhIo,  aiul,  aniont,'  (jthcr 
reasons,  because  it  tends  to  destroy  llic  evidence  of  identity.' 
Nor  woiibl  it  make  any  dilVerence  that  the  tenant,  l»y  pulling 
down  a  buiUling  ami  rel)uilding  it  of  a  dilTerent  fashion,  makes 
it  mor(!  valuai>le  than  at  lirst.''^ 

25.  But  it  is  apprehended  that  a  more  liberal  rule  is  now 
applied  in  respect  to  constructive  acts  of  waste  in  En^'iand 
than  formerly,  and  there  certainly  is  a  much  more  lil)eral  eun- 
struction  put  upon  such  acts  in  this  country  than  that  of  the 
common  law.  Thus,  the  cuttiuL'"  a  duov  in  a  house,  if  it  did  no 
actual  injury  and  did  not  tend  to  destroy  the  evidence  of  the 
reversioner's  title,  would  not  be  waste.^  The  proper  test  in 
all  these  cases  seems  to  be,  does  the  act  essentially  injure  the 
inheritance  as  it  will  come  to  the  reversioner ;  and  this  is  a 
question  for  the  jury.** 

26.  The  law  seems  to  be  correctly  stated  by  the  chancellor 
in  Winship  r.  Pitts.  "  It  is  not  waste  for  the  tenant  to  erect 
a  new  edifice  upon  the  demised  premises,  provided  it  can  be 
done  without  destroying  or  materially  injuring  the  buildings, 
or  other  improvements  already  existing  thereon.  lie  has  no 
right  to  pull  down  valuable  buildings,  or  to  make  imj)rove- 
mcnts  or  alterations  which  will  materially  or  permanently 
change  the  nature  of  the  property  so  as  to  render  it 
impossible  for  him  to  restore  *  the  same  premises,  [*114] 
substantially,  at  the  expiration  of  the  term.     It  cannot 

be  waste,  to  make  new  erections  upon  the  demised  premises 
which  may  be  removed  at  the  end  of  the  term  without  much 
inconvenience,  leaving  the  property  in  the  same  situation  it 
was  at  the  commencement  of  the  tenancy,  and  the  materials 
of  which  new  buildings,  if  left  on  the  premises,  would  more 
than  compensate  the  owner  of  the  reversion  for  the  expenses 
of  their  removal,"^ 

27.  In  accordance  with  the  principle  thus  laid  down,  vari- 

1  Huntley  i;.  Ruasell,  13  Q.  B.  588.  ^  2  Rolle,  Abr.  815,  pi.  17,  IS. 

»  Young  V.  Spencer,  10  B.  &  C.  145;  Jackson  v.  Tibbits,  3  Wend.  341. 

*  Young  V.  Spencer,  10  B.  i:  C.  145  ;  Doe  v.  Burlington,  5  B.  i:  Ad,  507; 
Smith,  Lnnd.  &  T.  194,  n.;  Jackson  v.  Andrew,  18  Johns.  431;  Hasty  r.  Wheeler, 
12  Me.  434  ;  Phillips  i-.  .Smith,  14  M.  k  W.  Am.  ed.  589.  595,  u. ;  Webster  c 
Webster,  33  N.  H.  25;  McGregor  v.  Brown,  10  N.Y.  114,  118. 

»  Winship  v.  Pitts,  3  Paige,  262. 


154  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK    L 

ous  cases  have  been  decided  in  this  country.  Thus,  in  the 
case  just  cited  it  was  held  not  waste  for  the  tenant  for  years  of 
a  house  and  lot  in  the  city  of  New  York  to  erect  a  livery  stable 
upon  it.  In  another,  the  tenant  for  years  tore  down  a  dilapi- 
dated building,  and  erected  another  of  the  same  size  on  the 
same  foundation,  and  at  the  end  of  the  term  moved  it  off.^  In 
another,  the  tenant  for  life  erected  a  new  smokehouse  in  place 
of  one  gone  to  decay,  from  materials  obtained  on  the  home- 
stead.- In  another,  the  tenant  for  life  tore  down  a  dilapidated 
barn  which  was  in  danger  of  falling,  and  it  was  held  not  to 
be  waste.^ 

28.  How  far  it  is  waste  for  one  in  possession  of  structures 
erected  by  him  on  land  the  title  to  which  remains  in  another, 
depends  upon  the  circumstances  under  which  the  erection 
was  made,  which  have  been  discussed  at  large  ^  already,  need 
not  be  here  referred  to  in  detail.  Briefly  it  may  be  said  that 
a  tenant  for  years  may  within  his  term  or  lawful  holding 
remove  structures  erected  by  him  for  the  purpose  of  trade  or 
agriculture ;  ^  and  so  may  any  one,  structures  of  whatever  kind 
placed  on  the  land  with  the  express  or  implied  consent  of  the 
landowner  to  their  remaining  personalty.^  But  where  without 
such  consent,"  or  where  a  valid  contract  could  not  be  made 
between  the  builder  and  the  landowner,  as  in  the  case  of 
husband  and  wife,  or  where  a  tenant  for  life  makes 
[*115]  *  permanent  improvements,  it  would  be  waste  to  re- 
move what  was  so  attached  to  the  land.^  It  would, 
however,  be  otherwise,  if  the  structure  was  never  in  fact 
affixed  to  the  land.^  And  where  a  railroad  company  took 
lands  by  eminent  domain,  and  erected  stone  piers  thereon  for 
a  bridge  for  the  railroad,  it  was  held  that,  upon  the  company 
abandoning  the  land,  these  piers  did  not,  as  fixtures,  belong 
to  the  owner  of  the  land.^*^ 

1- Beers  v.  St.  John,  16  Conn.  322.  2  Sarles  v.  Sarles,  3  Sand.  Ch.  601. 

8  Clemence  v.  Steere,  1  R.  L  272.  *  See  ante,  *3  et  seq. 

5  Van  Ness  v.  Pacard,  2  Pet.  137  ;  3  Dane,  Abr.  222.  6  Ante  *3. 

7  Bonney  v.  Foss,  62  Me.  248  ;  Madigan  v.  Macarthy,  108  Mass.  376. 

8  Dozier  v.  Gregory,  1  Jones  (N.  C. ),  100  ;  ilcCullough  v.  Irvine,  13  Penn.  St. 
438  ;  Washburn  v.  Sproat,  16  Mass.  449. 

9  Austin  V.  Stevens,  24  Me.  520. 

10  Waguer  v.  Cleveland,  &c.  R.  R.,  22  Ohio  St.  563. 


en.  V.  $  4.]  KSTATE.S    VOH   LIFE.  1',') 

20.  Thoiit^li  a  tenant  is  clearly  liahle  if  he  permits  n  liotise 
or  fences  (tu  tin-  prcniiscs  to  ^o  toilrcay,  when  by  the  exorcise 
of  n'as<)n:il)li'  ilili^ence  he  mitrht  prevent  it,  it  is  not  easy  to 
lay  down  rules  d  jiruiri  to  deline  in  all  cases  when  and  how 
far  a  tenant  shall  act.  Decay  is  (jften  so  gradual  that  it  is 
diflicult  to  determine  when  a  tenant  is  hound  to  repair,  or  how 
far  he  shall  go  in  making  repairs  in  any  given  case.  And  this 
is  especially  so  in  case  of  estates  for  years.  And,  as  a  general 
rule,  whatever  would  he  waste  to  houses  or  fences  in  England, 
would  lie  in  this  country.'  If  a  tenant  erect  a  new  house,  he  is 
as  much  hound  to  keep  it  in  repair  as  he  would  be  a  house 
standing  when  he  entered.^ 

30.  A  tenant  from  year  to  year  is  not  held  liable  to  make 
good  the  mere  wear  and  tear  of  the  premises.^  lie  is  only 
obliged  to  keep  the  house  wind  and  water  tight.* 

31.  But  that  does  not  seem  to  be  the  measure  of  what  is 
required  of  a  tenant  for  years  or  for  life.''  In  this  country, 
the  latter  is  bound  to  keej)  the  premises  in  repair,  whether 
there  is  such  a  stipulation  in  the  lease  or  not.^  And  this  he 
must  do  though  there  be  no  timber  upon  the  premises," 
though  it  is  said  that  in  sucii  case,  if  tenant  be  in  by  lease, 
the  lessor  must  provide  timber  necessary  for  the  repairs, 
if  there  be  no  fault  in  the  lessee.^  But  while  he  is  bound 
t(^  use  ordinary  care  to  prevent  buildings  going  to  decay, 
he  is  not  bound  to  expend  extraordinary  sums  for  that  pur- 
pose." 

*32.  If  a  house  is  uncovered  or  ruinous  when  the  [*110] 
tenant  takes  possession,  he  will  not  be  made  liable  by 
suffering  it  to  remain  so,  though  if  there  is  timber  upon  the 
premises  he  may  use  it  for  rei)airintr  the  house. '"^  It  would  bo 
a  doulde  waste  to  let  a  house  go  to  decay,  and  then  cut  timber 
to  repair  it. 

»  3  Dane,  .Vbr.  214  ;  M.  239  ;  Smith.  Lnn.l.  k  T.  196. 

a  3  Dane.  Abr.  215.  '  Torriano  v.  Young,  6  Car.  &  P.  8. 

♦  Auworth  V.  Jolinson,  5  Car.  &  P.  239. 
-  Smith,  Land,  k  T.  195. 

•  Long  I'.  Fitzsimmons.  1  Watts  &.  S.  530. 

'  Co.  Lit.  53  a.  •  Com.  Dig.  "Estate  by  Grant."  E.  3. 

»  Wilson  r.  Edmonds.  24  N.  IL  517. 
"  3  Dane,  Abr.  221,  222  ;  Co.  Lit.  53,  54  b;  Clemence  r.  Slecrv,  1  R.  L  272. 


156  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   L 

33.  In  England,  it  will  be  sufficient  in  respect  to  the  fences, 
if  the  tenant  keep  them  in  as  good  repair  as  he  finds  them ; 
nor  would  he  be  at  liberty  to  cut  timber  to  build  fences  where 
there  were  none  before,^  though  it  is  apprehended  that  a 
different  rule  would  be  applied  in  this  country,  making  it  de- 
pend upon  the  usages  of  the  place  and  the  rules  of  good 
husbandry  there, 

34.  Though  a  tenant  is  liable  for  acts  of  waste  done  upon 
the  premises  by  a  stranger,  he  will  not  be  for  what  is  done  by 
the  act  of  God,  public  enemies,  or  the  law.  But  if  a  house  be 
unroofed  by  a  tempest,  the  tenant  may  not  suffer  it  to  remain 
so.^  And  where  a  surveyor  of  highways,  under  authority  of 
law,  opened  gravel  pits  within  the  demised  premises,  the  ten- 
ant was  held  not  liable  for  suffering  it  to  be  done.^ 

35.  With  the  above  exceptions,  the  tenant  is  bound  to  pro- 
tect .  the  premises  from  waste,  even  against  strangers,  or  is 
responsible  to  the  reversioner  for  the  same,  and  may  have  his 
remedy  against  the  wrongdoer.^  But  in  Michigan,  if  a  tenant 
for  life  has  conveyed  away  his  estate,  he  will  not  be  liable  for 
any  waste,  committed  by  his  grantee,  although  such  tenant  for 
life  be  a  tenant  in  dower .^ 

36.  In  England,  by  statute  (6  Anne,  c.  31),  any  person  is 
exonerated  from  the  consequences  of  a  fire  which  shall  take 
by  accident  in  his  own  house,  unless  he  has  bound  himself  by 
some  express  stipulation.  But  this  does  not  extend  to  cases 
of  fires  caused  by  carelessness  on  the  part  of  the  tenant  of 
such  house. ^ 

37.  It  is  said  there  are  no  statutes  upon  the  subject  in 
the  United  States  (except  in  New  York,  in  regard  to  fires 

1  Co.  Lit.  53  b  ;  3  Dane,  Abr.  219. 

2  Co.  Lit.  54  a  ;  3  Dane,  Abr.  216,  221  ;  Smith  Land.  &  T.  195,  n.  ;  Pollard 
V.  Shaaffer,  1  Dall.  210. 

8  Huntley  v.  Russell,  13  Q.  B.  572,  591. 

*  Co.  Lit.  54  a  ;  Doctor  &  Stud.  112  ;  Fay  v.  Brewer,  3  Pick.  203  ;  3  Dane, 
Abr.  225  ;  Co.  2d  Inst.  145  ;  Wood  v.  Griffin,  46  N.  H.  230,  237,  240  ;  Cook  v. 
ChampL  Tr.  Co.,  1  Denio,  91;  Attersol  v.  Stevens,  1  Taunt.  183,  198  ;  Austin  v. 
Huds.  Riv.  R.  R.,  25  N.  Y.  334. 

6  Beers  v.  Beers,  21  Mich.  464. 

8  Filliter  v.  Pliippard,  11  Q.  B.  347.  There  was  a  second  statute,  14  Geo.  IlL 
c.  78,  §  86,  somewhat  enlarging  that  of  Anne,  extending  it  "  to  stable,  barn,  or 
other  building,  or  on  whose  estate  any  fire,"  &c.,  shall  begin. 


cii.  V.  §  t.]  i:sTATn>;  for  lifk.  l.'T 

ill  woods  *  and  liillow  laiul,  and  one  which  is  the  Ranio  ['11  "J 
as  the  statute  of  Anne,  in  New  Jtisey  and  l)ola\rarc), 
thou^di  there  are  sundry  cases  where  a  party  who  has  caused 
damage  to  the  property  of  anotlier  hy  carelessly  setlinjr  or 
niana;ring;  lire  upon  his  own  hind  has  heen  hehi  responsiljU?. 
But  if  the  lire  occurs  without  his  fault,  while  exercising  rea- 
sonable care  and  diligence,  the  tenant  would  not  bo  responsi- 
ble.•  The  statute  of  Anne  has  been  adopted  as  a  part  of  the 
conunon  law  by  the  courts  of  Wisconsin,  but  not  that  of 
14  (leo.  111.  l>ut  it  is  held  not  to  apply  to  (ires  cau.sed  by 
locomotive  euiriues  while  running  upon  railroads,  the  estate  of 
the  railroad  company.  Nor  are  railroad  companies  relieved 
from  responsibility  for  fires  occasioned  by  negligence  iiiojKi- 
ating  their  roads  ;  and  if  (ires  arc  shown  to  have  l)cen  caused 
by  railway  engines  upon  the  road,  the  burden  of  showing  that 
it  was  not  the  result  of  negligence  or  the  want  of  due  care 
and  skill  is  on  the  railroad  company .^ 

38.  In  respect  to  the  remedy  which  the  reversioner  has  for 
waste  done  upon  the  premises,  it  has  already  been  stated  that 
the  common  law  provided  an  action  only  in  the  cases  of  dower 
and  curtesy,  and  that  it  was  by  the  statutes  of  Marlbridgc 
and  (Gloucester  that  the  action  of  waste  was  extended  to  ten- 
ants for  life  and  years  by  grant  or  demise.^ 

30.  And  it  is  still  competent  for  lessors,  if  they  see  fit,  to 
grant  leases  exempting  tenants  from  responsibility  for  waste, 
or,  as  it  is  commonly  expressed,  "without  impeachment  of 
waste."  IJut  unless  a  clause  to  this  efTect  is  inserted,  tenants 
for  life  or  years  are  rcsjionsible  for  waste  done  or  i>ermitted 
upon  the  demised  premises.'* 

>  Sinitli,  IjiiuI.  &  T.  Am.  cd.  199,  n.  ;  1  Hreonl.  Cruise,  133,  n.  ;  Bamanl  v. 
Toor,  21  Pick.  378  ;  JIaull  v.  Wilson,  2  Hnrringt.  443  ;  Clark  r.  Foot,  8  Johus. 
4-21  ;  4  Kent,  Com.  82  ;  Kev.  Stat,  of  Delaware,  1S52,  c.  88,  §  6  ;  Nixon,  Dig. 
N.  J.  Ijiws,  1835,  p.  868,  §  8.  But  it  is  now  held,  notwithstamling  the  remarks 
of  Denio,  .1.,  in  Althorf  v.  Wolf.-,  22  N.  Y.  366,  that  the  statuU-  of  6  Anne,  c.  31, 
niodifuil  I'j-  that  of  14  Geo.  III.  c.  78,  has  become  a  jMirt  of  the  common  law  of 
New  York.     Lansing  r.  Stone,  37  Barb.  15. 

2  Spaiiltling  V.  Chicago  &  N.  K.  K.,  30  Wise  110.  Sec  also  8  Am.  Law  Kev. 
146. 

»  2  Bl.  Com.  283  ;  Co.  2d  Inst.  299  ;  Chipman  v.  Emeric,  3  Cal.  273. 

*  2  Bl.  ConL  283. 


158  LAW   OF  REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

40.  At  common  law  there  were  two  remedies  for  waste,  one 
by  a  writ  of  prohibition,  where  it  had  been  threatened,  the 
other  by  a  writ  of  waste  for  waste  actually  done,  in  which  the 
tenant  was  obliged  to  pay  the  value  of  the  waste,  and  a  keeper 
was  appointed  to  prevent  future  waste.  And  this  action  still 
lay  against  the  original  tenant  in  dower  or  curtesy,  although 
he  or  she  might  have  assigned  over  the  estate.  Such  action 
would  not  lie  against  the  assignee  even  for  waste  done  after 
the  assignment.! 

41.  But  no  one  could  maintain  it  but  he  who  had  an  imme- 
diate estate  of  inheritance  upon  the  determination  of  the 
estate   in   dower  or  curtesy  without   any  interposing  vested 

freehold.^ 
[*  118]  *42.  By  the  statute  of  Marlbridge,  the  actual  dam- 
ages sustained  by  the  reversioner  were  recovered  in  an 
action  of  waste.  That  of  Gloucester  gave  treble  damages, 
and,  in  addition  thereto,  the  reversioner  recovered  the  thing 
wasted,  though  it  was  not  always  easy  to  determine  how  far 
such  forfeiture  extended,  and  what  part  of  the  premises  it 
embraced.  Thus,  if  it  were  done  sjmrsim,  through  a  wood,  the 
whole  lot  was  forfeit.  So  if  in  several  rooms  in  a  house,  the 
whole  house.  But  if  in  only  a  part  of  the  wood,  or  a  single 
room  in  the  house,  which  was  or  might  easily  bo  separated 
from  the  rest,  that  part  only  of  the  thing  wasted  was  held 
forfeited.^ 

43.  And  if  the  tenant  repairs  what  would  be  held  to  be 
waste  before  the  action  is  commenced,  no  action  can  be  main- 
tained therefor.^ 

44.  The  action  of  waste  depends  upon  privity  between  the 
parties,  so  that  if  the  reversioner  grant  away  his  reversion 
after  waste  done,  no  action  in  this  form  will  lie,  and  the 
same  would  be  the  effect  if  the  reversioner  had  died  and 
it  had  descended  to  his  heirs.  So  if,  after  committing 
waste,  the  tenant  for  life  died,  no  action  lay  against  his 
executors.^ 


1  Co.  2d  Inst.  300.  2  Com.  Dig.  "Waste,"  c.  2;  Co.  Lit.  218  b,  n.  122. 

8  Co.  2d  Inst.  299  ;  Id.  303  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  283. 

*  Co.  Lit.  53  a ;  Jackson  v.  Andrew,  18  Johns.  431.  ^  Co.  Lit.  53  b. 


CU.  V.  §  4.]  ESTATKS    KOU    LIFK.  l-'H 

4o.  In  one  case  a  witlou-  had  assiLrncfl  her  interest  and  the 
reversioner  had  assigned  his.  Her  assipiee  eonnnitt».d  waste. 
It  was  hehl  that  the  asKi^ieo  of  the  reversion  conld  n<>t  have 
waste  or  an  aetion  on  the  ease  in  the  natnre  of  waste  against 
her,  beeausc  of  tlie  want  of  privity  between  them.* 

4G.  Bnt,  in  sueh  a  ease,  the  heir  of  a  reversioner  might 
have  waste,  or  case  in  the  natnre  of  waste,  again>t  her  after 
the  assignment  of  her  estate.  So  might  the  assignee  of  the 
heir  of  the  reversioner  against  the  a.ssignee  of  the  life  estate. 
In  the  first  of  these  ca.ses  there  was  a  privity  of  aetion  at  com- 
mon hiw  ;  in  the  other  there  was  a  privity  of  estate.  But 
between  the  assignee  of  the  reversion  of  the  life  e.s- 
tatc  and  the  tenant  in  *  dower  then;  is  no  privity  at  ['HO] 
all.  And  the  same  is  true  in  respect  to  tenants  by 
curtesy.-  * 

47.  In  several  of  the  States  the  diUlculties  as  to  the  forms 
and  i)arties  to  the  aetion  of  waste,  arising  from  the  teehnieal 
rules  of  the  common  law,  have  been  obviated  by  statute,  in 
some  cases  giving  the  heir  of  the  reversioner  an  aetion  for 
waste  done  in  the  lifetime  of  the  ancestor.^  In  others,  ac- 
tions for  waste  done  survive  against  the  executors,  Are.,  of  the 
tenant.* 

48.  And  it  would  seem  that  an  action  upon  the  case  in  the 

•  Note.  —  This  apparent  solecism  of  creating  a  privity  in  estate  between  the 
grnnti'cs  of  two  {H-rsons  wlio  hatl  ori^uully  no  privity  in  estate  between  them- 
selves, as  alwve  stjited,  between  the  a.ssi^nee  of  the  heir  of  a  reversioner  an<l  the 
assignee  of  a  ilowress,  is  to  be  ascribetl  to  the  statute  of  Gloucester,  and  is  not 
the  creature  of  the  common  law,  "so  as,"  in  the  words  of  Coke,  "in  this  ]>oint 
our  act  (the  statute  of  Gloucester)  is  introductory  of  a  new  law."  '2  Inst.  301 ; 
Park,  Dower,  359  ;  Com.  Dig.    "  Waste,"  c.  4  ;  Co.  Lit.  54  a. 

»  Foot  V.  Dickinson,  2  Met.  611.  "Privity"  is  defined  to  be  the  mutual  or 
successive  relationship  to  the  same  rights  of  property.    1  Grccnl.  Ev.  §§  1S9,  523. 

2  Bates  P.  Shraeder,  13  .Johns.  260  ;  Walker's  Case,  3  Rep.  23  ;  Foot  ».  Dick- 
inarm,  2  Met.  611;  Co.  2d  Inst.  301. 

'  Miis»ichu.vUs,  Pub.  .SUt.  c.  179,  §  1  ;  ifniru.  Rev.  Stat  1871,  c.  95;  XfW 
York,  2  Stat-  at  I^rge,  34.');  U'i.iconsin,  Rev.  Stat.  1858,  c.  143,  §  4  :  Michigan, 
Comp.Sut  1857,  c.  136,  §  4  ;  Lnca,  Co.le,  1873,  ]>.  533  ;  Mutaouri,  Wagner,  Stat. 
884  ;  Delatcare,  Rev.  Cwle,  1852,  c.  88.  §  5  ;  .Veir  Jt*-!/,  Nixon's  Dig.  90S;  A'rn- 
tucly.  Gen.  St.  1873,  p.  609. 

♦  Michigan,  R.-v.  Stat.  pt.  3,  tit.  3.  c.  ♦!,  §  (1  :  Main.-.  Hi  v.  ."^Lit.  l>:i,  c.  »5, 
S  i  ;  M<iM(ichu3eUs,   Pub.  Stat.  c.  179,  §  5. 


160  LAW   OF   REAL   PEOPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

nature  of  waste,  for  waste  actually  done,  is  a  common-law 
remedy,  which  any  one  having  a  reversionary  interest  may 
maintain  to  recover  the  actual  damages  done,  against  any  one 
who  does  the  injury,  whether  lessee  or  stranger.^  In  Maine, 
a  reversioner  may  have  waste  to  recover  the  place  wasted  and 
damages,  or  case  in  the  nature  of  waste,  and  recover  damages, 
but  not  both.2 

49.  Though,  as  has  been  seen,  the  interposition  of  a  free- 
hold in  remainder  between  the  estate  of  the  tenant  commit- 
ting waste,  and  the  remainder  or  reversion  in  fee,  would  pre- 
vent the  owner  of  the  latter  from  maintaining  waste  as  the 
law  stood,  yet  he  is  not  without  right  or  remedy  in  respect 
to  timber  cut  upon  the  premises.  The  property  in  that  is 
considered  as  being  in  him,  and  he  may  seize  it,  or  bring 
trover  for  its  conversion,  or  replevy  it,  or  bring  trespass  de 
bonis  for  the  taking  of  it.  Nor  does  it  matter  whether  the 
timber  is  cut  by  a  stranger  or  by  the  tenant  himself,  since 
the  tenant  cannot  convey  any  interest  in  it  when  severed.^ 
If  a  tenant  for  life  cut  timber  and  sell  it,  he  is  thereby  a 
wrongdoer,  and  cannot  claim  the  interest  upon  such  sale,  on 
the  ground  that  it  was  a  part  of  the  income  of  the  estate. 
The  reversioner  in  such  case  may. have  trover  for  the  conver- 
sion of  the  timber,  or  an  action  for  money  had  and  received, 
if  the  tenant  shall  have  sold  it,  which  action  must  be  brought 
within  six  years,  or  be  barred  by  the  Statute  of  Limitations.* 
But  if  the  trees  are  cut  by  a  stranger,  both  the  tenant  and 
reversioner  may  have  actions  therefor,  —  trespass  by  the  ten- 
ant, and  case  by  the  reversioner.  The  trees,  however,  when 
severed  from  the  freehold,  become  the  absolute  and  sole  prop- 
erty of  the  reversioner,  and  trespass  will  lie  in  his  favor 

1  Chase  v.  Hazelton,  7  N.  H.  171,  175.  And  such  action  by  lessor  against 
lessee  is  not  affected  by  a  subsequent  conveyance  of  the  reversion  to  the  latter. 
Dickinson  v.  Mayor,  48  Md.  583.  In  Iowa,  owner  of  land  may  have  tresjMss  for 
acts  of  permanent  injury  done  to  it  while  in  possession  of  a  tenant,  the  statute 
having  done  away  the  distinction  between  trespass  and  case.  Brown  v.  Bridges, 
31  Iowa,  138,  145. 

2  Stetson  V.  Day,  51  Me.  434. 

8  Lewis  Bowles's  Case,  11  Kep.  82  ;  Berry  v.  Heard,  Cro.  Car.  242  ;  Richard- 
son V.  York,  14  Me.  216  ;  Bulkleyu.  Dolbeare,  7  Conn.  232  ;  Mooers  v.  "Wait,  3 
Wend.  104. 

*  Seagram  v.  Knight,  L.  li.  2  Ch.  App.  628 ;  Jones  v.  Hoar,  5  Pick.  285. 


CIl.  V.  §    I.]  ESTATKS    FOR    LIFP:.  It'.l 

against  any  one  who  ri-niovrs  thcni,  oven  thoii<:li  it  he  llic 
tenant  himself,  as  the  j)n)j)erty  in  ehattels  carries  with  it 
possession  as  against  a  wrongd(jer.'  Nor  wouhl  the  tenant 
for  life  have  any  better  rights  in  this  respret,  though  the 
trees  cut  had  grown  upon  what  was  pasture-land  when  he 
took  possession,  or  the  natural  growth  ol"  wno<I  up«»n  thr 
land,  before  the  determination  of  the  life  estate,  woidd  be- 
come e(puil  in  value  to  the  trees  which  he  had  cut.  Nor 
could  he  set  off  against  the  reversioner's  claim  for  damages, 
what  he  had  jtaid  to  procure  firewood  from  the  same.^  This 
principle  applies  not  only  to  the  timber  cut,  but  to  materials 
of  buildings  severed  from  the  inheritance,  and  the  produce  of 
mines  wrongfully  severed.^ 

*50.  But  if  tenant  for  life  has  the  next  existing  [*1:2(J] 
estate  of  inheritance,  subject  to  intermediate  contin- 
gent remainders  in  tail,  a  court  of  chancery  would  restrain  his 
cutting  timber,  otherwise  he  would  have  an  inducement  to 
cut  to  the  injury  of  the  remainder-man,  as  he  would  Ijc  en- 
titled to  the  timber,  his  bt-ing  tlie  only  existing  estate  of 
inheritance.*  No  one,  however,  whose  interest  is  that  of  a 
contingent  remainder,  or  executory  devise,  can  maintain  an 
action  at  law  against  a  tenant  for  life,  for  committing  waste 
upon  the  premises.^ 

61.  As  has  been  stated  above,  leases  arc  sometimes  made 
with  provisions  exempting  the  tenant  from  impeachment  for 
waste.  Such  tenant,  whether  for  life  or  years,  may  open  new 
mines,  fell  timber,  and  claim  as  his  own  that  which  has  been 
blown  down,  though  he  has  no  property  in  the  timber  while 
standing,  nor  can  he  sell  it  to  another  to  cut  after  his  death, 
nor  delegate  any  right  to  a  third  party  to  do  so.  But  if  ho 
underlets,  his  tenant  will  have  the  same  exemption  as  him- 
self.^ But  such  a  tenant  is  not  at  liberty  to  commit  wilful 
and  malicious  waste,  and  courts  of  chancery  will  interpose, 

1  I^ne  V.  Thompson,  48  N.  H.  320. 

>  I'hillips  V.  Allen,  7  Allen,  115  ;  Clark  v.  Holdeu,  7  Gray.  8,  11, 
«  Tii.l.  Cns.  67;  Uvcdall  v.  Uvedall,  2  RoUe,  Abr.  119,  pt.  3. 
«  ■Williams  r.  Bolton,  3  P.  Wins.  26S,  n. 
»  Hunt  I-.  Hall.  37  Me.  363,  366. 

«  2  Bl.  Com.  283,  n.;  I'yne  v.  Dor,  1  T.  K.  55  ;  Cholmeley  r.  Paxton,  3  Bing. 
207  ;  1  Cruise,  Dig.  128  ;  fuJ.  Gas.  67  ;  Bowles's  Caae,  11  Rep.  83. 
VOL.  I.— 11 


162  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

by  injunction,  to  restrain  its  commission,  or  compel  him  to 
repair  the  waste,  if  actually  committed.^  The  custom  of 
leasing  in  this  way  does  not  seem  to  have  obtained  in  this 
country  .2 

52.  Among  the  persons  who  are  liable  for  waste  committed 
on  lands  in  their  occupation  are  parsons  in  respect  to  glebe 
lands,  whether  settled  for  life  or  years.^ 

53.  The  courts  of  the  various  States  have  held  differently 
in  respect  to  the  extent  to  which  the  common  law  as  to  waste, 
or  the  statutes  of  Marlbridge  and  Gloucester,  have  been 
adopted  in  the  different  States.  The  tendency  of  late  has 
been,  both  in  England  and  this  country,  to  do  away  with  the 
severe  remedies  provided  in  tlie  latter  statute,  and  to  substi- 
tute either  a  process  in  equity  for  restraining  the 

[*121]  commission  of  waste,  or  an  action  *  on  the  case,  in 
which  the  actual  damages  done  to  the  inheritance 
may  be  recovered  by  the  reversioner.  Such  now  is  the  case 
by  statute  in  England,  where  the  action  of  waste  is  abolished 
by  3  &  4  Wm.  IV.  c.  27,  §  36.  And  the  action  in  this  coun- 
try has  gone  very  much  into  disuse  in  the  States  where  it  is 
recognized  by  the  law.* 

54.  Sullivan,  in  his  treatise  on  land  titles  in  Massachusetts, 
states  that  in  the  course  of  thirty  years'  practice  he  had  never 
known  an  action  of  waste  in  that  State  to  enforce  a  forfeiture 
of  lands,  though  he  had  known  actions  to  recover  for  the 
damage  actually  done.^  Previous  to  the  act  of  1783  there 
was  no  statute  in  that  State  which  declared  the  estate  of 
a  widow  forfeited  for  waste.  By  that  statute  such  a  for- 
feiture is  provided  for,  but  no  mention  is  made  of  treble 
damages.  It  was,  however,  held  that,  except  so  far  as  modi- 
fied   by   the    statute    of    the    State,   the   statutes    of    Marl- 

1  Marker  v.  Marker,  4  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  95.  This  was  done  in  the  case  of  Lord 
Barnard,  tenant  of  Raby  Castle,  who,  from  dislike  of  his  son,  the  reversioner, 
strifjped  the  castle  of  its  iron,  lead,  doors,  &c.   Vane  v.  Lord  Barnard,  2  Yern.  738. 

2  4  Kent,  Com.  78,  n. 

8  Cargill  V.  Sewall,  19  Me.  288.  See  also  Huntley  v.  Russell,  13  Q.  B.  572, 
588  ;  Tud.  Cas.  65 ;  1  Cruise,  Dig.  131. 

*  Smith,  Land.  &  T.  197,  n.;  Greene  v.  Cole,  2  Saund.  252,  n.  7  ;  McCuUough 
V.  Irvine,  13  Penn.  St.  438;  4  Kent,  Com.  81;  ^Vms.  Real  Prop.  24. 

6  3  Dane,  Abr.  228. 


Cri.  V.  §  4.]  ESTATF-S    FOIl    LIFE.  1«',3 

bridge  ami   rilouccster  were  a  jtart  of   the  common  law  <<{ 
Massachusott.s.^ 

55.  And  Judge  Kent  is  inclined  to  believe  that  the  aetion 
of  waste,  cither  at  common  law  or  founded  ujton  the  statutt- 
of  (ibjueester,  has  been  generally  reeeived  in  the  country  as 
apjilicable  to  all  kinds  of  tenants  for  life  or  years.- 

5«»,  Connecticut  seems  to  liav*;  been  iin  exception  to  the 
above  projiosition,  since  it  is  there  held  that  tenants  for  life, 
except  ti^'uants  in  dower  or  by  eurtesy,  are  n(jt  inipeaehablf 
f(ir  waste,  though  a  reversioner  may  have  an  aetinii  (in  lh<' 
case  in  the  nature  of  waste  for  an  injury  to  the  reversionary 
interest  while  in  the  possession  of  a  tenant;'' 

57.  In  Maine  it  is  held,  that  the  statute  of  Gloucester  never 
was  a  part  of  the  common  law  of  the  State  in  respect 
to  tenants  *in  dower,  and  an  action  of  waste  against  [*122] 
such  tenant  cannot  be  sustained  there,  though  an  ac- 
tion on  the  case  in  the  nature  of  wa.stc  may  be,  unless  it  l»c 
for  permissive  waste."*  And  in  deorgia,  the  law  as  to  liability 
of  dowress  and  the  statute  of  CJlouccster  as  affecting  dower 
lands,  is  the  same  as  in  Maine.''  * 

•  Note.  —  The  following  are  believed  to  he  substantially  the  present  statute 
laws  of  the  States  eiiunuTatoil,  relating  to  waste  coniinit ted  by  tenants  for  life,  in 
(lower  and  by  curtesy,  namely  :  —  MiVistidmsctta.  If  tenant  in  dower  or  by  cur- 
tesy, for  life  or  years,  commit  or  sufler  wa.stc,  the  person  having  the  ne.vt  imme- 
diate estate  of  inheritance  may  have  wa.stc  against  the  tenant,  and  recover  the 
place  wasted  and  the  damages.  The  heir  may  sue  for  waste  done  in  the  time  of 
the  ancestor.  The  party  injured  may  hare  an  action  of  tort  in  the  nature  of  waste 
to  recover  the  damages,  and  the  remainder-man  or  reversioner  may  maintain  it 
though  there  be  an  intervening  estate  for  life,  or  though  the  remainder  or  rever- 
sion be  for  life  or  years,  and  the  action  may  be  prosecuted  against  the  executors  or 
administrators  of  the  tenant,  for  waste  committed  by  him.    Mass.  Pub.  StJit.  1881, 

» Sackettr.  Sackett,  8  Pick.  309  ;  Stat.  1783,  c.  40,  §  3  ;  2  Am.  Jur.  76.  And 
the  Puk  Stat.  c.  179,  §  1,  provides  for  a  forfeiture  of  the  place  wasted,  and  actual 
damages  in  actions  of  waste  against  tenants  by  curtesy,  dower,  for  life,  or  for  years. 

*  4  Kent,  Com.  79.  Such,  in  addition  to  the  States  whereas  in  the  •  Note  alwve 
it  is  given  by  statute,  seems  to  be  the  case  in  North  Carolina,  Alabama,  and 
Louisiana. 

»  Moore  v.  Ellsworth,  3  Conn.  433  ;  Randall  r.  Cleaveland,  6  Conn.  328. 

«  Smith  r.  FollansWe,  13  Me.  273.  But  it  is  assumed  by  Parris,  J.,  in  Hasty  r. 
Wheeler,  12  Me.  434,  438,  that  if  an  onlinar}-  tenant  for  life  or  years  commits 
waste,  he  forfeits  the  i>Iace  wasted  and  treble  damages. 

»  Porker  v.  Chambliss,  12  Ga.  235  ;  Woodward  v.  Gates,  38  Go.  205. 


164  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

[*123]       *58.  But  from  the  fact  that  the  action  is  so  seldom 
brought,  it  is  hardly  worth  while  to  occupy  any  more 

c.  179.  —  Maine.  The  law  is  the  same  as  in  Massachusetts  as  to  maintaining  the 
action  of  waste  against  the  tenant,  and  recovering  the  place  wasted  and  damages, 
and  also  an  action  on  the  case  in  the  nature  of  waste,  by  one  having  a  reversion 
with  an  intermediate  estate,  or  a  reversion  for  life  or  j^ears.  Rev.  Stat.  1883,  c. 
95,  §§  1,  2,  3.  —  New  York.  If  guardian,  tenant  by  curtesy,  in  dower,  for  life  or 
years,  or  the  assigns  of  such  tenant,  commit  waste,  the  reversioner  may  recover 
the  place  wasted  and  treble  damages.  2  Stat,  at  Large,  345,  346.  And  in  this 
respect  the  statute  of  New  Jersey  is  the  same.  Rev.  1877,  pp.  1235,  1236.  —  North 
Carolina.  Has  abolished  the  action  of  waste,  but  for  what  would  be  waste  a 
judgment  is  rendered  for  damages,  and  if  the  injurj'  to  the  estate  in  reversion  shall 
be  adjudged  equal  to  the  value  of  the  tenant's  estate  or  iinexpired  term,  or  if  it 
shall  be  done  in  malice,  the  plaintifl'  shall  have  a  judgment  of  forfeiture  and  evic- 
tion. Code,  1883,  §§  624,  629.  ^Delaware.  Tenants  by  curtesy,  &c.,  are  liable 
to  actions  for  waste  in  which  the  plaintiff  may  recover  the  place  wasted  and  treble 
damages.  Laws,  1874,  p.  537.  —  Missouri.  If  tenant  for  life  or  years  commit 
waste,  he  is  subject  to  an  action  to  lose  the  thing  wasted  and  to  pay  double  the 
damages  assessed,  and  is  still  liable  in  damages  if  he  is  in  possession,  though 
he  may  have  aliened  the  premises.  Rev.  Stat.  1879,  §  3107. —  Virginia.  If 
tenant,  &c.,  commit  waste,  he  is  liable  to  any  per.son  injured,  in  damages  ;  and  if 
wantonly  done,  he  is  liable  to  three  times  the  amount  assessed  as  damages. 
Code,  1873,  p.  967. — Kentucky.  The  law  is  like  that  of  Missouri,  and  rever- 
sioner in  fee  may  sue,  though  there  be  an  intervening  estate  for  life  or  years. 
Gen.  Stat.  1873,  p.  607.  — Kansas.  The  action  of  waste  is  abolished,  and  wrongs 
which  were  remediable  by  actions  of  waste  are  subjects  of  action  as  other  wrongs. 
Comp.  Laws,  1879,  §  4225.  — And  in  New  York,  if  the  tenant  above  mentioned  let 
or  grant  his  estate,  and  still  retain  possession  of  the  same  and  commit  waste,  the  re- 
versioner may  maintain  his  action  of  waste  against  such  tenant.  2  Stat,  at  Large, 
345,  346.  And  in  this  respect  the  law  is  the  same  in  MicJiigan.  Comp.  Law, 
1871,  §  6354  ;  Wisconsin,  Rev.  Stat.  1878,  §  3172  ;  Delaware,  Laws,  1874, 
p.  537  ;  Ncio  Jersey,  Rev.  1877,  p.  1236.  —  In  Connecticut,  it  has  been  decided 
in  Moore  v.  Ellsworth  (3  Conn.  483),  in  conformity  with  the  common  law 
before  the  statute  of  Marlbridge,  that  tenants  for  life  other  than  tenants  in 
dower  and  by  curtesy  were  not  liable  for  waste.  By  statute  (Gen.  Stat.  1?75, 
p.  490),  every  person  having  no  greater  estate  in  lands  than  for  years  or  life, 
created  by  the  act  of  the  parties,  and  not  by  act  of  law,  who  shall  commit  waste,  is 
made  liable  to  the  party  injured  in  an  action  on  the  case.  The  law  of  Minnesota 
is  the  same  as  to  such  tenants,  tenants  in  dower  and  by  curtesy,  except  that  judg- 
ment for  forfeiture  and  eviction  and  treble  damages  will  only  be  rendered  where 
the  injury  to  the  reversion  is  adjudged  in  the  action  to  be  equal  to  the  value  of 
the  tenant's  estate,  or  unexpired  term,  or  to  have  been  done  in  malice.  Stat. 
1878,  p.  820.  So  in  Oregon,  Code,  1862,  §  334.  —In  Indiana,  the  action  of  waste 
is  abolished,  but  the  law  is  the  same  as  to  recovery  for  waste  done  as  in  Minnesota, 
except  that  only  the  actual  damages  are  recovered.  Rev.  Stat.  1881,  §  286.  — In 
Iowa,  the  action  may  be  brought  by  the  reversioner,  who  may  have  an  action  of 
waste  notwithstanding  an  intermediate  estate  for  life  or  years,  except  that  he  re- 
covers three  times  the  damages  and  a  judgment  of  forfeiture  and  eviction,  if  the 


CH.  V.  §  4.]  ESTATES    FOR   LIFE.  1  •'.."> 

spsic'c  ill  discussini^  'the  subji-ct,  aiul  it  is  only  no-  [•1-1] 
ccsaary  to  refer  the  reiuler  to  the  case  of  (ifeeiie  v. 

•Iniiia^'i's  are  t'ljual  to  two  thirds  of  iho  ilcfi'i»lttiil'«  iiitcTi-jjl,  lU-v.  Code,  1880,  p.  813. 
So  in  Jhikota,  Ijjw.s  18t52,  p.  14y.  —In  JUumU  Jsla.ul,  U-miiit  for  life  coniiiiitting 
or  suireriiig  waste,  forfeits  tho  pliu-u  wusttil  luul  liuultlt-  duinagia*  to  the  |«'nMiii  en- 
titled to  the  next  esUiU*  in  reiuainder  or  reverHion.  I'ub.  Stat.  18S2,  p.  040.  —  In 
Aeiv  lluinpaliirt,  tenants  in  dower  iiro  luude  liublu  in  danio^ua  for  wa-ste,  without 
any  provision  by  statute  for  other  tenants  or  forfeiture.  Gen.  Laws,  1878,  c.  202, 
§  «.  The  court,  in  Chase  v.  Hazelton,  7  N.  H.  171,  waive  the  jwint  whether  the 
statutes  of  .Marlbridge  anil  (iloucester  liave  Ijcen  ado|>tcd  as  a  part  of  th<;  cuninion 
law  of  New  Hanipsliire.  Hut  tliey  hold  that  ai-tioiis  on  tho  ia.se  in  the  nuture  of 
waste,  lie  in  all  cjises  where  the  revei-sionary  interest  of  the  plaintilf  is  injurtsl  by 
acts  of  waste,  wliether  by  tenant  or  stmnger.  —  Xcbraska.  Widows  are  liable  to 
the  ne.xt  of  inlieritjince  for  all  damages  occasioned  by  waste  committed  or  sulfered 
by  her.  Gen.  StJit.  1873.  — The  statute  law  of  Wrmmil  is  like  that  of  New 
Hampshire.  Uev.  Law.s,  1880,  §  2227. —So  is  that  of  MissLisippi.  Kev.  Co«le, 
1871,  p.  255.  —So  is  the  law  of  Illinois,  excejit  that  there  is  a  forfeiture  of  the 
place  as  well  as  a  judgment  for  dau)age.s.  Uev.  Stat  1874,  p.  428.  — In  Ohio, 
though  a  tenant  for  life  is  liable  for  waste,  the  action  of  waste  is  abolished,  and  no 
one  forfeits  the  place  wasted,  in  an  action  for  the  waste  done,  except  tenant  in 
dower  or  curtesy,  who  forfeits  the  jdace  wasted  to  the  immediate  remainder- 
man or  rever-sioner.  Walker.  Am.  Law,  277,  320,  329  ;  Uev.  Stat  1880,  §§  4177, 
4iy».  —  In  Michigan,  the  action  is  always  ou  the  cjise,  and  judgment  may  bo  had 
for  double  damages  against  tenants  by  curtesy,  in  ilower,  for  life  and  years. 
Conip.  Ijiw,  18.")7,  c.  130,  §§  1,  5.  — And  the  law  in  Wisconsin  is  the  .same.  Uev. 
Stat.  1878,  c.  130.  And  any  one  who  has  tho  reversion  or  remainder  in  fe«*  or 
in  tail,  after  an  inter^•euing  estate  for  life,  as  well  as  remainder-man  or  rever- 
sioner for  life  or  years,  may  have  an  action  on  the  cai>e  in  the  nature  of  waste 
against  tenant  committing  waste.  Id.  §  3175. —  In  Kcntuchj,  an  action  of 
waste  may  be  maintaine*!  by  any  one  who  has  the  remainder  or  reversion  in 
fee-simple  after  an  intervening  estate  for  life  or  years  ;  and  also  by  one  who  has 
a  remainder  or  reversion  for  life  or  years  only,  each  recovering  such  damage  as 
it  shall  appear  he  has  sustained.  Any  jierson  who  may  have  waste  may  have  an 
action  on  the  case  in  the  nature  of  waste  to  recover  actual  damages,  or  tn-Me 
danuiges  if  the  injurj*  be  wantonly  committed.  Gen.  .Stat.  1873,  p.  007,  §  3.  —  In 
California,  the  tenant  who  commits  waste  forfeits  treltle  damages,  but  not  the 
place  wastecL  Harston  Code,  1877,  §  732  ;  C'hipman  v.  Kmeric,  3  Cal.  273.  —  In 
Arizoiui,  Comp.  I>aws,  1877,  §  2088  ;  and  Xcvndtt,  Comp.  Ijiws,  1873,  §  1313,  tenant 
for  life  committing  waste  is  liable  in  treble  damages.  —  In  Wrst  I'irfjinia,  any 
tenant  is  liable  for  waste,  and,  if  malicious,  in  treble  damages.  Uev.  Stat.  1878, 
c.  li»9,  §§  1,  4.  — In  Colorado,  Gen.  Laws,  1877,  p.  591;  and  Trjtas,  Uev. 
Stit.  1879,  p.  193,  the  common-law  action  is  recognized.  In  Pntiu*;/lvanin, 
Brightly's  Purd.  Dig.  p.  55,  §  12  ;  p.  1465,  §  2,  and  p.  1467,  §  15,  tho  action  ex- 
ists IS  at  common  law,  and  ndief  by  injunction  will  also  lie  given.  —  In  Tmnrxtte, 
the  ri-medy  and  n-lief  .seem  the  same  as  in  Pennsylvania.  Stat.  1871,  §§  2133, 
2134.  —  In  Washington,  treble  damages  are  given,  and  if  the  waste  is  malicious 
or  ei|ual  to  the  value  of  the  life  tenant's  estate,  the  place  is  forfeited.  Code  1881, 
§  601. 


166  LAW   OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK   L 

Cole,  and  the  notes  thereon  in  Saunders's  Reports,  in  which 
he  will  find  the  subject  of  actions  on  the  case  in  the  nature 
of  waste  fully  explained,  as  well  as  the  cases  in  which  thej 
will  lie.  Among  other  things  it  will  be  found  that  such  an 
action  may  be  brought  by  him  in  reversion  for  life  or  years, 
as  well  as  in  fee,  and  may  be  maintained  for  permissive  as 
well  as  voluntary  waste.^  So  it  may  be  brought  against  a 
tenant  for  years  for  permissive  waste  done  upon  the  demised 

premises,^ 
[*125]       *59.  In  the  present  state  of  the  law,  however,  the 

most  usual  remedy  resorted  to  by  a  reversioner  against 
a  tenant  for  life  or  years  in  respect  to  waste  is  by  application 
to  chancery  to  obtain  an  injunction  restraining  him  from 
committing  it.  This  power  is  incident  to  courts  of  chancery, 
and  is  conferred  by  statute  upon  other  courts  in  some  cases. 
It  may  be  applied  in  many  cases  where  the  party  seeking  re- 
lief could  not  sustain  an  action  of  waste,  as  where  an  estate 
for  life  intervenes  between  the  estate  of  the  tenant  and  that  of 
the  estate  of  inheritance,  in  favor  of  the  intermediate  remain- 
Perhaps  no  more  proper  place  may  offer  for  noticing  provisions  for  preventing 
■waste  in  special  cases,  other  than  tenancies  for  life  or  years.  —  In  KetUuckij,  a 
guardian  is  liable  to  his  ward  for  wa.ste.  Gen.  Stat.  1873,  p.  607.  —  In  New  York, 
if  one  commits  acts  of  waste  upon  lands  sold  on  execution,  while  the  same  are  yet 
subject  to  redemption,  he  will  be  liable  to  an  action  of  waste  ;  and  the  law  is  sub- 
stantially the  same  in  Wisconsin.  N.  Y.,  2  Stat,  at  Large,  p.  347  ;  Minn.  Stat. 
1866,  p.  492  ;  Wis.  Eev.  Stat.  1858,  c.  143,  §  8.  — In  Maine  and  Massachusetts,  if 
a  tenant  commit  waste  on  lands  during  an  action  to  recover  the  same,  the  party 
aggi'ieved  may  recover  three  times  the  amount  of  damages.  Maine,  Rev.  Stat. 
1857,  c.  95,  §  8  ;  Mass.  Pub.  Stat.  1881,  c.  138,  §  9.  —Minnesota.  If  one  coiq- 
mit  waste  on  land  sold  on  execution,  while  subject  to  redemption,  the  court  will 
restrain  it.  Rev.  Stat.  1866,  p.  492.  —  In  Delaware,  there  may  be  a  writ  of  es- 
trepement,  or  injunction  to  prevent  waste,  pending  an  action  of  ejectment  or  an 
action  of  waste.  Rev.  Code,  1852,  c.  88,  §  10.  —  In  FJiode  Island,  there  may  be  a 
writ  of  esti-epement  to  stay  waste.  Gen.  Stat.  1872,  p.  524.  —  So  in  Pennsylvania. 
Brightly's  Purd.  Dig.  1466.  —  In  other  States  there  maybe  an  injunction  for  that 
purpose  :  as  in  Maine,  Gen.  Stat.  1871,  p.  732  ;  Massachusetts,  Pub.  Stat.  1881, 
c.  138,  §  15  ;  New  Hampshire,  Gen.  Stat.  1867,  c.  190,  §  1. 

1  2  Saund.  252,  and  n.  7.  Though  it  is  said  in  broad  terms,  in  the  following 
cases,  that  case  for  waste  will  not  lie  for  permissive  waste.  Countess  of  Shrews- 
bur}''s  Case,  5  Rep.  13  ;  Heme  v.  Bembow,  4  Taunt.  764;  Gibson  v.  "Wells,  1  B. 
&  P.  N.  R.  390. 

2  Moore  v.  Towushend,  33  N.  J.  284. 


en.  V.  §  4.]  f:states  for  life.  1«37 

dcr-man,ns  \\v\\  as  tho  ivmaiiKlcr-nian  in  fee'  Ami  this  rem- 
edy may  l»e  aiiplied,  altliuu;;lj  aiiotluT  is  provitlcil  Ity  Htatiit*-' 
So  it  may  often  he  a]>|>lied  where  tenants  hohl  withuiit  im- 
peaehmt-nt  of  waste,  if  they  exneisc  this  power  in  an  nnna- 
sonahh"  anil  unconseionahle  manner,'' 

(JO.  Xor  will  this  remedy  l)e  fjranted  except  in  cases  of 
tcchnieal  waste.  It  will  not  he  in  eases  of  mere  trespass,  and 
it  must  moreover  he  for  an  injury  which  will  he  irreparahle, 
ami  not  to  he  compensated  in  dama«.zes.*  Ilut  it  will  he 
jrranted  if  material  w:iste  is  threatened,  though  the  injury 
actually  done  he  trilling.'' 

1)1.  In  one  case  the  court  lay  down  tho  following  rule  as  to 
ca.ses  where  courts  of  ecpiity  will  iiiteri)ose  to  pnivent  injuries 
to  real  estate,  —  one  whieh  seems  to  he  in  conformity  with 
tlie  principles  acted  upon  l>y  courts  in  other  States.  If  there 
is  a  privity  of  estate  hetwcen  the  party  applying  for 
the  injunction  *  and  him  who  is  doing  or  ahout  to  do  [•120] 
the  act,  such  as  exists  hetween  tenant  for  life  or  years 
ami  tht;  reversioner,  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  act  shoidd 
work  irreparahle  injury  to  induce  the  court  to  grant  it.  Hut 
if  the  parties  are  strangers  in  res|)ect  to  the  estate,  or  are 
claimants  adverse  to  each  other,  the  eourt  will  recpiire  evidence 
that  the  injury  threatened  will  i)e  irreparahle,  hefore  they  will 
interpose  to  restrain  it  hy  injunction.  And  this,  whether  the 
act  threatened  he  waste  or  trespass.*^  Nor  will  an  injunction 
to  stay  waste  he  granted  where  the  right  is  douhtful.' 

J  JoiR-s  P.  Hill,  1  Moore,  loO  ;  I^iu.vsjit'a  Foiil.l.  ¥ai.  3,  u. ;  Id.  52,  n. ;  Tracy 
V.  Tmcy,  1  Vi-rn.  23  ;  Molliiu-aux  r.  Po\v.  H,  3  V  ■Wins.  2»5S,  n.  F.;  Kniii'  v.  Van- 
dcrburgli.  1  Johns.  Cli.  11  ;  Story,  Kq.  Jiir.  §  013.  Hut  lidil,  that  r»'tnaindfr-mnn 
for  life  roiild  not  have  a  hill  to  enjoin  the  tenant  of  tho  i)revio>i8  ciitatc.  Mayo  c. 
Foa.st.r.  2  McConl.  t"h.  137. 

2  Harris  r.  Thoniaii,  1  Hen.  &  M.  18.  drntra,  Cutting  r.  Carter,  4  Hen.  i  .M. 
424  ;  I'oindextcr  V.  Henderson,  Walker,  176. 

*  Kane  r.  Vanderburg]>,  1  .lohns.  Ch.  11  ;  2  Rl.  Com.  283  ;  Tud.  Coa.  68.  CO. 

*  Attaijuin  p.  Fish,  5  Met.  140  ;  Atkins  r.  Chilnon,  7  Met  398  ;  Poindextt-r  r. 
Heiidcr8f>n,  Walker,  176  ;  Ix;ighton  r.  Uighton,  32  Me.  399. 

»  Livingston  r.  Royiiolds.  26  Wend.  115;  I^udon  r.  Warfiehl,  5  .1.  .T.  Manh. 
196  ;  Rdgcrs  r.  Uodgers,  11  llarh.  595  ;  White  Water  Canal  r.  lontogj-*,  2  Ind. 
469. 

*  Georges  Creok  Co.  v.  Detmold,  1  Md.  Ch.  Dec.  371.  Sec  Atkins  r.  Chilaoo, 
7  Met.  398  ;  I'oindexter  p.  Henderson,  Walker,  176. 

^  Storm  r.  Manu,  4  John*.  Ch.  21  ;  Field  p.  Jackson,  2  Dick.  599. 


168  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  L 

62.  It  seems  that,  upon  a  bill  for  an  injunction  to  stay 
waste,  where  waste  has  already  been  done,  it  is  competent  for 
the  court  of  equity  to  require  an  account  of  the  waste  to  be 
taken,  and  to  give  the  party  a  compensation  for  the  damages 
in  order  to  avoid  a  multiplicity  of  actions,  although  the  plain- 
tiff may  have  a  remedy  therefor  by  an  action  at  the  common 
law.i 

63.  Courts  of  equity  in  England  often  authorize  tenants  to 
cut  timber  which  would  be  injured  by  standing,  and  invest  the 
proceeds  for  the  benefit  of  those  entitled  to  it.^ 

64.  And  in  England,  by  statute  8  &  9  Vict.  c.  56,  provision 
is  made  for  improving  lands  held  by  tenants  by  draining  and 
the  like,  through  the  agency  of  the  court  of  chancery .3 

1  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §§  517,  518,  917  ;  Tud.  Cas.  68  ;  Watson  v.  Hunter,  5  Johns. 
Ch.  169. 

2  Storj',  Eq.  Jur.  §  919.  And  a  similar  power  is  delegated  to  courts  in  Massa- 
chusetts, Pub.  Stat.  c.  126,  §  12  ;  and  ilaine,  Rev.  Stat.  1871,  p.  784. 

3  Wms.  Real  Prop.  27. 


CU.  VI.] 


ESTATES   BY   CURTSEY. 


1G9 


ciiai*ii:r  VI. 

ESTATta    BY   Cl'UTF-SY. 


1.  Estate  di'liiied. 

2.  Curtesy  by  eijuity. 
8.  Origin  of  the  esUite. 

4.  Curtesy  now  generally  disused. 

5.  Curtesy  in  the  United  Stiites, 
6,  7.  Keijuisites  to  give  curtesy. 

8.  Wliat  is  sullicient  .seisin. 

9,  10.  Curtesy  in  c^uitulile  estates  and  money. 

11-13.  Curtesy  in  determinable  fees. 

14,  15.  Curtesy  in  equitable  estates  settled  on  wife. 

16-18.  Curtesy  where  there  is  a  reversion  after  determiuatioD  of  wife's 

estate. 

19-21.  Curtesy  of  determinable  estates  with  remainder. 

22.  Curtesy  in  case  of  joint  tenancy. 

23.  Curtesy  a  continuation  of  wife's  estate. 
24-30.  What  seisin  of  wife  ri'<iui.site. 

31.  Possession  of  co-tenant  sufliiient. 

32.  Possession  of  wife's  tenant  for  years. 
33-36.  Curtesy  in  wife's  reversion,  in  what  coses. 
37,  38.  Curtesy  in  what  lies  in  grant 

39-41.  S«'i.sin  by  tnistee  does  not  give  curtesy. 

41  a.  Effect  of  conveyance  by  wife  before  marriage. 

42,  43.  Merger  of  reversion  antl  life-estate,  where  it  gives  curtesy. 

43-46.  Birth  of  living  chiltl  reijuisite. 

47.  Curtesy  initiate  and  consummate. 

48-50.  Nature  of  the  estate. 

51.  Curtesy  subject  to  the  debts  of  the  tenant. 

52.  Effect  of  alienage. 

53,  54.  How  curtesy  may  be  forfeited. 

55.  Curtesy  .subject  to  same  duties,  &c.,  as  estates  for  life. 

56.  No  preliminary  act  in  obtaining  it. 

1.  An  estate  by  the  curtesy,  or,  as   it  is   more  commonly 
called,  by  curtesy,  is  that  to  which  a  husband  is  entitled,  uj»on 

the  death  of  the  wife,  in  the  lands  or  tenements  of 

which  she  was  *  seised  in  possession,  in  fee  simple  [•128] 

or  in  tail,  during  their  coverture,  provided  they  have 

had  lawful  issue  born  alive,  which  miirht  have  been  capable  of 


170  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  L 

inheriting  the  estate.     It  is  a  freehold  estate  for  the  term  of 
his  natural  life.^ 

2.  Equity,  following  the  law,  holds  that  where  the  wife  is 
cestui  que  trust  in  fee  simple  or  in  tail,  the  husband  is  entitled 
to  curtesy  in  the  trust  estate,  in  the  same  manner  as  in  the 
legal  estate.^ 

3.  It  has  been  much  discussed  by  writers  whether  this 
estate  was  originally  an  institution  of  the  English  law,  as  stated 
by  Littleton,  §  35.  Sir  Martin  Wright  insists  that  it  was 
known  in  Scotland,  Ireland,  Normandy,  and  to  the  ancient 
Almain  laws ;  while  the  "  Mirror  "  ascribes  the  period  of  its 
introduction  into  England  to  the  time  of  Henry  I. ;  and  Wood- 
deson  in  his  Lectures,  and  Christian  in  his  Notes  to  Blackstone, 
consider  it  of  English  origin,  and  thence  transferred  into  the 
laws  of  Scotland  and  Ireland,  though  it  seems  to  be  conceded 
that  it  takes  its  name  from  curtis,  a  court,  rather  than  from 
any  peculiar  regard  to  husbands  in  the  English  law.^  Mr.  Bar- 
rington  says  the  word  is  clearly  derived  from  the  French  word 
courtesie,  and  it  is  called  curtesy  of  England,  to  distinguish  it 
from  a  very  similar  right  by  the  Norman  law.*  The  writers 
all  seem  to  agree  that  it  is  not  of  feudal  origin,  though  by  that 
law  as  soon  as  a  son  was  born  the  father  was  admitted,  in 
respect  to  the  estate,  as  one  of  the  2)ares  eurice,  and  did  homage 
for  the  same  alone,  while  prior  to  that,  husband  and  wife  did 
the  homage  together.^     Wright  and  Craig  ascribe  its  origin  to 

the  civil  law,  in  the  time  of  Constantine.^ 
[*129]       *  4.  Whatever  may  have  been  its  origin,  it  has  been 

a  well-known  estate  at  the  common  law,  with  well- 
defined  qualities  and  incidents,  from  a  period  as  early  probably 
as  the  reign  of  Henry  I.,  if  not  before.  Of  late,  however,  by 
reason  of  the  prevalence  of  marriage  settlements  in  England, 
it  has,  practically,  become  infrequent  there.'^ 

5.  In  this  country  it  was  adopted  as  a  common-law  estate. 

1  Lit.  §  35  ;  Co.  Lit.  30a;  2  Bl.  Com.  126  ;  Adair  v.  Lott,  3  Hill,  182. 

2  Watts  t;.  Ball,  1  P.  W^ms.  108  ;  Co.  Lit.  29  a,  n.  165  ;  Tud.  Cas.  38. 

8  Wright,  Ten.  192,  193  ;  2  Bl.  Cora.  126,  and  n.  In  Erskine,  Institutes, 
p.  380,  it  is  said,  that  in  Scotland,  "the  right  of  curtesy  or  cuiiality  has  been 
received  by  our  most  ancient  customs." 

4  Stat.  440.  5  Wright,  Ten.  193  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  126,  127 

«  Wright,  Ten.  194.  ^  Wms.  Real  Prop.  187. 


CIl.  VI.]  ESTATES   DY   CURTESY.  171 

It  Still  fxibts  in  its  LH)nmi()n-la\v  form  hy  express  statute,  (jr 
by  statutory  recopiition,  in  New  Iluni|ishire,  Vermont,  Rhode 
Islanil,  New  Jersey,  Delaware,  Marylauil,  West  Vir^Muia,  Pniii- 
sylvania,  Nortii  Carolina,  Kentucky,  Tennessee,  and  Nebraska.' 
In  Connecticut,  Vir«;inia,  and  ^Missouri  it  is  recojrnized  by  the 
courts  as  an  existing  estate.^  In  Orejron  and  Ohio  curtesy  is 
given,  thouirh  no  issue  be  born  alive.^  In  Massachusetts  it  ex- 
ists as  at  connnon  law,  but  is  ajijtarently  restricted  in  case  of 
intestacy,  if  there  are  no  issue.*  It  has  been  expressly  abol- 
isheil  in  Illinois,  Indiana,  Iowa,  Kansas,  Mississijipi,  Minne- 
sota, Dakota,  Wyoming',  Arizona,  and  Nevada,''  and  dilVerent 
provisi«jns  for  the  husband  substituted, —  as  in  lllint»is,  where 
the  husl)and  is  endowed  of  a  life  estate  similar  to  dower  at 
common  law  ;^  Imliana,  where  he  receives  a  fee  in  one  third 
of  the  wife's  realty  as  heir  ;"  and  in  Kansas,  where  his  share 
is  one  half  of  her  estate  in  fee,  sul>jeet,  however,  to  her  debts, 
and  to  any  sale  on  execution;^  while  in  Arizona  he  receives 
one  half  of  the  property  held  in  community  by  his  wife  and 
himself,  and  in  Nevaila  the  whole.^     In  other  States,  again, 

I  N.  H.  GfU.  L.  1878,  c.  202,  §  14,  Vt  Rev.  L.  1880,  §  2229  ;  but  not  where 
wife  lias  issut-  by  a  former  husltami,  wlio  would  take  tlie  catuU;.  K.  I.  Tub. 
StaL  18S2,  c.  1G(1,  §.^  20,  r.3  ;  c.  1S2,  §  3.  N.  J.  llcv.  1877,  pp.  29S.  320.  Del. 
Kev.  Stftt.  1874.  pj..  515,  .133.  .Ml.  Hev.  Co.le,  1878.  art.  4.1,  §  2.  W.  Va.  Hev. 
Stat.  c.  70,  §  i:..  Va.  Briglitly  Punl.  Dig.  p.  10<»7 ;  IVyor  r.  WotJ,  31  I'a.  St. 
141:,  147.  N.  C.  Ctxle,  I8.s3,  §  1S33.  Ky.  Oen.  Stat.  1^73,  c  52,  art.  4,  §  14. 
Tcnn.  Stat.  1S71,  §  2486  f.     Neb.  Gen.  Sut.  1873,  c.  17,  §§  2i},  40. 

'  1  Greeiil.  Cruise,  140,  n.  ;  ^Vlcxander  r.  Warrance,  17  Mo.  228. 

•  Ohio  Kcv.  Stat.  1880,  §  4176  ;  Oregon  Gen.  L.  1872,  p.  588.  In  Ohio,  more- 
over, the  husband's  curtesy  does  not  extend  to  lands  which  his  wife  received  from 
a  former  hu!>band,  except  by  devise,  if  theie  are  issue  to  take  it, 

*  Mass.  Pub.  Sut,  1881,  c.  124,  §  1;  but,  §  3,  a  luiskind  Ukes.  in  case  of  intes- 
tacy and  want  of  ussue,  the  wife's  realty  in  fee  to  the  amount  of  $5,000  und  curtesy 
only  in  the  residue,  if  any,  and  the  former  provision  is  al.so  subject  to  her  debts, 
if  there  is  no  ivsue  of  the  marriaj^e,  tlu;  husUmd  now  takes  one  half  the  lands  for  his 
life,  whether  tiie  wife  pnivides  othenvise  by  her  will  or  not.    Stat.  l!S85,  e.  2.'i.'>,  §  2. 

»  111.  IJcv.  Stat  1883,  c.  41,  S  1-  Ind.  Rev.  Stat  1881.  §  2482.  Iowa,  Rev. 
Code,  1880,  §  2440.  Kans.  Comp.  L.  i:-«7f»,  §  2129.  Miss.  Rev.  Co»le.  1880, 
§1170.  Minn.  L  1875,  c.  40,  §5.  Dak.  Rev.  Co.le.  1877,  p.  247.  WyomingComp. 
L.  1876.  c.  42,  §  1.    Arizona  Comp.  L,  1877,  §  1976.    Nov.  Comp.  I^  1873,  §  157. 

•  111.  Rev.  Sut  1883,  c.  41,  §  1  ;  Henson  v.  Moore,  104  111.  403. 

T  Ind.  Rev.  Sut  1881,  {  2483.  If  the  property  exceeds  $10,000,  he  has  but 
one  fourth,  and  if  more  than  $20,000,  but  one  fifth.     lb. 

*  Kans.  (  omp.  L.  1879,  §§  2109,  2118,  2129.  And  if  there  are  no  issue,  he 
Ukes  the  whole  esUte.      §  2121. 

»  Ncv.  Comp.  L.  1873,  §  160 ;  Arizona  Comp.  L.  1877,  S  19"7. 


172  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPEETY.  [BOOK  L 

curtesy  is  superseded  by  the  adoption  of  statutory  provisions 
inconsistent  therewith.  Thus  in  Louisiana,  California,  and 
Texas  by  the  community  of  property  in  which  a  common  stock 
is  made  of  all  acquisitions  by  either  husband  or  wife  during  mar- 
riage ;  and  in  the  latter  State  a  further  provision  is  made  in  his 
favor,  in  case  of  intestacy .^  So  in  Florida  and  Georgia,  where 
the  husband  takes  a  child's  share,  and  the  whole  if  there  are 
no  children.^  In  Michigan  the  unrestricted  power  of  a  mar- 
ried woman  to  convey  inter  vivos  and  dispose  by  will  of  all  her 
realty  has  been  held  to  abolish  curtesy ;  ^  and  similar  pro- 
visions exist  in  South  Carolina,  Alabama,  Arkansas,  and  Mon- 
tana.^ So  in  New  York  it  seems  to  be  competent  for  the 
wife,  by  her  separate  conveyance  in  her  lifetime,  to  defeat  her 
husband's  right  to  curtesy.^  In  Maine  and  Wisconsin,  though 
curtesy  is  given  by  statute,  yet  in  the  former  State  it  is  lim- 
ited to  a  life  interest  in  one  third  of  the  wife's  realty,  and  then 
only  if  she  died  solvent ;  and  in  the  latter  only  in  lands  of 
which  she  died  seised,  and  which  were  not  otherwise  disposed 
of  by  her  will.^ 

6.  The  definition  before  given  suggests  the  essential  requi- 
sites to  entitle  a  husband  to  curtesy :  (1)  marriage ;  (2)  seisin 
of  wife  during  coverture ;  (3)  birth  of  a  child  alive  during  the 
life  of  the  wife ;  (4)  death  of  the  wife. 

7.  In  considering  these  in  detail,  the  marriage  must  be  a 

la'wful  one,  though  if  it  be  a  voidable  one  it  will  give 
[*130]  curtesy,  *  unless  it  is  actually  avoided  during  the  life 
of  the  wife.     It  cannot  be  declared  void  afterwards.'' 

8.  In  respect  to  the  seisin  of  the  wife,  it  must,  in  general 

1  Stat.  1850,  c.  147,  §  10.  Wood,  Calif.  Dig.  488,  §  10.  Tex.  Rev.  Stat.  1879, 
§  1653.  If  there  are  children,  the  survivor  takes  one  half ;  if  none,  tlie  whole. 
And  see  Portis  v.  Parker,  22  Tex.  699. 

2  Fla.  Dig.  1881,  p.  471,  §  12  ;  p.  757,  §  16.  Ga.  Code,  1873,  §  1761,  where  the 
wife  has  also  the  power  to  dispose  by  will  of  all  her  separate  earnings  ;  §  2410, 

3  Tong  V.  Marvin,  15  Mich.  60,  73  ;  Mich.  Comp.  L.  1871,  §  4300. 

*  So.  Car.  Gen.  Stat.  1882,  §  2035.  Ala.  Code,  1876,  §  2713  ;  but  if  she  dies 
intestate,  her  husband  is  entitled  to  use  of  her  realty  for  life,  §  2714.  Ark.  Dig. 
Stat.  1874  ;  Montana  Rev.  Stat.  1879,  p.  272. 

6  4  N.  Y.  Stat,  at  Large,  513  ;  Thurber  ■;;.  Townsend,  22  N.  Y.  517. 

6  Me.  Rev.  Stat.  1883,  c.  103,  §  15  ;  but  if  she  dies  intestate  and  childless  and 
her  estate  is  solvent,  the  husband  receives  one  half  for  his  life.  lb.  Wise.  Rev. 
Stat.  1878,  §§  2180,  2277.  ^  2  Burns,  Eccl.  Law,  501. 


Cri.  VI.]  ESTATES   DT   CURTESY.  173 

terms,  1)0  of  an  estate  of  inheritance.  liut  tliis  may  be  either 
a  Icpal  or  an  equitable  one.  In  pvin^  form  and  effect  to 
estates  under  the  e(|uitalilo  view  of  the  Statute  of  Tsch,  eourts 
of  equity  intended  to  follow,  and  in  most  respects  have  fol- 
lowed, the  law,  in  regard  to  the  nature  and  incidents  of  stieh 
estates.  Amontr  these  was  the  right  of  curtesy,  and  hushands 
of  cestuis  ijuc  trust  were  allowed  to  take  curtesy  in  the  trust 
estates,  if  they  were  estates  of  inheritance,  of  which  the  wife 
had  in  equity  what  answered  to  a  seisin  at  law  of  legal  estates 
in  possession.^  And  the  receipt  of  the  rents  and  {jrofits  by 
the  wife  as  such  crstui  que  trust  during  coverture,  is  ordinarily 
suflicient  seisin  in  e([uity  to  give  a  husband  curtesy.^  IJut  it 
does  not  seem  to  be  sulTieient  seisin  of  a  trust  estate,  to  give 
husband  curtesy  thereof,  that  the  wife  had  the  rents  and 
profits  of  the  estate,  if  it  was  by  the  terms  of  the  trust  to  her 
own  sej)arate  use,  her  seisin  in  such  case  not  enuring  to  the 
benefit  of  the  hu.sband.^  And  where  the  estate  was  conveyed 
to  a  wife  to  her  sole  and  separate  use  and  dispo.sal,  and  free 
and  clear  of  any  control  of  her  husband,  without  being  subject 
to  the  debts,  liabilities,  or  engagements  of  the  husband,  it  was 
held  that  a  devise  of  her  estate  defeated  her  husl)and's  right 
of  curtesy.^ 

9.  Originally,  curtesy  could  not  l>e  claim<Ml  of  a  use  which 
the  wife  had  as  cestui  que  iise.  But  now  the  right  is  extended 
to  equities  of  redemption,  contingent  uses,  and  moneys  directed 
to  be  laid  out  in  lands  for  the  l)enefit  of  the  wife.  Equity  in 
such  cases  treats  the  money  as  land.^  Thus,  where  an  ex- 
ecutor sold  the  land  of  a  female  heir  under  such  circumstances 
that  she  might  confirm  the  sale  and  take  the  money,  or  avoid 

1  Koper,  Hus.  &  Wife,  18,  20;  Watts  v.  Ball,  1  P.  Wms.  109;  Robison  r. 
Codman,  1  Sumn.  121  ;  Morgan  v.  Morgan,  5  MaiM.  408  ;  Hiarlo  v.  Green- 
bank,  3  Atk.  695,  717  ;  Sweetapple  v.  Bindon,  2  Veni.  537,  u.  3  ;  Davis  v.  Maaon, 
1  Pet.  503. 

a  Morgan  v.  Morgan,  5  MaiM.  408  ;  4  Kent,  Com.  31  ;  Tud.  Cos.  39. 

•  Hearlc  r.  Greenbank,  3  Atk.  717  ;  Sweetapple  r.  Bindon,  2  Veni.  537,  n. 

*  Pool  f.  Blakie,  53  111.  495  ;  Stokos  v.  McKibbin,  13  Penn.  St.  267.  See 
Bennett  r.  Davis,  2  P.  Wms.  316.  But  in  Tennessee  the  nile  is  different,  and 
express  words  are  necessary  to  cut  off  the  husband's  curtesy.  Carter  r.  Dale,  8 
Lea,  710. 

'  Davis  V.  Mason,  1  Pet.  503  ;  Sweetapple  r.  Bindon,  2  Vern.  536  ;  Fletcher 
P.  Aahburuer,  1  Bro.  C.  C.  497,  499  ;  3  Prest  Abe.  381. 


174  LAW    OF  REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

it  and  take  the  land,  and  she  preferred  the  money,  her  hus- 
band was  held  entitled  to  curtesy  out  of  the  money,  she  hav- 
ing died  before  it  was  paid  over.^  So,  where,  in  order 
[*131]  to  make  partition,  the  *  share  of  a  wife,  tenant  in 
common,  was  sold,  the  husband  had  curtesy  in  the 
money.2 

10.  In  many  of  the  States  curtesy  is  given,  by  statute,  in 
equitable  estates  of  which  the  wife  was  seised,  and  it  seems  to 
be  a  rule  recognized  in  most  if  not  in  all  the  States.^  Thus  in 
Rhode  Island  an  estate  was  conveyed  to  trustees  to  the  sole . 
use  of  a  married  woman  during  life,  to  be  conveyed  to  her 
heirs  upon  her  failure  to  appoint  as  to  the  same,  and  she  died 
without  having  made  an  appointment.  Her  husband  was  held 
entitled  to  curtesy.*  So  where  the  conveyance  was  to  J  S, 
habendum  to  him  and  his  heirs  to  the  only  use,  benefit,  and 
behoof  of  J  D,  a  married  woman,  it  was  held  to  be  a  legal 
estate  executed  in  J  D,  and  her  husband  had  a  right  to  cur- 
tesy therein.^  In  North  Carolina,  a  husband  has  curtesy  in  a 
trust,  or  an  estate  in  equity,  of  the  wife,  but  this  does  not  ex- 
tend to  a  mere  right  in  equity  to  have  an  estate.^ 

11.  To  recur  to  the  proposition  that  the  estate  of  the  wife 
must  be  one  of  inheritance,  no  question  could  arise  in  respect 
to  estates  in  fee-simple  absolute,  nor,  ordinarily,  as  to  estates 
tail.  But  questions  of  great  subtlety  and  difficulty  have  arisen 
in  respect  to  determinable  estates,  whether  upon  their  deter- 
mining the  husband's  right  of  curtesy  is  defeated  or  not.  In 
an  earlier  part  of  the  work  it  became  necessary  to  speak  of 
estates  in  fee-simple  determinable,  as  well  as  in  tail,  of  estates 
defeasible  by  a  breach  of  condition,  and  of  the  determination 

1  Houghton  V.  Hapgood,  13  Pick.  154. 

2  Clepper  v.  Livergood,  5  Watts,  113  ;  Forbes  v.  Smith,  5  Ired.  Eq.  369.  So 
where  the  devise  was  to  a  daughter  and  her  heirs,  with  power  of  sale  in  the  ex- 
ecutor, and  he  sold,  the  husband  had  curtesy  in  the  money.  Duuscomb  v, 
Dunscomb,  1  Johns.  Ch.  508. 

8  1  Greenl.  Cruise,  147,  n.,  mentions  Alabama,  Kentucky,  Maryland,  Missis- 
sippi, and  Virginia.  So  Kansas,  Comp.  L.  1879,  §§  2109,  2129.  Alexander  v. 
Warrance,  17  Mo.  228  ;  Eobison  v.  Codman,  1  Sumn.  121  ;  Houghton  v.  Hap- 
good, 13  Pick.  154.  See  1  Bro.  C.  C.  503,  note,  Am.  ed.,  for  a  collection  of 
American  cases.  Rawlingsu.  Adams,  7  Md.  26,  54  ;  Dubs  v.  Dubs,  31  Penn.  St.  149. 

*  Tilliiighast  v.  Coggeshall,  7  R.  I.  383.     Cf.  Robie  v.  Chapman,  59  N.  H.  41. 

6  ^'ightiIlgale  v.  Hiddeji,  7  R.  L  115.      ^  Sentill  v.  Robesou,  2  Joues,  Eq.  510. 


en.  VI.]  E8TATE.S   BY   CURTE.ST.  11'} 

of  estates  by  the  lmj)|ieiiintr  of  some  event  which,  nt  th<*ir 
crejitioii,  was  inadf  to  limit  their  duration.  In  applyintr  the 
principles  of  these  estates  to  that  of  the  wife,  in  ordiT  to  de- 
termine whether  the  husband  has  rit'ht  of  curtesy  therein,  it 
lias  been  settled,  in  resju'ct  to  estates  tail,  for  instance,  that, 
though  the  issue  in  tail  fail  by  death  of  the  child  in  the  wife's 
lifetime,  whereby  her  estate  at  her  death  is  at  an  end,  the 
husband  takes  curtesy,  it  brinf  a  ritdit  incident  to  such  an 
estate.' 

12.  So,  wluMv  the  devise  was  to  a  dauirhter  and  her  heirs, 
and  if  .she  died  without  issue,  the  whole  estate  was  to  be  sold 
and  the  proceeds  paid  to  her  brothers  and  sisters,  and  she 
married  and  had  a  child,  who  died,  and  then  she  died  with- 
out issue,  her  husband  had  curtesy.'^ 

13.  It  will  be  observed  in  the  above-cited  cases  that 

the  wife  *  had  a  determinable  fee,  that  there  was  an  [•132] 
executory  devise  over  (the  nature  of  which  will  be 
more  fully  explained  hereafter)  in  case  of  its  determining, 
and,  what  may  perhaps  be  unimportant,  that  the  estate  was 
only  determined  at  the  moment  of  her  death,  her  estate  u[>  to 
that  time  havinir  Ijeen  a  fee  with  its  ordinary  incidents,  and 
her  death  the  natural  termination  of  her  estate.  But  if  the 
estate  of  the  wife  had  l>een  determined  by  the  ])reach  of  some 
condition  expressed  in  the  deed  thereof,  for  which  the  grantor 
or  his  heirs  had  entered,  this  entry  would  so  far  retroact,  that 
the  grantor  would  be  in  of  his  original  estate,  and  all  inter- 
mediate estates  and  rights  would  have  been  defeated,  includ- 
ing, of  course,  the  husband's  curtesy.  The  estate  would  be 
defeated  ab  initio.  So  if  the  seisin  of  the  wife  were  tortious, 
as  gained  by  disseisin,  or  under  a  defective  title,  and  had  been 
defeated  l)y  an  eviction  under  a  judgment  upon  a  title  para- 
mount, the  same  consequence  would  follow.  So  where  a 
daughter  becomes,  during  coverture,  seised  as  heir  to  her 
father,  and  the  mother  has  her  dower  set  out  of  the  same 
lands,  it  defeats  the  seisin  of  the  daughter  in  the  lands  so  set 

»  Taine's  Case,  8  Rep.  34  ;  post,  vol.  2,  •374. 

a  Huchnnan  v.  Shefler,  2  Vt-atos,  374  ;  Uny  r.  Mnycr,  8  WntU,  2f'3  :  Tslin- 
ferro  r.  Burwell,  4  Call,  321.  The  same  principle  is  kid  down  iu  But-kwortL  r. 
Thirkell,  3  li.  &  P.  652,  n. 


176  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  L 

out,  and  with  it  her  husband's  curtesy,  since  the  widow's 
seisin,  when  consummated  by  the  setting  out  of  her  dower,  is 
considered  as  anterior  to  that  of  the  daughter  as  heir,  and  of 
course  converts  the  latter  into  that  of  a  reversion.  But  if  the 
widow  die  in  the  lifetime  of  the  daughter  and  her  husband, 
the  latter  will  have  curtesy  by  the  actual  seisin  thereby  con- 
ferred upon  his  wife.^ 

14.  A  principle  analogous  to  that  stated  above  is  applied 
in  respect  to  curtesy  in  equitable  estates.  Thus,  where  the 
devise  was  to  the  separate  use  of  the  daughter,  to  be  disposed 
of  as  she  should  see  fit,  the  trust  to  cease  on  the  death  of  the 
husband,  it  was  held  that  she  had  such  an  estate  of  inherit- 
ance as  entitled  her  husband  to  curtesy .^  And  the  same  was 
held,  where,  by  a  marriage  settlement,  the  estate  was  con- 
veyed to  trustees  for  the  sole  and  separate  use  of  the  wife, 

with  power  to  appoint,  and  she  made  no  appointment.^ 
[*133]  There  was  in  *  both  these  cases  a  fee  in  the  wife,  and 

though,  while  living,  the  husband  was  excluded  from 
controlling  her  estate,  there  was  nothing  in  the  terms  of  the 
devise  or  settlement  expressly  excluding  him  from  the  ordi- 
nary right  of  curtesy.  It  was  accordingly  held  that  where 
land  was  given  in  trust  for  the  wife  and  her  heirs  for  her 
separate  use,  without  power  of  alienation  by  her  or  her  hus- 
band, he  was  entitled  to  curtesy.  The  effect  of  the  statute  in 
Pennsylvania  being  to  make  no  distinction  between  legal  and 
equitable  estates  in  the  matter  of  curtesy  as  well  as  dower, 
the  law  of  that  State  seems  to  coincide  with  that  of  Massachu- 
setts, which  gives  a  husband  curtesy  in  lands  of  which  his  wife 
is  seised  to  her  sole  and  separate  use  as  an  inheritance.* 

15.  But  though  it  is  not  competent  at  common  law,  in  the 
grant  to  a  woman  of  an  estate  of  inheritance,  to  exclude  her 
husband  from  his  right  of  curtesy,^  a  like  rule  does  not  pre- 
vail in  equity,  where  an  estate  may  be  so  limited  as  to  give 

1  1  Roper,  Hus.  &  Wife,  36  ;  Id.  42,  43  ;  Co.  Lit.  241,  Butler's  note,  170. 

2  Payne  v.  Payne,  11  B.  ilon.  138  ;  Clancy,  Rights  of  Worn.  193,  194. 

8  Morgan  v.  Morgan,  5  Madd.  408  ;  Clancy,  Rights  of  Worn.   193,  194.     But 
see  Cochran  v.  O'Hem,  4  Watts  &  S.  95.     See  also  Clark  v.  Clark,  24  Barb.  582. 
*  Dubs  V.  Dubs,  31  Penn.  St.  149,  155 ;  Mass.  Pub.  Stat.  c.  124,  §  1, 
'  Mildmay's  Case,  6  Rep.  41  ;  Clancy,  Rights  of  Worn.  191  ;  Mullany  v.  Mul- 
lany,  4  N.  J.  Eq.  16. 


CU.  VI.]  ESTATES    BY    CUUTHSY.  177 

tho  wile  tlie  inlu'rituncc  and  (Icprivc  the  husband  of  (Mirtosy  if 
the  intent  of  the  devisor  or  settlor  Ije  express.'  Thus  in  Ben- 
net  V.  Pavis,  the  testator  devised  hinds  to  his  dau>;l»ter  and 
her  lieirs,  to  her  soh'  and  separate  use,  tlirectini;  that  her  hus- 
band sht)uhl  not  he  tenant  hy  eurte'sy  in  ca«e  he  survived,  hut 
that  ujMjn  her  death  the  hinds  shcjuld  po  to  her  heirs ;  the 
court,  in  order  to  carry  out  the  intent  of  tlie  testator,  liehl  the 
husband  to  be  trustee  for  the  lieirs  of  the  wife,  whereby, 
thouirh  he  took  the  Icfral  estate  of  curtesy  for  life,  the  heirs 
had  the  beneficial  interest.*  And  the  husband  would  i)e 
ccjually  excluded  from  such  equitable  estate  of  his  wife, 
though  it  hud  been  created  l>y  himself.'' 

16.  There  is  no  dilhculty  in  apjilyinj^  the  rule  as  to  curtesy, 
where  the  estate  in  the  wife  is  the  <)nly  one  created  i)y  the 
devisor  or  settlor,  and  that  is  so  defeated  by  condition  or 
otherwise,  as  to  be  a.L'aiu  in  the  oriirinal  owner's  hands,  in  the 
same  manner  as  if  it  had  never  pa.sseil  to  the  wife.  l>ut  where 
the  grantor  or  devisor  parts  with  all  his  estate,  in  the  first 
place,  to  the  wife,  with  a  limitation  over  upon  the  happening 
of  some  event  which  of  itself  is  to  determine  her  estate  before 
its  natural  expiration,  and  pass  it  at  once  to  another,  (lucstioiis 
of  great  subtlety  have  arisen  which  arc  discussed  with  much 
acuteness  i)y  courts  and  legal  writers.  The  (piestion 
briefly  stated  is.  In  •what  cases  may  curtesy  be  [*1''^4] 
claimed  in  determinable  fees  of  tho  wife  ? 

17.  Mr.  Iloj)er's  illustration  of  an  estate  of  inheritance  do- 
termining  by  its  natural  expiration  is,  an  estate  in  fee  tail  in 
a  wife  who  dies  without  issue  or  heirs.  An  estate,  on  the 
other  hand,  determinable  on  a  particular  event,  indej>cndent 
of  its  natural  ex|)iration,  he  illustrates  by  an  estate  in  fee- 
simple  or  fee  tail  in  tho  wife,  "  whilst  or  so  long  a.s  A  has 
heirs  of  his  body,  or  until  IJ  attains  twenty -one,  and  then  to 
B  in  fee."  *     In  these  last  instances,  if  A  die  without  issue,  or 

»  Cwhran  v.  O'Hcni.  4  Wntta  &  S.  95  ;  Hcarlo  r.  GnHiiljonk,  3  Alk.  6I>5, 
716;  Morgan  r.  MorKun.  5  Ma.ld.  40S  ;  Stokes  r.  M'Kibhin,  13  IVnn.  St.  267  ; 
Bennct  v.  Davb,  2  1".  Wtiw.  316  ;  TuJ.  Cos,  39.  See  tdao  Rigler  r.  Cloud.  14 
Penu.  St.  316. 

«  IViiiict  V.  DaviH,  2  P.  Wins.  316.     Sec  also  Clark  c.  CluiV,  24  liark  iS2. 

•  HiRl.r  r.  Cloud,  14  P.nn.  St.  361. 

•  1  Kopor,  Hu».  &  Wife,  87-39. 

vou  1.-12 


178  LAW  OP  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

B  attain  twenty-one,  the  husband's  right  of  curtesy  will  be 
defeated,  with  the  estate  out  of  which  it  was  to  be  derived.^ 
These  are  evidently  cases  of  simple  limitation  of  estates  by 
events,  upon  the  happening  of  which  the  estate  limited  is  de- 
termined, and  completely  at  an  end  with  all  its  incidents,  as 
if  it  had  been  measured  by  the  lapse  of  a  certain  number  of 
years,  months,  or  days. 

18.  And  it  is  laid  down  as  a  general  proposition  that  "  any 
circumstance  which  would  have  defeated  or  determined  the 
estate  of  the  wife,  if  living,  will,  of  course,  put  an  end  to  the 
estate  by  curtesy."  ^ 

19.  But  the  examples  already  given  show  that  curtesy  may 
be  had  in  many  cases  where  the  estate  of  inheritance  granted 
in  the  first  instance  to  the  wife  has  determined  and  passed 
over  to  another  by  force  of  its  original  limitation.  Such  a 
limitation  as  is  here  referred  to  is  what  is  known  as  a  condi- 
tional one,  —  a  limitation  not  known  to  the  common  law,  but 
originating  in  the  doctrine  of  shifting  uses  or  executory  de- 
vises. It  implies  the  creation  of  two  estates  by  one  and  the 
same  deed  or  de^dse,  in  such  a  manner  that  the  first  will,  upon 
the  happening  of  a  certain  contingent  event,  be  defeated  and 
brought  to  an  end  before  its  natural  determination,  and  the 
second  estate  thereupon,  at  once,  and  without  any  act  or  thing 
done  to  give  it  effect,  come  in  and  take  the  place  of  the  first 
estate.  The  first  of  these  estates  may  be  a  fee,  and  the  event 
that  determines  it  and  passes  it  over  to  the  third  party  may 
be  the  dying  of  the  first  taker  without  issue,  or  before  a  cer- 
tain age,  or  both  ;  and  the  question  then  has  been,  whether 
the  husband  or  wife  of  such  first  taker  is  thereby  defeated  of 
what  till  that  event  had  been  a  right  incident  to  an  existing 
estate,  or  might  enjoy  it,  although  as  to  the  deceased  the  es- 
tate was  determined  by  death.  Lord  Mansfield,  in  one  case, 
was  of  opinion  that  the  husband  in  such  a  case  was  entitled 
to  curtesy  ;  ^  and  Best,  C.  J.,  was  of  a  like  opinion  in  a  case  of 
dower.*  But  the  doctrine  does  not  find  favor  with  Mr.  Park 
in  his  work  on  Dower  ;  ^  and  the  opinion  of  Lord  Mansfield  is 

1  Id.  39.  2  1  Atk.  Conv.  255. 

8  Buckworth  v.  Thirkell,  3  B.  &  P.  652,  n. 

4  Moody  V.  King,  2  Bing.  447.  *  Park,  Dower,  177-183. 


cii.  VI.]  estatf::s  uy  curtesy.  179 

iinj»UL'"n<Ml  In-  Mr.  Sii'j<l<Mi.'  And  :it  mio  timo  it  wus  lidd  in 
Nt'w  ^^•rk  that  such  a  (lotoriuinati»m  of  an  cstato  defcut.s  tho 
rijrlit  hoth  r)f  (lowcr^aiui  curtosv ."'  And  the  En^Mi«h  court 
h(dd,  in  a  case  wIutc  a  convcyanct;  was  uiado  to  «nch  imcs  a« 
C  I)  nhonld  appoint,  and  in  default  of,  and  until  appointment, 
to  the  use  of  0  I)  in  fee,  who  was  married,  that  hy  the 
execution  of  tlii.s  appointment  in  the  lifetime  of  C  I>,  hi.s 
estate  was  defeated,  and  with  it  iiis  wife's  ri^rht  of  dower.^ 
Mr.  Hurton  alludes  to  the  circumstance,  that  in  one  clarts  of 
the  Knsrlifth  cases  above  cited  the  estate  was  defeated  hy  tlie 
death  of  tlie  first  taker,  and  in  tlic  other  hy  the  act  of  the  first 
taker  in  his  lifetime.  Hut  a|»parently  concludinir  that  tiiis  mix 
hardly  reconcile  these  decisions, hi*  adds:  "Such  and  so  suhtle 
apjM'ars  the  distinction,  on  the  Ln-ouiul  of  |»ositiv(!  law,  hrtwc<n 
these  decisions."  *  (Jihson,  (.'.  .!.,  undertakes  t*;  exj)lain  away 
these  difficulties,  in  the  case  of  lOvans  v.  Evans,  although  it  is 
nearly  identical  with  one  cited  from  the  New  York  n'ports  lie- 
low,  in  which  the  court  came  to  an  opposite  conclusion,  and 
he  seems  to  overlook  the  fact  that  there  can  be  no  limitation 
of  a  fee  ujion  a  fee  at  common  law,  and  that  the  questions,  in 
most  of  the  cases,  do  not  arise  under  limitations  at  common 
law. 

20.  The  case  of  Evans  v.  Evans,  thouprh  one  of  dower,  was 
decided  upon  analogy  to  cases  of  curtesy,  and  the  reasonini^ 
of  the  court  applies  to  the  one  as  well  as  to  the  other.  The 
devise  in  that  case  was  to  A  and  B,  their  heirs  and  assigns  ; 
but  should  either  die  without  having  lawful  issue  living  at  his 
(her)  death,  then  the  estate  of  one  so  dyin'j:  to  vest  in  the 
survivor  and  heirs  forever.  It  was  held  that  ujM»n  A  dying 
without  living  issue,  his  widow  (her  hus])and)  was  entitled  to 
dower  (curtesy)  out  of  the  estate.*^  The  court — CJihson.  Ch. 
.1.  — declared  that  none  of  the  text-writers,  except  Mr.  Pres- 
ton, had  suggested  the  true  solution  of  the  difficulty  in  such 

*  SugJ.  Powers,  vol.  2,  p.  31. 

«  Vt'ller  r.  W.-H.-r,  28  Ikrh.  58S,  overrulo.l  54  N.  Y.  235. 

'  HnttieM  v.  .Sta-di-n,  42  Hurh.  622,  overruled  54  N*.  Y.  280.     See  post,  •ISS. 

*  \U\  r.  PiiiiR.  5  H.  &  A.  561. 

*  Burton,  lU'fll  Prop.  145.     See  pout,  •213-»216,  and  cases  citid. 
'  Evona  v.  Evans,  9  Penn.  St.  190. 


180  LAW  OF  EEAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I, 

cases  in  giving  .curtesy  or  dower  to  the  husband  or  wife  of  the 
deceased  person  whose  entire  estate  was  determined 
[*135]  by  the  death  ;  and  *held  the  solution  to  15e,  that  es- 
tates determinable  hy  executory  devise  and  springing 
use,  are  not  governed  by  common-law  principles.^  It  was  ac- 
cordingly held  that  a  limitation  to  A  and  her  heirs,  with  a 
limitation  over  to  N  upon  A's  dying  without  issue,  was  such 
an  estate  in  A  as  gave  her  husband  the  right  of  curtesy 
therein.^ 

21.  If,  therefore,  the  estate  of  the  wife  be  an  estate  of  in- 
heritance, determinable  by  a  limitation  which  operates  to  de- 
feat her  estate  at  common  law,  the  right  of  curtesy,  it  would 
seem,  is  gone.  But  if  the  limitation  over  be  by  the  way  of 
springing  use  or  executory  devise  which  takes  effect  at  her 
decease,  thereby  defeating  or  determining  her  original  estate 
before  its  natural  expiration,  and  substituting  a  new  one  in  its 
place,  which  could  not  be  done  at  common  law,  the  seisin  and 
estate  which  she  had  of  the  fee-simple  or  tail  will  give  the 
husband  curtesy.^  And  the  doctrine  of  this  paragraph  is  now 
recognized  as  the  law  in  such  cases  in  New  York.* 

22.  If  the  wife  be  one  of  two  or  more  joint  tenants,  though 
she  is  actually  seised,  yet  if  she  die,  living  her  co-tenant,  her 
husband  cannot  claim  curtesy,  from  the  very  nature  of  the 
estate,  which  becomes  at  her  death  the  absolute  and  several 
estate  of  the  survivor.^ 

23.  The  husband's  curtesy  is  in  many  respects  but  a  con- 
tinuation of  the  estate  of  the  wife,  though  it  is  regarded  more 
in  the  nature  of  an  estate  by  descent  than  purchase.^ 

24.  For  these  and  other  reasons  it  is  held  that  the  wife 

1  Duckworth  v.  Thirkell,  3  B.  &  P.  652,  n.  ;  Moody  v.  King,  2  Biiig.  447.  See 
also  Barker  v.  Barker,  2  Sim.  249  ;  and  2}ost,  pi.  44  ;  3  Prest.  Abs.  372. 

2  Grout  V.  Townshend,  2  Hill,  554. 

2  For  the  discussion  of  the  points  above  referred  to,  the  reader  is  referred  to 
1  Eoper,  Hus.  &  Wife,  36-42  ;  4  Kent,  Cora.  33,  and  n.  ;  3  Prest.  Abs.  372,  384; 
Co.  Lit.  241  a,  Butler's  note,  170  ;  and  a  critical  article  of  rouch  learning  and 
nice  discrimination  in  11  Am.  Jur.  55.  The  point  is  also  examined  more  at 
large  in  respect  to  dower,  post,  chap.  7.  "Wright  v.  Herron,  6  Rich.  Eq.  406  ; 
Grout  V.  Townshend,  2  Hill,  554. 

*  Hatfield  V.  Sneden,  54  N.  Y.  280. 

6  Lit.  §  45  ;  Tud.  Cas.  38. 

6  Eoper,  Hus.  &  Wife,  35 ;  Watson  v.  Watson,  13  Conn.  83. 


en.  VI.]  EST.vTE.«i  ny  turte-sy.  181 

mu.st  have  boon  actually  soi.sod  f>f  tlin  estate  diirini^  covorttiro, 
thotiirh  the  formor  .strietne.ss,  in  thi.s  rc.sjM'ct,  ha.H  been  rclaxid 
in  Entrlaiul  and  .still  mure  so  in  several  of  the  United  States,' 
ThouLih  it  is  laid  down  in  numerous  ea.ses  that  in  order  to 
entitle  a  husband  to  curtesy,  the  wife  must  have  had  actual 
seisin,-  and  that  if  she  was  never  sei.sed  durin;^  coverture,  the 
husband  has  no  riirht  to  her  laml  after  her  decease,''  it  is  i\\>- 
prehended  that  this  is  limited  to  those  easels  where  her  title  is 
incomplete,  at  common  law,  without  a  f<irmal  entry,  as  in  the 
case  of  an  heir  or  devisee,  and  does  not  extend  to  eases  whi're 
the  wife  acipiires  title  by  deed,  the  etTect  of  which  is  to  pass  a 
legal  seisin  and  title  to  the  land.*  Nor  is  an  entry  necessary, 
in  case  of  a  descent  of  land  in  Missouri,  to  entitle  the  husband 
of  the  heir  to  curtesy  out  of  the  same.''  So  in  Mississippi,  a 
constructive  seisin  of  a  wife  is  suflicient,  as  where  the  land  is 
vacant,  or  in  the  hands  of  a  tenant  for  years,  or  at  sufTerance. 

25.  Still,  it  is  the  ireneral  rule  of  law  in  both  countries  that, 
if  the  estate  be  such  that  there  may  be  an  entry  made  ujton  it, 
there  must  be  such  an  entry  durint^  coverture,  in  order  to  give 
tlie  husband  curtesy.*^  It  is  said  that  the  chief  rea.son  for 
requiring,  in  this  country,  the  husband  to  taki^  the  lands  of  the 
wife  into  actual  pos.session,  is  to  .strengthen  her  title  tn  them, 
and  protect  them  from  adverse  claim,  and  fiom  hostile  posses- 
sion, which  might,  by  its  continuance,  endanger  her  right. 
And  this  may  as  well  be  done  by  the  husband's  vendee  as  by 
himself.' 

*2G.  If,  therefore,  a  woman  be  dis.sei.sed  and  then  ['lotJ] 
marry,  the  husband  must  regain  the  seisin  by  making 
an  entry  during  coverture.^ 

»  Perkins,  §§  457,  470;  Steams,  Re.il  Act.  283;  Doctor  &  Stutl.  145  ;  TuJ. 
Cas.  40  ;  1  Rojier,  Hus.  k  Wife,  7  ;  4  Kent,  Com.  30,  n. 

-  f)rr  V.  Hollidiiys,  9  R.  Men.  59  ;  Stinebnugh  v.  Wisdom,  13  B.  Mon.  4C7. 

8  Petty  r.  Malier,  15  B.  Mon.  591. 

*  Ailair  v.  Ix)tt,  3  Hill,  18'2  ;  Jackson  v.  Johnson,  5  Cowen,  74,  98.  See  also 
Wa.s3  r.  Bucknam,  38  Me.  360. 

'  Harvey  r.  Wickhftm,  23  Mo.  115;  Reaume  r.  Chambers,  22  Mo.  36,  54; 
Stepliens  r.  Hume,  25  Mo.  349. 

6  Ailams  V.  Ixjpan,  6  Mon.  175;  Mercer  r.  Selden,  1  How.  37  ;  Xecly  r. 
Butler,  10  B.  Mon.  48. 

^  Vanars<lall  r.  Fauntleroy,  7  B.  Mon.  401. 

"  Perkins,  §  458  ;  1  Rojier,  Hu.s.  k  Wife,  8  ;  Den  r.  Dcmarcst,  21  N.  J.  525. 


182  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

27.  In  Eng^land,  where  land  descends  to  the  wife,  the  hus- 
band must  enter  to  gain  sufficient  seisin  to  give  him  curtesy. ^ 

28.  But  in  this  country,  as  a  general  proposition,  the  seisin 
in  law  which,  in  the  case  just  supposed,  is  thrown  upon  the 
heir  if  the  ancestor  die  seised,  would  be  sufficient  to  give  her 
husband  curtesy  without  actual  entry  made.^  And  in  Penn- 
sylvania, Connecticut,  and  Ohio,  a  right  of  entry  on  the  part 
of  the  wife  would  be  a  sufficient  seisin,  although  the  premises 
were  in  the  adverse  possession  of  another.^ 

29.  And  it  may  be  laid  down  as  a  general  proposition  that 
in  this  country,  if  lands  are  vacant  or  wild  lands,  ownership 
draws  to  it  the  legal  seisin  without  any  actual  seisin  being 
taken.^  But  the  husband  of  a  wife  who  is  entitled  to  a  pre- 
emptive right  in  public  land  is  not  entitled  to  curtesy  in  the 
same.^  But  in  Kentucky,  actual  seisin  is  requisite  in  order  to 
give  curtesy  even  of  wild  lands ;  ^  though  the  receipt  of  the 
rents  and  profits  by  the  wife  will  be  sufficient.'^ 

30.  A  decree  of  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction,  settling 
the  right  of  husband  and  wife  to  the  wife's  land,  would  be 
deemed,  so  far  as  his  right  to  curtesy  is  concerned,  equivalent 
to  actual  possession.^ 

31.    The  possession   by  a  co-tenant  is  sufficient  to 

[*137]  give  *  curtesy  to  the  husband  of  a  tenant  in  common, 

the  entry  and  possession  of  one  being  the  entry  and 

1  Prest.  Abs.  381  ;  Co.  Lit.  29  a. 

2  Day  V.  Cochran,  24  Miss.  261  ;  Adair  v.  Lett,  3  Hill,  182  ;  Jackson  v.  John- 
son, 5  Cow.  74  ;  Chew  v.  Commissioners,  &c.,  5  Rawle,  160  ;  Stephens  v.  Hume, 
25  Mo.  349  ;  Mass.  Pub.  Stat.  c.  173,  §  3. 

3  Stoolfoos  V.  Jenkins,  8  S.  &  R.  167  ;  Bush  v.  Bradley,  4  Day,  298;  Kline  v. 
Beebe,  6  Conn.  494 ;  Borland  v.  Marshall,  2  Ohio,  N.  s.  308  ;  Mitchell  v.  Ryan, 

3  Ohio  St.  377  ;  Merritt  v.  Home,  5  Ohio  St.  307. 

4  Jackson  v.  Sellick,  8  Johns.  262  ;  Davis  v.  JLison,  1  Pet.  503  ;  Weir??.  Tate, 

4  Ired.  Eq.  264  ;  Barr  v.  Galloway,  1  McLean,  476  ;  Pierce  v.  Wanett,  10  Ired. 
446  ;  McCorry  v.  King,  3  Humi)h.  267  ;  Wells  v.  Thompson,  13  Ala.  7\)B;  Guion 
V.  Anderson,  8  Humph.  298,  324  ;  Day  v.  Cochran,  24  Miss.  261  ;  Reaume  v. 
Chambers,  22  Mo.  36.     But  see  Vanarsdall  v.  Fauntleroy,  7  B.  Mon.  401. 

^  McDaniel  v.  Grace,  15  Ark.  465. 

6  Neely  v.  Butler,  10  B.  Mon.  48  ;  Stinebaugh  v.  Wisdom,  13  B.  Mon.  467, 
overruling  the  dicta  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  Davis  v.  Mason,  1  Pet.  503  ;  Welch 
V.  Chandler,  13  B.  Mon.  420. 

T  Powell  V.  Gossom,  18  B.  Mon.  179. 

8  Ellsworth  V.  Cook,  8  Paige,  643. 


CH.  VI.]  ESTATES   BY   CURTESY.  188 

possossion  of  all.'  So  if  the  grnntoo  of  the  luishand  nitcrH 
ujxiii  th(!  laini  of  the  wife,  and  liolds  jiossrssion  undir 
sii(di  LTimt,  he  will  liavr  tin-  liLdits  of  a  tenant  liy  ciirtrsv 
airainst  tlic  inMrs  of  the  wifi-  diirniir  the  lite  of  thr  hiis- 
hand,  althon^rh  the  latter  neviT  hud  aetual  jxts.session  of  the 
premises.^ 

32.  The  possession  hy  a  t<'nant  for  years  or  at  will  of  the 
wife  is  a  siithcient  seisin  in  the  hushand,  and  the  same  will  he 
true  thon^li  the  estate  descend  to  the  wife  snhjcct  to  a  tenancy 
for  years  in  another,  and  the  wife  die  hefore  receiving;  rent ; 
the  possession  of  the  tenant  in  sneh  cases  heing  regarded  sm 
the  possession  of  the  owner  of  the  inheritance.^ 

33.  But  if  the  estate  of  the  wife  he  a  reversionary  one,  snl)- 
jcct  to  a  prior  freehold  estate  in  another,  her  constrnetivc 
seisin  of  such  revcrsicjn  will  not  entitle  her  hushand  to  curtesy, 
unless  the  prior  freehold  determine  during  coverture.*  The 
case  of  Doc  v.  Rivers^  illustrates  this  proposition.  In  that 
case  the  tenant  in  tail,  previous  to  her  marria<_'e,  made  a  set- 
tlement, by  lease  and  release,  upon  her  husliand  for  life,  re- 
mainder to  herself  for  life,  remainder  to  the  first  and  other 
sons  of  the  marriage.  She  dying  in  the  lifetime  of  lier  hus- 
band, the  heir  in  tail  entered,  and  it  was  held  the  husband  was 
not  entitled  to  a  life  estate  hy  the  .settlement  or  hy  curtesy  ; 
for,  first,  she,  as  tenant  in  tail,  could  not  hy  sueh  conveyance 
affect  the  rights  of  the  issue  in  tail ;  secondly,  the  hushand  on 
the  marriage  became  seised  of  a  freehold  himself,  and  his 
wife's  interest  was  therel»y  turned  into  a  reversionary  one.  In 
another  case.  A,  by  indenture,  conveyed  an  estate  to  B,  the 
wife  of  C,  in  fee,  in  which  B  and   C  agreed  that  A  .sliould 

*  Sterling  r.  Pfiilington,  2  E<i.  Caa.  Abr.  730  ;  Wass  t'.  Bucknam,  33  Me.  360. 
'  Vanarsdall  v.  Fauntleroy,  7  B.  Mon.  401. 

*  Tayloe  v.  Gould,  10  Barb.  383  ;  Mackcy  r.  Proctor,  12  B.  Mon.  433  ;  De 
Grey  r.  Kichardson,  3  Atk.  469  ;  Jackson  v.  Johnson,  5  Cow.  "4  ;  LowT>'  r. 
Steele,  4  Ham.  170  ;  Green  v.  Liter,  8  Cranch,  245  ;  Powell  v.  Gossom,  18  B. 
Mon.  179  ;  Day  v.  Cochran,  24  Miss.  261  ;  Carter  v.  Williams,  8  I  red.  E<i.  177. 

*  Adams  v.  Ix)gan,  6  Mon.  175  ;  Stmldard  r.  Gibbs,  1  Siimn.  263  ;  2  BI.  Com. 
127  ;  Co.  Lit.  29  a  ;  3  Prest.  Al«.  382  ;  I.ourj-  p.  Steele,  4  Ham.  170  ;  Ch.-w  r. 
Conim'rs,  5  Kawle,  160  ;  Hilncr  v.  Ege,  23  Pejin.  St.  305  ;  Orfoni  r.  Benton.  36 
N.  H.  395  ;  Planters'  Bk.  v.  Davi.s,  31  Ala.  626  ;  Malone  r.  Mcljiurin.  40  Mias. 
161  ;  Ferguson  r.  Twee<ly,  43  N.  Y.  643  ;  Shores  v.  Carley,  8  Allen,  426. 

»  Doe  V.  Kivtra,  7  T.  IL  276. 


184  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  L 

occupy  and  possess  it  free  from  rent  during  her  (A's)  life. 
B  died  before  A,  and  it  was  held  that  the  husband  could  not 
claim  curtesy .1 

34.  It  may  be  proper,  in  this  connection,  to  notice  the  effect 
upon  the  wife's  seisin  and  consequently  the  husband's  right  to 
curtesy,  where  the  estate  comes  to  her  after  it  has  been  in  the 
hands  of  another  for  the  purpose  of  raising  money  for  the  pay- 
ment of  debts  and  the  like.  If,  for  instance,  a  grantor  by  deed 
convey  lands  to  another  until  he  can,  out  of  the  rents  and 

profits,  pay  the  grantor's  debts,  the  grantee  will  have 
[*138]  a  freehold  *  estate,  because  of  the  uncertain  duration, 

though  it  might  be  obvious  that,  in  all  human  prob- 
ability, the  rents  of  the  estate  would  cancel  these  debts  in 
ten  years. 

35.  But  if  this  were  done  by  devise  to  his  executors,  for 
instance,  until  his  debts  should  be  paid,  it  would  give  but  a 
chattel  interest  to  the  executors.  If,  therefore,  the  heir  of  the 
grantor,  in  the  former  case,  were  a  married  woman  who  should 
die  before  the  estate  of  the  grantee  had  determined  by  pay- 
ment of  the  debts,  her  husband  would  not  have  curtesy; 
while  if  she  were  heir  of  the  devisor,  as  in  the  latter  case, 
he  would.2 

36.  So  where  testator  devised  his  estate  to  his  widow  until 
she  tjould  raise  a  certain  amount,  and  then  devised  the  estate 
to  his  daughter,  subject  to  this  devise  to  his  widow,  it  was 
held  that  the  husband  of  the  daughter  was  entitled  to  curtesy 
on  the  same.^ 

37.  Where  that  of  which  the  husband  claims  curtesy  lies  in 
grant,  like  a  rent,  as  understood  at  the  common  law,  and  not 
in  livery,  actual  seisin  is  not  required,  seisin  in  law  being 
sufficient.* 

38.  Nor  is  it  required  in  cases  of  grant  by  deed,  where  the 
seisin  passes  to  the  grantee  of  the  inheritance  by  force  of  the 
Statute  of  Uses.^ 

1  Planters'  Bk.  v.  Davis,  31  Ala.  633. 

2  Manning's  Case,  8  Rep.  96. 

'  Robertson  v.  Stevens,  1  Ired.  Eq.  247. 

*  Davis  V.  Mason,  1  Pet.  507  ;  Co.  Lit  29  a ;  Jackson  v.  Sellick,  8  Johns. 
262. 

^  Jackson  v.  Johnson,  5  Cow.  74. 


en.  VI.]  ESTATES  nv  ruRTEsy.  185 

39.  liut  the  seisin  whidi  a  wife  has  as  trustee  of  the  letral 
estate,  does  not  ^mvc  Iut  husl)an(l  curtesy.' 

40.  Anil  in  analotry  to  this  doctrine,  wlicrc  a  woman,  before 
marriaL,a*,  contracted  by  parol  to  convey  her  land  for  a  price 
which  was  paid  her,  and  the  purchaser  was  put  into  posses- 
sion, and  remained  so  after  her  inarriafrc  and  durinj^  her  life, 
it  was  held  that  the  husl)and  could  not  claim  curtesy .^ 

41.  Nor  would  it  make  any  dilli-rence  in  the  al)ove  case  of 
seisin  by  the  wife  as  trustee,  that  she  should  become 
entitled  to  a  *reversi(m  of  the  eciuitablo  estate  after  [•13'J] 
the  equitable  life  estate  of  another,  if  she  dies  before 

such  intermediate  estate  is  determined.^ 

41  a.  Where  a  woman,  on  the  eve  of  her  marriafrc,  conveyed 
her  real  estate  without  the  consent  of  her  contemplated  husband, 
it  was  held  to  be  a  fraud  upon  his  ritrhts  and  void  as  to  him.* 

42.  Sometimes,  however,  the  owner  of  a  reversion  may,  by 
its  bein^  united  with  the  life  estate  that  precedes  it,  acquire 
such  an  immediate  seisin  as  to  raise  the  ri^ht  of  curtesy.  But 
this  may  depend  ui)ou  whether  it  is  by  deed  or  devise.  Thus, 
if  a  life  estate  and  the  reversion  in  fee  come  toirether  in  one 
person  by  deed,  the  reversion  will  merge  the  life  estate,  even 
though  a  contingent  remainder  were  limited  to  intervene  be- 
ween  them ;  the  life  estate  merging  in  the  reversion  defeats 
the  contingent  remainder  at  common  law  by  destroying  the 
freehold  particular  estate  which  supported  it.  If,  therefore, 
the  person  in  whom  the  two  unite  is  a  feme  covert,  her  hus- 
band might  claim  curtesy.  But  if  there  be  a  devise  to  one 
for  life,  with  a  contingent  remainder  in  fee,  there  would  be  a 
reversion  expectant  upon  the  failure  of  the  contingent  remain- 
der which  would  descend  to  the  testator's  heir-at-law.  And 
if  she  happened  to  be  the  devisee  for  life,  and  the  doctrine  of 
merger  above  explained  were  to  apply,  her  reversion  would 

•  Chew  V.  Comm're,  5  Rawle,  160. 

'  Wfilsh  V.  Chandler,  13  B.  Mon.  420.  In  this  case  there  was  a  dcvd  given  l>v 
hnsVmnd  and  wife,  but  the  court  held  the  doctrine  of  the  text,  without  reference 
to  the  deed. 

»  Chew  r.  Comm'rs,  5  Rawle,  160. 

♦  HoMis  V.  Blandford,  7  Mon.  469.  See  also  Spencer  r.  Spencer,  3  .Tones.  E<j. 
404  ;  Williams  v.  Carle,  10  N.  J.  Eq.  543.  See  post,  vol.  2.  •537;  Chandler  c 
HoUingsworth,  3  Del.  Ch.  99. 


186  LAW  OF  EEAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I, 

merge  her  life  estate  and  destroy  the  contingent  remainder. 
But  as  this  would  be  giving  the  effect  to  a  will  to  destroy 
itself,  the  law  in  such  case  will  keep  the  life  estate  and  rever- 
sion distinct,  and  the  husband  of  such  devisee  cannot  claim 
curtesy.  Still,  if  such  devisee  for  life  were  to  acquire  such 
reversion  by  any  other  means  than  by  the  will  which  created  the 
several  estates  for  life  and  in  remainder,  it  would  merge  the 
life  estate,  and  the  effect  would  be  to  give  the  husband  of 
the  tenant  curtesy  therein.^ 

43.  The  same  rule  as  applies  in  case  of  devise  will,  how- 
ever, apply  where  a  tenant  for  life  becomes  such,  and  also  a 
reversioner  in  fee  with  an  interposed  contingent  remainder, 

by  the  same  deed.^ 
[*  140]       *  44.  Curtesy  being  considered  a  continuance  of  the 

inheritance,  it  is  not  only  necessary  that  the  wife 
should  have  had  a  living  child,  but  it  must  have  been  such 
a  child  as  by  possibility  might  have  inherited  the  estate. 
Thus,  if  the  inheritance  be  in  tail  male,  and  the  child  be  a 
female,  it  would  not  be  sufficient.^  So,  where  the  devise  was 
to  A  and  her  heirs,  and  if  she  died  leaving  issue,  then  to  such 
issue  and  their  heirs,  it  was  held  that  upon  her  death  her  hus- 
band could  not  claim  curtesy,  since  her  issue  would  take  as 
purchasers,  and  not  as  heirs  of  the  mother  to  a  part  of  her 
inheritance.^ 

45.  It  is  immaterial  whether  the  child  is  born  before  or 
after  the  wife  acquires  her  estate,  if,  had  it  lived,  it  would 
have  inherited  that  estate  ;  and  it  matters  not  though  it  die 
before  she  acquires  the  estate,  so  far  as  the  husband's  right  to 
curtesy  is  concerned.^  So,  when  a  wife  in  Massachusetts  con- 
veyed her  estate,  which  she  held  to  her  own  sole  use,  without 
her  husband  joining  in  the  deed,  before  any  child  born  of  the 
marriage,  and  a  child  was  born  after  the  conveyance,  it  was 

1  Plunket  V.  Holmes,  1  Lev.  11  ;  Kent  v.  Hartpoole,  3  Keble,  731  ;  1  Cruise, 
Dig.  149  ;  1  Roper,  Hus.  &  Wife,  10  ;  2  Crabb,  Real  Prop.  113  ;  Doe  v.  Scuda- 
more,  2  B.  &  P.  294  ;  Boothby  v.  Vernon,  2  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  728,  s.  c.  9  Mod.  147. 

•^  Hookers.  Hooker,  Cas.  temp.  Hardw.  13. 

3  Co.  Lit.  29  b  ;  Day  v.  Cochran,  24  Miss.  261  ;  Heath  v.  White,  5  Conn. 
228,  236. 

*  Barker  v.  Barker,  2  Sim.  249  ;  Sumner  v.  Partridge,  2  Atk.  47. 

8  C^o.  Lit.  29  b ;  Jackson  v.  Johnson,  5  Cow.  74  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  128. 


CIl.  VI.]  ESTATES    BY   CrRTF.SY.  187 

held  that  it  irnvc  him  u  riL'ht  of  furtcsy  in  tlic  waiiM',  as  a  wife, 
under  tlie  statute,  cannot,  by  deed,  (h'I'cat  her  hnsliaml's  rij/ht 
if  he  survive  her.'  If  was  accordingly  held,  where  adverse 
possession  was  taken  in  the  life  of  the  wife  durinir  cr»vertiire, 
and  she  then  had  issue  ami  died,  that  her  husl>and  was  en- 
titled to  curtesy .2  And  where  a  man  married  a  widow  who 
already  had  a  son,  and  had  by  her  u  child,  he  was  held 
entitled  to  curtesy  in  her  estate  against  any  claim  of  such 
prior  8on.^ 

40.  Hut  in  most  of  the  States  where  curtesy  is  allowed, 
great  strictness  is  required  in  the  proof  that  the  child  was 
actually  born  alive  in  the  lifetime  of  the  mother.  In  I'enn- 
sylvania,  the  necessity  of  a  child  being  born  is  dispensed  with 
by  statute.*  The  maxim  of  the  common  law  on  the  subject 
of  the  birth  of  such  child  is  mortuus  eritus  non  est  exitus,  and 
if  the  mother  die  before  the  exitiis  of  the  child,  and  that  be 
by  the  Ca'sarean  operation,  thoutrh  it  be  born  alive,  it  would 
not  l)e  sufhcient  to  give  the  father  curtesy.'^  The  rule  in  Nor 
mandy,  where  curtesy  is  allowed,  is  thus  stated  :  //  faut  ipi'il 
soit  sorti  Ju  vetdre  dc  la  mrre,  il  ne  suffiroit  pas  que  la  tete  eut 
paru  et  qu'on  pretendit  qiCil  auroit  donn6  des  sijnes  de  vie  par 
des  oris  ou  antrement.^ 

47.  As  soon  as  a  child  is  born,  the  husband's  right  to  cur- 
tesy is  said  to  be  initiate,  and  is  consummate  only  ujjon  the 
wife's  death.  The  freehold  is  thereupon,  ipso  facto,  in  him, 
nor  would  any  disclaimer  of  his,  short  of  an  actual  release, 
prevent  its  vesting  in  him  instantly  ujion  the  death  of  the 
wife.  It  devolves  u})ou  him  as  the  estate  of  the  ancestor  does 
upon  the  heir." 

1  Comer  v.  ChnmWrlain,  6  Allen,  166. 

*  Jackson  r.  Johnson,  5  Cow.  74  ;  Guion  r.  Anderson,  8  Humph.  307. 

•  Heath  r.  White,  5  Conn.  236.  But  the  law  is  otherwise  by  statute  in  Michi- 
gan.     Hathon  r.  Lyon,  2  Mich.  93. 

*  1  Cruise,  Dig.  143,  n.  ;  Dunlop's  I^ws,  p.  510  ;  Lancaster  Co.  Bonk  r.  Stauf- 
fer,  19  Fenn.  St.  398  ;  Co.  Lit.  29  b;  Dubsi-.  Dubs,  31  I'enn.  St  154.  This  jx.int 
ia  discus.sod  in  connection  with  the  ijuestion  how  far  a  chihl  en  ventre  aa  viirc  may 
be  considered  as  in  existence,  in  Mursellis  v.  Thalliimer,  2  Paige,  35. 

»  Co.  Lit.  29  b  ;  Marscllis  v.  Tlialhiiiier,  2  I'aige,  42. 

•  1  Flaust,  Coutumes  de  Normandie,  613. 

">  2  Bl.  Com.  128  ;  Watson  v.  WatAou,  13  Conn.  83  ;  Witham  r.  ^erkin^  2 
Me.  400  ;  Walk.  Am.  Law,  329. 


188  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   L 

[*141]  *  48.  His  estate  thus  acquired  is  one  for  life  in  his 
ovra  right,  and,  although  it  is  said  to  have  had  its 
origin  in  the  husband's  obligation  to  support  the  children, 
he  is  as  much  entitled  to  it  when  they  do  not  need  support  as 
when  they  do,  and  where  they  do  not  as  where  they  do  live 
any  length  of  time,  if  actually  born  alive.^ 

49.  Though  somewhat  anticipating  the  subject-matter  of  a 
subsequent  chapter  (ch.  9),  it  seems  desirable  to  ascertain 
here,  what  is  the  nature  of  the  husband's  right  of  curtesy 
initiate  during  the  life  of  the  wife,  and  how  far  she  or  her 
heirs  would  be  affected  by  a  tortious  entry  and  possession  by 
a  stranger  during  the  coverture.  The  cases  agree,  that  by 
the  marriage  the  husband  acquires  an  estate  of  freehold  in  the 
inheritance  of  the  wife,  in  her  right,  but  he  is  not  sole  seised 
during  coverture,  and  that  after  issue  had,  though  he  is  tenant 
by  the  curtesy,  he  is  jointly  seised  with  the  wife.^  The  court 
of  New  Hampshire  regard  this  seisin  and  possession  of  the  hus- 
band by  right  of  curtesy  initiate,  as  so  entirely  his  own,  that 
if  he  is  disseised  during  coverture,  neither  his  wife  nor  her 
heirs  would  be  affected  by  a  possession  under  such  disseisin, 
however  long  continued,  so  long  as  the  husband  was  alive,  and 
that  they  would  have  twenty  years  after  his  death  in  which  to 
regain  their  seisin  by  entry  or  action,  in  the  same  way  as  a 
reversioner  who  had  an  estate  expectant  upon  an  estate  for 
life.*^  The  court  of  Tennessee,  on  the  contrary,  hold  that  such 
disseisin  and  possession  run  against  both  husband  and  wife, 
and  would  bar  the  title  of  both  as  well  as  of  her  heirs,  except 
for  the  saving  in  the  statute  in  favor  of  femes  covert,  &c., 
which  gives  a  certain  time  in  which  to  bring  an  action  after 
such  disability  is  removed.  The  same  rule  applies  as  to 
her  heirs,  in  case  the  husband  survives  her,  they  having 
three  years,  the  time  given  to  persons  under  disabilities 
after  the  same  are  removed,  in  which  to  sue  for  the  land. 

1  Heath  v.  White,  5  Conn.  235. 

2  "Weisinger  t).  Murphy,  2  Head,  674  ;  Guion  v.  Anderson,  8  Humph.  298,  325; 
Butterfield  v.  Beall,  3  Ind.  203  ;  Jackson  v.  Johnson,  5  Cow.  74,  95  ;  Junction 
Railroad  v.  Harris,  9  Ind.  184  ;  McCorry  v.  King's  Heirs,  3  Humph.  267  ;  Mel- 
vin  V.  Prop'rs,  16  Pick.  161  ;  post,  chap.  9,  pi.  3.  See  also  Wass  v.  Bucknam, 
38  Me.  356. 

»  Foster  v.  Marshall,  22  N.  H.  491. 


CU.   VI. j  E.STATE.S    UY    CURTKSV.  1  SfJ 

And  tlu!  same  doctrine  is  maintaiiK  d  in  Maine  and  ^la.s.^a- 
chusetts.'* 

50.  Curtesy  beinjj  considered  a  continuance  of  tlif  wifr's 
inheritance,  the  hnshaml  takes  the  estate  subject  to  the  same 
incumbrances  under  which  she  lield  it.'-* 

51.  And  this  ri^ht  initiate,  as  well  as  the  estate  consum- 
mate, is  liable  to  be  taken  for  his  debts  ;  nor  can  he  defeat 
the  rijrht  by  any  disclaimer  of  his  right  to  curtesy .^  Nor  will 
ecjuity  interfere  in  favor  of  wife  or  children  to  prevent  his 
creditors  levying  upon  his  estate.* 

52.  It  was  once  deemed  an   insujierable  disability   to  the 

•  Note.  — The  court  of  New  Ilamitshirc  rvfer  to  Jackson  v.  Johnson,  5  Cowon, 
74,  and  Heath  r.  White,  5  Conn.  228,  as  having  liccn  "  dt'ciilcd  in  acconlnnco 
with  our  views,  and  wo  think  uf)on  sounder  princiides  than  tlie  ca.scs  in  Ma.ssa- 
chusetts  to  which  we  have  referred."  But  it  is  to  be  noticed  that  in  the  first  of 
the^e  cases  the  disseisin  occurred  In-fore  the  husband's  right  to  curtesy  liad  be- 
come initiate  by  the  birth  of  a  child,  and  the  court  were  divided  in  opinion. 
And  in  the  other,  tlio  allege<l  ailverse  [wssi-ssion  of  the  tenant  did  not  Kgin 
until  after  the  death  of  the  wife,  and  the  husljand  was  the  only  ttne  entitled  to 
the  possession  or  liable  to  be  disseiseil,  the  luir  being  a  mere  reversioner,  and, 
of  course,  not  aifected  by  any  i>ossession  adverse  to  the  hus))and  as  tenant  for 
life.  The  foregoing  cases  do  not  relate  to  the  elfect  of  a  conveyance  by  the 
husbuid.  By  the  statute  32  Ibii.  VIII.  c.  28,  which  is  a  jwrt  of  the  common 
law  of  Massachusetts,  if  the  husband  alone  conveys  his  wife's  land,  it  shall  not 
work  a  discontinuance  of  her  estate,  but  she  or  her  heirs,  at  his  deceast-,  may 
enter  ujkiu  the  same  as  if  no  sach  conveyance  had  b«'en  made.  Bruce  v.  Wood, 
1  ilet.  542,  544.  And  see  Miller  v.  Shackleford,  4  Dana,  277  ;  2  Kent,  Com.  133, 
note  ;  post,  p.  •425. 

*  Weisinger  v.  JIurphy,  Guion  v.  Anderson,  McCorry  r.  King's  Heirs,  sup.  ; 
Melius  V.  Snowman,  21  Me.  20l  ;  Melvin  r.  Prop'rs,  16  Tick.  161  ;  Bruce  v. 
Wood,  1  Met.  542.  Sec  post,  p.  *425  ;  Coo  v.  Wolcottville  Mg.  Co.,  35  Conn. 
175  ;  Watson  v.  Watson,  10  Conn.  75,  88. 

«  2  Crabb,  Real  Prop,  119  ;  1  Kojwr,  Hus.  k  Wife,  35. 

»  Burd  V.  Dansdalo,  2  Binn.  80  ;  Watson  v.  Watson,  13  Conn.  83  ;  Canby  r. 
Porter,  12  itliio,  79  ;  Van  Duzer  ».  Van  Duzer,  6  Paige,  366  ;  Litchfield  r.  Cud- 
worth,  15  Pick.  23  ;  HoIk-tU  r.  Whiting,  16  Mass.  186  ;  Mattocks  v.  Steams, 
9  Vt.  326  ;  Ijincaster  Bk.  r.  Stuulfer,  10  Pcnn.  St.  398  ;  Day  r.  Cochran,  24 
Miss.  261,  275.  But  fjuery,  how  fur  it  is  liable  for  debts  in  Missouri.  Harvey  r. 
Wickham,  23  Mo.  117.  In  Pennsylvania  it  cannot  l>e  levi«l  on.  Brightly  Punl. 
Dig.  p.  1007.  And  in  Massachusetts  it  is  lieM  that  the  statutes  |Mnnitting  the 
wife  to  cut  off  the  husliaud's  curtesy  with  his  consent  are  inconsistent  with  a 
right  in  creditors  to  levy  thereon.  Silsby  v.  Bullock,  10  Allen,  94  ;  SLapl«»  r. 
Brown,  13  Allen.  64. 

♦  Van  Duzer  v.  Van  Duzer,  6  Paige,  366. 


190  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

right  of  curtesy  that  the  husband  was  an  alien,  the  law  not 
lending  him  its  aid  to  obtain  an  estate  which,  when  obtained, 
it  might  at  once  take  from  him.^ 

53.  There  are  various  ways  in  which  a  husband  may  forfeit 
his  estate  to  curtesy,  and  in  some  of  the  States  this  is  a  conse- 
quence of  a  divorce  a  vinculo,  obtained  against  him  by  his  wife 
for  his  fault,  for  his  estate  can  never  become  consummate  by 

the  death  of  his  wife,  if  the  woman  whom  he  mar- 
[*142]  ried  cease  *  to  be  wife  during  her  life.     This  has  been 

so  held  in  Connecticut,  Massachusetts,  New  York,  In- 
diana, Vermont,  Kentucky,  and  Delaware,  in  cases  decided  in 
their  courts.^  In  North  Carolina,  by  statute,  his  curtesy  is 
barred  by  his  adultery,  divorce,  or  abandonment  of  his  wife. 
So  in  Maryland  by  his  bigamy.^ 

54.  By  the  English  law,  after  the  statute  Westm.  2,  c.  24, 
tenant  by  curtesy  would  forfeit  his  estate  by  making  a  feoff- 
ment of  the  lands.^  And  the  same  was  held  to  be  the  effect 
in  Maine  and  New  Jersey,  of  a  deed  of  conveyance  in  fee.^ 
But  it  was  held  in  Pennsylvania  and  New  Hampshire  that 
such  a  deed  would  convey  only  such  estate  as  the  grantor  had, 
and  would  not  operate  as  a  forfeiture.^  So  in  Kentucky,  a 
deed  of  bargain  and  sale  by  a  husband  in  fee  conveys  only 
such  interest  as  he  has  in  the  premises."  And  in  South  Caro- 
lina, where  a  husband  conveyed  his  wife's  land  in  fee,  it  was 
held  that  the  grantee  thereby  acquired  the  husband's  rights, 

1  Foss  V.  Crisp,  20  Pick.  121  ;  Reese  v.  Waters,  4  Watts  &  S.  145.  But  this 
disability  is  now  done  away  with  in  most  of  the  States.  See  note  on  the  subject, 
chap.  3. 

2  Bishop,  Mar.  &  Div.  §  666.  See  also  1  Greenl.  Cruise,  150  :  Wheeler  v. 
Hotchkiss,  10  Conn.  225  ;  Conn.  Gen.  Stat.  1875,  p.  187.  See,  as  to  effect  of 
divorce,  the  note  at  the  end  of  chap,  7. 

3  Md.  Rev.  Code  1878,  art.  72,  §  102  ;  N.  C.  Code  1883,  §  1838  ;  Long  v. 
Graeber,  64  N.  C.  431  ;  Teague  v.  Downs,  69  N.  C.  280.  So  in  Kentucky.  Gen. 
Stat.  1873,  c.  52,  art.  4,  §  14.  In  Aiizona,  in  such  a  case  it  is  at  the  discretion 
of  the  court.     Comp.  L.  1877,  §  1978. 

4  2d  Inst.  309. 

6  French  v.  Rollins,  21  Me.  372  ;  4  Kent,  Com.  84. 

6  McKee  v.  Pfout,  3  Ball.  486  ;  Flagg  v.  Bean,  25  N.  H.  49  ;  Dennett  v. 
Dennett,  40  N.  H.  498.  For  the  effect  of  such  conveyances  upon  the  estate  of 
the  tenant  by  curtesy,  the  reader  is  referred  to  p.  *142,  note  5. 

■'  Meraman  v.  Caldwell,  8  B.  Mon.  32  ;  Miller  v.  Miller,  Meigs,  484.  See  also 
Butterfield  v.  Beall,  3  Ind.  203  ;  Junction  Railroad  v.  Harris,  9  Ind.  184. 


ClI.    VI.  J  ESTATES    DV    riMlTESY.  101 

and  that  she  coiihl  not,  (hiring  tlic  lite  ot  licr  hushanfl,  rocover 
jiosscssion  of  the  same,  and  that  slw  had  seven  years  after  his 
death  in  wliich  to  brinir  an  aetion  lor  the  same.  S(j  in  Ten- 
nessee.^ By  statute  in  New  York,  a  wife  may  defeat  the 
husband's  right  to  curtesy  in  lands  aeeruing  to  her  during 
coverture,  by  conveying  them  to  a  thinl  per.son.  Jlut  unless 
she  e.vereises  her  rii^ht  during  iier  life,  ids  right  to  curtesy  at 
cunnnon  law  remains."- 

55.  It  is  hardly  necessary,  after  what  has  been  said,  to  add 
that  tenants  by  curtesy  hold  their  estates  subjeet  to  the  duties, 
limitations,  and  obligations,  which  attach  to  those  of  ordinary 
tenants  for  life,  for  which  reference  may  be  had  to  the  chapter 
which  treats  of  estates  for  life. 

5b.  LiDon  the  death  of  the  wife,  the  husband  is  at  once  in 
as  tenant  by  the  curtesy,  without  having  to  resort  to  a  prelim- 
inary form  to  consummate  his  title  to  the  same. 

'  Mmincrlyn  r.  Munnerlyn,  2  Brcv.  2;  Miller  v.  Milkr,  Jlcigs,  4S4.     Sec  uls,t» 
Boykiii  V.  liniu,  2S  Ala.  332. 
3  Clark  V.  Clark,  2*  Barb.  581. 


192  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  L 


CHAPTER  YII. 

DOWER. 

Sect.  1.  Nature  and  HistxDry  of  Dower. 

Sect.  2.  Of  what  a  Widow  is  Dowable. 

Sect.  3.  Requisites  of  Dower. 

Sect.  4.  How  Barred  or  Lost. 

Sect.  5.  How  and  by  whom  Assigned. 

Sect.  6.  Nature  of  the  Interest  and  Estate  of  Dowress. 


SECTION  I. 

NATURE   AND   HISTORY  OF   DOWES. 

1.  Dower  defined. 

2.  History  of  dower. 

3.  Early  regard  for  it. 

4.  Reasons  for  Dower  Act  of  "Wm.  IV. 

5.  Dower  in  the  United  States. 

6.  Varieties  of  dower. 

7.  Dower  an  institution  of  law. 

8.  Division  of  the  subject. 

9.  Lex  loci  applied  to  dower. 

10.     Rule  as  to  time  in  respect  to  dower. 

1.  Dower  is  the  provision  which  the  law  makes  for  a  widow 
out  of  the  lands  or  tenements  of  her  husband,  for  her  support 
and  the  nurture  of  her  children.^ 

2.  There  seems  to  be  much  uncertainty  in  regard  to  its  ori- 

gin and  early  history.  The  word  cZos,  indeed,  was  de- 
[*147]  rived  *  from  the  civil  law,  but  signified  dowry,  or  the 

portion  which  the  wife  brought  to  the  husband,  and 
no  such  provision  as  the  common  law  makes  out  of  the  hus- 

1  Co.  Lit,  30  a ;  2  Bh  Com.  180. 


CU.  VII.  §   1.]  DOWKU.  l!"'. 

baml's  hinds  for  the  wife,  was  known  to  that  co(h','  (Uitti- 
bock,  in  his  coniinents  uj>on  liiuctun,  huKls  that  Knj^lish  dower 
was  not  a  Roman  institution,  l)ut  "should  rather  he  compared 
to  tlie  doarium  (Witthum)  of  the  (Jerman  k'j;al  authorities." - 
From  what  source  the  common  law  derived  tlic  institution  of 
dower,  the  various  writers  u|)on  the  subject  do  not  af^rec. 
From  the  statement  of  Tacitus  that,  among  the  Germans, 
dowry  —  dos  —  was  something  bestowed  In*  tlie  husband  uj>on 
the  wife,"''  Mr.  Cruise  assumes  that  the  custom  of  d<jwer  was 
derived  from  the  Germans,  and  thence  became  well  known  to 
the  Saxons,'*  from  whom  it  passed  into  the  common  law. 
Blaekstoiic,  on  the  other  hand,  says,  it  ''seems  to  have  been 
unknown  in  the  early  i):irt  of  our  Saxon  constitution,"  and 
suggests  that  "  it  might  be  with  us  the  relic  (jf  a  Danish  cus- 
tom, dower  having  been  introduced  into  Dennuirk  by  Sweyn, 
the  father  of  Canute  the  Great."  ^  Sir  Martin  Wright  main- 
tains that  it  was  unknown  to  the  early  Saxon  law,  and  that  it 
found  its  way  into  England  by  means  of  the  Norman  con(piest. 
Quoting  from  Bacon's  "  History  of  the  English  (Jovernment," 
he  says,  "  We  find  no  footsteps  of  dower  in  lands  until  the 
time  of  the  Normans."  ^  Mr.  Maine  ascribes  the  existence  of 
dower  to  the  influence  and  exertions  of  the  Church.  After 
exacting,  for  two  or  three  centuries,  an  express  promise  from 
the  husl)and  at  marriage,  to  endow  his  wife,  it  at  length  suc- 
ceeded in  ingrafting  the  jtrinciple  of  dower  on  the  customary 
law  of  all  western  Europe."  Mr.  naningtoii  inclines  to  believe 
that  the  English  borrowed  the  doctrine  from  the  Goths  and 
Swedes.  One  reason  assigned  by  him  for  the  making  of  such 
a  provision  by  law  was,  that  wives  had  no  personal  fortune  to 
entitle  them  to  a  jointure  by  the  way  of  bargain  on  their  mar- 
riage. And  one  reason  why  the  widow  was  to  continue  in  the 
capital  messuage  for  the  term  of  forty  days  after  the  hus- 
band's death,  was  to  prevent  a  supposititious  child  ;  that  being 
a  deceit  not  unfrcquently  practised   in  the  time  of  Magna 

1  Terraes  de  la  Ley,  280 ;  2  Bl.  Com.  129.  «  E<lition  by  Coxe,  135. 

'  '^ Dolcm  non  uxor  marito  acd  uxori  maritus  offcrt."     Tac.  De  Mor.  Ger.  18. 
*  1  Cruise,  Dig.  152. 

»  2  Bl.  Com.  129.  «  Wright,  Ten.  191  ;  Bacon,  Hist.  Eng.  Gov.  104. 

'  Anc.  Law,  224. 
VOL.  I.— 13 


194  LAW   OF   REAL   PEOPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

Charta.^  Whatever  its  origin,  it  had  become  so  well  estab- 
lished and  was  held  in  so  much  favor  as  early  as  the  reign  of 
Henry  HI.,  that  express  provision  was  made  in  the  Magna 
Charta  of  the  ninth  year  of  that  king's  reign,^  for  enforcing 
it  in  favor  of  a  widow,  and  for  assigning  it  to  her  without 
charge,  and  giving  her  in  the  meantime  the  right  to  occupy 
the  principal  mansion  of  her  husband,  if  not  a  castle,  for  the 
space  of  forty  days  after  his  death,  free  of  charge,  unless  she 
should  marry  again  within  that  period. ^ 

3.  The  favor  with  which  dower  was  for  a  long  time  regarded 
in  the  early  history  of  the  common  law,  is  evinced  by  the  prom- 
inent place  it  holds  among  the  early  writers,  as  well 

[*148]  as  *  among  the  decisions  in  the  Year  Books.  Bacon, 
in  his  treatise  on  Uses,  remarks  that,  "  tenant  in 
dower  is  so  much  favored  as  that  it  is  the  common  by-word 
of  the  law  that  the  law  favoreth  three  things,  —  life,  liberty, 
dower."  * 

4.  In  treating  of  this  regard  for  dower  in  connection  with 
the  changes  in  the  condition  of  property  in  England  which 
led  to  the  act  of  3  and  4  William  IV.  c.  105,  called  the  Dower 
Act,  the  commissioners  on  the  subject  of  the  law  of  real  prop- 
erty refer,  as  an  explanation,  to  the  fact  that  dower  took  its 
rise  before  estates  were  alienable  inter  vivos,  or  devisable  by 
will,  and  when,  practically,  no  general  inconvenience  could 
result  from  appropriating  a  portion  of  the  inheritance  of  a 
deceased  proprietor  for  the  support  of  his  widow,  "  whose 
claims,  in  natural  justice  and  policy,  appear  to  stand  at  least 
on  an  equal  footing  with  the  claims  of  the  heir."  ^  There  had 
been,  however,  for  many  years,  a  growing  disposition  in  that 
kingdom  to  free  the  real  estate  of  its  subjects  from  the  in- 
cumbrance of  dower  which  embarrassed  it  as  a  means  of  con- 
verting it  readily  into  purposes  of  trade  and  commerce.  And 
various  measures  had,  from  time  to  time,  been  resorted  to,  to 
relieve  these  estates  from  this  charge  of  the  common  law.  It 
will  be  proper  to  refer  hereafter  to  some  of  the  expedients 
to  which  conveyancers  had  recourse  in  order  to  evade  the 

1  Stat.  9,  10.     Fleta,  cap.  15.        ^  That  of  John  contained  no  such  provision. 
'  Magna  Charta,  c.  7  ;  2d  Inst.  16.  *  Bacon,  Law  Tracts,  331. 

»  1  Report,  Eng.  Com.  18. 


CII.  VII.  §  1.]  POWER.  19.-, 

claims  of  married  women  upon  the  estates  of  tlieir  liusl)ainls  ; 
but  it  is  only  necessary  to  remark,  ut  this  time,  that  Ity  the 
act  above  referred  to,  it  rests  with  the  husband  whcfhcr  his 
widow  shall  share  any  part  of  his  real  estate  as  her  dower  (»r 
not.  This,  however,  is  in  fact  a  chancre  of  less  practical 
importance  than  mitrht  at  first  be  supposed,  for,  as  stated  by 
the  commission  above  mentioned,  Ity  the  UH-ans  icfcrrcd  to,  the 
law  of  dower  had  come  to  be  in  most  cases  evaded,  and  the 
ri^dit  to  dower  existed  iM-nelicially  in  so  few  instances  that  it 
was  of  little  value  considered  as  a  provision  for  widows,  and 
never  calculated  on  as  a  provision  by  females  who  contracted 
marriaire,  or  by  their  friends.'  * 

*5,  In  this  country,  thouiili  the  riudit  of  dower  has  [*14i'] 
been  modilied  from  time  to  time,  and  is  not  by  any 
means  uniform  throujrh  all  the  States,  it  has  been  re«rarded 
with  a  f^ood  dei^ree  of  favor,  Ijeing  conformed  by  the  laws  of 
the  several  States  to  the  sujtposcd  wants  and  condition  of  their 
citizens.  In  the  majority  of  States  dower  exists  in  its  common- 
law  form;-  thoutrh,  in  many  of  these,  additional  jirovisiuns  are 

*  Nin  K.  —  Tlie  earliest  net  upon  the  suhjcft  in  Mas-sachusetts  is  that  of  1»341, 
which  gives  to  willows  a  right  of  dower  to  one  third  part  of  such  hinds,  tene- 
ments, and  hereditaments  as  tlie  huslwnd  may  liave  been  seised  of  during  cover- 
ture, excepting  such  as  may  liave  Iweii  conveyed  "  by  some  act  or  consent  of 
such  wife,  signitied  in  writing  under  lier  liand,  and  acknowh-dged  before  some 
magistrate  or  others  authorized  tliereto,  whicli  shall  bar  her  from  any  right  or 
interest  in  such  estate."  Mass.  Anc.  Chart.  99.  This  ordinance  is  said  to  have 
been  the  origin  of  the  custom  so  universal  in  this  country  of  wives  barring  their 
claim  of  dower  by  joining  in  a  deed  with  their  husbands  of  tlie  estate  granted. 

1  1  ReiHjrt,  Eng.  Com.  17. 

■■«  These  are  Alabama,  Code  1876,  §§  2232,  2233.  Arkansas,  Rev.  Stat.  1874, 
§  2210.  Delaware,  Rev.  Stat.  1874,  p.  515,  533.  Florida,  Dig»'st  1S81,  c.  95,  §  1. 
Illinois,  Rev.  Stat.  1883,  c.  41,  §  1  ;  Sturgis  v.  Ewing,  18  111.  176.  Kentucky, 
O.-n.  Sut  1873,  c.  52,  art.  4,  §  2.  Michigan,  Conij..  L.  1871,  §  4269.  Maine. 
Re.-.  Stat.  1883,  c.  103,  §  1  ;  and  see  §  14.  Massachusetts,  Tub.  Stat.  ISSl, 
c.  124,  §  3.  Missouri,  Rev.  Stat.  1879,  §  21 86,  in  lands  owned  in  fee  and  al.>.o 
leaseholds  of  twenty  years'  duration.  Marylan<l,  Rev.  Code  1878,  art.  45,  §  1. 
Nebraska,  Gen.  Stat.  1873,  c.  17,  §  1.  (Querj-  in  New  Hamp-shin-.  Gen.  L.  187S, 
c.  202,  §§  2,  4.)  New  York,  1  Rev.  Stat.  740,  §  1.  New  Jereey,  Rev.  1877, 
p.  320,  298.  North  Carolina,  Code  1883,  §  2102.  Ohio.  Rev.  Stat  1880,  §  4188, 
al.so  in  all  the  lands  in  which  the  husband  had  an  interest  by  Imnd,  lea*',  or 
claim.  Oregon,  Gen.  L.  1872,  p.  584.  Rhode  Island,  Pub.  Stat  1882.  c.  229, 
§  1.  c.  166,  §  20.  South  Carolina,  Gen.  Stat.  1882,  §  1801.  Virginia,  Co<io  1873, 
c.  106,  §  1.    W.  Virginia,  Rev.  Stat.  1879,  c.  70,  §  1. 


196  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK    I. 

made  in  favor  of  the  widow,  generally  in  case  of  intestacy  or 
if  there  are  no  children.^  In  a  number  of  the  States  dower 
has  been  expressly  abolished,  and  different  provisions  substi- 
tuted ;2  and  in  others  again  statutory  provisions  have  been  in- 
troduced inconsistent  with  such  an  estate  in  the  wife.  Thus 
in  California  and  Texas,  she  has  one  half  of  the  community 
property,  or  that  acquired  by  either  during  coverture,  but  no 
dower  in  her  husband's  separate  or  antenuptial  estate.^  In 
several  States  her  dower  interest  is  limited  to  property  of 
which  her  husband  died  seised.*  In  Colorado  she  takes  one 
half  interest  in  fee  in  any  realty  owned  by  him  during  cover- 
ture.^ In  Pennsylvania,  while  her  interest  is  the  same  in 
amount  as  at  common  law,  it  is  held  that  she  takes  it  as  heir.^ 
In  Indiana  she  receives  also  as  heir  a  fee  in  one  third  of  her 
husband's  realty,  decreased  to  one  fourth,  and  one  fifth  as  the 
estate  increases  in  value."     In  Iowa,  in  1851,  dower  was  abol- 

1  Thus  in  Illinois,  in  such  case,  one  half  of  the  husband's  realty  in  fee  ;  in 
Delaware  one  half  for  life  ;  in  Florida  she  may,  at  her  election,  take  a  child's 
share  in  such  real  estate  ;  in  Massachusetts,  in  case  of  intestacy,  a  childless  widow 
receives  realty  to  the  value  of  $5,000,  if  there  is  so  much  after  paying  debts, 
and  has  dower  in  her  husband's  other  real  estate.  And  it  is  very  generally 
provided  that  if  there  are  neither  children  nor  kin,  the  widow  will  take  the  whole 
real  estate  as  heir.     Statutes  icbi  siqwa,  and  2}ost. 

2  This  is  the  case  in  Arizona  and  Nevada,  where  the  community  system  pre- 
vails. Ariz.  Comp.  L.  1877,  §  1976  ;  Nev.  Comp.  L.  1873,  §  157.  So  Dakota, 
Rev.  Code  1877,  p.  247  ;  Indiana,  Rev.  Stat.  1881,  §  2482  ;  Iowa,  Rev.  Code, 
1880,  §  2440,  where  the  widow  takes  one  third  in  fee  of  all  the  realty  whereof 
the  husband  was  seised  in  fee  at  law  or  in  equity  during  coverture,  and  which  has 
not  been  sold  by  judicial  sale.  Kansas,  Comp.  L.  1879,  §  2129,  where  the  widow 
receives  one  half  in  fee  under  similar  conditions,  §  2109.  Minnesota,  Laws  1S75» 
c.  40,  §  5.  Mississippi,  Rev.  Code  1880,  §  1170,  where  the  widow  takes  the  whole 
realty  if  there  are  no  children,  otherwise  a  child's  share,  §  1171.  Wyoming, 
Comp.  L.  1876,  c.  42,  §  1,  where  the  widow's  share  is  one  half  in  fee  if  there  are 
children  ;  if  none,  the  three  quarters  in  fee,  unless  the  estate  is  under  $10,000, 
when  she  takes  the  whole.     lb. 

8  Beard  v.  Knox,  5  Cal.  252  ;  Tex,  Rev.  Stat.  1879,  §  1653,  and  if  no  children, 
she  has  the  whole.     lb. 

*  Connecticut,  Gen.  Stat.  1875,  p.  376  ;  New  Hampshire,  Gen.  L.  1878,  c.  202, 
§  2,  but  see  §  4  ;  Vennont,  Rev.  L.  1880,  §  2215  ;  Georgia,  Code  1873,  §  1763  ; 
Tennessee,  Stat.*1871,  §  2398. 

5  Gen.  L.  1877,  §  1751. 

6  Brightly,  Purd.  Dig.  p.  528  ;  but  subject  to  his  debts,  Gourley  v.  Kinley, 
66  Penn.  St.  270  ;  and  if  no  issue  she  has  one-half  for  life  in  lieu  of  dower,  Dig. 
p.  529.  '  Rev.  Stat.  1881,  §  2483. 


fli.  VII.  §  1.]  DOWETl.  1<j7 

ishcd  and  restored  in  18')3.'  It  was  ajrain  abolished  in  180'2, 
and  an  estate  of  one  third  in  fee  of  all  the  husband's  realty 
c.\e('i)t  wiiat  bad  been  sold  on  exeeution  was  ji-ivcn  in  its  stead.'** 
Dower  had  been  estalilished  by  law  in  Missouri  while  it  was  yet 
a  territory.^  And  by  tlie  ordinance  of  ITST,  it  beeaine  an  inci- 
dent to  proj)erty  throughout  tin?  Northwest  Territory.* 

G,  To  save  the  necessity  of  exjilainition  hereafter,  it  may  be 
remarked  that  the  word  ''dower,"  both  technically  and  in  a 
popular  sense,  has  reference  to  real  estate  exclusively.^  Used 
in  this  sense,  there  were  five  species  known  to  the  English 
law,  one  only  of  which,  namely,  that  at  common  law,  is  in  use 
in  this  country.^  All  the  others,  except  that  "  by  custom," 
have  been  abolished  by  statute  in  England,  after  having  fallen 
into  general  disuse."*  Before  the  share  of  which  a  widow 
should  be  dowal)le  was  so  fully  defined  in  the  Magna 
Charta  of  lien.  III.,*  dower  ad  ostium  ecchsice  was  ['loO] 
princii)ally  in  use,  the  husband,  however,  being  re- 
stricted to  one  third  part  of  his  estate.^  If  no  such  endow- 
ment was  made,  she  might  take  one  third  of  all  the  lands  of 
which  the  husband  was  seised  at  tlie  time  of  the  espousals. 
And  if  he  had  no  iaiuls  at  the  time  of  espousul,  an  endowment 
of  goods  and  chattels  at  that  time  was  a  bar  to  dower  in  any 
lands  he  might  afterwards  acquire.''  Among  the  species  of 
dower  by  custom  in  use  in  England  in  i)articular  localities  arc 
those  of  Gavelkind  and  of  Freebcnch  in  copyhold  lands.     By 

•  Note.  —  It  will  l)c  enough,  therefore,  to  mention  these  without  any  further 
explanation.  Dower  ad  ostium  ecclcsiir,  was  the  enilownunt  by  the  husliand  of 
liin  wifo  at  the  time  of  their  marriage  of  certain  specific  lan<b.  Tliat  ex  assensu 
jMiiria  was  like  the  last,  except  that  the  endowment  wa.s  of  lands  of  the  father  by 
his  assent.  Dower  dt.  la  plus  belle  was  connected  with  military  tenures*,  and  lie- 
came  extinct  upon  the  abolishing  of  these  by  the  statute  12  Charles  II.  c.  24. 
Lit  §  48  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  132. 


'  Burke  v.  Barron,  8  Iowa,  1.34  ;  Lucas  v.  Sawj-er,  17  Iowa,  619. 
2  Meyer  r.  Meyer,  23  Iowa,  359. 

•  Ueaume  v.  Chambers,  22  Mo.  30  ;  Wagner's  Stat.   18C0,  p.  i38  ;  Rev.  Stat 
1874,  p.  423. 

«  O'Ferrallr.  Simplot,  4  Iowa,  381. 

»  Dow  r.  Dow,  36  Me.  211.  •  Steam^  Real  Act.  278. 

'  2  Bl.  Com.  135.  "2  BL  Com.  133.     GlanvilJe,  lib.  6,  cap.  1. 

•  2  Bl.  Com.  134. 


198  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

Gavelkind  she  took  half  the  lands  of  the  husband  during  her 
widowhood.^  By  Freebench  she  had  in  some  manors  all  the 
customary  lands  of  the  husband  so  long  as  she  remained 
chaste  and  unmarried.  If  she  married  again  she  forfeited 
these  lands,  but  might  regain  them  by  riding  into  the  Barons' 
Court  upon  a  black  ram,  backwards,  reciting  certain  doggerel 
rhymes, — a  sample  of  the  coarse  fun  in  which  the  common 
people  in  England  were  inclined  to  indulge.^ 

7.  This  brief  recurrence  to  the  history  of  this  species  of 
estate  will  serve  to  illustrate  the  remark  of  the  court  in  giving 
judgment  in  a  matter  involving  the  right  of  dower  in  New 
York.  "  It  is  not  the  result  of  contract,  but  a  positive  insti- 
tution of  the  State,  founded  on  reasons  of  policy."  ^  And  in 
this  connection  it  may  be  proper  again  to  refer  to  the  language 
of  the  Magna  Charta,  which  in  the  first  place  relieves  the 
widow  from  the  burden  of  fine  and  relief,  to  which  heirs  and 
alienees  were  uniformly  subjected  by  the  feudal  law,  declar- 
ing that  she  shall  give  nothing  for  her  dower.  It  then  gives 
her  the  right  to  tarry  in  the  chief  house  of  her  husband,  if  not 
a  castle, "  by  forty  days  after  the  death  of  her  husband,"  which 
has  since  been  known  as  her  quarantine;^  and  adds,  "And  for 
her  dower  shall  be  assigned  unto  her  the  third  part  of  all  the 
lands  of  her  husband  which  were  his  during  coverture,  except 
she  were  endowed  of  less  at  the  church-door."  ^  So  uniform  has 
the  common  law  of  both  countries  been  in  this  respect,  that  in 
popular  phrase  a  widow's  dower  is  called  her  "  thirds,"  implying 
an  interest  to  that  extent  in  the  real  estate  of  her  husband. 

8.  In  treating  of  the  subject  of  dower,  it  is  proposed  to  con- 
sider —  1.  Of  what  a  widow  is  dowable.  2.  What  are  the 
requisites  to  entitle  her  to  dower.     3.  How  the  right  of  dower 

maybe  lost  or  barred.  4.  How  and  by  whom  dower 
[*151]  may  be  *  assigned,  and  in  what  manner  its  assignment 

be  enforced.  5.  The  nature  of  the  interest  and  estate 
of  a  wife  and  widow  in  her  dower  land.  6.  Some  of  the 
peculiarities  as  to  dower  existing  in  the  several  States. 

9.  It  may  be  proper,  as  a  preliminary  remark,  to  observe 

1  Co.  Lit.  Ill  a.  2  jac.  Law  Die.  "  Free  Bench." 

8  Moore  v.  Mayor,  8  N.  Y.  110.  *  2  Bl.  Com.  135. 

6  2  lust.  16. 


CU.  VII.  §   l.J  DOWER.  199 

that  the  hiw  liy  wliich  the  ri^ht  of  duwer  in  any  particuhir 
case  is  determined,  is  that  of  the  place  where  the  Hubjj-et- 
matter  of  the  claim  is  situate.  Thus  a  woman  who  is  married 
and  domiciled  in  Louisiana  is  entitled,  upon  the  death  of  her 
husband,  to  dower  in  lands  of  which  he  was  seised  in  Missis- 
8ipj)i,  althouj^h,in  the  jilace  of  her  domicil,  dower  is  not  recoj^- 
nizecl  l>y  law.^  So,  thoufrh  a  widow  domiciled  in  (leor;^ia 
could  only  claim  dower  in  such  lands  as  her  hushand  died 
seised  of,  she  may  recover  it  in  South  Carolina  in  all  lands  of 
which  he  was  seised  in  the  latter  State  durintr  coverture.''* 
The  ri;:^ht  of  dower  does  not  result  from  any  contract,  nor  is 
it  a  right  which  is  guarded  by  constitutional  provisions  of  the 
State.  It  is  an  incident  of  the  marriage  relation  resulting 
from  wedlock,  cstabli.shed  by  positive  institutions  of  the  coun- 
try where  it  is  applied,  so  that  a  widow  is  entitled  to  dower, 
although  the  marriage  was  consummated  abroad,  where  the 
common  law  does  not  obtain.^  And  it  results,  moreover, 
from  wedlock  by  the  operation  of  existing  laws  at  the  time  of 
the  husband's  death.* 

10.  ]]ut  though  dower  is  to  be  assigned  according  to  the 
law  in  force  at  the  death  of  the  husband,  that  is  not  always  a 
test  of  the  widow's  right  to  be  endowed.  Thus,  for  instance, 
where  land  of  the  husliaml  was  sold  for  the  payment  of  debts, 
untU-r  a  law  which  cut  oil  the  right  of  d(jwer  therein,  and  a 
subsequent  statute  was  enacted  securing  to  a  widow  dower 
out  of  all  the  lands  of  which  her  husband  was  seised  during 
coverture,  it  was  held  that  it  would  not  extend  to  lands  jiro- 
viously  sold  during  coverture  under  the  then  exist- 
ing law.^  So  where  a  statute  *  had  changed  the  com-  [*152] 
mon  law  by  restricting  a  widow's  dower  to  lands  of 
which  her  husband  died  seised,  but  saved  all  rights  which  ha<l 
already  attached,  a  husl)and  during  coverture  had  previously 
sold  an  estate  by  deed  in  which  his  wife  did  not  join,  and  they 
had  removed  from  the  State,  it  was  held  that  she  had  a  right 

»  Duncan  r.  Dick,  Walker,  281  ;  Story,  Confl.  Laws,  §  44S  ;  2  Kent,  Com. 
183,  n.  " 

a  Umnrr.  Scott,  3  Strobh.  562,  •  Moore  r.  The  Mayor,  8  N.  Y.  110. 

*  Mclizet's  App.,  17  Pcnn.  St.  449  ;  Lucaa  v.  Sawyer,  17  Iowa,  617  ;  Ivaodall 
V.  Kn-iger,  2  Dillon,  444. 

&  Kcnnerly  v.  MiiiM>uri  Ins.  Co.,  11  Mo.  204. 


200  LAW   OF   EEAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

to  claim  dower  in  this  estate.^  Upon  the  same  principle, 
where  a  statute  gave  dower  to  a  wife  upon  her  divorce  from 
her  husband  for  his  misconduct,  it  was  held  not  to  retroact  so 
as  to  affect  lands  conveyed  by  him  before  such  statute  was 
passed.^  So  where  the  statute  of  a  State  excluded  a  wife 
from  dower  who  had  been  divorced  for  her  "  aggression,"  it 
was  held  that  a  divorce  granted  in  another  State,  though  for 
such  cause,  did  not  operate  to  bar  her  claim  in  the  former 
State.^  If  after  the  death  of  the  husband  and  before  judg- 
ment in  an  action  of  dower,  the  law  is  changed,  her  rights  iu 
respect  to  the  same  are  determined  by  the  law  as  it  was  at 
her  husband's  death.^  And  the  same  rule  applies  where  the 
husband  has  conveyed  the  land  during  coverture  ;  the  law  at 
the  time  of  such  conveyance  fixes  the  wife's  right  to  doAver  in 
the  same.^  A  question  has  been  raised  in  several  of  the 
States,  how  far  the  legislature  can,  by  legislative  action,  affect 
an  inchoate  right  of  dower  or  curtesy,  during  the  coverture 
of  the  parties.  The  question  has  been  presented  in  two  forms. 
In  one  is  involved  the  right  of  dissolving  a  particular  marriage 
by  such  an  act,  and  thus  defeating  its  incidents  of  dower  and 
curtesy.  In  the  other,  the  right  by  general  law  to  change  or 
abrogate  these  as  rights  of  property  without  directly  acting 
upon  the  status  of  marriage.  The  weight  of  authority  upon 
the  latter  point  appears  to  be  decidedly  in  favor  of  such  a 
power  in  the  legislature,  and  that  it  is  the  law,  as  it  exists  at 
the  time  of  the  husband's  or  wife's  death,  which  determines  the 
survivor's  right  to  dower,  or  curtesy.  This  seems  to  be 
the  recognized  law  in  New  York,  Pennsylvania,  Iowa,  New 
Hampshire,  Ohio,  Maine,  Mississippi,  and  Missouri,  although 
the  power  of  dissolving  marriages  by  legislative  acts  is  denied; 
Connecticut,  where  legislative  divorces  are  held  valid,  and 
Kentucky,  where  a  like  doctrine  is  held  ;  ^  and  the  court  of 

1  Johnson  v.  Vandyke,  6  McLean,  422.      This  was  a  case  arising  in  Michigan. 

2  M'Cafferty  v.  M'Cafferty,  8  Blackf.  218  ;  Comly  v.   Strader,  1  Smith  (Ind.), 
75  ;  s.  c.  1  Ind.  134. 

8  Mansfiehl  v.  M'Int3Te,  10  Ohio,  27.  *  Burke  v.  Barron,  8  Iowa,  132. 

5  O'Ferrall  v.  Sim[ilot,  4  Iowa,  381  ;  Yonng  v.  Wolcott,  1  Iowa,  174.     But  see 
Strong  V.  Clem,  12  Ind.  37,  and  cases  cited  in  Moore  v.  Kent,  37  Iowa,  20. 

6  Thnrber  v.  Townsend,  22  N.  Y.  .''.17  ;  Moore  v.  I\Iayor,  8  N.  Y.  114  ;  Meli- 
zet's  App.,  17  Penn.  St.  455  ;  Lucas  v.  Sawyer,  17  Iowa,  517  ;  Merrill  v.  Sher- 


CII.  VII.  §   1.]  DOWKR.  201 

Illinois,  vliich  fonncrly  held  such  a  ri"_'ht  to  ho  a  vested  one, 
and  not  siiliject  to  he  defeated  l>v  an  aet  of  lejjrislation,  han 
recently  declared  it  not  a  vested  riLdil,  hut  within  the  control 
of  the  lejrislature.'  'i'he  coui-ts  of  Florida,  without  ch'cidin*^ 
the  main  ([uostion,  hold  nianiajre  a  cr>ntiact  which  tiie  leiris- 
hiture  may  not  impair  ;2  while  in  Massachusetts  the  courtn 
repud  the  inchoate  riirht  of  dower  in  a  married  woman  in 
lier  hushand's  lands  as  an  interest  in  the  property  rather  than 
as  a  mere  possihility,  and  entertain  Ktron";  douhts  if  it  may  ho 
cut  olT  while  inchoate,  hy  an  aet  of  the  lejrislature.^ 

10  a.  In  a  case  in  Minnesota  an  estate  in  which  the  hushand 
was  seised  was  conveyeil  l>y  a  jwwer  of  attorney,  in  which  the 
wife  joined,  in  l>i.')ii.  Such  j)ower  heinjz;  inoperative,  so  far  as 
the  wife  was  concerned,  an  act  of  the  le<rislature  was  passed 
in  IH')!,  declarintr  all  deeds  heretofore  or  liereafter  made  hy 
hushand  and  wife  under  a  joint  power  of  attorney,  pood.  In 
1M()!»  the  husliand  died.  It  was  held  that  hoth  hushand  and 
wife  heini::  livin<^  when  the  act  was  passed,  and  iier  riirht  of 
dower  Iteinir  then  inchoate,  it  had  the  effect  to  l)ai'  her  riudit. 
The  huiiruaire  of  Dillon,  J.  (U.  S.  Circuit  Court),  is,  "  While 
the  ripht  remains  inchoate,  it  is,  as  resjiects  the  wife,  under 
the  ahsolute  control  of  the  Icfrislature,  which  may,  by  general 
enactment,  chanjre,  ahridjre,  or  even  destroy  it,  as  its  judLMuent 
may  dictate."^  A  recent  ca.se  in  Iowa  substantially  adojited 
the  doctrine  of  Dillon,  J.,  that  the  ripht  of  a  wife  to  he  en- 
dowed of  the  lands  of  her  hu.shand,so  long  as  it  is  inchoate,  is 
suscejttihlo  of  being  enlarged,  abridged,  or  entirely  taken  away 
by  statute,  but  resti'icted  it  to  the  time  of  alienation  of  the 
land  l)y  the  husband.  The  marriage  took  place  in  1859,  when, 
by  statute,  the  wife  took  wiiat  would   be  dower  at  common 

biinio,  1  N.  H.  199,  214  ;  Weaver  r.  Oregp,  6  Ohio  St.  547  ;  Bnrlwurr.  Rnrlxiur,  46 
Me.  9  ;  Mi^ee  v.  Young,  40  Miss.  1(54,  171  ;  State  r.  Fn,-,  4  Mo.  120,  153 ;  Brys«jn  r. 
Catii{ilK:ll,  12  Mu.  4'JS  ;  Starr  v.  Vvtun;  8  Coiiu.  541  ;  Magtiirc  v.  )(nguii\<,  7  Dtuio, 
181. 

>  Ruswll  r.  Ram.sey,  35  111.  372,  373  ;  H.nson  v.  Moore,  104  III.  403  ;  citing 
ami  .ollowingCfKiley  on  Const  Limitations  (5th  e«l.)  \\  442. 

a  Toiuier  v.  Cmhain,  4  Fla.  23. 

'  I  Minn  r.  Sargent,  101  Mass.  33rt,  340. 

*  H.indnll  r.  Kn-iger,  2  Dillon,  444,  447.  The  jndgo  cites  Lucas  r.  .Sawjrr, 
17  Iowa,  517  ;  Satterlee  v.  Matthuwsou,  2  IVt.  380  ;  Watson  p.  Mercer,  8  Pet  88. 


202  LAW   OF   EEAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

law.  Soon  after  the  marriage,  the  husband  conveyed  the  land, 
but  the  wife  did  not  join  in  the  conveyance.  In  1862  the 
legislature  changed  the  law,  giving  widows  a  fee  in  their 
dower  lands,  instead  of  a  life  estate.  The  husband  died  in 
1870,  and  the  court  held  that  she  was  entitled  to  dower  as  the 
law  was  in  1859,  when  the  land  was  aliened  by  the  husband, 
and  not  under  the  law  of  1862.1 


SECTIOi^  II. 

OF   WHAT   A   WIDOW   IS   DOWABLE. 

1.  Dower  in  lands,  tenements,  &c. 

2.  Must  be  of  estates  of  inheritance. 

3.  When  an  excejition  in  estates  for  years. 

4.  Must  be  estates  which  her  issue  could  inherit. 

5.  Inheritance  must  be  entire. 

6.  Reversions  and  remainders. 

7.  Dower  in  case  of  contingent  remainder. 

8.  Dower  after  a  possibility. 

9.  Dower  in  estates  in  joint  tenancy, 

10.  Estates  in  common. 

11.  Estates  exchanged. 

12.  Partnership  estates. 

13.  Equitable  estates  in  England. 

14.  No  dower  in  tiiists. 

15.  No  dower  in  mortgages. 

16.  Dower  in  equitable  estates  in  United  States. 

17.  Equities  of  redemption. 

18.  Dower  in  moneys. 

19.  Estates  subject  to  liens. 

20.  Estates  subject  to  judgments. 

21.  Dower  in  mines. 

22.  Shares  in  corporations. 

23.  Wild  lands. 

24.  Incorporeal  hereditaments, 

25.  Crops. 

1.  In  the  first  place,  by  the  common  law  the  widow  is 
dowable  of  all  lands,  tenements,  or  hereditaments,  corporeal 
and  incorporeal,  of  which  the  husband  may  have  been  seised 
in  fee  or  in  tail  during  coverture.^ 

1  Moore  v.  Kent,  37  Iowa,  20  ;  Same  v.  Hutchins,  7  West.  Jurist,  491. 

2  2  Bl.  Com.  131. 


cii.  VII.  §  2.]  DowEU.  203 

2.  Tlio  estate  of  the  liushaiul  in  these  must  have  been  one 
of  iuheiitauoc,  for,  as  hers  is  a  mere  eontinuaiice  of  the  t'stato 
of  her  husliand,  il"  his  was  U'ss  than  one  of  inheritance  it  can- 
not extend  beyond  his  own  Hfe.^  Thus  where  the  donee  in 
tail  (»f  an  estate  is,  by  statute,  math'  tenant  for  life  with  a  fee- 
8ini|»h'  in  thf  lieirs  of  his  liody,  iiis  wile  cannot  chiim  dower.^ 
And  tliis  is  true  even  tliou^di  he  he  seised  of  an  estate 

per  autre  vie,  'and  dies  before  the  cestui  que  cie.^  [*\i')S] 
The  estate  in  such  a  case  became  at  common  law  a 
kind  of  derelict  to  be  seized  upon  by  the  first  occupant  who 
chose  to  approjiriatc  it,  since,  beiuji;  a  freeh(jld,  it  would  not 
go  to  the  executors  of  the  tenant,  and  not  beinj^  one  of  in- 
heritance it  did  not  go  to  his  heirs.  Nor  dues  it  make  any 
difi'erence  in  respect  of  dower  that  by  the  statute  29  Car.  II. 
such  estate  goes  to  the  heir  of  the  tenant  as  special  occupant. 
Different  provisi(Mi8  are  made  in  different  States  in  respect  to 
it;  as  in  New  York,  if  it  is  not  devised  by  the  tenant  it  goes 
to  his  executors.  In  Massachusetts  it  descends  like  estates 
in  fee.^ 

3.  If,  therefore,  the  estate  of  the  husband  be  a  term  for 
years,  his  wife  cannot  claim  dower  out  of  it  at  connnon  law, 
no  matter  how  long  it  is  to  continue,  nor  though  it  be  renew- 
able hjrever.  Park  mentions  the  case  of  a  lea.sc  for  two 
thousand  yoars.^  A  case  in  the  court  of  Mississippi  was  ono 
for  ninety-nine  years.^  One  in  Maryland  was  for  ninety-nino 
years,  renewable  forever.  And  it  was  held  that  it  would 
make  no  difference  that  the  lease  contained  a  covenant  to  con- 
vey the  estate  in  fee  to  the  lessee  ujton  request,  since  such  an 
estate  did  not  come  within  the  statute  of  that  State  giving 
dower  out  of  lands  held  by  ccjuitable  titles.^  In  Massachu- 
setts, terms  for  a  hundred  or  more  years  are  clothed  with  the 
incidents  of  fee-simple  estates,  including  the  right  of  dower, 

1  2  Crabb,  Real  Prop.  132  ;  Park,  Dow.  47.  Soo  Gorham  v.  Danieln,  23  Vt 
600,  a  ca.se  of  dower  in  a  hnslmnd'a  life  estate. 

'  Hurrisr.  Page,  12  Mo.  358. 

»  Park,  Dow.  43  ;  Gillis  r.  Brown,  5  Cow.  388  ;  Fisher  r.  Grimes,  1  Sm.  k  iL 
Ch.  107. 

*  Pub.  Stat.  Mass.  c.  125,  §  1.     .See  p.  •94,  n.  5. 

»  Park,  Dow.  47.  «  Waiv  v.  Washington,  6  Sm.  k  M.  737. 

»  Spaugler  v.  Stanler,  1  Md.  CL  Dec.  36. 


20-1  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

SO  long  as  fifty  years  of  the  term  remain.^  But  in  Connecti- 
cut, an  estate  for  nine  hundred  and  ninety-nine  years  in 
a  husband  does  not  give  his  wife  a  right  of  dower  therein,^ 
although  in  anotlier  case,  for  the  purposes  of  taxation,  such 
an  estate  has  been  treated  as  a  fee.^ 

4.  The  inheritance,  moreover,  must  be  such  an  one  as  the 
issue  of  the  wife  might  by  possibility  take  by  descent.*  This 
relates  to  the  question  whether  her  issue  could  inherit,  if  she 
had  any,  and  not  to  her  physical  capacity  to  bear  children. 
As  where  an  estate  was  given  to  A  and  the  heirs  of  his  body 
begotten  of  his  wife  B.  Here,  according  to  Coke, 
[*154]  though  B  were  *  an  hundred,  and  A  but  seven  years 
old,  B  would  be  entitled  to  dower,  whereas,  if  B  died 
and  A  married  again,  his  second  wife,  though  she  may  have 
borne  him  children,  could  not  claim  dower.^ 

6.  The  inheritance,  besides,  must  be  an  entire  one,  and  one 
of  which  the  husband  may  Iiave  corporeal  seisin,  or  a  right  to 
such  seisin  during  coverture.'' 

6.  If,  therefore,  tlie  husband  have  only  a  reversion  or  re- 
mainder after  a  freehold  estate  in  another,  though  it  be  in  fee, 
it  will  not  give  his  wife  a  right  of  dower  therein,  unless  by  the 
death  of  the  intermediate  freeholder,  or  a  surrender  of  his 
estate  to  the  husband,  the  inheritance  become  entire  in  the 
husband  during  coverture.'^  And  if  the  husband  sell  his  re- 
version during  the  continuance  of  the  particular  estate  for  life, 
his  wife  thereby  loses  all  claim  to  dower  therein.^  But  if  the 
intermediate  estate,  subject  to  which  the  husband  has  a  rever- 

1  Pub.  Stat.  c.  121,  §  1.  2  Goodwin  v.  Goodwin,  33  Conn.  314. 

8  Bvainard  v.  Colchester,  31  Conn.  407. 

4  Lit.  §  53.  5  Co.  Lit.  40  a ;  2  Bl.  Com.  131  ;  Tud.  Cas.  45. 

6  Tud.  Cas.  43  ;  Apple  v.  Apple,  1  Head,  348.  Aliter  in  Kentucky,  Gen.  Stat. 
1873,  c.  52,  art.  4,  §  4. 

T  Tud.  Cas.  43  ;  Perkins,  §  337  ;  Park,  Dow.  57,  74,  76  ;  2  Crabb,  Real  Prop. 
132,  158  ;  1  Atk.  Conv.  256  ;  4  Kent,  Com.  39  ;  Duncomb  v.  Duncomb,  3  Lev. 
437  ;  Eldredge  v.  Forrestal,  7  Mass.  253  ;  Shoemaker  v.  Walker,  2  S.  &  R.  554  ; 
Dunhams.  Osbom,  1  Paige,  634  ;  Robison  v.  Codman,  1  Sumn.  121, 130;  Moore  v. 
Esty,  5  N.  H.  479  ;  Otis  v.  Parshley,  10  N.  H.  403  ;  Green  v.  Putnam,  1  Barb. 
500  ;  Arnold  v.  Arnold,  8  B.  Mon.  202  ;  Fisk  v.  Eastman,  5  N.  H.  240  ;  Beards- 
lee  V.  P.eardslee,  5  Barb.  324  ;  Durando  v.  Durando,  23  N.  Y.  331  ;  Brooks  v. 
Everett,  13  Allen,  457. 

*  Apple  V.  Apple,  1  Head,  348  ;  Gardner  v.  Greene,  5  R.  I.  104. 


en.  Tii.  §  2.]  Downn.  205 

sion  or  rcmaindLM*  in  fee,  be  a  term  for  years  or  chattel  intorcst, 
the  wife  will  be  entitled  to  dower  in  the  fee.*  And  where 
there  was  a  devise  to  executors  to  pay  debts,  and  aft«'r  to  (he 
testator's  son  in  tail,  it  was  hchl  that  the  devise  to  the  execu- 
tors was  of  a  ihatlel  interest,  ami  that  the  widf»w  of  the  son 
was  entitled  to  dower  sulijeet  to  the  jtayinent  of  the  testator's 
debt.-  Nor  will  it  make  any  dilTerenee  with  rejrard  to  a 
widow's  riirht  of  dower  that  the  husband,  before  niarriai^e, 
converted,  by  his  own  act,  a  j)resent  estate  in  fee  into  one  for 
life  or  into  a  reversion.  She  could  not  claim  dower  though 
the  deed  of  the  husband  had  never  been  recorded.^  If  the 
husband  is  seised  of  a  life  estate  in  lands  and  accjuire  the 
innnediate  reversion  or  remainder  in  fee  expectant 
upon  its  determination  *  they  will,  upon  a  familiar  [•loo] 
principle  of  law  that  a  greater  will  mer«re  a  less  estate 
if  they  unite  in  one  person  by  the  same  risiht  at  the  same  time, 
become  one  entire  estate  of  inheritance,  and  consequently  his 
wife  would  be  entitled  to  dower  out  of  it  if  she  survive  him.'' 

7.  If  now  there  were  interposed  between  this  life  estate  and 
the  reversion  or  remainder,  a  continirent  remainder,  as,  for  in- 
stance, estate  to  A  for  life,  remainder  in  fee  to  the  oldest  son  of 
B  who  has  no  son  yet  born,  remainder  to  A  in  fee,  the  contingent 
remainder  in  B  would  be  defeated  by  such  merger,  because  it 
is  a  principle  of  the  common  law  that  if  the  i)articular  or  pre- 
vious estate  of  freehold  on  which  the  contingent  remainder 
depends,  is  destroyed  or  determined  before  such  remainder 
has  become  vested,  it  fails  for  want  of  sui)port,  and  is  conse- 
quently defeated,  and  the  life  estate,  in  the  supposed  case,  is 
swallowed  ui>  and  lost  in  the  remainder  in  fee,  and  the  reason 
is,  that  a  contingent  remainder  is  not  an  estate.  Tlie  conse- 
quence in  such  a  case  would  be,  that  the  widow  of  such 
tenant  for  life  would  be  entitled  to  dower  for  the  reasons 
above  stated.^     Though  the  rule  is  as  above  stated,  there  is 

»  2  Crabb,  Real  Prop.  133,  158  ;  Park,  Dow.  "7  ;  Bates  r.  Bates,  1  1^1.  Ilnvm. 
826. 

«  Hitchens  r.  Kitchens,  2  Vtm.  403  ;  Perkins,  §  335  ;  2  Crabb,  Real  Prr.p. 
150  ;  Tud.  Cas.  43. 

•  Blooil  c.  Blood,  23  Pick.  80.  «  B.-ard8le«  r.  Beanlslee.  5  Barb.  324. 

»  Wms.  Real  Prop.  235  ;  Hooker  c.  Hooker,  Cas,  temp.  HarJw.  13  ;  Purcfoj 
V.  Rogers,  2  Sauud.  3&0. 


206  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPEETY.  [bOOK  1. 

this  exception,  if  the  several  interests,  namely,  the  life  estate, 
the  contingent  remainder,  and  the  remainder  or  reversion  in 
fee  be  created  or  raised  by  the  same  act,  deed,  or  devise,  the 
law  will  not,  by  applying  the  technical  rule  of  merger,  allow 
the  contingent  remainder  to  be  destroyed  by  the  life  estate 
and  remainder  being  united  in  one  person.  But  whenever  it 
vests  by  the  contingency  happening,  which  gives  it  vitality  as 
an  estate,  the  life  estate  and  remainder  will  open  and  let  it  in. 
Thus,  suppose  A  by  will  devises  to  his  son  and  heir  an  estate 
for  life,  with  a  contingent  remainder  to  the  heirs  of  B  in  fee, 
and  either  expressly  devises  the  remainder  to  his  son  or  makes 
no  disposition  of  it  and  it  descends  as  a  reversion  to  his  son 
as  heir.  Here  the  son  has  a  life  estate  and  a  reversion  or  a 
remainder  in  fee  without  any  estate  interposed,  and  if  he  had 

acquired  it  by  grant  or  descent  from  some  one  else,  it 
[*156]  *  would  have  merged  the  life  estate,  extinguished  the 

contingent  remainder,  and  given  his  wife  dower.  But 
as  he  takes  under  the  same  will  which  creates  the  contingent 
remainder,  he  shall  not  be  at  liberty  to  give  effect  to  the  testa- 
tor's intention,  in  one  part,  and  defeat  it  in  another,  and 
merger  will  not  take  place,  and  consequently  his  wife  cannot 
claim  dower.i  When,  therefore,  as  in  tlie  last  case,  the  con- 
tingent remainder  is  not  defeated  by  law,  its  interposition 
between  the  life  estate  and  reversion  prevents  the  inheritance 
in  the  husband  being  an  entire  one,  which  is  necessary  in 
order  to  give  dower.^  * 

*  Note. Mr.  Park,  however,  intimates  that  in  such  case  there  would  be  such 

a  union  between  the  life  estate  and  reversion  as  to  give  the  wife  of  the  holder 
dower  until  the  contingent  remainder  vests,  and  the  life  estate  and  reversion  open 
to  let  it  in.  Park,  Dow.  72.  And  other  writers  agree  with  Mr.  Park  in  the  views 
he  suggests.  2  Ptoper,  Hus.  &  Wife,  362-365  ;  2  Crabb,  Real  Prop.  160  ;  1  Atk. 
Conv.  256  ;  Tud.  Cas.  43.  But  much  of  the  nice  speculation  upon  the  extinction 
of  contingent  remainders  by  merger  in  similar  cases  is  done  away  with  in  Eng- 
land by  Stat.  8  &  9  Vict.  c.  106,  §  8,  saving  such  remainder  from  being  defeated 
by  the  determination  of  the  particular  estate  on  which  it  depends  before  it  has 
vested.  "Wms.  Real  Prop.  279.  And  such  are  the  statutes  of  Massachusetts, 
Maine,  New  York,  Indiana,  and  Missouri,  Kentucky,  Texas,  Virginia,  Michigan, 
Minnesota,  and  Wisconsin.     And  see  post,  2,  *266.     Id.  note  by  Rawle. 

J  Hooker  v.  Hooker,  Cas.  temp.  Hardw.  13  ;  s.  c.  2  Barnard.  200  ;  Id.  380  ; 
Plunket  V.  Holmes,  T.  Raym.  30  ;  Lewis  Bowles's  Case,  11  Rep.  80  ;  Park,  Dow. 
65-70  ;  Feame,  Cont.  Rem.  343,  344  ;  Crump  v.  Norwood,  7  Taunt.  362  ;  Tud, 
Cas.  43.  '^  1  Atk.  Conv.  256. 


rn.  VII.  ^  2.]  DOWER.  207 

8.  The  foropoing  positions  are  in  harmony  witli  tlio  dortrinn 
thiit  the  interposition  of  a  jxjHuif'iliti/,  not  intcnilin^'  tlicichv 
what  is  unilerstood  l>y  the  hiw  to  l»e  a  condition  thiit  tlic  pres- 
ent estate  of  thf  hiisliaml  sh<iulil  111'  prevented  by  the  terms  of 
its  limitation  ti-om  liecominir  an  estate  of  inheritance,  defeats 
the  ri;xlit  of  dower  in  his  wife,  so  lonir  as  that   jtossi- 

bility  •  exists.  Thus,  thouirh  an  estate  in  joint  t€n-  ["I'^^T] 
ancy  he,  in  terms,  one  of  inheritance  in  each  of  the 
joint  tenants,  yet  the  possibility,  so  lonji;  as  the  joint  owner- 
sliip  snbsists,that  the  present  estate  of  each  may  be  completely 
defeated  by  his  dyinir  in  the  lifetime  of  the  other,  prevents  the 
right  of  dower  attaching  in  the  wife  of  either  except  the  actual 
survivor.^  i^o  where  the  tenant  for  life  leases  his  estate  to 
the  remainder-man  in  fee  for  the  life  of  the  lessee,  the  possi- 
bility that  the  lessor  may  survive  the  lessee,  and  thus  have  a 
reversion  in  fact  after  the  death  of  the  lessee,  prevents  such  a 
union  or  entirety  of  the  inheritance  and  freehold  in  the  remain- 
der-man as  to  give  his  wife  d<jwer.-  And  perhaps  a  still 
stronger  case  is  reported  in  Levinz :  W  I)  was  tenant  for 
life,  remainder  to  J  S  antl  his  heirs  for  the  life  of  W  I),  re- 
mainder in  tail  to  W  D.  It  was  held  that  the  possibility  that 
W  D  might  forfeit  his  life  estate,  and  the  remainder  to  J  S 
take  effect,  so  far  interposed  between  the  life  estate  in  W 
P  and  the  inheritance  in  him  in  tail  as  to  prevent  his  wife 
from  claiming  dower,  he  having  died  in  the  life  of  J  .S.^  It 
should,  however,  be  stated  that  Mr.  Fearne,  in  the  above  case, 
regards  the  interest  of  J  S  as  an  intervening  vested  estate, 
and  not  a  possibility.^ 

9.  From  the  nature  of  the  estate  of  joint  tenants,  no  right 
of  dower  attaches  in  favor  of  either  of  the  tenants,  which  his 
wife  can  enforce,  unless  her  husband  siirvives  the  others.^  In 
many  of  the  United  States  the  principle  of  survivorship  among 
joint  tenants  is  abolished  by  statute,  and  consequently  this 

1  Park,  Dow.  72. 

2  Park.  Dow.  58  ;  2  Rolle,  Abr.  497. 

«  1  Atk.  Conv.  256  ;  Park,  Dow.  73  ;  Duncomb  r.  Duncomb,  3  Lev.  .137. 
♦  Fcame,  Cont.  Rem.  349. 

'  Park,  Dow.  88  ;  Co.  Lit.  87  b :  Mayburry  r.  Bricn,  15  Pet.  21  ;  2  Cmbb, 
Real  Prop.  134  ;  Broughton  v.  Randall,  Cro.  Eliz.  503. 


208  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

disability  of  being  endowed  is  removed  on  the  part  of  their 

wives.i  * 
[*158]       *  10.  The  estate  of  a  tenant  in  common  is  subject 

to  dower  as  if  held  in  severalty,  but  it  will  be  set  off 
in  common,  unless  partition  be  made  during  the  life  of  the 
husband  between  the  tenants,  in  which  case  the  dower  of  each 
tenant's  wife  is  limited  to  the  portion  set  apart  to  him.^  The 
wife  of  a  tenant  in  common  holds  her  inchoate  right  of  dower 
so  completely  subject  to  the  incidents  of  such  an  estate,  that 
she  not  only  takes  her  dower  out  of  such  part  only  of  the  com- 
mon estate  as  shall  have  been  set  to  her  husband  in  partition, 
but  if,  by  law,  the  entire  estate  should  be  sold  in  order  to  effect 
a  partition,  she  loses  by  such  sale  all  claim  to  the  land,  although 
no  party  to  such  proceeding.  But,  as  will  be  shown  hereafter, 
she  is,  in  some  cases,  allowed  in  equity  to  share  in  the  proceeds 
of  such  sale.^ 

11.  Where  a  husband  exchanges  lands,  using  the  term  in 
its  strict  technical  meaning,*  his  wife  may  have  dower  in  either 
of  the  estates,  but  she  cannot  claim  it  in  both,  though  the 
husband  has  been  seized  of  both  during  coverture.^  In  this 
country  the  doctrine  of  exchanges  of  lands  has  prevailed  to 
but  a  limited  extent.  It  is  recognized  by  the  statutes  of  New 
York,  Kentucky,  Wisconsin,  and  Arkansas,  and  some  other 
States,^  but  it  is  limited  to  cases  of  exchanges  of  equal  inter- 

*  Note.  —  Upon  this  doctrine  of  joint  tenancy  were  based  several  of  the 
devices  formerly  resorted  to  in  order  to  prevent  the  right  of  dower  attaching  upon 
lands  when  purchased.     Tud.  Cas.  46. 

1  In  North  Carolina,  Weir  v.  Tate,  4  Ired.  Eq.  264  ;  South  Carolina,  Reed  v. 
Kennedy,  2  Strobh.  67  ;  Kentucky,  Davis  v.  Logan,  9  Dana,  185.  See  Rawle's 
note  to  Wms.  Real  Prop.  132.     See  note  to  Joint  Tenancy,  post. 

'^  Lit.  §  44  ;  Perkins,  §  310  ;  Park,  Dow.  42  ;  Tud.  Cas.  46 ;  Reynard  v. 
Spence,  4  Beav.  103  ;  Potter  v.  Wheeler,  13  Mass.  504  ;  Wilkinson  v.  Parish,  3 
Paige,  653  ;  Totten  v.  Stuyvesant,  3  Edw.  Ch.  500  ;  Davis  v.  Bartholomew,  3 
Ind.  485  ;  Lloyd  v.  Conover,  25  N.  J.  47,  52. 

8  Lee  V.  Lindell,  22  Mo.  202.  See  also  Warren  v.  Twilley,  10  Md.  39  ;  Wea- 
ver V.  Gregg,  6  Ohio  St.  547. 

4  See  Termes  de  la  Ley,  319  ;  2  Bl.  Cora.  323. 

6  Perkins,  §  319  ;  Co.  Lit.  31  b. 

6  Stevens  v.  Smith,  4  J.  J.  Marsh.  64.  In  New  York,  Illinois,  Wisconsin, 
and  Oregon,  and  several  other  States,  if  she  does  not  elect  within  one  year  to  take 
dower  in  the  lauds  given  in  exchange,  she  is  deemed  to  have  elected  to  take  her 


cii.  VII.  §  -2.]  DowEii.  209 

ests.  It  they  are  iinr(|ual,  the  cast?  coiucs  witliin  tln'  (jiflinary 
transftTs  of  real  estate,  ami  the  riL^lits  ot  dtnvrr  utturli  jiccijnl- 
iugly.'  So  it  has  Iteen  held  in  ^hiiur,  ihat  if  two  tt'iiants  in 
CDiuinon  divide  their  estates  by  simply  exeeutiiiji;  mutual  re- 
leases, the  wife  of  one  of  them  shall  not  take  dower  in  l)oth 
paieels.'^  But  if  the  exehanjre  wuh  of  une(|ual  parts,  one  ten- 
ant payinir  the  dilTerenee  in  value  to  the  other,  it  takes  the 
charaeter  of  an  ordinary  transfer  of  lanils,  and  (he  widow  may 
claim  dower  in  both  parcels.^  And  it  was  held  in  New  llam|>- 
shire  that  where  the  owners  of  lands  a<rreed  to  cxchaiif^o  lands, 
which  was  done  by  each  executinjj:  to  the  other  a  deed  of  his 
land  in  usual  form,  the  wives  might  claim  dower  in  both 
parcels.^ 

12.  Whether  the  widow  of  a  deceased  |tartncr  sliall  be  en- 
titled to  dower  in  lands  purchased  and  held  Ijy  the 
partners  has  *  frequently  been  discussed,  and  it  is  ['l;";'.'] 
not  easy  to  reconcile  all  the  cases,  especially  the  early 
ones,  with  the  law  as  now  understood,  nor  will  it  be  attemi»te(l 
here.**  Thouirh  it  may  sumetimcs  depend  ujion  the  eliaraeter 
which  the  jjarties  intend  to  <::ivc  to  lands  held  by  them  for 
their  j(jint  and  mutual  benelit,  yet  it  may  be  laid  down  as  a 
general  proposition,  that  if  real  estate  is  purchased  by  two  or 
more  j)artners,  and  j)aid  for  out  of  partnershij)  funds,  and  held 
for  partnership  purjjoses,  though  it  will  be  regarded  in  law  as 
held  l)y  the  several  partners  as  tenants  in  common,  yet  in 
ccpiity  it  is  so  far  regarded  in  the  light  of  personalty  as  to  be 
subject,  under  an  im|>lied  trust,  to  be  sold  and  a|iplied  if 
necessary  for  the  payment  of  the  partnership  debts.  Nor  can 
the  widow  of  one  of  such  partners  claim  dower  out  of  any 
|)art  of  such  estate,  except  such  as  may  not  be  required  for 
the  payment  of  the  partnership  del)ts.  Of  that  she  may  claim 
her  dower  both  at  law  and  in  e(piity.'^     It  is,  indeed,  intimated 

dowcr  in  those  received  in  exchanffo.  1  SUit.  nt  Ijirgc,  p.  691  ;  111.  Rev.  St.  1874, 
p.  425;  Wi.sc.  Rev,  St  1858,  c.  8»,  §  2  ;  On-Ron,  Sta.  1855,  p.  405  ;  Minu.'sota, 
SUt.  ISGfi,  p.  3G0  ;  Arkansjus,  Dig.  1858,  c.  60.  §  3. 

•  Wilcox  V.  llandall,  7  Bjirb.  633.  ^  Moslier  r.  Mosh.r.  32  M<\  412. 

•  Id.  *  Ca-s-H  c.  Thompson,  1  N.  H.  65. 
'  See  Sumner  r.  Ilampaon,  8  Ham.  328. 

•  Greene  r.  Greene,  1  Ham.  250  ;  Sumner  v.  Hampson,  8  llnm.  3^5  ;  Bum.'ido 
V.  Merrick,  4  Met.  637  ;  Dyer  r.  Clark,  6  Met  562  ;  Howanl  r.  Pric-at,  5  Met  652; 

VOL.  I.— 14 


210  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY,  [bOOK   I. 

in  one  case  above  cited,^  that  the  character  of  personalty  may- 
be stamped  upon  real  estate  held  by  a  copartnership  by  an  ex- 
press or  implied  agreement  indicating  such  intention.  But 
this  could  only  be  done  in  equity .^  And  where  land  was 
bought  by  several  for  purposes  of  speculation,  and  the  title 
taken  in  the  name  of  one  as  trustee  for  all,  with  an  agreement 
that  it  should  be  sold  and  the  proceeds  divided,  the  court 
regarded  it  as  personalty,  and,  upon  the  death  of  one  of 
the  cesfuis  que  trust   held   that   it  did  not  descend  to  heirs 

or  give  his  widow  a  claim  of  dower.^  Although  it 
[*160]  would  seem  that  w^ithout  such  *  agreement  the  widow 

of  the  cestui  que  trust  would  be  entitled  to  dower  in 
the  estate  so  held>  The  taking  the  title  in  the  name  of  one 
of  several  copartners  does  not  seem  to  make  any  difference  in 
this  respect,  unless,  as  was  done  in  one  case,  the  partner  so 
holding  the  title  had,  by  agreement,  been  charged  by  the  part- 
nership as  debtor  for  the  purchase-money.^  But  it  is  only 
wdien  and  so  long  as  they  constitute  a  part  of  the  partnership 
property  that  lands  are  exempt  from  the  claim  of  dower,  for 
where  two  parties  engaged  in  buying  and  selling  lands  and 
town  lots,  taking  and  giving  deeds  as  tenants  in  common,  and 
lands  were  sold  accordingly  in  the  lifetime  of  both  partners, 
it  was  held  that  by  such  sale  they  were  withdrawn  from  the 
joint  stock,  and  that,  to  the  claim  for  dower  by  the  widow  of 
one  of  the  partners,  the  tenant  could  not  avail  himself  at  law 
of  the  fact  that  the  land  had  been  a  part  of  the  joint  stock  of 
the  former  owners.^     And  where  the  purchase  and  holding  of 

■Woolridge  v.  "Wilkitis,  3  How.  Miss.  360  ;  Diihring  v.  Duhring,  20  Mo.  174  ; 
Richardson  v.  "Wyatt,  2  Desauss.  471  ;  Pierce  v.  Trigg,  10  Leigh,  406;  Goodburu 
V.  Stevens,  5  Gill,  1  ;  s.  c.  1  Md.  Ch.  Dec.  437  ;  Markham  v.  Merrett,  7  How.  Miss. 
437.  But  see  Smith  v.  Jackson,  2  Edw.  Ch.  28  ;  Hale  v.  Pluniraer,  6  Ind.  121  ; 
Loubat  V.  Nourse,  5  Fla.  350  ;  Bopp  v.  Fox,  63  111.  540  ;  Post,  *423.  If,  there- 
fore, the  firm  is  insolvent,  she  can  get  nothing.     Willet  v.  Brown,  65  Mo.  138. 

1  Goodbum  v.  Stevens,  1  Md.  Ch.  Dec.  437. 

2  See  Markham  v.  Merrett,  7  How.  Miss.  437,  and  the  dictum  of  the  Vice- 
Chancellor  in  Smith  v.  Jackson,  2  Edw.  Ch.  36,  in  respect  to  the  above  cited  case 
of  Greene  v.  Greene,  1  Ham.  250. 

8  Coster  V.  Clark,  3  Edw.  Ch.  428.  *  Hawley  v.  Jaraes,  5  Paige,  451-457. 

6  Story,  Part.  §§  92,  93  ;  Collyer,  Part.  82  ;  Smith  v.  Smith,  5  Ves.  189  ; 
Park,  Dow.  106. 

<"  Markham  v.  Merrett,  7  How.  (Miss.)  437. 


en.  VII.  §  2.]  DOWER.  21 1 

land  by  jiersons  who  wcro  partiuTs  was  not  dono  with  nn  in- 
tention to  throw  it  into  the  fund  as  jiartnership  stock,  l)iit  was 
ctjUateral  to  tlieii'  |iartnershi|)  l)usin('ss,  an<l  as  a  means  ol  car- 
rying that  on,  it  was  liclil  that  tlic  widow  ol"  one  ol"  the  pai-t- 
ners  was  not  e.xrliidcil  from  lier  claim  to  dower.  'J'lius  wlirri» 
W  and  C  airreed  to  purchase  two  hun(h'('d  acres  of  hiiid,  on 
which  was  a  mill,  and,  liaviuL''  done  so,  c(»mmrncc(l  and  cai'iicd 
on  tlie  business  of  millintr  as  partners  upon  the  i)remiscs  for 
several  years,  it  was  held  that  as  to  the  I'cal  estate  they  were 
tenants  in  common,  and  their  wives  cntitlccl  to  dower.'  * 

13.  The  law  as  to  dowei'  out  of  e(pntahle  estates  was,  until 
the  late  d(nver  act,  dilferent  in  England  from  the  law 
as  it  generally  *  prevails  in  this  country.  All  the  [*101] 
early  authorities  there,  both  at  common  law  and  in 
equity,  held  that  a  widow  was  not  dowablc  of  the  interest  of  a 
trustee  or  cestui  que  trust  in  lands,  and  this  restriction  was 
extended  to  an  equity  of  redemption,  although  an  elTort  was 
made  more  than  once  by  eminent  chancellors  to  extend  the 
right  of  dower  in  this  to  tlu^  widow  of  him  who  held  it,  the 
estate  of  the  husband  in  such  case  not  being  deemed  a  legal 
e.state,  if  the  mortgage  were  in  fee,  and  not  for  years  only.- 
And  so  far  was  this  doctrine  cari-ied,  that  if  a  man  before 
marriag(>  conveyeil  his  estate  ])rivately  without  the  knowledge 
of  his  wife,  to  trustees  in  trust  for  himself  and  his  heirs  in  fee, 
that  would  prevent  dower.  "  So  if  a  man  purchase  an  estate 
aftei-  marriage,  and  takes  a  conveyance  to  trustees  in  trust  for 
himself  and  his  heirs,  that  will  put  an  end  to  dower."  ^  And 
though  the  changes  in  the  law  in  this  respect  have  in  late 
years  been  so  great  that  the  matter  has  become  one  of  little 

*  Note.  — It  is  hardly  necessary  to  remiiul  the  reader  of  tin-  difTereiit  mediums 
through  which  tlie  subject  of  laud  bi-ing  regarded  as  in-rsoualty  for  j>artiiershiji 
purposes  is  viewed  by  courts  of  eijuity  and  those  of  common  law.  But  it  should 
be  borne  in  mind  in  examining  the  rases  relating  to  this  point. 

»  "Wheatley  v.  Calhoun,  \'2  Leigh,  264  ;  Hale  v.  Plummor,  6  Ind.  121. 

2  E.j.  Cas.  Abr.  384.  jd.  9  ;  2  Crabb,  Heal  Prop.  161  ;  4  Kent,  Com.  43  ;  Tu.l. 
Cas.  46  ;  1  Roper,  Hus.  &  Wife,  354-3.58  ;  Dixon  r.  Saville.  1  Bro.  C.  C  326  ; 
D'Arcy  V.  Blake,  2  Sch.  &  Lef.  387 ;  Mayburry  v.  Bricn.  15  Pet.  38.  The  case 
of  Banks  v.  Sutton,  2  P.  Wms.  700,  in  favor  <>f  allowing  dower  in  such  casoa,  wac 
oveiTuled,  and  generally  denied  to  be  law.     Park,  Dow.  138  ;  4  Kent  Com.  43. 

«  Co.  Lit.  20S  0,  n.  105. 


212  LAW   OF  REAL   PROPEETY.  [BOOK   I. 

consequence,  it  may  be  well  to  notice  here  the  distinction  that 
for  a  long  time  obtained  between  the  right  of  curtesy  and 
dower  in  equitable  estates,  the  husband  of  a  cestui  que  trust, 
if  of  the  inheritance,  being  entitled  to  curtesy,  but  tlie  wife  of 
similar  cestui  que  trust  being  denied  dower.  This  seems  to 
have  grown  out  of  the  attempt  of  the  court  of  chancery  in 
England  to  build  up  a  system  of  trusts  with  the  incidents  of 
legal  estates  out  of  the  old  system  of  uses,  which  had  their 
existence  in  chancery  alone,  and  which  it  was  attempted  to 
suppress  by  the  Statute  of  Uses,  27  Hen.  VIII.  c.  10,  and  the 
nature  of  which  has  been  heretofore  explained.^  A  widow 
was  never  dowable  of  a  use,  and  it  had  come  to  be  not  an  in- 
frequent mode  of  evading  the  right,  to  have  lands  conveyed 
so  as  to  be  held  by  another  to  the  use  of  the  husband,  instead 

of  being  conveyed  directly  to  himself. ^  The  object 
[*162]  of  the  Statute  of  Uses  was  to  *  do  away  with  this 

double  ownership  of  lands,  and  to  restore  the  tenure 
and  title  of  these  to  their  original  simplicity  at  common  law. 
But  the  ingenuity  of  chancery  courts  and  chancery  lawyers 
ere  long  discovered  a  mode  of  evading  the  spirit  of  the  law, 
by  subtle  refinements  and  distinctions  in  construing  the  stat- 
ute, and  of  building  up  a  system  of  equitable  estates  under 
the  name  of  trusts,  whereby  the  legal  seisin  and  estate  was 
in  the  trustee,  and  the  beneficial  interest  or  equitable  estate  in 
the  cestui  que  trust.^  In  carrying  out  this  measure,  it  was  the 
study  and  aim  of  chancery  to  give  to  equitable  estates,  as  near 
as  might  be,  the  incidents  and  attributes  of  legal  estates  at 
common  law.  It  was  accordingly  understood  and  assumed 
that  the  incidents  of  curtesy  and  dower  attached  to  equitable 
as  to  legal  estates  at  the  common  law,  and  that  construction 
was  actually  applied  in  cases  of  curtesy.  But  when  it  was 
proposed  to  extend  it  to  dower,  it  was  ascertained  that  so 
many  estates  in  the  kingdom  had  been  settled  in  the  form  of 
trusts,  for  the  very  purpose  of  avoiding  dower,  that  it  would 
produce  very  great  confusion  in  titles  if  widows  should  be 
made  dowable  of  such  estates,*  and  an  exception  was  made  in 
this  respect,  which  continued  till  the  late  dower  act  of  the 

1  Ante,  p.  *55.  2  Perkins,  §  349. 

8  Wms.  Real  Prop.  134-136.  *  D'Arcy  v.  Blake,  2  Sch.  &  Lef.  3S7. 


rii.  VII.  §  2.]  DOWKR.  213 

3  and    I  \\'iii.    I\'.  c.  1(>"),  rcinovcil   tins  anotniily  as  regards 
dowel'.' 

11.  Hut  iioithor  in  Enjrlaiid  imr  in  this  ('oiintry  can  the 
widow  of  a  trustee  have  dower,  altliouLdi  he  holds  the  lejral 
seisin  and  estate.'-^  But  if  the  trustee  accpure  the  cfpiitahle 
estate,  the  latter  mer<,'es  in  the  letnil  estate  of  the  trustee,  and 
Ids  wife  hecomes  entitled  to  dower.-'  Thou^rh  it  is  sugti^ested 
hy  Judu'-e  Kent,  that  so  far  as  the  hnshand  has  a  henefieial' in- 
terest in  the  trust  estate,  his  wife  may  he  endowed.*  And  sr> 
far  as  the  letral  and  trust  estates  arc  coextensive,  the  cquitahle 
nu'rjjfes  in  the  lethal  estate  and  tnves  the  wife  dower.'' 
]Jut  where  the  husband  *  before  nnu'riaL^c  crave  bond  [*1<I;>] 
to  convey  his  land,  he  was  regarded  in  eijuity  as 
trustee  of  the  vendee,  and,  havinir  married,  his  wife  was  denied 
dower.*'  So  where  the  husband  had  a  <rencral  [tower  of  ajv- 
pointmcnt  to  uses  of  an  estate  held  in  trust  for  that  purpose 
by  another,  his  wife  was  not  dowablc  thereof,  he  havini;  made 
the  appointment,  although  until  the  appointment  made,  or 
in  default  thereof,  the  estate  was  to  be  held  to  his  use  in 
fee.' 

15.  The  wife  of  a  mortgagee  cannot  claim  dower  in  the 
mortgaged  estate  until  the  same  is  foi-eelosed.^  And  even  if 
the  husband  enters  to  foreclose  the  mortgage,  and  then  con- 
veys his  interest,  and  the  mortgage  is  foreclosed  in  the  hands 
of  his  grantee,  his  wife  will  not  be  entitled  to  dower.'**     In  this 

1  1  Speiice,  Eq.  Jur.  501  ;  1  Atk.  Conv.  278. 

2  Noel  V.  Jevon,  Freem.  Ch.  43 ;  Hill,  Trust.  269  ;  Tud.  Cos.  47  ;  2  Eq.  Cos. 
Abr.  383  ;  Derush  r.  Brown,  8  Ham.  412  ;  Greene  v.  Greene,  1  Ham,  249  ;  IJart- 
lett  r.  Gouge,  5  B.  Mon.  15'2  ;  Kobison  v.  Codman,  1  Sumn.  121  ;  Cowman  i". 
Hall,  3  Gill  A:  J.  398  ;  Powell  v.  Monson,  3  Mason,  364  ;  Cooper  v.  Whitney,  3  Hill, 
95  ;  Brooks  v.  Everett,  13  Allen,  458.  So  by  statute  in  New  Jersey.  Kev.  1677, 
p.  3-24. 

*  Hojikinson  v.  Dumas,  42  N.  H.  303,  306. 

*  4  Kent,  Com.  43,  46  ;  Prescott  v.  Wnlkcr,  16  N.  H.  340,  343, 

6  Dean  v.  Mitchell,  4  J.  J.  Marsh.  451  ;  Hill,  Trust.  252,  n.;  Coster  r.  Clarke, 
3  E.lw,  Ch,  428. 

«  Dean  v.  Mitchell,  4  .1.  J.  Marsh.  451. 
^  Kay  r.  Pung,  5  B.  &  A.  561. 

*  Tud.  Cas.  47  ;  4  Kent,  Com.  43  ;  4  Dane,  Abr.  671.  So  by  statute  also  in 
N.  Y.,  1  Rev.  St.  740,  §  7  ;  HI.  Rev.  St.  1833,  c.  41,  §  6  ;  Ark!  Dig.  SL  1874, 
§  2216. 

»  Foster  v.  Dwinel,  49  Maine,  41. 


21-1  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOB:  L 

respect,  estate  in  the  lands  remains  in  the  mortgagor  while  the 
mortgagee  has  a  security  only  in  it.^ 

16.  As  a  general  proposition,  the  laws  of  the  United  States 
may  be  said  to  coincide  with  those  of  England,  as  to  dower 
in  equitable  estates,  under  her  present  Dower  Act,  although  it 
is  not  uniform  in  all  the  States,  and  in  some  the  ancient  doc- 
trine of  the  common  law  prevails.  Thus,  it  has  been  held 
in  the  District  of  Columbia,  a  wife  is  not  dowable  of  an  equity 
of  redemption.^  So,  in  Maine,  the  wife  of  a  cestui  que  trust  is 
not  dowable.^  But  in  Maryland  she  would  be  dowable  if  the 
husband  hold  the  equitable  estate  at  his  death.  And  the  law 
is  the  same  in  New  York  and  Kentucky,  and  in  North  Caro- 
lina, Iowa,  Tennessee,  and  Arkansas.*  In  Illinois,  the  widow 
of  one  having  an  equitable  estate  in  fee  in  land,  of  which  the 
husband  receives  the  rents  and  profits,  is  entitled  to  dower  out 
of  the  same.^  In  Pennsylvania,  also,  the  wife  of  a  cestui  que 
trust  is  dowable.^  And  the  law  is  the  same  for  both  legal  and 
equitable  estates  in  this  respect.  Dower  belongs  to  both.'  In 
Virginia,  West  Virginia,  and  Alabama  a  wife  may  have  dower 
out  of  a  complete  equitable  estate  of  the  husband,  if  it  be  such 
that  a  court  of  equity  would  enforce  the  conveyance  of  the 
legal  estate.^     Other  cases  of  equitable  estates,  where,  by  local 

law,  dower  has  been  allowed,  might  be  enumerated, 
[*164]  as  in  *  Kentucky,  Ohio,  and  Illinois,  where  a  widow 

is  dowable  of  lands  contracted  for  by  the  husband, 
but  not  conveyed  till  after  his  death  ;  but  it  is  not  deemed  ex- 
pedient to  load  these  pages  with  citations  of  authorities  in  the 
attempt  to  explain  or  define  local  enactments.^     In  Iowa,  when 

1  Crittenden  v.  Johnson  11  Ark.  94. 

2  Stelle  V.  Carroll,  12  Pet.  201.  '  Hamlin  v.  Hamlin,  19  Me.  141. 
*  Bowie  V.  Berry,  1  Md.  Ch.  Dec.  452  ;  Miller  v.  Stump,  3  Gill,  304  ;  Hawley 

V.  James,  5  Paige,  318,  452  ;  Lawson  v.  Morton,  6  Dana,  471  ;  Thompson  v. 
Thompson,  1  Jones  (N.  C. ),  430  ;  Lewis  v.  James,  8  Humph.  537;  Earnests. 
Gay,  7  Iowa,  26  ;  Gully  v.  Ray,  18  B.  Mon.  107  ;  Kirby  v.  Vantrece,  26  Ark. 
368  ;  Tate  v.  Jay,  31  Ark.  576. 

5  Atkin  V.  Merrill,  39  HI.  62.  «  Shoemaker  v.  Walker,  2  S.  &  R.  554. 

7  Dubs  V.  Dubs,  31  Penn.  St.  149  ;  Mershon  v.  Duer,  40  N.  J.  Eq.  333. 

8  Rowton  V.  Rowton,  1  Hen.  &  M.  92  ;  W.  Va.  Rev.  Stat.  1879,  c.  70,  §§  2,  3; 
Gillespie  v.  Somerville,  3  Stew.  &  P.  447. 

9  Robinson  v.  Miller,  1  B.  Mon.  93  ;  Smiley  v.  Wright,  2  Ohio,  512  ;  Daven- 
port V.  Farrar,  1  Scam.  314. 


en.  VII.  §  2.]  DCJWKH.  L'l."* 

the  coiniuon-liiw  ri^'^lit  of  dower  existed,  slie  had  not  a  ri).dit  of 
dower  in  lands  to  wliich  lier  husband  liad  aciiuiied  u  |»re-enj|»tive 
right  under  tho  United  States.*  IJutnow,  in  thi«  .State,  and  in 
Kansas,  where  she  takes  an  estato  in  fee,  this,  by  statute,  in- 
chuh's  eijuitabh!  as  well  as  legal  estates.'-  And  such  woiUd  be 
the  rule  probably  in  other  States  where  her  share  is  u  fee,*^  or 
whore  she  tiikes  an  ab.solute  share  of  the  community  property.* 
In  Massachusetts,  as  a  general  proposition,  the  common  law 
as  to  dower  in  ecpiitalde  estates  [>revuils.  lUif,  by  statute, 
where  there  is  an  agreement  to  convey  lands,  ami  tjic  party 
to  whom  the  Conveyance  is  to  be  made  dies,  provision  is  made 
whereby  any  person  having  an  interest  to  compel  performance 
may  procure  it  to  be  made.  And  it  has  been  luld  thai  the 
widow  of  such  contracting  party  may  claim  dower,  through 
such  decree,  in  the  land  conveyed.''  But  this  applies  only  to 
cases  where  the  contract  has  been  performed  on  the  part  of  the 
husl»and  in  his  lifetime.'^  Where,  however,  a  husbancl  had  bid 
off  an  estate  sold  by  order  of  the  court  of  e(iuity,and  had  paid 
at  the  time  of  his  death  a  part  of  the  j)urchase-money,  but  had 
received  no  deed,  it  was  held  that  his  widow  might  have  dower 
out  of  the  estate,  she  contributing  y)ro  rata  towards  the  balance 
of  the  iiurehase-money.' 

17.  With  equities  of  redemption,  also,  the  principle  of  regard- 
ing them  as  legal  estates  and  subject  to  dower  so  generally 
prevails  in  this  ciMintry,  that  to  cite  all  the  cases  in  which  the 
doctrine  is  stated  or  conlirmcd  would  l>c  occupying  room  that 
might  be  more  usefully  emj)loyed.  It  is,  therefore,  jiroposed 
only  to  give  from  the  numerous  authorities  that  arc  found  in 
our  reports,  one  or  two  in  addition  to  those  already  cited,  in 
each  State,  most  of  them  relating  to  dower  in  ecpiities  of  re- 
demption, but  some  of  them  to  equital)le  estates  generally. 
And  it  may  be  remarked,  in  passing,  that  the  law  is  the  same 

1  Bowers  v.  Keesecker,  14  Iowa,  301. 

2  Iowa,  Rev.  Co«le  ISSO,  §  '2  J 40  ;   Kansas,  Comp.  L.  1670,  §  2109. 

'  Imliaiw,  Minnesota,  MisMssippi,  Montana,  and  Wyoming  ;  Statutes  ante, 
•HP,  n. 

*  California,  I^ouisiana,  Tfxas,  Arizona,  and  Nevada  ;  Statutes  ante,  'H9,  n. 

*  Reed  v.  Whitney,  7  Gray,  533 ;  Pub.  Stat.  c.  151,  8.  2,  §  3. 
«  LoWell  V.  Hayes,  4  Allen,  187. 

">  Church  V.  Church,  3  Sandf.  Ch.  434. 


216  LAW  OF  REAL  PEOPEETY.  [BOOK  I. 

whether  the  estate  is  mortgaged  before  coverture  or  during 
coverture,  if  the  wife  join  in  the  mortgage.^ 

18.  In  many  cases  besides,  courts  of  equity  allow  dower  out 
of  money  which  is  the  proceeds  of  the  sale  of  real  estate,  in 
place  of  assigning  it  out  of  the  real  estate  itself,  where  the 
sale  has  been  made  by  order  of  court  or  by  the  wrongful  act 

of  an  agent  or  trustee,  and  the  parties  interested  have 
[*165]  elected  to  *  affirm  the  sale.^     So,  where  land  in  which 

a  widow  has  a  right  of  dower  is  appropriated,  under 
the  exercise  of  eminent  domain,  for  public  uses,  and  a  sum  of 
money  is  awarded  for  such  taking,  she  may  claim  and  have  as 
dower  out  of  such  money  one  third  of  the  net  income  of  the 
same.^  In  England,  under  like  circumstances,  the  court 
awarded  her  as  her  dower  a  sum  properly  estimated  out  of  the 
corjnis  or  principal  of  the  money  paid  for  the  land  taken,  instead 
of  annual  payments.^  And  where  a  mortgage  in  which  the 
wife  had  joined  was  foreclosed  by  a  sale  of  the  premises,  and 
a  surplus  remained  after  satisfying  the  mortgage  debt,  she 
was  held  entitled  to  dower  out  of  such  surplus.^  It  will  be 
necessary  to  recur  to  this  subject  again  when  speaking  of 
assigning  dower  in  equity,  but  the  following  cases  may  be 
referred  to,  to  illustrate  these  points.^ 

1  Mayburrj'  v.  Brien,  15  Pet.  38  ;  Simonton  v.  Gra)',  34  Me.  50  ;  Gibson  v. 
Crehore,  3  Pick.  475  ;  Titus  ■;;.  Neilson,  5  Johns.  Ch.  452  ;  Montgoraerj'  v.  Bruere, 
5  N.  J.  865  ;  Taylor  v.  McCrackin,  2  Blackf.  260  ;  Heth  v.  Cocke,  1  Eand. 
344;  Stoppelbein  v.  Shulte,  1  Hill  (S.  C),  200  ;  Fish  v.  Fish,  1  Conn.  559; 
Wooldridge  v.  Wilkins,  3  How.  (Miss.)  360  ;  Mclver  v.  Cherry,  8  Humph.  713  ; 
Thompson  v.  Boyd,  21  N.  J.  58  ;  Mills  v.  Van  Voorhis,  23  Barb.  125,  136  ;  McAr- 
thur  V.  Franklin,  15  Ohio  St.  492,  16  Id.  193  ;  Ark.  Dig.  St.  1874,  §§  2213, 
2214.  While  in  Georgia  the  widow  takes  dower  by  statute  irresjjective  of  the 
lien  of  the  mortgage  or  vendor.     Code  1873,  §  1769. 

2  Chaney  v.  Chanej%  38  Ala.  35,  38  ;  Williamson  v.  Mason,  23  Ala.  488  ; 
Schmitt  V.  Willis,  40  N.  J.  Eq.  515. 

8  Bonner  v.  Peterson,  44  111.  253.  <  FcC  Hall's  Estate,  L.  R.  9  Eq.  179. 

6  Bank  of  Commerce  v.  Owens,  31  Md.  320. 

*  Where  the  foreclosure  takes  place  after  the  hu-sband's  death,  it  is  perhaps  un- 
questioned that  his  widow  takes  dower  in  the  surplus.  Titus  v.  Neilson,  5  Johns. 
Ch.  452 ;  Hartshorne  v.  Hartshorne,  2  N.  J.  Eq.  349  ;  Hawley  v.  Bradford, 
9  Paige,  200  ;  Thompson  v.  Cochran,  7  Humph.  72  ;  Chaffee  v.  Franklin,  11  R.  I. 
578  ;  Willettt).  Beatty,  12  B.  Mon.  172,  174;  Matthews  v.  Duryee,  45  Barb.  69. 
Where  before  the  husband's  death,  it  has  generally  been  held  that  the  inchoate 
right  of  dower  would  be  protected.  Denton  v.  Xanny,  8  Barb.  618  ;  Vartie  v. 
Underwood,  18  Barb.  561,  564.    And  though  these  cas£s  were  doubted  and  such 


CII.  VII.  ^   li.]  DOWKR.  217 

10.  Akin  to  an  ccjnity  of  rodcmi)tion,nn(l  govcrnod  in  many 
rcsports  i)y  tlic  same  rule  as  to  dower,  is  the  inlen-st  which 
the  liushand  has  in  hinds  for  which  tin-  purchase-monry  has 
not  l)e«'n  ]iaid,  in  Ihosc  States  where  the  vendor  of  hind« 
lias  a  lien  upon  them  for  the  juu'chase-money.  The  widow  is 
entitle<l  to  share  in  the  sin'plns  left  after  discharjrinjx  such 
lien,  as  will  he  e.\j)lained  when  the  siihjcct  of  assifrnini;  dower 
in  eipiity  is  considered.'  And  in  Kentucky  it  has  heen  hehl 
that  a  widow  can  oidy  claim  dower  suhject  to  lien  of  the 
huilder,  whom  her  liushand  has  employed  to  erect  huildingH 
on  the  land.'-  lUit  (he  law  in  this  resjiect  is  otherwise  held  in 
Massachusetts,  Illinois,  and  Indiana,  in  which  .States  similar 
questions  have  hccji  raised.^ 

20.  And  where  there  was  a  judfrment  outstan<ling  at  the 
time  of  the  marriairc,  which  l)y  the  law  of  (he  State  constituted 
a  lien  uj)on  the  land, (he  widow  can  only  claim  her  dower  in  the 
land,  suhject  to  such  lien,*  unless  (he  judgment  happen  to  ho 
entered  up  the  same  day  with  (he  marriage,  in  which  case 
the  dower  right  olitains  (he  precedence.'' 

-1.  A  widow  is  entitled  to  dower  in  mines  helonging  to  her 
liushand  in  fee,  which  may  have  heen  ojjened  during  his  life- 
time, whether  widiin  his  own  land  or  (hat  of  another.*^ 
And  *  this  extends  to  quarries  of  slate  and  other  stoue ;  [•106] 

protection  refused  in  Ncwhall  r.  Lj-nn  Sav.  Bk.,  101  Mass.  428,  perJiaps  on  account 
of  want  of  equity  jxiwer,  they  have  been  uniformly  followed  in  New  York,  Mills  v. 
Van  Voorhis,  23  Barh.  125,  134,  136  ;  8.  c.  20  N.  Y.  412  ;  Klmendorff  r.  Lockwood, 
4  Ijins.  393,  396  ;  Raynor  v.  Kaynor,  21  Hun,  36,  40  ;  Matthews  v.  Duryee,  4 
Keyes,  525  ;  and  see  Jackson  v.  Edwards,  7  Paige,  386,  408  ;  and  in  other  States, 
De  WoHfr.  .Muq)hy,  11  H.  I.  630  ;  Keith  v.  Trapier,  1  Bailey,  E4.  63  ;  VnvlanJ 
V.  Jacobus,  19  N.  J.  E<\.  231  ;  Unger  v.  Leiter,  32  Ohio  St.  210.  In  Virginia  and 
Kentucky  the  right  is  given  by  btatute  ;  Robinson  v.  Schakett,  29  Gratt.  99  ;  Tis- 
dale  r.  Risk,  7  Bush,  139. 

»  McClure  v.  Hanis,  12  B.  Mon.  261  ;  Miller  v.  Stump,  3  Oill,  304  ;  Crane  r. 
Palmer,  8  Blackf.  120  ;  Ellicott  r.  W.hli.  2  Bland,  1M2  ;  Wnmer  r.  Van  Alstyne, 
3  Paige,  513  ;  Williams  r.  Wood,  1  Humph.  408  ;  liames  i-.  Ony,  7  luwa,  26. 
So  by  statute  in  several  States  ;  see  post,  "243. 

*  Nazareth  Inst.  v.  Lowe,  1  B.  Mon.  257. 

'  Van  Vronker  v.  Eastman,  7  Met  157  ;  ShaefTer  «.  Weed,  3  Gilm.  511  ;  Pifer 
V.  Ward,  8  Blackf.  252  ;  McCabe  v.  Bellows,  7  Gray,  148. 

*  Robbins  v.  Robbins,  8  Blackf.  174  ;  Trustees  r.  Pratt,  10  Md.  5. 
'  Ingram  v.  Morris,  4  Ilairingt.  111. 

*  Stoughton  r.  Leigh,  1  Tauut.  402  ;  Contes  v.  Cheever,  1  Cow.  460. 


218  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

the  working  of  the  mines  and  quarries  in  such  case,  if  within 
the  dower  hinds  of  the  widow,  being  a  mode  of  enjoyment 
of  the  dower  land  itself.^  But  though  she  may  work  an 
open  mine,  under  her  claim  of  dower,  to  exhaustion,  she  may 
not  open  new  ones  even  within  the  land  set  to  her  as  a  part  of 
her  dower.  Nor  can  she  claim  her  dower  in  mines  in  other 
lands  of  her  husband  than  those  set  off  to  her  as  her  dower 
estate.^  What  shall  be  regarded  as  an  open  mine  or  quarry  is 
not  always  easy  to  define,  though  one  or  two  decided  cases 
may  aid  in  determining  it.  In  Coates  v.  Cheerer,^  a  bed  of 
iron  ore  had  been  opened  by  the  husband,  and  after  being 
wrought  a  while  was  discontinued,  and  partially  filled  up,  and 
new  openings  had  been  made  by  the  heir,  and  yet  it  was  held, 
for  purposes  of  dower,  to  be  an  open  mine.  In  Billings  v. 
Taylor,^  a  quarry  of  slate-stone  underlay  about  four  acres. 
The  mode  of  working  it  was  to  uncover  a  space  of  ten  or 
twelve  feet  square,  and  excavate  the  slate  to  a  certain  depth, 
and  then  commence  a  new  pit.  At  the  time  of  the  husband's 
death  he  had  excavated  about  a  quarter  of  an  acre  in  this 
manner ;  and  the  question  was,  whether  his  widow  could 
claim  dower  out  of  the  four  acres  and  excavate  stone  from 
any  part  that  might  be  set  to  her,  and  it  was  held  that  she 
might,  the  whole  being  an  open  quarry.* 

22.  In  Kentucky,  shares  in  the  capital  stock  of  railroad 
companies,  being  deemed  real  estate,  are  subject  to  the  claim 
of  a  widow's  right  of  dower.^  And  a  similar  principle  applies 
as  to  shares  in  some  of  the  inland  navigation  companies  in 
England.^     But  as  a  general  thing,  shares  in  corporations  are 

considered  mere  personal  chattels. 
[*167]       *23.  In  most  of  the  States,  it  is  believed,  a  widow 

is  dowable  of  wild  lands,  as  is  settled  in  many  ad- 
judged cases,  some  of  which  were  cited  and  considered  when 

*  Note.  —  The  subject  will  be  resumed  when  the  mode  of  assigning  dower 
is  considered. 

1  Billings  V.  Taylor,  10  Pick.  460  ;  Moore  v.  EoUins,  45  Me.  493,  case  of  a 
lime  quarry  ;  Hendrix  v.  McBeth,  61  Ind.  473. 

2  Park,  Dow.  119.  8  Coates  v.  Cheever,  1  Cow.  460. 

*  Billings  V.  Taylor,  10  Pick.  460. 

6  Price  V.  Price,  6  Dana,  107.  "  Park,  Dow.  113. 


CH.  VII.  §  2.]  DOWKR.  -Jill 

trcatinir  of  waste. ^  But  in  Massaclmsrtls,  .Mainr,  and  New 
Ilanipsliirc,  it  has  born  held  that,  ujtun  the  jiiinciple  of  the 
Common  law  as  hiid  down  liv  I>iat'ti»n,  Xihtl  rltiiuarr  /mterit 
muUer  in  duti-ni  siiu/ii,  ///>/  ijwjj  uti  et  frui  ponni(  ilr  nfnis 
dotalil'HS  sine  raxto,  diHtrnctinu;  vel  exHio^'  a  W(jman  shall  not 
he  diiwahh'  (if  wihl  and  inicnllivalrd  wixxl  an<l  forest  lands, 
unless  the  same  were  used  in  conneetion  with  a  cultivated 
farm  and  tenement  for  supplying  fuel  and  timlter  for  the 
necessary  piu-posi-s  of  the  farni.^  Nor  would  the  dearinjr 
and  sul>duin<5  of  such  hind  Ijy  the  husband's  i^rantee  during 
his  life  give  his  widow  any  better  right  to  dower  in  the 
same.* 

24.  Dower  may  also  bo  claimed  out  of  various  species  of 
incorporeal  hereditaments  which  iiclongcd  to  the  husband  as 
an  inheritance,  such  as  rights  of  fishing,  rents,  and  the  like.^ 
Of  these  last  the  chancellor,  in  Chase's  Case,*'  remarked,  while 
speaking  of  the  law  as  it  is  understood  in  Maryland,  "  It  is 
clear  that  a  W(nnan  nniy  be  endowed  of  a  rent  service,  rent 
charge,  or  rent-seek."  *  IJufe  care  should  be  used  to  discrim- 
inate between  here<litaments  out  of  which,  by  the  manner  of 
their  creation  and  the  form  in  which  they  exist,  dower  may 
arise,  and  those  where  it  may  not.  Thus  of  a  jtersonal  annu- 
ity not  issuing  from  lands,  dower  cannot  lie  claimed, 
although  the  *  husband  held  it  to  himself  and  his  ['108] 
heirs."     And  so  far  as  these  hereditaments  arc  aj> 

•  NoTK.  —  Yet  qtujcre  as  to  rent  service,  iiuless,  as  in  Pennsylvania,  the  statute 
Quia  Einptorca  is  not  a  part  of  the  law  of  that  State.  Smith,  I,iiiiil.  &  T.  l»0, 
and  n. 

1  CanipW'U's  Appeal,  2  Dougl.  (Mich.)  141  ;  Chnpnian  r.  Sohroedcr,  10  Oa. 
321  ;  Macuulay  r.  Dismal  Swamp,  2  Kob.  (Va.)  507  ;  Hickman  p.In-iue,  3  Dana, 
121  ;  Allon  i-.  McCoy,  8  Ham.  418. 

2  Braiton,  315. 

«  Conner  r.  Shepherd,  15  Mass.  164  ;  White  v.  Willis,  7  Pick.  143  ;  Kuhn  v. 
Kaler,  14  Me.  409;  Stevens  v.  Owen,  25  Me.  94;  Ford  v.  Erskine,  50  Me.  227; 
Johnson  v.  Perley,  2  N.  H.  56  ;  Fuller  v.  Watson,  7  N.  H.  341,  ante,  •WO.  See 
Mass.  Pub.  Stat.  c.  124,  §  4,  in  what  cases  she  may  clear  lands,  or  cut  wood  ou 
land.',  set  to  her  out  of  her  husband's  estate. 

•  Webb  V.  Townsend,  1  Pick.  21. 

»  Co.  Lit.  32  a  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  132  ;  Park,  Dow.  36,  112  ;  Perkin.s,  §  347. 

•  Chase's  Case,  1  Blaml,  227. 

1  Perkins,  §  347  ;  Co.  Lit.  132  a ;  Tud.  Cos.  42 ;  Aubin  i-.  Dalv,  4  B.  &  A.  59. 


220  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

pendant  upon  other  estates,  a  right  to  be  endowed  of  them  is 
by  reason  of  their  appendancy  to  the  estate  out  of  which  she 
has  her  dower.^  So  far  as  rents  are  concerned,  they  should, 
in  order  to  attach  to  them  the  right  of  dower,  be  granted  or 
created  as  estates  of  inheritance.  But  of  such  rents  a  widow 
is  dowable,  though  it  is  apprehended  that  instances  of  these 
are  rare  in  this  country .^  If,  therefore,  a  man  make  a  lease 
for  years,  reserving  rent,  and  marry,  and  die  before  the  expir- 
ation of  the  term,  his  wife  will  not  be  endowed  of  the  rent, 
but  she  may  be  of  the  reversion,  and  the  rent  pro  rata  will 
belong  to  her  as  incident  to  the  reversion.^  But  if,  in  the  case 
supposed,  the  husband  had  made  a  lease  for  his  own  life,  .re- 
serving rent,  his  wife  could  not  claim  dower  either  in  the  rent 
or  the  land,  —  not  in  the  rent,  for  it  is  determined  at  the  death 
of  the  husband,  and  not  in  the  land,  for  of  that  the  hus- 
band, at  no  time  during  coverture,  had  any  other  estate  than  a 
reversion.^ 

25.  If  corn  or  other  annual  crop  be  growing  upon  the  hus- 
band's lands  at  the  time  of  his  death,  which  shall  be  assigned 
to  her  as  dower,  she  will  be  entitled  to  the  same,  instead  of 
his  executors.^  As  a  compensatory  provision  to  the  estate,  the 
common  law  denied  to  her  representatives  the  crops  growing 
upon  her  dower  land  at  her  decease.^  But  the  statute  of  Mer- 
ton,  ch.  2,  interposed,  and  gave  her  the  right  of  disposal  of 
these,  and  they  now  go  to  personal  representatives  of  the  ten- 
ant in  dower,  like  emblements  in  other  cases.'' 

1  Park,  Dow.  115  ;  4  Kent,  Com.  40. 

2  Co.  Lit.  32  a ;  Id.  144  b  ;  2  Cruise,  Dig.  291  ;  i)ost,  vol.  2,  p.  *8. 

8  Co.  Lit.  32  a  ;  Stoughton  v.  Leigh,  1  Taunt.  410  ;  Chase's  Case,  1  Bland, 
227  ;  Weir  v.  Tate,  4  Ired.  Eq.  264. 

*  Co.  Lit.  32  a ;  Weir  v.  Tate,  4  Ired.  Eq.  264. 

6  2d  Inst.  81  ;  Ralston  v.  Ralston,  3  G.  Greene  (Iowa),  533. 

6  Bracton,  §§  2,  96.  7  2d  Inst.  81  ;  Park,  Dow.  355. 


CII.  VII.  §  3.]  DOWFK.  221 

♦SECTION    111.  [MCO] 

REQUISITES   OF    DOWEll. 

1.  UcquUitcs  enumeruU'd. 

2.  I.rgiil  iiiiiiTiaj,'t'. 

3.  W'liiit  iiiiirriagcs  U'giil. 

4.  Viilulity  of  iiiiiiriiigi',  how  ilutcniiineil. 

5.  Sfisiii  of  husliiiiid. 

5  a.  KUV'i't  of  convi'vuiici'  hy  husbaiul  l)cfore  marriage  on  dower. 

0.  Stisin  iiei'd  not  Ik-  riyhtful. 

7.  Miiy  be  di-feasiblo. 

8.  Siisin  sullicioiit  in  time. 

9.  Instantaneous  seisin. 

10.  Dower  in  case  of  mortgages. 

11.  Wlicn  seisin  instantaneous. 

12.  Soisin  must  bo  elfectuul. 

13.  Suisin  in  equity. 

14.  Si'isin  ilffi-ati'd  by  husband. 

15.  Kiiuitable  seisin,  how  b)st. 

16.  Eipiities  of  redemption. 

17.  Elfeet  of  foreclosure. 

18.  Etfeet  of  redeeming  estates. 

19.  ElFect  of  satisfying  mortgages. 

20.  Etfeet  of  merger  on  dower. 

21.  When  dower  not  niTeeted  l>y  discharge,  &c. 

22.  When  recoverable  in  equity. 

23.  Effect  of  diseliarge  of  mortgage. 

24.  Wliat  is  evidence  of  .seisin. 

2'i.  Tenant  estoppetl  to  deny  seisin. 

2').  Feoffee  estopped  to  deny  it  in  feoffor. 

27.  When  tenant  is  not  estopped. 

28.  Death  of  husband. 

1.  The  rcr|iiisites  of  dower  are,  marriage,  seisin  of  the  1ms- 
baiid,  and  his  (U.-ath ;  and  these  will  be  considered  in  their 
order.^  * 

2.  The   nianiiitre  must   he  a  Icifal  <.>n<',  though  if  voidable 

•  Note.  —  Something  more  tlinn  the  ceremony  of  marriage  was  neccssarj*  to 
give  the  wife  a  right  of  dower,  by  the  laws  of  Normandy.  "  fcsl  au  coudtcr  que 
la  fcm.ne  gagne  ami  douairc" —  "  il  /nut  qu'cllc  coiuhe  avec  son  mari  jniur  ac- 
quirer son  iliniaire  ;  c'ral  ce  qui  doniu  la  dcrniire  perfection  d  ce  droiL"  1  Flauat, 
Coutumo  de  Normandie,  528. 

»  2  BL  Com.  130. 


222  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I, 

only,  and  not  void,  the  wife  will  be  entitled  to  dower  if  it  be 
not  dissolved  during  the  life  of  the  husband.^ 

3.  Among  the  marriages  which  arc  void  at  common  law, 
are  those  with  idiots  and  with  persons  insane  at  the  time,  es- 
pecially if  they  do  not  afterwards  have  lucid  intervals,  and 
do  that  which  will  give  validity  to  the  marriage.^  So  would 
be  a  marriage  with  a  second  wife  during  the  life  of  the  first 
without  a  divorce  first  had,  even  though  the  first  wife  were  to 
die  during  the  lifetime  of  the  husband,  unless  the  cohabitation 
after  her  death  were  under  such  circumstances  as  to  raise  a 
legal  presumption  that  a  marriage  had  taken  place  after  the 
husband  was  again  free  to  contract  it.^  The  age  at  which 
parties  may  contract  a  legal  marriage  varies  in  different  coun- 
tries and  States,  though,  if  contracted  at  an  earlier  age,  they 
are  not  void,  but  voidable,  and,  unless  avoided  in  the  hus- 
band's lifetime,  will  lay  the  foundation  for  a  claim  of 

[*170]  dower.     At  the  common  law  *  this  age  was  fourteen 
in  males,  and  twelve  in  females.     Yet  it  is  said  a 
widow  may  have  dower,  if  of  the  age  of  nine  years  at  the 
death  of  her  husband.*  * 

4.  As  a  general  proposition,  though  limited  by  statute  pro- 
visions in  some  cases,  the  validity  of  a  marriage  in  any  given 
case  is  to  be  determined  by  the  law  of  the  country  in  which  it 
is  solemnized.  If  valid  there  it  will  be  valid  everywhere,  and 
so  if  void  there  it  is  everywhere  void.^  One  of  the  exceptions  to 
this  would  be  a  marriage  which  is  polygamous  or  incestuous.^ 

*  Note.  — The  idea  of  marriage  and  dower  at  such  an  age  would  be  ridic- 
ulous if  it  were  not  connected  with  the  memory  of  the  fact  that  the  disposal  of 
his  female  ward  in  marriage  was  once  an  important  perquisite  to  the  lord  as 
guardian  in  chivalry,  which  must  be  eflected  before  she  was  sixteen  years  of 
age,  or  she  was  beyond  his  control.     2  Bl.  Com.  131,  n. 

1  Co.  Lit.  33  a ;  Tud.  Gas.  45. 

2  2  Bl.  Com.  130  ;  Clancy,  Rights  of  Worn.  297  ;  Jenkins  ■z?.  Jenkins,  2  Dana, 
102  ;  Bishop,  Mar.  &  D.  Book  3,  c.  8. 

3  Higgins  a;.  Breen,  9  Mo.  493  ;  Perkins,  §§  304,  305  ;  Smart  i>.  Whaley,  6  Sm. 
&  M.  308  ;  Donnelly  ^7.  Donnelly,  8  B.  Mon.  113. 

*  Co.  Lit.  33  a. 

5  Clark  V.  Clark,  8  Cush.  385  ;  Story,  Confl.  of  Laws,  §  113  ;  W.  Cambridge 
V.  Lexington,  1  Pick.  505 ;  Putnam  v.  Putnam,  8  Pick.  433. 

6  Story,  Confl.  of  Laws,  §  113  ;  Smith  v.  Smith,  5  Ohio  St.  32. 


cii.  VII.  §  Ji.]  POWER.  228 

]>ut  in  oitlfi-  to  1)0  incestuous  it  luv.xt  Im-  suoh  na  is  so  V)y  the 
law  of  natuit',  and  is  liy  the  p-ncral  consent  of  all  Christen- 
iloni  (leenu'il  to  be  incestuous.'  Tlius,  where  an  mint  ami 
nephew  intermarried  in  a  country  where  such  a  marriage  wart 
v<)i(lal)!e  hut  not  void,  and  ri'mo\ed  to  another,  where  such  a 
niairiaire  is  alisohittdy  prohihited,  it  was  neverth<'less  held 
that  the  niarriaij^e  was  here  to  he  rrirardt'd  as  a  valid  one.* 
Another  excejition  arises  from  the  positiM-  provisions  t»f  loeal 
law,  invaUdatiuL',  within  that  locality,  marriages  contracted 
clsewherr  in  \iolation  of  siit-h  a  law,  and  souirht  to  he  enforced 
in  tlu'  latter  State.  Hut  to  constitute  such  an  exception  the 
parties  to  which  it  is  a|»plied  must  he  citizens  of  the  State  in 
which  such  law  exists,  and  suhject  to  its  laws  at  the  time  it  is 
applied.  Thus,  supjiose  a  party  who  is  divorced  for  his 
own  fault  is  prohihitetl  to  marry  hy  the  law  of  *  the  [*171] 
State  where  such  divorce  is  grant<'d,  a  marriafje  sol- 
emnized between  him  and  another  in  that  State  would  be  void. 
But  if  he  iro  into  another  State  where  no  such  law  exists,  and 
marry  there,  the  marriaire  would  be  so  far  lawful  in  the  State 
of  his  domicil  as  to  lmvc  his  wife  dowciJ'  And  even  if  a  |)arty 
who  has  been  divorced  in  another  State  for  a  cause  which 
would  not  be  the  irround  of  a  divorce  here,  the  j)arties  being 
citizens  and  <lomiciled  there,  comes  here  and  marries  in  this 
State,  it  will  be  a  valid  marriaire.*  But  if  it  is  exjin-ssly  j»ro- 
vided,  as  it  is  in  the  statutes  of  Mas.sachusetts,''  that  a  mar- 
riage contracted  by  a  party  wh(»  is  prohil)ited  from  marrying 
here,  and  who  goes  into  another  State  and  there  marries,  with 
an  intent  to  return  here  and  to  eva<le  the  law  of  this  State, 
shall  1)0  void  here,  it  will  bo  so  held,  although  as  to  the  State 
where  it  was  contracted  it  was  valid,  and  miirht  be  elsewhere.* 
Of  course,  in  such  a  case,  the  widow  of  such  marriage  could 

*  Mc<lway  v.  Nt-edham,  16  Ma.ss.  157;  r.i-poinviKxi  r.  rurtis,  6  Moas.  368,  878; 
Sutton  V.  W.im'ii,  10  Met.  451  ;  Story,  Coiifl.  of  Uws,  §  114. 

■•'  .Sutton  r.  Wumn,  10  M.t.  4.51  ;  Sti-vcnson  r.  Cniy,  17  B.  Mon.  193. 

•  rutnam  r.  Putnnni,  8  Tick.  433  ;  Coinuionwcolth r.  Hunt,  4  Cu.sh.  4'»  •  ^f..l• 
way  r.  Ni-cdham,  16  Mohs.  157. 

*  Clark  p.  Clark.  8  Cush.  385. 

»  Pub.  Stat  1881,  c.  145,  §  10.     So  in  D-lawarf,  Ror.  Stat.  1874,  ]x  477. 

•  Comm'ih  t.  Ijino,  113  Majw.  458,  wlifr**  it  wnn  In-M  that  the  intent  mast 
be  aOBrmativcly  shown,  auil  both  {tartiwi  citizens  of  tin*  lattor  State. 


224  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

not  claim  dower  in  our  courts.  This  principle  of  regarding  a 
marriage  void  in  the  place  of  the  domicil  of  the  parties,  though 
entered  into  in  another  State  where  such  marriages  are  valid, 
because  of  its  being  in  violation  of  a  positive  law  of  the  place 
in  which  they  were  domiciled,  was  considered  in  the  Yice- 
Chancellor's  Court  in  England,  by  Judge  Cresswell,  in  the 
case  of  Brook  v.  Brook.^  By  the  statute  5  and  6  Wm.  IV.  c. 
54,  it  was  provided  that  marriages  which  before  had  been  held 
voidable  by  the  ecclesiastical  courts  as  being  between  persons 
within  prohibited  degrees  of  affinity,  should  be  ipso  facto  void. 
In  the  case  of  Regina  v.  Chadwick,^  it  was  held  that  a  mar- 
riage with  a  sister  of  a  deceased  wife,  if  performed  in  England, 
was  void.  In  the  case  of  Brook  v.  Brook,  the  question  was 
whether  the  same  principle  should  apply  to  a  marriage  sol- 
emnized by  English  subjects  in  Denmark,  where  no 
[*172]  such  restraint  exists.  The  *  judge  went  fully  into 
former  decisions,  as  well  as  the  doctrine  as  stated  in 
Story's  Conflict  of  Laws,  and  lield  in  general  terms  "  that 
marriages  contracted  by  the  subjects  of  a  country  in  which 
they  are  domiciled,  in  another  country  are  not  held  valid  if  by 
contracting  it  the  laws  of  their  own  country  are  violated." 
Yice-Chancellor  Stuart  concurred  in  this  opinion.  It  is  con- 
ceded in  the  discussion  of  the  case  that  the  doctrine  went  fur- 
ther than  the  American  law  as  stated  by  Judge  Story.  But 
they  held  that  the  statute  declaring  all  such  marriages  abso- 
lutely null  and  void  was  binding  upon  British  subjects  every- 
where.^ There  is  no  question,  it  is  believed,  that  every  nation 
may  make  its  own  laws  which  shall  bind  all  within  its  proper 
jurisdiction,  and  the  question  how  far  acts  done  under  another 
jurisdiction  shall  be  valid  within  its  own  territory  is  one  rather 
of  comity  than  right,  so  that  no  general  rule  can  be  laid  down 
as  to  marriages,  which  shall  apply  to  States  or  nations  as  a 
part  of  the  Jus  gentium,  and  by  which  the  validity  of  any  mar- 
riage can  be  tested.  In  addition  to  what  has  been  said  above, 
it  may  be  remarked  that,  so  far  as  the  ceremonial  forms  ad- 
opted in  the  solemnization  of  a  valid  marriage  are  required, 

1  3  Sm.  &  G.  481.  ^  n  Q.  b.  205. 

3  See  Comm'th  v.  Lane,  113  Mass.  458,  467,  where  this  case  is  criticised  and 
the  American  doctrine  reasserted. 


CII.  VII.  §  3.]  DOWKR.  22o 

it  is  sunific'Ut  that  tlirv  oonfonn  to  tliose  in  use  in  the  plaor 
where  it  is  cck'l)iati'(h  And  that  if  the  ceremonial  he  not  Huch 
as  to  constitute  it  a  leirai  niarriap"  where  it  is  soh-nmi/ed,  it 
woukl  not  I'entk'r  it  a  valid  maniai'-e  even  in  other  j)laces 
where  the  forms  made  tise  of  would  have  heen  snlhcient.' 

5.  The  next  circumstance  necessary  to  entitle  a  widow  to 
dower  is  that  her  hnshand  slujuld  have  heen  seined  of  the 
premises  at  some  time  during  coverture.  As  a  "rcneral  propo- 
sition, every  widow,  at  common  law,  is  entitled  as  dower  to 
one  third  part  of  all  the  lauds  and  tenements  lA  which  her 
hushaud  was  seised  at  any  time  during  coverture  as  of  inheri- 
tance, to  hold  to  herself  during  her  natural  life.^  But  before 
discussing  this  matter  more  at  length,  it  is  well  to 
fix  what  would  be  a  sutlicient  *  seisin  to  attach  the  [*173] 
right  of  dower  to  premises  in  which  the  husband  may 
have  been  interested.  In  the  first  jilace,  then,  it  is  not  required, 
as  in  case  of  curtesy,  at  common  law,  that  there  shoidd  have 
been  an  actual  seisin  or  seisin  in  deed.  It  is  enough  tliat  the 
husband  had  a  seisin  in  law,  with  a  right  to  an  immediate 
corporal  seisin.  If  it  were  not  so,  it  might  often  be  in  tin- 
husband's  power,  by  neglecting  to  take  such  seisin,  to  deprive 
his  wife  of  her  right  of  dower.^  In  North  Carolina  it  has  been 
held  that  the  seisin  of  a  husband  is  not  sufliciently  complete  to 
give  his  wife  dower,  unless  the  deed  by  which  he  holds  the 
estate  has  been  recorded.*  The  seisin  in  law  above  spoken  of 
is  such,  liy  the  way  of  example,  as  an  heir  has,  when  an  estate 
in  fee  has  descended  to  him  without  any  adverse  seisin  in  any 
third  party .^  But  if  before  the  marriage  the  hu.sband  shall 
have  lost  his  seisin  by  a  stranger  entering  and  al)ating  his 
right,  and  he  marries  and  dies  before  regaining  his  seisin  by 
entry  or  otherwise,  his  wife  cannot  claim  dower  for  want  of 
seisin.*"     And  where  a  disseisor  employed  au  agent  to  in-ocure 

*  Scrimshire  v.  Seiiinshire,  2  Hagg.  Cuusist.  395  ;  Lacon  r.  Higgins,  3  Stark. 
178  ;  2  Cnibb,  Real  Prop.  128. 

«  2  Bl.  Com.  129. 

*  Atwood  r.  Atwood,  22  Tick.  283  ;  Mann  ».  Edson,  39  Me.  25  ;  Co.  Lit.  31  a  ; 
Tud.  Cns.  45  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  131  ;  Bnsli  v.  Busli,  5  Houst.  245. 

*  Thnimis  V.  Thoma.s,  10  Ii-ed.  123. 

»  2  Cmbb.  Real  rr.>i..  123;  Co.  Lit.  31  a  ;  Duuham  r.  Osborne,  1  Paige,  634. 
"  4  Dune,  Al-r.  CG'.« ;    Pi  rkius    6  3'-7 
VOL.  I.  —  15 


226  LA-^V  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

a  deed  of  release  from  the  disseisee,  and  the  agent,  instead  of 
taking  it  to  the  disseisor,  took  it  to  himself,  it  was  held  that  it 
did  not  give  him  as  grantee  such  seisin  as  would  entitle  his 
wife  to  dower,  since  one  who  is  disseised  could  not  convey  a 
seisin  to  a  stranger.^  The  same  rule  as  above  stated  as  to  an 
abator  applies  in  the  case  of  disseisin,  and  the  wife  of  a  dis- 
seisee who  was  disseised  before  marriage  cannot  claim  dower, 
although  he  still  retains  a  right  of  entry,  if  he  does  not  exer- 
cise this  right  and  regain  his  seisin  during  coverture.^  But  in 
the  case  above  supposed  of  the  abatement  of  the  heir,  if  he 
had  married  in  the  lifetime  of  the  ancestor  from  whom  the  fee 
descended,  the  seisin  in  law  which  in  such  case  the  husband 

as  heir  had  by  the  descent  would  enure  to  the  wife's 
[*174]  benefit    *  in   the  way    of   dower,  though   an   abator 

should  enter  and  prevent  her  husband  from  acquiring 
actual  seisin  during  their  coverture.^  If,  therefore,  at  com- 
mon law,  the  husband  had  not,  during  coverture,  anything 
more  than  a  mere  right  of  entry  or  of  action  to  obtain  seisin, 
it  would  not  be  sufficient  to  entitle  his  widow  to  dower.*  As 
an  illustration  of  this  proposition,  where  one  made  a  feoffment 
upon  condition  and  then  married,  and  during  coverture  the 
condition  was  broken,  but  the  husband  neglected  to  enter  and 
revest  the  seisin  in  himself  before  he  died,  his  wife  was  held  not 
to  be  entitled  to  dower,  though  the  heir  entered  and  regained 
the  seisin  for  himself.^  Nor  does  it  make  any  difference  in 
the  effect  of  a  want  of  seisin  that  the  husband  parted  with  it 
before  his  marriage,  with  a  view  to  defraud  his  creditors,  or 
that  the  deed  was  not  recorded.^  The  seisin  of  which  men- 
tion thus  far  has  been  chiefly  made  should  be  understood  as  a 
legal  seisin  or  its  equivalent.  We  shall  speak  hereafter  of 
dower  in  equitable  estates  where  under  the  Englisli  Dower  Act, 

1  Small  V.  Proctor,  15  Mass.  495. 

2  Thompson  v.  Thompson,  1  Jones  (N.  C),  431. 

8  2  Crabb,  Real  Prop.  1 29,  &c. ;  1  Brooke,  Abr.  Dower,  262. 

*  Tud.  Cas.  45. 

^  Thompson  v.  Thompson,  1  Jones  (N.  C),  430. 

0  Whithed  v.  Mallory,  4  Cush.  138  ;  Blood  v.  Blood,  23  Pick.  80  ;  Richardson 
V.  Skolfield,  45  Maine,  386.  And  in  Baker  v.  Chase,  6  Hill,  482,  a  conveyance 
immediately  before  mamage,  without  consideration  and  with  the  intent  to  deprive 
the  wife  of  dower,  was  held  a  bar. 


cii.  VII.  5;  o.]  nowFR.  '2-21 

as  Will  as  by  the  laws  of  many  f>f  (ln'  States,  of  course  a  seisin 
in  etjuity  will  he  siinifient* 

5  <i.  A  conveyance  hy  a  linshaiHl  imiiiriliatt'Iy  i»efore  niar- 
riaj^e,  if  (lcsii^ne<l  to  bar  his  wife  of  dower,  and  this  is  not 
kn<)wn  to  her,  has  been  held,  in  e<|uity,  to  he  fraudulent  and 
not  to  l»ar  her,  if  the  person  to  whom  the  conveyance  is  made 
was  cojjnizant  of  the  fact.  And  this  seems  clearly  settled  by 
an  almost  unbroken  current  of  authority.  Thus  in  .^waino  r. 
rerine,-  a  dee«l  to  a  daiitrhter,  without  consideration,  jj'iven 
for  that  |mr|)ose,  was  held  not  to  bar  the  wife  of  the  jz^rantor 
(»f  her  dower  in  the  premises.  In  IJaker  v.  Chase,''  where  such 
a  conveyance!  to  a  son  by  a  former  wife,  as  an  advancement, 
was  held  to  be  a  bar  in  law,  \\\u)\i  the  technical  rule  that  tlie 
husltand  was  never  seised  diii-inir  coverture,  the  C(jurt  say: 
"  What  a  court  of  equity  mi<j:ht  say  al)out  such  a  fraud  us 
that,  1  will  not  say."  But  later  cases  in  the  same  State  have 
repeatedly  relieved  against  such  a  conveyanc«\^  A  case  is 
put  by  Mr.  Crui.se,  of  a  man  conveying  land  to  a  trustee  for 
himself  in  order  to  defeat  the  right  of  dower  in  a  wife  whom 
he  was  about  to  marry,  and  it  was  h(dd  ta  be  fraudulent  and 
void.''  In  Tennessee,  a  voluntary  conveyance,  without  consid- 
eration, with  an  intent  to  l)ar  dower,  if  known  to  the  grantee, 
would  be  fraudulent  and  void  as  to  the  wife,"  and  a  like  doc- 
trine is  held  in  Michigan,  California,  Vermont,  Iowa,  Missouri, 
Mississip|»i,  and  New  Jersey." 

6.  It  is  not,  however,  necessary  that  the  seisin  of  the  hu.s- 

»  rost,  p.  'l?!).     And  see  2  Crnbb,  Real  Prop.  130,  1C2  ;  ami  antr,  p.  •165. 
"  Swaine  v.  Perinc,  5  John.  Ch.  489  ;  and  see  Petty  v.  Petty,  4  B.  Mon.  215. 
«  Baker  v.  Chnse,  6  Hill,  482. 

*  Youngs  V.  Carter,  10  Hun,  194  ;  s.  r.  50  How.  410  ;  Pomeroy  r.  Pomcroy,  54 
How.  228. 

»  1  Cruise,  Dig.  411.     See  4  Cruise,  Dig.  416. 

•  Brewor  v.  Conncll,  11  Humph.  500  ;  Ix)ndon  r.  London,  1  Humph.  1  ;  Row. 
Land  V.  Kowlaiiil,  2  .Sneed,  543.    • 

^  Cran.v>n  r.  Crnn.son,  4  Mich.  230  ;  Brown  r.  Bronson,  35  Mi^h.  415  ;  Rowe 
r.  Bradley,  12  Cal.  226  ;  .lenny  r.  Jenny.  24  Vt.  324  ;  Buzi.k  r.  Buziok,  44  Iowa, 
•J59  ;  Crccolius  v.  Hor>t,  4  Mo.  Ap|>.  Ca.  419  ;  Jig^its  v.  Ji.iigits,  40  Mis*.  718: 
Smith  V.  Smith,  2  Halst.  Ch.  515.  This  subject  is  fully  considered  in  e«juity,  and 
.1  ronveyancc  made  hy  huslmnd  or  wife  on  the  eve  of  marriage,  unknown  to  the 
nther,  if  made  without  valuable  consideration,  held  void  as  to  the  oth-T  party,  by 
Bates,  Ch.,  in  Chandler  r.  HoUingsworth,  3  DcL  Ch.  99  ;  poat,  vol.  2,  p.  •597. 


228  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

band  should  be  a  rightful  or  an  indefeasible  one.  Thus  the 
widow  of  a  disseisor  or  an  abator  and  the  like,  may 

[*175]  hold  dower  against  *  all  persons  except  the  person  who 
has  the  rightful  seisin,  and  who  has  regained  it  by 

entry  or  suit.^ 

7.  So  though  her  husband's  estate  was  a  defeasible  one,  pro- 
vided it  is  one  of  inheritance,  the  wife  may  claim  and  retain 
her  dower  until  the  estate  is  determined  or  defeated.  Thus 
she  may  have  dower  out  of  lands  held  as  a  base,  or  qualified 
fee,  or  a  fee  upon  condition,  so  long  as  the  seisin  of  such  an 
estate  is  undisturbed.^  And  it  may  be  regarded  as  a  general 
proposition,  that  where  dower  attaches  to  an  estate  it  is  always 
subject  to  the  same  equities  that  existed  against  the  husband's 
title  at  the  time  of  its  attaching.  So  that  if  the  legal  estate 
be  in  the  husband,  and  an  equitable  estate  be  outstanding  in 
favor  of  another  at  the  time  of  the  marriage,  no  right  of  dower 
can  be  set  up  against  such  equitable  titlc.^  And  on  this 
ground  the  widow  of  a  trustee  is  not  dowable,  and  the  widow 
of  a  mortgagor  may  lose  her  right  of  dower  by  a  foreclosure 
of  the  mortgage.  The  nature  and  rights  of  dower  in  estates 
held  as  determinable  fees  or  subject  to  executory  limitations, 
as  it  respects  seisin,  will  be  considered  hereafter,  when  the 
subject  of  what  will  defeat  a  wife's  right  of  dower  comes  to 
be  spoken  of. 

8.  No  particular  length  of  time,  however,  during  which  the 
husband  should  retain  seisin,  is  required  by  law,  no  matter  how 
brief  it  is,  if  it  be  for  the  husband's  own  use  and  benefit,  nor 
whether  the  seisin  be  one  in  law  or  in  deed.^  And  this  point 
is  illustrated  by  the  old  case  of  the  execution  of  father  and 
son  from  the  same  cart.  There  the  wife  of  the  son  was  held 
dowable  of  what  had  been  the  father's  estate,  by  reason  of  the 
son  having  been  observed  to  struggle  longer  than  the  father, 
whereby  there  was  space  of  time  long  enough  for  the  estate  to 

1  Park,  Dow.  37  ;  4  Dane,  Abr.  668. 

2  1  Jarman,  Wills,  792  ;  Co.  Lit.  241,  n.  4  ;  1  Cruise,  Dig.  162  ;  4  Dane,  Abr. 
668  ;  Park,  Dow.  50  ;  Jackson  v.  Kip,  3  Halst.  241. 

*  Firestone  v.  Firestone,  2  Ohio  St.  415. 

4  2  Kent,  Com.  39  ;  McClure  v.  Harris,  12  B.  Mon.  261  ;  McCauley  v.  Grimes, 
2  Gill  &  J.  318  ;  Stanwood  v.  Dunning,  14  Me.  290  ;  Gage  v.  Ward,  25  Me.  101  ; 
Douglass  i».  Dickson,  11  Rich.  (S.  C.)  417. 


(11.  VII.  §  :i.]  DOWER.  2-2t» 

(hsceiul  from  the  fiitlici*  to  lln'  son,  and  tlir  wik-'.s   ritrlit   "i 
dower  to  attach.' 

*!>.  Hut  if  tlio  seisin  of  the  Inisl.and  he  merely  in-  ["ITO] 
stantaiicons,  intended  as  a  means  of  aceomplisliinir 
some  uheiior  jiin-poso  in  regard  to  the  estate,  the  hushand 
hein.LS  iis  it  wei-e,  a  conduit  through  whieh  tlio  CHtato  jnisHes 
witliout  an  intent  to  eh)the  him  with  a  Itenelieial  interest,  it 
would  not  jjivo  his  wife  any  rij;ht  of  dower.'-  And  it  nuitters 
not  whether  the  transaction  consists  of  one  conveyance  or 
of  several,  or  whether  they  arc  executed  hetween  two  parties 
only  or  morc.^  In  respect,  therefore,  to  an  instantaneous 
seisin,  whether  it  shall  he  sullieient  to  confer  the  ri'_dit  of 
dower  depends  ujion  the  character  rather  than  the  duiation 
of  the  seisin."*  Thus  in  the  case  of  McCauley  v.  (Jrimes,  just 
cited,  the  ohject  of  the  conveyance  was  to  elTcct  a  divisi<jn  of 
the  estate  of  a  ]>erson  deceased  amouir  his  children,  (»iie 
of  whom  held  a  pai"t  of  the  estate  hy  deed.  i>y  an  aLnvenient 
between  II  and  the  children,  the  one  who  held  this  tleed 
conveyed  the  estate  to  II,  who  at  the  same  time  executed 
bonds  to  the  several  children  for  the  jiayment  of  their  respec- 
tive shares,  and  secured  the  ])ayment  thereof  by  a  mortijajre 
of  the  same  land  ;  it  was  held  that  the  wife  of  II  could  only 
claim  her  dower  subject  to  this  mortpi<:e.  So  where  a  pur- 
chase was  effected  by  one,  and  another  advanced  the  purchase- 
money  for  the  purchaser,  and  the  vendor  made  a  deed  to  the 
I)urchaser,  who  made  a  mortgage  at  the  same  time  to  the  one 
who  advanced  the  purchase-money  to  secure  him  the  rejtayment 
thereof,  it  has  been  held  by  the  courts  of  most  of  the  States, 
that  the  seisin  in  the  husband,  the  purchaser,  in  such  a  case, 
would  be  an  instantaneous  one,  which  would  only  irive  his  wife 

»  Broiighton  r.  Randall,  Cro.  Eliz.  503.     And  seo  2  HI.  Com.  132. 

'•'  2  Cmbb,  Kcal  I'rop.  161  ;  Stanwood  r.  Duiusing,  14  Me.  290  ;  Wo..l.lriclf;c 
r.  "Wilkins,  3  How.  (.MLss.)  360  ;  Gully  i'.  Way,  18  H.  Mon.  107.  In  1  S.ril.n.T. 
Dower,  483-485,  it  is  maintniniMl  that  this  is  only  against  the  niort^^ii;,'"',  and 
that  even  as  against  hira  there  is  a  right  in  the  wife  to  re<leeni  ;  and  this  is  so 
held  in  New  Hampshire,  Maryland.  Maine,  and  s<ime  other  juris<lictii»ns. 

8  Ha/leton  v.  I/«-snre,  0  Allen,  24,  U»>  ;  King  r.  StetHon,  11  Alhn,  40". 

*  McCauley  v.  Grimes,  2  Gill  k  J.  313  ;  Mayhurrj-  r.  Brien,  15  IVt.  21.  39; 
WeUter  c.  CampMl,  1  Allen.  313:  Pendklon  r.  I'omeroy,  4  Allen,  510  :  Smith 
r.  McCarty,  119  Ma>w.  51'.'. 


230  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

dower  subject  to  such  mortgage.^  The  question  in  these  cases 
is  not  confined  to  a  conveyance  and  mortgage  between  the 
same  nominal  parties.  It  is  rather,  whether  the  two  instru- 
ments are  to  be  considered  as  parts  of  one  and  the  same  trans- 
action, and  no  space  of  time  intervenes  between  the  taking  of 
and  parting  with  the  estate.^  And  such  seems  to  be  the  true 
rule  of  law,  although  in  a  case  in  Kentucky  such  seisin 
was   held   sufficient   to   give   the   widow   of     the    purchaser 

dower.^  * 
[*177]  *  10.  The  cases  above  cited  suggest  what  is  per- 
haps the  best  illustration  of  what  is  intended  by  an 
instantaneous  seisin  in  the  husband,  which  will  not  give  dower 
to  the  wife,  that  of  a  deed  and  mortgage  simultaneously  made 
in  pursuance  of  an  agreement  entered  into  at  the  time  of 
making  a  purchase  by  the  husband,  and  intended  to  secure 
to  the  vendor,  or  some  one  who  advances  the  purchase-money 
for  the  estate,  the  payment  of  the  same.*  Nor  would  it  make 
any  difference  that  the  mortgage  embraced  other  land  with 
that  wliich  the  mortgagor  has  purchased  of  the  mortgagee.^ 
But  the  burden  of  proof  is  upon  the  party  who  relies  upon  the 
mortgage  and  deed  constituting  but  one  transaction.^     In  such 

*  Note.  —  There  is  a  case  where,  as  reported,  it  would  seem  that  the  court 
overlooked  the  circumstance  of  the  purpose  and  character  of  the  seisin  on  the  part 
of  the  husband,  and  merely  regarded  its  duration  as  determining  the  question  of 
how  far  it  was  an  instantaneous  one  in  the  sense  of  the  law,  and  is  therefore  at 
variance  with  every  other  reported  case  that  has  fallen  under  obsei-vation  in 
preparing  this  work.  Adams  v.  Hill,  29  N.  H.  210.  And  see  Scribner,  Dow. 
c.  12,  §  48. 

»  4  Kent,  Com.  39  ;  Smith -y.  Stanley,  37  Me.  11  ;  Kittle  t'.  Van  Dyck,  1  Sand. 
Ch.  76  ;  Clark  v.  Munroe,  14  Mass.  351  ;  Mayburry  v.  Brien,  15  Pet.  21,  39  ;  Gil- 
liam V.  Moore,  4  Leigh,  30  ;  Cunningham  v.  Knight,  1  Barb.  399.  But  see  Mills 
V.  Van  Voorhis,  23  Barb.  125  ;  Gammon  v.  Freeman,  31  Me.  243. 

2  King  V.  Stetson,  11  Allen,  407  ;  Boynton  v.  Sawyer,  35  Ala.  497  ;  Stephens 
V.  Sherrod,  6  Texas,  297  ;  Stow  v.  Titft,  15  John.  458  ;  Lassen  v  Vance,  8  Cal. 
271. 

8  McClure  v.  Harris,  12  B.  Mon.  2(51. 

4  Stow  V.  Tifft,  15  Johns.  458  ;  Reed  v.  Morrison,  12  S.  &  R.  18  :  Holbrook  v. 
Finney,  4  Mass.  566  ;  BullardiJ.  Bowers,  10  N.  H.  500  ;  Griggs  t).  Smith,  7  Halst. 
22  ;  Bogie  v.  Rutledge,  1  Bay,  312  ;  Hinds  v.  Ballou,  44  N.  H.  619. 

6  ]iIoore  V.  Rollins,  45  Me.  493. 

^  Grant  v.  Dodge,  43  Me.  489  ;  Smith  v.  McCarty,  119  Mass.  519. 


en.  VII.  §  :l]  dower.  2:^1 

cases  the  lien  onMitoil  l>y  tlic  niort,L'a;i»'  takes  jn-eeedmce  <»f  tho 
iML^it  of  (lower  ill  the  wife  of  the  puieha.ser,  althoii^^h  the  titlo 
of  the  Miortgajree,  like  tiiat  of  a  willow,  is  derived  from  tho 
seisin  of  the  hiisl)and.  And  in  the  ca.ses  above  suppo.sed,  tho 
seisin  of  the  hnsband  gives  the  wife  a  right  of  dower  as  against 
evervhody  but  the  mortgagee  and  his  assigns,  so  that  if  the 
mortgage  be  discharged  by  the  husband  in  his  lifetime,  or  by 
liis  executor  or  adniinistrator,  she  may  be  endowed  as  if  it  had 
never  existed.*  l>ut  if  a  pureha.ser  pay  a  moitgage  and  have 
it  assigned  to  him,  it  does  not  operate  a  discharge  so  as  to  let 
in  the  mortgagor's  widow  to  di^wer,  uidess,  when  he  l>ecame 
pun-baser,  he  assumed  the  uliligation  of  j»aying  the  mortgage. 
Nor  does  the  recital  in  a  deed  of  an  estate,  that  the  premises 
are  sultject  to  a  mortgage,  import  a  promise  on  the  part  of  the 
purchaser  that  he  is  to  pay  such  mortgage."  But,  if  it  be  un- 
discharged, she  may  come  in  and  avail  her.self  of  a  right  to 
redeem  the  estate  from  the  mortgage.^  It  was  held  in  South 
Carolina,  where  a  husband  had  given  a  mortgage  to  secure  the 
jiurcbase-nn)ney  for  land,  and  had  died  leaving  j)ers(Mial  a.ssets, 
that  the  widow  had  a  right  to  call  on  the  j)ersonal  to  discharge 
the  mortgage  debt,  and  thereby  secure  to  lier  her  dower  in  tljc 
premises.  And  if,  by  the  executor's  neglect  thus  to  redeem  the 
mortgage,  the  widow  loses  licr  dower,  she  may  recover  satis- 
faction therefor  out  of  the  personal  estate."*  The  efTect  upon 
the  dower  of  the  wife  is  the  same  whether  the  mortgage,  made 
as  above  supposed,  were  for  life  or  in  fee,  since  so  far  as  the 
mortgage  has  effect,  it  conveys  a  freehold,  and  leaves  oidy  tho 
reversion  free  from  incumbrance.''  'I'hus  where  a  father  gave 
his  son  a  deed  in  fee  of  an  estate,  who  at  the  same  time  gave 
back  to  the  father  a  deed  of  the  same  land  to  hold  for  the 
term  of  his  life,  in  which  deed  there  was  a  recital  that  if  the 
grantor  performed  the  condition  of  a  certain  bond  the  grantee 

1  Bullird  V.  Bowers,  10  N.  H.  500  ;  Klinok  r.  Kc(  klfv.  2  Hill,  Ch.  250  ; 
Brown  r.  Ijipiiam,  3  Cush.  551.  So  where  the  vendee's  lien  ia  discharged  by  hia 
takiuf?  further  security.    Ilhiir  r.  Thontpson,  11  Gmtt.  441. 

'  Strong  r.  Converse,  8  Allen,  557  ;  Fiske  r.  Tolman,  124  Moss.  254  ;  and 
see  /)«)*/,  •518. 

•  Young  V.  Tnrlx'll,  37  Me.  509  ;  Mills  r.  Van  Voorhis,  23  Barb.  125,  133. 

*  Henognn  r.  Harllec,  10  Kich.  E<i.  285. 
'  Moore  v.  Esty,  6  N.  II.  479. 


232  LAW    OF   EEAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

[*178]  should  not  enter,  it  was  *  held  that,  though  it  did 
not  amount  to  a  mortgage,  it  did  not  leave  the  son 
such  a  seisin  as  entitled  his  wife  to  dower,  he  having  died  in 
the  lifetime  of  his  father.^  An  instance  somewhat  analogous, 
where  the  right  of  dower  did  attach,  was  where  A  sold  an 
estate  to  B,  subject  to  a  right  in  A  to  repurchase  it,  the  wife 
of  B  was  held  dowable  if  the  transaction  was  not  intended  as, 
and  in  effect  amounted  to,  a  mortgage.^ 

11.  But  in  all  the  cases  above  supposed  of  what  is  deemed 
such  an  instantaneous  seisin  as  not  to  raise  the  right  of  dower, 
the  same  act  that  gives  the  husband  the  estate  must  convey 
it  out  of  him  again,  so  that  as  to  him  it  shall  be  in  transitu 
only.^  Or  the  two  conveyances  to  and  from  the  husband 
must  constitute  in  legal  effect  one  entire  transaction.  This 
would  be  the  case  if  both  instruments  were  executed  at  the 
same  time,  between  the  same  parties,  relative  to  the  same  sub- 
ject-matter.* And  it  is  immaterial  that  they  bear  different 
dates,  provided  they  are  delivered  at  the  same  time,  which 
may  be  proved  by  parol.^  Equity,  moreover,  is  disposed  in 
favor  of  a  mortgagee  to  give  effect  to  a  deed  as  having  been 
simultaneously  delivered,  though  not  executed  until  some 
time  after  the  delivery  of  the  original  deed,  where  it  has  been 
done  in  pursuance  of  an  agreement  then  made.^  Thus  where 
husband,  on  receiving  a  deed,  agreed  to  secure  the  purchase- 
money  by  a  mortgage  of  the  same  estate,  but  delayed  the 
execution  of  it  in  consequence  of  a  disagreement  as  to  its 
terms  for  ten  months,  and  then  delivered  it,  it  was  still  held 
to  be  a  part  of  the  same  transaction,  and  that  his  wife  could 
only  claim  dower  out  of  the  equity  of  redemption.^  But  if 
the  claim  of  the  mortgagee  ceases  or  fails  to  grow  out  of  the 
same  transaction  that  gave  the  mortgagor  his  seisin,  the  doc- 

1  Moore  v.  Esty,  5  N.  H.  479.  2  chase's  Case,  1  Bland,  206. 

3  2  Bl.  Com.  132  ;  Reed  v.  Morrison,  12  S.  &  R.  18. 

*  Stow  V.  Tifft,  15  Johns.  458  ;  Cunningham  v.  Knight,  1  Barb.  399  ;  Moore 
V.  Rollins,  45  Me.  493. 

6  Mayburry  v.  Brien,  15  Pet.  39;  Reed  v.  Morrison,  12  S.  &  R.  18  ;  Webster 
V.  Campbell,  1  Allen,  313  ;  Pendleton  v.  Pomeroy,  4  Allen,  510.  It  is,  on  the 
other  hand,  immaterial  that  they  bear  the  same  date,  if  the  actual  execution  was 
at  dilfLTent  times.    Rawlins  v.  Lowndes,  34  Md.  639. 

"  4  Kent,  Com.  141.  ^  Wheatley  v.  Calhoun,  12  Leigh,  264. 


cii.  VII.  §  :1]  DOWER.  283 

triiic  of  liis  litMi  hciiiir  jiiinr  to  that  (if  iW  wife's  driwer  docH 
not  Jipply.  Tims  whuiv  A  Hold  to  H,  who  inortj/apMl 
the  estate  buck  to  A  to  *  secure  the  imrehase-iuoiiev ,  [•179] 
and  then  got  C  to  pay  the  debt  to  A,  and  the  latter 
discharii:cd  his  niortifiifie,  and  thereupon  H  at  the  same  time 
gave  a  new  niortgajre  to  C  for  the  purchase-money  whicii 
he  had  paid  to  A,  it  was  held  that  IJ's  wife  was  entitled  to 
dower  indi'iKjndent  of  the  latter  mortgage.*  So  \Ui»'re  the 
owner  of  land  hargaincd  with  another  to  sell  him  the  land, 
and  gave  a  bond  conditioned  to  deliver  a  deed  of  the  jirem- 
ises,  but,  before  executing  such  deed  married,  and  afterwards 
made  his  deed  to  the  puiehaser  and  took  back  a  mort'.rage  to 
secure  the  purchase-money,  it  was  held  that  his  wife  was 
entitled  to  dower  out  of  the  land  so  conveyeil.''^ 

1'2.  I>ut  after  all,  the  seisin  of  the  husband,  in  order  to 
insure  dower,  must  be  such  as  to  avail  in  giving  him  an 
effectual  estate  of  inheritance.  Thus,  where  tlu'  own<'r  of  land 
conveyed  it  by  deed  to  the  husband,  who  entered  and  after- 
wards reconvcyed  to  his  grantor,  but  neither  of  these  deeds 
was  recorded,  and  the  original  grantor  then  conveyed  the 
estate,  by  a  deed  which  was  recorded,  to  a  person  who  pur- 
chased for  a  valual)le  consideration,  without  notice  of  such 
prior  conveyance,  it  was  held  that  whatever  seisin  had  been  in 
the  husband  was  defeated  and  rendered  of  no  avail  i)y  these 
transactions,  anil  his  wife  could  not  therefore  claim  dower  out 
of  the  estate.'^ 

13.  It  is  so  difVicidt  to  keep  the  line  that  separates  the 
rijLihts  of  dower  at  common  law  and  in  (Mpiity  distinct,  that  it 
is  hardly  possible  to  treat  of  one  without  eml»raeing  more  or 
less  of  the  other.  It  may  be  well,  then,  to  speak  in  this  con- 
nection of  a  seisin  in  equity,  such  as  will  give  a  wi<low  d<nver 
in  equitable  estates,  whereby  law  they  are  not  subject  to  such 
right.     So  far  as  dower  iu  ecjuities  of  redemption  is  concerned, 

»  C,nff>  V.  Want,  25  Me.  ini. 

'  Diinoiid  V.  HiUingsU-a,  2  Hiir.  &  (J.  2(5J.  In  Ki-ntucky,  iu  a  smiiiir  >  ix',  it 
was  lii'lil  tlint  tlu-  wife  of  tho  vendee,  ond  not  the  wife  of  the  vendor,  wiw  intitletl 
to  dower.  But  in  the  latter  case  the  vendee  had  been  put  into  p<iss.  v,i.in  U-foro 
mnrriap',  though  tho  died  was  not  given  till  after.  Stevens  t".  .Smith,  4  J.  J. 
Mursh.  •54.     See  also  01dh:itn  r.  .S.ile,  1  B.  ilou.  76. 

*  Emersou  v.  Hanu,  G  Met  475. 


23-4  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [bOOK   I. 

the  law  is  pretty  well  defined.  In  respect  to  other  equitable 
estates  it  is  easier  to  illustrate  by  decided  cases  than 
[*180]  to  state  a  principle  which  shall  be  *  generally  appli- 
cable. Thus  where  the  legal  estate  in  lands  was  vested 
in  trustees  to  convey  to  the  husband  at  a  particular  time, 
which  was  during  or  prior  to  the  coverture,  it  was  held  that 
the  wife  should  have  dower  in  the  estate,  upon  the  principle 
that,  in  equity,  what  the  law  requires  to  be  done  is  regarded 
as  if  it  were  done,  and  as  the  conveyance  ought  to  have  been 
made  in  the  husband's  lifetime,  it  should  be  treated  as  if  it  had 
been  made.^  The  same  rule  would  apply  if  the  husband,  by 
the  terms  of  the  trust,  had  a  right  to  have  the  estate  conveyed 
to  him  at  any  time  he  chose.'-^  But  if  this  right  to  have  con- 
veyance made  was  the  result  of  contract  only  between  the  ven- 
dor and  purchaser,  and  to  be  made  on  the  husband's  request, 
jt  would  not  give  the  purchaser's  wife  a  right  to  dower  if  no 
such  request  had  been  made  in  his  lifetime.^  In  Kentucky 
and  Ohio  the  courts  have  held  a  wife  entitled  to  dower  under  a 
somewhat  similar  state  of  facts,  except  that  the  husband  had 
paid  the  full  price  for  the  land,  the  vendor  having  thereby  be- 
come, in  equity,  trustee  for  the  vendee,  bringing  them  more 
nearly  within  the  doctrine  of  the  above  case  of  Yeo  v.  Mer. 
cereau.*  But  if  the  land  were  merely  bargained  for  by  the 
husband,  and  no  deed  had  been  given,  although  he  had  taken 
possession,  his  widow  could  not  claim  dower.^  Nor  could  she, 
if  her  husband,  having  such  agreement  or  a  mere  equital)le 
title  to  land,  have  the  deed  made  to  a  third  person,  or  even 
to  himself  as  trustee  for  a  third  person,^  especially  if  by  the 
agreement  the  conveyance  was  to  be  made  to  the  husband  or 
his  assigns,  and  he  had  had  it  made  to  a  third  party .^    Where 

1  Banks  v.  Sutton,  2  P.  Wms.  715  ;  Otway  v.  Hudson,  2  Vera.  583  ;  2  Crabb, 
Real  Prop.  162. 

2  Yeo  V.  Mercereau,  3  Harris.  (N.  J.)  387. 
8  Spanglcr  v.  Stanler,  1  Md.  Ch.  Dec.  36. 

4  Robinson  v.  lliller,  2  B.  Mon.  284  ;  Smiley  v.  Wright,  2  Ohio,  506  ;  Pugh  v. 
Bell,  2  Mon.  125  ;  Gillespie  v.  Somerville,  3  Stew.  &  P.  447. 

6  Pritts  V.  Ritchey,  29  Penn.  St.  71  ;  Barnes  v.  Gay,  7  Iowa,  26. 

«  Heed  v.  Ford,  16  B.  Mon.  114,  117  ;  Gully  v.  Ray,  IS  B.  Mon.  107.  See 
Owen  V.  Bobbins,  19  111.  545  ;  Blakeney  v.  Ferguson,  20  Ark.  547  ;  "Welsh  v. 
Buckins,  9  Ohio  St.  331. 

7  LobdeU  v.  Hayes,  4  Allen,  187,  191. 


Cii.  VII.  §  ;».]  l)o\vi;i{.  235 

A  ht'M  a  contract  fur  land  lioni  the  State,  and  contracte<l 
with  C  to  convey  it  to  liini,  and  he  contracted  with  S  to 
sell  it  to  him,  and  S  convcycMl  to  the  tenant  his  interent  in 
the  land  with  covenants  of  title,  and  the  State  made  a  deed 
to  A,  and  he  niatle  u  deed  t(j  C  ;  after  S'h  death  his  widow 
claimed  dower  in  the  premises.  lint  the  court  held  that 
S  never  had  sufficient  seisin  to  snpport  the  claim,  and  that, 
if  he  had  any  seisin,  it  was  instantaneous  in  fa\(n-  (jf  the 
temint.' 

14.  In  such  case,  however,  it  wcjuld  he  cf^mpetcnt  for  the 
hushand  to  ilefeat  his  wife's  right  of  dower  hy  releasing  or  ex- 
tinguishing his  right,  which  answers  to  seisin  in  e(piity,  which 
he  could  not  have  done  in  respect  to  his  seisin  of  lands  at 
common  law.  Thus,  in  another  case  in  Kentucky,  where  a 
hushand  had  made  a  verhal  contract  for  land  and  had  huilt 
thereon,  and  afterwards  hargained  it  to  a  third  person,  and 
had  the  deed  from  the  original  vendor  made  directly  t(j  his 
vendee,  his  wife  was  not  held  dowahle.^  It  was  ]irol)al)ly  upon 
this  principle  that  it  was  held  in  one  case,  that  if,  ltef(jn!  mar- 
riage, the  hushand  jiurchases  land  and  gives  Ijack  a  moi'tgage 
for  the  i>urchase-nioney,  a  release  of  his  right  of  re- 
dcm])tion  to  the  *  mortgagee  during  coverture  defeats  ['l^l] 
any  claim  of  dower.^  And  in  another,  that,  where  the 
condition  of  the  hushand's  mortgage  was  hroken  hefore  mar- 
riage and  he  released  his  right  of  redemption  during  cover- 
ture, it  harred  any  right  of  dower  in  his  wife.*  In  the  latter 
case  there  was  a  dissenting  opinion  hy  one  of  the  judges, 
and  it  is  apprehended  that  in  those  States  wlicre  the  mort- 
gagor is  regarded  as  the  holder  of  the  legal  estate  with  its  in- 

*  Steele  v.  ila^e,  48  111.  3itt).  In  Illinois  and  sonio  other  States,  wlien-  a  wife 
has  dower  in  her  husband's  eiiuitable  interests,  tlie  statutes  give  her  dower  in 
land  contracted  for  bj*  him  ouly  if  the  contract  is  carried  out  or  the  purcha-se- 
money  was  i>aid  in  full  before  his  death  ;  III.  Kev.  Stat  1883,  e.  41,  §  1  ;  Ky. 
Geu.  Stat.  1873,  c.  52,  art.  4,  §  12 ;  Ala.  Code  1876,  §  2232.  But  in  Indiana  and 
Missouri  these  reiiuirenients  are  not  mailo.  Ind.  Rev.  Stat.  18S1,  §  241*3  ;  Mo. 
Rev.  Stat.  §  2187  ;  and  in  Ohio  the  wife  has  dower  in  all  the  land  her  husband 
was  interested  in  by  bond,  lease,  or  claim.    Rev.  Stat.  1880,  §  4183. 

*  Herron  v.  Williamson,  Litt.  Cas.  2.'')0. 

«  Jack.-son  v.  Dewitt,  6  Cow.  316  ;  exi«laine«l  in  Milb  t?.  Van  Voorhis,  23  Barb. 
133,  135.     See  also  Reed  r.  Morrison,  12  3.  &  U.  18. 

*  Rands  V.  Kendall,  15  Oliio,  671. 


236  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  L 

cidents,  and  the  interest  of  the  mortgagee  as  a  lien  or  pledge 
only  for  his  debt,  the  right  of  dower  in  such  a  case  would 
attach,  in  respect  to  the  mortgagor's  estate,  the  equity  of  re- 
demption, which  he  could  not  by  his  own  deed  alone  defeat.^  * 
The  case  of  Sweetapple  v.  Bindon,^  though  one  of  curtesy, 
furnishes  by  analogy  a  strong  illustration  of  the  kind  of 
equitable  estate  which  will  sustain  curtesy  or  dower  as  the  law 
now  is.  A  devised  X300  to  be  laid  out  in  land,  and  settled 
upon  his  daughter  and  her  children,  and  if  she  died  without 
issue,  to  go  over.  She  married,  had  a  child,  and  died  without 
issue,  before  the  money  was  laid  out.  It  was  held  that  the 
money  should  be  considered  as  land,  and  the  right  of  curtesy 
attached.^ 

15.  This  matter  will  be  again  referred  to  when  the  mode 
of  assigning  dower  comes  to  be  considered.  But  it  may  be 
proper  here  to  remark,  that  in  regard  to  equitable  estates, 
such,  for  instance,  as  that  of  a  cestui  que  trust,  that  may  happen 
which  is  analogous  to  the  loss  of  seisin  by  the  husband  before 
the  wife's  right  of  dower  has  attached  in  estates  at  law.     If, 

in  the  case  supposed,  the  trustee  shall  convey  away  the 
[*182]  estates  in  violation  *of  the  trust  under  which  he  held 

it,  the  husband,  cestui  que  trust,  must  apply  to  the 
court  and  have  the  purchaser  declared  a  trustee,  or,  if  he  die 
before  this  is  done,  he  will  be  considered  as  having  been 
divested  of  his  equitable  seisin,  and  his  wife  cannot  claim  her 
dower.* 

16.  In  recurring  to  dower  in  equities  of  redemption,  it  will 
be  found  that  the  law  upon  the  subject  is  somewhat  peculiar. 
Her  right  has  a  double  aspect ;  as.  to  all  the  world,  except  the 

*  KoTE.  —  The  subject  of  the  wife's  right  to  be  endowed  out  of  estates  purely 
equitable  has  been  somewhat  considered  in  a  former  part  of  this  treatise,  to 
which,  and  the  cases  there  cited,  the  reader  may  be  referred  for  something  more 
on  the  subject  of  what  is  sufficient  to  give  such  an  equitable  seisin  as  will  entitle 
a  widow  to  dower  ;  ante,  pp.  *161-165. 

1  See  Yeo  v.  Mercereau,  3  Harris.  (N.  J.)  387  ;  Mc Arthur  v.  Franklin,  15 
Ohio  St.  507. 

2  2  Vern.  536. 

*  See  also  the  cases  cited  in  Eaithby,  notes  to  the  above  case. 

*  Thompson  v.  Thompson,  1  Jones  (N.  C. ),  430. 


CII.  VII.  5$  :1]  DOWFH,  _.,, 

mortjrnirt'C  and  liis  assiL'us,  it  is  as  if  no  mortf^atrc  luid  ever 
l)'>on  nuulc.  Tlie  mortj;a;!:<)r  has  the  Icpil  estate  in  thf  himl. 
The  widow  may  liave  her  action  at  hiw  to  recover  her  dower, 
witli  (huna<res  for  its  (h-tention,  just  as  if  the  estate  were  un- 
ineunihcred  ;  nor  would  it  he  competent  for  the  tenant  to 
resist  her  chiim  on  the  j^round  that  a  8tranf.'er  hohis  an  out- 
standinur  mortgairc  upon  the  j)remises,  unless  he  claims  title 
throuirh  such  stran<rer.i  Hut  if  a  ti-nant  is  sued  in  an  action 
to  recovei-  the  land,  he  may,  hy  a  proper  plea,  set  uj)  in  defence 
to  such  suit  a  seisin  in  fee  in  a  stranger,  although  he  do  not 
claim  under  him;  for,  if  the  demandant  have  no  right,  he  can- 
not di-;iw  in  question  the  tenant's  rlLdit/'^  Xor  does  it  make 
any  dilTcrencc  in  this  resj)ect  whether  the  mortgage  was  made 
hefore  her  marriage  or  was  executed  l)y  her  with  her  hushand 
diH'ing  coverture.  As  against  the  mortgagee  and  those  claim- 
ing under  him,  the  claim  of  a  widow  where  the  mortgage  is 
made  hefore  marriage,  or  by  her  joining  during  coverture,  is 
equitable  alone.  She  cannot  recover  the  dower  against  him 
though  in  possession,  by  a  suit  at  law.^ 

17.  If  the  mortgage  shall  have  been  properly  foreclosed,  all 
claim  on  her  part  is  gone  at  law.*  And  it  was  even  held,  in 
one  case,  where  such  a  mortgage  was  foreclosed  during  the 
life  of  the  husl)and  by  a  sale  of  the  premises  under  an  order 
of  the  court,  that  the  wife  could  not  set  up  in  e(|uity  a  claim 
to  any  jtart  of  the  surplus  over  and  above  the  amount  of  the 
mortgage  debt,^  *  but  the  weight  of  modern  authority  is 
clearly  otherwise.^ 

•  Note.  —  What  will  amount  tu  .smli  a  foreclusurf  will  \k-  tonsidin-il  wiuii 
the  8ul>jt'ct  of  whut  will  bar  dower  is  cxaniiiied. 

*  Collins  V.  Torry,  7  Johns.  278  ;  Smith  v.  Eustis,  7  Mc.  41  ;  Young  r.  Tur- 
bell,  37  Me.  509;  Whitehead  v.  Middleton,  2  How.  (Mi»8.)  692;  Taylor  v. 
Fowler,  18  Ohio,  567;  Eaton  v.  Sinionds,  14  Pick.  98;  Fay  r.  Cheney,  14 
Pick.  399  ;  Brighnm  r.  Winchester,  1  Met.  8P0  ;  Hitchcock  v.  Harrington,  6 
Johns.  290  ;  Hustings  v.  Stevens,  29  X.  H.  564  ;  Moore  r.  Esty,  5  N.  H.  479  ; 
Jackson  r.  Dewitt,  6  Cow.  316;  Savage  r.  Dooh-y.  23  Conn.  411. 

"  Wolcott  r.  Knight,  6  Mass.  418  ;  Steams,  Real  Act.  226. 
-  Cfil>son  r.  Crehore,  3  Pick.  475  ;  ».  c.  5  Pick.  146  ;  Eaton  p.  SunonJi,  )4 
Pick.  98  ;  Farw.-ll  r.  Cotting.  8  Allen,  211. 

«  Stow  r.  TilTt,  15  Johns.  458  ;  Reed  v.  Morrisou,  12  S.  i  R.  18. 

»  Frost  r.  Peacock,  4  Edw.  Ch.  673. 

"  See  ante,  "165  and  note  ;  post,  •215  ond  note. 


238  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

[*183]  *18.  On- the  other  hand,  if  the  mortgage  shall  have 
been  SO  paid  or  redeemed  as  to  constitute  no  longer  a 
lien  npon  the  premises,  the  tenant  cannot  avail  himself  of  it, 
though  standing  in  his  own  name,  in  defence  to  the  wife's 
claim  of  dower.^  Whether  a  mortgage  in  any  given  case  is 
or  is  not  a  subsisting  outstanding  lien  and  incumbrance  upon 
an  estate,  so  as  to  affect  the  dower  right  of  the  wife  of  the 
mortgagor  or  his  assignee,  often  presents  questions  of  great 
difficulty.  Sometimes  it  has  been  attempted  to  determine  the 
question  by  inquiring  whether  the  party  who  sets  up  the  mort- 
gage has  obtained  a  property  in  it  by  a  formal  assignment. 
At  other  times  it  has  been  held  important  that  there  has  been 
a  formal  discharge  or  release  of  the  mortgage  by  the  holder 
thereof,  upon  being  paid  the  mortgage  debt.  It  is  apprehended 
that  neither  of  these  is  a  test  which  can  always  be  relied  on, 
since  courts  of  equity,  in  which  such  questions  usually  arise, 
will  go  behind  the  form  to  reach  the  substantial  equities  of 
the  parties.2 

18  a.  If  the  purchaser  of  an  estate  which  is  subject  to  a 
mortgage  pay  it  off  to  save  his  estate  from  forfeiture,  and 
without  any  legal  obligation  on  his  part  to  do  so,  he  may 
stand  on  his  title  as  mortgagee.  And  if  he  has  the  mortgage 
assigned  to  him,  the  widow  of  the  mortgagor,  in  order  to 
claim  dower,  must  pay  him  the  entire  mortgage  debt,  if  he 
requires  it.  If  he  has  the  mortgage  discharged,  she  may,  in 
Massachusetts,  have  her  dower  out  of  the  equity  of  redemp- 
tion, or  may  contribute  her  proportion  of  the  redemption 
money,  and  have  it  set  out  to  her  in  the  whole  estate.  If,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  mortgage  debt  be  paid  out  of  the  property 
of  the  mortgagor,  or  by  the  person  who  owes  the  debt,  it  is  a 
satisfaction  of  the  mortgage,  and  discharges  it,  and  lets  in  the 
widow's  claim  to  dower.  So,  where  the  purchaser  assumes 
to  pay  the  debt  as  his  own,  or  the  mortgagor,  when  selling  the 
estate,  leaves  enough  of  the  purchase-money  in  the  vendee's 
hands  to  satisfy  the  debt,  and  the  purchaser  pays  it,  the  effect 
on  the  widow's  right  of  dower  would  be  the  same.    Xor  would 

1  Hitchcock  V.  Harrington,  6  Johns.  290  ;  Wade  v.  Howard,  6  Pick.  492. 

2  Niles  V.  Nye,  13  Met.  135  ;  Simonton  v.  Gray,  34  Me.  50.  See  Xewtou  v. 
Cook,  4  Gray,  46. 


(11.  VII.  v^  :'..J  DowKH.      .  289 

it  inakc  any  JilTercnc*'  in  tlii.s  ro8{)rpt  if,  whon  h.  j.u.l  ihe 
drbt,  he  took  an  n.s.si<rninent  of  the  niort^'a^c.  He  c-oiild  not 
set  it  np  again.st  her  claim.' 

10.  If,  therefore,  a  niortjra;.'e  ha.><  hem  paiil  an<l  salislied  hy 
some  one  whose  duty  it  wa.s  to  pay  it,  hy  rea.'^on  of  aetinL'  for 
or  liohling  under  the  mortgagor,  with  an  agreement  cvpresH  or 
implied  to  pay  the  same,  he  eouKl  not  h<dd  it  as  an  outstand- 
ing title  or  inctunbrance  ujion  tiie  land,  although  he  might 
take  ever  so  formal  an  assignment  of  the  instrument  to  himself. 
On  the  other  hand,  where  a  purchaser  of  an  estate  upon  which 
there  is  an  outstanding  mortgage,  in  order  to  protect  liis  own 
estate,  yields  to  the  demand  of  the  holder  of  the  mortgage 
and  pays  it,  he  may,  as  against  others  whose  estates  he  has 
thereby  relieved,  be  deemed  an  etiuitable  assignee  of  the 
mortgage  without  any  formal  assignment,  depending  upon 
the  intention  with  which  this  is  done.-  Whether  the  par- 
ticular case  should  fall  within  one  category  or  the  other 
above  stated  often  depends  upon  the  circumstances  of  such 
case,  so  that  it  becomes  a  question  of  fact  quite  as  much  as 
of  law,  to  determine  whether  a  mortgage  is  an  out- 
standing incumbrance  or  not.  .Some  *  general  i)rin-  [•1x4] 
ciples  upon  this  point  have  been  laid  down  by  courts 
which  may  aid  in  determining  the  law  in  any  given  case. 
Thus,  it  has  been  held  that,  if  a  mortgage  is  paid  and  dis- 
charged by  the  mortgagor  or  his  assigns,  it  shall  enure  to  the 
benefit  of  his  widow  in  the  matter  of  dower,  and,  her  right 
reviving,  she  may  recover  just  as  if  no  mortgage  had  existed.^ 
So  if  it  be  paid  after  the  husband's  death  by  his  administrator.* 

»  McCabe  v.  Swap,  14  Allen,  183  ;  Hatch  r.  Paltncr,  68  Me.  271  ;  Putnam  v. 
Collamore,  120  Mass.  454  ;  Thompson  v.  Hoywood,  129  Ma-ss.  401. 

'  Jaiuea  r.  Morey,  2  Cow.  246  ;  Gibson  r.  t'rehorv,  3  Pick.  473  ;  8iinonton  r. 
Gray,  34  Me.  60  ;  Strong  v.  Converse,  8  Allen,  557  ;  Hinds  v.  Ballon,  44  N.  H. 
619  ;  Tooniey  v.  McLean,  105  Ma«8.  122  ;  Carlton  v.  Jackson,  121  Mass.  592. 

*  Wedge  V.  Moore,  6  Cu.th.  8  ;  Bolton  v.  Ballard,  13  Mass.  227  ;  Snow  r. 
Sterens,  15  Mass.  273  ;  BuUard  v.  Bowers,  10  N.  H.  500  ;  Coat<-s  c.  Ch<-<ver.  1 
Cow.  460  ;  Hitchco«.k  v.  Harrington,  6  Johns.  290  ;  Collins  r.  Torn,-,  7  John*. 
278  ;  Gibson  t.  Crehon-,  3  Pick.  475.  So  where  the  mortgagee  redeemed  from  k 
tajc  sale.    Walsh  r.  Wilson,  130  Mass.  124. 

*  Hildreth  v.  Jones,  13  Mas.*.  525  ;   Mathewson  r.  Smith,  1  R.  I.  22  ;  P 
».  CoHsit,  15  X.  H.  88  ;  Hastings  r.  .Stevens.  29  .V.  H.  564  ;  Klinck  c.  K- 

2  Hill,  CL  250  ;  Hatch  v.  Palmer,  5d  Me.  271.     So  where  paid  by  the  heir  who 


240  LAW  OP  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

It  has  been  sometimes  contended  that  an  administrator  is 
bound  to  apply  the  personal  assets  of  the  estate  to  relieve 
the  real  estate  from  the  mortgages  upon  it.  But  it  is  not 
necessary  to  settle  the  question  here,  though  it  has  been  held 
that,  in  case  of  insolvent  estates,  administrators  are  not  bound 
to  make  such  application  of  the  personal  assets,  the  creditors' 
lien  upon  these  being  paramount  to  the  claims  of  the  widow 
and  heirs.^  As  the  mortgagor,  who  is  supposed  to  have  had 
the  benefit  of  the  mortgage-money,  is,  if  he  discharge  the 
mortgage,  not  allowed  to  call  upon  another  for  contribution, 
having  only  paid  his  own  de])t,  so  if  the  mortgaged  estate  is 
bought  by  a  stranger  under  such  circumstances  as  to  show 
that  he  only  paid  for  the  excess  of  its  value  over  the  mort- 
gage, or  so  that  one  part  of  the  estate  satisfies  the  charge 
upon  the  whole,  the  widow  of  the  mortgagor  will  be  let  in  to 
claim  dower  at  law,  if  such  purchaser  shall  obtain  a  discharge 
of  the  mortgage.^  Thus,  where  the  husband's  right  in  equity 
was  taken  and  sold  upon  execution,  and  the  purchaser  paid 
the  mortgage  and  had  it  discharged,  the  wife  had  dower  as 
of  an  unincumbered  estate.^  And  in  the  case  of  Barker  v. 
Parker,"*  just  cited,  the  same  consequence  followed  as  to  the 
wife's  dower,  though  the  mortgage  debt  was  paid  by  a  stranger, 
and  the  holder  of  the  mortgage  released  to  the  mort- 
[*185]  gagor.  In  *  another  case  the  husband  gave  a  mort- 
gage to  secure  the  purchase-money  of  certain  lands, 
in  which  his  wife  joined.  He  afterwards  sold  a  portion  of 
these  to  a  third  person,  who  agreed  to  apply  the  purchase- 
money  in  discharging  the  first  mortgage.  The  wife  signed 
this  deed,  but  it  contained  no  words  of  grant  or  release  on 
her  part.  The  purchaser  paid  the  first  mortgage,  and  the 
holder  discharged  it  upon  record ;  and,  on  the  death  of  the 
husband,  it  was  held  that  she  was  entitled  to  dower  against 
this  second  purchaser,  and  that  the  transaction  did  not  oper- 
ate to  give  him  the  rights  of  equitable  assignee  of  the  mort- 

has  given  the  statutory  bond  to  pay  all  debts  and  legacies.     King  v.  King,  100 
Mass.  224. 

1  "Wedge  V.  Moore,  6  Cush.  8.  ^  Gibson  v.  Crehore,  5  Pick.  146. 

8  Eaton  V.  Symonds,  14  Pick.  98 ;  Barker  v.  Parker,  17  Mass.  564. 

*  17  Mass.  564. 


(11.   VII.  §   ;5.J  DOWKK.  241 

gaj^c.^  Ill  all  such  cases,  thcrcfuro,  il'  it  he  the  intention  of 
the  party  payinir  a  inortt^age  to  retain  it  as  a  lien  upon  tiie 
laiul,  ho  should  have  it  fornially  a.ssigned  to  him  so  that  ho 
may  stand  in  the  place  of  the  inortgairee,  if  lie  holds  under 
such  circumstances  that  law  or  ecpiity  will  regard  him  as 
assignee.  If,  instead  of  that,  he  actually  cause  the  mortgago 
to  he  discharged,  the  lien  upon  the  estate  is,  with  some  excei>- 
tions,  gone  and  extinct  as  if  it  never  existed.- 

20.  Whether  such  a  union  of  the  legal  and  Cipiitahle  estiitcs 
as  would  arise  if  the  assignee  of  the  mortgagor  acquired  the 
inten'st  of  the  mortgagee  hy  assignment  would  or  W(juld  not 
operate  as  a  merger,  would  depend  upon  the  fact  whether  the 
holder  of  the  two  had  an  interest  to  jm-vent  the  merger.^  lu 
Ctuisidering  the  sui)ject  of  merger  where  the  legal  and  ecpiit- 
ahle  estates  unite  in  the  same  jjerscm,  the  residt  altove  stated 
is  one  which  is  sustained  hy  equity  rather  than  law.  At  law 
such  a  coming  together  of  the  respective  interests  of  moitgagor 
and  mortgagee  W(>rks  a  merger  of  the  mortgagee's  in  that  of 
the  mortgagor,  or  perhaps  more  properly  operates  as  a  dis- 
charge of  the  mortgage,  esjiecially  if  it  take  place  during  the 
life  of  the  mortgagor,  and  consecpicntly  it  would  let  in  the 
right  of  the  mortgagor's  wife  to  dower  in  the  estate.'' 
"Whereas  this  rule  is  not  *inflexihle  with  courts  of  [•18G] 
Cijuity,  hut  will  depend  on  the  intention  and  interest 

of  the  person  in  whom  the  estates  unite.^ 

21.  And  where  the  two  estates  were  suhsisting  separately 
at  the  death  of  the  mortgagor,  the  efTect  of  a  discharge  of  the 
mortgage,  unless  hy  the  executor  or  administrator  of  the 
mortgagor,  or  of  the  union  of  the  two  hy  a  redemption  of 
the  mortgage,  would  not  be  to  give  the  wife  dower  as  of  an 

>  I'arttr  f.  GofRlin,  3  Ohio  St.  75. 

'  Husvll  r.  Austin,  1  Paig'",  li'2  ;  .Innios  r.  Mon-y,  2  'ow.  24'?;  Fn-cmnn 
r.  Paul,  3  Mo.  2t>o  ;  Yomi>;  v.  TaHxll,  ;J7  Me.  50l>  ;  Smith  r.  Staiihy,  37  Mf. 
11  ;  (Jilttuii  V.  L'rvhuTv,  3  Pi.k.  47.''(  ;  \Vf.lj;f  r.  .M«x)rc,  6  (.'ush.  8  ;  Wo<li'  r.  How- 
ard, 6  Pi.  k.  492  ;  H.-ustings  r.  Stt-vcns,  21*  N.  H.  564. 

•  Janiiui  f.  Mercy,  2  (.'ow.  24«5  ;  CJilson  r.  Tn-hore,  3  Pick.  47.'i. 

«  (.'ontes  r.  Cheovor,  1  Cow.  460  ;  l{.f<l  r.  Morrison,  12  S.  &  K.  IS  ;  Knnyan  r. 
Stewart,  12  Barb.  537;  Collins  r.  Torr>-,  7  Johns.  278;  Snow  r.  St.-vtns  15 
Ma*».  278. 

•  Eaton  r.  SiinonJs,  14  Pick.  08;  Juin  -  >•  \!  r-y,  2  Cow.  -if.  .'^-•..  „.< 
I>1.  23. 

Vol..  I.— 16 


242  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [dOOK  I. 

unincumbered  estate.^  And  the  reason  of  this  distinction  is 
this :  During  the  life  of  the  husband,  the  wife  is  not  bound 
to  contriljute  towards  the  redemption  of  the  mortgage,  and  is 
not  therefore  to  be  charged  therewith,  whoever  may  redeem. 
But  upon  her  husband's  deatli  she  takes  her  interest  in  the 
estate,  if  at  all,  charged  with  tlie  mortgage,  and  if  any  one 
interested  in  the  estate  as  heir  or  purchaser  discharge  or 
redeem  the  mortgage,  he  thereby  acquires  an  equitable  lien 
upon  the  estate,  which  he  may  hold  against  the  widow  till  she 
contributes  her  proportion  of  the  charge  according  to  the  value 
of  her  interest.^  But  in  either  contingency,  nothing  but  a 
payment  in  fact,  or  an  actual  release  of  the  mortgage,  will 
operate  to  discharge  it  so  as  to  let  in  the  claim  of  dower  at 
common  laAV.^ 

22.  And  if  the  mortgagee  is  in  possession  of  the  mortgaged 
premises  for  condition  broken,  or  the  purchaser  of  the  equity 
of  redemption  who  has  redeemed  the  mortgage,  the  widow's 
remedy  for  the  recovery  of  her  dower  is  by  a  bill  in  equity 
only,  as  she  cannot  maintain  a  writ  of  dower  until  she  has 
contributed  her  share  of  the  redemption  money,  as  will  be 
hereafter  more  fully  considered.^  The  several  positions  which 
have  been  stated  above  are  so  fully  explained  and  illustrated 
in  the  following  cases  from  tlie  Massachusetts  Reports,  that 
liberal  extracts  are  made  from  the  opinions  of  the  court,  as 

the  readiest  way  of  defining  the  law  as  now  generally 
[*187]  understood.     In  the  *  first  of  these  the  facts  were 

briefly  these :  A  made  two  mortgages,  one  to  B  and 
another  to  C,  in  both  of  which  his  wife  joined.  The  right  in 
equity  of  A  having  come  to  G  by  sundry  mesne  conveyances, 
G  mortgaged  the  estate  to  the  plaintiff.  B  and  C,  having 
taken  possession  of  the  mortgaged  estate,  assigned  their  mort- 
gages to  the  heir  of  A,  who  set  out  dower  in  the  same  to  A's 
widow,  as  if  the  mortgages  had  been  discharged.     The  plain- 

'  Hildreth  v.  Jones,  13  Mass.  525. 

2  Eaton  V.  Simonds,  14  Pick.  98  ;  in  which  Popkin  u  Bumstead,  8  Mass.  491, 
is  explained.  Swainei>.  Perine,  5  Johns.  Ch.  482  ;  Gibson  v.  Crehore,  5  Pick.  140; 
Strong  V.  Converse,  8  Allen,  560  ;  Richardson  v.  Skolfield,  45  Me.  386. 

8  Crosby  v.  Chase,  17  Me.  369  ;  Farwell  v.  Cotting,  8  Allen,  211. 

*  Van  Dyne  v.  Thayre,  14  Wend.  233  ;  Smith  v.  Eustis,  7  Me.  41  ;  Carll  v. 
Butman,  Id.  102  ;  Cass  v.  Martin,  6  N.  H.  25  ;  Piichardsou  v.  Skollield,  sup. 


cii.  VII.  §  .">.J  POWER.  243 

tilT  then  souirht  to  redeem  fiom  these  inort^'afres,  niid  the  heir 
olTered  to  disehar^i'  them  il  he  would  pay  the  umuuut  due 
upon  Ihi'iu  'I'he  phiintilT,  however,  insisted  uj»oii  uii  usHijrn- 
ment  of  tht'se  mortgages  to  him,  and  that  the  assiirnment  of 
the  dower  slioidd  he  set  aside.  1'|m'J'  h  hill  for  that  purpose, 
it  was  held  that  he  had  a  right  to  have  these  mortguges  as- 
signed to  him,  and  that  he  had  a  right  to  hold  tl»e  estate  until 
the  witlow  should  eontrihuti'  her  share  of  the  mortgage  del»t, 
and  that,  until  she  had  so  eontrihuted,  she  had  no  right  at  law 
to  elaim  dower  in  the  premises.^  In  the  other.  Chief  Just iee 
Shaw  explains  in  what  cases  and  nnder  what  circumstances 
a  wife  who  has  joined  with  her  hushand  in  a  mortgage  may 
avail  herself  of  her  right  of  dower  as  against  such  mortgage.^ 
This  will  he  the  case  (1)  where  the  deht  shall  he  jtaid  or 
satisfied  hy  the  hushand,  or  hy  some  one  acting  in  his  hehalf 
and  in  his  right,  so  that  the  mortgage  is  extinguished, —  the 
Avhole  ohject  and  purpose  in  giving  it  having  been  aecom- 
jdished  ;  (2)  hy  redeuijition,  —  payinu''  the  deht  herstdf,  though 
this  can  only  i)e  enforee(l  as  a  right  hy  a  process  in  e<|uity, 
and  hy  tendering  the  payment  of  the  mortgage  dehl.  Uidess 
one  of  these  shall  have  i)een  done,  the  demandant  cannot 
maintain  an  action  of  dower  against  any  persmi  holdiiej:  the 
rights  of  the  mortgagee  ;  the  only  i-emedy  is  in  etjuity.-'  In 
order  to  have  a  jjayment  operate  to  discharge  an<l  extinguish 
a  mortgage,  it  must  he  made  hy  the  hushand,  or  out  of  the 
husliand's  fumls,  or  l)y  some  one  as  personal  rej)resentative, 
assignee,  or  standing  in  some  other  relation  which, 
in  legal  effect,  makes  him  *  mortgagor  and  debtor,  ['l^*.*^] 
and  one  whose  duty  it  is  to  pay  and  discharge  the 
mortgage  debt.  Whether  a  given  tranaactitm  shall  be  held, 
in  legal  effect,  to  operate  as  a  ]»ayment  or  discharge  which 
extinguishes  the  mortgage,  does  not  depeud  upon  the  form  of 
words  used,  so  much  as  upon  th«'  rehitions  subsisting  Ixt ween 
the  parties  advancing  the  money  and  the  party  executinir 
the  transfer  or  the  release,  and  their  relative  duties.  If  the 
money  is  advanced  by  om-  whose  duty  it  is,  by  contract  or 

»  Xilcs  r.  Xvo,  13  M.t.  135  ;  U.)s»il<'r  r.  Consit,  15  N.  H.  38. 

8  Mrowii  r.  bi|ihuni,  3  <"ush.  551  ;  Stronj'  r.  Converse.  8  .Ml'ii.  .':.?. 

«  Thomikson  p.  Boyd,  '2-2  N.  J.  543  ;  WuUun  p.  Clcndeniii,  6  UUckf.  477. 


244  LAW  OF  EEAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

otherwise,  to  pay  and  cancel  the  mortgage  and  relieve  the 
mortgaged  premises  of  the  lien,  —  a  diit}'  in  the  proper  per- 
formance of  which  others  have  an  interest,  —  it  shall  be  held 
to  be  a  release  and  not  an  assignment,  although  in  form  it 
purports  to  be  an  assignment.  When  no  such  controlling  ob- 
ligation or  duty  exists,  such  an  assignment  shall  be  held  to 
be  an  extinguishment  or  assignment  according  to  the  intent 
of  the  parties,  and  their  respective  interests  in  the  subject 
will  have  a  strong  bearing  upon  the  question  of  such  intent. 
Thus  where  the  assignee  of  the  husband,  an  insolvent  debtor, 
sold  his  equity  of  redemption,  the  mortgagee's  right  also  com- 
ing by  assignment  into  the  same  hands  was  held  not  to  be 
extinguished,  the  vendee  being  under  no  obligation  to  pay 
the  mortgage,  and  the  two  estates  did  not  merge  so  as  to  let 
in  the  debtor's  widow,  who  had  signed  the  mortgage  deed, 
to  claim  dower  at  law ;  for  so  long  as  her  outstanding  claim 
between  the  equity  and  the  mortgage  existed,  there  could  be 
no  merger.^ 

23.  It  was  intimated  above  that  the  question,  whether  a 
mortgage  shall  be  regarded  as  extinguished  or  not  by  its  for- 
mal discharge,  may  depend  upon  whether  it  is  done  in  the 
lifetime  of  the  mortgagor  or  not.  Thus  where  A  mortgaged 
to  B,  C,  and  t)  successively,  his  wife  joining  in  the  second 
only,  D  paid  up  the  debts  of  B  and  C  during  the  life  of  A,  and 
had  their  mortgages  discharged,  and  then  conveyed  the  whole 
estate  with  warranty  to  the  tenant ;  in  a  suit  for  dower  at  law, 
it  was  held  that  this  let  in  the  widow  to  dower.  The  presump- 
tion in  such  case  would  be,  that  the  party  who  thus 
[*189]  redeemed  took  the  *  estate  subject  to  the  prior  charges 
and  paid  for  it  accordingly,  and  assumed  the  discharge 
of  them  as  a  duty.^  So  where  the  mortgage  was  made  to  se- 
cure the  purcliase-money,  and  afterwards  the  mortgagor  sold 
the  estate  to  W  S,  and  thereupon  the  mortgagee  released  to 
W  S  his  interest  in  the  estate,  and  W  S  executed  new  notes 
and  mortgage  to  the  same  mortgagee  for  the  amount  of  the 

1  Robinson  v.  Leavitt,  7  N.  H.  73,  98  ;  Adams  v.  Hill,  29  N.  H.  202  ;  Thomp- 
son V.  Boyd,  21  N.  J.  58  ;  s.  c.  22  N.  J.  543  ;  Simonton  v.  Gray,  34  Me.  50.  See 
also  Tucker  v.  Crowley,  127  ]\Iass.  400  ;  and  a7ifc,  *1S3  ;  post,  *563. 

2  Wedge  V.  Moore,  6  Cush.  8.     See  Eunyan  v.  Stewart,  12  Barb.  537. 


(II.  VII.  §  P).]  DOWEn.  •2[:, 

()iiirin:il  dr\)t,  it  was  hold  that  l»y  <lischarpinjr  tlio  first  mort- 
jra<ri',  Ihi'  widow  of  the  lirst  inortL'a'j'or  was  h-t  in  for  dowor.' 
Ihit,  after  ail,  it  is  apprduinlfd  that  the  form  of  the  traiinac- 
tion  or  tlic  time  of  doiiii:  it  i.><  not  (•oiicliisivo,  since  it  de|)onds 
much,  if  in»t  altoir<'tlier,  uiion  the  intrnt  with  which  it  \n  done. 
If  it  is  the  intent,  on  tlie  part  of  the  person  jiayinj_'  the  ni(jrt- 
page  del)t,  to  l)econio  siihstituted  \o  thi-  place  and  with  tin- 
rights  of  the  mortgagee,  instead  of  teehnieally  extinguishing 
the  mortgage,  it  would  not  relieve  the  wiilow  of  the  mortgagor 
from  contrihuting  her  share  of  the  mortgage  deltt,  or  making 
a  proper  ahatement  on  account  thereof.-  Where  tin;  wife 
joined  her  huslKind  in  a  mortgage,  and  the  hushand  having 
become  bankrupt,  his  assignee  purchased  and  took  an  assign- 
ment of  the  mortgage,  and  then  sold  the  estate  in  parcels ;  it 
was  held  not  to  be  a  discharge  of  the  mortgage,  and  that  the 
widow  could  not  claim  dower  out  of  the  estate,  <'.\cept  by  a 
bill  ill  equity  and  an  offer  to  redeem  from  the  mortgage.' 

-4.  Although  it  is  not  within  the  intended  scope  of  this 
work  to  go  at  length  into  the  renieily  of  a  widow  for  the  re- 
covery of  her  dower,  so  far  as  the  mode  of  jiroof  by  which  sip- 
is  to  estal)lish  her  right  is  conccMMied,  there  are  a  few  jirinei- 
ples  in  respect  to  a  legal  i)resuniption  of  .seisin  in  the  husl>and 
which  seem  to  be  aj)propriate.  If  the  husband  is  in  posses- 
sion of  lands,  claiming  ownership  of  them,  it  is  sulhcient 
prima  facie  evidence  of  right  of  dower  in  his  widow.*  And 
where  A  bought  an  estate  in  the  name  of  iiis  son,  who  onteretl 
into  possession  and  died,  it  was  held  that,  though  as  between 
the  son  and  father  there  was  a  resulting  trust  in  favor  of  the 
father  by  imi)lication,''  the  widow  of  the  son  was  entitled  to 
dower,  the  legal  estate  having  been  in  him.  and  the  trust  in 

»  Smith  r.  Stanley,  37  .M.-.  11. 

»  Mnss.  Pub.  Stnt.  c.  124,  §  5  ;  Newton  v.  Cook,  4  Orny,  4fl  ;  Pynchon  r.  I^'*- 
tcr,  6  Gray,  314  ;  McCabe  v.  IMlows.  7  fin.v  1  is  •  r..rt.,Mr  ,-  P.',rl.,nr  4.;  M. , 
9  ;  Tooinoy  r.  Mclycan,  105  Ma,ss.  122. 

»  Sorgent  v.  Fuller,  105  Miuss.  1 19. 

«  Mann  v.  Edson,  39  Me.  25 ;  Torrenco  r.  Cnrbry,  27  Mim.  C97  ;  Cnrpentrr  r. 
Weeks.  2  Hill,  841  ;  Forrest  v.  Tmnini.ll.  1  Bailey,  77:  Moon>  r.  F-«ty.  5  N'.  H. 
479  ;  Knight  r.  Mains,  12  Me.  41  ;  Gri^c^'s  r.  Smith,  12  N.  J.  22  ;  Rcid  t.  Stereo. 
son.  3  Rich.  (S.  C.)  66. 

»  Hill,  Trufit.  91  ;  po$t,  vol.  2,  i>.  •111. 


246  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

favor  of  the  father  being  fraudulent  as  against  creditors  and 
purchasers.!  If,  however,  the  possession  of  the  husband  turns 
out  to  be  under  a  contract  of  purchase,  but  no  deed  has  been 
made,  it  has  been  held,  in  Maine,  that  his  wife  cannot  claim 
dower,  although  the  purchase-money  has  been  paid.^  But  in 
North  Carolina  such  a  possession  has  been  held  sufficient  to 

give  the  wife  dower.^  So  a  sufficient  legal  seisin  is 
[*190]   of  ten  inferred  from  the  fact  that  the  tenant  holds  *  his 

title  to  the  estate  mediately  or  immediately  from  the 
husband,  by  a  deed  from  him  or  his  heir.  And  it  may  not  be 
necessary  to  show  that  the  tenant  holds  by  title  derived  from 
the  husband,  any  further  than  that  the  husband  was  once 
seised  and  conveyed  the  estate  by  deed.  Thus,  it  was  held 
that  by  proving  the  execution  and  delivery  of  a  deed  of  the 
premises  to  the  husband,  that  he  was  during  coverture  in  pos- 
session of  them,  and  that  he  aliened  them  during  coverture, 
the  title  of  the  tenant  would  be  presumed  to  be  the  same 
under  which  the  husband  held,  if  no  evidence  of  any  other 
title  on  his  part  is  offered.^  The  rigid  rules  of  law  in  requir- 
ing proof  of  a  better  title  against  a  stranger  in  possession  of 
real  estate  do  not  apply  between  a  widow  claiming  dower 
and  the  tenant.  If  it  appear  that  the  tenant  holds  by  deed 
from  the  husband,  or  from  his  son  and  heir,  or  by  a  levy  of  a 
ji.  fa.  against  the  husband,  who  held  a  deed  in  fee  of  the 
premises,  it  will  be  sufficient  evidence,  if  uncontrolled,  to  es- 
tablish his  wife's  claim  for  dower.^  Thus,  where  tenant  held 
by  virtue  of  a  levy  of  an  execution  upon  the  land  as  that  of 
the  husband,  it  was  sufficient  evidence  of  seisin  of  the  husband 
to  sustain  an  action  of  dower.^  But  if  the  tenant  claims  under 
a  deed  from  the  mortgagee,  he  will  not  be  estopped  thereby, 

1  Bateman  v.  Bateman,  2  Vern.  436  ;  2  Crabb,  Real  Prop.  163. 

2  Hamlin  v.  Hamlin,  19  Me.  141  ;  Hamblin  v.  Bank  of  Cumberland,  19  Me.  66. 

3  Thompson  v.  Thompson,  1  Jones  (N.  C),  430. 

4  Wall  V.  Hill,  7  Dana,  172  ;  Carter  v.  Parker,  28  Me.  509  ;  Lewis  v.  Meserve, 
61  Me.  374. 

5  Hitchcock  V.  Harrington,  6  Johns.  290  ;  Dolf  v.  Basset,  15  Johns.  21  ;  Hyatt 
V.  Ackerson,  14  N.  J.  564  ;  Kimball  v.  Kimball,  2  Me.  226  ;  Norwood  v.  Marow, 
4  Dev.  &  B.  442  ;  Randolph  v.  Doss,  4  Miss.  205  ;  Embree  v.  Ellis,  2  Johns. 
1x9  ;  Collins  v.  Tony,  7  Id.  278  ;  Bordley  v.  Clayton,  5  Harringt.  154  ;  Douglass 
V.  Dickson,  11  Rich.  S.  C.  417. 

6  Cochrane  v.  Libby,  18  Me.  39. 


cii.  VII.  ^  ;3.j  nowHR.  -J  }7 

if  the  wklow  of  his  (.Taiitor  ciaiiiis  dower,  to  show  that  iicr 
liiishaiid's  interest  was  only  that  (»f  a  niortj^^aj^ee.'  And  this 
doetiini;  was  held  t(i  a|»i)ly  to  ii  case  where  the  execution  credi- 
tor, after  levyinir  upun  the  (h'liti)r"s  estate,  (|nitelainied  it  \o 
another  within  the  time  in  which  the  debtor  ha<l  a  ri^riit  to  re- 
dei'in  it.  If  the  creditor's  wife,  in  such  case,  claim  dower,  the 
tenant  may  show  that  her  husband's  interest,  while  h<'  held  it, 
was  in  the  nature  of  a  mortgage  subject  to  the  debtor's  rijrht 
of  redemption,  and  not  such  a  seisin  as  carries  with  it  a  right 
of  dower.2  And  in  many  cases  the  courts  have  gone  much 
further  than  to  hold  the  possession  of  land  acquired  by  title 
from  the  husband  prima  facie  evidence  of  a  right  of  dower  on 
the  part  of  his  widow. 

25.  A  tenant  has  been  held  to  be  cstojipetl  to  dt-ny  the 
seisin  of  the  husband,  or  the  husband's  death,  if  the  title  is 
derived  from  his  heir.  Thus,  where  the  tenant  held  by  a 
deed  from  two  grantors,  one  of  whom  died,  and  his  widow 
brought  suit  for  dower,  it  was  held  that  the  tenant  could  n(jt 
show  by  parol  that  the  interest  and  estate  of  the  deceased 
grantor  in  the  premises  granted  was  less  than 
*  one  half,  in  order  to  reduce  the  share  out  of  which  ['rjlj 
she  might  claim  her  dower.^  An  heir  is  estopped  to 
deny  the  seisin  of  his  father  in  lands  which  descended  to  him, 
to  a  claim  by  his  mother  for  dower  therein.*  And  where  a 
tenant  claimed  under  the  heir  of  the  husband,  it  was  held  that 
he  could  not  deny  the  death  or  seisin  of  tlie  husband,  in  an 
action  by  his  widow  to  recover  her  dower.^  So  where  the 
widow,  as  executrix  of  her  husband's  will,  conveyed  the  estate 
to  the  tenant,  subject  to  her  right  of  dower,  it  was  held  that 
he  was  cstoi>pcd  to  deny  the  husband's  seisin."  And  wlicro 
she  proved  a  deed  of  the  estate  to  her  husband,  and  one  with 
warranty  from  him,  followed  by  a  deed  from  his  grantee  to 
the  tenant,  it  was  held  sufTicient  to  establish  the  husband's 


1  Foster  v.  Dwiiicl,  49  Mo.  44.  '  Foster  r.  Gordon,  49  Me.  54. 

«  Stimpson  v.  Thoniastoii  B'k,  28  Mc.  259. 

♦  Griffith  V.  Griffitli,  5  Harringt.  5. 

'  Hitchcock  V.  Carpenter,  9  Johns.  344  ;  Hitchcock  v.  Harrington,  6  John* 
290  ;  Montgomery  v.  Brupre,  4  N.  J.  260. 

•  Smith  V.  Ingalls,  13  Me.  284. 


248  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   L 

seisin.^  Where  the  husband  entered  upon  a  parcel  of  land 
other  than  that  described  in  his  deed,  by  mistake,  and  died, 
and  his  administrator  sold  it  as  his,  and  the  original  vendor, 
in  order  to  make  a  good  title  in  the  purchaser,  released  to 
him,  it  was  held  that  the  tenant  was  not  at  libertj'  to  deny 
the  husband's  seisin  against  a  claim  to  dower  in  behalf  of  his 
widow.2  In  another  case  it  was  held  sufficient  for  her  to  es- 
tablish her  husband's  seisin,  to  show  he  was  in  possession  of 
the  premises,  and  made  a  deed  of  warranty  of  the  same,  and 
that  the  tenant  claimed  under  him.^ 

26.  It  is  laid  down  as  settled  law  that  if  a  tenant  at  will, 
for  years,  or  for  life,  make  a  feoffment,  the  feoffee  cannot  set 
up  a  want  of  seisin  on  the  part  of  the  feoffor,  in  an  action 
brought  by  his  wife  to  recover  her  dower.^  Nor  would  he  be 
admitted  to  show  that  such  seisin  was  only  colorable,  and 
designed  to  defraud  the  creditors  of  him  from  whom  the  hus- 
band derived  his  seisin.^  And  where  the  husband,  being  seised 
of  a  remainder  expectant  upon  a  life  estate,  mortgaged  the 
land  in  fee,  and  died,  and  his  wife  claimed  dower  against  the 
mortgagee,  it  was  held  that  he  could  not  set  up  a  want  of 
seisin  in  the  husband  against  her  claim.^  But  whether  this 
rests  upon  the  doctrine  of  estoppel  alone,  is  a  question  upon 

which  the  authorities  are  divided.'^  In  some  of  the 
[*192]  cases  where  the  tenant  holds  under  *  the  husband,  he 

has  been  held  to  be  estopped,  as  already  stated,  from 
denying  the  husband's  seisin.^  Thus,  where  the  only  title  of 
the  tenant  was  a  deed  of  warranty  from  the  husband,  he  was 
not  permitted  to  show  that  the  husband,  in  fact,  had  no  title 
to  a  part  of  the  premises.     As  the  husband's  deed  was  his 

1  Thorndike  v.  Spear,  13  Me.  91  ;  Davis  v.  Millett,  34  Me.  429. 

2  Hale  V.  Munii,  4  Gray,  132. 

8  Bolster  v.  Cushman,  34  Me.  428  ;  Bancroft  v.  White,  1  Caines,  185  ;  Embree 
V.  Ellis,  2  Johns.  119  ;  Ward  v.  Fuller,  15  Pick.  185  ;  Hains  v.  Gardner,  10  Me, 
383  ;  English  v.  Wright,  1  N.  J.  437  ;  Thompson  v.  Thompson,  19  Me.  235  ; 
Osterhout  v.  Shoemaker,  3  Hill,  519. 

4  Taylor's  Case,  cited  6  Johns.  293  ;  Tud.  Cas.  44. 

6  Kimball  v.  Kimball,  2  Me.  226.  «  Nason  v.  Allen,  6  Me.  243. 

7  Moore  v.  Esty,  5  N.  H.  479. 

8  Pledger  v.  Ellerbe,  6  Rich.  266.  So  in  Iowa.  Davis  v.  O'Ferrall,  4  G.  Greene, 
358. 


cii.  VII.  §  o.]  POWER.  249 

only  title,  "he  is  therefore  estopped  from  donyinphis  j^rantor's 
seisin."  *  So  where  A  conveyed  to  li  l»y  deed  of  warrunly,  and 
npon  the  death  of  B,  his  widow,  relying  upon  that  deed  as  evi- 
dence of  litT  hiisljand's  si-isin,  had  dower  set  <Hit  to  her,  and 
afterwards  A's  wife  lirouirht  her  action  of  dower  a^'ainst  li's 
wife  and  the  tenants  ciainnng  under  her,  it  was  IilIiI  that 
B's  wife  was  estopped  to  deny  A's  seisin.'^  Au<i  in 
New  *  Jersey  it  has  been  held,  that  where  the  hus-  ['IW] 
band  conveys  during  coverture,  his  grantee  cannot 
deny  his  seisin.^  On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  held  in 
Arkansas  that  the  vendee  of  the  husband  is  not  estopped, 
in  an  action  to  recover  dower,  from  showing  aflirmativfly  a 
want  of  seisin  in  the  husband.*  In  Maine,  though  the  tt-nant 
who  held  under  the  husband  was  not  permitted,  in  an  action, 
brought  by  his  grantor's  widow,  to  deny  the  seisin  of  the 
husband,  yet  he  was  permitted  to  deny  that  it  was  such  a 
seisin  as  gave  his  widow  a  right  of  dower.^  So,  in  Kentucky, 
the  tenant,  though  he  purchased  of  and  entered  originally 
under  the  husband,  may  contest  the  widow's  claim  of  dowur 
by  showing  that  he  has  acquired  and  holds  under  a  superior 
title  to  that  of  the  husband,  provided  he  goes  further  and 
shows  that  he  was  evicted,  by  act  of  law,  from  the  seisin 
acquired  under  the  husband,  before  he  acquired  the  title  under 
which  he  now  claims  to  hold  and  defend.®  In  one  case  in 
New  York,  which  carried  the  doctrine  to  an  extreme  lengtli, 
the  court  refused  to  permit  the  tenant  to  defend,  by  showing 
that,  when  the  husband  conveyed  to  him,  there  was  a  superior 
title  in  another,  which  he,  the  tenant,  had  since  acquired  and 
still  held,  unless  the  seisin  and  possession  derived  from  the 
husband  had  been  defeated  by  actual  eviction  of  the  tenant.' 
The  court  laid  great  stress  upon  the  analogy  between  the 
grantee  of  the  husband  i-esisting  the  claim  of  the  grantor's 
widow,  and  a  lessee  contesting  the  title  of  his  lessor,  in  an 
action  to  recover  the  premises  on  the  expiration  of  the  lease ; 

1  Wedge  r.  Moore,  6  Cush.  8  ;  Gayle  v.  Price,  5  Rich.  525. 

a  May  v.  Tillman,  1  Mich.  262.  •  Thompson  v.  Boyd,  22  X.  J.  5<a 

*  Crittenden  v.  Woodrutf,  11  Ark.  82. 

'  Gammon  v.  Freeman,  31  Me.  243.  •  Hugley  v.  Gregg,  4  Dana,  63. 

7  Bowne  v.  Potter.  17  Wend.  164. 


250  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

and  carried  the  principle  so  far,  that,  although  the  tenant  pur- 
chased and  took  a  conveyance  from  one  who  held  the  para- 
mount and  true  title,  and  who  had  commenced  an  action 
against  him  to  recover  the  premises,  yet  he  was  not  permitted 
to  avail  himself  of  this  unless  he  had  been  actually  evicted. 
But  it  is  apprehended  that  the  tendency  of  more  recent  cases 
has  been  to  apply  a  more  liberal  rule  in  respect  to  estoppels  in 
like  cases.  Thus  it  is  now  generally  held,  that  a  tenant  need 
not  be  actually  evicted  by  one  having  a  better  title,  in  order 
to  be  allowed  to  deny  that  of  his  landlord.  If  he  has  yielded 
in  good  faith  to  such  better  title  in  order  to  avoid  being  ex- 
pelled, and  the  true  owner  has  entered  and  given  permission 
to  him  to  hold  under  him,  he  may  avail  himself  of  this  in  an 
action  against  him  by  the  original  lessor  to  recover  posses- 
sion.^ So  in  Illinois,  the  grantee  of  a  husband  was  admitted 
to  deny  the  husband's  title  and  seisin,  and  to  show  that  he 
claims  under  another  title ;  while  in  Kentucky  he  may  show 
the  true  nature  of  the  husband's  seisin,  and  that  it  was  not  such 
as  to  entitle  his  widow  to  dower,^ 

27.  And  in  a  more  recent  case  in  New  York,  where,  in  an 
action  to  recover  dower  of  a  tenant,  to  whom  the  husband  had 
conveyed  the  premises  by  a  grant  in  fee  with  covenants  of 
warranty,  the  tenant  offered  to  show  that  the  husband  had 
only  a  leasehold  estate  in  the  premises,  the  court  held  that 
he  was  not  estopped  to  set  up  this  in  defence.^  The  court 
say  that  for  forty  years  the  settled  doctrine  had  been  that 
he  was  estopped,  but  the  former  cases,  including  that  from 
Wendell,  had  been  overruled  by  the  case  of  Sparrow  v.  King- 
man.* And  the  law  of  New  York  may  be  considered  as 
now  settled  accordingly.  Nor  is  there  anything  in  the 
Massachusetts  cases  inconsistent  with  the  doctrine 
[*194]  of  the  two  last-cited  cases,  while  *the  modern  Eng- 
lish cases  seem  to  be  in  accordance  therewith,^  Nor 
will   it  make  any  difference   whether   the   title   derived   by 

1  Morse  v.  Goddard,  13  Met.  177  ;  Taylor,  Land.  &  T.  §§  307,  708  ;  Emery  v. 
Barnett,  i  C.  B.  y.  s.  423. 

-  Owen  V.  Eobbins,  19  lU,  545  ;  Gulley  v.  Ray,  18  B,  Mon.  114. 
8  Finn  v.  Sleight,  8  Barb.  401.  *  1  N.  Y.  242. 

6  Gaunt  V.  Wainman,  3  Bing.  N.  C.  69. 


CII.  VII.  §   1  ]  DOWER.  251 

tlie  ti-nant  from  the  liusliand  was  liy  a  deed  of  (juitclaiin  or 
warranty.' 

28.  The  last  re(|uisitc  in  (jrder  to  entitle  a  woman  to  dower 
is  the  natnral  death  of  her  hnshand.  There  was  once  known 
in  En^dand  what  was  ealled  a  civil  death,  as  when  a  man  be- 
came a  monk,  but  that  did  not  jrive  his  wife  a  ri^dit  to  recover 
dowcr.2  And  it  is  conceived  that  nijthing  answering  to  civil 
death  ever  was  known  to  the  American  law.  The  mode  of 
proving  the  death  of  the  husband,  as  well  as  when  a  legal  prc- 
sumptit^n  of  death  would  arise,  comes  more  jirojierly  under  the 
head  of  Evidence,  and  is  therefore  omitted  here. 


SECTKJN   IV. 

HOW   LOST   OR   BARRED. 

1.  By  alienafje. 

2.  Forfeiture  for  crime. 

3.  Detinue  of  charters. 

4.  EIoi)euient. 

5.  Divorce. 

6.  Forfeiture  by  conveyance. 

7.  Effect  of  huslmnd's  conveyance. 

8.  Kelea.se  by  wife. 

9.  Fine  and  recovery. 

10.  Deed  of  wife. 

11.  Husband  must  join  in  deed. 

12.  Requisites  of  a  sufficient  deed. 

13.  No  release  but  by  deed. 

14.  Rule  of  construing  release. 

15.  Acknowledgment  of  deed. 

16.  Effect  of  avoiding  deed. 

17.  Dower  barred  by  foreclosure. 

18.  Release  to  husband  void. 

19.  Widow,  when  estopped  to  claim  dower. 

20.  When  barred  by  rebutter. 

21.  Barred  by  judicial  sale 

22.  Barred  by  defeating  seisin. 

23.  Defeated  by  paramount  title. 

24.  Defeated  by  levying  execution. 

25.  Defeated  by  sale  for  debts. 

26.  Seisin  lost  by  condition  broken. 

1  Kingman  v.  Sparrow,  12  Barb.  201.  ^  2  Crabb,  Real  Prop.  131. 


252  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

27.  Determination  of  base  fee. 

28.  Executing  an  appointment. 

29.  Principle  of  dos  de  dote. 

30.  Effect  of  release  of  first  widow. 

31.  When  the  husband's  estate  determines. 

32.  Dower  of  a  conditional  limitation. 

33.  Barred  by  jointure. 

34.  Statute  of  Limitations. 

35.  Barred  by  Dower  Act  of  Wm.  IV. 

36.  Statute  provisions  as  to  bar,  &c. 

37.  Barred  by  eminent  domain. 

The  next  subject  in  order  relates  to  the  manner  in  which 
the  right  of  dower  may  be  lost  or  barred. 

1.  At  common  law,  alienage  on  the  part  of  the  husband  or 
wife  was  a  disability  to  her  claiming  dower.^  By  a  very  early 
statute,  if  an  alien  woman  married  a  British  subject  by  the 
king's  license,  she  might  claim  dower.^  And  now,  by  the 
statute  7  &  8  Vict.  c.  QQ.,  if  an  alien  woman  marry  an  English 
subject,  she  becomes  naturalized.  A  similar  doctrine  now  pre- 
vails under  the  naturalization  laws  of  the  United  States.  This 
disability  is  done  away  with  by  the  local  statutes  of  several  of 
the  States.^ 

2.  By  the  common  law  also,  the  widow  of  a  con- 
[*195]  victed  traitor  *  could  not  recover  dower.^  But  it  is 
believed  that  no  such  principle  was  ever  introduced 
into  the  law  of  this  country.^  And  even  in  the  acts  of  confis- 
cation passed  by  the  legislatures  during  the  American  Revolu- 
tion, the  rights  of  dower  of  offending  parties  were  excepted.^ 

3.  Under  the  common  law,  if  the  widow  obtained  possession 
of  the  title  deeds  of  her  husband's  estates  and  withheld  them 
from  the  heir,  he  could  raise  a  temporary  bar  to  her  recovering 
her  dower  by  action,  by  pleading,  as  it  was  called,  "  detinue 
of  charters,"  so  long  as  she  actually  did  detain  them.^  This 
plea  was  sustained  on  the  ground  that,  as  she  withheld  the 
evidences  of  his  title,  the  heir  was  not  able  to  set  out  what 
should  be  her  just  proportion.     But  such  a  defence  never  ob- 

1  2  Bl.  Com.  131  ;  2  Crabb,  Real  Prop.  131.  ^  Qq.  Lit.  31  b,  n.  9. 

8  See  ante,  *50.  *  2  Bl.  Com.  131.  «  Wms.  Pieal  Prop.  103,  n. 

6  Stearns,  Real  Act.  287  ;  Sewall  v.  Lee,  9  Mass.  363 ;  Cozens  v.  Long,  2  Pen- 
ningt.  559. 

7  2  Bl.  Com.  136. 


CU.  VII.  ^    t.]  DOWER.  2'>3 

tainod  in  this  country,  since  under  our  rriristiaiinii  laws  tiic 
heir  ha.s  the  means  of  asccrtainini;  tlu'  land  out  of  wliirh  his 
ancestor's  widow  is  entith'd  to  dower.* 

4.  l>y  the  early  statute  of  Wcstniinstcr  li,-  if  a  wife  ciojic 
with  another  man  and  live  in  adultery  with  him,  she  thereby 
forfeits  her  dower  in  her  husliand's  estate;  and  this,  without 
any  fornuil  divorce,  may  ho  shown  upon  the  tiial  in  an  action 
for  the  recovery  of  her  dower.^  After  such  an  elopement  the 
husband  is  not  bound  to  receive  her  back  atrain.^  Hut  if  ho 
voluntarily  receive  her  back  by  what  is  called  a  reconcilement, 
she  will  thereby  be  restored  not  only  to  a  riirht  of  dower  in  all 
the  lands  of  which  he  had  been  seised  durinir  coverture  before 
her  elopement,  but  to  the  laiuls  which  her  liusband  had  bou;j-ht 
and  sold  durinjr  her  elojjement.''  The  leavinir  of  her  hu.si>and 
against  her  consent  will  not  oj)cratc  to  bar  her  dower,  unless 
she  afterwards  voluntarily  commit  adultery.^  Noi- 
woidd  she  *  f(U-feit  it  by  livini;:  with  a  num  to  wIkuu  ['!'■"'] 
she  had  l)een  marrietl  under  a  mistaken  belief  that  her 
first  husband  was  deati.  if  siie  had  good  cause  to  believe  he  was 
dead.'  If,  however,  she  and  her  husband  voluntarily  separate, 
and  while  living  apart  she  commit  adultery,  she  will  forfeit 
her  dower.^  As  this  ground  of  forfeiture  dejjends  entirely 
upon  the  statute  of  Westminster,  it  is  not  enough  that  she 
connnit  adultery  ;  she  must  have  eloped  from  her  husband.^ 
Where,  therefore,  in  the  absence  of  her  husband  she  com- 
mitted adultery  at  the  jtlace  of  her  and  her  husjjand's  home, 
it  was  held  not  to  be  the  ground  of  siu'h  a  forfeiture.'"  The 
statute  of  Westminster  has  licen  re-enacte<l  in  substance  in 
several  of  the  States,  as  in  Viigiuia,  Missouri,  Xnrtii  Carolina, 
New  Jersey,  Ohio,  Kentucky,  West  Virginia,  and  South  Caro- 
lina."    And  it  seems  to  have  been  rccoirnized  as  a  jtart  of  the 

>  Stearns,  Real  Act.  310.  =  1.3  ¥A.  I.  <■    Si. 

8  Tu.l.  ("as.  51.  *  tSovier  r.  Ilan.ook.  6  T.  K.  6ii.3. 

*  Co.  Lit.  33a,  n.  8.  «  2<1  Inst.  434  ;  Cogp^wi-ll  v.  Tiblxtts,  3  X.  II.  41. 
'  2  Cmlil.,  Heal  Prop.  173  ;  1  Cruise  Dig.  175,  176. 

*  IL'thrington  v.  Graliani,  6  i5ing.  135. 

»  Ci.ggswell  V.  TibWtts,  3  X.  11.  41  ;  2J  Inst,  435. 
10  Coggswell  V.  Tibl)ctts.  3  N.  H.  41. 

"  Stegall  r.  Stegall,  2  Brock.  256  ;  Lee<.nii.tc  v.  Wiusli,  0  M,>.  .^4  7  :  Walt.rs  r. 
Jordau,  13  Ired.  361,     See  uote  at  end  of  this  chapter. 


254  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK    I. 

American  common  law,  where  no  such  re-enactment  has  been 
made  in  terms,^  though  it  has  been  held  not  to  be  in  force 
in  Massachusetts.^  In  New  York,  however,  since  1830,  such 
elopement  and  adultery  would  not  bar  dower  unless  followed 
by  a  divorce; 2 nor  in  Delaware,  nor  Rhode  Island.* 

5.  A  divorce  from  the  bonds  of  matrimony  always  defeats 
the  right  of  dower,  unless  it  be  saved  by  the  statute  authorizing 
such  divorce  ;  for,  at  common  law,  in  order  to  entitle  a  widow 
to  dower,  she  must  have  been  the  wife  of  the  husband  at  the 
time  of  his  decease.^  It  is  accordingly  provided  in  the  statutes 
of  the  States  in  which  such  divorces  are  granted,  that  dower, 
or  some  reasonable  provision  out  of  the  husband's  estate,  shall 
be  enjoyed  by  the  wife,  unless  she  is  the  party  m  fault.^    Thus, 

in  Massachusetts,  the  wife  in  such  case  has  dower 
[*197]  precisely  as  *  if  her  husband  were  dead,  whether  the 
lands  have  been  conveyed  by  him  or  not.'^ 

6.  By  the  common  law,  a  widow,  like  other  tenants  for  life, 
forfeited  the  dower  already  set  out  to  her,  by  conveying,  in 
fee,  the  lands  assigned  to  her,  upon  the  feudal  idea  that  by  so 
doing  she  renounced  her  obligation  to  her  superior.^  And  by 
statute  6  Edw.  I.  c.  7,  it  was  expressly  provided,  that  if  tenant 
in  dower  made  a  feoffment  of  her  lands  to  another,  with  livery 
of  seisin,  of  a  greater  estate  than  she  possessed,  it  worked  a 
forfeiture,  since  the  effect  of  it  was  to  divest  the  reversioner 
of  his  seisin,  and  turned  his  estate  into  a  right  of  entry .^  But 
as  by  the  statute  8  &  9  Vict.  106,  §  4,  feoffments  are  no  longer 
deemed  to  have  any  tortious  operation  upon  the  rights  of  others, 
the  statute  6  Edw.  I.  is  virtually  done  away  with.^*^    And  it  was 

1  4  Dane,  Abr.  676 ;  4  Kent,  Com.  53 ;  Bell  v.  Xealy,  1  Baik^j^  312  ;  1  Cruise, 
Dig.  156,  n.,  175,  n.     In  Pennsylvania,  Pteel  v.  Elder,  62  Penn.  St.  308. 

2  Lakin  v.  Lakin,  2  Allen,  45. 

3  Reynolds  v.  Reynolds,  24  Wend.  193  ;  Pitts  v.  Pitts,  52  X.  Y.  593. 
*  Rawlins  v.  Battel,  1  Houst.  224  ;  Bryan  v.  Batcheller,  6  R.  I.  543. 

5  Bishop,  Mar.  &  Div.  §§  661,  662  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  130  ;  4  Kent,  Com.  54  ;  Wait 
V.  Wait,  4  Barb.  192  ;  Wliitsell  v.  Mills,  6  lud.  229  ;  McCrauey  v.  McCraney, 
5  Iowa,  232  ;  Watt  v.  Corey,  76  Me.  bo. 

«  Bishop,  Mar.  &  Div.  §  663. 

^  Davol  V.  Howland,  14  Mass.  219.  See  note  as  to  statute  provisions  on  the 
subject  at  the  end  of  this  chapter. 

8  Wrns.  Real  Prop.  121  ;  4  Kent,  Com.  82. 

9  4  Kent,  Com.  S3  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  136.  i"  Wrns.  Real  Prop.  122. 


CII.  VII.  §  4.]  DoWRU.  2'tri 

always  comjK'tcnt  for  hor  lo  convfy  so  iniu'h  estate  as  she  had.* 
And  if  her  conveyance  of  a  greater  estate  was  hy  tlee<l  taking 
its  eflect  from  tlie  Statute  of  Uses,  it  did  not  work  a  forfeiture. 
Nor  lias  the  doctrine  of  forfeitm'e  hy  conveying  a  larger  ostati* 
than  helonged  to  her  ever  nlitained,  to  any  general  extent,  in 
this  country.'-^  Thus,  in  Kentucky,  a  conveyance  by  a  widow 
of  her  dower  lands  in  fee,  l»y  deed  of  bargain  and  sale,  is  held 
to  work  no  forfeiture.^  By  statute  in  Massachusetts,  the  con- 
veyance hy  a  tenant  for  life  of  a  gi-eater  estate  than  he  has, 
has  no  effect  except  to  pass  so  much  estate  as  he  may  lawfully 
convey.* 

7.  There  were  various  ways  by  wliieh  a  wife  miirht  bar  her 
inchoate  right  of  dowei-  during  coverture  Ity  releasing  the 
same.  But  no  conveyance  by  the  husband  could,  by  the  com- 
mon law,  cut  off  her  right  of  dower,  or  charge  it  with 
ineumltrancos  of  *  his  creation  duiiu'i-  their  coverture:''  [*198] 
so  that  after  his  decease  she  to(jk  her  duwer  lands  dis- 
charged of  all  such  conveyances  or  incumbrances.'^  And  where 
the  husl)and  made  a  mortgage  in  which  the  wife  joiucil,  and 
afterwards  released  his  interest  in  the  estate,  it  was  held  not 
to  cut  oft'  her  right  of  dower  in  the  ecpiity  of  redemjttion.'  The 
law  as  to  the  right  of  the  husband  to  cut  off  the  widow's  right 
of  dower  l)y  his  own  deed  has  been  essentially  changed  in  Kng- 
land  and  in  several  of  the  United  States,  as  will  hereafter  he 
shown.  But  still,  if  the  deed  of  the  husband  might  be  avoided 
for  usury,  the  interest  of  the  widow  in  the  estate  is  so  immedi- 
ate that  she  may  avail  herself  of  this,  and  claim  lu-r  dower, 
without  waiting  for  his  heirs  to  avoid  the  c(»iiveyanee  alto- 
gether.^ How  far  the  deed  of  a  husband,  wheie  by  law  his 
wife  is  only  dowal)le  of  such  lands  as  he  dies  sei.sed  of,  shall 
be  effectual  to  bar  his  wife's  right  of  dower  when  made  for 
that  purpose,  has  been  differently  held  by  different  courts, 
lu  Tennessee,  if   this  was    known   to  the  purchastT  when   he 

'  2(1  Inst.  309  ;  Wins.  Real  Prop.  25,  n.  ^  Wins.  IJcal  Prop.  2o,  u, 

»  Uol.inson  v.  Miller,  1  B.  Mon.  88  ;  r.cn.  Stat.  Ky.  1873,  p.  637. 

«  Pub.  Stat.  c.  126,  §  7.     As  to  barring  dowpr.    Mason  r.  Mason,  140  Mass.  63. 

*  Park,  Dow.  237  ;  R:tnk  v.  Ilanna,  6  Ind.  20. 

«  Park,  Dow.  23!)  ;  2  frabb,  Real  Prop.  149. 

"  Swaine  r.  Perine,  5  Johns.  Ch.  482.     Cf.  Dockray  v.  Milliken,  70  Me.  517. 

8  Norwood  V.  Marrow,  4  Dev.  &  B.  442. 


256  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

bought  tlie  estate,  it  was  held  that  the  conveyance,  as  to  her, 
was  fraudulent  and  void.  So  in  Vermont  and  North  Carolina, 
if  the  land  is  conveyed  by  the  husband  to  his  heirs  ;  ^  while  in 
Connecticut  it  was  held  effectual,  though  made  to  the  heir  or 
to  a  grantee  by  the  way  of  a  gratuity .^ 

8.  So  far  as  a  release  by  her  own  act  is  concerned,  the  wife 
might,  from  an  early  period,  bar  her  claim  to  dower  by  join- 
ing with  her  husband  in  the  act  of  conveyance. 

9.  The  most  usual  way  of  doing  this  was  by  levying  a  fine 

or  suffering  a  recovery .^  These  are  abolished  by  the 
[*199]  statute  3  &  4  *  Wm.  lY.  c.  74 ;  and  wives  may  now 

convey  their  estates  by  deeds  executed  in  concurrence 
with  their  husbands,  and  acknowledged  in  the  form  required 
by  that  act.^  A  custom  had  long  prevailed  in  London  of 
wives  barring  themselves  of  their  dower  by  joining  with  their 
husbands  in  deeds  of  their  estates,  without  resorting  to  fines 


or  recoveries 


5 


10.  If  fines  or  recoveries  *  were  ever  resorted  to  in  this 
country  as  a  means  of  barring  dower,  it  must  have  been  to  a 
very  limited  extent,  for,  from  a  very  early  period,  there  has 
existed  a  mode  of  doing  this  by  the  wife  joining  with  the  hus- 
band in  a  deed  containing  proper  words  of  grant  or  release  on 
her  part.^  There  was  an  ordinance  to  that  effect  adopted  by 
the  Massachusetts  colony  in  1641,  which  has  been  regarded  by 
some  writers  as  the  origin  of  this  as  an  American  usage.'' 

11.  In  order  to  its  operating  as  a  bar,  such  deed  must  have 
certain  requisites.     In  the  first  place,  the  wife  must  have  been 

*  Note.  —  Fines  and  recoverie.s  Avere  once  in  force  in  some  of  the  States,  but 
not  in  others,  and  are  now  wholly  disused.  Stearns,  Real  Act.  11.  Recoveries 
were  in  use  in  Massachusetts,  but  not  lines.  They  were  both  in  use  in  Maryland, 
but  never  in  Virginia.     Chase's  Case,  1  Bland,  206,  229. 


1  Brewer  u  Connell,  11   Humph.  500  ;  McGee  v.  ^McGee,  4  Ired.  105  ;  Thayer 
V.  Thayer,  14  Vt.  107  ;  Jenny  v.  Jenny,  24  Yt.  324  ;  and  see  ante,  *174  and  n. 

2  Stewart  v.  Stewart,  5  Conn.  317.  »  4  Kent,  Com.  51  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  137. 

4  Wms.  Real  Prop.  189. 

5  2  Crabb,  Real  Prop.  172  ;  Tud.  Cas.  50. 

6  Fowler  V.  Shearer,  7  Mass.  14  ;  1  Bland,  229  ;  Barge  v.  Smith,  27  N.  H.  332  ; 
Kirk  V.  Dean,  2  Binn.  341  ;  Powell  v.  Monson,  3  Mason,  347. 

'  Mass.  Anc.  Chart.  99. 


cii.  VII.  i^  1.]  DOWKn.  2'm 

of  age  when  cxccntinf^  it.^  But  by  statute  in  Maino  a  wife 
of  auv  a<''<3  may  release  lier  ilower  l»y  tlet-il.  In  Miunrsota,  Illi- 
nois, ami  Iniliana,  she  may  do  it  if  eijifliteen  years  of  aj,'r.-  In 
111!  tin-  States,  with  n\u'  or  two  exceptions,  the  husWand  muHt 
join  with  the  wife  in  the  deed  which  rcliminishes  her  ri;:ht, 
in  order  to  j^^ive  it  any  elTect  as  a  Inir  of  hrr  dower/*  And  tiiis 
is  true  where  the  wife  of  a  second  hnshiind  executes  a  deed  of 
release  of  dower  in  the  estate  of  her  former  husliaufl.*  In 
New  Ilamijshire  it  has  l)een  held  that  she  mijrht  l>ar  her  dower 
in  lands,  conveyed  by  her  husband,  by  a  sejjarate  deed  subse- 
quently executed.''  Nor  is  the  above  proposition  intended  to 
apply  to  those  States  where  special  jtowers  are  conferred  by 
statute  upon  married  women  as  to  making.'  deeds,  if  thereby 
the  rules  of  the  common  law  in  this  respect  have  been 
changed.  *  And  where,  the  husband  havintr  (••mveyed  ['iOO] 
lands  in  his  lifetime,  his  widow  after  his  death  re- 
leased all  her  riirht  in  the  estate  to  the  heirs  of  his  irrantec, 
it  was  held  to  Ijar  her  riirht  of  dower,  though  the  consideration 
was  only  nomiiuil.'^ 

12.  It  is  not  sufficient,  in  most  of  the  States,  that  the  wife 
sign  the  deed  with  her  husband,  unless  the  same  contains 
words  of  grant  or  release,  which  she  adopts  or  wliich  sj)ccially 
apply  to  her  interest  in  the  estate."     Her  deed  in  such  cases 

>  Jones  V.  Tod  J,  2  J.  .1.  Marsh.  359  ;  OMlmm  r.  Sale,  1  15.  Mon.  7G  ;  Thomaa 
V.  Gammel,  6  Leigh,  9  ;  Cuiiiiinghani  v.  Knight,  1  BarV).  399;  Priest  r.  Cummin'Tf*, 
16  Weml.  617  ;  .s.  c.  20  Wend.  338  ;  Markham  v.  Merrett,  8  Miss.  437  ;  Hughes 
r.  Wat«on,  10  Ohio,  127  ;  Cason  v.  Hubbard,  38  Miss.  35. 

»  Adams  V.  Puhner,  51  Me.  480  ;  Wise.  Rev.  Stit.  c.  8(3.  §  12  ;  Lyon  r.  Kain, 
86  111.  370  ;  Hoyt  v.  Swar,  53  111.  134  ;  Uw  r.  Long,  41  Ind.  5S<]. 

"  Ulpr.  Campion,  19  Pcnn.  St.  3t51  ;  Moore  r.  Tisdnlo,  5  l\.  Mon.  352  ;  Powell 
V.  Monson,  3  Mason,  353,  354  ;  Sliaw  v.  Russ,  14  Me.  432  ;  .Stearns  r.  .Swift,  8  Pick. 
532  ;  Page  v.  Page,  »3  Cush.  196,  overruling  certain  dicta  in  Fowler  v.  .Sheart-r.  7 
Mass.  14  ;  .Tackson,  Real  Act.  326  ;  French  v.  Peters,  33  3Ie.  396  ;  Davis  r.  Bar- 
tholomew, 3  Ind.  485  ;  Dodge  v.  Aycrigg,  1  Beasley,  82  ;  Williams  v.  !to1i«on,  6 
Ohio  St.  510.  But  by  statute  in  Massachusetts,  Maine,  and  Rho<le  Island,  she 
may  release  her  dower  by  a  separate  deed  8ul»8e<jucDt  to  that  of  her  hiijliand. 
Mass.  Pub.  Stat.  c.  124.  §  6  ;  Mc  Ucv.  Slat.  1SS3.  c.  103.  §  6  ;  R.  I.  PuK  Stat 
1882,  c.  166,  §  1. 

*  Oslwme  V.  Horine,  19  111.  124.  »  Shepherd  r.  H..wanl.  2  X.  H.  507. 

•  Thatcher  v.  Howlaud.  2  .Met.  41. 

">  Leavitt  v.  l.aini>ny.  13  Pick.  383  :  fatlin  f.  Ware,  9  Moss.  218  ;  Stevens  p. 
Owen,  25  Me.  94  ;  Lufkin  i'.  Curtis,  13  Mass.  223  ;  Powell  r.  Mudsou,  3  Maaon, 
VOL.  I.—  17 


258  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

does  not  operate  by  the  way  of  grant  of  any  title,  but  by  the 
way  of  estoppel.  So  that  words  of  release  on  her  part  would 
be  as  effectual  as  any  words  of  grant.^  But  a  release  of 
dower  to  a  stranger  cannot  be  set  up  as  a  bar  to  her  claim 
against  the  tenant  of  the  estate.  Nor  would  it  make  any 
difference,  in  this  respect,  that  the  release  was  made  to  one 
through  whom  the  tenant  claims,  if  the  releasee  had  before 
that  ceased  to  have  any  interest  in  the  estate.^  But  though 
the  interest  of  a  wife  as  a  dowress  is  not  the  subject  of  grant, 
so  long  as  it  is  inchoate,  it  may  be  released  to  the  owner  of 
the  fee.  In  Illinois,  she  may  release  it  by  joining  with  her 
husband  in  a  deed  ;  and  where  the  owner  of  land  which  was 
subject  to  a  wife's  right  of  dower,  conveyed  the  same  with 
covenant  of  warranty,  and  then  the  husband  and  wife  re- 
leased her  right  of  dower  in  the  premises  to  the  vendor  and 
covenantor  of  the  tenant,  it  was  held  that  there  was  so  much 
of  privity  of  estate  between  the  covenantor  and  the  owner  of 
the  fee,  that  her  release  to  him  enured  to  the  benefit  of  his 
grantee  and  covenantee  to  bar  her  claim  of  dower.^  The  usual 
mode  of  barring  herself  by  deed  is  by  a  clause  of  simple  re- 
lease, as  "  in  token  of  relinquishing  her  right  of  dower  in  the 
granted  premises,"  or  the  like.  But  words  of  grant  may  be 
equally  effective,  although  no  reference  is  made  to  her  right 
of  dower,  eo  nomine.  Thus,  where  the  husband  owned  two 
thirds  and  the  wife  one  third  of  an  estate  in  fee,  and  they 
joined  in  making  the  deed,  and  this  clause  was  contained  in  it, 
"  in  token  of  our  conveyance  of  all  right,  title,  and  interest, 
whether  in  fee  or  in  freehold  in  the  premises,"  it  was  held 
that  she  was  barred  of  her  right  of  dower  in  the  husband's 
two  thirds.'*  And  in  a  case  in  Ohio,  where  the  language  of 
the  deed  was,  "  We  A  &  B"  (husband  and  wife),  "do  give, 
grant,"  &c.,  the  estate  in  question,  and  this  deed  was  signed 
and  acknowledged  by  both,  it  was  held  to  bar  the  wife's  right, 

347  ;  Hall  v.  Savage,  4  Mason,  273.  See  Westfall  v.  Lee,  7  Iowa,  12  ;  Lothrop 
V.  Foster,  51  Me.  367  ;  jmst,  vol.  2,  *  555. 

1  Frost  V.  Deeriug,  21  Me.  156  ;  Stearns  v.  Swift,  8  Pick.  532  ;  Learned  v. 
Cutler,  18  Pick.  9. 

2  Pixley  V.  Bennett,  11  Mass.  298  ;  Harriman  v.  Gray,  49  Me.  537. 

3  Robins  v.  Kinsie,  45  111.  354. 
^  Learned  v.  Cutler,  18  Pick.  9. 


CH.  Vn.  §  4.]  DOWER.  2')0 

thoiiirlj  it  coiitainod  no  words  of  rclcaso  of  dowor.'  And 
wliLMT,  in  another  case,  the  deed  contained  in  its  hody  lh<.' 
name  of  the  husband  alone,  l)ut  was  HJ^iod  and  scaled  hy 
them  hoth,  ami  on  tli(!  same  j)a|»er,  hut  l)elo\v  her  seal  and  sIl'- 
natnre,  there  was  a  certificate  oi  her  releas<?  of  dower  in  tho 
above  premises,  and  they  both  acknowledjred  the  deed 
before  a  *  notary,  who  eertilied  that  "  each  aeknowl-  [*-0l] 
cd};ed  that  they  sitrned,  sealed,  and  delivered  the 
above  instrument  of  mortirago,"  it  was  held  to  Ix;  a  «rood  re- 
lease of  dower  in  the  premises.^  So,  if  she  join  in  a  deed 
which  is  cxeoute(l  by  the  attorney  of  her  husband,  it  will  Ite  as 
cfTectual  as  if  siLnied  by  the  husband  himself.  At  least  it  was 
80  held  in  the  Ohio  courts,  and  was  laid  down  as  a  dictum  in 
the  case  of  Fowler  r.  Shearer,  above  cited.'*  It  is  not,  how- 
ever, easy  to  reconcile  this  doctrine  with  that  by  which  the 
deed  of  the  wife  derives  its  validity  from  the  concurrence  of 
the  husband  in  its  execution,  and  it  may  l)e  |)eculiar  to  Ohio, 
where  there  is  a  statute  upon  the  subject.  The  law  .seems  to 
be  conflicting  as  to  the  power  of  married  women  to  act  by 
attorney.  In  Delaware  it  has  been  held  that  she  coidd  nf)t 
in  that  way  make  a  deed;*  and  in  Indiana,  that  she  could  not 
acknowledirc  it  by  attorney.'' 

13.  An  unsealed  in.strument,  though  signed  by  Inisband  and 
wife  in  the  form  of  a  deed  of  conveyance,  and  containinir  a 
clause  of  relincpiishment  of  dower,  will  not  bar  her  claim." 
The  right  cannot  be  released  or  c(jnveyed  by  ]ianil.'  N'nr 
would  her  separate  release,  written  upon  the  back  of  her  hus- 
band's deed,  bar  her  unless  he  joined  in  it.*^ 

14.  And  ordinarily,  courts  do  not  extend  her  release  by  con- 
struction beyond  its  strict  legal  effect.  Thus,  where  the  wife 
by  her  deed  released  dower  to  one  of  two  tenants  in  common 

»  Smith  V.  Haii.ly,  16  Ohio,  191,  236. 

2  Duiuliia  ».  Iiit(liio«k,  12  How.  256. 

«  GU-nn  V.  Bunk  of  V.  8.,  8  Oliio,  72  ;  Fowler  v.  Shearer,  7  Mass.  14. 

*  Lewis  V.  Coxe,  5  Hamngt.  401. 

'  Dawson  r.  Sliirh-y,  6  IMiukf.  531.  See  also  Earle  r.  Earlo,  1  SiH<ncer,  347  ; 
Sumner  r.  Connnt,  10  Vt.  9  ;  Mass.  Puh.  Stat.  c.  120.  §  14  ;  Willanl,  K.  E-.t.  209  ; 
post,  vol.  2,  p.  •r>64  ;  .Wise.  Rev.  Stnt.  c.  86,  §  13,  gives  the  i>owpr. 

•  Manning  v.  Lalwree,  33  Me.  343. 

'  Keeler  v.  Tatnell,  23  N.  J.  62.  "  French  v.  Peters,  33  Mc.  396. 


260  LAW   OF  REAL   PROPERTY.  [bOOK   I. 

of  lands,  it  was  held  that  the  other  tenant  in  common  could 
not  avail  himself  of  it  as  a  bar  to  her  claim  against 
[*202]  him.i  And  the  *  acknowledging  of  a  deed  not  executed 
by  her,  will  not  bar  her  claim.^  In  one  case  a  wife 
joined  with  her  husband  in  formally  executing  a  deed,  in  which 
there  was  a  blank  left  to  be  filled  by  a  description  of  the  prem- 
ises granted.  Her  husband  inserted  altogether  a  different 
parcel  than  was  intended  when  she  signed  it,  and  delivered  it. 
It  was  held  that  she  was  not  thereby  barred  of  her  dower  in 
the  premises  described  in  the  deed.  In  other  words,  it  was 
not  a  deed  by  which  she  was  bound.^  So  where  the  deed  of 
indenture  describes  the  wife  as  a  party,  and  recites  that  the 
instrument  witnesseth  that  the  husband  thereby  conveys,  &c., 
while  he  alone  in  terms  conveys  and  covenants,  it  was  held 
not  to  bar  lier,  although  she  joined  in  its  execution  and  in 
acknowledging  it.*  In  New  Hampshire,  however,  by  force  of 
immemorial  usage  in  that  State,  if  a  wife  sign  and  seal  a  deed 
with  her  husband,  she  bars  her  dower,  though  it  contain  no 
apt  words  of  release  or  grant  on  her  part.^  In  some  of  the 
States  it  is  not  requisite  that  the  wife  should  acknowledge 
her  deed  in  order  to  give  it  effect  in  tlie  way  of  bar  of  dower. 
Such  is  the  law  in  Massachusetts,  Maine,  New  Hampshire, 
and  Connecticut.^ 

15.  But  in  most  of  the  States  it  is  not  only  necessary  that 
she  should  acknowledge  the  deed,  but  it  must  be  done  in  the 
mode  pointed  out  by  the  statute  of  the  particular  State,  and 
properly  certified  in  order  to  operate  as  a  bar.'''  And  great 
strictness  in  this  respect  is  maintained  by  the  courts;  and 
where  tbe  law  requires  a  certificate  of  the  officer  taking  the 
acknowledgment,  parol  evidence  of  the  fact  will  not  be  ad- 

1  White  r.  "White,  1  Harris.  202.  2  Witter  v.  Biscoe,  13  Ark.  422. 

8  Conover  v.  Porter,  14  Ohio  St.  450,  455  ;  post,  vol.  2,  p.  *555  ;  Burns  v.  Lynde, 
6  Allen,  305. 

*  M'Farland  v.  Febiger,  7  Ohio,  194. 

6  Burge  V.  Smith,  27  N.  H.  332  ;  Dustin  v.  Steele,  Id.  431. 

8  1  Am.  Jur.  74. 

T  Kirk  V.  Dean,  2  Binn.  341  ;  Scanlan  v.  Turner,  1  Bailey,  421  ;  Clark  v.  Red- 
man, 1  Blackf.  379  ;  Sheppard  v.  Wardell,  Coxe,  452  ;  Rogers  v.  Woody,  23  Mo. 
548  ;  Lewis  v.  Coxe,  5  Harringt.  402.  "Whether  this  is  necessary  in  Iowa,  qucsre. 
Morris  v.  Sargent,  18  Iowa,  90,  99. 


cu.  VII.  §  4.]  nowKn.  201 

niittcil  to  sii|t|>ly  this.'  The  ackiiowh'tl'jmt'nt  l)y  th<'  wif.-  in 
Ohio  lliav  he  siiiinltMlK'oiis  w  ith  th:it  of  tlic  hiisltaMil.  or  (I>>mc 
U|M»ii  :i  diflc'iviit  (hi\  .- 

It).  Tlic  (luestioii  hn.s  inon-  than  once  Iw-cn  raised  ii>  to  the 
elTect  of  a  release  ol  (h)wei-  by  a  wile  where  the  deed  of  the 
husband,  by  whieh  she  had  done  it,  wan  itself  avoided,  as  l>y 
creilitors,  for  instanec,  beeause  of  its  bein;^  fraudulent  as  to 
them.  Tlie  court  of  New  Jersey  were  inclined  to  consider  ln'f 
barri'd  of  her  claim  as  airainst  all  [M-rsons.^  JJut  the  court  <■; 
Massachusetts  in  smh  a  case  held  that  sIk^  was  not  barred 
except  as  to  those  who  claim  under  the  deed  as  a 
valid  one,  anil  *  that  a  stranir<r  win;  did  not  claim  [•203] 
umler  it  could  not  avail  himself  of  Iht  havinir  ex- 
ecuted it.*  Where  a  husbaml  made  a  deed  which  was  fraudu- 
lent as  to  his  creditors,  in  which  his  wife  joined  in  ndensini^ 
her  dower,  and  the  estate  was  then  reconveyed  to  her,  the 
creditors  haviuLT  set  aside  the  conveyance  for  fraud,  it  was 
held  that,  inasmuch  as  her  deed  conveyed  nothimr,  it  had  no 
efTect  except  by  way  of  estoppel,  and,  havini;  been  avoided, 
lier  claim  to  dower  was  not  thrrt'by  aftected  cxcejit  as  to 
those  claimintr  undei'  her  deed.  Scj  the  fraudulent  convey- 
ance by  her  husband  to  her,  when  avoided,  did  not  mertro  her 
claim  to  dower  in  the  premises,  and  the  same  was  not  therel>y 
barred.^  Nor  is  it  difhcult  to  jierccivo  irood  reason  why  such 
shoulil  Ite  the  rule  of  law,  when  it  is  remembered  that  the 
deed  of  the  wife  in  such  case  operates  niei-ely  as  an  estoppel. 
It  conveys  no  interest  or  estate  in  lands,  as  will  be  shown 
more  fully  when  the  nature  of  this  riirht  of  dower  shall  Im- 
hereafter  considered.*^     And  upon  the  same  principle,  where 

»  El  wood  r.  Klock,  13  Ikrb.  50. 

2  Williams  r.  Hobson,  6  UhioSt.  510,  515. 

'  Diu  V.  Johnson,  3  Harris.  8". 

*  iJobinson  r.  Iktcs,  3  .Mit.  40.     See  also  Manhattan  Co.  v.  Kviit-ion,  0  P.'»ijr»', 
(h.  4.'»7  ;  WcKxhvorth    r.    I'aige,  5   Ohio  St.  "0  ;   Kiihanlson  r.  Wvnian,  >V2   M< 
2.S(> ;  Mullciney  r.  Horon,   49  X.  Y.   Ill,  117  ;   Harriinan  r.  C.niy,  41»  M 
M«Farlan<l  r.   Cioo^lnian,  22  Am.  L.  He>,'.  "03;    Ki<lj;Avay  r.  Masting,  23  < '. 

294.  Hut  where  the  «lee<l  whi.  h  .sh<-  sif^m-.l  w«.s  nvoitletl  by  not  Iwing  «iuly 
reconbii,  she  wonKl  Ik*  l»m-<l  by  it.     Morton  r.  Noble,  57  111.  176, 

*  Mnlloncy  c.  Horon,  49  N.  V.  111.  117  ;   Harriman  v.  Oray,  49  .Me.  537  ; 
Kiclmnlson  r.  Wymnn,  62  Me.  280  ;  Hi.lgway  «•.  Ma.sting,  23  Ohjr.  .><t.  294. 

*  Grccu  r.  Putnam,  1  IJarb.  500  ;  Moore  r.  Tbo  Mayor,  8  X.  Y.  llu. 


262  LAW   OF   EEAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

the  grantee  of  the  husband  under  a  deed,  in  which  the  wife 
joined,  sued  the  husband  upon  his  covenant  of  seisin,  and 
recovered  in  the  action,  it  was  held  he  could  no  longer  avail 
himself  of  the  deed  as  a  bar  to  the  wife's  claim  to  dower  out 
of  the  same  premises.  He  had  avoided  the  deed  by  such 
judgment.^  And  where  a  widow,  administratrix,  in  order  to 
settle  a  claim  against  her  husband's  estate,  surrendered  her 
claim  of  dower,  and  the  settlement  was  set  aside,  she  was 
remitted  to  her  right  of  dower.^ 

17.  From  the  familiar  knowledge  of  the  effect  of  a  fore- 
closure of  a  mortgage  upon  the  rights  of  the  parties  to  the 
same,  it  is  hardly  necessary  to  add,  that  if  a  mortgage  given 
by  the  husband  before  marriage,  or  by  husband  and  wife  during 
coverture,  is  foreclosed,  all  right  of  dower  on  the  part  of  the 
wife  is  thereby  barred  at  law.^  But  it  seems  that  in  order  to 
bar  a  wife's  right  of  dower  by  foreclosure  in  New  York,  the 
wife  must  be  made  a  party  to  the  proceedings ;  she  is  not 
bound  by  those  against  her  husband  alone.*  A  different  rule 
prevails  in  some  of  the  States.^  Such  would  be  the  effect  of 
the  vendor's  enforcing  his  lien  for  the  purchase-money,  or  of 
the  enforcement  of  a  judgment  lien  outstanding  at  the  time 
of  the  marriage.^ 

17  a.  Although  by  the  foreclosure  of  a  mortgage  made  be- 
fore marriage,  or  in  which  the  wife  joined  if  made  after,  or 
where  the  equity  of  redemption  is  acquired  by  the  husband 
during  coverture,  the  wife's  right  of  dower  is  defeated  and  ex- 
tinguished at  law,  if  the  husband  before  such  foreclosure  shall 
have  conveyed  his  interest  in  the  estate  by  bankruptcy  or 

1  Stinson  v.  Sumner,  9  Mass.  143.  ^  Pinson  v.  Williams,  23  Miss.  64. 

8  Nottingham  v.  Calvert,  1  Ind.  527  ;  Farwell  v.  Cotting,  8  Allen,  211  ;  Pitts 
V.  Altlrich,  11  Allen,  39. 

*  Wheeler  v.  Morris,  2  Bosw.  524  ;  Bell  v.  Tlie  Mayor,  10  Paige,  49  ;  Lewis  v. 
Smith,  9  N.  Y.  502  ;  Mills  r.  Van  Voorhis,  23  Barb.  125,  134,  136.  But  see  Smith 
V.  Gardner,  42  Barb.  356.  There  seems  to  be  an  exception  to  this  rule  if  the 
mortgage  which  is  foreclosed  is  given  for  the  purchase-money.  The  wife  would 
be  bound  by  it,  though  done  in  mortgagor's  lifetime,  without  making  her  a  party. 
Bracket  v.  Baum,  50  N.  Y.  8. 

6  See  j)ost,  p.  *596  ;  Davis  v.  Wetherell,  13  Allen,  60,  62. 

6  Bisland  v.  Hewett,  11  Sm.  &  M.  164  ;  Wilson  v.  Davisson,  2  Rob.  (Ya.)  384  ; 
Piobbinsi?.  Robbins,  8  Blackf.  174  ;  Ingram  v.  Morris,  4  Harringt.  Ill  ;  Williams 
V.  Woods,  1  Humph.  408 ;  post,  p.  *266. 


CM.  VII.  §  4.]  DOWF.R.  203 

olhcrwisr,  the  wife  may  luivt-  a  liill  in  CMjiiity  to  rcdiTin  the 
estate  from  the  mort^a<re  duiinjr  the  life  of  the  huHhaixl,  und 
thereby  save  the  same  from  forfeitun?.  If  slie  rederm.s,  she 
becomes  thereby  an  e((ijital)K'  assiirnee  of  the  mortgaj^e.' 

18.  But  tliere  is  no  way  in  which  a  /tine  cuvert  at  common 
law  can  l)ar  her  ri^ht  of  dower  by  any  release  made  to  her 
hnsband.'-  l']ven  a  eonti-aet  made  between  herself, 
lier  hiisliand,  *  and  her  trustee,  releasin'j:  her  claim  of  [••J04] 
dower,  would  not,  if  made  during  coverture,  have  that 
ofTect/'  A  contract  to  forbear  to  claim  dower  is  not  a  n  lease 
of  it,  nor  will  a  covenant,  entered  into  before  marriatre,  n<»t  to 
claim  dower,  operate  as  a  release  of  her  claim.' 

11».  It  has  often  been  held  that  a  widow  lias  barred  herself 
from  claiming  dower  by  acts  which  have  operateil  in  the  way 
of  estopiiel,  of  which  instances  will  bo  given.  Hut  these  acts, 
in  order  to  have  that  effect  ujjon  the  rights  of  a  married  woman, 
must  constructively  amount  to  one  of  the  modes  knf)wn  to  the 
law  as  constituting  such  bar,  since  her  right  of  d.jwer  is  not 
derived  from,  nor  is  it  dependent  on,  any  contract ;  nor  would 
she  i)e  b.ure(l  l»y  any  acts  or  decdarations  upon  which  others 
may  h:ive  been  induced  to  act,  although  in  a  matter  of  con- 
tract under  similar  circumstances  sh  j  might  not  !)»•  admitted 
to  aver  against  the  triith  of  her  acts  or  declarations,  when  by 
80  doing  it  would  work  fraud  and  injustice.'''  In  one  case  the 
husband  mortgaged  his  estate  without  the  wife  joining  in  the 
deed.  He  then  conveyed  the  equity  of  redemjition  by  deed,  in 
which  his  wife  joined.  Suliseipiently  the  grantee  in  the  last 
deed  reconvcyed  to  the  husband,  and  it  was  held  that  she  coidd 
only  claim  dower  in  the  eciuity,  since  by  joining  with  her  hus- 
band in  the  deed  of  the  cijuity,  she  had  released  and  extin- 
guished all  right  to  the  estate  as  it  originally  existed.®  Hut 
questions  of  e8toi)pel  have  most  frequently  arisen  where  sales 

»  Dnvis  V.  Wetherell,  13  Allen,  60  ;  Burns  ».  Lyndc,  6  Allen,  305. 
»  (-'nrvjii  r.  Miirmy,   3  Piige,  483  ;  Rowe  r.    Hainilton,  3  Me.  63  ;  Martin  r. 
Martin,  22  Ala.  104. 

•  Townsontl  r.  Ti>v\ns<'n"l,  2  SAiulf.  711. 

•  I'roadi-  V.   Inf;rnliiun.    13   Tick.  33;    HastingB  r.   Dickinson,  7  Ma&s.  153; 
Gil>3on  V.  Cihsun,  15  .Mn-ss.  10«5  ;  Vnnco  r.  Vance,  21  Me.  304. 

»  Martin  c.  Martin.  22  Ala.  86.  104. 

•  Hoogland  r.  Watt,  2  SuuJf.  Lh.  14S. 


264  LAW   OP   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   J. 

of  estates  have  been  made  after  the  death  of  the  husband, 
under  circumstances  involving  some  action  on  the  part  of  the 
widow.  Thus  where  a  widow  was  entitled  to  dower  out  of  an 
equitable  estate  of  her  husband,  which  was  sold  Ijy  his  admin- 
istrator by  order  of  court,  at  which  sale  she  was  present  and 
stated  that  the  estate  was  free  from  any  claim  of  dower  ;  it  was 
held  that  she  was  thereby  estopped  from  claiming  it  against  the 

purchaser,  who  had  bought  the  premises  relying  upon 
[*205]  her  statement,  although  it  *  was  merely  by  parol.^     In 

one  case  the  court  left  it  uncertain  whether  by  her 
merely  standing  by  at  such  a  sale,  and  not  making  known  her 
claim,  she  would  be  estopped  to  urge  it.^  But  the  cases  here- 
after referred  to  do  not  recognize  so  strict  a  rule  of  duty  on 
her  part.  There  must  be  some  unequivocal  act  or  declaration 
on  her  part  which  would  either  render  a  claim  of  dower  on  her 
part  clearly  unjust,  or  subject  her  to  damages  equal  to  its 
value  if  claimed,  where  the  court,  to  avoid  circuity  of  action, 
would  refuse  the  claim.  Thus  where  the  widow,  as  adminis- 
tratrix of  her  husband's  estate,  sold  lands  under  license  of 
court,  and  orally  declared  they  were  free  of  dower,  and  the 
purchaser  went  on  and  made  improvements  upon  them,  she 
was  held  to  be  estopped.^  But  where  she  was  present  at  the 
public  sale  of  the  husband's  estate  and  made  no  objection  or 
declaration,  she  was  held  not  to  be  estopped.*  Nor  even 
where  as  administratrix  she  sold  the  estate  for  the  payment  of 
her  husband's  debts,  but  said  nothing  upon  the  subject  of 
dower.^  But  if  she  had  induced  the  purchaser  to  act  upon  the 
belief  that  she  had  no  claim  of  dower,  she  might,  perhaps,  be 
estopped  from  claiming  it.^  On  the  other  hand,  where  she  sold 
her  husband's  estate  imder  a  defective  power  and  received  the 
purchase-money,  she  was  not  allowed  to  claim  dower  out  of 
the  estate  sold."  So  where  the  heirs  sold  the  inheritance  by  an 
arrangement  with  the  widow  that  she  should  receive  her  share 
of  the  purchase-money,  which  was  accordingly  paid  to  her,  and 

1  Smiley  v.  Wright,  2  Ohio,  506.  ^  jjeth  v.  Cocke,  1  Band.  344. 

3  Dougi-ey  v.  Topping,  4  Paige,  94. 

4  Smith  V.  Paysenger,  2  (2  Mill.)  Const.  R.  (S.  C.    59. 

»  Sip  V.  Lawback,  2  Harris.  442.         «  Wright  v.  De  Groif,  14  Mich.  164,  167. 
">  Reed  v.  Morrison,  12  S.  &  R.  18. 


CII.  Vll.  §  4.]  DOWER.  2G5 

she  fjavc  ii  rcccii)!  for  the  same,  l»ut  si<_'nf(l  no  dcctl  nf  rclcasi', 
it  was  lii'Ul  that  she  was  cstniiprd  I'mm  claiiniiij;  \u'V  dower,' 
But  whore  the  widow  as  administratrix  in  connection  witli  a 
co-adniinistrator,  in  order  to  cai'ry  out  a  contract  of  sah*  en- 
tered into  l)y  the  hiisbanil,  convuy«'(l,  unch'rdecrt'e  of  court,  all 
the  estate  of  her  hnsl)and  and  all  her  own,  after  his 
death,  and  siirnccl  *  tluir  names  to  th«'  deed,  it  was  held  [•200J 
not  to  pass  or  alYeet  lier  rigiit  of  dowcr.^  And  where 
commissioneis  made  under  an  order  of  court  juissed  u|inn  the 
api»licatioii  nf  a  widow,  sold  land  of  the  husbaml,  hut  nothinj; 
was  said  of  dowei-  in  her  application,  she  was  held  nut  t(» 
be  estopjuHl  from  claiminu:  it  ;  nor  would  she  b»',  thou;:h 
present  at  the  sale,  and  makiuir  no  claim  of  dower.'  JJut 
where  as  administratrix  she  sold  her  husband's  land  by  order 
of  court,  ami  in  her  deed  covenanted  to  warrant  the  title,  to 
avoid  circuity  of  action,  slit,'  was  held  to  lia\c  tln-reiiy  barred 
herself  of  dowei-.'  So  whei-e  the  estates  of  which  the  husband 
died  si'iscd  was  sold  by  direction  of  the  court  of  erpiity  free 
from  dower  for  the  j)ayment  of  his  debts,  and  the  wife  took 
part  in  the  jiroceedinjjrs,  it  was  held  to  l)ar  her  dower.''  And 
where  the  widow  as  administratrix  sold  her  husband's  estate 
and  then  married  the  j)urchaser,  and  he  sold  the  estate  by  a 
warranty  deed,  in  which  she  joined,  rclinquishini;  her  rijrht  of 
dower  in  the  premises,  it  was  held  that  she  was  barred  as  to 
her  rights  under  either  husband.''  In  another  case  the  mort- 
gagee brought  a  l»ill  to  foreclose  the  mortgage,  and  made  the 
widow,  as  administratrix  of  the  husband,  a  party  to  the  suit, 
but  said  nothing  of  her  right  as  dowress.  '{'he  estate  was  sold 
under  a  decree  of  the  court,  but  it  was  held  that  she  was  not 
thereby  l)arrcd  of  her  dower  therein." 

20.  A  widow  may  be  estopped  or  rebutted  from  claiming 
dower  by  the  covenants  of  her  ancestor  from  whom  she  has 
received  assets.     Thus  the  laud  of  A  was  sold  on  execution, 

'  Simpson's  ApfHial,  8  IVim.  St.  l;>9  ;  Ellis  v.  Diddy,  1  Smith  (Ind. ).  354;  ».  c. 
1  Iiid.  561. 

2  Shurtz  V.  Tlinnifts,  8  r.-nn.  St.  359.     Soo  Aikinnn  v.  Ilnrs.  II,  08  X.  V.  18rt. 

•  Owin  r.  Sliitttr,  2t>  Ala.  547  ;  Tonnnnt  r.  Stoney,  1  Rich.  Vai  222.  Hut  tco 
Stoney  r.  Charleston  Bk.,  1  Kich.  Kq.  275. 

•  .Mngif  V.  Mellon,  23  Mi.-w.  585.  *  fJiirdincr  r.  Miles  5  Hill.  94. 

•  Usher  r.  lUchimison,  29  Mc.  415.  '  Ltwis  v.  Smith,  11  Uirh.  15'i 


266  LAW   OP   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

and  bought  by  B,  who  conveyed  it  with  covenants  of  warranty. 
A's  wife  was  heir  at  law  to  B,  and  on  his  death  received  assets 
by  descent.     A  and  B  having  both  died,  she  sued  for  dower  as 

widow  of  A.  But  the  court  held  that  she  could  not 
[*207]   claim  it  *  against  the  covenants  of  B,  since  what  she 

recovered  as  dower  she  would  have  to  respond  for 
as  heir.i 

21.  In  some  of  the  States  a  widow  holds  her  right  to  dower 
subject  to  the  right  of  creditors  of  the  husband  to  have  his 
property  disposed  of  for  their  benefit.  Such  is  the  case  in 
Pennsylvania,  where  the  estate  is  sold  by  legal  process  called 
a  judicial  sale.^  So  a  sale  for  taxes  in  Ohio,  if  made  by  a 
proper  officer,  cuts  off  a  widow's  claim  to  dower  in  the  prem- 
ises.^ But  where  the  husband,  as  an  insolvent  debtor,  con- 
veyed his  estate  to  trustees  to  sell  to  pay  his  debts,  it  was 
held  that  such  sale  would  not  bar  the  wife's  dower  as  if  made 
by  the  sheriff  or  administrator,  or  the  like.^  But  in  Massa- 
chusetts, Delaware,  Illinois,  and  Tennessee,  the  claims  of  cred- 
itors are  subordinate  to  that  of  dower.^  And  where  in  New 
Jersey  the  interest  of  the  mortgagor  was  sold  after  his  death 
by  order  of  court,  his  wife  was  held  to  be  entitled  to  dower 
out  of  the  surplus,  after  satisfying  the  mortgage.^  The  right 
of  widows  to  dower  out  of  the  surplus  of  estates  wliich  have 
been  sold  by  order  of  court  for  special  purposes,  will  be  fur- 
ther explained  when  the  mode  of  assigning  dower  is  consid- 
ered. 

22.  The  necessity  of  seisin  in  the  husband  has  been  already 
considered  as  a  necessary  element  of  the  right  of  dower.     The 

1  Torrey  v.  Minor,  1  Sm.  &  M.  Ch.  489.  See  Bates  ■;;.  Norcross,  14  Pick.  224  ; 
Russ  V.  Perry,  49  N.  H.  547.  But  in  ilassachusetts  not  unless  the  assets  were 
strictly  such  within  the  State.    Julian  v.  B.  C.  F.  &c.  R.  R.,  128  Mass.  555. 

'^  Kirk  V.  Dean,  2  Binu.  .341  ;  Reed  v.  Morrison,  12  S.  &  R.  18 ;  4  Kent,  Com. 
41. 

*  Jones  V.  Devore,  8  Ohio  St.  430. 

*  Keller  v.  Michael,  2  Yeates,  300  ;  Eberle  v.  Fisher,  13  Penn.  St.  526.  So  a 
wife  is  not  barred  by  a  sale  by  an  assignee  in  bankruptcy.  Lazear  v.  Porter, 
87  Penn.  St.  513  ;  overruling  dictum  in  Worcester  v.  Clark,  2  Grant,  84. 

5  Stinson  v.  Sumner,  9  Mass.  143 ;  Griffin  v.  Reece,  1  Harringt.  508  ;  Sisk  v. 
Smith,  1  Gilm.  503  ;  Coombs  v.  Young,  4  Yerg.  218  ;  Lewis  v.  Coxe,  5  Harriugt 
402. 

«  Hinchman  v.  Stiles,  1  Stockt.  361,  454. 


cii.  VII.  §  4.]  nowKR.  '2>u 

cflFect  of  cl('f(!iitiii<;  tluH  seisiii  upon  a  widow'n  ri^'lit,  pn 
interesting  (luestions,  and  Konie  of  tlirm  of  .i.n'.iil'  i  'l.l- 
culty. 

23.  If  the  seisin  of  tlu?  liushand  Ite  tlcfeated  In  a  |iaianii)iuit 
title  and  right  of  seisin  which  has  its  origin  prior  to  that  of 
the  hnshand,  it  (U'feats  with  it  the  right  of  (hjwt-r  in  the  wife 
or  widow.  Thus,  if  the  seisin  <»f  the  huslmnd  is  wrongful,  as 
that  of  a  dis.sfisor,  and  the  rightful  owner  n'gain  his  si-isin 
after  the  husband's  death,  the  dower  of  the  widow  will  Ix,' 
defeated.  1 

24.  So  whore  tiie  husliaiid's  lan<l  at  the  lime  <.f  Ins  mar- 
riage was  under  attachnu-nt,  or  sul)jeet  to  a  judgment 

lien,  and  was  levied  upon  during  coverture,  *  it  was  [•20H] 
held  that  his  seisin  was  therein'  defeated  at  a  period 
anterior  to  the  marriage,  and  his  widow's  right  of  dower  there- 
by destroyed.'-^  Hut  her  claim  to  her  dower  is  generally  held 
paramount  to  a  builder's  lien  u]ion  land  of  the  huslian<l,  for 
labor  or  materials  furnished  during  coverture.'^ 

25.  So  if  lands  whieh  have  descende<l  to  an  heir  are  sold 
for  payment  of  the  ancestor's  debt,  or  by  an  executor,  under  a 
power  in  the  will  of  the  t<^stator,the  seisin  of  the  heir  (jr  devisee, 
although  completed  by  entry,  will  thereby  be  divestecl,  and  the 
right  of  dower  in  his  wife  defeated.'* 

2d.  The  sanu'  effeet  would  follow  if  the  huslmnd  is  evieted 
during  coverture  by  title  j»aiamount,  (jr  if,  his  otate  being  one 
upon  condition,  the  grantor  or  donor  enters  for  a  breach  of 
the  condition,  and  regains  his  oi-iginal  seisin.'*  In  the  case  of 
13eardslee  v.  lieardslee,  just  cited,  the  tenant  for  life  leased  to 
the  remainder-man  in  fee,  for  the  term  of  th<'  life  of  the  lessor. 
Ordinarily,  the  union  of  the  particular  estat*-  with  the  inherit- 
ance in  remainder  or  reversion  would  ojx-r  it"  <.>  '/iv.-  ili.-  uifo 

»  Tiul.  Ca-H.  44;  2(nil.l.,  K.-ul  rroj.    165. 

"  IJrowii  r.  Williiuns.  31  .Mo.  403;  Sjuifonl  r.  Mclican,  3  Pnigr,  117.  And 
where  the  levy  wa.s  sul»so<jiifiit  to  tin-  IiusUiikI'h  ili-ntli,  it  woulil  defeat  the  Jowcr 
Kssigiiisl  alronily  to  his  wiilow.     Wliiti-h<u.l  r.  ('uniiiiiiiH,  2  Iiul.  58. 

*  Antt,  "les  and  n.     So  Murk  r.  Muri-hy.  76  Iiid.  534. 

*  Orecno  r.  Ore^Mic.  1  Oliio,  241*  ;  W.  jr  r.  Tate,  4  IrwI.  ¥^{.  2'14  ;  Mit<hrll  v. 
Mitchell,  8  Pinn.  St.  126. 

*  2  Cnitih,  Real  Prop.  166  ;  BcardHl.-.-  r.  BoanUK-e,  5  Bar)..  324  :  NorlJirul  a 
Whipp,  12  B.  Mou.  72  ;  Com.  Dig.  "  Dower,"  A-  6  ;  Pcrkiu*.  §{  311.  312. 


268  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [bOOK   L 

of  the  remainder-man  dower  by  way  of  merger  or  surrender. 
But  in  this  case  the  lease  was  upon  condition  that  the  rent 
should  be  paid,  which  the  lessee  having  failed  to  perform,  the 
lessor  entered  and  defeated  his  seisin  and  estate,  and  with  it 
the  right  of  dower  in  his  wife. 

27.  So  where  the  husband  is  seised  of  a  base  or  a  determi- 
nable fee,  and  the  same  is  determined  by  the  happening  of  the 
event  upon  which  it  is  limited,  the  right  of  dower  on  the  part 
of  his  wife  or  widow  thereupon  ceases.^ 

28.  Upon  this  principle,  the  case  of  Ray  v.  Pung  was  de- 
cided.^ Lands  were  conveyed  to  A  B  and  his  heirs  in  trust 
for  such  uses  as  C  D  should  by  deed  appoint,  and  in  the  mean 
time  and  in  default  of  such  appointment,  to  C  D  in  fee.     C  D 

then  had  a  wife,  and  afterwards  by  deed  appointed 
[*209]  the  estate  *  to  another  in  fee,  and  it  was  held  that  his 

wife  thereby  lost  her  right  of  dower.^  But  if  such 
deed  of  appointment  had  not  been  executed,  his  wife  might 
have  claimed  her  dower  in  the  estate.  Thus,  where  A,  for  a 
consideration  paid  by  B,  conveyed  lands  to  a  trustee  in  trust 
to  the  use  of  B  and  his  heirs,  they  to  possess  the  same,  and  in 
trust  to  convey  the  same  to  such  person  as  B  should  by  will 
or  in  writing  appoint,  and  B  died  without  having  made  any 
such  appointment,  it  was  held  that  the  wife  might  have  dower, 
on  the  ground  that,  under  the  Statute  of  Uses,  B  took  a  quali- 
fied or  determinable  fee,  but  one  which  had  not  been  deter- 
mined.^ 

29.  Out  of  the  doctrine  that  a  widow's  right  of  dower  may 
be  defeated  by  avoiding  the  seisin  upon  which  it  depends, 
grows  the  familiar  maxim,  Bos  de  dote  peti  non  debet,  which 
is  American  as  well  as  English  law.^  The  application  of  this 
doctrine  may  be  illustrated  in  this  way.  Upon  the  death  of 
the  owner  of  the  land  in  fee,  it  passes  at  once  by  descent  or 
devise  to  his  heir  or  devisee,  and  carries  with  it  such  a  seisin 
as  gives  the  wife  of  such  heir  or  devisee  a  right  of  dower  in 
the  premises.     The  ancestor  or  devisor  may  have  left  a  widow 

1  2  Crabb,  Real  Prop.  166  ;  Seymour's  Case,  10  Rep.  96  ;  Com.  Dig.  "Dower," 
A.  5. 

2  Ray  V.  Pung,  5  B.  &  A.  561.  »  4  Kent,  Com.  51  ;  1  Atk.  Conv.  277. 
*  Peay  V.  Peay,  2  Rich.  Eij.  409.  6  i  Dane,  Abr.  671. 


en.  VII.  ij  1.]  POWER.  200 

wIjo  i.s  (Mititlud  to  (lower  out  of  the  land,  Imt  until  she  li.'is  it 
set  out,  the  existence  of  .suth  a  riirlit  does  not  afl'ret  that  of 
the  wife  of  tlie  heir  or  devisee,  and  if  he  dies  she  may  elaini 
dower  out  of  the  whole  estate.'  As  will  he  more  fully  shown 
liereafter,  the  estate  of  a  dowress,  as  soon  as  iier  estate  is  set 
out  to  her,  is  considered  as  a  continuation  of  thr  husliand's 
estate,  restinu:  upon  his  seisin,  there  heintr,  in  edutcmplation 
of  law,  no  interval  of  time  or  estate  hctwcen  that  of  tin-  hus- 
hand  and  the  dowrr  estate  (»f  his  wife.  If,  fhrn-fdrr,  tin- 
widow  ()i  the  ancestor  or  devisor  sees  lit  at  any  time  to  rnforce 
lier  riirht  and  to  have  her  dower  assitrned,  it  at  (incc  relates 
back  and  cuts  olT  the  seisin  <if  the  heir  or  devisee  as  to  so 
much  of  the  estate,  and  converts  his  interest  into  that  <if  a 
reversion  expectant  upon  her  death,  and  with  it  de- 
stroys the  estate  in  *  possession  which  he  may  have  [•210] 
enjoyed  in  the  interim,  as  if  it  had  never  existed.  If, 
tlicn,  he  were  to  die  in  the  life  of  the  last-named  dowress,  his 
widow  could  not  claim  dower  for  want  of  a  suflieicnt  seisin 
on  his  j)art  durinix  coverture.^  If,  before  the  widow  of  the 
ancestor  should  have  her  (h)wer  assijnied,  the  heir  were  to 
die  and  his  widow  should  have  her  (hjwer  assi^^ned  to  her, 
and  then  the  first-mentioned  widow  were  to  have  hers  assijined 
in  the  same  land,  it  would  defeat  the  first  assi^^nment.  Nor 
could  the  wife  of  the  heir,  if  he  dies  leavinir  the  widow  of  his 
ancestor,  liave  dower  in  the  lands  set  out  to  her,  after  the 
death  of  the  latter,  because  her  husband,  by  construction  of 
law,  never  had  anything  in  them  but  a  reversionary  interest.^ 
But  if  the  heir  in  the  case  above  supposed  had  purchaseil  the 
estate  of  his  ancestor  in  his  lifetime  and  married,  and  the  an- 
cestor's widow  after  his  death  should  have  her  dower  assipned 
in  the  granted  premi.ses,  it  would  not  have  the  effect  to  defeat 
the  seisin  accpiired  by  the  deed,  l)ut  would  only  be  an  inter- 
ruption of  that  seisin  during  the  life  of   the  elder  dowress. 

»  Elwoo^l  V.  'Klock,  13  Barb.  60  ;  1  Cruise,  Dig.  164  ;  Hitolicns  r.  Hitch- 
ens,  2  Vera.  405  ;  Geer  v.  Hamblin,  1  Mo.  54  ;  Robinson  r.  Miller,  2  B.  Mon. 
288. 

«  Co.  Lit.  31  n  ;  Park,  Dow.  155  ;  Goer  r.  Hamblin.  1  Me.  54  ;  Dunlinm  r. 
Ostwm,  1  Paige,  634  ;  Cook  v.  HBniiiioiul.  4  Mason,  485. 

•  Reynolds  v.  Reynolds,  5  Paige,  161  ;  Safford  v.  Safford,  7  Paige,  259 ;  4  Kent, 
Com.  8th  ed.  65,  n. 


270  LATV  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

Or  if  before  dower  had  been  set  off  to  the  elder  dowress,  the 
purchaser  had  died,  and  his  own  widow  had  been  endowed 
out  of  the  same,  the  assignment  of  dower  to  the  former  would 
operate  to  interrupt  the  enjoyment  of  the  latter  of  her  dower 
during  the  life  of  the  former,  but  no  longer.  Or  if  the  pur- 
chaser had  died  during  the  life  of  the  ancestor's  widow,  and 
after  her  dower  had  been  assigned,  the  widow  of  tlie  purchaser 
would  be  entitled  to  dower  out  of  the  remainder  of  the  estate, 
together  with  dower  out  of  the  reversion  of  that  part  of  the 

estate  set  to  the  ancestor's  widow.^  *  In  the  first  of 
[*211]  the  cases  above  supposed,  the  *  doctrine  dos  de  dote 

prevailing,  the  widow  of  the  ancestor  had  her  estate 
as  a  continuance  of  her  husband's  as  if  there  had  been  no 
intermission  between  them.  In  the  others  the  purchaser  had 
acquired  a  seisin  in  the  life  of  the  ancestor,  and  hers  could 
only  go  back  to  his  death.  A  reported  case  will  serve  to 
illustrate  this  matter  further.  A  husband  died,  leaving  a 
wife  and  six  children.  One  of  these,  a  son,  married  and  died 
in  the  life  of  his  mother,  and  it  was  held  that  his  widow  could 
claim  dower  in  only  one  sixth  of  two  third  parts  of  the  fa- 
ther's estate.^  But  in  the  cases  supposed  above,  if  the  widow 
of  the  ancestor  or  of  the  vendor  had  had  her  dower  set  out  in 
the  premises  before  the  heir  or  purchaser  had  married,  and 
he  were  to  marry  and  die  in  her  lifetime,  his  widow  could  not 
claim  dower.  The  seisin  which  he  had  acquired  before  dower 
had  been  set  out  as  supposed  would  not  avail  him,  not  having 
existed  during  their  coverture,  and  as  soon  as  it  was  set  out 
his  estate  was  converted  into  a  reversion  which  could  not  give 
his  own  widow  dower.^ 

30.  The  cases  do  not  seem  to  be  uniform  upon  the  subject, 

*  Note.  —  In  the  case  of  Bear  v.  Snyder,  11  "Wend.  592,  the  court  seem  to 
have  overlooked  the  distinction  that  the  second  widow  is  entitled  to  dower  out 
of  the  reversion  of  the  land  set  out  to  the  first,  where  the  husband  of  the  former 
takes  by  purchase,  but  not  where  he  takes  by  descent. 

1  4  Dane,  Abr.  663  ;  1  Eoper,  Hus.  &  Wife,  382  ;  Park,  Dow.  156  ;  1  Cruise, 
Dig.  164  ;  Bastard's  Case,  4  Rep.  122  ;  Geer  v.  Hamblin,  1  Me.  54  ;  Manning  v. 
Laboree,  33  Me.  343 ;  Dunham  v.  Osborn,  1  Paige,  634. 

2  In  Matter  of  Cregier,  1  Barb.  Ch.  598. 

^  Park,  Dow.  156  ;  Reynolds  v.  Reynolds,  5  Paige,  161. 


en.  VII.  §  4.]  nowKu.  271 

liow  far  the  widow  claimintr  under  tlie  elder  title  iiiuRt  linvo 
proceeded  in  Imvinir  lier  dower  assigned  to  her,  fo  alTeet  tin; 
ri<;ht  of  the  yonnL'"er  widow  to  h;i\i'  dower  out  of  the  entire 
estate.  Th(>  (juestion  has  lieen  raise*!  where  the  tenant  ha.s 
soujrlit  to  har  tlu'  youuL't'i"  widow  hy  inti-rjiosinj;  the  right  of 
the  elder  to  dower.  In  one  case  T  L  conveyed  lands  to  S  L^ 
who  conveyed  to  the  tenant.  Aft»r  T  I/s  death,  his  widow 
sued  for  her  dower,  and  olttained  judgment,  ami  then  released 
to  tlic  tenant.  Then  the  widow  of  S  L,  he  luiving  died,  «ued, 
claiming  dower  out  of  the  whole  estate.  But  it  was  held  that 
she  could  only  have  it  out  of  two  thirds  of  the  estate  exclud- 
ing the  third  of  which  the  llrst  was  dowable.'  Hut  where  the 
first  of  two  wiclows,  in  the  case  supposed,  released  to 
the  tenant  her  *  right  hef(jrc  she  had  taken  measures  [••21J] 
to  have  her  dower  assigned,  it  was  held  to  be  no  har 
to  the  second  claiming  dower  out  of  the  entire  estate,  since 
by  the  release  of  the  first  her  right  was  simply  extinguished, 
and  no  one  could  set  it  uj)  against  the  claim  of  the  second.- 

31.  To  the  extent  already  dclinifl,  it  is  not  understood  that 
there  is  any  difficulty  in  determining  how  the  right  of  dower 
is  affected  by  the  seisin  upon  which  it  (U'j)ends  being  defeated, 
as  in  case  of  a  base  fee,  or  an  estate  upon  condition,  and  the 
like.  IJut  there  is  a  class  of  cases  where  what  at  first  sight 
might  seem  to  be  an  inconsistent  doctrine  is  aj>plied.  Thus, 
in  the  familiar  case  of  tenant  in  tail  dying  without  issue,  al- 
though the  estate,  as  one  of  inheritance,  is  determined,  and 
the  remainder  over  upon  such  a  contingency  takes  efTect,  yet, 
it  having  been  an  estate  of  inheritance  in  the  tenant,  his 
widow,  if  he  dies,  will  be  entitled  to  dower,  it  being  by  impli- 
cation of  law  annexed  to  such  an  estate  as  an  incidental  |)art 
of  it,  a  portion  of  the  quantity  of  enjoyment  designated  by 
the  terms  of  the  limitation  itself.^  And  the  doctrine  is  broadly 
laid  down  by  writers  upon  the  sul»ject,  that  wherever  the  hus- 
band is  seised  during  coverture  of  such  an  estate  as  is  in  its 
nature  subject  to  the  attachment  of  dower,  the  right  of  dower 
will  not  be  defeated  by  the  determination  of  that  estate  by 

*  LtAvitt  r.  Lnniprey,  13  Pick.  382. 

2  F.1\vo<h1  r.  Klock,  13  Biirb.  50.     See  also  Atwood  r.  Atwcxxl,  22  Pick.  283. 

•  2  Crnbb,  Real  Prop.  165  ;  4  Kent,  Com.  49  ;  Park,  Dow.  82,  157. 


272  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

its  regular  and  natural  limitation,  as  in  the  case  of  tenant  in 
tail  dying  without  issue,  or  tenant  in  fee  dying  without  heirs, 
whereby  the  estate  escheats.^ 

32.  And  this  class  of  cases  has  given  rise  to  much  ingenious 
speculation  and  grave  diversity  of  opinion,  where  the  estate 
of  the  husband  is  one  of  inheritance,  but  ceases  at  his  death 
by  Avliat  is  called  a  conditional  limitation.  This  may  be  illus- 
trated by  example,  although  the  nature  of  executory  estates 
may  not  yet  have  been  explained.     It  should  be  borne  in  mind 

that  the  distinction  between  estates  upon  condition 
[*213]  which  have  already  *  been  spoken  of,  and  conditional 

limitations,  is  that  the  former  can  only  be  defeated  by 
the  grantor  or  his  heirs  entering  for  condition  broken,  and 
defeating  the  estate ;  so  that,  notwithstanding  the  breach,  the 
estate  and  those  dependent  upon  it  remain  unaffected  until 
such  entry.  In  case  of  conditional  limitations,  however,  the 
estate  is  so  limited  by  the  terms  of  the  grant  or  devise  creat- 
ing it,  that  upon  the  happening  of  some  condition,  the  estate 
ipso  facto  ceases,  and  passes  at  once  over  to  some  other  per- 
son. Again,  while  by  the  common  law  a  freehold  cannot  be 
created  to  commence  in  future  unless  by  the  way  of  reversion 
or  remainder,  nor  can  a  reversion  or  remainder  be  created  to 
take  effect  after  the  determination  of  a  prior  estate  in  fee- 
simple,  yet  by  way  of  springing  or  shifting  use  by  deed,  or  by 
way  of  executory  devise  by  will,  a  fee-simple  may  be  limited 
to  take  effect  after  a  previous  estate  in  fee-simple  shall  have 
been  determined.  To  recur,  then,  to  the  right  of  dower  in 
estates  held  by  a  conditional  limitation,  it  is  laid  down  by  a 
writer  of  great  authority,  "  that  an  immediate  estate  in  fee, 
defeasible  on  the  taking  effect  of  an  executory  limitation,  has 
all  the  incidents  of  an  actual  estate  in  fee-simple  in  posses- 
sion, such  as  curtesy,  dower,  &c.,  the  devisee  having  the  in- 
heritance in  fee,  subject  only  to  a  possibility."  ^  And  this 
case  might  be  put  for  illustration.  A  devises  lands  to  B  in 
fee,  but  if  he  die  without  children  living,  then  over  to  another. 
Though  B  die  without  children,  his  wife  will  nevertheless  have 

1  Park,  Dow.  147  ;  Perkins,  §  317  ;  Tud.  Cas.  44  ;  Paine's  Case,  8  Rep.  36  a ; 
4  Kent,  Com.  49  ;  Northcut  v.  Whipp,  12  B.  Mon.  65,  73  ;  1  Atk.  Conv.  258. 

2  1  Jarman,  Wills,  792  ;  2  Crabb,  Real  Prop.  167. 


rn.  VII.  §  4.]  DOWEU.  27:1 

duwcr.'  'I'lio  diHiculty  has  Ijucn  tu  (li>tinL'ui>h  ujKin  what 
grouinl  a  u  iih)NV  may  have  her  (h»\vrr  Mut  of  an  estat*-  whnh 
has  hei'ii  dt'tcatt'd  l»y  an  cxocntory  limitation  liki-  the  uhove, 
but  wuuKl  l)e  haired  if  thi'  estate  of  her  husband  were  drfcalcd 
by  a  condition  at  common  lau.oilis  Ihmml''  a  liasc  oi-  dtlcnuiu- 
able  fee. 

Butler  has  a  very  chihorate  noti*  to  i'o.  Lit.  ii41,  in  wiiirh 
he  attempts  to  assist,  as  he  calls  it,  "  in  elearinir  up  the  eom- 
plox  and  al)struse  jioints  of  learnin^^  in  whiih  this  (piestion  is 
involved."  .JudL'e  Kent  says,  "  that  the  ablest  writers  upon 
property  law  are  a^Minst  the  right  of  the  dowress  when 
the  fee  *  of  the  husband  is  determined  by  executory  ['-HJ 
devise  or  shiftinir  use."  -  Atkinson  states  the  law  to 
be  thus: ''Where  the  husband's  estate  is  defeated  by  title 
paramount,  as  by  entry  for  condition  broken,  i)y  reason  of  a 
defective  title  in  the  grantor,  or  by  sbifting  use,  the  right  to 
the  dower  is  also  defeated  ;  but  wlu-rc  the  husband's  estate 
is  defeated  by  executory  devise,  it  has  been  settle<l,  rather 
anomalously,  it  has  been  thought,  that  the  widow  shall  never- 
theless be  entitled  to  dower." -^  Preston  leaves  the  point  as 
doubtlul.*  Burton  says,  "  Where  the  wife  or  husl)and  has  an 
estate  in  fee  subject  to  be  divested  by  a  shifting  use  or  exec- 
utory ilevise,  it  has  been  a  disjmted  question  whctlu-r  these 
rights  may  not  be  enforced  after  the  event,  and  notwithstan<I- 
ing  the  divesting  and  destruction  of  the  estate  u|»on  which 
they  attached."^  One  of  the  leading  cases  uj»on  this  subject 
is  Buekworth  v.  Thirkidl,*^  which  is  said  by  Judge  Kent  to  Im» 
opi>osed  to  the  ojtinion  of  the  ablest  writ«'rs  (Ui  property  law  ;" 
while  C.  J.  Best  says  that,  though  (juestioned,  it  has  beccune 
the  settled  law,  and  cites  in  that  connection  Lit.  §  53.*     The 

>  2  «'rHl>l).  Heal  rn)p.  107  ;  Co.  Lit.  241,  n.  4  ;  KeimeJy  v.  Kcniiwly,  2V»  N.  J. 
185.     St-e  iil.Hu  antr,  jip.  •134,  "IS.^i,  nnd  ca-tcn  ciNmI. 

«  4  Kfiit,  Com.  50.  S<f  also  Park.  Dow.  17S-1S6  ;  Northcut  c.  Whi|>j»,  12  11. 
Hon.  65. 

»  I  Atk.  Conv.  258.  ♦  3  Prvst  Al«.  373. 

»  IlurtoH,  Rial  Pnij..  $  355. 

•  »ii.  kworth  r.  Thirk.-ll.  3  B.  &  P.  6.12.  n. 

">  4  Kfiit,  Com.  50.  Si'o  al.to  Park,  Dow.  178  ;  Erana  r.  Krana,  9  Pcnn.  Su 
190. 

•  Mo.xly  r.  King,  2  Ring.  447.  So  HntfioM  r.  Sn«lfn.  54  N.  Y.  2S5.  oTcr- 
ruling  ».  r.  42  Barb.  615,  ami  W.lUr  c.  Wilier,  2S  Barb.  588. 

VOL,  I.—  18 


274  LAW   OP   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK    L 

case  of  Moody  v.  King  was  this.  Devise  to  W  F  and  his 
heirs,  and  if  he  should  have  no  issue,  then  over ;  W  F  had 
a  wife,  but  died  without  having  had  issue,  and  his  wife  was 
held  entitled  to  dower. 

Where  the  distinction  between  two  classes  of  cases  is  ap- 
parently so  subtle,  it  may  be  of  little  use  to  attempt  to  recon- 
cile or  explain  them,  though  it  is  not  difficult  to  conceive  that 
there  is  a  marked  difference  between  a  case  where  by  the 
terms  of  the  limitation,  if  the  estate  created  by  it  is  determined, 
it  comes  back  with  its  seisin  to  him  who  had  the  original  seisin 
by  himself  or  his  heirs,  and  one  where  the  seisin  is  never  re- 
served by  the  original  owner,  but  passes  upon  the  expi 
[*215]  ration  of  the  first  *  estate,  to  another.  Nor  is  it  diffi- 
cult to  comprehend  that  so  much  of  the  seisin  in  the  case 
of  an  estate  of  inheritance,  as  goes  to  the  widow  at  the  death 
of  her  husband,  should  remain  in  her  as  a  continuation  of  his 
seisin  and  estate  till  exhausted  by  her  death.  The  matter  was 
considered  quite  at  length  by  Gibson,  C.  J.,  in  a  case  ^  where 
the  devise  was  to  two  sons,  G  and  0,  their  heirs  and  assigns, 
but  if  either  should  die  without  having  lawful  issue  living  at 
his  death,  his  estate  should  vest  in  the  surviving  brother  and 
his  heirs.  The  widow  of  one  of  these  sons  who  had  died 
•without  issue,  living  the  other  son,  claimed  dower,  and  the 
same  was  allowed.  This  was,  it  is  true,  a  case  of  executory 
devise,  but  the  reasoning  of  the  Chief  Justice  covers  the  case 
of  springing  and  shifting  uses  also.  "  Not  one  of  the  text- 
writers,"  says  he,  "  has  hinted  at  the  true  solution  of  the  diffi- 
culty, except  Mr.  Preston.  All  agree  that  where  the  hus- 
band's fee  is  determined  by  recovery,  condition,  or  collateral 
limitation,*  the  wife's  dower  determines  with  it."  "  I  have  a 
deferential  respect  for  the  opinion  of  Mr.  Butler,  who  was  per- 
haps the  best  conveyancer  of  his  day,  but  I  cannot  apprehend 
the  reasons  of  his  distinction  in  the  note  to  Co.  Lit.  241  a,  be- 
between  a  fee  limited  to  continue  to  a  particular  period  at  its 
creation,  which  curtesy  or  dower  may  survive,  and  the  devise 

*  XoTE.  —  An  instance  of  a  collateral  limitation  would  be  a  grant  to  one  and 
his  heirs  till  the  building  of  St.  Paul's  shall  be  finished.     Park,  Dow.  163. 

1  Evans  v.  Evans,  9  Penu.  St.  190. 


CH.  VII.  §  4.]  DOWKR.  276 

of  a  fei»-siinj>lt*  or  w  foe-tail  al).solut4»  or  conditional,  which  hy 
Bulisoijuont  words  is  made  dftcrminaltli'  n)M>n  sonw  particular 
event,  at  tii(!  happciiinji;  of  which  dower  or  curtesy  will  ccaso." 
"How  to  reconcile  to  any  nyHteni  of  reanon,  technical  or  natu- 
ral, tiie  existence  of  a  derivative  estate,  after  the  extinction  of 
that  from  which  it  was  derived,  was  for  him  (  Holler)  to  show, 
and  he  has  not  done  it.  The  east;  of  ;i  tenant  in  tail,  says 
Mr.  Preston,'  is  an  excejition  arising;  from  an  e(juital)le  con- 
struction of  the  statute  Pe  Doitix^  and  the  cases  of  d^wt-r  of 
estates  dcterniinahle  hy  executory  devise  and  s|irin;j- 
ing  us(!  *  owe  their  existence  to  tln^  circinnstance  that  [*-li'>J 
these  limitations  are  not  governed  l)y  connnon-law 
principles.  The  mounting  of  a  fee  upon  a  fee  by  e.xecutory 
devise  is  a  proof  of  that."  "  Hefore  the  Statute  of  Wills  tlu're 
was  no  executory  devise,  ami  hefore  the  Statute  of  Uses  there 
were  no  sprin^inu:  uses."  "  It  was  the  henijirn  temper  of  the 
judges  who  moulded  the  limitations  of  the  estates  introduced 
by  them,  whether  (n'itrinal  or  derivative,  S(»  as  to  relax  the 
severer  principles  of  the  common  law,  and  among  other  things 
to  preserve  curtesy  and  dower  from  heinir  liarred  hy  a  deter- 
mination (jf  the  (»riirinal  estate  which  C(juld  not  be  prevented." ^ 
In  Xorlhcut  v.  Wjiipp,-'  already  cited,  the  testator  devised  to 
his  "  son  W  L  and  his  heirs."  IJy  a  C(jdicil  he  directed  that 
if  W  L  died  without  heirs,  the  estate  should  pass  to  his 
sisters.  W  L  married  and  died  without  heirs,  and  his  wife 
claimed  dower.  The  court  allowed  dower  on  the  broad  ground 
that  in  all  cases  where  the  husband  is  seised  of  such  an  estate 
that  the  issue  of  the  wife,  if  she  had  any,  would  inherit  it,  she 
is  dowable,  although  her  husband  die  without  issue,  and  though 
it  is  limited  over,  in  case  of  his  so  dying  to  another.  Another 
case  is  Milledge  v.  Lamar."*  The  devise  was  to  Thomas,  his 
heirs,  ite.,  but  should  the  said  Thomas  die  without  any  heir  of 
his  body  begotten,  then  over;  it  was  held  that,  upon  Thomas's 
dying  without  issue,  his  wife  was  entitled  to  dower.  And  the 
court  speak  with  approbation  of  Ihiekworth  v.  Thirkcll,  and 
Mo(^dy  V.  King,  above  cited,  and  cite  Lit.  §  .'>'2. 

'  3  Prcst.  Abs.  373.  ^  s<,>  also  Saiumeji  &,  Pnyno's  Cano,  1  Ixon.  167 

•  N'orthcnt  r.  Whipp.  12  R.  Mon.  65.     Cf.  Biuh  r.  Biwh,  5  Iloust.  245. 

*  Milli-dge  V.  Laniar,  4  Desau&s.  617,  037. 


276  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

Though  the  above  cases  may  not,  perhaps,  place  the  distinc- 
tion between  the  different  kinds  of  determinable  estates,  so 
far  as  dower  is  concerned,  on  very  clear  grounds,  the  tendency 
of  the  modern  English  and  American  cases  seems  to  be,  to 
sustain  the  distinction  in  favor  of  dower  out  of  estat-es  which 
have  been  determined  by  an  executory  limitation,  and  perhaps 
the  reasoning  of  Ch.  J.  Gibson  furnishes  a  satisfactory  basis 
on  which  the  distinction  should  rest.  The  court  of  New  York, 
in  revising  an  opinion  given  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  that 
State,  sustain  the  doctrine  above  laid  down,  and  liken  the  de- 
termination of  a  husband's  estate,  in  such  cases,  to  that  which 
happens  by  the  death  of  a  tenant  in  tail,  in  which  case  a  widow 

always  takes  dower.^ 
[*  217]  *  33.  The  most  common  mode  formerly  in  use  of 
barring  dower  was  by  means  of  a  jointure.  But  as 
this  forms  a  species  of  estate  of  a  peculiar  character,  it  will  be 
considered  by  itself.  And  in  connection  with  it  reference  will 
be  made  to  ante  and  post  nuptial  settlements,  testamentary 
provisions,  &c.,  as  affecting  rights  of  dower. 

34.  In  some  States  there  is  a  bar  to  the  widow's  recovering 
dower  arising  from  lapse  of  time.  But  the  law  on  this  point 
is  very  far  from  being  uniform,  or,  in  some  cases,  even  settled. 
That  a  long  lapse  of  time  after  the  husband's  death  before  any 
claim  made  may  be  evidence  proper  to  be  submitted  to  a  jury 
to  establish  a  release  of  the  right,  would  seem  to  be  sustained 
by  authority  as  well  as  the  general  principles  of  evidence, 

1  Hatfield  v.  Sneden,  54  N.  Y.  285.  See  also  ante,  p.  *135.  The  conclusion 
in  the  text  is  further  supported  by  the  recent  cases  in  this  country  of  Jones  v. 
Hughes,  27  Gratt.  560  ;  Medley  v.  Medley,  Id.  568,  where  the  limitations  were, 
under  the  statutes  of  Virginia,  executory  devises  ;  and  by  Smith  v.  Spencer,  2  Jur. 
N.  s.  778,  where  there  was  an  executory  devise  over  after  an  equitable  fee,  in  each 
of  which  dower  was  allowed.  See  also  Daniel  v.  McManama,  1  Bush,  544,  where 
the  same  doctrine  is  maintained,  though  the  devise  over  did  not  take  effect.  A 
contrary  decision  was  made  in  Edwards  v.  Bibb,  54  Ala.  475,  but  this  is  the  only 
case  to  that  effect  in  any  court  of  last  resort  in  this  country  or  in  England.  It 
relies  partly  on  the  case  of  Woller  v.  Weller,  28  Barb.  588,  since  overruled,  and 
on  Adams  v.  Beekman,  1  Paige,  63L  But  this,  like  Sumner  v.  Partiidge,  2  Atk. 
47  and  Barker  v.  Barker,  2  Sim.  49,  proceeded  on  the  wholly  distinct  ground  that 
where  the  devise  over  is  to  the  issue  of  the  first  taker,  as  they  take  as  purchasers 
and  not  by  descent,  their  parent  was  not  seised  of  an  estate  which  they  could 
inherit,  and  the  necessary  condition  Xor  dower  fails. 


CH.  VII.  §    I.]  DOWKR.  L'TT 

even  thou^rh  no  positive  rul<;  of  liinila(i<)H  ■  \i>i.  ■!.'  S.i  ilir 
rofoivini;  a  H<.'|jiirat<'  inaiiit('imnc«!  for  H«'vcral  y<'arH  hrforo 
tlif  liusbaiurs  ilcatli,  under  artich'n  of  m>|>aratinn,  and  C'»ij- 
tiniiiii','  to  rrcM'ive  it  for  ci^ht  yrairs  after,  was  Inld  to  create 
a  jtrcsimiptiiui  ()f  release  of  dower  on  the  jcirt  of  the 
wife.-^ 

;}.').  ill  IliiLdanil,  l»y  th»;  statute  :J  i^:  1  Win.  1  \  .  e.  IJT  tlie 
limitation  of  a  widow's  ri^ht  to  ehiini  dower  is  lixed  at  twenty 
years  from  the  death  of  the  hiisliand.  Ihit  before  that  there 
was  no  statute  liar  to  its  recovery  the-re.'  A  simiUir  liniitati<in 
e.xists  in  New  York,  New  .Jersey,  Massachu.setts,  Iowa,  Indi- 
ana, Mississippi,  and  South  Carolina;*  also  in  Tennessee ,'' 
and  in  Kentucky."  In  Miehi;^au  the  sanie  limitation  exists 
since  the  statute  of  184<!,  by  which  dow«'r  miirht  l>e  recovered 
in  an  action  of  ejectment."  In  New  Ilampshiri'  the  bar  is 
twenty  years,  reckoned  fnjin  the  date  of  the  demand  of  dowcr.^ 
In  Ohio  the  limitation  is  twenty-one  years,''*  while  in  TJeor^ia 
it  is  but  seven  from  the  deiith  of  the  husband.'''  It  seems 
that  in  Maine  the  statute  limitation  of  twenty  years  applies 
to  d(;wer ;  but  it  beirins  to  run  only  from  the  death 
of  *  the  husband,  so  that  she  would  not  be  tillected  by  ['ilSJ 
any  adverse  possession  prior  to  that  time."  |5y  statute, 
all  suits  for  dower  are  barred  after  three  years  in  Alabama, 
where  the  husband  aliens,  otherwise  not  till  twenty  years.'^ 
On  the  other  hand,  the  old  Enjrlish  law  as  to  dower  Iteing 
barred  by  the  lapse  of  time  jucvails  in  Connecticut,  in  North 

»  Barnanl  r.  F/lwnnls,  4  N.  H.  .'521.  "■'  Kvans  r.  Kvnni,  3  Yentes,  507. 

>  4  Ki'nt,  Com.  70  ;   I'lirk,  Dow.  311  ;  l.st  K«p.  Eng.  Com.  H.al  Vr^>\K  4o. 

*  4  Ktnt,  Com.  70  ;  Muss.  Piih.  Stat.  c.  124,  §  13  ;  Wilson  r.  McI>-nai;Iinn, 
1  Mf.Mullan,  Kq.  35;  Pluire.s  r.  W.iln-rs,  0  Iowl^  loO  ;  Iml.  K«-v.  StuL  ISSl, 
§  2i»3  ;  MiHxIy  V.  Hiirprr,  38  Mi.«i.s.  599. 

*  Cnniiichafl  v.  Caniiichad,  5  Miimpli.  96. 

•  ItalU  V.  Hughes,  1  Dana,  407.  ^  prtxtor  r.  Bigilow.  38  Mi.h.  282. 

•  lU)hie  r.  Fluiuk-re,  33  N.  H.  524.  »  Tutllo  v.  WiUmti,  10  Oliio,  24. 

>'>  Chaiminn  ».  .S<'liro<?<lor,  10  Oa.  321.  The  Ranic  rule  is  in  opt>rntion  in  Illinois 
Owen  p.  P.acock.  38  111.  33. 

"  Durham  v.  Angicr,  20  Mo.  242. 

"  Alabama,  Code  1876.  §  2251  ;  n«rk»»lalc  r.  Ganrtt,  64  Ala.  277  ;  IVnnugh 
V.  Turrcntini',  60  Ala.  557.  Prior  U)  tho  Htntutc  of  1858,  the  thrv**  yenrn'  l-ar 
appliiHl  in  all  caaes.  RiJgway  r.  Mc.\li>inc,  81  Ak.  458  ;  Martin  r.  .Martin, 
35  Ala.  560. 


278  LAW   OF  REAL   PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

Carolina,  and  in  Maryland.^  In  the  cited  case,  the  husband 
died  in  1814,  and  the  suit  for  dower  was  brought  in  1841. 
And  so  far  as  the  Statute  of  Limitations  grows  out  of  the 
supposed  right  to  presume  a  title  from  long  adverse  enjoy- 
ment by  the  person  in  possession,  it  could  not  well  apply  to 
the  case  of  dower,  since  upon  the  death  of  the  husband  the 
wife  is  not  seised,  nor  has  she  a  right  of  entry.  So  that  who- 
ever is  in  possession  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  holding  adversely 
to  her,  and  her  non-claim  is  a  mere  forbearance  to  place  her- 
self in  a  condition  in  which  she  can  convert  a  mere  personal 
chose  in  action  into  an  estate. 

36.  Much  of  the  law,  however,  as  once  understood,  as  to 
barring  a  widow's  right  of  dower  in  her  husband's  estate,  has 
been  practically  superseded  by  statutes  both  in  England  and 
several  of  the  United  States.*  In  pursuance  of  a  recom- 
mendation on  the  part  of  the  commissioners,  the  act  of  3  &  4 
Wm.  lY.  c.  105,  called  the  Dower  Act,  was  passed,  covering 
all  cases  of  marriage  since  Jan.  1,  1834.     By  that  act  the 

dower  of  married  women  has  been  placed  completely 
[*219]  within  the  power  of  their  *  husbands.    A  husband  may 

exclude  his  wife  from  such  claim  by  inserting  a  clause 
of  such  exclusion  in  the  deed  which  he  takes,  or  by  a  deed 
executed  by  himself  in  his  lifetime,  or  by  his  will,  after  his 
death.  And  even  if  no  such  disposition  is  made  of  the  hus- 
band's lands,  they  are  charged  with  the  payment  of  his  del)ts, 
to  the  exclusion,  if  need  be,  of  the  widow's  dower.^   The  effect 

*  Note.  —  The  reasons  for  this  change  in  EngLand  are  examined  and  explained 
at  length  by  the  Commissioners  upon  the  Law  of  Real  Property,  in  their  First 
Report,  p.  16.  They  regard  the  law  of  dower  as  well  adapted  to  the  static  of 
freehold  property  existing  at  the  time  when  it  was  established,  but  that  the 
changes  in  the  condition  of  the  kingdom  render  it  at  this  day  highly  inconve- 
nient. And  that  this  has  led  to  so  many  modes  of  evading  the  law  upon  the  sub- 
ject, "  that  the  general  result  is,  that  the  right  to  dower  exists  beneficially  in  so 
few  instances,  that  it  is  of  little  value  considered  as  a  provision  for  widows." 
The  same  idea  has  been  expressed  by  Blackstone,  who  speaks  of  it  as  having  be- 
come "a  great  clog  to  alienations,"  and  "otherwise  inconvenient  to  families." 
2  Bl.  Com.  136. 

1  1  Swift's  Dig.  256  ;  Spencer  v.  Weston,  1  Dev.  &  B.  213  ;  Chew  v.  Farmers' 
Bk.,  2  Md.  Ch.  Dec.  231. 

"  Wms.  Real  Prop.  193,  194. 


CH.  VI 1.  §    1.]  POWKR.  279 

lias  IxM-n  that  dowor  no  lonpT  exists  in  |>raclirc,  oxccj)t  an 
against  the  husl»an«l*s  ln-iis  at  law,  ami  even  to  that  extrnt  it 
is  inoiK'rativo  if  the  liiislian<I,art  is  now  conini<»nly  done,  inH<_«rtH 
a  di'olaration  in  his  tilh'-<l«'(Ml  denyinir  sueh  ri^rlit.'  'I'hr  unly 
coniponsation  provided  in  the  act  for  this  overthrow  «»f  the  old 
system  is,  that  dower  may  extend  to  lands  to  whieh  the  hns- 
hand  has  a  right  thouirh  unaeeompanied  with  u  seisin,  and  tu 
e([iiitable  estat<*s  of  inheritanee.-  From  various  causes  jrrow- 
ing  out  of  the  condition  of  a  new  country,  in  wliich  wild  lands 
rapidly  become  cultivated  fields,  and  forests  give  place  to 
marts  of  trade  and  commerce,  the  people  of  many  of  the  States 
have  seen  fit  to  modify  l>y  statute  the  cnmmun  law  as  to  dower. 
In  some  the  widow  can  only  claim  liei-  dower  out  of  lauds  of 
which  her  hiisliand  died  seised.  In  some  she  is  authorized  to 
clear  wild  hind  and  reduce  it  to  culture,  thouirh  to  do  so  she 
must  cut  down  the  timber  and  liicwood  thereon.  And  in 
others  there  are  other  changes  whieh  can,  at  iiest,  be  but  very 
briefly  noticed.  In  stncral  of  the  States  the  common  law  will 
be  found  substantially  in  operation,  except,  it  may  be,  as  to 
eqtiitable  estates,  which  have  already  been  sp(»l<en  of.  Many 
of  these  changes  have  alieady  been  enumerated.* 

*  37.  One  mode  in  which  dower  maybe  defeated  [*220] 
remains  to  be  mentioned,  and  that  is,  by  the  exercise 

of  eminent  domain  during  the  life  of  the  husband,  or, 

what  is  equivalent  to  it,  the  ^dedication  of   land  to  [••JillJ 

the  public  use.     This  grows  out  of  the  nature   of  a 

wife's  interest  in  the  lands,  and  whether  it  is  such  as  oiiirbt 

to   be   regarded    in   giving   compensation.      In  a  case  in  New 

York,  where  a  cori)oration  was  authorized  to  lake  lands  for  a 

public  use,  and  hold  the  same  in  fee,  paying  the  owners  there- 

•  N'mtk.  —  Scenn^/-,  •140,*lrt3,  nrnl  noto».  t^pon  tho  pxtont  to  wliirh  in  sorcral 
SUtes  dower  cxtcmKs  to  i'({uitiible  aa  well  nn  Icgnl  cst.itrs,  the  following  aiitliorities 
may  further  l>c  referred  to:  Dcnisli  r.  Brown,  8  Ohio,  413;  TuttU-  r.  Wjllson, 
10  Ohio,  24  ;  Griffin  r.  Reece,  1  Hnrrin^t.  508  ;  Avnnt  r.  RoWrtnon.  2  M.Miillan, 
215;  Mnrkhnin  v.  Merrett,  7  How.  (Mi«.s.)  437;  Hill  r.  Mitchell,  6  Ark.  «o3. 
As  to  the  effevt  of  a  testnnifiitjiry  provision  in  the  wife's  fnvor,  in  Imrrinu'  li<r 
claim  for  dower,  and  how  far  she  may  elect  to  accept  or  n-fuse  thia,  see/KsT,  •*i7l, 
272,  ami  notca. 


^  Ibid.  ll>4.  a  Wms.  Real  Trwp.  194. 


280  LAW  OP  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

of  an  ascertained  compensation,  it  was  held  that  the  wife's 
right  of  dower  was  effectually  barred  by  the  act  of  the  legisla- 
ture. It  was  said  that  the  right  of  the  wife  during  her  hus- 
band's life,  being  merely  inchoate,  could  not  be  regarded  in 
exercising  eminent  domain,  and  was,  moreover,  subject  to  any 
regulation  which  the  legislature  might  see  fit  to  make,  though 
its  effect  might  be  to  divest  the  right ;  and  the  estate  of  the 
widow  after  the  assignment  of  dower  being  a  continuation  of 
the  estate  of  the  husband,  he,  while  living,  was  the  only  one 
who  could  represent  it,  and  his  compensation  was  in  full  for 
the  part  taken.^  So  where  the  owners  of  land  laid  open  a 
street  in  a  city  for  the  purpose,  among  other  things,  of  erect- 
ing a  market-house  thereon  by  the  city,  which  was  done  ac- 
cordingly, it  was  held  that  land  so  taken,  like  land  taken  for 
highways,  was  not  subject  to  the  widow's  dower  in  right  of  the 
original  owners.^  The  principle  involved  in  the  above  and 
similar  cases  is  a  pretty  important  one,  nor  has  it  been  hither- 
to very  well  defined.  It  is  difficult  to  see  why  it  should  not 
apply  in  all  cases  where  the  law  authorizes  the  husband's  land 
to  be  taken  in  invitum,  and  compensation  therefor  made  for 
the  fee  of  the  same  ;  as,  for  instance,  in  those  States  where 
the  mill-owner  is  authorized  to  flow  lands  which  he  does  not 
own.  At  common  law,  a  widow  could  not  have  dower  of  a 
castle,^  since,  among  other  reasons,  she  could  not  put  it  to 

profitable  use  ;  and  the  same  reasoning  would  apply  as 
[*222]  to  *  lands,  though  granted  by  the  husband,  which  have 

been  appropriated  to  public  uses,  such  as  cemeteries, 
public  parks,  and  the  like. 

1  Moore  v.  The  Mayor,  4  Sandf.  456  ;  s.  c.  8  N.  Y.  110. 

*  Guynue  v.  Ciuciunati^  3  Ohio,  24.  •*  1  Cruise,  Dig.  129. 


CH    VII.  §  5.]  DOWER.  281 


SKCTION    V. 

HOW    AND    MY    WIloM    ASSI(;.NKI). 

1.  Kiglit  lucnit-fl  lit  (U<4ith  of  huiiljauJ. 

2.  WiiioWN  (jiuimiiliiu-. 

3.  I'uml  iiHsifjuiiioiit  j^xmI. 

4.  I)<)\viT  of  c<»njn»oii  ri^lit. 

6.  \\'\\vu  by  mvtcti  niiil  luuixU. 

6.  Wlifii  in  roimnoJi,  &c. 

7.  Wlu'ii  an  uHHi^nnont  U  a  iiatufiKtioiu 

8.  AHhij^uniiiit  must  \)C  alwolutv. 

9.  Must  bi"  II  fn-oholiL 

10.  Hy  wlidin  inadi'. 

11.  DiiwiT,  how  recovered. 

12.  How  rooovpn-*!  at  law. 

13.  Of  iiiakinn  ikiiiaud. 

14.  Action  of  dower. 

15.  Fomi  of  judgment. 

16.  Of  damages. 

17.  Etfect  of  judgment. 

18.  Writ  of  seisin. 

19.  Service  of  writ  of  seisin. 

20.  Form  of  assigning  dower. 

21.  When  objection  miulo  to  a.ssignment. 

22.  Mixle  of  estinuiting  vidue  of  estate. 

23.  Inipniveuients,  how  availed  of. 

24.  Assignment  dt  ncvo. 

25.  Hcnudy  for  dower  in  equity. 

26.  Estimating  life  estate. 

27.  Rule  of  contributing  to  rodeem. 

The  next  subject  in  order  \n,  liow  aiKi  l)y  whom  dnwer  may 
Imj  a.s.signed,  and  in  what  manner  its  as.siirnnient  may  be  en- 
forced. 

1.  In  the  first  j»lace,  the  widow  is  entitled  to  have  dower 
set  out  to  her  immediately  u|M)n  the  death  of  her  husband. 
But  imtil  it  is  assitrned  she  has  no  riirht  to  claim  any  siK-cifx' 
part  of  the  e.statc,  or  enter  upon  or  occupy  any  part  of  it.' 

2.  Out  of  tenderness,  however,  for  her  condition,  the  Matnia 
Charta  provided  for  her  the  riirht  to  occupy  the  principal 
mansion-house  of  her  liusban<l,  and  to  be  8U|)portcd  therein 
out  of  his  j)er8onal  estate  for  the  term  of  forty  days  from  the 

»  2  Bl.  Com.  139. 


282  LAW  OP  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

time  of  his  death,  which  was  called  her  quarantine.  She  for- 
feited this,  however,  if  she  married  again  within  that  time.^ 
This  right,  moreover,  could  only  be  exercised  in  respect  to 
such  estate  as  she  is  dowable  of.  If  her  husband,  therefore, 
died  possessed  of  a  leasehold  estate,  she  could  not  claim  her 
quarantine  out  of  it.^  The  right  of  quarantine  in  the  widow 
is  recognized  in  the  statutes  of  the  States,  though  somewhat 
various  as  to  the  extent  and  duration  of  its  enjoyment  by  the 
widow.* 

*  Note. — In  Alabama  slie  has  the  use  of  the  dwelling-house  in  which  the 
husband  usually  resided,  rent  free,  till  her  dower  is  assigned  to  her,  Code,  1867, 
§  1630  ;  even  against  the  alienee  of  her  husband,  Shelton  v.  Carrol,  16  Ala.  148  ; 
Pharis  v.  Leachnian,  20  Ala.  662.  In  Arkansas  she  has  the  mansion-house  two 
months,  and  until  dower  is  assigned.  Dig.  Stat.  1874,  §  2226.  Florida,  she  holds 
till  dower  is  assigned.  Dig.  Amend.  Code,  294.  And  in  Kentucky.  Gen.  Stat. 
1873,  p.  530  ;  Chaplin  v.  Simmons,  7  Mon.  337.  The  same  in  Mississippi,  Rev. 
Code,  1871,  p.  255  ;  Georgia,  Code,  1873,  §  1768  ;  Missouri,  Rev.  Stat.  1879, 
§  2205  ;  New  Jersey,  Rev.  1877,  p.  320.  Rhode  Island,  if  she  brings  her  writ  of 
dower  within  twelve  months  of  the  grantor's  administration.  Pub.  Stat.  1882, 
c.  187,  §  6.  Texas,  same  as  Alabama.  Hartley's  Dig.  1850,  p.  287.  Virginia, 
the  same  ;  and  also  the  profits  of  one  third  of  the  real  estate.  Code,  1860,  p.  533. 
In  Connecticut  the  widow  immediately  on  death  of  husband  becomes  tenant  in 
common  with  the  husband's  heirs,  of  her  dower.  38  Conn.  256  ;  Stedman  v.  For- 
tune, 5  Conn.  462.  Indiana,  dower  is  abolished,  and  widow  takes  one  third  by 
descent.  Rev.  Stat.  1881,  §  2483.  So  in  Iowa.  Rev.  Code,  1880,  §  2440,  and  this 
is  to  include  the  dwelling-house,  if  possible,  §  2441.  In  Minnesota  and  Kansas, 
also,  the  widow  takes  her  share  in  fee  :  in  the  former  State,  one  third,  Stat.  1878, 
c.  46,  §  2  ;  and  in  the  latter,  one  half,  Comp.  L.  1879,  §  2109.  On  the  other 
hand,  in  Arizona,  Texas,  Colorado,  Nevada,  and  Dakota,  she  takes  an  absolute 
share  of  the  community  property  in  lieu  of  dower.  Ante,  *149,  and  note.  Maine, 
the  period  is  ninety  days.  Rev.  Stat.  1883,  c.  103,  §  14.  Massadiuscfts,  it  is  a 
right  to  occupy  the  premises  with  the  children  or  heirs  of  deceased,  or  receive  one 
third  of  the  rents  till  dower  is  set  out.  Pub.  Stat.  c.  124,  §§  3,  14.  Michigan, 
she  may  remain  one  year  in  the  house.  Comp.  L.  1871,  §  4291.  In  New  York, 
forty  days.  1  Stat,  at  Large,  p.  699.  In  Ncxc  Hampshire,  the  widow  is  entitled 
to  occupy  the  house  of  her  husband  forty  days  without  rent,  and  have  reasonable 
sustenance  out  of  the  estate  ;  and  she  is  entitled  to  one  third  part  of  the  rents  and 
profits  of  the  estate  of  which  her  husband  died  seised, until  dower  is  assigned.  Gen.  L. 
1878,  c.  202,  §  12.  Vermont,  she  may  occupy  with  the  heirs  until  dower  is  set  out. 
Gen.  Stat.  1862,  p.  413.  Wisconsin,  Ohio,  and  Oregon,  the  widow  may  occupy  the 
house  for  one  year.  Wise.  Rev.  Stat.  1858,  c.  89.  §  23  ;  Ohio  Rev.  Stat.  1880, 
§  4188  ;  Oreg.  Gen.  L.  1872,  p.  587.  In  Nebraska  the  widow  may  occupy  the 
dwelling-house,  and  have  reasonable  sustenance  from  the  estate  for  one  year* 
Gen.  Stat.  1873,  pp.  278,  279  ;  and  may  occupy  witji  the  children  and  other  heirs 
without  assignment  of  dower,  so  long  as  they  do  not  object,  lb.  pp.  278,  279. 

1  Tud.  Cas.  51  ;  Co.  Lit.  34  b.  2  Voelckner  v.  Hudson,  1  Sandf.  215. 


cii.  VII.  §  ■).]  nowKU,  283 

3.  TIk'  ri^lit*of  a  wife  to  (lower  hnviiifj  hocome  [•223] 
fixed  by  ttu>  (l*>ath   of  tlu*  liiisliand,  nothing  rcinaiiiH 

in  order  to  cousiminuitc  it  hut  to  asct-rtain  the  particular  part 
of  his  estate  she  is  to  enjoy  hy  virtue  of  it.  Tlw  niouicnt 
this  is  done,  a  freehohl  vests  in  her  l>y  act  of  hiw,  and  not  l»y 
way  of  conveyanee  frtjiu  the  heir  or  terre-tenant.  Nor  is  any 
writini;  or  livery  of  seisin  re(|uired  to  complete  the  assipnnent. 
A  parol  assiirnnient,  if  aeeepted  l)y  the  widow,  is  as  efleetual 
as  if  done  in  ever  so  formal  a  manner.' 

4.  There  ar(>  two  modes  (»f  assij:^ninf^  dower,  one  "  of  com- 
mon riirht,"  and  one  "  auminst  connnon  li^^ht."  The  fornu-r 
is  the  one  always  to  be  adopted  where  ,the  as.si^ninicnt  is  by 
legal  jtrocess,  and  must  be  jnirsued  by  the  tenant  or  heir  if 
he  untlertakes  to  set  out  dower  so  as  to  satisfy  her  claim 
without  any  formal  as.sent  or  acceptance  on  her  part. 

The  *  other  may  he  resorted  to  and  take  almost  any   ['224] 
form,  l)ccausc  it  imjilies  a  special  assent  or  agreement 
on  her  part  to  acce|)t  it  instead  oi  the  more  precise  and  for- 
mal manner. 

5.  Dower  of  common  right  must  always  be  assigned  by 
metes  and  bounds  where  the  j)r()j>erty  is  of  a  character  that  it 
can  be  so  set  out.'-^  And  if  the  sherifl"  in  assigning  dower 
should  adopt  any  other  form,  it  would  be  erroneous."^ 

6.  But  where  the  j)artie.s  agree  on  a  dilTerent  form,  it  may 
be  effectual.  Thus  dower  may  l)e  set  out  in  common  with 
the  balance  of  the  estate."*  Or  it  may  he  a  nut  for  life  i.ssuing 
out  of  the  lands  of  which  the  widcjw  is  dowabh' ;  or  it  may  be 
of  a  certain  agreed  number  of  acres.''  But  the  dower  assigned 
must  be  out  of  land  of  which  she  is  dowable,  unless  it  is  done 
by  the  consent  of  the  parties.'' 

1  Mpscrvc  V.  .Miseni-,  19  X.  H.  2  JO  ;  Rloo<i  r.  Rlood,  23  Pick.  80  ;  Shattuck 
V.  Grai^g.  23  Pick.  88  ;  Conant  r.  LittU-,  1  Pick.  139  ;  JohtJHon  r.  Neil.  4  Ala. 
166  ;  Jones  r.  Hnwer,  1  Pick.  3U  :  Ekik.r  r.  H.iker,  i  Me.  67  ;  Boyera  r.  New- 
bonks,  2  In.L  388  ;  Tud.  Cos.  51  ;  Jolmson  c.  Moree,  2  N.  H.  48  ;  Pinkhani  r. 
Gear,  3  N.  M.  163: 

*  Pierce  r.  Williams,  2  Penninfft.  521. 

•  Bwlh  r.  LaniWrt,  Style,  276  ;  Co.  Lit.  34  l>,  n.  213  ;  1  UoUe,  Abr.  CS3. 

*  Booth  p.  Lamljert,  Style,  276. 

»  Co.  I.it  34  b  ;  Moore,  59  ;  1  Bright,  IIus,  &.  Wife,  375,  377,  379  ;  TuJ.  '»«.  52. 

•  Perkius,  §  407. 


284  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

7.  If  it  is  done  in  any  form  against  common  right,  it  will 
not  operate  to  bar  her  claim  unless  it  be  done  by  indenture  to 
which  she  is  a  party,  and  by  which  she  would  be  estopped 
from  avoiding  it.^  Even  the  acceptance  of  a  deed  from  the 
heir  or  tenant  would  not  be  sufficient  if  she  do  not  execute  a 
release.^  One  reason  why  an  assignment  of  lands  out  of 
which  the  widow  is  not  dowable  is  no  bar  to  dower  unless 
done  and  accepted  by  indenture,  is,  that  her  title  to  it  must 
depend  upon  the  grant  of  the  person  making  the  assignment, 
and  unless  this  be  by  deed,  she  can  only  hold  as  tenant  at 
will ;  and  for  the  further  reason,  that  a  right  or  title  to  a 
freehold  cannot  be  barred  by  any  collateral  satisfaction.^  And 
the  same  rule  applies  to  a  rent  granted  in  lieu  of  dower  out 
of  lands  of  which  she  is  not  dowable.*     Where  her  dower  has 

been  thus  assigned  against  common  right,  she  will  be 
[*225]  bound  by  it,  whether  it  turns  out  to  *  be  more  or  less 

valuable  than  what  her  appropriate  dower  would  have 
been,  and  she  cannot  insist  upon  a  new  assignment,  though 
her  title  fails  to  that  which  she  has  accepted.^ 

8.  Another  essential  requisite  in  assigning  dower  "  of  com- 
mon right,"  in  order  to  operate  as  a  bar  to  a  widow's  action 
for  recovery  of  dower,  is  that  it  should  be  done  absolutely, 
and  not  be  accompanied  by  any  condition.^  And  where  in 
the  assignment  the  trees  growing  upon  the  premises  were  ex- 
cepted, it  was  held  that  such  exception  was  inconsistent  and 
void.'' 

9.  In  the  next  place,  such  assignment  must  be  absolute  for 
her  life.  Any  less  estate,  whatever  be  its  value,  would  not 
bar  her  suit  to  recover  her  legal  dower.^  And  one  reason  for 
this  is,  that  the  estate  of  the  widow  in  her  dower  lands  is 
considered  as  a  continuance  of  that  of  her  husband,  the  heir 

1  Co.  Lit.  34  b  ;  Perkins,  §  410  ;  1  Bright,  Hus.  &  Wife,  377  ;  Tud.  Cas.  52  ; 
Conant  v.  Little,  1  Pick.  189  ;  Jones  v.  Brewer,  Id.  314. 

2  1  Eoper,  Hus.  &  Wife,  410. 

8  1  Roper,  Hus.  &  Wife,  410  ;  Vernon's  Case,  4  Eep.  1.      • 

4  1  Bright,  Hus.  &  Wife,  377. 

6  Jones  V.  Brewer,  1  Pick.  314  ;  Co.  Lit.  32  b. 

6  Co.  Lit.  34  b,  n.  217  ;  2  Crabb,  Real  Prop.  144  ;  Tud.  Cas.  52. 

7  Bullock  V.  Finch,  1  Rolle,  Abr.  682  ;  Tud.  Cas.  52. 

«  1  Bright,  Hus.  &  Wife,  379  ;  2  Crabb,  Real  Prop.  144. 


en.  VII.  §  .").]  POWER.  285 

or  ti'iiaiit  lii'ini;  ti  nu'W  minister  of  the  law  in  niarkiiifr  out  as 
to  what  parlicuhir  land  this  shall  ap|il_v.  lie  ciinnot  dictate 
or  change  the  tcnus  on  which  she  is  to  hold  it.* 

10.  In  resj)eet  to  the  ja-rson  l»y  wlmni  dower  may  l>o  set 
out,  where  resort  is  not  liad  to  Iciral  jirocess,  it  ninst  l)c  the 
tenant  of  the  freehold.  No  other  person  can  do  it.  IJut  it  i.s 
not  e.s.sential  that  the  title  of  the  tenant  should  he  a  valid  one, 
provideil  he  is  in  po.ssession  under  a  claim  of  title,  and  sets 
out  the  dower  without  fraud  or  covin.-  It,  therefore,  it  ho  so 
done  hy  a  dis.seisor,  ahator,  or  intruder,  it  cannot  be  avoided 
by  the  heir  or  disseisee,  ]u-ovided  it  be  of  such  part  only  of 
the  estate  as  the  heir  would  have  been  bound  to  assign  had  he 
been  in  possession  of  the  premises.  Though,  if  it  be  of  a  rent 
instead  of  the  land,  the  heir  or  disseisee  would  not  be  bound 
by  it,  becau.se  it  is  against  common  right,  and  is  only  good 
when  made  by  some  one  competent  to  bind  the  estate  by 
agreement."^  It  may  be  done  ljy  an  infant,  if  heir  to  the 
estate  of  which  the  wi(hjw  is  dowable,  sultject,  Ikjw- 
ever,  to  be  corrected  and  diminished*  by  writ  of  ad-  [*22G] 
measurement  of  dower  in  favor  of  such  infant,  if,  by 
mistake,  he  shall  have  set  her  out  too  much.*  But  this  ])rivi- 
lege  is  limiteil  to  infants,  for  if  the  heir  be  of  age  and  sets 
out  dower,  which  is  accepted  by  the  widow,  both  parties  will 
be  governed  by  it.''  If  the  infant  heir  be  under  guardianship, 
the  guardian  may  assign  dower.  And  it  seems  that,  if  so  done, 
it  will  lund  the  heir,  although  Blackstone  and  Fitzherbert  state 
the  law  otherwise.*^  The  courts  of  Illinois  hold  that  such  set- 
ting out  of  dower  by  the  guardian  of  a  minor  does  not 
bind  him  when  he  comes  of  age,  so  that  he  may  not  then  have 
it  revised."     If  the  land  be  owned  by  two  as  joint  tenants, 

>  1  Bright,  Hus.  k  Wife,  379.  2  Co.  Lit.  35  a. 

»  IVrkins,  §  3l»4  ;  Tud.  Cas.  51  ;  Co.  Lit.  35.1  ;  1  Bright,  Hus.  &  Wife,  3C5  ; 
Perkins,  §  3l»8  ;  ante,  i<\.  6. 

•  2  in.  Cm.  130  ;  Fitzh.  N.  B.  348  ;  Jones  v.  Brewer,  1  Tick.  314  ;  M..Cor- 
niick  r.  Tiiylor,  2  I  ml.  336. 

»  Stoiifjhton  r.  I^igh,  1  Taunt.  402  ;  Tud.  Cm.  52. 

•  Boyers  v.  Newbnnks,  2  Ind.  3S8  ;  .Tones  r.  Bn-wer,  1  Tick.  314  ;  Vounp  r. 
Tiirbfll,  37  Me.  509  ;  Curtis  v.  Hobart,  41  Me.  230  ;  2  BL  Com.  136  ;  Fitzh.  N.  li. 
348. 

•  Bonner  v.  Peterson,  44  111.  253. 


286  LAW   OP  REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

either  may  set  out  the  dower.i  And  if  these  joint  tenants  be 
husband  and  wife,  she  will  be  bound  by  the  assignment  of  the 
husband.^ 

11.  If  now  it  is  inquired  what  measures  a  widow  is  to  resort 
to  if  the  heir  or  tenant  shall  fail  to  assign  her  her  legal  dower, 
it  will  be  answered  that  she  may  resort  to  certain  forms  of 
legal  process  by  which  the  same  will  be  effected.  In  Illinois 
a  widow  recovers  her  dower  in  an  action  of  ejectment.^  One 
of  these  modes  is  by  the  common-law  action  of  dower,  another 
is  by  proceedings  in  equity,  and  a  third  is  one  provided  in 
most,  if  not  all  the  States,  by  a  cheap  and  summary  process 
issuing  from  courts  having  cognizance  of  probate  matters. 
In  some  cases  these  may  be  concurrent  remedies.  But,  gen- 
erally speaking,  the  last  is  more  restricted  than  either  of  the 
others,  and  confined  to  cases  where  the  claim  of  the  widow  is 
upon  the  heir  or  devisee  of  the  husband,  and  is  not  the  proper 
one  to  resort  to  when  it  is  necessary  to  determine  a  contested 
rio-ht  of  dower.*  In  New  York,  the  effect  of  a  decree  of  the 
surrogate  is  merely  to  fix  the  admeasurement  and  location  of 
the  wife's  dower,  but  it  does  not  establish  the  title.  That 
must  be  tried  in  an  action  of  ejectment,  sued  out  to  recover 
possession  of  the  premises.^  If,  however,  dower  shall  have 
been  set  out  by  one  of  these  courts,  the  assignment  is  conclu- 
sive upon  the  parties  until  the  judgment  shall  be  reversed.^ 

And  in  Massachusetts,  though  the  judge  of  probate 
[*227]  has  no  right  to  assign  dower  out  *  of  a  mortgaged 

estate,'^  yet  if  the  mortgagor  dies  seised  of  land,  dower 
may  be  set  off  to  his  widow  by  the  judge,  if  neither  the  mort- 
gagee, nor  heirs  or  devisees  of  the  mortgagor  object.^     In  re- 

1  Co.  Lit.  35  a.  ^  2  Crabb,  Real  Prop.  142. 

8  Owen  V.  Peacock,  38  111.  33. 

*  Shcatfe  v.  O'Neil,  9  Mass.  9  ;  French  v.  Crosby,  23  Me.  276  ;  Matter  of  "Wat- 
kins,  9  Johns.  245  ;  Hollonian  v.  Holloman,  5  Sra.  &  M.  559  ;  Ware  v.  Washing- 
ton, 6  Sni.  &  M.  737  ;  Bisland  v.  Hewett,  11  Sm.  &  M.  164  ;  Thrasher  t;.  Piuckard, 
23  Ala.  616. 

6  Parks  V.  Hardey,  4  Bradf.  15. 

«  Jackson  v.  Hixon,  17  Johns.  123  ;  Tilson  v.  Thompson,  10  Pick.  359. 

7  Raynham  v.  Wilmarth,  13  Met.  414. 

«  Henry's  Case,  4  Cush.  257.  And  the  subsequent  transfer  of  the  mortgage  to 
the  heir,  who  has  so  assented,  will  not  entitle  the  latter  to  disi^ute  the  assignment. 
King  V.  King,  100  Mass.  224. 


cii.  VII.  §  ").]  DO^VER.  287 

spect  to  Vermont,  tlic  propositions  above  stated  as  to  juris- 
diction do  nut  apply,  Iteraiise  courts  of  prol)ate  there  Imvc 
exclusive  jurisdiction  in  assitrnin)^  dower.'  In  l'JiLd:iiid  and 
in  several  of  the  States,  courts  of  equity  and  coinnion  law 
have  concurrent  jurisdiction  in  many  cases  resjiectiiiix  dower.''* 
In  I'lnLrland  this  has  hem  the  case  sin<'e  the  time  of  Mli/a- 
beth,and  has  Ix'come  much  the  more  usual  mode  of  recovcriuLT 
dower.^  Hut  where  there  is  this  concurient  jurisdiction,  the 
rules  of  law  which  they  ap[)ly  are  alike  in  l)oth  courts."*  This 
right  of  concurrent  jurisdiction  has  been  exercised  in  the 
courts  of  the  United  States  in  the  cases  above  cited,  and  in 
New  York,  New  Jersey,  Maryland,  Alabama,  Virginia,  North 
Carolina,  and  Illinois.^  But  in  some  cases,  as  in  eciuitablo 
estates  for  instance,  it  will  be  seen  hereafter  that  courts  of 
etpiity  have  exclusive  jurisdiction.  It  will  therefore  be  proper 
to  consider  the  remedies  at  the  common  law  by  themselves. 

12.  Dower  should  be  set  out  to  the  widow  within  the  time  of 
her  quarantine,  and  it  is  often  said  she  may  bring  her  action 
at  law  for  its  recovery  if  not  set  out  within  that  time.''  And 
as,  at  common  law,  no  damages  could  ijo  recovered  in  a  real 
action,  it  does  not  seem  to  have  been  necessary  to  make  a 
demand  for  dower  before  commencing  the  action.'^  But  if  no 
such  (K'mand  is  made,  the  tenant  may  jdead  tout  temps  prist  in 
bar  of  any  claim  for  damages.  And  as  by  the  statute  of  Mer- 
ton,  damages  are  recoverable  in  an  action  of  dower,  a 
demand  *  is,  practically,  uniformly  made  j)reliminary  [*2"28] 
to  the  commencement  of  the  action.^ 

13.  In  some  of  the  States  a  demand  must  be  made  before 
commencing  an  action,  and  the  time  within  which,  after  such 

»  Dun  forth  v.  Smith,  23  Vt.  247. 

•  2  Cmbb,  H.-al  rroi>.  187  ;  HerU-rt  r.  AVnn,  7  Cmndi,  370,  376. 
«  r.Tkin8,  §  317  ;  2  Cmbb,  Heal  Prop.  187. 

•  Potier  r.  Baalay,  15  Ala.  439  ;  Mayburn-  r.  Britn,  15  Pet  21. 

•  liailgh'y  V.  Bruco,  4  Paigi-,  98  ;  Hartshoriip  r.  Hartshome,  2  N.  J.  Eq.  349  ; 
Wells  p.  Beall,  2  Gill  &  J.  468  ;  Ki<l.lall  r.  TrimbK'.  1  M.l.  Ch.  Dec.  143  ;  Blunt 
V.  Geo,  5  Call,  481  ;  Campbell  v.  Muri>hy,  2  Jones,  £<!.  357  ;  Blain  r.  Harrison, 
11  111.  384  ;  Oslwrn.'  r.  Horine,  17  111.  i>± 

•  2  Crabb,  R.-al  Prop.  140  ;  1  Bright,  Hiis.  k  Wife,  363  ;  4  Kent,  Com.  63. 
1  Steams*,  Ueal  Act.  312. 

•  StcaniH,  Real  Act.  313  ;  Co.  Lit.  32  b  ;  Watson  r.  Watson,  10  C.  B.  3  ;  Hitch- 
cock r.  HarriugtuD,  6  Johns.  290. 


288  LAW    OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK    I. 

demand  is  made,  it  may,  and,  if  brought  at  all,  must,  be  com- 
menced, is  regulated  by  their  local  statutes.  In  Massachusetts 
it  must  be  made  of  the  person  who  is  seised  of  the  freehold, 
and  the  action  may  not  be  commenced  until  one  month  after 
such  demand,  and  must  be  within  one  year.^  And  this  demand 
is  a  personal  one,  and  is  required  to  be  made  upon  every  person 
who  is  tenant,  though  he  be  a  tenant  in  common  with  others.^ 
And  it  may  be  made  by  attorney.^  But  a  demand  for  dower 
in  one  parcel  of  land  which  belongs  to  two  persons  in  severalty, 
must  be  made  upon  each  separately.  A  joint  demand  would 
not  be  good  as  to  either.*  The  heir  or  tenant  therefore  has 
one  month  after  such  demand  in  which  to  assign  the  dower. 
And  he  may  always  protect  himself  against  a  suit,  if  after  such 
demand  he  proceeds  to  set  out  dower  to  the  widow  fairly  to 
the  extent  of  her  right,  for  by  so  doing  he  acquires  a  good  and 
legal  defence  against  any  further  claim.^  In  New  York,  no 
previous  demand  is  required  in  order  to  give  the  widow  her 
action,  which  in  that  State  is  in  the  form  of  ejectment,  instead 
of  the  common-law  form.^  Nor  is  it  necessary  to  make  de- 
mand of  the  heir  where  the  husband  died  seised  in  order  to 
maintain  an  action  for  dower  in  New  Jersey ;  Dor  can  tout  temjjs 
Jurist  be  pleaded  to  the  action.''  It  has  been  held  to  be  sufficient 
to  demand  the  dower  of  the  minor  and  his  guardian,  where  the 
heir  who  is  to  set  it  out  is  under  age.^  Although  it  is  usual  to 
demand  dower  in  writing,  it  is  not  necessary  to  do  so ;  it  may 
be  done  by  parol ;  ^  and  the  one  making  it  may  be  appointed 
by  parol.i^     So  it  may  be  demanded  by  an  attorney  ;  nor  is  it 

necessary  that  the  power  of  such  attorney  should  be 
[*229]  in  writing.^^     And  in  Watson  v.  Watson, ^^  *  above 

cited,  where  the  son  of  the  demandant  "  asked  him 

1  Pub.  Stat.  c.  174,  §  2  ;  unless  such  person  is  unknown  to  her  or  absent  from 
the  State. 

2  Burbank  v.  Day,  12  Met.  557.  ^  Stevens  v.  Pieed,  37  N.  H.  49. 
*  Pond  V.  Johnson,  9  Gray,  193.  ^  Baker  v.  Baker,  4  Me.  67. 

6  Jackson  v.  Churchill,  7  Cow.  287  ;  Ellicott  v.  Mosier,  7  N.  Y.  201  ;  s.  c.  11 
Barb.  574. 

7  Hopper  V.  Hopper,  22  N.  J.  715.  ^  Young  r .  Tarbell,  37  Me.  509. 
9  Co.  Lit.  32  b  ;  Baker  v.  Baker,  4  Me.  67  ;  Page  v.  Page,  6  Cash.  196. 

1"  Lothrop  V.  Foster,  51  Me.  367. 

"  Luce  V.  Stubbs,  35  Me.  92.  "  "\Yatson  v.  "\Yatson,  10  C.  B.  3. 


CH.  VII.  §   ').]  nOWKR.  2*^0 

(the  trnant)  if  lie  wnuM  i»ay  liis  niotlior  licr  thirds,"  to  \\  Iiirli 
lie  replied,  "  No,"  the  demaiul  was  held  ^ood,  no  question 
having  been  raised  as  to  the  authority  of  the  son  to  make  such 
re(|uest.  But  if  a  power  of  attorney  be  given  in  writiuL',  it 
must  contain  sullieient  authority  to  make  the  requisite  de- 
mand, or  it  will  be  of  no  avail.  Theref(jre  where  the  power 
authorized  the  agent  to  demand  dower  in  the  "  aforesaid 
premises,"  hut  no  premises  have  Imumi  mentioned,  it  was  held 
BO  defective  that  no  demand  under  it  would  lay  the  foundati(^n 
for  an  airtion.'  No  great  particularity  is  re(iuired  in  the  de- 
Hcrijttion  of  the  estate  out  of  which  the  dower  is  demanded. 
It  will  be  sullieient  if  it  give  notice  to  the  tenant  to  what  land 
it  means  to  refer.^  It  is  enough  that  the  demand  apprise  the 
tenant,  with  reasonable  certainty,  of  the  claim  made  upon 
him."'  The  demand  must  be  made  of  the  tenant  of  the  free- 
liold,  though  it  need  not  be  made  upon  the  land.*  And  a 
demand  so  made  will  be  sufficient,  though  such  tenant  were 
afterwards  to  convey  his  lands  before  suit  brought,  and  though 
the  suit  must  in  that  case  be  against  another  person,  who  is 
the  tenant  of  the  freehold  when  the  action  is  commenced.^ 

14.  If  the  widow  shall  have  taken  the  proper  preliminary 
measures  without  success,  she  is  entitled  to  an  action  for  tlio 
recovery  of  her  dower,  with  damages  for  its  detention,  and  a 
precept  directed  to  the  sheriff  reipiiring  him  to  cause  her 
dower  to  be  set  off  and  possessitjn  delivered  to  her,  and  to 
enforce  the  payment  of  the  damages  which  a  jury  shall  have 
ascertained.^  This  is  one  of  the  three  real  actions  which  were 
retained  in  England  under  the  repealing  statute  of  3  «fc  4 
Wm.  IV.  c.  7,  §  36,  the  other  two  being  quare  impedif'  and 

•  Sloan  r.  Whitman,  5  C'ush.  532. 

'  Hayn.s  r.  Powers,  22  N.  H.  590 ;  Atwoo<l  v.  Atwood,  22  Pick.  283  ;  Bear 
V.  Snyder,  11  WciiJ.  592  ;  Aver  r.  Spring,  10  Mass.  80. 

•  I)avi<  r.  Walk.r.  42  X.  H.  482. 

•  Lnee  c.  Stubl«,  35  Me.  02. 

»  Barker  f.  Blake,  36  Me.  433  :  Wat.ion  p.  Watson,  "0  Enp.  Com,  Uw,  5.  n. ; 
Mass.  Pub.  Stat.  c.  174,  §  10  ;  Parker  r.  Mnq)hy,  12  Mow.  485. 

•  2  Bl.  Torn.  136  ;  1  Brigl.t.  Hiw.  k  Wife,  369  ;  1  Rolle,  Abr.  683  ;  Steams, 
Real  Act  311-319. 

^  As  this  action  is  desipne.1  to  try  a  dispnteil  title  to  an  a^lvowson.  or  the  right 
of  presentation  to  a  churrh,  there  is  no  anion  answering  to  it  in  the  form*  in  use 
in  the  United  States.     Actions  of  dower  and  quart  impcdU,  as  special  actions,  are 
YOU  I.  — 19 


290  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   L 

ejectment.  It  is  one  of  the  two  retained  in  Massa- 
[*230]  chusetts,  the  other  being  a  writ  of  *  entry  upon  dis- 
seisin.^ There  were  formerly  two  forms  of  action  of 
dower.  But  the  form  in  use  in  this  country  answers  most 
nearly  to  that  known  to  the  common  law  as  "  the  writ  of 
dower  unde  nihil  habet.''  ^  It  m,ust  be  brought  in  the  county 
where  the  land  lies,  like  all  real  actions,^  and  lies  only  against 
the  tenant  of  the  freehold  at  the  time  of  commencing  the  ac- 
tion.* And  this,  as  has  been  before  stated,  though  he  who 
was  tenant  of  the  freehold  when  the  demand  was  made  shall, 
in  the  mean  time,  have  conveyed  to  another  tenant.^  Nor 
can  the  tenant,  though  a  minor,  have  the  ordinary  privilege 
of  an  infant  defendant  in  a  real  action,  of  having  the  "  parol 
demur,"  that  is,  of  having  the  action  continued  in  court  till 
he  arrive  at  full  age.  And  the  obvious  reason  is,  that  the 
widow  is  supposed  to  need  the  enjoyment  of  her  dower  for 
her  immediate  support.^  In  some  States  the  plea  of  non- 
tenure may  be  pleaded  in  bar  of  such  an  action."  In  others, 
it  must,  to  avail,  be  pleaded  in  abatement.^  But  the  suit  may 
be  against  the  tenant  of  the  freehold,  though  he  holds  by 
wrong,  such  a  disseisor,  abator,  or  intruder.^  So  if  the  owner 
of  the  estate  shall  have  bargained  it  away,  but  the  deed  has 
not  yet  been  delivered,  he  will  be  the  party  to  be  sued.^*'     But 

now  done  away  with,  and  dower  must  be  sued  for  by  writ  and  summons  as  in  any 
other  action,  by  the  common  law.  Procedure  Act  of  1860.  Upon  the  writ  is 
indorsed  a  notice  that  the  plaintiff  intends  to  declare  in  dower.  Broom's  Com. 
Law,  119. 

1  Pub.  Stat.  c.  173,  §  1  ;  c.  174,  §  1.  In  the  writ  of  entrj-,  in  Massachusetts, 
the  demandant  not  only  recovers  damages  covering  mesne  profits,  but  under  a 
state  of  things  provided  for  by  statute,  the  tenant  may  claim  compensation  for 
betterments  made  by  him  while  in  possession  of  the  demanded  premises.  Pub. 
Stat.  c.  173,  §§  12,  17,  18  ;  Haven  v.  Adams,  8  Allen,  368.  But  where  he  has 
made  them  without  reason  to  suppose  himself  owner,  he  cannot  claim  such  com- 
pensation.    Daggett  V.  Trac}',  128  Mass.  167. 

2  4  Kent,  Com.  63  ;  Stearns,  Real  Act.  302.  ^  Stearns,  Real  Act.  87. 

*  1  Bright,  Hus.  &  Wife,  398  ;  Hurd  v.  Grant,  3  Wend.  340  ;  Miller  v.  Beverly, 
1  Hen.  &  M.  367  ;  EUicott  v.  Mosier,  11  Barb.  574. 
s  Barker  v.  Blake,  36  Me.  433. 

6  Stearns,  Real  Act.  107  ;  1  Bright,  Hus.  &  Wife,  364. 
''  Casporus  v.  Jones,  7  Penn.  St.  120. 
'  Manning  v.  Laboree,  33  Me.  343. 

9  Norwood  V.  Morrow,  4  Dev.  &  B.  442  ;  Otis  v.  "Warren,  16  Mass.  53. 
^'^  Jones  V.  Patterson,  12  Penn.  St.  149, 


en.  VII.  §  .'.]  DOWER.  291 

iu  Ne'w  York,  the  action  hcin;^  ejfctnieiit,  it  may  be  niain- 
tniiu'il  njrainst  any  tenant  in  possession,  whetlier  a  freeholder 
or  not.'  The  proper  action  of  (iower  cannot  be  a  joint  one 
apiinst  the  ."Several  tenants  of  separate  jiareelsof  estate,  thcjii^^h 
ori^'inally  derived  from  the  husl>and,  l)ut  each  tenant  nnist  be 
sucti  separately  in  respect  to  the  jtarcel  of  which  he  is  tenant. - 
The  action,  moreover,  is  so  personal  in  its  nature  on 
•the  part  of  the  demandant,  tijat  if  she  dies  diirinir  its  [*231J 
p(Midency  the  suit  abates.-'  In  Atkins  v.  Vc.iukiiis, 
jiKlgment  for  dower  was  rendered,  and  l)y  afrrcement  between 
the  parties  certain  jiersons  were  to  act  as  commissioiu-rs  to 
set  out  the  dower  and  assess  the  damages,  to  be  reported  to 
tlie  court  for  adjudication,  and  the  demandant  died  Itefore  they 
had  m:ide  their  return.  The  court  declined  to  enter  judpncnt 
for  daniaires  and  costs,  and  they  add  :  "  The  action  died  with 
the  demamlant,  and  the  ju(bjrment  for  dama<res  cannot  n<jw  be 
rendered."^*  It  is  no  objection  to  the  action  that  some  per- 
son other  than  the  tenant  holds  a  morttraire  upon  the  premises, 
80  that  the  widow  is  only  dowable  of  an  ecpiity  of  redemption, 
unless  the  tenant  holds  under  or  Ity  the  ritdit  of  such  mort- 
ga<re.5 

1.").  If  she  prevails  in  her  action,  slic  obtains  judtrmcnt  for 
lier  dower  and  damaires  for  its  detention.'* 

1'k  Damaires,  as  already  remarked,  were  not  originally  re- 
coverable in  an  action  of  dower.  They  were  first  given  by 
the  statute  of  Merton,  eh.  1,  in  an  action  against  the  heir  for 
the  land  of  which  the  husband  died  seised,  and  arc  declared 
to  be  "  the  value  of  the  whole  dower,"  '••  from  the  time  of  the 

•  Note.  —  By  the  statute  of  Maryland  the  action  of  dowi-r  survives.  1  Hil- 
liarU,  Ileal  Proj..  154. 

>   Kllicott  r.  Mosier,  7  N.  Y.  201  ;  Ellis  r.  Kllis.  4  K.  I.  lin. 

"  F<>s<lick  r.  Oooding,  1  Me.  30  ;  1  I{(.i.er,  Hus.  &  Wife,  437  ;  Barney  r. 
f  n>wntT.  9  Ala.  9(H. 

■  Kowo  r.  Johnson.  19  Me.  146;  Sandlwck  r.  Quigley,  8  Watts,  460;  .Atkins 
V.  Yeomnns  6  Met.  438. 

•  .\tkins  r.  Yeomnns,  6  Met.  438.  See  also  Rowc  r.  Johnson,  19  Me.  146  ; 
Tumey  r.  Smith,  14  111.  242  ;  Hildreth  r.  Thompson,  16  Mass.  101. 

•  Smith  r.  Eustis,  7  Me.  41  ;  Thompson  r.  Ik)yd,  2  N.  J.  543  ;  Manning  ». 
Laboree,  33  Mc.  343  ;  Hastings  v.  Stevens,  29  X.  H.  564. 

•  Gen.  SUt.  c.  135,  S  4  ;  Uavitt  r.  bimprvy,  13  Pick.  382. 


292  LAW    OF    REAL    PROPERTY.  [BOOK    L 

death  of  the  husband  unto  the  day  that  the  said  widow  by 
judgment  of  our  court  have  recovered  seisin  of  her  dower," 
<fec.i  But  by  the  English  law,  damages  were  not  recoverable 
of  any  but  the  heir  or  abator  or  their  assigns,  in  respect  to 

lands  of  which  the  husband  died  seised.^  The  vendee 
[*232]  of  the  heir,  therefore,  would  *  be  liable  for  damages  in 

the  same  way  as  the  heir  himself,^  but  not  the  alienee 
of  the  husband.*  The  rule  and  measure  of  damages  as  to  the 
mode  of  computing  them  seems  to  be  the  same  in  England 
and  here,  that  is,  one  third  of  the  value  of  the  annual  rents 
and  profits  of  the  estate  out  of  which  dower  is  claimed.^  But 
in  respect  to  the  lengtli  of  time  for  which  this  allowance  shall 
be  made,  there  is  quite  a  difference  in  the  laws  of  the  different 
States.*  In  Virginia  the  widow  can  recover  damages  against 
her  husband's  alienee^  in  proceedings  in  equity,  from  the  date 
of  the  subpoena.^  In  Pennsylvania  she  recovers  from  the  death 
of  the  husband,  where  he  died  seised,  although  the  tenant  may 
have  been  in  possession  but  a  part  of  the  time  since.'''  But  in 
Delaware,  in  such  case,  she  could  recover  damages  only  from  the 
time  of  purchase  by  the  tenant.^  In  Alabama,  if  the  action 
be  against  the  heir,  damages  are  allowed  from  the  death  of 
the  husband.  If  against  a  purchaser,  they  cover  only  the 
time  from  the  commencement  of  the  suit.^  In  Ohio  and  South 
Carolina  no  damages  are  allowed  in  an  action  of  dower.i'^  In 
Missouri  and  Wisconsin  the  widow  has  damages  against  the 

*  Note.  —  The  rule  as  above  stated  seems  to  be  the  settled  law,  although  the 
point  that  an  extra  sura  should  be  allowed  for  the  illegal  detention  of  the  dower 
is  raised,  and  authorities  tending  to  sustain  it  are  cited,  in  Fisher  v.  Morgan, 
Coxe,  125. 

1  Co.  2d  Inst.  80. 

2  Co.  Lit.  32  b;  Steams,  Real  Act.  312;  Thompson  v.  Colier,  Yelv.  112; 
Fisher  v.  Morgan,  Coxe,  125. 

8  Hitchcock  V.  Harrington,  6  Johns.  290. 

4  2  Crabb,  Real  Prop.  120  ;  Embree  v.  Ellis,  2  Johns.  119. 

5  Winder  v.  Little,  4  Yeates,  152  ;  Sedgwick  on  Damages,  130  ;  Laji;on  v. 
Butler,  4  Harringt.  507  ;  4  Kent,  Com.  65. 

6  Tod  V.  Baylor,  4  Leigh,  498.  '  Seaton  v.  Jamison,  7  Watts,  533. 
^  Kewbold  V.  Ridgeway,  1  Harringt.  55  ;  Green  v.  Tenant,  2  Harringt.  336. 

9  Beavers  v.  Smith,  11  Ala.  20. 

^'>  Heyward  v.  Cuthbert,  1  McCord,  386  ;  Bank  of  United  States  v.  Dunseth, 
10  Ohio,  18. 


CII.  VII.  §  .">.]  DOWER.  2!».1 

lit'irfroin  the  dratli  of  Hit'  liusliaiid  ;  airuinst  luishaml's  alinjcc, 
from  the  tiinc  ol  llif  flcmaiid  foi-  (lower. •  In  Massaclmsctts, 
damoifi's  nro  allowed  from  tlic  limr  of  the  di'maml,  if  tlir  ac- 
tion !)('  apiinst  tlic  pcrstm  of  whom  demand  is  made.  If  ajrainst 
a  .Kuliseiinent  pnrcha.ser,  they  are  oidy  allowed  from 
the  time  of  his  jturehase  *  and  a  separate  aet ion  on  [*233] 
the  case  may  be  maintained  a^rainst  the  prior  tenant 
to  recover  damajies  from  the  time  of  demand  to  the  time  of 
his  conveyance.^  The  law  is  the  same  in  New  York,  in  re- 
spect to  a  purchaser,  and  damap's  are  recoverable  from  the 
time  of  his  j)urchase  only.'^  And  where  the  husband  died 
seised,  the  widow  was  held  entitled  to  rents  and  |iro(its  fi-om 
the  time  of  his  death,  to  be  apj)ortione(l  iijtun  the  heirs  and 
terre-tenants  aeeordini;  to  the  length  of  time  they  occupied.* 
In  Maryland,  if  the  widow  recover  dower  at  common  law 
against  the  husband's  alienee,  she  may  afterwards  recover,  by 
proceedings  in  CMpiity,  the  rents  and  ])ro(its  from  the  time 
dower  was  demanded.''  In  Maine,  New  Hampshire,  and  Rhode 
Island,  damages  are  recoverable  only  from  demand,  lii  New 
Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  and  Tennes.see,  the  same  rule  as  to  dam- 
ages is  apjilied  as  in  the  English  courts,  where  the  claim  is 
against  the  alienee  of  the  hu.sband,  and  they  are  not  allowed 
except  where  the  husband  dies  seised.*^  And  in  New  York,  in 
addition  to  the  restriction  above  mentioned,  the  widow  cannot 
claim  damages  for  more  than  si.\  years,  nor  for  any  time  an- 
terior to  her  demand  made."  In  North  Carolina,  in  a  process 
in  equity  to  recover  dower,  a  widow  was  held  entitled  to  an 
account  for  mesne  jtrolits  from  the  death  (jf  her  hn.sliand  up 
to  the  assignment  of  dower.  And  where  Imildings  which  had 
been  insured  were  burned  after  the  death  of  the  husband,  and 
before  dower  was  assigned,  she  was  held  entitled  to  ii  j>ro  rata 
share  of  the  insurance  money .^     These  damages,  as  already 

1  Mi-rinnahnn  i-.  Porter,  10  Mo.  7>6  ;  Thraslur  v.  Tvack,  15  Wise.  256. 
»  rub.  Sut.  c.  174,  §  10  ;  Wliiltaker  r.  Cm-r,  12y  Muss.  -117. 

•  1UISS.-1I  «;.  Austin,  1  Paige,  1S»2.  *  Huziii  r.  Tliurber,  4  Jolins.  Ch.  604. 

*  Sellnian  r.  liowen,  8  Cill  &  J.  50. 

«  Fislicr  r.  .Morgiin,  Cox.-.  125  ;  Slmrp  r.  P.ttit,  4  Dall.  212  ;  Waters ».  Gooch, 
6  J.  .1.  .Marsh.  5!>6  ;  Co.  Lit.  32  b  ;  Dort.  &  .Stiul.  Dial.  2,  c.  13. 
^  Bell  r.  The  Mayor,  10  Paige,  49,  70. 
"  Campbell  r.  Muri)hy,  2  Jones,  Etj.  357,  363,  364. 


294  LAW  OP  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

stated,  are  ordinarily  found  by  the  jury ;  but  if  there  be  a 
judgment  by  default,  the  court  may  assess  the  damages  by 
assent  of  demandant,  or  send  the  question  to  a  jury.i  * 

17.  The  judgment  in  an  action  of  dower  is  regarded   as 

having  a  double  character,  the  recovery  of  seisin  being 
[*234]  by  force  of  *  the  common  law,  that  of  damages  and 

costs  by  force  of  the  statutes  of  Merton  and  Glouces- 
ter.2  ^mj  these  are  so  far  independent  of  each  other  that  the 
demandant  may  have  a  complete  judgment  for  seisin  of  her 
dower,  with  damages  or  without  them  as  the  case  may  be.^ 
And  if  verdict  be  for  both,  where  no  damages  are  recover- 
able, the  court  will  treat  the  finding  as  to  the  damages  as  sur- 
plusage, and  render  judgment  for  the  seisin.*  But  unless 
there  be  a  judgment  for  her  seisin  of  dower,  she  cannot  have 
one  for  damages,  —  so  that  if  by  her  death  a  recovery  for  the 
former  fails,  her  estate  has  no  remedy  by  way  of  damages  for 
detention  of  the  dower.^  Nor  can  a  demandant  in  an  action 
of  dower,  as  may  be  done  in  other  real  actions,  enter  upon  the 
land  recovered  by  the  judgment  without  a  formal  writ  of  entry. 
And  the  reason  is  that  in  one  case  the  demandant  sues  for 
and  establishes  his  right  to  a  specific  parcel  of  land  ;  in  the 
other,  the  part  she  is  to  have  can  only  be  ascertained  by  the 
assignment  of  her  dower.^ 

18.  For  this  reason,  after  judgment  in  her  favor,  she  may 
have  a  writ  of  habere  facias  seisinam  directed  to  the  sheriff, 
commanding  him  to  cause  her  dower  to  be  set  out,  and  seisin 

*  Note.  —  The  mode  of  assessing  damages  in  the  English  courts  varies  in 
some  respects  from  that  in  Massachusetts,  as  will  he  seen  by  referring  to  2 
Sauud.  45,  n.  4,  or  Co.  Lit.  32  b,  n.  4  ;  but  the  subject  hardly  seems  to  be  of 
sufficient  importance  for  the  student  of  American  law  to  occupy  more  space  in 
this  work. 

1  Steams,  Real  Act.  311  ;  Perry  v.  Goodwin,  6  Mass.  498. 

•2  2  Crabb,  Real  Prop.  186  ;  Taylor  v.  Brodrick,  1  Dana,  345  ;  Sharp  v.  Pettit, 
4  Dall.  212.  The  statutes  of  Merton  and  Gloucester  are  a  part  of  the  common 
law  of  Delaware.     Layton  v.  Butler,  4  Harringt.  507. 

3  2  Saund.  45,  n.  4  ;  Co.  Lit.  32  b,  n.  4  ;  Waters  v.  Gooch,  6  J.  J.  Marsh.  586. 

*  Shirtz  V.  Shirtz,  5  Watts,  255. 

s  Atkins  V.  Yeomans,  6  Met.  438  ;  Rowe  v.  Johnson,  19  Me.  146  ;  Turney  v. 
Smith,  14  111.  242  ;  Tuck  v.  Fitts,  18  N.  H.  17L 

6  Hildreth  v.  Thompson,  16  Mass.  191 ;  Co.  Lit.  34  b  ;  Steams,  Real  Act.  318. 


CIl.  VII.   ^  .").]  DOWER.  295 

thi'ivul"  iklivcrcil  to  her,  aiul  to  make  a  return  of  his  duiuj^s 
thereon,*  which  writ  may  contain  a  clause  of  firri  fac'ian  for 
the  recovery  of  danuiges  under  sueh  a  form  of  judg- 
ment.''* •  I  Jut  the  form  of  the  writ  of  seisin,  and  of  [*2;]5] 
the  precept  to  the  sherilY,  would  dej)end  upon  the  law 
of  the  particular  State  where  the  judgment  is  rendered.  Thus, 
the  form  in  Hastell  is  simjily  a  connnand  to  the  slicrilT  to 
make  an  assignment  and  full  seisin  of  a  third  part  of  the 
lands  described,  who  in  his  return  states  that  he  has  so 
done.'' 

ll>.  In  some  of  the  States  the  slierifT  eau.ses  dower  to  he  .set 
(tut  li\  roiiuuissioiicrs,  who  act  uudei"  oath.  IJiit  though  the 
sherilY  is  bound  In'  his  precept  to  make  a  return  of  his  doings 
into  the  court  from  which  it  issued,  the  demandant  is  not 
obliged  to  wait  until  such  return  is  made  and  accepted  before 
entering  upon  and  taking  jiossession  of  her  dower  land.  She 
may  enter  as  soon  as  the  assignment  is  made  and  seisin  given, 
subject  oidy  to  the  hazard  of  having  her  title  defeated  by  some 
irregularity  in  the  proceedings.'*  It  sometimes  happens,  how- 
ever, that  the  dower  lands  of  the  widow  arc  subject  to  a  term 
of  years  created  l>efore  marriage.  If  there  were  no  rent  issu- 
ing out  of  such  term,  the  widow  takes  her  judgment  with  a 
ce%»ai  I'leeutio  until  the  term  shall  have  expired.**  If,  in  the 
lea.se  or  grant  of  sueh  a  term,  rent  was  reserved  and  pavable, 
the  widow  might  have  her  dower  set  oil"  in  tlic  jiremises  by 
metes  and  bounds,  and,  as  reversioner,  claim  one  third  of  the 
rents  and  prcjfits  without  any  cetssat  executio  ujion  Iwr  judg- 
ment.'^ 

20.  As  has  been  more  than  once  stated,  the  sheriff  must, 
ordinarily,  execute  his  precept  by  assigning  the  dower  by 
metes  and  bounds,  where  the  same  can  be  doneJ     IIow  far 

>  Rastell,  Kiitrie-s,  235. 

'  Sti-anis,  Real  Act.  317  ;  Beiiner  r.  Evans,  3  Pi-nn.  454. 

•  Itiistell,  Entrie*.  235. 

«  Co.  Lit.  37  b,  n  ;  Parker  r.  Purktr,  17  Pick.  236;  Mansfield  r.  Poiubn.ko, 
6  Pick.  440. 

»  Co.  Lit.  208  a,  n.  105  ;  Tii.l.  Cas.  47  ;  Muundrell  v.  Muiui.ln-ll,  7  Vcs.  5fi7. 

•  Co.  Lit  32a  ;  Stoughton  v.  L.i;,'li,  1  Taunt.  402  ;  W.ir  r.  Tiito,  4  Irt-.!.  V.i\. 
264. 

'  Perkins,  §  414  ;  Steams,  Real  Act  318  ;  Pierce  v.  Williams,  2  Penningt.52L 


296  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   L 

he  may  or  must  do  this  in  respect  to  separate  and  distinct  par- 
cels of  land  may  depend  npon  circumstances.  If  the  lands 
were  aliened  in  the  life  of  the  husband,  the  dower  of  the  wife 

must  be  set  out  separately  in  the  land  of  each  alienee.^ 
[*236]  If  the  lands  out  of  which  a  *  widow  is  dowablc,  and 

which  are  held  by  the  same  person,  consist  of  parcels 
of  meadow,  pasture,  and  corn  land,  the  sheriff  is  not  boaud  to 
set  out  a  part  of  each ;  he  may  assign  it  all  from  one  if  it  is 
reasonable  so  to  do.^  But  in  such  and  similar  cases  he  is 
bound  to  exercise  sound  and  reasonable  discretion.  And 
where  he  set  out  to  a  widow,  as  her  dower,  a  third  part  by 
metes  and  bounds  of  every  chamber  in  a  house,  the  assign- 
ment was  set  aside,  and  a  fine  imposed  upon  the  sheriff  for 
contempt  in  so  doing.^  But  where  certain  rooms  in  a  house 
were  set  out  with  the  privilege  of  using  the  halls,  stairways, 
<fec.,for  access  to  them,  it  was  held  to  be  a  good  assignment.* 
An  assignment  which  gave  the  widow  a  right  to  cut  wood 
upon  or  depasture  land  not  set  to  her  for  dower  would  not  be 
valid.^ 

Where,  from  the  nature  of  the  estate  out  of  which  the  dower 
is  to  be  assigned,  it  cannot  be  done  by  metes  and  bounds,  it 
may  be  done  by  giving  a  share  in  common  of  the  estate,  or 
an  alternate  occupation,  or  otherwise  as  may  best  serve  the 
purposes  of  the  law.  In  many  cases  a  widow  is  dowable  of 
money  when  this  is  the  proceeds  of  land.  But  this  class  of 
cases  will  be  considered  hereafter,  when  equitable  dower  is 
spoken  of.^  An  instance  of  the  former  method  of  assigning, 
where  it  cannot  be  done  by  metes  and  bounds,  would  be  that 
out  of  an  estate  held  by  the  husband  as  tenant  in  common. 
The  sheriff  cannot  set  apart  any  portion  of  the  estate  as  hers, 
and  the  widow  becomes  by  the  assignment  tenant  in  common 
with  the  other  owners  of  the  land.''     The  case  of  a  mill  vvould 

1  Cook  V.  risk,  Walker,  423  ;  Coulter  v.  Holland,  2  Harriugt.  330  ;  Co.  Lit. 
35  a  ;  Doe  v.  Gwiniiell,  1  Q.  B.  682. 

^  1  Bright,  Hus.  &  Wife,  367. 

3  2  Crabb,  Real  Proi).  147  ;  1  Bright,  Hus.  &  "Wife,  370  ;  Abingdon's  Case, 
cited  in  Howard  v.  Candish,  Palm.  264. 

*  White  V.  Story,  2  Hill,  543.  ^  Jones  v.  Jones,  Busbee,  N.  C.  177. 

''  See  ante,  *163  ;  post,  *244,  et  seq. 

^  Fitzh.  N.  B.  149  ;  1  Bright,  Hus.  &  Wife,  371. 


.]  DOWFU.  297 

ho  aiiotlMT  cxiiinpli'.  In  Kniilaiul  slio  may  bo  oiidowr-d  of 
CVLTV  third  toll  dish,  or  of  a  third  part  (»f  the  jtrolits  of  tho 
mill,  and,  it  is  added,  filio  '*  may  ^riiid  fhtir  toll  frcf."  ' 

IJv  tlu'  law  of  Massachusetts,  where  a  mill  or  other  tene- 
ment eannot  ho  tiivided  without  damaj^e  to  the  whole, 
dower  is  assigned  of  *  the  rents,  issues,  and  profits  [*237] 
then'of,  to  be  had  in  e<inimon  with  the  other  owners 
of  the  estates.'-'  So  in  the  ease  of  a  ferry,  where  a  share  of 
its  use,  or  of  the  profits,  or  a  share  of  the  time,  should  bo 
assij^ned  for  dower."''  Mines  constitute  a  special  class  of  es- 
tates, out  of  which  a  widow  may  l)e  dowable,  and  the  mode  of 
assiirniiiL'  dower  tlu'rein  was  fully  considered  in  the  ease  cited 
below.*  It  was  there  held  that  if  the  mine  (tr  mines  formed  a 
part  of  the  value  of  the  estate  of  which  dower  is  to  b(;  bad,  it 
is  not  necessary  that  any  )»art  of  such  mines  should  be  set  out 
as  dower,  provide"!  ijic  widnw  have  one  third  ]iart  in  value  of 
the  entire  estate  assiirned  to  her  out  of  other  parts  of  it.  If 
the  mine  is  emln'aced  within  what  is  set  out  by  metes  and 
bounds,  it  need  not  be  described  ;  for,  if  open,  it  may  be  used 
and  worked  as  i)art  of  the  dower  for  her  own  exclusive  use. 
If  any  part  of  a  mine  or  mines  is  set  t)ut  whicli  does  not  form 
a  part  of  the  estate  which  is  defined  by  metes  and  bounds,  but 
still  forms  a  part  of  the  ireneral  estate  of  which  she  is  dowable, 
it  should  be  specifically  described.  If  the  mine  (jr  mines  be 
in  another  jjcrson's  land,  and  open  and  wrought,  and  the  same 
can  be  divided  by  metes  and  bounds  so  as  not  to  prevent  the 
other  owners  or  proi)rietors  from  enjoying  a  j»roj)er  |troj}ortion 
of  the  pi-olits  thereof,  her  dower  should  1)0  so  divided  and  as 
signed.  Ibit  if  this  cannot  bo  done,  the  .assignment  should  be 
so  maile  as  to  give  the  widow  one  third  part  of  the  profits, 
as  by  a  separate  alternate  enjoyment  of  the  whole  for  short 
|>eriods,  or  by  giviuL'  her  a  certain  pi-i)]M>rlinn  of  the  profits  of 
such  minu.^  In  making  the  assignment  .if  dower,  the  estimate 
of  the  third  part  has  reference  to  tho  jjroductive  value  of  tho 

»  2  fmbh,  K.al  rroj).  U8  ;  P.  ikins.  §  41.^.  ;  1  Bright,  Hua.  k  Wife,  372. 
«  Tub.  .Stat  r.  174,  §  12  ;  Sttariis,  lU-al  Act  319. 

•  Stfvens  r.  Stovi-iiK,  3  Dnna,  371. 

•  Stoujjhton  r.  I>'igh,  1  Tniiiit.  402. 

•  See  C<Mte»  r.  Chet'VtT,  1  Cow.  460,  478  ;  BUlinijs  r.  Taylor,  10  Pick.  460. 


298  LAW  OF  EEAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

estate,  and  not  the  quantity.  Such  part  of  the  estate  should 
be  set  out  to  her  as  will  give  her  one  third  part  of  the  annual 
income  or  profits  of  the  entire  estate.^  The  time  to  which 
this  estimate  must  refer,  if  the  estate  were  sold  in  the  life  of 
the  husband,  and  had  been  increased  in  productiveness  by  the 
purchaser,  would  be  that  at  which  the  husband  parted  with 
it.     If  the  husband  die  seised,  it  refers  to  the  time  of  his 

death  .2 
[*238]       *21.  But  if  either  party  wish  to  raise  objection  to 

the  manner  or  extent  of  the  assignment,  it  should  be 
done  when  the  return  of  the  officer  who  sets  it  out  is  made  to 
the  court.^ 

22.  Notwithstanding  what  has  been  said,  the  question  of 
the  time  in  reference  to  which  the  value  or  income  shall  be 
estimated,  has  presented  difficulties  wliich  have  led  to  differ- 
ent rules  in  different  jurisdictions.  If  the  case  be  one  where 
the  claim  is  made  of  the  heir,  the  rule  is  uniform  in  referring 
to  the  value  and  condition  of  the  estate  as  it  is  when  the 
dower  is  actually  assigned,  unless  he  shall  have  done  acts  to 
deteriorate  it  since  the  death  of  the  husband.  If  he  has  en- 
hanced the  value  of  it,  it  is  his  own  folly  to  have  done  so 
without  first  setting  out  the  dower,  and  he  cannot  claim  to 
have  these  improvements  allowed  to  him  in  making  the  esti- 
mate.* And  if  the  heir  were  to  sow  the  husband's  lands  after 
his  death,  and  these  were  to  be  set  off  to  the  widow,  he  could 
not  claim  the  crops  as  emblements  belonging  to  him.^  So  if, 
without  the  fault  of  the  heir,  the  estate  be  diminished  in 
value  between  the  death  of  the  husband  and  the  assignment 
of  the  dower,  she  must  bear,  -pro  rata^  this  depreciation.^  Nor 
could  the  sheriff  in  assigning  dower  have  any  regard  to  the 
fact  that  the  estate  had  been  deteriorated  by  tlie  wrongful 
act  of  the  heir.     He  could  only  set  it  out  in  reference  to  the 

1  Coates  V.  Cheever,  1  Cow.  460,  476 :  McDaniel  v.  McUaniel,  3  Ired.  61  ;  Smith 
V.  Smith,  5  Dana,  179  ;  Leonard  v.  Leonard,  4  Mass.  533  ;  Park,  Dow.  255. 

•■2  Davis  V.  Walker,  42  N.  H.  482. 

8  Chapman  r.  Schroeder,  10  Ga.  321. 

4  Catlin  V.  Ware,  9  Mass.  218  ;  Thompson  v.  Morrow,  5  S.  &  R.  289  ;  1  Bright, 
Hus.  &  Wife,  385  ;  Co.  Lit.  32  a  ;  Powell  i'.  Moiison,  3  Mason,  347,  368,  369. 

6  Parker  V.  Parker,  17  Pick.  236  ;  Co.  2d  Inst.  81. 

•  1  Bright,  Hus.  &  Wife,  385  ;  Powell  v.  Mouson,  3  Mason,  368. 


CH.  VII.  §    ").]  DOWKIl.  209 

tlu'ii  condition  of  the  estate.'  'V\\o  dowrcss's  roniody  for  tlio 
injury  su.-^taincd  hy  such  dctcrioriition  niu.st  he  son^dit  hy  an 
action  for  daina;.?es,2  though  .Judjre  Story,  in  Powell  v.  Mon- 
Bon,^  is  (li.spo.sed  to  doul)t  the  ri«rht  of  u  widow  in  sucii  cases 
to  recover  daniajres  of  the  heir.  The  questions  in  respect  to 
which  the  chief  dilliculty  has  arisen,  relate  to  ca.ses  where  tlie 
j)ro|>erty  was  aliened  l»y  the  hiisl)aMd  in  his  lifrtinic  and  had 
i)een  diminisheil  or  eidianeed  in  value  lietween  the 
alienation  *  and  the  time  of  assiunin^r  dower.  In  some  [*230] 
important  particulars  the  Knirlish  and  Ani<Ti*an  law 
differs.  Thus  in  a  recent  case  it  was  held  'Mhat  d(jwer 
attaches  to  the  husband's  real  property  at  the  period  of  his 
death,  according  to  its  then  actual  value,  without  reij^ard  to 
the  hands  which  hroujLrht  it  into  the  condition  in  which  it  is 
found."  And  the  court,  Denman,  C.  J.,  cites  with  apjjroba- 
tion  the  opinion  of  Sir  Edw.  Sugden,  "  that  the  widow  is  en- 
titled t )  liave  assigned  to  her  as  her  dower  so  much  in  value 
as  is  equal  to  a  third  in  value,  according  to  the  condition  of 
the  estate  at  the  time  of  lier  husl)aiurs  death."  ^  So  far  as  the 
ride  becomes  applicable  to  the  value  <d'  estates  which  have 
been  deteriorated  by  waste  or  mismanagement  while  in  the 
liands  of  an  alienee  of  the  husltand,  it  is  Ijelieved  to  i)e  the 
same  in  l).»tli  countries.  The  nature  of  a  wife's  intn-cst  dur- 
ing her  husliand's  life  is  such,  that  if  an  alienee  of  the  estate 
cause  a  i)ermanent  damage  to  it,  she  is  without  remedy,  and 
must  therefore  be  content  to  take  her  dower  out  of  the  estate 
as  she  linds  it,  when  her  right  becomes  consummated  by  the 
death  of  her  husband.^  Nor  does  there  apjiear  to  be  any 
essential  diftercncc  between  the  laws  of  the  two  countries, 
where  the  estate  after  the  alienaticjii  bv  the  husband,  and  be- 


>  Co.  Lit.  32  11 ;  Powell  r.  Monson,  3  Mason,  368, 

»  1  IJright,  Hu.s.  &  Wilf,  385;  2  Cnil.L,  n«-.il  Prop.  138  ;  1  RopT,  Hus.  & 
Wife.  34'.t. 

■  Pow.ll  1-.  .Moiison,  3  Mnson,  368  ;  CampWl  r.  Muq)hy.  2  Jones,  Eij.  389. 

«  Dor  ».  Gwiiinell,  1  Q,  B.  682  ;  Cnmiitx-U  v.  Muq.hy,  «/;».  363. 

*  M.C'lniiahau  f.  Porter,  10  Mo.  746  ;  Tlionijison  v.  Morrow,  5  S.  &  K.  280  ; 
IVrkins,  §  329  ;  1  Bright,  Has.  &  Wife,  386;  Powell  r.  Monson.  3  Miison,  363, 
Ami  tho  suggestion  of  relief  in  c<inity  thrown  out  in  B«nvers  r.  Smith,  1 1  Aln,  20, 
do«'s  not  seem  to  have  been  mted  on  in  any  tlwiiled  cn-se.  In  We>t<ott  r.  Cunip- 
bell,  11  R.  I.  378,  however,  the  rule  itself  is  lueutioned  with  disapproval. 


300  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  L 

fore  the  assignment  of  the  dower,  has  become  enhanced  or 
diminished  in  value  by  natural  or  extraneous  causes,  inde- 
pendent of  improvements  made  by  the  alienee  himself.  The 
widow  in  such  case  may  share  in  the  increased,  as  she  must 
in  the  decreased,  value  of  the  estate.^  Two  or  three  of  the 
cases  cited  will  illustrate  these  propositions.  The  case  of 
Powell  V.  Monson  was  one  where  the  alienees  had  erected 
large  and  expensive  works  for  manufacturing  purposes,  which 
enhanced  the  value  of  the  lands  very  much,  independent  of 
the  mere  value  of  the  structures  placed  upon  the  premises. 

The  judge  held  "  that  the  dower  must  be  adjudged 
[*240]  according  to  the  value  of  the  land  in  controversy  at  *  the 

time  of  the  assignment,  excluding  all  tlie  increased 
value  from  the  improvements  actually  made  upon  the  premises 
by  the  alienee,  leaving  the  dowress  the  full  benefit  of  any 
increase  of  value  arising  from  circumstances  unconnected  with 
these  improvements."  2  Thompson  v.  Morrow  was  the  case  of 
an  estate  in  the  city  of  Pittsburg,  enhanced  in  value  by  the 
growth  of  and  rise  of  property  in  that  city.  Tilghman,  C.  J., 
says,  "Throwing  those  (the  improvements  made  by  the  pur- 
chaser) out  of  the  estimate,  she  shall  be  endowed  according  to 
the  value  at  the  time  her  dower  shall  be  assigned."  ^  In  the  case 
of  Braxton  v.  Coleman,  the  estate  sold  by  the  husband  had  a 
mill  standing  upon  it,  which  was  carried  away  and  another  was 
built  in  its  stead,  and  afterwards  a  third  and  much  enlarged 
one  was  erected,  and  it  was  held  that  the  widow  could  only 
claim  dower  out  of  the  land.  In  New  York,  owing  to  the 
language  of  the  statutes  of  that  State,  the  value  of  the  estate 
at  the  time  of  its  alienation  is  the  criterion  for  determining 
what  proportion  shall  be  set  off  as  the  widow's  share.'*  And 
a  similar  rule  prevails  in  Virginia,  Michigan,  Nebraska,  and 
Oregon.^     So   also   in   Alabama,  though  at  first   treated  as 

1  Smith  V.  Addlenian,  5  Blackf.  406  ;  Wms.  Real  Prop.  191,  note  ;  1  Cruise, 
Dig.  171  ;  Powell  v.  Monson,  3  Mason,  347,  375  ;  Johnston  v.  Vandyke,  6  ik'Lean, 
422  ;  Braxton  v.  Coleman,  5  Call,  433  ;  Bowie  v.  Berry,  1  Md.  Ch.  Dec.  452. 

2  Powell  V.  Monson,  3  Mason,  375.     See  Gore  v.  Brazier,  3  Mass.  523,  544. 

3  Thompson  v.  Morrow,  5  S.  &  R.  289.  See  4  Kent,  Com.  67-69  ;  Dunseth  v. 
U.  S.  Bk.,  6  Ohio,  76. 

4  Braxton  v.  Coleman,  5  Call,  433  ;  Walker  v.  Schuyler,  10  Wend.  4S0. 

6  Tod  V.  Baylor,  4  Leigh,  498  ;  Mich.  Comp.  L.  1879,  §  4275  ;  Neb.  Gen.  St. 
1873,  c.  17,  §  7  ;  Oreg.  Gen.  L.  1872,  p.  585. 


en.  VII.  §  5.]  DOWER.  301 

doubtful  how  far  a  widow  could  avail  licrsolf  of  tlic  rise  iu  value 
of  the  estate  hy  extraneous  causes,'  she  is  not  allowe(l  to  shan; 
therein.-  Tlie  dootrine,  iiowever,  which  is  laid  dnwn  liy  Judge 
Storv  and  Ch.  J.  'Pilirhnian,  ahove  stateil,  may  he  eonsidered  as 
in  aceonhmcc  with  tht-  p'ueral  jioliey  of  the  Anieriean  law, 
and  as  l)eint:  ireneraily  the  eoumion  hiw  of  I  he  country.''  And 
in  res|iect  to  the  (|uestion  whether,  and  how  far  a  widow  shall 
have  the  lienelit  of  ini|>rovenient.s  made  hy  the  alienee  of  the 
husband,  the  law  in  the  United  States  seems  to  he  uniform, 
and  will  he  found  to  he  much  more  in  harmony  with  the  |)olicy 
of  a  youni;  an<l  thrivini^  conununity,  where  new  huuls 
arc  purehascMJ  foi-  the  purpose  of  *improvin,ir  thcni  ["211] 
hy  the  expenditure  of  money  and  labor,  an<l  where 
villaires  ami  cities  arc  seen  sprinjrinjz;  up  within  the  life  of 
a  sin;ile  individual.  F'or  such  a  community  the  rule  of  the 
Enirlish  law  would  be  I'nuiid  altogether  unsuitcd,  though  it 
may  be  well  adaj)ted  to  tin.'  habits  of  a  people  where  the  incon- 
veniences growing  out  of  the  exercise  of  dower  rights  have  Un' 
a  long  time  l)ecn,  to  a  great  extent,  avoided  hy  marriage  settle- 
nu'uts  and  other  similar  jirovisions.  The  citation  of  a  single 
case  from  ea(di  of  several  States,  out  of  the  many  that  may  l)e 
readily  found  in  the  reports,  will  be  sufficient  to  establish  the 
law  of  this  country  to  be,  that  where  laiildings  have  been 
crecteil,  improvements  made,  or  the  value  of  lands  enhanced 
by  money  expended  or  labor  done  by  the  alienee  of  the  hus- 
band, upon  the  land  out  of  which  dower  is  claimed,  the  benefit 
of  these  is  not  to  be  shared   by  the  widow.*     Thus,  in  Maine, 

1  Barney  v.  Frowiicr,  9  .Via.  901. 

2  Beavers  v.  Smith,  11  Ala.  20  ;  Francis  v.  Garmnl,  IS  .Ma.  794  ;  Thra.sher  v. 
rinkur.l,  23  Ala.  61  tj. 

«  WooMri.lge  v.  Wilkiiis,  3  How.  (Miss.)  360  ;  Mo.sher  v.  Mosbcr,  15  Me.  371  ; 
Green  v.  Teiiiiant,  2  Ilarringt.  336  ;  Summers  v.  BaM>,  13  111.  483  ;  Sedgwick  on 
Damages,  133  and  note;  Dunscth  v.  U.  S.  Bk.,  6  Ohio,  76.  See  also  4  Kent. 
Com.  63. 

*  4  Kent,  Com.  6.'i  ;  Humphrey  v.  Phinnej-.  ?  Johns.  484  ;  Thompson  r.  Mor- 
row, 5  S.  &  R.  289  ;  Catlin  r.  Ware,  9  M«s.s.  218  ;  Powell  v.  Monson.  3  Mason, 
347  ;  Tod  v.  Biiylor,  4  Leigh,  498  ;  I^^jwett  v.  Steele.  4  "Wash.  C.  C.  1\or,  :  Wilson 
r.  Oatman,  2  Blackf.  223  ;  Brown  v.  Duncan,  4  McCord,  346  ;  Wooldridi;e  v. 
Wilkins,  3  How.  (Mi.'..s.)  360  ;  I^rrowe  r.  Beam,  10  Ohio.  498  ;  Holdw  r.  Harvey. 
16  Me.  80  ;  Barney  r.  Frowner,  9  Ala.  POl  ;  M.-dannhan  v.  Porter.  10  Mo.  746; 
Bowie  V.  Berry,  3  Md.  Ch.  Deo.  35'J  ;  Kawlins  v.  Battel,  1  Houst  (Del.)  224. 


302  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

where  improvements  had  been  made  by  the  alienee,  the  widow 
had  such  a  share  of  the  whole  estate  set  out  to  her  as  would 
produce  an  income  equal  to  one  third  part  of  what  the  whole 
estate  would  produce  if  no  improvements  had  been  made  upon 
it  after  it  had  been  conveyed  by  the  husband.^  And  in  Alabama, 
where  a  dilapidated  mill  upon  the  premises  was  torn  down  by 
the  alienee  of  the  husband,  and  a  new  and  expensive  structure 
erected  in  its  stead,  it  was  held  that  the  widow  of  the  grantor 
was  not  entitled  to  any  share  of  the  improvements,  and  that 
her  dower  should  be  set  out  with  reference  to  the  value  of  the 
premises  at  the  time  of  the  alienation,  though  the  destruction 
of  the  old  mill  afforded  a  proper  case  for  compensation  to  the 
widow  by  a  court  of  equity.'-^ 

23.  In  respect  to  the  time  when  and  manner  in  which  the 
tenant  is  to  suggest  that  improvements  have  been 
[*242]  made  in  the  *  premises,  in  order  to  have  a  proper 
judgment  rendered  in  any  case,  the  law  does  not  seem 
to  be  uniform.  It  should  be  done  by  some  proper  plea  or  sug- 
gestion upon  the  record,  and  not  by  the  way  of  controverting 
the  right  of  the  demandant  to  recover  her  dower.^  And  where 
the  tenant,  by  his  plea,  denied  the  marriage  and  seisin  of  the 
husband,  the  court  say,  "  We  cannot,  from  these  pleadings, 
understand  that  any  improvements  have  been  made  since  then 
(the  alienation),  or  of  what  nature  or  value,  to  be  excluded 
from  the  judgment  to  be  rendered."  ^  In  New  York,  the  court 
say,  the  value  may  be  ascertained  in  one  of  three  ways  :  either 
by  a  jurv  upon  the  trial  of  the  issue,  or  by  the  sheriff  on  the 
writ  of  seisin,  or  by  a  writ  of  inquiry  founded  upon  proper 
suggestions.^  It  is  suggested  in  a  work  on  Real  Actions,  of 
high  authority,  that  a  convenient  mode  of  doing  this  would  be 
by  having  the  increased  value  found  by  the  jury  at  the  bar  of 
the  court,  as  is  done  in  actions  to  recover  lands  where  the 
tenant  claims  allowance  for  improvements.^ 

'  Carter  v.  Parker,  28  Me.  509  ;  Manning  v.  Laboree,  33  Me.  343.  Where, 
however,  the  grantee  had  subdivided  the  land,  the  widow  was  entitled,  as  against 
each  parcel,  to  the  general  rise  in  value  from  the  improvements  made  on  the  oth- 
ers.    Boyd  V.  Carlton,  69  Me.  200. 

2  Beavers  V.  Smith,  11  Ala.  20  ;  Sturtevant  v.  Phelps,  16  Gray,  50. 

8  Stearns,  Eeal  Act.  317  ;  Coxe  v.  Highee,  6  Halst.  395. 

*  Aver  V.  Spring,  10  Mass.  80.  ^  Dolf  r.  Bisset,  15  Johns.  21. 

8  Stearns,  Real  Act.  317  ;  Mass.  Pub.  Stat.  c.  173,  §§  17-23. 


rn.  VII.  J;  ;").]  dower.  303 

24.  It  soniotimos  haiiitciiH  that  the  ussi<^nin(!ut  of  dower 
proves  to  be  ino|)eralive,  by  the  widow's  beinjr  evietcd  fioiu 
the  hiiul  assifTiied  to  her,  by  a  better  title.  Jii  such  ease,  Iht 
ri^lit  to  any  redress  by  the  way  oi  a  lu-w  assignment  depends 
upon  whether  the  dower  is  of  common  ri^dit  or  atrainst  com- 
mon rit^ht.  In  the  one  case  she  may  have  her  dower  assijrned 
(/('  novo  out  of  the  bahmee  of  the  estate  ;  in  tlie  other,  she  may 
not.  Where  she  has  accepted  (h)wer  which  has  been  assi<rned 
against  common  right,  sh<'  has  no  remecly  if  it  fails.'  She 
could  not,  under  either  mode  of  assignment,  avail  hei-self, 
for  relief,  of  the  covenant  of  warranty  made  to  her  husband, 
since  she  is  not  the  assignee  of  the  whole  estate  in  the  lands 
set  out  to  her  as  dower.-  Jf  her  dower  was  at  first  set 
ofT  upon  a  *  judgment  of  court,  her  remedy,  in  case  [*243] 
she  is  dej)rived  of  any  part  of  her  dower  land,  would 
be  by  scire  facias,  whcmu\)on  a  new  writ  of  habere  /arias  would 
issue,  which  is  to  be  served  and  returned  like  the  first.^  Nor 
is  this  remedy  of  an  assignment  de  novo  confined  to  a  claim  in 
favor  of  the  widow  alone.  It  .may  be  ajiplied,  in  some  cases, 
to  reduce  the  dower  set  out  to  her.  Thus,  where  there  was  an 
action  pending  against  the  husband  iov  the  recovery  of  a  pretty 
large  proportion  of  his  estate,  at  the  time  of  his  death,  and  dower 
was  assigned  to  his  widow  out  of  the  entire  estate,  and  after- 
wards the  demandant  prevailed  in  his  action  and  recovered 
a  large  part  of  the  estate  of  which  husband  died  seised,  not 
set  out  to  her,  it  was  held  that  a  new  assignment  should  be 
made,  having  reference  to  the  estate  belonging  in  fact  to  the 
husband.* 

25.  A  widow's  remedy  in  equity  for  the  recovery  of  dower 
is,  in  some  respects,  broader  than  at  law.  It  embraces  a  large 
class  of  cases  for  which  the  common  law  furnishes  no  adi'- 
quate  remedy.  Among  these  are  all  cases  of  trust  estates  and 
equities  of  redemption,  and  also  many  cases  wliere,  by  sale  or 

»  Jones  r.  Brewer,  1  Pick.  314  ;  Scott  r.  Hancock,  13  Mass.  162  ;  Holloman 
r.  Holloman,  5  Sm.  &  M.  559  ;  Mnntz  v.  Buchanan,  1  Md.  Ch.  Dec.  202  ;  French 
r.  Pmtt,  27  Me.  381  ;  Tud.  Cas.  52  ;  Perkins,  §  418. 

"^  St.  Clair  r.  Williams,  7  Ohio,  2d  Pt.  110. 

»  Steams,  Real  .\ct.  321  ;  2  Cnihb,  Heal  Prop.  151. 

*  Singleton  v.  Singleton,  5  Dana,  87. 


804  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I, 

othenrise,  the  land  has  been  converted  into  money,  without 
extinguishing  the  widow's  right  in  equity  to  share  in  the 
proceeds.  A  resort  to  equity  is  always  a  convenient  and  de- 
sirable mode,  where  it  is  necessary  to  call  upon  the  tenant  to 
disclose  his  title  or  state  an  account  of  mesne  profits,  and  the 
like ;  ^  though  in  all  cases  where  the  widow's  right  of  dower 
is  controverted  in  proceedings  in  equity,  the  court  sends  the 
case  to  a  court  of  common-law  jurisdiction  to  have  the  ques- 
tion determined  by  a  jury.^  And  in  Vermont,  if  demandant 
first  goes  into  chancery  for  her  dower,  in  order  to  clear  off 
mortgages  and  the  like,  the  court  in  the  end,  in  order  to  the 
fi.nal  assignment  of  the  dower,  remit  the  proceedings  to  the 
probate  court,^  which  goes  on   and    completes   the   process. 

Among  the  cases  where  the  only  remedy  for  the  re- 
[*244]  covery  of  dower  is  *  through  a  court  of   chancery, 

are  those  where  it  is  claimed  out  of  an  equity  of  re- 
demption, and  the  claim  is  against  the  mortgagee  or  his 
assigns,  even  though  the  mortgagee  may  have  purchased  the 
husband's  equity  of  redemption.*  And  the  same  rule  applies 
where  a  party  interested  has  redeemed  the  mortgage,  and  the 
widow  of  the  mortgagor  demands  dower  against  him.^  So 
chancery  has  exclusive  jurisdiction  where  the  estate  out  of 
which  dower  is  claimed  was  held  in  trust,  actually  or  con- 
structively, for  the  benefit  of  the  husband.  Tliese  points  may 
be  better  illustrated  by  referring  to  a  few  decided  cases  than 
by  any  statement  of  a  general  proposition.  Thus,  in  Smiley 
V.  Wright,  and  also  in  Taylor  v.  McCrackin,^  the  estate  had 
been  bargained  for,  and  a  greater  or  smaller  proportion  of  the 
purchase-money  paid  by  the  husband,  but  no  deed  had  been 

1  2  Crabb,  Eeal  Prop.  189  ;  Swaine  v.  Ferine,  5  Johns.  Ch.  482. 

2  Park,  Dow.  329  ;  Swaine  v.  Ferine,  5  Johns.  Ch.  482  ;  Selhnan  v.  Bowen, 
8  Gill  &  J.  50.  3  Danforth  v.  Smith,  23  Vt.  247. 

*  Bird  ■;;.  Gardner,  10  Mass.  366  ;  Gibson  v.  Crehore,  3  Pick.  475  ;  Swaine  v. 
Ferine,  5  Johns.  Ch.  482  ;  Vandyne  v.  Thayre,  19  Wend.  162  ;  Heth  v.  Cocke, 
1  Rand.  344  ;  "VVooldridge  v.  Wilkins,  3  How.  (Miss. )  360  ;  Smith  v.  Eustis, 
7  Me.  41  ;  Thompson  v.  Boyd,  22  N.  J.  543  ;  Brown  v.  Lapham,  3  Cush.  551  ; 
Woods  V.  Wallace,  30  N.  H.  384  ;  Wing  v.  Ayer,  53  Me.  138  ;  McArthur  v. 
Franklin,  16  Ohio  St.  193,  205. 

6  Cass  V.  Martin,  6  N.  H.  25  ;  Gibson  v.  Crehore,  5  Pick.  146  ;  Hastings  v. 
Stevens,  29  X.  H.  564. 

6  Smiley  v.  Wright,  2  Ohio,  506  ;  Taylor  v.  McCrackin,  2  Blackf.  260. 


en.  VII.  §  ■).]  DOWER.  305 

iiiaik',  ami  llu-  widow  sought  to  slian^  in  the  Ix-ncl'it  of  tin' 
|»urehiuse.  Where  uii  estate  was  (Icviscil,  eharged  with  the 
pavineiit  of  ii  sum  of  money,  and  the  widow  of  the  devisee 
sought  to  have  her  dower  set  out  in  the  |tremises,  it  was  lichl 
that  it  couhl  only  ho  done  hy  her  eontriltuling,  or  olTering  to 
cuntrihute,  her  just  jiroportion  of  her  eharge  upon  the  hind.' 

Where  the  wife  joined  in  a  mortgage  containing  a  power  of 
sale,  and  there  wa.s  reserved  to  the  mortgagor  whatever  sur- 
plus, in  the  event  of  a  sale,  there  might  he  after  .satisfying  the 
mortgage  deitt,  his  widow  was  held  entitled  to  lier  dower  out 
of  sueh  surplus,  and  a  court  of  eipiity  secured  the  same  to 
her,  hy  causing  one  third  part  of  it  to  he  invested  for  that 
j)urpose.2  So  where  the  husband  died  seised  of  land  for  which  a 
part  of  the  purchase-money  was  due,an<l  the  estate  was 
sold  by  the  administratis-  l»y  order  of  court,  and  *  the  [*24')] 
purchase-money  paid  out  of  it,  leaving  a  surplus,  tlie 
court  held  the  wife  entitled  to  her  dower  out  of  such  suri»lus.'' 
In  the  ai)Ove  ca.se  of  Denton  v.  Nanny,  the  court  of  New- 
York  held  that  the  right  of  wife  in  a  mortgaged  estate  would 
not  be  barred  by  ])rocecdings  against  her  husband  to  which 
she  was  not  a  party,  and  that,  in  such  case,  the  court  would 
have  one  third  of  the  surplus  proceeds  of  the  sale  of  the  es- 
tate, aftei'  ]iaying  the  mortgage,  set  apart  and  invested  on 
interest  for  the  joint  lives  of  her  and  her  husliand,  and  for 
her  lii'e,  if  surviving  him,  as  her  dower  right.*    So  where,  as  in 

I  ClouKh  t».  Elliott,  23  N.  H,  182  ;  post,  pi.  27. 

»  DiMitoii  V.  Nanny,  8  Bjirb.  618.  "  Denton  v.  Nanny,  8  Biirb.  616. 

♦  Brt-wer  v.  Vanai-silnli',  6  Dana,  204  ;  Mills  v.  Van  Voorhis,  23  Barb.  125,  136. 
Tho  cases  sustainiiiK  the  doctrine  of  the  t<'xt  have  aln'aJy  been  cited,  an/e,  *165 
and  note  ;  and  that  the  inchoate  right  of  dower  will  be  protectetl  in  oiniity,  and 
the  wife's  rijihts  in  the  surplus  after  satisfying  the  mortgage  debt  will  Ix'  sustainetl, 
seenis  established  by  the  clear  weight  of  authority.  The  case  of  Frost  v.  Peacock, 
4  Kdw.  eh.  678,  niitf,  ♦182,  is  manifestly  inconsistent  with  all  the  later  cases  on 
this  jKiint  in  New  York,  as  well  as  those  in  other  States ;  and  Newhall  v.  Lynn 
Snv.  Bk.,  101  MiLss.  428,  to  the  same  elfect,  ]>robably  n'st.s  on  the  limited  eijuity 
jurisdiction  po»sesse«l  by  the  court  that  deciiled  it.  It  certainly  <lid  not  proceed 
on  the  want  of  interest  in  the  wife,  as  the  same  court  had  ju.st  recognized  inchoate 
dower  as  a  proj>erty  right  entitling  the  wife  to  redeem,  Davis  v.  Wethcrell,  13 
Allen,  60  ;  and  not  suliject  to  legislative  abrogation,  Dunn  ».  Sargent,  101  Ma.ss. 
336,  340.  Where  the  wife  is  party  to  the  fon-closun',  a  difTcrent  rule  may  ]»r»'vail. 
Titus  r.  Ncilson,  5  Johns.  Ch.  452.  In  giving  relief,  the  rule  has  Wen  adopted 
by  some  courts  to  8«'t  utade  one  third  of  the  surplus  iu  trust  to  jH-nuit  the  wife 
VOL.  I.—  20 


306  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   L 

New  York,  the  surrogate  has  power,  when  the  husband  dies 
indebted,  to  cause  the  estate  to  be  sold,  discharged  of  the 
widow's  claim  for  dower,  the  court  will  cause  one  thii-d  jjart 
of  the  purchase-money  to  be  put  at  interest,  for  her  benefit, 
as  dower.^  And  it  may  be  laid  down  as  an  almost  universal 
proposition,  that  where  estates  out  of  which  widows  wer.e 
entitled  to  dower  have  been  sold  by  order  of  court,  or  have 
been  so  sold  as  to  give  courts  of  equity  jurisdiction  over  the 
money,  these  courts  will  allow  the  widow's  dower  out  of  the 
money S.2  In  Jennison  v.  Hapgood,^  the  executor  of  a  will 
sold  his  testator's  mortgaged  estate,  and  purchased  it  himself, 
paying  the  mortgage  in  part  out  of  the  assets  in  his  hands, 
and  in  part  out  of  his  own  funds ;  and  the  widow,  as  she 
chose  to  affirm  the  sale,  was  held  entitled  to  dower  of  one 
third  part  of  what  the  estate  sold  for,  and  one  third  part  of 
what  was  paid  towards  the  mortgage  out  of  the  assets  of  the 
estate.  In  Church  v.  Church,*  shares  of  tenants  in  common 
were  sold  by  order  of  court  to  effect  partition,  and  the  widow 
of  one  of  the  tenants  was  held  entitled  to  dower  out  of  the 
proceeds  of  the  sale.  And  the  cases  are  numerous  where 
mortgages  in  which  the  wife  has  joined  have  been  foreclosed, 

after  the  death  of  the  husband,  by  sale,  in  which  the 
[*246]  widow  has  shared  *  as  dower  in  the  proceeds  of  the 

suryjlus  after  satisfying  the  mortgage.^  So  where 
the  vendor,  holding  a  lien  for  purchase-money,  enforces  it  after 
the  husband's  death  by  a  sale  under  decree  of  chancery,  the 
vendee's  widow  is  entitled  to  dower  in  the  surplus  after  satis- 

to  receive  the  income  when  a  widow,  Vreeland  v.  Jacobus,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  231  ;  but 
the  better  rule  —  at  least,  where  any  one  but  the  husband  is  interested  in  the 
surphis — is  to  estimate  the  present  value  at  a  sum  in  gross.  Unger  v.  Leiter, 
32  Ohio  St.  210. 

1  Lawrence  v.  Miller,  1  Sandf.  516  ;  s.  c.  2  N.  Y.  245  ;  Higbie  v.  AVestlake, 
14  N.  Y.  281. 

2  Jennison  v.  Hapgood,  14  Pick.  345  ;  Titus  v.  Neilson,  5  Johns.  Ch.  452  ; 
rhurch  V.  Church,  3  Sandf.  Ch.  434  ;  Willet  v.  Beatty,  12  B.  Mon.  172  ;  Mills  v. 
Van  Voorhis,  23  Barb.  125. 

8  14  Pick.  345. 

*  Church  V.  Chuech,  3  Sandf.  Ch.  434  ;  Warren  v.  Twesley,  10  Mo.  39  ;  Weaver 
V.  Gregg,  6  Ohio  St.  547,  552. 

5  Smith  V.  Jackson,  2  Edw.  Ch.  28  :  Keith  v.  Trapier,  1  Bailey,  Eq.  63  ;  Haw- 
ley  V.  Bradford,  9  Paige,  200  ;  Hartshorne  v.  Hartshome,  2  N.  J.  Eq.  349. 


rn.  VII.  §  ').]  DOWER.  307 

fvin^'  the  lii'U.^  Aixl  where  Rovoral  tenants  in  common,  with 
tlu'ir  wives,  conveyed  the  estate  to  trustees  to  Kcll,  one  ol  the 
grantors  havinir  <lit'il,iiis  widow  was  htlil  entitled  to  one  third 
of  the  income  of  the  monev  lor  which  his  share  Hold,  as  her 
dower.-  Without  ninitipl}  ini;  illustrations  from  decided 
cases,  a  leading;  Massachusetts  case  will  serve  the  jmipose 
ujMjn  several  of  the  points  idtove  stated.'*  The  deman<lant 
joined  with  her  husiciiid  in  a  moit^aire  to  one  H.  'I'he  inis- 
band  died  insolvent,  ami  his  administrators  sold  his  e<piity  of 
redt'mption  for  the  |»ayment  of  del)ts,  to  Crehore,  the  defend- 
ant, who  <ravc  his  hoiul  contlitioned  to  pay  the  debt  dne  H. 
Subsc(|uently  B  assiirned  his  mortu:ap:c  to  the  defendant,  who 
soon  after  mortpijred  tlie  premises  to  J  P,  but  had  entered 
upon  and  rented  them  and  received  rent  for  the  same.  The 
plaintilT,  without  demandinfi:  dower  of  l>  or  defendant,  and 
without  havinji;  had  dower  set  off  to  her,  brought  assumjisit 
against  the  defendant  for  a  share  of  the  rents.  The  court 
lield  that  the  action  would  not  lie,  her  only  remedy  beinir  in 
e(|uity  against  the  mortgage(M)r  his  assigns,  and  tiiat  sin-  (•niild 
only  avail  herself  of  her  right  liy  jiaying  her  proportion  of  the 
mortgage  debt.  They  hehl  fiu'ther,  that  the  jturchasing  in  of 
the  mortgage  by  tiic  (Icteudant  was  not  a  payment  and  extin- 
guishment of  it  as  to  the  widow  who  had  signed  the  di'ed. 
The  widow,  thereupon,  brought  her  bill  in  Cfpiity,  oiTering  to 
redeem  the  mortgage,  and  claiming  to  be  admitted  to  dower 
in  the  premises.*  It  was  held  by  the  court  that  she  might 
maintain  the  bill  before  her  dower  had  been  assigned 
to  *  her,  though  she  could  not  have  maintained  a  writ  [*247] 
of  entry  before  such  assignment,  for  her  legal  right 
was  inchoate  until  assignment  made.  Before  she  redeems  the 
mortgage,  she  has  no  right  to  demand  an  assignment  of  dower 
as  against  the  mortgage.  Nor  is  it  necessary  to  have  dower 
ju'cviously  assiL'"ned  by  the  heirs,  for  she  cannot  redeem  a  part 
of  the  mortgaged  jaemises  without  reileeming  the  resiilne  also. 
if   required   by  the  mortgagee.^     It  was  accordingly  held   that 

'  Williams  r.  W.xxl,  1    Iluiin.h.  408  ;  Mcriurp  v.   Harris,    12  B.    M.-ii.   2rtl  ; 
Willet  r.  Bt-ntty,  12  R.  Mon.  172.  ^  Unwley  r.  Jnin«-s,  5  I'ni^ro,  318. 

«  Gibson  r.  Cn-hop',  3  Pi.k.  •17.';.  ♦  Oil^on  r.  f'lvhon'.  5  Pick.  146. 

•  Cass  V.  Martin,  6  N.  H.  2.'.  ;  Wiiif,'  v.  Avit,  53  Mc  138,  142. 


308  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

she  could  have  dower,  but  must,  to  that  end,  redeem  the  mort- 
gage, and  as  the  mortgagee  was  not  obliged  to  accept  his  debt 
in  parcels, but  might  insist  upon  its  being  paid  in  an  entire  sum, 
and  the  widow  was  obliged  to  do  this  to  save  her  estate,  she 
thereljv  became  an  equitable  assignee  of  the  mortgage,  with 
the  right  to  hold  the  estate  under  it  until  the  owner  of  the 
equity  of  redemption  came  in  and  contributed,  pro  rata,  his 
share  of  the  mortgage  debt,  she  keeping  down  in  effect  one 
third  part  of  the  interest  of  the  mortgage  debt  during  her  life. 
But  where  the  mortgage  had  been  foreclosed,  except  as  to  the 
widow,  or  the  mortgagee  had  acquired  the  equity  of  redemp- 
tion, the  court,  instead  of  requiring  the  widow,  before  claiming 
dower,  to  redeem  the  mortgage  from  the  tenant,  as  mortgagee, 
and  then  requiring  him,  as  holder  of  the  equity,  to  contribute 
to  redeem,  permitted,  in  order  to  avoid  this  circuity  of  action, 
the  widow  to  have  dower  assigned  to  her,  contributing  her 
proportion  of  tlie  mortgage  debt,  or,  as  held  in  a  similar  case 
in  New  Hampshire,  paying  the  same  into  court  for  the  use  of 
the  holder  of  the  mortgage.^ 

By  a  statute  in  Massachusetts  the  widow  may  have  an  action 
of  dower  against  the  heir  or  other  person  claiming  under  the 
husband,  who  shall  have  redeemed  the  mortgage  upon  the 
estate.^  But  where  a  wife  joined  in  a  mortgage,  and  the  hus- 
band's equity  of  redemption  was  afterwards  sold  on  execution, 
and  came  by  mesne  conveyance  to  the  holder  of  the  mortgage, 
it  was  held  that  the  only  remedy  for  the  wife,  for  her  dower, 
in  such  case,  was  in  equity .^  And  where  a  tenant  in  common 
joined  with  his  co-tenant  in  executing  a  mortgage  of  the  com- 
mon estate,  and  then  married,  and  then  conveyed  his  interest 
in  the  estate  to  his  co-tenant,  who  discharged  the  mortgage,  it 
was  held  that  the  wife  of  the  first-mentioned  tenant  might 
claim  her  dower  in  the  half  of  the  estate,  after  deducting  the 
amount  of  the  mortgage  from  the  value  thereof.*  And 
[*248]  the  same  rule  applies  in  all  cases  *  where  the  owner 

1  Van  Yronker  v.  Eastman,  7  Met.  157;  Bell  v.  The  Mayor,  10  Paige,  49,  70; 
Wood  V.  Wallace,  30  N.  H.  384. 

2  Pub.  Stat.  c.  124,  §  5.  '  Farwell  v.  Cotting,  8  Allen,  211. 

4  Pynchon  v.  Lester,  6  Gray,  314.     See  Newtou  v.  Cook,   4  Gray,  46  ;  Snyder 
V.  Snyder,  6  Mich.  470. 


CII.  VII.  §  ;').]  DOWER.  309 

of  tlio  lile-i'statc  and  the  iviiKiiiulcr-mnn  arc  rociuircd  to 
contribute  tlu'ir  respective  proportions  of  the  mort<rage 
debt.*  Instead  of  re(|uirin;^  the  wife  to  contribute  towani 
the  j)aynient  of  the  ihlit,  the  connnissioners  may  estimate  the 
entire  worth  or  vahie  of  such  annuity  by  mathematical  ndrs.'^ 
The  duration  of  the  widow's  life,  upon  which  sueli  calcuhition 
is  to  l)e  made,  must, of  necessity,  be  probh-matical.  Jkit  courts 
are  in  the  hal)it  (»f  adopt inir  computations  as  to  the  j)roljal)h' 
(hiratinn  of  lil'r,  wliich  an-  cuutiiiui'd  in  tabh's  calculated  upon 
a  jrreat  ninnbcr  of  lives,  and  supposed  to  approxinuite  the  true 
average  of  life  at  its  various  j>eriods.  In  Massaidiusetts  the 
tables  of  Dr.  Wi<;<rles\vorth  received  tiie  approval  of  the  court  ;•* 
in  New  York  the  statute  |»rescril)es  the  I'ortsmouth  or  North- 
ampton tables.^  But  those  known  as  the  Carlisle  Tables  are 
elsewhere  <renerally  in  use  in  this  country  for  such  purposes, 
except  in  Maryland,  where  Dr.  Ilalley's  tables  were  adojtted  ;'' 
Pennsylvania,  where  the  Carlisle  tables  arc  held  not  authori- 
tative; and  Kentucky,  where  the  American  Life  Annuity  Taldes 
are  adopted.*^  In  applying  these  tables  to  particular  cases, 
reference  is  had  to  the  health  as  well  as  the  a«rc  of  the  per- 
son. In  some  cases  the  niorttragee  may  have  been  in  receipt 
of  the  rents  of  the  estate  where  the  widow  may  seek  by  re- 
demption to  have  her  dower  in  the  estate,  and  lules  are  adojitec] 
in  such  cases  for  ascertaining  the  balance  that  may  Ix'  due. 
Hut  it  would  l)e  entering  too  much  in  detail  to  do  anything 
more  than  to  refer  to  them  here.' 

20.  A  similar  rule  is  ap|»Iied  in  estimating  the  relative  value 

'  Swaine  r.  IViiue,  5  .luhiis.  Cli.  4S2  ;  (!il>son  v.  Crvhoro,  5  Pick.  146. 

*  The  principles  uiion  which  this  is  iloiie  are  stateil  in  Hell  r.  The  Mayor,  10 
Pnige,  49,  71. 

•  K-stnbrook  r.  HnpROod,  10  Mass.  315,  n.;  Houghton  v.  Hapgood,  13  Pirk.  iri4. 

♦  N.  Y.  Uws,  lS7(i,  c.  717,  §  5. 

'  .\lKTcromhie  v.  Kiddle,  3  Md.  Ch.  Dec.  320;  but  see  Dorsey  v.  Smith,  7  liar. 
&  J.  367. 

•  Shipi)on's  App.  80  Pa.  St.  391  ;  Ale.xander  r.  Bradley,  3  Bush,  6<J7.  A 
much  more  eoniprehensive  set  of  tables  has  recently  been  prejwred  on  the  V>a>is 
of  the  Carlisle  Tables  by  Messrs.  Giauijue  and  McClure,  and  entitled  Dower  and 
Curtesy  Tables  ;  Cincinnati,  18S2. 

'  Van  Vronker  r.  Eastimm,  7  .Met.  ir>7;  Tucker  v.  nuffuni,  1*5  Pi<k.  46.  .'Nee 
2  Scribner,  Dow.  (2d  ed.)  603-61)4,  where  the  history  and  law  ou  tliia  subject  are 
fully  set  forlL 


310  LAW    OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   L 

of  a  widow's  dower  to  that  of  the  whole  estate,  as  in  ascer- 
taining the  share  of  any  charge  or  burden  upor^  the  estate 
which  she  must  bear  as  dowress.  And  this  is  especially  ap- 
plicable where  she  is  to  be  endowed  out  of  moneys,  the  pro- 
ceeds of  the  sale  of  real  estate,  from  which  is  to  be  deducted 
what  the  tenant  may  have  paid  to  redeem  the  mortgage,  assign- 
ing the  widow  her  dower  according  to  the  value  of  the  resi- 
due.^ If  the  husband  be  the  grantee  of  a  part  of  the  mortgaged 
premises,  and  his  widow  seeks  to  recover  dower  in  the  same, 
she  will  in  the  end  be  obliged  to  contribute  or  allow  such 
part  of  the  mortgage  debt  as  her  interest  in  her  husband's 

portion  of  the  estate  bears  in  value  to  the  whole  es- 
[*249]  tate.2     Where    the    widow   pursues    *her    remedy  in 

equity  for  the  recovery  of  dower,  it  seems  that  the 
setting  out  of  the  dower,  as  well  as  the  ascertaining  the  amount 
she  shall  contribute,  may  be  done  by  a  master  or  by  commis- 
sioners, in  the  discretion  of  the  court.^  If,  however,  she  shall 
have  had  her  dower  set  out  at  common  law,  without  reference 
to  the  mortgage,  she  may  have  her  bill  to  redeem,  and  as  be- 
tween her  and  her  reversioner  and  the  owner  of  the  other 
two  thirds  of  the  estate,  she  must  contribute,  |>ro  rata,  accord- 
ing to  the  relative  values  of  their  respective  interests.* 

27.  In  determining  the  amount  which  the  dowress  shall 
contribute  toward  the  mortgage  debt  as  forming  her  pro  rata 
portion  thereof,  the  rule  is  to  require  her  to  pay  what  will  be 
equivalent  to  one  third  of  the  annual  interest  during  her  life.^ 
But  this  must  be  paid  in  a  gross  sum,  and  not  in  the  way  of 
an  annual  payment,  unless  the  mortgagee  elects  not  to  enforce 
the  payment  of  the  principal  sum,  in  which  case  she  must 
contribute  to  keep  down  one  third  of  the  interest.^  This  gross 
sum  is  calculated  by  considering  this  interest  as  an  annuity,  to 
continue  as  long  as,  by  the  chances  of  life,  she  is  to  live,  and 
computing  its  present  worth. 

1  Pub.  Stat.  c.  124,  §  5  ;  Newton  v.  Cook,  4  Gray,  46. 

2  Carll  V.  Batman,  7  Me.  102. 

8  Swaine  v.  Perine,  5  Johns.  Ch.  482.     See  also  Van  Vronker  v.  Eastman, 
7  Met.  157,  and  Wood  v.  Wallace,  30  N.  H.  384. 
*  Danforth  v.  Smith,  23  Vt.  247. 

5  Swaine  v.  Perine,  5  Johns.  Ch.  482  ;  McArthur  v.  Franklin,  16  Ohio  St.  193, 
205  ;  ante,  pi.  25. 

6  Bell  V.  The  Mayor,  10  Paige,  70  ;  Wing  v.  Ayer,  53  Me.  138. 


CM.  VII.  §  .').]  DOWER.  :ni 

So,  on  tlio  otlier  lian<I,  wlu-ri;  luoncv  i.s  a.s.sifjrnod  in  lieu  of 
dower,  the  widow  receive.s,  in  most  of  the  States,  a  f^ross  sum 
instead  of  an  annuity,  or  a  share  of  the  annual  income.'  In 
others  it  is  h(dd  that  .such  a  conij)osition  cannot  be  made  liy 
order  of  tlie  court  except  hy  a^neeuieut  of  the  parties.^  In 
South  Carolina,  the  courts  adopt  as  aii  arbitrary  rule  the 
priuci|)le  that  a  widow's  estate  for  life  in  one  third  is  equal 
to  one  sixth  of  the  entire  fee  in  tiie  whole  estate.'^  In  Ala- 
bama, T»'uncs.sec,  and  in  ilic  United  States  courts,  it  is  nut 
held  competent  to  assi<rn  to  a  widow  a  ^ross  sum.  ll  can 
only  l)e  decreed  that  the  annual  value  of  the  dower 
be  paid  her  annually.*  But  *  in  Maryland,  Kentucky,  [*250] 
and  Maine,  cases  have  arisen  where  the  courts  have 
decreed  her  a  sum  inprross  in  such  ca.scs,  calculated  upon  her 
chances  of  life."  And  the  same  rule  is  adopted  in  Massa- 
chu.setts.  In  New  York,  in  an  early  case,  the  court,  without 
goinjr  into  the  reasons  for  so  doinpr,  directed  the  fund  out  of 
which  her  dower  was  to  come,  to  be  invested,  and  the  income 
paid  over  to  her  durinj^  life.*^ 

>  These  are  New  York,  Connecticut,  Delaware,  Pennsylvania,  New  Jersey, 
North  (.'arolino,  Ohio,  West  Virginia,  Michigan,  Wisconsin,  iIinnesot«,  and  per- 
hajw  others.  2  Scribner,  Dow.  G54,  n.,  statutes  and  cases  cited  ;  W.  Va.  Rev. 
Sut.  c.  70,  §  17-19. 

*  Virginia,  tJeorgin,  and  Arkansa.s.     2  Seribner,  Dow.  nbi  supra. 

'  Wright  V.  Jennings,  1  Bailey,  277  ;  Garland  i'.  Crow,  2  Bailey,  24.  Ante, 
p.  •Si>,  note. 

*  Johnson  v.  Elliott,  12  Ala.  112;  Beavers  o.  Smith,  11  Ala.  20;  Francis 
r.  Garrard,  18  Ala.  7i)4  ;  Lewis  v.  James,  8  Humph.  537  ;  Summers  v.  Donnell, 
7  Heisk.  565  ;  Herbert  v.  Wren,  7  Cranch,  370. 

'  Good  bum  v.  Stevens,  1  Md.  Ch.  Dec.  420,  441 ;  Brewer  r.  Vanarsdale,  6  Dana, 
204  ;  Simonton  v.  Gray,  34  Me.  50  ;  Carll  v.  Butman,  7  Me.  102  ;  Jennison  v. 
Haj.good,  14  Pick.  345. 

0  Titus  r.  Neilson,  5  Johns.  Ch.  452.  As  has  more  than  once  been  stated,  in 
most,  if  not  all  the  States,  the  courts  of  proV»ate  jurisdiction  have  cognizance  of 
matters  of  dower  so  far  as  to  issue  process  for  setting  it  off  in  the  estates  of  deceased 
{wrsons,  where  the  principal  estate  shall  have  Uen  the  subject  of  settlement  in 
such  court.  But  the  details  of  the  law  on  this  subject  do  not  seem  to  come  within 
the  purposes  of  the  present  work. 


312  LAW   OP   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   L 

SECTION  VL 

NATURE   OF   THE   ESTATE   IN   DOWER. 

1.  Interest  of  wife  —  in  dower. 

2.  Interest  of  widow  before  assignment. 

3.  Estate  of  dowress  after  assignment. 

4.  Tenure  of  dowress  as  to  fealty. 

5.  Incidents  to  dower. 

1.  The  nature  of  the  interest  which,  inchoate  in  the  wife, 
uecomes  consummate  in  the  widow,  in  the  way  of  dower,  de- 
serves a  distinct  notice,  since,  in  many  respects,  it  is  unlike 
any  other  known  to  the  law.^  At  common  law,  the  moment 
her  coverture  and  her  husband's  seisin  concur,  she  acquires  a 
right  which  nothing  but  her  death  or  her  voluntary  act  can 
defeat,  unless  it  be  by  an  exercise  of  sovereignty  by  the  forms 
of  the  law  in  appropriating  the  estate  of  the  husband  to  a  pub- 
lic use.  No  adverse  possession,  therefore,  as  against  her  hus- 
band, however  long  continued,  can  affect  her  right  to  recover 
dower  after  his  decease.^  It  is  no  right  which  her  husband 
can  bar  or  incumber  ;  nor  she  herself,  except  by  deed  in  which 
her  husband  joins,  and  then  it  is  only  in  the  way  of  estoppel, 
for  her  deed  even  of  grant  does  not  pass  any  title  to  the 
estate.^  She  has  not,  in  this  stage  of  her  right,  even  a  chose 
in  action  in  respect  to  the  estate ;  nor  can  she  protect  it  in  any 

way  from  waste  or  deterioration  by  her  husband  or 
[*251]  his  alienee ;  nor  is  her  right  at  law  in  any  sense,*  an 

interest  in  real  estate,  nor  property  of  which  value  can 
be  predicated.^  She  cannot  convey  it,  nor  is  it  a  thing  to  be 
assigned  by  her  during  the  life  of  the  husband.^ 

2.  But  immediately  upon  the  death  of  her  husband,  her 
right  becomes  consummate  and  perfect ;  and  if  the  heir  then 
Avaste  or  deteriorate  the  estate,  slie  may  have  a  remedy  for  the 
loss  thereby  occasioned  to  her.   But  as  her  right  is  still  a  mere 

1  Park,  Dow.  334. 

•■2  Durham  v.  Angier,  20  Me.  242  ;  Moore  v.  Frost,  3  N.  H.  126. 
8  Learned  v.  Cutler,  18  Pick.  9.     Cf.  Maxon  v.  Gray,  14  R.  I.  641, 
*  Moore  v.  The  Mayor,  8  N.  Y.  110  ;  McArthur  v.  Franklin,  16  Ohio  St.  193, 
200.     As  to  her  rights  in  equity,  .see  ante,  *165,  245  and  notes. 
6  Gunnison  v.  Twitchell,  38  N.  H.  62. 


cu.  VII.  §  ♦>.]  DOWER.  ni;] 

eJwsc  in  nrt'iDn^Aw   has  iKilliinj^  of  wlilcli   i»tate  can,  at   ilii.s 
8taj;c  of  Iht  interest,  lie  j»re(liciite<l.'      She  is  n»jt  seised  of  any 
])art  of  the  hnuls,  on  the  death  of  her  hnsliaml,  hy  any  rijj-ht 
of  (h)\ver,  until  it  is  assiirned  t<j  her.-     In  \'erniont,  howevei-, 
she  heoitmes  entitled  to  jiossj-ssion  and  enjoyment  of  the  estate, 
in  couuuou  with  the  heirs  of  her   hnshand,  of   an   undivided 
third   part,  whieh   she   may  continue   to  hold   durinjr  her  life 
without  a  previous  formal  assijrnnient  t»f  tlower.''     So  in  Cou- 
neetieut,  hefore  her  dower  has  been  assifrned  1o  her,  .she  has 
the  rifxhta  of  a  tenant  in  oonnnon  with  the  heirs  at  law  of  the 
husliand.*     lint  a  surrender  hy  deed,  with  covenants  of  war- 
ranty, hy  her,  would  estop  her  from  claiming'-  dower  in  the 
premises.^    She  has  no  estate  in  the  lands,  nor  anything  whieh 
she  can  assiirnor  convey  to  anothei-,  or  whicii  can  he  taken  in 
executiou  for  her  delit  ;'^  thouirh   in  Alaliama  and   Indiana  an 
assiLrnnieiit  Ity  a  widow  of  her  iMLdit   in   hinds    in    wliii'ii    her 
husband  died  .seised,  was  held  to  be  valid.^     And  in  Indiana 
she  was  hehl  to  have  such  an  interest  as  she  could  assign  in 
lands  of  which  her  husband  had  been  sci-sed  during  coverture, 
although  he  had  conveyed  the  same  in  his  lifetime,  and  the 
assignee  may  sue  in  his  own  name.^     But  her  right  is  not  one 
against  which  a  .statute  of  limitation  runs  in  favor  of  a  tenant 
as  being  adversely  seised,  unless  expressly  embraced  in  such 
statute ; "  nor  is  it  such  an  interest  as  to  be  affected  by  any 
proceedings  for  foreclosure  by  a  mortgagee  against  her  hus- 
band, unless  she  is  made  a  party  by  proper  notice.     Thus, 

*  4  Kent,  Com.  61  ;  Green  v.  Putnam,  1  B.irb.  500  ;  Stewart  v.  M. -Martin, 
5  Harl>.  43S  ;  Johnson  r.  Shields,  32  Me.  424  ;  Cox  v.  Jaf,'ger,  2  Cow.  G38,  651  ; 
ShieKls  r.  Batts,  5  J.  J.  Marsh.  12;  Hoxsicu.  Ellis,  4  H.  I.  123;  Saltmarsh  v.  Smith, 
32  Ala.  404  ;  Stewart  v.  Chadwick,  8  Iowa,  463;  Aikman  v.  Harsell,  98  N.  Y.  186. 

'  Sheafe  v.  O'Neil,  9  Ma-ss.  9  ;  Weaver  v.  Crenshaw,  6  Ala.  873. 

*  Dummerston  r.  Newfane,  37  Vt.  9.     See  Mass.  Pub.  Stat.  c.  121,  §  \\. 

*  Woostcr  r.  Hunt's  Lyman  Iron  Co.,  38  Conn.  256. 
'  Jackson  v.  Wright,  14  Johns.  194. 

«  Brown  r.  Meredith,  2  Keen,  527  ;  Green  v.  Putnam,  1  Barb.  500  ;  Gooch  r. 
Atkins,  14  Mass.  378;  Saltmarsh  v.  Smith,  32  Ala.  404;  Kausch  r.  Moore, 
48  Iowa,  611.     See  Pope  r.  ilead,  99  N.  Y.  635,  that  she  may  assign, 

■    Powell  V.  Powell,  10  Aln.  900  ;  Matlock  i'.  Lee,  9  Ind.  29S. 

«  Strong  V.  Cl.-m,  12  Ind.  37. 

'  4  Kent,  Com.  70  ;  Parker  r.  Ol'ear,  7  Met.  21  ;  Spencer  v.  W.st.m.  1  Dcv.  & 
B.  213  ;  Guthrie  r.  Owen,  10  Yerg.  339  ;  Barnard  v.  Edwards,  4  X.  H.  107. 


314  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

where  the  husband  bought  an  equity  of  redemption,  and  after- 
wards sold  it  to  the  mortgagee,  who,  in  order  to  perfect  his 
title,  gave  notice  to  the  husband  that  he  held  for  foreclosure, 
as  the  law  stood  before  the  Revised  Statutes  in  Massachusetts, 
it  was  held  that  the  wife  was  not  affected  by  such  proceedings. 
In  order  to  be  effectual  as  to  her,  she  must  be  notified  after 
her  husband's  death,  and  the  mortgagee  must  hold  for  the 
requisite  time  afterwards.^     The  principle  above  stated,  that, 

until  assignment  made,  dower  is  not  the  subject  of 
[*252]  sale  or  conveyance  *  so  as  to  vest  a  legal  title  in  the 

assignee  or  alienee,  and  enable  him  to  sue  for  it  in 
his  own  name,  is  recognized  in  courts  of  equity  as  well  as  law.^ 
But  where  such  sale  or  assignment  is  made,  equity  will  protect 
the  rights  of  the  assignee  and  sustain  an  action  in  the  widow's 
name  for  his  benefit.^  And  if  she  sells  her  right  and  gives 
the  purchaser  a  power  of  attorney  for  the  purpose,  he  may 
prosecute  an  action  and  recover  dower  in  her  name  in  her 
stead.^  And  where  a  widow  sold  her  right  of  dower  to  one  of 
the  heirs  of  her  husband,  who  brought  a  bill  in  equity  against 
the  heirs  and  himself,  to  have  her  dower  set  out  to  him,  the 
court  decreed  the  same  to  be  done.^  But  under  her  rights  at 
law,  that  of  dower  prior  to  assignment  vests  in  action  only,  and 
cannot  be  aliened.^  The  most  she  can  do  is  to  release  it  to 
some  one  who  is  in  possession  of  the  lands,  or  to  whom  she 
stands  in  privity  of  estate ;  she  cannot  invest  another  with 
it.'  She  cannot,  therefore,  mortgage  it  before  it  is  assigned, 
nor  lease  it ;  and  a  covenant  to  pay  rent  to  her  does  not  bind 
the  assignee  of  the  covenantor.^  Of  so  little  effect  is  the  con- 
veyance of  a  widow's  mere  right  of  dower,  that  where  the  first 
of  two  successive  widows  entitled  to  dower  out  of  the  same 


1  Lund  V.  Woods,  11  Met.  566. 

2  Tompkins  v.  Fonda,  4  Paige,  448  ;  Torrey  v.  Minor,  1  Sm.  &  M.  Ch.  489  ; 
Harrison  r.  Wood,  1  Dev.  &  B.  Eq.  437. 

3  Lamar  v.  Scott,  4  Rich.  516  ;  Powell  v.  Powell,  10  Ala.  900. 

*  Robie  V.  Flanders,  3-3  N.  H.  524.  ^  Potter  v.  Everitt,  7  Ired.  Ecj.  152. 

6  In  Indiana,  by  statute,  the  widow's  dower  after  assignment  is  inalienable 
during  the  period  of  a  second  marriage.     Rev.  Stat.  1881,  §  2484. 

T  Blain  v.  Harrison,  11  111.  384;  Summers  v.  Babb,  13  111.  483  ;  Jackson  v. 
Vanderheyden,  17  Johns.  167  ;  Johnson  v.  Shields,  32  Me.  424  ;  Park,  Dow.  335. 

8  Strong  V.  Bragg,  7  Blackf.  62  ;  Croade  v.  lugraham,  13  Pick.  33. 


en.  VII.  i;  •;.]  DOWER.  .''>1'> 

estate  cunvovcd  to  tho  tenant  Iut  ii;rlit  htforo  the  dowci-  wa.s 
n.ssignt'd,  it  wa.s  litld  to  be  an  oxtinLMiislinicnt  of  Ikt  li^dit,  so 
that  when  tlu'  .srconil  canit'  to  claim  Iht  dower,  tlir  Itnant 
could  not  make  u.sc  of  tlir  convcyant'c  to  allcct  licr«daini  to  In- 
cndowo(l  out  of  the  wlude  estate.'  Ami  where  a  man  nianird 
n  widow,  who.sc  dower  in  lior  first  hu.sliaiid'rt  estate  had  not 
been  set  out,  and  assiirued  all  Ins  estate  and  ellects  of  wliit.-h 
ho  was  pos.sessed  in  ritrht  of  Ids  wife  or  otherwise,  it  was  held 
not  to  carry  any  ri^lit  which  she  had  to  have  her  dower 
assigned.''  On  the  *  other  hand,  where  a  mort^ni<^ec  [*253] 
undertook  to  foreclose  aj;ainst  a  mortirajj^e  made  during 
coverture  by  the  husband,  but  to  wjiich  .she  was  no  party,  and 
to  that  end  made  her  a  jiarty  to  the  liill,  it  was  held  that  she 
was  not  aft'ecteil  l)y  the  decree,  for  as  dowress  she  lield  by  a 
title  jiaramonnt  to  the  mortirairo.  Nor  could  she  in  such  a 
8uit  contest  the  validity  of  the  mort<(age.3  Still,  her  interest 
is  not  such  that  at  common  law  she  could  bring  ejectment,  or 
maintain  a  j)rocess  for  partition,  in  respect  to  lands  of  lier 
deceased  liusbaml.*  If  she  entered  upon  such  lands  except 
under  her  rigid  of  (piarantine,  she  would  l)e  a  tres]»asser,  and 
would  be  as  to  the  lieir  an  abator,  if  her  husband  died  seised. 
Or  if  slie  held  pos.session  beyond  the  period  of  her  quarantine, 
she  would  become  a  trespas.ser,  and  liable  to  be  expelled  by 
the  heir  by  ejectment.^'  And  if  she  obtain  pos.session  under 
form  of  legal  process  of  assignment,  and  the  assignment  prove 
void,  she  may  be  regarded  as  a  disseisor.*'  And,  as  observed 
by  a  legal  writer,  this  is  probably  the  only  case  where  a  person 
who  has  a  title,  unopposed  by  any  adverse  right  of  possession, 
may  not  reduce  it  to  possession  by  an  entry  upon  the  estate.' 
When  she  has  prosecutiMl  her  claim  for  dower  to  judgment,  it 
seems  to  give  so  much  consistency  to  her  title,  that  if  she  then 

1  Elwoo»l  r.  Klock,  13  Barb.  50. 

»  2  (  rabl),  Heal  IVop.  1 49  ;  Brown  r.  Meredith,  2  Keen,  527. 

•  LewU  V.  Sinitli,  9  N.  Y.  502. 

*  I'ringle  r.  CUw,  5  S.  &  R.  536  ;  D<>e  v.  Nvitt,  2  Car.  &  V.  430  ;  Coles  v.  Coles, 
16  Johns.  319  ;  Bni.lshaw  r.  Calliighan,  5  Johns.  80. 

*  Corey  V.  iVoplc,  45  Barh.  202. 

•  4  Kent,  Com.  61  ;  Jackson  v.  O'Donnghy,  7  Johns.  247  ;  Hildreth  r.  Tliomp- 
«on,  16  Mem.  191  ;  McCully  v.  Smith,  2  Bailey,  103  ;  Park,  Dow.  336  ;  Sharpley 
V.  Jones,  5  Harringt.  373.  7  p^rk,  Dow.  334. 


316  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

release  it  to  the  tenant  in  possession,  it  will  not  extinguish  it, 
but  he  may  avail  himself  of  it  against  a  second  widow  claim- 
ing dower  in  the  same  estate.^  But  still  she  could  not  herself 
enter  upon  land  as  her  dower  except  in  pursuance  of  the  exe- 
cution of  a  writ  of  habere  facias^  Though  she  need  not  wait 
until  such  writ  has  been  returned  into  court,  as  soon  as  her 
dower  is  designated  under  such  writ,  she  may  enter  and  enjoy 
it,  subject  only  to  the  hazard  of  having  the  proceedings  set 

aside  for  informality,  and  there  becoming  a  tort  feasor 
[*254]   *  by  such  entry  and  occupancy.^     In  the  execution  of 

such  a  writ,  the  widow  has  no  right  to  elect  in  which 
part  of  the  estate  her  dower  shall  be  set  out,  provided  one 
third  part  in  value  be  assigned  to  her.^  Nor  is  it  until  her 
dower  has  been  assigned,  in  some  of  the  modes  heretofore 
pointed  out,  that  the  estate  of  a  dowress  becomes  consum- 
mated and  clearly  fixed  and  ascertained. 

3.  But  the  moment  this  has  been  done,  and  she  has  entered 
upon  the  premises  assigned  her,  the  freehold  therein  is  vested 
in  her  by  virtue  and  in  continuance  of  her  husband's  seisin.^ 
Therefore,  though  upon  the  death  of  the  husband  his  heir 
enters  and  gains  actual  seisin  of  the  premises,  as  soon  as  the 
widow  enters  under  her  assignment  of  dower  it  destroys  his 
seisin  at  once  of  so  much  of  the  inheritance,  and  he  is  thence- 
forward considered  as  never  having  been  seised  thereof.^  Yet 
she  cannot,  after  her  dower  is  assigned,  have  assumpsit  for 
use  and  occupation  of  her  dower  land  against  the  tenant  who 
has  held  it  since  her  husband's  death,  although  no  damages 
shall  have  been  allowed  her,  when  she  recovered  judgment  for 
her  dower.'' 

1  Leavitt  v.  Lamprey,  13  Pick.  382.  2  Evans  v.  Webb,  1  Yeates,  424. 

3  Co.  Lit.  37  b,  n.  ;  Parker  v.  Parker,  17  Pick.  236  ;  2  Crabb,  Real  Prop.  152, 

*  Taylor  v.  Lusk,  7  J.  J.  Marsh.  636.     But  it  is  prescribed  by  statute  in  many 

States  that  the  assignment  of  the  dower  or  other  interest  taken  by  the  widow  in 

her  husband's  estate  shall,  if  possible,  include  the  dwelling-house.     See  post,  ch. 

9,  §§  1,  2. 

5  Co.  Lit.  339  a  ;  Park,  Dow.  339,  340  ;  Windham  v.  Portland,  4  Mass.  384  ; 
Lawrence  v.  Brown,  5  N.  Y.  394  ;  Jones  v.  Brewer,  1  Pick.  314. 

6  Powell  V.  Monson,  3  Mason,  368  ;  Park,  Dow.  340 ;  Gilb.  Ten.  27  ;  Lawrence 
V.  Brown,  5  N.  Y.  394  ;  Perkins,  §  424  ;  Norwood  v.  Marrow,  4  Dev.  &  B.  442  ; 
2  Crabb,  Real  Prop.  143. 

T  Thompson  v.  Stacy,  10  Yerg.  493  ;  Sutton  v.  Burrows,  2  Murph.  79  ; 
Andrews  v.  Andrews,  14  N.  J.  141.     Cf.  Parks  v.  McLellan,  44  N.  J.  L.  552. 


CU.  VII.  ^  ♦).]  DOWER.  317 

4.  Nor  (loos  sli(>  as  tenant  in  dower  hold  her  estate  «>f  the 
heir  or  tenant  who  set  it  ont  to  her,  hnt  of  her  deceased  hus- 
band, or  rather  liy  appointnient  of  the  law.'  The  law,  more- 
over, does  not  eonsich-r  that  then-  is  any  i)rivity  of  estate 
between  the  dowress  and  the  reversioner  of  her  lands.^  Nor 
wotdd  she  be  bound  liy  any  proceedinjjs  in  court  wbieli  ithite  to 
the  sale  of  her  husband's  interest  in  tho.se  iands.^  And 
BO  indejM'ndent  of  *  the  heir  is  the  estate  of  u  dowress,  [*2o5] 
tliat  where  he  a.ssijjjned  dower  lands  to  a  widow,  and 
at  the  same  time,  by  the  same  act,  limited  a  remaiiuler  to  a 
third  person,  dependent  upon  her  life  estate  as  a  particular 
estate  to  support  it,  it  was  held  to  be  a  void  limitation  as  to 
the  rem.undcr,  since  her  freehold  was  not  of  his  creation,  nor 
could  he  unite  it  to  the  remainder  so  as  to  make  them  one 
estate  when  taken  to^n'ther.*  After  the  language  which  has 
been  almve  used,  and  the  ca.ses  cited  illustrating  the  relation 
there  is  between  a  widow  and  the  heir  or  alienee  of  the  hus- 
band, in  respect  to  tlie  laiuis  which  may  have  Ijcen  set  out  to 
her  as  dower,  it  may  seem  somewhat  inconsistent  for  the  law 
writers  to  alVinn  that  "she  holds  of  the  heir  l)y  fealty,  the 
assignment  of  dower  being  a  species  of  subinfeudation  ;"^  and 
"in  point  of  tenure  a  dowress  holds  of  the  heir,  or  person  who 
has  the  reversion  in  the  lands  assigned  to  her,  notwithstand- 
ing she  is  in  by  her  husliaud  and  not  by  the  heir."*^  And  yet 
it  is  believed  that  the  several  i)ropositions  may  be  I'cconciled 
by  considering  the  c«)nnection  in  which  the  language  of  the 
writers  is  used.  The  e.\i)lanation  is  to  be  sought  in  the  doc- 
trine of  feudal  tenures,  which  have  become  obsolete  or  of  no 
practical  imjiortancc.  By  the  theory  of  the  feudal  law  every 
estate  owes  certain  services  to  him  of  whom  it  is  liolden. 
Fealty  was  one  of  these  services,  and  was  due  alike  from  free- 
hoUk-rs  and  tenants  for  years  as  an  incident  to  tlieir  estates, 
to  be  paid  to  the  reversioner.'^  Previous  to  the  statute  of  (Juin 
£mj>ti>rex,  thcjse  who  held  of  the  |irincipal  lord  often  enfeofl'cd 

»  {•oniiiitf.  Litlf,  1  Puk.  189  ;  Baker  v.  Bakor,  4  Me.  67  :  Park,  Dow.  340. 
«  Ailaiiis  r.  Bults,  9  Conn.  79.  «  Ijiwrcnce  r.  Brown,  5  N.  Y.  391 

*  Park,  Dow.  §  341.     Soe  Plow  J.  25.  '  1  Cruise,  Dig.  165. 

•  Paik.  Dow.  §  344  ;  Pirkins,  §  424  ;  2  Crabb,  Real  Prop.  143, 
'  Co  Lit.  07  b  ;  Lit.  §  132. 


318  LAW   OF  REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

others  to  hold  of  them  bv  what  was  called  subinfeudation. 
That  statute  put  an  end  to  these  mesne  tenures,  if  in  fee,  and 
required  him  who  had  been  enfeoffed  by  the  lord's  tenant  to 
hold  directly  of  the  lord  himself,  and  to  pay  to  him  the  ser- 
vices due  in  respect  to  the  estate.^     Still,  the  tenant  under 

the  lord  might  create  a  tenure  under  himself  for  life 
[*256]   or  *  years,  while  he  continued  liable  for  tlie  services 

due  to  the  lord.  And  in  such  case  there  was  still  a 
fealty  due  from  his  tenant  for  life  or  years  to  him  as  the  re- 
versioner.2  So  long  as  tlie  husband  lived  and  was  the  owner  of 
the  inheritance,  he  alone  owed  service  to  the  lord.  But  upon 
his  death,  his  inheritance  was  divided  between  the  heir  and 
his  widow  as  soon  as  her  dower  was  assigned,  she  taking  a 
freehold  for  life  in  one  third,  the  remaining  two  thirds  and  the 
reversion  in  her  third  going  to  the  heir,  who  became  substi- 
tuted, so  far  as  the  service  to  the  lord  was  concerned,  to  the 
husband  as  owning  the  inheritance.  And  as  this  assigning  of 
her  dower  is  properly  the  act  of  the  heir,  it  is  regarded  as  a 
kind  of  subinfeudation  on  his  part  in  respect  to  the  widow. ^ 
Now,  though  she  came  in  as  of  the  seisin  and  estate  of  her  hus- 
band, the  same  law  that  gave  her  an  estate  for  life  gave  the 
inheritance  to  the  heir  in  reversion,  or,  if  it  had  been  aliened 
by  the  husband,  to  the  alienee.  And  as  fealty  was  incident  to 
every  life  estate  and  was  due  to  the  reversioner,  the  widow 
may  be  said  with  truth  to  hold  of  the  heir  by  fealty,  in  point  of 
tenure,  although  she  came  into  her  estate  as  of  the  seisin  and 
estate  of  her  husband.'^  Nor  is  it  difficult  in  this  way  to  recon- 
cile the  proposition  that  the  seisin  of  the  widow  is  in  her  by 
relation  from  the  death  of  the  husband,  and  thereby  destroys 
the  intermediate  seisin  of  the  heir  or  alienee.  But  she  and  the 
heir  are  still  equally  in  the  "seisin"  of  the  estate,  using  that 
term  in  a  technical  sense,  as  denoting  the  completion  of  tliat 
investiture  by  which  the  tenant  was  admitted  into  the  tenure.^ 
The  tenant  in  such  case,  in  possession  of  the  freehold,  is  said 
to  have  the  actual  seisin  of  the  land,  the  fee  being  entrusted  to 
her.    And  it  was  because  of  the  fee  being  thus  entrusted  to  the 

^  Wms.  Real  Prop.  95.  2  Park,  Dow.  §  344  ;  Fitzh.  N.  B.  159  A. 

»  2  Bl.  Com.  136.  *  Wms.  Real.  Prop.  101  ;  Co.  Lit.  67  b. 

6  Co.  Lit.  266  b,  n.  217. 


en.  VII.  §  (!.]  DOWER.  319 

can;  and  protection  of  the  tenant  in  dower  that  any  act  of  dis- 
anirniancc  of  the  reversioner's  tith',  on  her  part,  was  hehl  to 
work  a  forfeiture  of  her  estate,  us,  for  instance,  her  conveying 
the  (h»\ver  hinds  in  fee  to  a  stranger.*  And  where, 
•therefore,  shi^  was  investeil  with  the  actual  seisin  by  [•2.J7] 
means  of  the  assignujent  <»f  her  dower,  the  interme- 
diate seisin  of  the  heir  was  not  ih'eniecl  to  have  been  adver.sc 
to  hers,  nor  inconsist«'nt  with  the  i<h'a  that  her  seisin  took 
cfTect  l)y  rehUion  from  the  decease  of  the  hiisliiind. 

5.  As  has  more  than  once  l»een  stated,  the  estate  of  a  widow- 
in  hinds  assigni'd  to  hei-  in  dower  is  a  freehold  for  life,  carry- 
ing with  it  the  various  incidents  heretofore  enumerated  as 
belonging  to  sucii  estates.  And,  ordinarily,  the  incidents  to 
her  estate  in  dower  cease  with  her  estate  in  the  land.  As 
where,  for  instance,  a  right  of  way  was  set  out  as  appurtenant 
to  dower  lands,  across  other  lands  of  the  husband,  it  ceased 
with  the  determination  of  her  estate.'-^  But  where  a  certain  part 
of  a  house  was  set  out  as  dower  with  certain  easements  in 
other  parts  of  it  as  ai)purt('nant,  and  the  jiarts  not  set  out  to  the 
widow  were  sold  and  descril)ed  as  being  all  the  estate  not 
assiguecl  to  her,  it  was  held  that  at  her  death  these  easements 
continuetl  a]»pui-tenaiit  to  the  dower  jiortion  in  the  hands  of  the 
heirs.-''  Among  other  duties  and  liabilities  of  a  dowress  is 
that  of  ki'eping  down  one  third  of  the  interest  uj)on  the  incum- 
brances or  charges  u|ioii  the  estate,  subject  to  which  she  liolds 
her  dower.''  She  is  answerable  for  waste  committed  upon  the 
premises,  whetlu'r  by  herself  or  a  stranger,  as  she  is  bound  to 
protect  the  reversioner's  interest.^  Sometimes,  however,  she 
may  use  one  part  of  her  dower  land  in  preference  to  another, 
and  thereby  be  exonerated  from  liability  for  waste,  when  she 
woidd  have  been  liable  if  it  had  been  the  only  estate  set  out 
to  her.  As  where  the  commissioners  set  out  one  third  part  of 
eight  different  parcels  into  which  they  divided  the  estate,  and 
one  of  the.se  was  woodland,  it  was  held  that  thouLdi,  as  a 
general  proposition,  she  would  be  bound  to  use  each  parcel 
as  if  it  had  been  the  only  land  of  which  her  husliand  died 
seised,  she   might  in  such  case  take  wood  and  timber  from 

•  Co.  Lit.  266  h.  n.  217.  "  Hoffinnn  r.  Sav.ipr,  15  M.irs.  IflO. 

•  Symmca  r.  Drew,  21  Pick.  278.  *  2  Crabb,  Real  Prop.  1'.4.       *  I.l.  155. 


320  LAW  OF  EEAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

[*258]  that  lot  for  the  use  of  the  cultivated  *  land.^  And  in 
Ohio,  where  an  unproductive  town  lot,  together  with 
an  unimproved  wood-lot,  were  set  out  as  a  widow's  dower,  it  was 
held  not  to  be  waste  to  cut  off  and  sell  enough  wood  from  the 
woodland  to  pay  the  taxes  upon  both  parcels.^  *  If  a  widow  is 
endowed  with  wild  lands  in  North  Carolina,  she  may  clear  a 
part  thereof,  if  necessary,  for  the  support  of  her  family .^ 

*  Note.  —  Most  of  the  States  have  statute  provisions  as  to  the  effect  of  di- 
vorces upon  dower  and  curtesy.  In  Massachusetts,  when  a  divorce  a  vinculo  is 
decreed  for  the  cause  of  adultery  committed  by  tlie  husband,  or  on  account  of  his 
being  sentenced  to  confinement  to  hard  labor,  the  M^ife  is  entitled  to  her  dower  in 
his  lands  in  the  same  manner  as  if  he  were  dead  ;  but  she  is  not  entitled  to  dower 
in  any  other  case  of  divorce  from  the  bonds  of  matrimony.  —  In  Maine,  the  wife 
is  in  like  manner  entitled  to  dower  when  such  divorce  is  decreed  to  her  for  the 
fault  of  the  husband,  for  any  cause  except  impotence.  And  in  both  these  States, 
upon  the  dissolution  of  a  marriage  by  a  divorce,  or  sentence  of  nullity  for  any 
cause  excepting  that  of  adultery  committed  bj'  the  wife,  the  wife  is  entitled  to  the 
immediate  possession  of  all  her  real  estate.  Mass.  Pub.  Stat.  c.  146,  §  27  ;  Me. 
Eev.  Stat.  1871,  c.  60,  §  7.  —  In  Maine,  when  a  divorce  from  bed  and  board  is 
decreed,  and  there  is  no  issue  living,  the  wife's  real  estate  is  restored  to  her ;  if 
there  is  issue  living,  or  the  divorce  is  decreed  for  the  cruelty  of  the  wife,  the  court 
may  exercise  its  discretion  as  to  the  restoration  of  property.  Id.  §  13.  —  In  Mas- 
sachusetts, there  are  no  longer  divorces  from  bed  and  board,  but  divorces  nisi, 
which  after  five  or  three  years  may  become  absolute.  Pub.  Stat.  c.  146,  §  3  ; 
Sparhawk  v.  Sparhawk,  116  Mass.  315. — In  Connecticut  it  is  declared  that  in 
case  of  divorce  where  the  wife  is  the  innocent  party,  if  no  alimony,  she  is  entitled 
to  dower.  Gen.  Stat.  1866,  p.  421  ;  Kev.  Stat.  1875,  p.  376.  And  if  the  divorce 
be  for  the  misconduct  of  the  wife,  the  court  may  decree  that  her  lands  revert  to 
her  husband.  Acts,  1866.  —  In  Rhode  Island,  when  a  divorce  a  vinculo  is  decreed 
to  the  wife  for  fault  of  the  husband,  if  there  be  no  issue  living,  she  is  restored  to 
all  her  lands,  tenements,  and  hereditaments.  If  there  be  issue  living  at  the  time 
of  the  divorce,  the  court  may  act  at  their  discretion  in  regard  to  .such  restoration. 
Pub.  Stat.  1882,  c.  167,  §§  4,  8.  —  In  New  Hampshire  it  is  simply  provided  that, 
upon  any  decree  of  nullity  or  divorce,  the  court  may  restore  to  the  wife  all  or  any 
part  of  her  real  estate.  Gen.  Laws,  1878,  c.  182,  §  12.  —  So  in  Vermont,  except 
when  the  divorce  be  for  the  adultery  of  the  wife.  Rev.  Laws,  1860,  §  2380.  — 
In  New  York  and  Arkansas,  in  case  of  divorce  dissolving  the  marriage  contract 
for  the  misconduct  of  the  wife,  she  shall  not  be  endowed.  But  when  a  decree  dis- 
solving tlie  marriage  is  pronounced  in  favor  of  the  wife,  all  her  real  estate  becomes 
her  absolute  property,  N.  Y.  Rev.  Stat.  1882  ;  vol.  3,  p.  2197,  §  8,  p.  2338;  Ark, 

1  Childs  V.  Smith,  1  Md.  Ch.  Dee.  483  ;  Cook  v.  Cook,  11  Gray,  123. 

2  Crockett  v.  Crockett,  2  Ohio,  N.  s.  180.  See  also  Padelford  v.  Padelford, 
7  Pick.  152  ;  Dalton  v.  Dalton,  7  Ired.  Eq.  197.  And  see  also,  as  to  her  cutting 
timber,  &c.,  on  wild  lands,  ante,  p.  *110,  n.  3. 

'  Lambeth  v.  Warner,  2  Jones.  Eq.  165. 


en.  Yll.  §  tJ.]  DOWER.  821 

Dig.  1S74,  §§  2207,  2217  ;  nml  if  tluMlivoni-  U-  on  nroount  of  the  adtiltiTj-  of  tho 
huMtvaiid,  tho  wife  lioit  ilowt-r  if  she  Kiirvives  liiiii,  Forrt-st  r.  Forrfst,  tJ 
Duer,  li>2.*—  In  MiMimri,  in  itll  ciun-a  of  (iivorci-  from  the  lionilM  of  [••JfiyJ 
niatriinuuy,  tho  K"'''}'  jwrty  forfeits  all  riglits  nml  iliiinis  under  und  l>y 
virtue  of  the  niiiniii^v,  und  if  tin-  wife  ohtain  a  divorce  fmni  tlie  bunds  of  luiitri- 
mony,  nil  |)ri>|HTty  that  ciiniP  to  her  liuhUind  by  tin-  marriage,  that  i*  undi.s|iowd 
of  at  tho  tinio  of  tiling  the  ]>etition,  n-vert*  It)  the  wife  and  ehildn-n.  Kev.  Stat. 
1881,  vol.  1,  §  2182.  —  In  Michiijan,  when  n  marriage  i.s  di»-Mjive<l  for  the  cauM;  of 
adultery  •■ommilted  by  the  husband,  for  his  nii.v'onduct  or  habitual  drunkunnutw, 
or  on  aoeount  of  hi.s  U-ing  wntenced  to  imprisonment  for  a  term  of  three  yearn  or 
longrr,  the  wife  is  entitled  to  her  dower  in  his  lands,  in  the  same  manner  oa  if  he 
were  dead  ;  but  she  is  not  entitled  to  dower  in  any  other  ease  of  tlivoreo  ;  and 
ui)on  the  dissolution  of  marriage  for  uny  cause  excepting  tiie  adultery  of  the  wife, 
she  is  entitled  to  the  restoration  of  all  her  real  estate.  Comp.  l^ws,  1S71,  c.  108, 
}  24.  —  In  .\fin7usotn,  in  case  of  divorce  for  any  cause  but  adultery  of  the  wife,  or 
a  nullity  of  marriage  declared,  or  tho  husband  is  sentenced  to  imprisonment  for 
life,  the  wife  is  entitled  to  her  Innils  as  if  her  husband  were  dead.  If  the  proin-rty 
thus  restored  be  insullicieut  for  her  .supiK)rt  and  that  of  her  children  committed  to 
her,  the  court  may  ilecree  to  her  such  real  estjite  of  the  husUmd,  not  exceeding 
the  value  of  her  dower,  as  tliey  may  deem  just  and  reasonable.  If  the  marriage  is 
dissolved  by  iinf)risonment  of  husband  or  his  adultery,  she  takes  her  dower  as  if 
he  were  dead  ;  but  her  dower  is  barred  by  one  year's  desertion.  Stat.  1878,  c.  46, 
§j  14,  2<l ;  c.  62.  §  24.  —  In  Kansas,  a  woman  divorced  for  the  fault  or  tui.sconduct 
of  her  husliand  has  her  dower  if  no  alimony  ;  but  is  not  endowed  if  divorced  for 
her  fault  or  misconduct.  Comp.  Laws,  187J>,  p.  6l»l. — In  CnUfornin,  where  the 
statute  has  done  away  with  the  common-law  right  of  dower,  and  substituted  in  its 
place  a  half  inten-st  in  the  common  pro|n-rty,  it  is  provided  that  in  case  of  the 
dissolution  of  the  mnmage,  the  common  property  .shall  l>e  ec|ually  divided  InHween 
the  parties,  except  that,  when  theilivorce  is  rendered  on  the  ground  of  a<lultery  or 
extreme  cruelty,  the  guilty  party  is  entitled  to  only  such  ]>ortion  of  the  common 
proi>erty  as  the  court  deem  just.  Hittell's  Codes,  1876,  §  5146.  —  In  Dxkot'i, 
dower  and  curte.sy  are  abolished,  and  each  j»arty  has  the  full  right  to  his  or  her 
separate  projwrty,  except  that,  on  a  divorce  for  the  fault  of  th^  husKin<i,  the  court 
may  order  an  allowance  from  his  estate  in  her  favor.  Hev.  Code,  1877,  i>ii.  247, 
S  3  :  354,  §  779  ;  246,  §§  7-3,  74.  —  In  Xcbraskn  and  Arizona,  the  wife  has  dower 
on  divorce  for  husljand's  adulter>',  dnmkennes.s.  or  niiscondnct.  or  imprisonment 
for  any  term  exceeding  three  years.  In  divorce  from  the  bonds  of  matrimony  for 
any  cause  except  the  wife's  adultery,  she  has  her  own  real  estate,  as  also  in  every 
divorce  from  lied  and  board.  Neb.  Comp.  Stat.  1881,  p.  254.  §  23  ;  .\rizona  Comp. 
L.  1877,  §  1923.  And  in  JViscmmn,  when  the  mainage  is  di.s.solvp4l  on  account 
of  the  husband's  b«Mng  sentenced  to  imprisonment  for  life,  but  not  in  any  other 
caw  of  divorce.  Rev.  Stat.  1878,  c.  109,  §  2373.  -  In  Indinnn,  although  the 
estate  of  dower  is  alwlished.  it  is  enaote<l  that  a  divorce  grante«I  for  the  adidtery 
or  misconduct  of  the  husUnd,  shall  entitle  the  wife  to  the  same  rights,  so  far  as 
his  real  estate  is  concerned,  that  she  would  have  been  entitled  to  by  his  death. 
Rev.  Stat.  1881,  %  1043.  An.l  it  is  enftcted  that  if  a  wife  shall  have  left  her  hus- 
band,  and  shall  be  linng,  at  the  time  of  his  death,  in  adultery,  she  shall  take  no 
part  of  the  estate  of  her  htis1>and.  Id.  §  2496.  —  In  PUnois,  ^^M^^^  a  divorce  for 
the  fault  or  misconduct  of  the  wife,  »)i,.  forfeits  her  <lower.  Ifev.  Stat.  l^'^O,  c.  41, 
%  14.  It  is  to  be  noticed  in  regard  to  tho  sututea  of  both  Indiana  and  Illinoia, 
Vol.  I.  — 21 


822  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

that  the  language  in  regard  to  the  divorce  is  general,  not  specifying  that  it  is  a 
divorce  a  vinculo.  —  In  Tennessee,  if  the  bonds  of  matrimonj'  be  dissolved  at  the 
suit  of  the  husband,  the  wife  is  in  no  case  entitled  to  dower.     Stat.  1871,  §  2473. 

—  In  Alabama,  a  divorce  for  the  adultery  of  the  wife  bars  her  dower.  Code, 
1876,  §  2698.  —  In  Ohio,  if  divorce  be  granted  by  reason  of  aggression  of  the  hus- 
band, the  wife  is  restored  to  her  lands,  and  shall  be  allowed  alimony  out  of  his 
real  and  personal  estate  ;  and,  if  she  survive  him,  she  shall  have  dower  in  his  real 
estate.  But  if  the  divorce  is  for  the  aggression  of  the  wife,  she  loses  all  right  of 
dower  in  her  husband's  lands,  but  has  a  restoration  of  her  own  lands  and  such 
share  of  his  lands  as  the  court  shall  judge  reasonable.  It  is  provided  that  if  a 
wife  willingly  leave  her  husband  and  dwell  with  her  adulterer,  she  shall  lose  her 
right  of  dower  ;  but  shall  be  restored  to  this  right  on  her  return  and  reconcilation 
with  her  husband.  Rev.  Stat.  1880,  §§  4192,  5699,  5700.  —  So  in  Delaware,  Laws, 
1874,  p.  476,  §  9  ;  p.  534,  §  9.  In  New  Jersey  and  West  Virginia  tlie  wife  is 
barred  of  her  dower  by  living  in  adultery,  N.  J.  Kev.  1877,  p.  322  ;  "W.  Va. 
Rev.  Stat.  1878,  c.  70,  §  7.  —  In  North  Carolina,  dower  and  curtesy  are  both 
barred  by  a  divorce  a  vinculo ;  and  curtesy  also  if  the  wife,  after  a  divorce  a 
mensa  et  thoro,  is  not  living  with  the  husband  at  the  time  of  her  death.  Code, 
1833,  §§  1838,  1843.  — In  Virginia  dower  is  barred  by  the  wife's  adulter}'. 
Code,  1873,  c.  106,  §§  7,  13.  — In  South  Carolina,  elopement  bars  dower.  Gen. 
Stat.  1882,  §  1799.  —  In  Kentucky  the  wife  loses  dower  by  living  in  adultery,  and 
the  provision  is  general,  barring  curtesy  and  dower  by  divorce  granted  a  vinciilo. 
Gen.  Stat.  1873,  p.  531,  §  14  ;  p.  526,  §  8;  c.  52,  art.  4,  §  3.  —In  Nevada,  if 
the  divorce  be  by  rea.son  of  the  imprisonment  of  the  husband  or  his  adultery,  the 
wife  takes  her  dower  as  if  he  were  dead.  1  Comp.  L.  §  220.  —  In  Maryland, 
when  a  man  is  convicted  of  bigamy,  his  first  wife  is  forthwith  endowed  of  one 
third  of  his  real  estate,  the  assignment  and  recovery  of  which  are  made  as  in  other 
cases  of  dower  ;  but  when  a  woman  is  so  convicted,  she  forfeits  her  claim  to  dower 
of  the  estate  of  her  first  husband.  Rev.  Code,  1878,  art.  72,  §  102.  —In  Ari- 
zona, Maine,  Vermont,  and  Michigan,  when  a  ^lYoxce  a  vinculo  matrimonii  is 

[*260]  decreed  for  the  cause  of  adultery  committed  by  the  wife,  the  husband  *  shall 
hold  her  real  estate  so  long  as  they  shall  both  live  ;  and  if  he  shall  survive 
her,  and  there  shall  have  been  issue  of  the  marriage  born  alive,  he  shall  hold  her 
real  estate  for  the  term  of  his  own  life,  as  a  tenant  by  the  curtesy  ;  but  the  court 
may  allow  her  so  much  of  her  real  or  personal  estate  as  is  necessary  for  her  sub- 
sistence. Me.  Rev.  Stat.  1871,  c.  60,  §  8  ;  Vt.  Rev.  L.  1880,  §  2384  ;  Mich. 
Comp.  Laws,  1871,  c.  108,  §§  25,  36.  Such  is  the  law  in  Rhode  Island,  when  a 
husband  has  obtained  a  divorce  n  vinculo  for  any  cause.  Pub.  Stat.  1882,  tit. 
XX.  c.  167,  §  5.  — While  in  Massachusetts,  upon  such  a  divorce  for  the  wife's  adul- 
tery, the  husband  is  to  have  only  so  much  of  her  realty  as  the  court  deems  neces- 
sary for  the  support  of  the  minor  children  committed  to  his  care,  and  his  right  to 
her  other  realty  on  her  death  ceases  if  she  marry  again.     Pub.  Stat.  c.  146,  §  26. 

—  In  Oreqon,  if  a  man-iage  is  dissolveil,  the  party  at  whose  prayer  it  is  done  shall 
be  entitled  to  one  third  part  in  fee  of  the  whole  of  the  real  estate  owned  by  the 
other  at  the  time  of  the  dissolution.  Gen.  L.  p.  210.  —  In  Maine  and  Rhode 
Island,  these  provisions  entitling  the  husband  to  curtesy  in  case  of  divorce  do 
not  apply  to  the  wife's  ])roperty  secured  to  her  by  the  laws  allowing  her  to  hold  a 
separate  property.  Stats,  s-ap.  —  In  Nciv  York  and  Tennessee,  if  a  decree  dissolv- 
ing the  marriage  be  pronounced  in  favor  of  the  husband,  his  right  to  any  real 
estate  owned  by  the  wife  at  the  time  of  pronouncing  the  decree  in  her  own  right. 


CII.  VII.  §  •').]  DOWER.  323 

ami  to  tlip  rents  an<l  profit*  thereof,  U  not  tjikcn  nwny  or  impnircil  by  r»c1i  ilis- 
fioliitiuu  of  the  marriagp.  N.  Y.  lUiv.  Stat.  .1th  «'tl.  ISSH,  vol.  3,  p.  237  ;  Cotle  of 
Tenn.  1874,  S  '2472.  —  In  lilifutis,  whoa  a  divorce  in  obtained  for  the  fault  iiinl 
misconduct  of  the  hustwnd,  he  losus  his  right  to  be  tenant  by  the  curtesy  in  t)i<- 
wife's  lands.  Kev.  Stat.  1880,  c.  41.  —  In  yllabama,  a  divorw;  deprives  the  hus- 
band of  all  control  over  the  separate  estate  of  the  wife.  Code,  1H7C,  §  2700. — 
In  Imlinmu,  although  the  estate  by  curtesy  is  alwlished,  a  divorce  decreed  on 
account  of  the  misconduct  of  the  wife  entitles  the  husband  to  the  same  rights  so 
far  as  his  or  her  re.il  estate  is  concerned,  as  he  would  have  been  entitled  to  by  her 
death.  Rev.  StAt.  1881,  §  1044.  Bui  if  a  huslxind  shall  have  left  his  wife,  and 
shall  Iw  living,  at  the  time  of  her  death,  in  adult<Ty,  or  shall  abandon  his  wife 
without  just  cause,  failing  to  make  suitable  provision  for  her,  he  shall  take  no 
part  of  her  estate.  II.  §§  2407,  2498.  —  In  Maryland,  a  huslwiid  forfeits  his 
claim  or  title  as  tenaut  by  the  curtesy  on  couvictiou  of  bigamy.  Code,  IS"'', 
p.  807. 


324  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 


CHAPTER  Till. 

JOIXTURE  AXD   OTHER  PROYISIOXS   IX  LIEF  OF  DOWER. 

1,  2.  Jointure  defined  and  classified, 

3.  Division  of  the  subject. 

4.  Origin  of  jointures. 

5.  Jointiires  as  affected  bj^  Statute  of  Uses. 
6,  7.  Requisites  of  a  legal  jointure. 

8.  When  jointures  are  a  bar  of  dower. 

9.  "When  wife  must  assent  to  jointure. 

10.  Effect  of  eviction  from  jointure. 

11.  Jointure  settled  after  marriage. 

12.  Widow  may  enter  at  once  into  jointure  lands. 

13.  Jointures  have  incidents  of  life  estates. 

14.  How  jointure  may  be  lost. 

15.  How  far  Stat.  Henr>-  Till,  adopted  in  the  United  States. 

16.  Of  equitable  jointures. 

17.  Equitable  jointures  require  assent  to  be  valid. 

18.  When  widow  may  elect  dower  or  jointure. 

19.  How  equitable  jointures  bar  dower. 

20.  Effect  of  eviction  from  equitable  jointure. 

21.  Effect  of  relinquishing  jointure. 

22.  Effect  of  jointures  in  United  States. 

23.  Testamentary-  jointures. 

24,  25.  Effect  of  accepting  testamentary  provision. 

26.  Wliere  widow  required  to  elect  the  one  or  the  other. 

27.  Where  she  may  elect  in  what  character  to  take. 

28.  How  election  is  evidenced. 

29.  Right  of  jointress  if  deprived  of  her  provision,  and  herein  of  eviction. 

1.  In  treating  of  dower,  it  has  been  seen  that  one  mode  of 
barring  the  claim  of  a  widow  to  dower  is  by  settling  upon  her 
an  allowance  previous  to  marriage,  to  be  accepted  by  her  in 
lieu  thereof.     This  is  called  a   jointure,  and  although  once 

very  common  in  England,  it  has  become  of  little  mo- 
[*262]  ment  since  the  *  Dower  Act  of  3  &  4  Wm.  IV.  c.  105, 

has  placed  the  subject  of  the  wife's  dower  under  the 
control  of  the  husband  in  all  cases  where  special  provision  is 
not  made  in  her  favor.     This  is  usually  done  by  marriage  set- 


en.  viii.]  joiNiruK.  3'2.j 

tk'iucnt.s.  Hut  it  is  novortlu'less  iinjtortant  to  imdcrstand  iIm.* 
nature  and  origin  of  jointiin'.s  and  the  rules  hy  wliieh  tin  y 
are  {jrenerallv  governed.  Jointures  are  not  of  the  nature  <d 
contracts,  but  of  provisions  made  hy  the  hushand  for  the 
wife.' 

2.  Thev  are  of  two  kimls  —  oiu>  at  law,  the  other  in  ecjuity. 
The  former  include  estates  in  lands  made  to  a  woman  in  con- 
templation of  marriage,  or  a  wife  after  marriage  in  .satisfac- 
tion of  dower.  They  are  oeeasionally  used  in  this  country, 
though  what  are  called  eipiituhle  jointures  are  more  frecpicntly 
adopted  than  those  at  law. 

3.  The  8ul>ject  may  be  considered  under  the  following 
heads:  1.  Legal  jointures:  (1)  made  before  marriage;  (2) 
made  after  marriage.  11.  Ecpiitable  jointures:  (1)  made  be- 
fore marriage ;  (2)  made  after  marriage.  III.  Tist.inient.iry 
and  other  provisions  in  lieu  of  dower. 

4.  Before  the  time  of  Henry  VI II.  tlu-re  had  grown  up  a 
sjH'cies  of  jjroperty  in  lands  called  uses,  by  which,  while  one 
man  owned  the  legal  estate  with  all  its  incidents  of  seisin, 
tenure,  «tc.,  another  had  a  usufructuary  interest  in  and  out 
of  the  same,  of  which  he  availed  himself  through  the  instru- 
mentality of  courts  of  (Mpiity.  As  there  could  be  no  seisin  of 
this  intangible  right,  no  dower  could  lie  acquired  in  it.  And 
liusbands  resorted  to  it  as  a  means  of  ]>revcnting  their  wives 
claiming  ilower,  by  having  estates  conveyed  to  some  other 
person  to  hold  to  the  use  of  the  husband.  Xor  was  there  any 
way,  excej»t  by  conveyances  to  uses,  by  whieh  |)rovision  could 
be  made  for  a  wife,  l)y  any  antenuptial  arrangement,  whith 
should  supersede  or  bar  her  future  claim  for  dower,  if  she  sur- 
viveil  her  husband  ;  and  this  on  technical  grounds  :  first,  that 
at  common  law  no  person  could  l)ar  himself  of  any  right  or 
title  to  lands  by  receiving  any  collateral  thing  in  sat- 
isfaction, unless  he  had  'actually  executed  a  release  ;  [*2G3] 
and,  second,  because,  until   married,  a  woman  could 

not  execute  a  valid  release  of  property  of  her  contemplated 
hu.sband,  to  which  she  had  till  then  no  title.^  When,  there- 
fore, a  husband  wished  to  make  provision  as  a  substitute  for 

*  RuckinghniTMihirf  r.  Dnirj-,  \xr  L»l.  MaiisficM,  2  YaU-u,  72. 

'  Venion's  Caac,  4  lU'p.  1  ;  HiutiugH  v.  Dickinson,  7  Moss.  153;  Co.  Lit.  36  U 


326  LAW  OP  BEAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

dower  for  the  wife  whom  he  was  about  to  marry,  he  had  such 
parts  of  his  lands  as  were  thought  a  reasonable  proportion, 
conveyed  by  the  person  who  held  the  legal  seisin  thereof  to 
some  one  to  the  use  of  the  husband  and  wife  for  the  term  of 
their  lives.  This  created  a  kind  of  joint  tenancy  or  jointure, 
whereby  the  wife,  if  she  survived  the  husband,  enjoyed  the 
estate  during  her  life.  There  was  this  peculiarity  in  the  joint 
estate  of  husband  and  wife,  as  there  still  is,  that  neither  could 
defeat  the  right  of  survivorship  of  the  other.^  * 

5.  By  the  statute  27  Henry  YIII.  c.  10,  called  the  Statute  of 
Uses,  an  attempt  was  made  to  do  away  with  uses  by  uniting 
the  legal  and  equitable  estates,  and  giving  them  thus  united  to 
the  one  in  whose  favor  the  use  had  been  declared.  The  con- 
sequence would  have  been,  had  this  idea  been  carried  out,  that 
all  husbands,  cestuis  que  use,  would  have  become  seised  of  the 
legal  estate,  and  thereby  have  given  dower  to  their  wives,  even 
though  these  might  already  have  had  provision  made  for  them 
before  marriage.  To  obviate  a  consequence  like  this  it  was 
provided  by  that  statute,  §§  6,  7,  8,  and  9,  substantially,  that  if 
lands  were  conveyed  for  the  benefit  of  a  wife  before  marriage, 
in  a  manner  pointed  out  in  §  6,  as  her  jointure,  she  should  not 
have  dower  unless  evicted  from  her  jointure  lands.  If  such 
jointure  was  created  after  marriage,  then  she  might  elect  to 

take  the  jointure  or  dower,  but  not  both.^ 
[*264]       *  6.  But  in  order  to  have  such  provision  operate  as 

a  bar  to  dower,  it  must  conform  to  all  the  require- 
ments prescribed  by  the  statute,  which  are  as  follows :  1.  It 
must  take  effect  immediately  upon  the  death  of  the  husband. 
2.  It  must  be  for  her  own  life  at  least.  No  estate  for  years, 
or  j9er  autre  vie,  will  answer.     3.  It  must  be  made  to  herself, 

*  Note.  —  Settlements  by  way  of  provision  for  the  wife,  previous  to  marriage, 
are  said  to  have  been  in  use  among  the  ancient  Germans  and  Gauls  ;  and  Ciesar 
and  Tacitus  are  quoted  to  sustain  the  position.  The  latter  says,  Dotem  non  uxor 
marito  sed  uxori  maritus  offcrt,  intersunt  parcntes  et  propinqui,  ct  Tnunera  probant. 
De  Mor.  Germ.  c.  18  ;  2  Flint.  Eeal  Prop.  198,  n. 

1  2  Bl.  Com.  137  ;  Vernon's  Case,  4  Kep.  1  ;  Tud.  Cas.  730;  1  Atk.  Conv.  410, 
n.  ;  Id.  261. 

2  Stat,  at  Large  ;  1  Atk.  Conv.  264  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  137  ;  McCartee  v.  Teller,  2 
Paige,  511,  562. 


(11.  VIII.]  JOTNTI'RE.  827 

and  not  to  nuothor  in  trust  for  hrr.  4.  It  must  ho  niaflo  and 
expiTssL'd  in  the  dcccl  to  be  in  full  sati.sfaction  of  her  dower.' 
And,  tliouirli  urdiiuirily  for  life  only,  jointures  may  We  estates 
in  fee,  and  i»e  jfood.'-^  A  provision,  in  ord»'r  to  come  within  the 
eliaraeter  of  a  jointure,  must  e«»nsist  wholly  of  land.  If  it 
Consists  partly  of  land  and  partly  of  an  annuity,  it  will  not 
liar  dower  unless  the  annuity  is  Heeiircd  upon  huid.''  Nor 
would  an  estate  u|»on  condition  he  a  hindinu'  pio\  isinu  f<M"  a 
widow  as  a  jointure,  unless  u|>on  the  huslnind's  death  she  elect 
to  enter  and  accept  the  ('ouditioual  estate.  If  she  do,  she  will 
be  bound  by  it  and  be  barred  of  dower.' 

7.  Though  a  jointure,  in  its  oriiriual  meaninjr  and  e<imuion 
accejjtance,  implies  a  joint  estate  in  the  husband  and  wife  with 
the  principle  of  survivurshi|»,  it  extends  to  a  sole  estate  lim- 
ited to  the  wife  alone.  Nor  is  it  necessary  that  it  should  pro- 
ceed directly  from  the  husband  ;  it  may  come  from  the  father 
or  any  otlier  person.  And  it  may  be  by  a  grant  to  the  wife 
l)eforc  coverture,  or  a  giaiit  to  her  by  any  person  other  than 
lier  husband  during  C(jverture.  So  it  may  be  by  a  conveyance 
to  her  use  cither  before  or  tJurinL''  eovei'ture,  and  may  be  to 
the  wif(^  and  husband  jointly,  or  to  the  wife  alone.^ 

8.  Although  Coke,  in  defuiing  j^intui-e,  sjteaks  of  it 

as  a  *  competent  livelihoiMl  of  freehold  Uiv  the  wife,(»f  [*-tJo] 
lands,  ttc,  the  law  furnishes  no  measure  of  compe- 
tency ;  and  if  it  complies  with  the  re(piiremcnts  of  the  statute 
as  to  (jualities  and  incidents,  it  will  bar  dower,  whatever  may 
be  its  amount.''  Such  will  be  the  elTect  where  it  is  settled  be- 
fore marriage,  though  the  wife  be  a  minor  at  the  time.  Nor 
is  it  necessary,  though  usual,  to  have  the  assent  of  the  parents 
or  guardian  of  the  wife  in   such   ease,    if   the    jirovision   be 

>  Atk.  Conv.  ir>5  ;  2  IJl.  Com.  138  ;  2  Flint.  Ki-al  Prop.  197  ;  <'o.  Lit.  atl  1.  ; 
Vemon"»  Cojr',  4  lU-\t.  1,  l»y  wliicli  it  is  lu-ld  that  nii  estate  durante  viduiUiU,  which 
nmy  coutinuo  for  hir  lif<',  woiihl  tx;  a  p(»o<l  jointim?,  except  in  case  the  wife  wua 
a  minor.     Met  artee  v.  T«-Uer.  2  Pnipc,  562. 

«  1  KoiM-r,  Hiis.  &  Wif.-,  465.  •  Vance  r.  Vance.  21  Me.  364. 

♦  (liUK  y,  Rights  of  Worn.  2(i9  ;  Vernon's  Cas*-,  4  Rep.  1  ;  McCarteu  v.  Telh-r, 
2  Paige,  562  ;  t'aruthers  r.  Canitliers,  4  Hro.  C.  «'.  500. 

»  2  Flint.  Real  Pn>p.  196  ;  1  RoiH?r,  Hiis.  k  Wife.  465  ;  3  Pre.st.  Al.s.  376  ;  1 
Cruise,  Dig.  195. 

«  1  Atk.  Conv.  266  ;  Driir>-  r.  I)nir>-,  2  YAvn,  39,  57;  IJuckinghamshiro  o. 
DruT)-,  2  Kden,  75,  n.  ;  1  Brigiit,  Huk.  &  Wife,  434. 


328  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  T. 

a  fair  one,  not  illusory  in  its  character ;  but  such  assent 
negatives  the  idea  of  the  provision  being  illusory  and  fraudu- 
lent.i 

9.  Nor  is  it  even  necessary  that  the  wife  herself  should,  in 
England,  assent  to  the  jointure  before  marriage,  whereas,  in 
Maine,  she  must  have  assented,  to  have  it  have  effect.^  There 
is  a  form  of  conveyance  by  the  way  of  jointure  in  Oliver's 
Practical  Conveyancer,  which  is  an  indenture  of  three  parts, 
to  which  the  wife  is  a  party.  But  it  is  remarked  in  a  note  to 
that  work,  that  it  is  not  necessary  she  should  be  a  party  to  the 
deed.3  But  while  the  law  as  to  jointures  is  adopted  in  most 
of  the  United  States,  the  statutes  of  several  of  them  require 
the  wife  to  be  made  a  party  to  the  deed  and  express  her  assent 
in  the  deed,  if  of  full  age  ;  if  under  age,  by  joining  with  her 
father  or  guardian  in  the  conveyance.  Among  these,  Maine, 
Massachusetts,  New  York,  Arkansas,  Connecticut,  Delaware, 
and  it  is  believed  some  other  of  the  States,  have  provisions 
like  those  above  stated.* 

10.  If  the  widow  is  evicted  from  her  jointure  lands  by  de- 
fect of  title,  she  may  be  remitted  to  her  right  of  dower  -pro 
tanto  or  in  the  whole,  as  the  case  may  be,  out  of  her  husband's 
estate.^ 

11.  If  the  jointure  is  not  settled  upon  the  wife  until 

[*266]  after  *  the  marriage,  it  is  no  further  binding  upon  her 

than  that  she  must  elect,  at  the  husband's  death,  to 

take  it  in  lieu  of  dower,  or  to  take  her  dower ;  she  cannot  have 

both.^     But  it  is  not  a  jointure  unless  so  expressed,  although 

1  Co.  Lit.  36  b  ;  3  Prest.  Abs.  377  ;  Buckinghamshire  v.  Drury,  2  Eden,  64, 
74  ;  McCartee  v.  Teller,  2  Paige,  556  ;  1  Roper,  Hus.  k  Wife,  471  ;  1  Cruise,  Dig. 
196. 

2  Vance  v.  Vance,  21  Me.  364.  So  in  several  States,  by  statute,  an  antenup- 
tial jointure  is  no  bar  to  dower  of  a  widow  who  did  not  assent  to  it,  if  she  dis- 
affirm within  a  limited  time  after  becoming  discovert ;  thus  in  Rhode  Island,  in 
one  year,  Pub.  St.  1882,  c.  229,  §  23  ;  Vermont,  in  eight  months.  Rev.  L.  1880, 
§  2219  ;  Virginia,  in  one  year,  Code,  1873,  c.  106,  §  4  ;  and  Ohio,  Rev.  St.  1880, 
c.  4189. 

8  1  Cruise,  Dig.  199. 

♦  Wms.  Real  Prop.  193,  Am.  note  ;  Bubier  v.  Roberts,  49  Me.  463.  So  Oregon. 
Gen.  L.  1872,  p.  586. 

5  1  Atk.  Conv.  269  ;  3  Prest.  Abs.  377  ;  4  Dane,  Ahr.  685,  686. 
«  McCartee  v.  Teller,  2  Paige,  556  ;  2  Flint.  Real  Prop.  197. 


CII.  VI 11.]  JUINTL'IIK.  329 

it  bo  liy  deed   fmiii  liushaiul  to  wife,  in  considi'ratioii  of  love 
and  alVcrtion.' 

12.  When  a  j<»intnr«'  takes  effect,  whether  Kcttled  heforo  or 
after  marriaire,  the  widow  is  at  lilx-rty  to  enter  at  once  into 
the  occupation  and  enjoynunt  of  it  upon  the  death  of  the  hus- 
band,'- thou<rh  it  is  said  that  she  may  not  claim  the  annual 
craps  ^rowin^  at  the  time  of  his  deatii.^ 

13.  While  she  ludds  her  jointure  lands,  if  she  has  only  a 
life  estate  in  them,  she  holds  them  subject  to  the  same  restric- 
tions as  tenants  for  life,  unless  there  was  a  covenant  in  the 
instrument  settlinir  them  upon  hei-  that  her  jointure  should  be 
of  a  certain  yearly  value.  In  such  case,  if  it  can  oidy  be 
raised  l)y  eonuiiitting  waste,  she  may  commit  it  so  far  as  is 
necessary,^ 

14.  A  wife  does  not  at  law  lose  her  jointui-e,  as  sJie  would 
hei"  dower,  by  t'lopiuLr  ami  livinir  in  adultery.'''  r>ut  if  she  and 
her  husl»and  join  iii  eonveyinir  away  the  lands  settled  upon  her 
before  marriage,  as  a  jointure,  she  thereby  lo.ses  both  dower 
and  jointure  ;  but  if  settled  after  marriage,  she  is  remitted  to 
her  right  to  claim  dower." 

15.  The  statute  of  27  Hen.  VI 11.  has  been  sul)stantially 
adoj)ted  in  most  of  the  United  States,  though  modified  in 
some  particulars.  As  in  Ohio,  where  a  minor  has  the  election 
to  take  dower  or  her  jointure,  though  settled  before  marriage. 
In  Connecticut,  jointure  may  consist  of  ]»crsonal  as  well  as 
real  estate."  But  in  Ma.ssachusctts  it  has  been  held  that, 
under  the  statute  of   IIcii.  Vlll.,  a  wife  cannot  bar  herself  of 

»  Bul.iiT  V.  RolHTts  49  Me,  463.  Post,  •279.  Sec,  for  the  common  law,  Ret'd 
V.  Dickurinan,  12  I'ick.  149  ;  see  also  Ma.ss.  Pub.  Stat.  c.  128,  §  9. 

*  HiLstings  V.  Dickinson,  7  Mass.  140,  153;  2  Crabb,  Real  Prop.  217  ;  2  Flint. 
Real  Proj..  199. 

«  1  Crui.se,  Dig.  201  ;  3  Dane,  Abr.  123.  In  wliiuh  respect  she  has  not  the 
rights  of  a  dowress. 

♦  1  Atk.  Conv.  272.  . 

*  1  Crui.se,  I)i;{.  209.  But  this  is  now  altered  by  statute  in  seveml  .'^tates. 
Thu.H,  in  New  York,  Rev.  Stat  18S2,  vol.  3,  p.  2198,  §  15  ;  Delaware,  Stat.  1S74, 
r-  476,  §  8. 

•  Co.  Lit.  36  b. 

">  4  Kent,  Com.  56,  n.  8th  ed.;  Wms.  Real  Prop.  193  ;  Am.  note  ;  Andrews  r. 
Andrews,  8  Conn.  79.  See  also  Craig  v.  Walthall,  14  Gratt.  518.  .liUe,  •265, 
note. 


330  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  1. 

her  dower  by  any  covenant  not  to  claim  it  in  consid- 
[*267]   eration  of  anything  *  else  than  a  freehold  estate  set- 
tled upon  her,  as  she  cannot  before  marriage  release  a 
right  which  is  not  in  existence.^ 

16.  Though  equitable  jointures  are  not  within  the  statute 
of  Hen.  YIIL,  they  are  held  to  be  equally  operative,  when 
taking  effect,  to  bar  dower  as  those  created  by  law.  Such  a 
jointure  will  bind  an  infant  in  the  same  way  as  a  legal  one, 
if  it  is  settled  upon  her  before  marriage  by  the  consent  and 
approbation  of  her  parents  or  guardian.  And  a  provision  in 
lieu  of  dower  for  an  infant,  if  so  assented  to  before  marriage, 
is  an  equitable  bar  to  dower,  if  it  is  as  certain  a  provision  as 
her  dower  would  be.^ 

17.  If  the  woman  be  of  age  at  her  marriage,  there  must  be 
an  express  agreement  on  her  part  to  accept  the  provision 
made  in  lieu  of  dower  in  order  to  bar  her  right  thereto.  She 
may,  if  she  pleases,  take  a  chance  in  satisfaction  of  dower. 
The  difference  between  this  equitable  and  a  legal  jointure  is, 
that  the  latter  is  not  a  contract  for  a  provision,  but  a  provision 
made  ;  while  the  former  proceeds  on  the  idea  of  a  contract 
on  the  part  of  the  wife  to  accept  a  certain  provision  in  lieu  of 
dower.3  If  the  provision  for  the  infant  be  precarious  or  un- 
certain, she  will  not  be  bound  by  it  as  a  bar  to  dower,  and  has 
her  election  to  take  it  or  dower.^  And  to  bar  a  widow  by  a 
jointure  of  a  chattel  interest,  there  must  be  an  express  assent 
to  receive  it,  though  she  could  not  have  both  that  and  dower.*^ 
The  above  is  put  to  illustrate  the  proposition  that,  if  agreed 
to,  any  provision,  whether  a  chattel  interest  in  land  or  a 
pecuniary  obligation,  will  bar  a  claim  for  dower  in  equity. 
And  even  "  a  chance  "  in  satisfaction  may  be  sufficient,  if  so 

1  Hastings  v.  Dickinson,  7  Mass.  153  ;  Gibson  v.  Gibson,  15  Mass.  106,  110. 
See  Pub.  Stat.  c.  124,  §  7. 

2  McCartee  v.  Teller,  2  Paige,  559  ;  Tud.  Gas.  49  ;  Corbet  v.  Corbet,  1  Sim.  & 
Stu.  612  ;  1  Atk.  Con  v.  267  ;  Drury  v.  Drury,  2  Eden,  60  ;  Carutliers  v.  Caruth- 
ers,  4  Bro.  C.  C.  518  ;  Clancy,  Rights  of  Worn.  221  ;  4  Dane,  Abr.  686. 

8  Camthera  v.  Carutliers,  4  Bro.  C.  C.  507,  n.  512,  513  ;  Dyke  v.  Readall,  2 
De  G.  M.  &  G.  209  ;  Tud.  Cas.  49  ;  2  Sugd.  Vend.  219  ;  Clancy,  Rights  of  Worn. 
221. 

4  Caruthers  v.  Carnthers,  4  Bro.  C.  C.  513 ;  Clancy,  Eights  of  Worn.  221  ; 
Smith  V.  Smith,  5  Ves.  189  ;  Tud,  Cas.  49  ;  2  Sugd.  Vend.  220. 

»  Charles  v.  Andrews,  2  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  388. 


CII.  Vni.]  JOINTURE.  831 

uiulurstood  l)V  hor,  noconliiifj:  to  Boinc  authorities,  though  ear- 
lier oui's  insist  that  tht*  provision  she  agrees  to  ucct'itt, 
thouL'h  it  may  he  inadequate,  nujst  he  an  *  avaihihle  ['iOH] 
one.'  The  ^reat  case  of  Drury  v.  Drury  hehl  an  an- 
nuity of  .£()00,  ahhough  not  cliarged  upon  hmd  and  arrived  to 
hy  an  infant  hefoie  niairia^e,  a  p)od  har  of  dower.'-  Hut 
where  the  antenuptial  eontiaet  only  secured  to  Imt  \sh:it  tlnn 
helonged  to  her,  hut  contained  no  recital  that  it  was  in  lieu  of 
dower,  it  was  held  that  it  was  n<j  har  t<j  her  claim  for  dower.-'* 

IH.  If  the  etpiitahle  jointure  lie  made  after  marriaLre,  the 
wife  may  (dect  as  in  ease  of  lejral  jointuics,  either  to  take  that 
or  her  dower.*  And  the  intention  to  har  dower  hy  such  prr)- 
visiou  must  also  appear,  in  order  t(i  have  that  elh'ct,  (houirh 
the  form  of  e.\j»ressin^  this  is  immateiial,  ]»rovided  sueli  in- 
tention can  he  shown  hy  evidence  reijuired  hy  the  Statute  of 
Frauds,  and  not  hy  parol.''  But  this  intention  may  he  apparent 
from  the  nature  of  the  provision,  and  the  inconsistency  of 
takinir  hoth  that  and  dower,  and  so  may  sufliciently  appear.'' 
But  if  it  only  satisfies  a  part  of  the  widow's  dower,  she  will 
not  he  hound  hy  it,  hut  may  give  it  up  ami  ejuim  her  dowei." 

19.  The  way  in  which  oquitahle  jointures  are  lendered 
effective  to  har  widows'  claims  of  dower,  at  law,  is,  that  where 
they  are  satisfactorily  shown  to  have  heen  made,  the  courts  of 
equity  will  i-estrain  the  claimants  fiom  prosecuting  a  suit  at 
law  to  enforce  their  conunon-law  right. ^ 

2<>.  The  effect  of  being  evicted  of  an  of|uital»lc  jointure  hy 
a  superior  title  seems  to  he  the  same  as  in  the  case  of  a  legal 
cue,  giving  the  widow  a  right  to  claim  her  dower  in  whole  or 

>  Caruthcre  v.  Cftrutliers,  4  Hro.  C.  C.  513,  n. ;  Power  r.  Sheil,  1  Molloy,  IJcj.. 
296 ;  Chit.  Dig.  .lointurv,  M.  §  11 ;  2  Sugd.  Vend.  'Sia  ;  Dyke  v.  K.-ndiill,  2  De  i;. 
M.  k  G.  2<iy  ;  Tud.  (  lus.  i'J  ;  1  Hoper,  Hiis.  &  Wifi-,  4S0  ;  Clancy,  Uighta  uf  Woiii. 
223. 

•  Drury  v.  Drury,  2  Kdcii,  30. 

•  Swaiiie  r.  IVriiu',  5  Jolins.  Ch.  482,  4S9.  5>ee  Woods  r.  Shurloy,  C'ro,  Juc. 
490  ;  4  Dane,  Abr.  685. 

«  1  R.-iN-r,  Hus.  &  Wife,  482  ;  Swnine  r.  P.  rine,  5  Johns,  f'h.  482. 
»  Chin.y.  Right.s  of  Woni.  228  ;  1  U.-jwr,  Hus.  k  Wife,  483  ;  Tenny  r.  Tenny, 
3  Atk.  8  ;  Couih  r.  Stratton,  4  Ves.  391. 

•  SuRd.  Vend.  219  ;  Clancy,  Righta  of  Worn.  229  ;  Tud.  Cos.  50. 
'  1  Roper,  Hus.  &  Wife,  483. 

•  Buckinghainahirc  v.  Drur)-,  2  Eden,  60,  68  ;  Beard  v.  Nutlhall,  1  Vini.  427. 


332  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   1. 

pro  fanto,  as  the  case  may  be,  out  of  her  husband's  other 
estate.!  And  an  alienation,  by  the  husband,  of  the  fund  out 
of  which  the  jointure  was  to  arise,  will  be  deemed  an  eviction 

of  the  same,  and  let  her  in  for  her  dower.^ 
[*269]  *  21.  In  accordance  with  this  doctrine,  where  a  con- 
tract before  marriage  fixed  the  share  the  wife  was  to 
take,  and  excluded  her  from  all  other  parts  of  the  estate,  and 
this  contract  was  given  up  to  the  husband  during  coverture 
and  by  him  destroyed,  it  was  held  that  she  was  remitted  to 
her  right  of  dower.^  So,  where  a  wife  before  marriage  agreed 
to  claim  no  part  of  her  husband's  then  estate,  she  was  held  to 
be  remitted  to  her  right  of  dower  by  his  abandoning  her  and 
violating  his  duties  of  husband  towards  her.* 

22.  When  the  law  as  to  jointure  in  the  United  States  is 
considered,  it  is  understood  to  be,  except  where  it  has  been 
modified  by  statute,  substantially  the  same  as  that  of  Eng- 
land before  the  late  Dower  Act.  It  was  held  in  Massachusetts, 
in  a  case  above  cited,  that,  though  a  widow  would  not  be  barred 
of  her  dower  by  an  antenuptial  covenant  not  to  claim  it,  yet 
if  she  entered  into  such  a  covenant,  for  a  valuable  considera- 
tion, which  had  not  failed,  if  she  recovered  her  dower,  she 
would  be  liable  upon  her  covenants  in  a  sum  in  damages  equal 
to  the  value  of  her  dower.^  After  that  decision,  there  was  a 
statute  providing  for  barring  dower  by  a  jointure  in  lands  or 
money  made  before  marriage,  the  wife,  if  of  age,  expressing 
her  assent  by  becoming  party  to  the  instrument,  or,  if  under 
age,  executing  it  with  her  father  or  guardian.^  And  if  de- 
prived of  such  provision,  she  might  be  endowed  as  at  com- 
mon law.  And  if  it  is  made  before  marriage,  without  such 
assent,  or  made  after  marriage,  she  may  elect,  within  six 
months  after  husband's  death,  to  accept  it  in  bar,  or  claim  her 
dower.'^     In  Connecticut,  any  provision  which  a  wife,  compe- 

1  Wms.  Real  Prop.  193. 

2  2  Sugd.  Vend.  *543,  citing  Drury  v.  Drury,  2  Eden,  60  ;  Power  v.  Sheil,  1 
Molloy,  Rep.  296. 

8  Gangwere's  Estate,  14  Penn.  St.  417.  *  Spiva  v.  Jeter,  9  Rich.  Eq.  434. 

6  Gibson  v.  Gibson,  15  Mass.  106. 

6  Pub.  Stat.  c.  124,  §  8  ;  Vincent  v.  Spooner,  2  Cush.  473. 
^  Pub.  .Stat.  c.  124,  §  9  ;. Thompson  v.  McGaw,   1   Met.  66.     See  also  Pub. 
Stat.  R.  L  c.  229,  §§  23-25  ;  Chapin  v.  HUl,  1  R.  I.  446,  450. 


CII.  VIII.]  JOINTURE.  333 

tent  to  mako  a  contract,  acccpl.s  Ix-furc  niarria;/*',  in  lien  «if 
dower,  will  ho  a  jrooil  ('(juitahlt'  jointure.'  In  Maine,  not  only 
mu.st  the  jointure,  in  order  lo  har  dnwer,  lie  a  freehoUl  pro- 
vision,  l»ut  it  must  lie  made  and  a.ssented  to  before  inarria|ze,* 
Nor  will  a  widow  he  harred  from  recovering  dower  liv 
her  covenants  with  her  luislcind  liefore  •  marria^re.''  [•270] 
And  vet  in  several,  if  not  all  the  States,  the  same  rtde  as 
to  ('([uitalile  jointures  and  their  elTect  is  applied,  as  that  which 
prevailed  in  i'(|uity  in  Kuirlaiid.  In  New  York,  the  distinction 
between  letral  and  e(iuitable  bars  of  dower  is  aljolished,  and  if 
the  wife  is  a  minor,  in  order  to  bar  lier  claim,  the  j»rovision 
must  be  to  take  effect  immediately  on  the  death  of  the  hus- 
band, and  nnist  be  to  continue  for  life,  and  must  be  reasonable 
and  competent,  having  reference  to  the  circumstances  and 
situation  of  the  parties,  ami  in  view  of  the  Imsband's  estate. 
The  provision,  moreover,  must  be  assented  to  by  the  intended 
wife,  if  of  age,  or  if  a  minor,  by  herself  and  father,  or  guardian.* 
In  Alabama  the  common  law  prevails  as  to  a  wife's  being 
barred  or  not  l)y  a  jointure  settled  upon  her.  Yet  a  court  of 
equity  will  enforce  an  antenujttial  contract  if  fairly  entered 
into,  by  tlecret'ing  a  specific  performance  of  such  agreement.'' 
And  where,  l)y  the  antenujitial  agi-et-ment,  she  relinquished 
all  right  of  dower,  but  her  husband  only  settled  ujion  her  her 
own  estate,  it  was  held  not  to  bar  her  of  claiming  dower  at  law. 
A  jointure,  to  be  a  bar,  must  be  something  conceded  to  the 
wife.^  But  a  bona  fide  antenuptial  arrangement,  cntere<l  into 
with  full  knowledge,  and  making  reasonable  provision  for  the 
wife,  may  bar  her  as  an  equitable  jointure."  And  in  Maryland 
an  infant  may  bar  herself  of  dower  by  a  contract  entered  into 
before  marriage.'^  In  Missouri,  a  provision,  whether  made  1m^- 
fore  or  after  marriage,  does  not  operate  as  a  j<jinture,  unless 
expressed  to  be  in  bar  of  dower.^     And  it  may  be  added  that 

•  Andrews  v.  Andrews,  8  Conn.  79.  '  Vance  r.  Vnnco,  21  Me.  864. 

•  Id.  «  .McCartet'  r.  Teller,  2  Paige,  511  ;  Lalor's  Real  Estate,  274,  275. 

•  Gould  r.  Womack,  2  Ala.  83. 

«  Blm  lemon  r.  Blackmon,  1»J  Aln.  633.     Soo  also  ^^'hitehw^d  r.  Mitldlcton,  2 
How.  ^Mi.'«.)  692  ;  contra,  fSelzer  v.  Gelzer,  1  Bailey,  Ch.  (S.  C.)  337. 
7  Stilley  r.  Fi.Irit,  14  Ohio.  610. 

«  L^verinR  v.  Hei^lie,  2  Md.  Ch.  81.     See  1   Bright,  Hus.  k  Wif,-,  4<51. 
»  Perty  V.  PerT)nian,  19  Mo.  469.     Sec  1  Bright,  Hus.  k  Wife,  449. 


334  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

the  mode  of  barring  dower  by  antenuptial  settlements,  so  com- 
mon in  England  before  the  late  Dower  Act,  comes  more  prop- 
erly under  another  head  of  the  law  of  real  estate.* 
[*271]  *  23.  In  many  cases  a  widow  is  barred  of  her  dower 
by  a  testamentary  provision,  made  for  her  by  her  hus- 
band, which,  though  not  properly  a  jointure,  operates  like  one, 
if  she  accepts  of  it,  which  she  may  do  at  her  election,  or  may 
decline  and  claim  her  dower.  And  there  are  numerous  cases 
where  she  may  claim  both  the  provision  and  dower.  Where 
by  the  terms  of  the  husband's  will  she  cannot  take  both,  she 
is  at  liberty  to  elect  which  she  will  take.  And  this  right  of 
election  is  a  personal  one,  and  is  not  transmissible  by  descent.^ 
And  the  intention  of  the  testator  in  this  respect  must  be  gathered 
from  the  will,  and  is  not  to  be  proved  by  parol.'*^  Thus,  for  in- 
stance, if  the  devise  be  in  terms  in  lieu  of  dower,  she  may  take 
either,  but  not  both.^  But  though  a  pecuniary  provision,  if 
made  in  lieu  of  dower,  and  the  same  is  accepted,  it  will  bar 
her  claim  for  dower.*  And  when,  under  the  exercise  of  the 
right  of  election,  she  accepts  a  provision  by  will  in  the  place 
of  dower,  she  takes  it  as  a  purchaser,  and  holds  it  in  prefer- 
ence to  other  legatees.^  So  where  the  devise  is  wholly  incon- 
sistent with  the  claim  of  dower,  or  where  it  would  prevent  the 

*  Note.  —  Other  cases  might  be  cited  from  the  reports  of  these  and  other 
States  upon  this  subject,  as  well  as  the  various  statutes  which  have  been  adopted 
by  different  States.  But  it  is  believed  they  do  not  materially  vary  from  the 
principles  above  stated,  and  the  comparative  importance  of  the  subject  hardly 
seems  to  justify  occupying  the  space  which  would  be  necessary  to  refer  to  them  in 
detail.  The  reader  is  referred  to  1  Greenl.  Cruise,  200,  note,  and  4  Kent,  Com. 
56,  note. 

1  "Welch  V.  Anderson,  28  Mo.  293  ;  Bubier  v.  Roberts,  49  Me.  460.  Nor  to  be 
exercised  by  her  guardian  if  she  is  insane.  Pinkerton  v.  Sargent,  102  Mass.  568  ; 
Crenshaw  v.  Carpenter,  69  Ala.  562 ;  Crozier's  Appeal,  90  Penn.  St.  384. 

2  Hall  V.  Hall,  8  Rich.  (S.  C.)  407  ;  Stark  v.  Hunton,  Saxton  (N.  J.),  216  ; 
Whilden  v.  Whilden,  Riley,  Ch.  (S.  C.)  205  ;  Herbert  v.  Wren,  7  Cranch,  370, 
378  ;  Higginbotham  v.  Cornwell,  8  Gratt.  83. 

8  Van  Orden  v.  Van  Orden,  10  Johns.  30  ;  2  Crabb,  Real  Prop.  177  ;  Chapin 
V.  Hill,  1  R.  L  446  ;  Raines  v.  Corbin,  24  Ga.  185  ;  Pemberton  v.  Pemberton,  29 
Mo.  408  ;  4  Dane,  Abr.  685  ;  7  Id.  426. 

*  Trueman  v.  Waters,  4  Dane,  Abr.  676. 

6  Hubbard  v.  Hubbard,  6  Met.  50  ;  Pollard  v.  Pollard,  1  Allen,  490  ;  Towle 
V.  Swasey,  106  Mass.  105. 


ni.  VIII. J  JOINTURE.  335 

wliolc  will  from  takinij^  cfTrct  if  (luwor  in  clainif"!.'  Oiii-  or 
two  cases  may  he  r«'forrc(l  t«»  as  illustrative  of  the  f«)rc;;(»inp 
propositions.  In  one  of  these  the  provision  by  will  for  the 
wi<low  was  the  use  of  uU  the  husliand's  estate  (lurinjr  her  life, 
with  a  remainder  over.  It  was  held  that  she  might  claim  one 
third  as  dower,  and  the  other  two  thirds  iiy  devise,  antl  that 
there  was  nofhini;  inconsistent  in  these  claims,  nor  would  her 
taking  the  whole  bar  her  claim  to  land  conveyed  by  the  hus- 
band in  his  lifetime.^  To  prevent  a  widow  claiming  both  the 
provision  in  a  will  and  her  dower,  she  must,  l)y  enforcing 
her  claim  of  d(jwer,  defeat  or  interrupt  or  disappoint  some 
provision  of  the  will.^ 

24.  Where  a  widow  accepts  a  to.stamontary  provision  given 
her  in  lieu  (jf  dower,  it  cuts  off  her  claim  to  lands  aliened  by 
the  liushaud  in  his  litetiiue,  as  well  as  to  those  acquirefl  after 
the  making  of  the  husband's  will,  and  constitutes  a  legal  as 
well  as  an  ecjuitable  bar.*  In  analogy  to  the  efTect  produced 
by  the  election  of  a  testamentary  jirovision  in  lieu  of  dower, 
it  has  been  held  that,  if  the  husband,  during  coverture,  con- 
veys a  portion  of  his  land  in  which  the  wife  does  not  join,  and 
then  dies,  leaving  no  childriii,  in  which  case  the  law  gave  her 
an  election  to  take  one  half  of  his  property  or  dower  out  of 
his  estate,  if  she  elects  to  take  the  half,  she  would  thereby  bar 
her  claim  of  dower  out  of  the  premises  conveyed  by  her  hu.s- 
band  in  his  lifetime.^  But  in  Penn.sylvania,  under  the  statute 
of  that  State,  she  would   not  l)y  such  acceptance  be 

*  barred  of  her  dower  in  lands  aliened  by  the  husband   [*372] 
before  making  the  will.* 

25.  Unless  the  intention  to  bar  the  widow's  dower  is  clear 

>  Incledon  r.  Northcoto,  3  Atk.  430,  437;  Keiim-tly  v.  Nedrow,  1  Dall.  415.  418; 
Hprbert  r.  Wren,  7  Crnncli,  370  ;  Allen  v.  Pniy,  12  Me.  138  ;  Duncan  v.  Duncan, 
2  Veates,  302  ;  Creacraft  v.  Wions,  A.ldis.  35U  ;  Whit«  v.  White,  10  N.  J.  'JO'i  ; 
Green  r.  Orei-n,  7  Porter  (Ala),  19  ;  AJsit  r.  Adsit,  2  Johns.  Ch.  448  ;  SanforJ 
r.  Jnck-son,  10  Paige,  266. 

«  Lewis  V.  Smith.  9  X.  Y.  502.     See  Bull  v.  Church,  5  Hill,  206. 

•  Cornell  V.  Ham,  2  Iowa,  552  ;  Pratt  p.  Douglnjuj,  38  N.  J.  Ecj.  516. 

*  Chapin  r.  Hill,  1  R.  I.  440  ;  Allen  r.  Pray,  12  Me,  138  ;  Kennedy  r.  MilU, 
13  Wend.  553  ;  Evans  r.  Pierson,  9  Rich.  9. 

»  Homscy  v.  Caj«-y,  21  Mo.  545  ;  Same  v.  Some,  23  Mo.  371. 
«  Borland  r.  Nichols  12  Penn.  St.  38.     The  same  rule  ia  adopted  iu  Virgiai*. 
Higginbothani  v.  Coruwell,  8  GratU  83. 


336  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  L 

in  case  of  testamentary  provision  for  lier,  she  will  be  held 
entitled  to  both,  where  there  is  no  statute  provision  to  the 
contrary.^  In  Massachusetts,  under  the  statute,  a  provision 
by  will  in  favor  of  a  wife  will  be  presumed  to  be  in  lieu  of 
her  dower,  unless  the  contrary  appear  to  be  the  intention  of 
the  will.  So  in  Pennsylvania,  Indiana,  Illinois,  Maryland, 
Kentucky,  Alabama,  North  Carolina,  New  Hampshire,  New 
Jersey,  New  York,  Missouri,  Kansas,  Maine,  and  Arkansas.^* 
In  certain  States,  as  in  Mississippi,  if  there  is  no  provision  for 
her  in  the  will,  she  takes  as  if  intestate.^ 

26.  So  in  many  of  the  States  she  must  signify  her  election 
of  dower  within  some  certain  period  prescribed  by  statute,  or 
she  will  be  deemed  to  have  elected  to  accept  the  provision  in 
bar  of  it,  unless  the  will  clearly  gives  her  both.^  In  the  fol- 
lowing States  this  election  must  be  made  within  six  months 
after  the  testator's  death,  or  it  is  construed  an  acceptance  of 

*  Note.  —  In  Kansas,  if  a  husband  die  without  any  descendants  living  capable 
of  inheriting,  the  widow  has  her  election  to  take  dower  or  to  take  all  the  real 
estate  of  her  husband,  subject  to  debts.  If  she  does  not  elect  within  six  months, 
she  is  endowed.     Compiled  Laws,  1862,  c.  83,  §§  4,  6,  7. 

1  Herbert  v.  Wren,  7  Ci'anch,  370 ;  Higginbotham  v.  Cornwell,  8  Gratt.  83  ; 
Kennedy  v.  Nedrow,  1  Dall.  418  ;  Sniitli  v.  Kniskern,  4  Johns.  Ch.  9  ;  Adsit  v. 
Adsit,  2  Johns.  Ch.  448  ;  Walker's  Int.  325  ;  Milliard  i;.  Binford,  10  Ala.  977,  987; 
Evans  v.  Webb,  1  Yeates,  424  ;  Pickett  v.  Peay,  3  Brev.  545  ;  Church  v.  Bull, 
2  Denio,  430  ;  Ostrander  v.  Sjuckard,  8  Blackf.  227  ;  Tooke  v.  Hardeman,  7  Ga. 
20  ;  Norris  v.  Clark,  2  Stockt.  51  ;  Van  Arsdale  v.  Van  Arsdale,  26  N.  J.  404  ; 
Mills  V.  Mills,  28  Barb.  454  ;  Clark  v.  Griffith,  4  Iowa,  405  ;  Yancy  v.  Smith, 
2  Met.  (Ky.)  408  ;  Dodge  v.  Dodge,  31  Barb.  413  ;  Durfee,  Pet.,  14  R.  L  47. 

2  Reed  v.  Dickerman,  12  Pick.  146  ;  Herbert  v.  Wren,  7  Cranch,  378  ;  Stat. 
Penn.  1833,  §  11  ;  Smith  v.  Baldwin,  2  Ind.  404  ;  111.  Rev.  Stat.  1883,  c.  41, 
§  10  ;  Md.  Rev.  Code,  1878,  art.  50,  §  227  ;  Collins  v.  Carman,  5  Md.  603  ; 
McCans  v.  Board,  1  Dana,  340;  Hilliard  v.  Binford,  10  Ala.  977  ;  Rev.  Stat.  N.  C. 
1837,  p.  612  ;  N.  H.  Gen.  L.  1878,  c.  202,  §  18  ;  N.  J.  Rev.  Laws,  677  ;  Thomp- 
son V.  Egbert,  17  N.  J.  459  ;  Penn.  Stat.  Pardon's  Dig.  1861,  p.  362;  Mo.  Rev. 
Stat.  1879,  §  2199  ;  Kansas,  Comp.  Laws,  1862,  c.  83,  §  10  ;  Bubier  v.  Roberts, 
49  Me.  460  ;  Ark.  Stats.   1858,  c.   60,   §  24. 

8  Miss.  Rev.  Code,  1880,  §  1173. 

<  N.  Y.  3  Rev.  Stat.  5th  ed.  1859,  p.  32,  §§  11-14  ;  Kennedy  v.  Mills,  13 
Wend.  556  ;  Walker's  Introduct.  325  ;  Minn.  Comp.  Stats.  1859,  c.  36,  §  18  ; 
Oregon,  Stats.  1855,  p.  407.  In  Ohio,  she,  by  neglecting  to  elect  the  provision 
within  six  months,  is  held  to  elect  dower.  In  Alabama,  the  time  is  one  year 
from  probate  of  the  will.  Code,  1867,  §  1928.  In  Nebraska,  one  year  from  hus- 
band's death.  Rev.  Stat.  1866,  p.  58.  So  in  Virginia.  Acts  1866.  In  Kansas, 
one  year  from  citation  by  the  probate  court.    Laws,  1865. 


Cll.  VIII.]  JOINTUUK.  837 

the  provision  and  bar  of  dower.  Massaclinsctts,'  Maine,* 
Missonri,^  New  Jersey,''  North  CaruUna/'  Maryhmd,'' 
Tennessee,"  *  Mississijjpi.**  Where  the  widow  dies  [•273] 
witliin  the  period  ^iven  by  tlie  statnte,  in  which  to 
make  eh'etion,  without  having  made  it,  the  hiw  will  presnnic 
the  eh'ction  to  be  that  which  is  most  favorable  for  her." 
Tliongh  in  Maryhmd  and  North  Carolina  it  has  been  held,  if 
she  so  die,  lu-r  re|)resentatives  will  be  bound  by  the  provisions 
of  the  hiisl);ind's  will,  as  the  rijrht  of  election  is  a  personal 
one  which  no  one  l)iit  heiself  can  e.xcrcise.'*^ 

27.  Besitles  this  i^cneral  power  of  eh-ction  Ijctween  a  devise 
and  dower,  the  wid<jw  often  may  elect  in  what  capacity  she 
shall  take  what  is  devised  to  her.  where  it  is  left  eipiivocal 
whether  as  dowress  or  devisee.  And  this  beconu's  an  imjior- 
tant  distinction  where  the  husband  leaves  creditors.^'  Thus 
in  one  case  a  husband  mortfraj^cd  his  estate,  his  wife  nut  join- 
ing in  the  deed.  By  his  will  he  devi.sed  her  the  whole  of  his 
estate  with  remainder  over.     After  his  death  the  mortgagee 

>  Pull.  Suit.  c.  12J,  §  Jt  ;  Pnitt  v.  Fclton,  4  Cusli.  174. 

2   Iliistings  V.  Cliirunl,  32  Mi\  132. 

'  KiiiHt  V.  Hullaiiil,  10  Mo.  2Jo.  lUit  now  l>y  sUitutc  in  twelve  months.  Cicii. 
Stat.  l.StJti,  f.  130,  §§  15,  10. 

<  Tli.ini|ison  V.  KjjI.crt,  17  N.  .1.  4.'i9. 

»  Peltijolm  r.  B.-iusley.  1  Dcv.  &  1$.  2r.4  ;  Rov.  Stat  N.  C.  1837,  p.  612. 

•  ('..llin.s  r.  Ciiniian,  5  .M.l.  5(t3,  :>30. 

"  Maloae  c.  Majoi-s,  8  lliiuiiih.  577. 

'  Er  jxirte  Moore,  7  How.  (Miss.)  fi05.  In  Alabama  the  election  must  he 
made,  if  at  all,  in  a  rea.sonubIe  time  ;  Hilliard  v.  Hinford,  10  Ala.  tti>0.  In  Ver- 
mont the  time  is  eight  months.  Smith  v.  Smith,  20  Vt.  270.  In  New  York  the 
election  mu.st  l)e  in  one  year.  Rev.  Suit.  5th  ed.  pt.  2,  eh.  1,  tit.  3,  §  14;  Willard 
Real  1-^t.  Ol*.  In  Pennsylvania  the  election  must  bo  made  within  twelve  months 
from  the  death  of  the  testJitor.  Punlou's  I)i<,'.  ISfil,  jt.  3C2.  In  Kansas,  within 
twelve  months  from  jiroof  of  the  will.  Stat.  Comp.  1862,  c.  183,  §  11.  In 
Arkansa.H,  eighteen  months.  In  Vermont,  eight  months.  Rev.  StJit.  1863,  c.  55, 
§5  4-6  ;  but  the  probate  court  may  now  extend  the  time.  Acts,  1864.  In  New 
York,  Wisconsin,  Kentucky,  Illinois,  Minnesota,  and  On-gon,  the  election  must 
bo  made  within  one  year.  N.  Y.  Rev.  Stat.  5th  etl.  1859,  p.  32,  §g  11-14;  Wis. 
Rev.  Stat.  1858.  <•.  8l»,  §§  14-19  ;  Ky.  Rev.  Stat.  1860,  c.  47,  art.  4,  §  7  :  III. 
Comp.  SUt.  1858,  vol.  1,  p.  152;  Minn.  Sut.  Comp.  1858,  c.  36,  §§  14-19  ; 
Ori'gon,  Stat.  1855,  j*.  407. 

»  .Merrill  v.  Kmery,  10  Pick.  507. 

w  IVv.ne  V.  IVjone,  3  Har.  k  McII.  05  ;  Collins  r.  Carman.  5  Md.  503  ;  Lewig 
r.  Ix'wis,  7  Ir\-d.  72.     So  by  statute  in  IVnn.sylvania  ;  Acts,  1865. 

"  Mitchell  r.  Mit.hell,  8  Ala.  414. 
Vol.  i.~'l'Z 


338  LAW  OP  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

foreclosed  his  mortgage,  making  the  widow  party  to  the  suit. 
But  it  was  held  that  she  still  might  claim  dower  in  one  third 
of  the  premises,  and  two  thirds  as  devisee,  since  the  judgment 
only  bound  those  who  claimed  under  the  mortgagor  as  mort- 
gagor, and  her  right  as  dowress  had  attached  before  the 
mortgage,  and  was  paramount  to  that.^ 

28.  An  election  in  these  cases  may  be  evidenced  by  acts  in 
pais,  such  as  entering  upon  the  land  devised,  as  well  as  by 
matter  of  record,  where  it  is  done  with  a  full  knowledge  of 
the  facts  in  respect  to  the  provision.^  But  ordinarily,  wher- 
ever a  widow  fairly  and  understandingly  has  elected  to  take 
the  provision  of  a  will  instead  of  dower,  she  cannot  afterwards 

revoke  it  and  claim  dower.^ 
[*274]  *29.  And  yet  it  has  been  held  that  if  she  has  been 

substantially  deprived  of  such  provision,  she  is  remit- 
ted to  her  right  of  dower.*  And  if  it  turns  out  that  nothing 
passes  by  the  devise,  she  may  claim  her  dower,  though  she 
may  once  have  elected  to  take  the  provision  of  the  will.°  If 
no  provision  is  made  for  her  by  the  will,  she  need  not  dissent 
from  the  will  in  order  to  claim  her  dower.^ 

i  Lewis  V.  Smitli,  9  N.  Y.  502,  512. 

2  Delay  v.  Viual,  1  Met.  57  ;  Ambler  v.  Norton,  4  Hen.  &  M.  23  ;  Tooke  v. 
Hardeman,  7  Ga.  20. 

2  Davison  v.  Davison,  15  N.  J.  235.  Nor  claim  a  share  of  lapsed  legacies. 
Re  Benson's  Accounting,  96  N.  Y.  63.     See  Mathews  v.  Mathews,  141  Mass.  511. 

*  Hastings  v.  Clifford,  32  Me.  132  ;  Thompson  v.  Egbert,  17  N.  J.  459.  See 
also  Thomas  v.  Wood,  1  Md.  Ch.  296, 

5  Chew  V.  Farmers'  Bank,  9  Gill,  361  ;  Osmun  v.  Porter,  39  N.  J,  Eq.  141. 

6  Green  v.  Green,  7  Porter  (Ala.),  19  ;  Martin  v.  Martin,  22  Ala.  86.  For 
further  references  upon  the  subject  of  election,  by  a  widow  in  case  of  a  will,  &c., 
the  reader  is  referred  to  1  White  &  Tud.  Cas.  Am.  ed.  284-289  and  n.  If  an 
infant  receive  a  negotiable  note  in  lieu  of  dower,  she  cannot  claim  both  to  sue  on 
it,  and  also  to  have  dower.     Drew  v.  Drew,  40  N.  J.  Eq.  458. 


en.  IX.  §  1.]  ESTATt-S   nV   MAUUIACE.  839 


("iLvrriiK  IX. 

ESTATi:.S   UV    MAHKIACH 

Sect.  1.     Estjito.s  during  Coverture. 
Sect.  2.     Iloiue.stead  Estates. 

SECTION    1. 
ESTATES   DUUINO    COVERTURE. 

1,  2.     Nnturi'  of  t'sUiU-s  of  husbaml  iiiul  wife. 

3.  Husbaiul  ntul  wifi-  have  a  joint  st-isiu  of  her  land. 

4.  E<iuity  tn-ats  tin-  wife  an  s<ih',  as  to  liinds. 

5,  6.  When  .she  is  reistruiiiej  from  disi*osiiig  of  her  estate. 

7.  Rule  ill  United  States  as  to  such  restrictions. 

8,  9.  When  hu.slHiud  and  wife  have  entiri'ties. 

10,  11.  When  lands  a<'ijnired  an-  owned  by  tln-in  severally. 

12.  Suits  by  huslwind  in  res|M'ct  to  the  wife's  land.s. 

13,  14.  When  huslund  and  wife  can  convey  to  each  other. 

15.  Ktfcct  of  husliand's  death  on  her  e.stato. 

1(5.  When  wife  may  l«?  grantee  of  lands. 

17.  When  she  may  disavow  conveyance  to  her. 

18,  19.  How  husUuiil  and  wife  may  convey  lands. 

20.  Husband  may  not  recover  for  im|>rovements. 

21.  Kights,  when  wife  dies  without  having  had  issue. 

22.  Husband,  when  and  how  liable  for  waste. 

Note.     Uniied  States  statutes  as  to  marital  rights  in  lands. 

1,  It  will  1)*^  recollected  that  the  interest  of  a  tenant  hv 
curtesy,  or  of  a  dowress,  relates  only  to  the  i>eriod  subsequent 
to  the  drti'iinination  oi  the  covert nn*. 

There  are  ri>j:lits  whieh  husbands  and  wives  respeetivelv 
have,  as  such,  in  lands,  anil  which  leniain  to  be  considered  aH 
not  comiuir  under  the  hcail  (^f  curtesy  (»r  dower.*  These  ritdits 
were  comparatively  sinijile  and  easily  defined  a.s  tliey 'vi-'- d 

•  XoTK.  —  It  is  not  intcndotl,  in  thi>  ■  iiU'T-r,  to  treat  of  that  joint  own.  r«l,iii 
eflands  by  husltand  and  wife,  known  as  estates  by  entirety.    Fof  tlicsc,  soc  u  13. 


340  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  1. 

at  common  law.    But  under  the  system  of  equity,  and 
[*270]   especially  *  under  the  modifications  of  modern  legisla- 
tion, these  rights  have  become  not  a  little  complex  and 
variant  in  the  different  States. 

2.  By  the  common  law,  for  instance,  the  rights  of  the  wife 
to  her  property  became  for  the  time  being  merged  by  the 
coverture.  And  if  this  property  consists  of  lands,  the  husband 
alone  is  entitled  to  the  rents  and  profits  thereof  ,i  subject  how- 
ever to  be  divested  by  a  divorce  a  vinculo.^  And  if  rents  are 
due  when  the  husband  dies,  they  go  to  his  personal  representa- 
tives, and  not  to  the  wife  as  survivor.^  Whereas,  in  many  of 
the  United  States,  as  will  be  seen,  the  wife  may  hold,  manage, 
and  convey  her  lands  like  a  feme  sole.  The  interest  which  a 
husband  has,  at  common  law,  in  his  wife's  lands,  is  regarded 
as  a  freehold,  since  it  is  for  an  uncertain  period  which  may 
continue  during  the  term  of  his  life.*  But  under  the  present 
statutes  of  Massachusetts  relating  to  married  women,  the  hus- 
band has  no  freehold  in  his  wife's  land.  And  the  right  of 
possession  remains  in  her  notwithstanding  his  deed  of  the 
same  to  another.  His  deed  would  only  operate  as  an  estoppel 
to  his  claiming  curtesy  against  his  grantee.^  But  if  the 
interest  of  the  wife  be  a  reversionary  one,  subject  to  a  prior 
freehold,  the  husband  has  no  control  over  it,  and  a  conveyance 
of  it  by  him  would  be  void.  He  must  have  a  present  right  of 
seisin  or  possession  to  exercise  control  over  it.^  He  might, 
therefore,  make  himself  a  tenant  to  the  prcecipe,  or  convey  a 
freehold  in  such  lands  to  another."  Thus,  where  an  indenture 
intended  to  be  signed  by  husband  and  wife,  releasing  lands 
belonging  to  her,  was  signed  by  the  husband  only,  it  was  held 
to  operate  as  a  release  during  their  joint  lives.^ 

1  1  Bl.  Com.  442  ;  Wms.  Real  Prop.  182. 

2  Burt  V.  Hurlburt,  16  Vt.  292  ;  Oldham  v.  Henderson,  5  Dana,  254. 

3  Shaw  V.  Partridge,  17  Vt.  626. 

4  1  Roper,  Hus.  &  Wife,  3  ;  Melvin  v.  Proprietors,  16  Pick.  161  ;  Babb  v. 
Perley,  1  Me.  7  ;  Co.  Lit.  351  a. 

5  Walsh  V.  Young,  110  Mass.  396.  «  Shores  v.  Carley,  8  Allen,  425. 

"  Co.  Lit.  326  a,  n.  280  ;  McClain  v.  Gregg,  2  A.  K.  Marsh.  454  ;  Trask  v. 
Patterson,  29  Me.  499  ;  Jlitchell  v.  Sevier,  9  Humph.  146  ;  Clancy,  Rights  of 
Vom.  161. 

8  Robertson  v.  Norris,  11  Q.  B.  916. 


en.  IX.   §   1.]  KSTSTI-;    I'V    MAUKIACK.  .^41 

3.  Still  the  Imshand,  in  such  cuso,  docs  not  liy  his  niarriii^'c 
aciiuiro  a  sole  seisin.  The  seisin  is  re  <^  a  riled  as  a  joint  one, 
and  in  both.  I>oth  tojrother  have  the  wludo  estate,  and  there- 
fore, in  law,  thev  are  both  considered  aH  seised  in  fee,  and 
mnst  so  state  their  title  in  plcadinir.'  *  And  until  the  birth  of 
a  chilli,  the  interest  of  the  husbaml  in  the  wife's  estate  Ih  ho 
far  inclu)at4\  that,  if  the  wife  forfeited  her  inheritance  before 
that  event  by  any  act  like  that  of  treason,  it  defeated  the  in- 
terest of  the  husl)and.- 

4.  Ecjuity  often  adopts  an  culirely  different  rule  from  that 
of  the  common  law  in  respect  to  a  wife's  .sej)arate  interest  in 
her  own  lands  duriuLT  coverture,  whi're  the  intention  of  the 
person  limit inir  them  to  the  wife  was,  in  so  d()inL^  to  secure 
them  to  her  sejtarate  use.  Nor  is  this  only  in  ease  of  their 
beinj;  exjiressly  ^jiven  to  trustees  for  her  benelit.  If  by  the 
terms  of  the  limitation,  the  intention  to  exclude  tlie 
marital  riirhts  of  *the  husband  does  not  ap|)ear,  Cipiily  [*-~~] 
will  follow  the  law,  and  sufl'er  him  to  enjoy  the  rents 

and  profits,  even  where  the  lamls  are  held  by  trustees.  Wheie- 
as,  if  the  limitation  is  clearly  t)  the  sole  an<l  separate  nse 
of  the  wife,  equity  will,  if  no  trustee  is  appointed,  IkjKI  the 
liasl>and  himself  as  the  wife's  trustee,  and  eomi)el  him  to 
execute  the  trust  by  givintr  her  the  rents  and  jirofits,  to  bo 
subject  to  her  sole  control.  And  this  is  said  to  be  the  rule  in 
equity  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic"'      No  particular  form 

•  Note.  —  In  aililition  to  what  ha-s  alrcaily  \>ocn  saiil  ((i/i/(',  p.  •141)  ii]kih  the 
subject,  thi'  nntlioritics,  with  the  exception  of  tlie  case  there  cite<l  from  the  New 
Hampshire  HeiH^rts,  seem  to  tie  uniform  that  the  seisin  of  husbiind  and  wife  of 
the  wife's  land  is  a  joint  one,  ami  not  the  seiMirate  seisin  of  either.  Co.  Lit.  67  a  ; 
1  Bright,  Hns.  &  Wife,  112;  Polyhhink  r.  Hawkins.  Doug.  329  ;  Took  v.  Olas- 
coek,  1  Sauiul.  K.  2j3,  n.  4  ;  Toole  r.  Loiifjueville,  2  Saund.  2S3,  n.  1  ;  Moore 
p.  Vinten,  12  Sim.  Ch.  101,  161  ;  Hall  v.  .^ayiv,  10  H.  .M..11.  4G  ;  Coe  r.  Wolcott- 
ville  il-^.  Co.,  35  Conn.  17;'>. 


»  Jlelvin  r.  Troprietors,  1«5  Pick.  165  ;  Com.  Dig.  Baron  and  F.me,  K.  1 ; 
Cnllin  V.  Milner,  2  Lutw.  1421  ;  Clancy,  Hights  of  Worn.  IGl  ;  anU,  p.  •141. 

*  1  Bright,  Hus.  A:  Wife,  113  ;  Co.  Lit.  351  a. 

«  ChuK-y.  llight-s  of  Wom.  256,  257;  Hill,  Tm.st.  406  ;  Id.  420.  and  Rawle's 
n.  1  ;  1  White  &  Tu.l.  Lea.l.  Cas.  373  ;  Cochran  v.  O'Heni,  4  Wattjj  i:  S.  95  ; 
Trenton  Bk.  v.  Woalniff,  1  Green,  Ch.  117;  Knight  r.  Bell,  22  Ala.  19S  ;  Ixmg 
».  White.  5  J.  J.  Marsh.  226  ;  Fears  r.  Brook-s  12  Ga.  195  :  Blanchanl  r.  Blooil,  3 
Barb.  352  ;  Stnart  v.  K5».sani,  2  Barb.  493  ;  PorU-r  v.  Rutland  Bk.,  19  Vt.  410. 


342  LAW   OF  REAL   PROPERTY.  [bOOK   I. 

of  expression  is  necessary  to  determine  whether  the  wife  alone 
or  husband  shall  have  the  benefit  of  the  trust  estate.  But  the 
intention  must  be  clear,  in  order  to  secure  such  separate 
use  to  the  wife,  and  to  exclude  the  marital  rights  of  the  hus- 
band.i 

5.  The  words  "  sole  "  and  "  separate,"  applied  to  the  nature 
of  the  intended  use  by  the  wife,  are  the  most  appropriate  to 
express  a  limitation  in  her  favor,  exclusive  of  any  interest  or 
control  on  the  part  of  the  husband.^ 

6.  One  of  the  great  objects  in  modern  marriage  settlements 
is  to  secure  to  the  wife  a  share  of  the  property  free  from  the 
debts  and  control  of  her  husband.  And  this  is  often  so  done, 
that  in  order  to  protect  her  against  the  solicitations  or  influ- 
ence of  her  husband,  she  will  not  be  allowed  by  chancery  to 
assign  or  anticipate  her  income.^  But  while  no  particular 
form  of  words  is  required,  if  the  intention  is  clear  to  impose 
a  restriction  upon  the  wife  as  to  anticipation  or  assignment 
of  her  income,  she  may,  unless  thus  specially  restricted,  dis- 
pose of  it  by  sale,  contract,  or  mortgage,  as  if  she  were  a.  feme 

sole,  according  to  the  English  rules  in  equity.^ 
[*278]       *7.  The  courts  of  the  several  States  have  not  been 

uniform  in  applying  the  principle  of  restriction  to 
wives  in  respect  to  estates  held  in  trust  for  them.  In  some, 
the  English  rules  of  chancery  are  adopted ;  in  others,  the 
wife  is  not  permitted  to  go  beyond  the  power  expressly  given 
by  the  deed  of  settlement.^ 

1  Welch  V.  Welch,  14  Ala.  76  ;  Fears  v.  Brooks,  12  Ga.  195  ;  Hill,  Trusts.  406  ; 
1  White  &  Tud.  Lead.  Cas.  338  ;  Tritt  v.  Colvvell,  31  Penn.  St.  228. 

2  Goodriim  v.  Goodrum,  8  Ired.  Eq.  313  ;  1  White  &  Tud.  Lead.  Cas.  338. 
8  Wins.  Real  Prop.  183  ;  Coote,  Mortg.  104. 

*  Hill,  Trust.  421 ;  White  v.  Hiilme,  1  Bro.  C.  C.  16. 

s  Instead  of  illustrating  these  doctrines  by  the  citation  of  the  numerous  cases 
which  have  arisen  in  the  several  States,  the  reader  is  referred  for  these  cases  to 
Hill  on  Trust.  421,  note  by  Wharton  ;  Wms.  Real  Prop.  184,  note  by  Rawle,  or 
1  White  &  Tud.  Lead.  Cas.  370-378,  Hare  &  Wallace's  notes.  By  a  reference  to 
these  authorities,  it  will  appear  that  the  English  rule  is  substantially  adopted  in 
New  Jersey,  Connecticut,  Kentucky,  North  Carolina,  Alabama,  Georgia,  and 
Missouri.  In  Pennsylvania,  South  Carolina,  Mississippi,  Tennessee,  Virginia, 
Rhode  Island,  the  wife  is  governed  by  the  terms  expressly  prescribed  in  the 
deed,  &c.  In  New  York  the  matter  is  regulated  by  statute.  Lalor,  Real  Est. 
173,  174. 


til.  IX.  §   1.]  K^TATES   BY    M.VHUI.vr.E.  843 

8.  Ill  coii>tiiinin  r  <>i  the  theoretic  unity  niul  entirety  of  the 
owiiership  of  hnslcind  anil  wife  in  res|Hct  to  their  interest  in 
lands,  tliey  cannot  take  l>y  purcljase  in  moieties;  and  \vh«'re 
land  was  conveyetl  to  them  to  hold  in  common  and  not  in 
joint  tenancy,  they  were  held  to  take  an  entirety  of  estate 
without  re^anl  to  the  intent.' 

0.  They  are  not  j)ro|ierly  joint  tenants  of  such  lamls,  sin<"e, 
though  there  is  a  right  of  snr\  ivor.sliij»,  neither  can  convey  so 
as  to  defeat  this  right  in  the  othei-.  Kach  takes  an  entirety 
of  the  estate.^  In  Iowa,  a  conveyance  or  devise  to  hushand 
and  wife  makes  them  tenants*  in  common,  unless  the  instru- 
ment exj)ressly  creates  a  j(jint  estate.^  IJut  in  Missi.ssij»|ii, 
where,  hy  law,  joint  tenancies  are  converted  into  tenancies  in 
common,  conveyances  to  hushands  and  wives  creates  teiiaiiciea 
by  entirety,  which  are  still  retained.'* 

10.  As  a  con8e<iuence  of  the  principle  tliat  hus])and  and 
wife  are  one  in  law,  if  lands  are  given  to  A  A:  B,  husband 
and  wife,  and  (\  the  husband  and  wife  take  a  moiety,  and 
the  other  grantee  a  moiety.''     IJiit    if    lands  descend 

to  A,  H,  A-  (',  they  •each  take  a  third   part,  though  A    [*:270] 
«V"  n  hap|»en  to  be  husband  and  wife.'^ 

11.  So  if  lands  descend  or  ari'  devised  to  .V  A  11,  who 
afterwards  intermarry,  they  still  remain  joint  tenants  or  ten- 
ants in  common  of  the  lands,  just  as  before  marriage." 

12.  As  the  husband  is  entitled  to  the  entire  rents  of  the 
wife's  lands,  except  as  hereinbefore  stated,  it  follows  that  he 

»  Stuckoy  r.  Kwfe's  Ex'rs,  26  rcnn.  St.  397. 

'  Gibson  V.  Ziiiiincrmnn,  12  Mo.  3Sr> ;  Boinar  r.  MuUins,  4  Rii-h.  Eq.  80; 
Brownson  i.  Hull,  16  Vt.  309;  Ttnia  v.  Za.hary.  1  IJusIhc.  Vai  286;  D.-n  r. 
Whitciiiore,  2  L)»'v.  k  H.  537  ;  Dun  v.  HnnUiilxr^li,  :,  Halst.  42  ;  FainhiM 
r.  CliasU'lleux,  1  IVnn.  St.  170;  Hanling  v.  Siirinjjir,  14  Me.  407;  Jncksion  r. 
Slevon.s,  16  Johns.  110;  XetMlham  v.  Branson,  5  In-d.  426;  Rosn  r.  Garrison, 
1  Dana,  35;  Taul  v.  Caini>lxll.  7  Yerf?.  319  ;  Tu.l.  Cos.  730.  In  Conni-cii.ut, 
however,  tlii-y  arc  joint  truant.H,  and  thu  liusband  may  convey  his  inton>««t. 
Whittlesoy  r.  Fuller,  11  Conn.  337.  And  it  is  staid  that  they  may  by  expn'ss 
wonU  be  made  tenants  in  common  by  a  gift  to  them  during  coverture.  I'rest. 
Abs.  41. 

•  HofTman  r.  Stigrrn,  29  Iowa,  302. 

•  Heming^vay  r.  Scales,  42  Misa.  1. 

»  Lit.  §  2K1  ;     Wms.  Heal  rnij..  184  ;  Tud.  Cns.  730. 

•  Knui.j)  V.  Windaor,  6  Cush.  156.  *  Tud.  Cas.  731  ;  Co.  Lit.  187  K 


344  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

alone  can  sue  for  an  injury  to  the  estate  which  affects  these.^ 
But  if  the  injury  affect  the  inheritance,  the  action  must  be  in 
their  joint  names,  and  it  will  survive  to  her  if  she  outlive  him.^ 
So  if  a  tenant  occupies  the  wife's  lands  by  the  consent  of  hus- 
band and  wife,  and  she  dies,  the  husband  can  maintain  an 
action  in  his  own  name  for  use  and  occupation.^ 

13.  By  the  common  law  neither  husband  nor  wife  could 
convey  lands  to  each  other,'*  nor  release  to  each  other.^  But 
the  husband  may  do  this  by  means  of  the  Statutes  of  Uses,  by 
conveying  to  another  to  the  wife's  use,^  or  by  a  covenant  with 
a  third  person  to  stand  seized  to  her  use.''  And  in  Maine, 
husband  and  wife  may  convey  directly  to  each  other,  and  the 
same  is  true  as  to  a  husband  conveying  by  deed  to  his  wife,  in 
Minnesota,^  and  in  lowa.^ 

14.  And  courts  of  equity  will  sometimes  sustain  a  deed 
from  husband  to  wife  against  the  grantor's  heir  at  law.^^  And 
a  devise  by  husband  to  wife  may  always  be  good,  as  the  cov- 
erture ceases  before  the  devise  can  take  effect.^^ 

15.  Upon  the  death  of  the  husband,  the  wife's  inheritance 
remains  to  her  unaffected  by  any  alienation  made  or  incum- 
brance created  thereon  by  the  husband.     No  further  act  is 

required  on  her  part  to  put  an  end  to  such  alienation 
[*280]  or  conveyance  *  than  a  simple  entry,  instead  of  her 

being  driven  to  an  action,  as  was  the  case  at  the 
common  law.^^ 

1  Fairchild  v.  Chastelleux,  1  Penn.  St,  176;  Wms.  Real  Prop.  184,  n.;  Babb 
V.  Perley,  1  Me.  6  ;  Mattocks  v.  Stearns,  9  Vt.  326. 

2  2  Kent,  Com.  131 ;  Babb  v.  Perley,  1  Me.  6 ;  Dippers  at  Tunbridge  Wells, 
2  "Wils.  414,  423. 

3  Jones  V.  Patterson,  11  Barb.  572. 

*  Martin  v.  Martin,  1  Me.  394  ;.  Voorhees  v.  Presb.  Ch.,  17  Barb.  103. 

&  Frissel  v.  Rozier,  19  Mo.  448. 

6  Wms.  Real  Prop.  185 ;  1  Roper,  Hus.  &  Wife,  53. 

^  Thatcher  v.  Omans,  3  Pick.  521. 

8  Bubier  v.  Roberts,  49  Me.  460  ;  Johnson  v.  Stillings,  35  Me.  427  ;  Allen  v. 
Hooper,  50  Me.  371  ;  Wilder  v.  Brooks,  10  Minn.  50. 

9  Hoffman  v.  Stigers,  28  Iowa,  302,  310. 

10  Jones  V.  Obenchain,  10  Gratt.  259  ;  Hunt  v.  Johnson,  44  N.  Y.  27,  37,  41. 

"  1  Roper,  Hus.  &  Wife,  53  ;  Lit.  §  168. 

^•■^  Stat.  32  Hen.  VJIL  c.  28  ;  1  Roper,  Hus.  &  Wife,  56  ;  Cleary  v.  McDowall, 
1  Cheves  (S.  C),  139  ;  Wms.  Real  Prop.  185  ;  Bruce  v.  Wood,  1  Met.  542  ;  1 
Bright,  Hus.  &  Wife,  162  ;  Melius  v.  Snowman,  21  Me.  201. 


(11.  IX.  §   1.]  ESTATES    BY    M.VRHIACE.  345 

IG  It  is  no  ohji'ctioii  to  a  woman's  lu-inf^  a  grant«r  of  lands 
from  a  stranjrcr,  that  sho  is  afttiie  fort-rt,  unless  her  liuslianU 
objects  l>y  some  express  dissent,  tlir  law  always  j)resuming  his 
assent  unless  (lie  eontrary  he  shown.  l>nt  it  is  said  that  she 
cannot  take  as  a  purchaser  if  he  expressly  ohjeets  to  Ikt  ac- 
cepting the  estate,  and  that  such  disairrccnimt  on  his  part 
divests  the  whole  estate.'  A  husltand  may  dissent  from  a 
purchase  l»y,  or  devise  to,  his  wife,  since  ntherwise  he  might 
be  nuule  a  tenant  to  his  own  disadvantage.  15ut  he  cannot 
by  his  dissent  dcfciit  her  tith'  as  hcir.- 

17.  It  is  laid  down  liy  Coke.''  that  a  wife  may  waive  a  pur- 
chase of  land  made  by  her  during  coverture,  and,  after  the 
deeea.se  of  her  husl)and,  av(jid  the  conveyance,  though  he  had 
a.sscnted  to  it  ;  and  that  her  heirs  may  do  the  same  after  her 
death,  if,  after  her  husl)and's  death,  she  .shall  not  have  agreed 
to  the  purchase.  IJut  where,  as  in  this  country,  a  wife,  by 
joining  with  her  husl)anil  in  a  deed,  may  part  with  her  lands 
and  pass  a  good  title,  the  joint  act  of  the  two  being  in  all  re- 
spects as  available  as  if  done  l»y  her  while  sole,  it  would  seem 
that  their  joint  assent  in  accepting  a  title  shoidtl  be  as  valid  as 
in  granting  one.  Ami  in  New  Hampshire  it  has  liccn  held 
that  a  deed  to  a  four  cnr>  r(,  made  witli  her  own  and  lnr  hus- 
band's assent,  vested  the  title  legally  in  her.  And  in  \'ermont 
it  has  been  held  that  a  deed  of  gift  to  a  wife  during  coverture, 
if  accepted  by  her  husband,  is  accepted  by  her,  and  that  her 
refusal  apart  from  him  is  of  no  consequence.'* 

18.  Unless  restrained  by  the  terms  of  the  settlement,  a  mar- 
ried woman  may,  since  the  statute  of  3  &  4  Wm.  IV.  c.  74, 
by  joining  in  a  deed  with  her  husband,  convey  any  in- 
terest she  *  has  in  real  estate.  Such  a  deed  would  of  [*281] 
course  convey  the  interest  of  both.  Previous  to  that 
statute  this  was  u.sually  done,  in  England,  by  levying  a  fine, 
which,  as  well  as  recoveries,  is  abolished  by  that  statute.'' 

10.  In  the  United  States,  the  custoir»  of  a  wife's  joining 
with  her  husband  in  a  deed  of  conveyance  of  her  lands  has 

>  Co.  Lit.  3a;  Com.  Dig.  "Baron  k  Feme,"  P.  2;  Perkins,  §§  4.3.  44. 

'  1  Dnno,  Abr.  368  ;  4  hi.  597.  »  Co.  Lit.  3  a. 

♦  Gonlon  r.  Hrtjrwoo.1,  2  N.  H.  402;  Brackett  t>.  Wait,  6  Vt  411,  424. 

•  Wms.  Real  Prop.  188. 


346  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

prevailed  from  a  very  early  period  in  their  history.  In  most, 
if  not  all  of  them,  there  are  now  existing  statutes  upon  the 
subject,  regulating  the  mode  in  which  such  deeds  shall  be  ex- 
ecuted in  order  to  be  valid.^  And  sometimes  equity  will  sus- 
tain a  deed  from  husband  to  wife,  though  void  at  law.^  And 
in  Maine,  a  wife  may  do  this,  though  not  of  the  age  of  twenty- 
one  years.3  The  discussion  of  the  form  of  such  deeds,  how- 
ever, properly  belongs  to  another  part  of  this  work. 

20.  If  the  husband  expend  money  upon  lands  of  liis  wife  in 
his  occupation,  by  erecting  Imildings  or  making  improvements 
thereon,  the  law  will  presume  he  intended  it  for  her  benefit, 
and  he  cannot  recover  for  the  same.* 

21.  The  rights  of  the  husband  as  tenant  by  curtesy,  where 
the  wife  dies  after  having  had  issue,  and  leaving  lands  of  in- 
heritance, have  been  considered  in  a  former  chapter.  But  if 
the  wife  die  without  having  had  issue,  nothing  remains  to  the 
husband,  as  against  the  claims  of  her  heirs  at  law,  except  the 
right  of  emblements.^ 

22.  It  will  be  perceived  that  a  husband  holding  his  wife's 
estate  of  inheritance  by  marital  right  is  tenant  for  life  with  a 
reversion  in  the  wife.  As  such,  he  would  be  liable  for  waste 
like  other  tenants  for  life,  if  it  were  not  that  a  wife  could  not 
maintain  such  an  action  against  her  husband.  If,  however, 
he  conveys  his  freehold  to  a  stranger,  who  commits  waste,  the 
action  lies ;  so  if  the  husband's  estate  is  levied  upon  by  his 
creditors  and  they  commit  waste ,  and  the  husband  and  wife 

may  join  in  an  action  for  such  an  injury.  And  chan- 
[*282]   eery  will  interpose  by  way  *  of  injunction  against  the 

husband  while  he  is  tenant,  to  prevent  his  committing 
■waste. ^  * 

*  Note.  —  From  the  statutes  of  the  several  States  in  relation  to  the  rights 
of  married  women  to   control  their  own  lands  during  coverture,  the  following 

1  Davey  v.  Turner,  1  Dall.  11;  Jackson  v.  Gilchrist,  15  Johns.  89, 109  ;  Fowler 
V.  Shearer,  7  Mass.  14  ;  Manchester  v.  Hough,  5  Mason,  67  ;  Durant  v.  Ritchie, 
4  Mason,  45  ;  Page  v.  Page,  6  Gush.  196. 

2  Shepard  v.  Shepard,  7  Johns.  Gh.  57  ;  Bunch  v.  Bunch,  26  Ind.  400. 
8  Adams  v.  Palmer,  51  Me.  478,  488. 

*  1  Roper,  Hus.  &  Wife,  54  ;  Washburn  v.  Sproat,  16  Mass.  449. 
6  Barber  v.  Root,  10  Mass.  260  ;  2  Kent,  Com.  131. 

*  Babb  V.  Parley,  1  Me.  6  ;  2  Kent,  Com.  131. 


CII.  IX.  ^    1.]  ESTATES    bY    MAUUIAGE.  347 

ulwtnul  of  the  varioUM  pruvifiiuiDi  u[>on  the  Kuhjfct  haa  bt-fii  dniMu.  -  .ti.i- 
bavM,  nil  timt  thu  wife  huldit  iit  thu  time  uf  luT  innrriogi',  or  ur(|iiiri-)t  afli-r- 
whmIh,  roiiKiiu!*  her  s<']iuruti-  i>Htiit<>,  not  Muhject  to  Ikt  huHl*uiii'«  iluhtii.  Such 
riitato  iiiny  b«  coiivfyctl  l»y  tlio  joint  dtfd  of  htisiljund  and  wife  atti-Htcd  hy  two 
witne.<wo)t,  and  hIic  niuy  lU-viHu  tite  8anif  by  Iut  hiJti  will  and  tcHUinu-nL  Co<U% 
1867,  §§  2371,  '2373.  and  2378.  —  ArknuMia,  a  tnarriol  woman  may  Ijo  m-iwd  of 
wiy  f.ttiite  in  hiT  own  right  and  name  and  a«  of  Iut  own  jirojK'rty,  exiept  HUfh 
M  may  U-  oonvt'y«Ml  to  Iut  hy  Ikt  hu.tltand  8ub)M'<|uciit  to  the  marria^je.  Hut 
■uch  |irop<Tty  '\»  not  i-xom|)t  from  thu  iHiynu-nt  of  thu  huHlMind'M  tU-htti,  until 
•hu  ha.s  tiled  a  Hchudulo  of  it  in  the  retonler's  ollice  ;  unle.ss  the  deed,  grunt, 
or  other  transfer  of  the  projuTty  expre.'wly  stetn  forth  that  tho  Mime  iji  deiiignvd 
to  1*0  exempt  from  liabilitias  of  the  husband.  She  cannot  make  a  will  unlcu 
emiKjwered  sw  to  do  by  a  marriage  settlement,  or  WTitten  authority  from  tho 
husband  Ix-forc  marriage.  Dig.  of  Suit.  1858,  c.  Ill,  §§  1,  7,  and  8  ;  c.  180,  §  3. 
And  now,  by  Acts  of  1873,  p.  382,  married  women  are  substantially  clothed  with 
full  projKTty  in  and  control  over  real  and  jn-rsonal  esUite  belonjjiiig  to  them  or 
RCiiuired  by  them  seiHinite  from  their  IuisImuuIs,  provided  they  cause  their 
•e|ianito  real  estate  to  be  recorded  in  their  names  in  the  counties  in  which  they 
reside.  —  t'nlijornui,  her  pro[KTty  at  the  time  of  the  marriage,  and  all  she  acijuires 
afterwards  by  gift,  devise,  or  descent,  remains  her  seiwrate  projierty.  Tho 
husliand  has  a  corresjM)nding  right  to  his  iirojK-rty  ;  but  what  they  acquire  dur- 
ing covertun^,  except  in  the  manner  already  stated,  becomes  the  common  projieity 
of  both.  A  married  woman  may  disi>ose  of  her  seiMirato  estate  by  deed  or  will, 
aa  if  single;  but  ujwn  the  death  of  husl>and  or  wife,  the  entire  conmiunity  property 
goes  to  tho  survivor,  if  he  or  she  shall  not  have  abandoned  the  othiT  and  lived 
aejNinite.  In  such  a  ca.se  tho  half  of  the  community  proj»erty  may  b«'  dispo.«ed 
of  by  the  party  dying,  or  will  go  to  his  or  her  de.scendant.s  or  heirs.  Ctxle,  1872, 
§S  1(52,  1273,  Hol.  —  Colorado,  the  estate  of  a  married  woman  remains  her 
t>ei>anite  proj^Tty,  and  is  not  subject  to  the  disjtosal  of  the  husband,  but 
may  bo  kirgained,  sold,  nnd  conveyed  by  her  as  if  sole.  I^w.s,  1874,  p.  185.  — 
In  Dakota,  curti'sy  and  dower  are  alwilished,  and  neither  husliand  nor  wife 
have  any  interest  in  the  pni|icrty  of  each  other,  except  that  the  huslmnd  must 
Bupjwrt  himself  and  wife  from  his  labor  and  projuTty,  and,  if  unable  to  do  so, 
she  must  assist  him  as  far  as  she  can.  They  may  contract  with  eiurh  other, 
and  every  woman  of  the  age  of  sixteen  years  may  devise  her  estate,  whether 
§ole  or  married.  But  in  joint  deeds  of  husljand  and  wife,  her  covenants  do  not 
bind  her.  Civ.  t'mle,  1866.  Hut  if  husband  deserts  his  wife,  or  is  unable  or 
neglects  to  proviile  for  his  family,  the  court  may  emjHiwer  her  to  ai-t  as  a  feme 
Kit  in  acquiring,  hoMiiig,  and  disj>osing  of  pr<>i>erty.  I^iws,  1870-71,  c.  32,  §  1. — 
ConiifcticiU,  the  real  estate  of  a  marrie<l  woman  Iwlonging  to  her  W-fon'  marriage, 
or  afterwanls  acquired  by  devise  or  inheritance,  or  by  conveyance  in  consitler- 
Blion  of  proiKTty  acquired  by  her  jK-rsonal  s»Tvices  during  coverture  cannot 
be  taken  for  her  husUnd's  debts,  but  shall  Ijc  hidd  by  her  to  her  sole  and 
seivimte  use  if  investol  in  her  name  or  in  that  of  a  tniste*-  for  her.  And  if  her 
huslnnd  be  insane,  tho  court  may  authorize  her  to  convey  her  real  estate  as  if 
sole.  Kev.  Stat.  1875,  pp.  56,  186,  187.  The  wife  may  dispose  of  her  estate  by 
joining  in  a  deed  with  her  husband.  Huslmnd  and  wife  take  a  joint  estate  con- 
voyetl  to  them,  aa  joint  tenants,  and  he  may  convey  his  interest  in  the  same  bv 
a  s*'pamte  de«-<l.  She  may  dis]iose  of  her  estate  by  her  last  will  in  the  same 
manner  as  a  feme  sole.     If  abandoned  by  her  husband,  her  pruiterty  vests  in  her 


348  LAW  OP  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

as  her  sole  estate.  But  the  interest  of  the  husband  in  the  estate  of  his  wife 
cannot  be  taken  for  his  debts  during  her  life.  Gen.  Stat.  1866,  p.  302,  §§  11,  12; 
Whittlesey  v.  Fuller,  11  Conn.  347  ;  Comp.  Stat.  p.  484,  §  1  ;  Stat.  1856,  c.  86. 
By  Act  1859,  c.  75,  the  probate  court  may  order  the  sale  of  the  real  estate  of  a 
minor  married  woman  whose  husband  is  of  age,  upon  their  joint  apiilication, 
and  their  joint  deed  is  made  as  effectual  as  if  she  had  arrived  at  full  age.  Rev. 
St.  1875,  p.  56,  187.  —  Ddmvare,  a  wife's  estate  is  held  as  her  sole  and  separate 
property,  and  not  subject  to  the  control  of  her  husband ;  she  may  also  dispose 
of  the  same  by  will,  but  not  so  as  to  affect  her  husband's  right  by  curtesy. 
Laws,  1875,  c.  165,  §  1.  — Florida,  a  wife's  estate,  on  her  marriage,  continues 
independent  of  the  husband,  and  is  not  liable  for  his  debts.  She  may  devise 
it,  but  cannot  convey  it  by  deed  unless  her  husband  joins  in  the  deed. 
Florida,  Dig.  2d  Divis..  T.  5,  c.  1,  §  2  ;  Thompson,  Dig.  1847,  c.  1,  §  1.— 
Illinois,  by  Act  1861,  p.  143,  real  property  belonging  to  a  married  woman 
as  her  sole  and  separate  property,  or  which  any  woman  hereafter  married 
owns  at  the  time  of  her  marriage,  or  which  any  married  woman  during 
coverture  acquires  in  good  faith  from  any  person,  other  than  her  husband, 
by  descent,  devise,  or  otherwise,  together  with  all  the  rents,  issues,  income,  and 
profits  thereof,  is  declared  to  remain  her  sole  and  separate  property,  under 
her  sole  control,  as  though  she  were  sole  ;  and  not  subject  to  the  disposal, 
control  or  interference  of  her  husband,  or  liable  for  his  debts.  She  may  dispose 
of  her  separate  estate  by  her  last  will,  in  the  same  manner  as  a  feme  sole.     Rev. 

Stat.  1855,  c.  110,  §  1.  And  she  may  manage,  sell,  and  convey  her 
[*283]  *  property  as  fully  as  her  husband  can  his  own  estate.     Rev.  St.  1874,  c. 

68,  §  9.  — Indiana,  by  Act  of  1859,  c.  141,  a  married  woman  is  enabled  to 
devise  her  real  estate.  And  by  Stat.  1860,  p.  374,  the  lands  of  a  married 
woman  are  not  subject  to  the  debts  of  the  husband,  but  remain  her  separate  prop- 
erty as  if  she  were  unmarried,  except  that  she  cannot  convey  them  but  by  deed  in 
which  her  husband  must  join,  Stat.  1 860,  p.  374  ;  but  her  covenants  do  not  bind 
her.  Rev.  Stat.  1876,  p.  363.  — Iowa,  she  has  the  same  power  to  convey  her  lands 
as  sifeme  sole.  Code,  1851,  §  1207,  and  Revision,  1860,  p.  390  ;  Code,  1873,  §  2202. 
— Kansas,  the  real  estate  owned  by  a  woman  at  the  time  of  her  marriage,  with  the 
rents  and  profits  thereof,  and  that  which  comes  to  her  by  descent,  or  devise,  or 
gift,  except  from  her  husband,  continues  her  sole  and  separate  property,  and  is  not 
subject  to  the  disposal  of  her  husband,  or  lialde  for  his  debts.  She  may  bargain, 
sell,  and  convey  the  same,  or  enter  into  any  contract  in  reference  to  it  as  if  she 
were  sole.  But  she  cannot  dispose  of  more  than  one  half  of  her  property,  both 
personal  and  real,  by  will,  without  the  consent  of  her  husband  in  writing.  Comp. 
Laws,  1862,  c.  141,  §§  1-4.  — Kentucky,  she  may  hold  real  estate  to  her  separate 
use  to  the  exclusion  of  her  present  or  future  husband,  if  conveyed  or  devised  to  be 
so  held  ;  but  she  cannot  alien  it  with  or  without  her  hu.sband's  assent.  If  it  is  a 
gift,  she  may  alien  by  the  consent  of  the  donor  or  his  personal  representatives. 
Such  estates  cannot  be  sold  or  incumbered  but  by  order  of  a  court  of  equity,  and 
only  for  the  purpose  of  exchange  and  reinvestment.  A  married  woman  may  dis- 
po.se  by  will  of  any  estate  secured  to  her  separate  use  by  deed  or  devise.  But  she 
may  convey  an  estate  which  she  owns  or  has  any  interest  in,  as  her  general  prop- 
erty, as  distinguislied  from  that  in  which  she  has  a  separate  estate,  whether  legal  or 
equitable,  in  possession  or  remainder,  by  a  deed  in  which  she  aTul  her  hus])and  shall 
join,  or  by  a  separate  deed,  if  he  shall  have  already  conveyed  his  interest.  Rev. 
Stat.  1860,  c.  47,  art.  4,  §  17,  and  c.  24,  §§  20,  21,  and  c.  106,  §  4.    And  see  Stuart 


ClI.  IX.  §  1  J  K<T\TK<   llY   maiikia(;k.  349 

r.  Wililir,  17  B.  Moii.  r<j.  "n  j.imt  jH^-tili"ii  i«f  IhisI'iiikI  nii<l  wif.-,  tin- rourt  iiiny 
einjwwcr  Iut  to  usf,  ••iijoy,  nml  coiivi-y  hiT  own  iiri>inrty  frit-  fnitu  luT  liiiklxiiiirit 
(lul)tb  i)T  cliiiiiiM.  Sii|>.  Ufv.  Stut.  IStSti,  \>.  728.  —  Mutiu,  thi'  wifi.-  inny  uwii  n-ul 
vtftuti'  in  iu-r  uwn  rif<lii,  wliiili  xlif  may  hvII,  iluviw,  ur  cuitvey  lut  n  frmc miU,  wilh- 
uut  jiiinilt-r  ur  a.HM-ut  uf  tlio  IiiihInukI.  Slu-  niuy  nlcitM-  to  licr  huKbund  the  ri^lit  to 
control  h«T  own  pro|H;rty,  nnd  to  (Ijh|k)w  of  tbo  ini-oin<'  ihca-of  for  llu-ir  niutuiil 
Uuictit,  ami  may  revoke  tiiu  wimi'  in  writing;.  Itiit  the  laml  of  n  nnirric*!  woman 
may  Itu  taken  uimiu  execution  to  Huti.tty  delttM  contracted  by  her  before  marriu^i-. 
Uev.  Sua.  c.  (Jl,  §§  1,  2.  And  see  .\cIji  lb«l,  c.  4«  ;  Acts  18(52,  c.  148  ;  AcU  1.S63, 
c.  2H;  Moore  v.  Kichardson,  37  Me.  438.  —  ifunjlund,  real  i>roi»erty  belonging  to  a 
woman  at  the  time  of  her  marriiijje,  or  ac<|iiircd  altiTwanlH  •>y  (fift,  ^int,  di-vise,  or 
dcM-ent,  i.s  not  liable  for  her  hu.sbund'M  debt^i  ;  but  she  hoUU  it  for  her  H<-|*arate  m«e, 
with  i»ower  of  devising  the  .same  iw  fully  iw  if  she  werw  Hole  ;  or  nhe  may  convey  it 
by  tt  joint  dinl  with  her  IiusIhuuI.  Cotle,  l^(50,  ji.  32a,  §§  1 ,  2.  If  marrieil  women 
are  le.s.seo8  of  land,  they  are  sulject  to  distreH.s  for  rent  which  ha-s  l>ei'n  ovenlue  for 
ninety  days,  as  if  they  were  sole,  and  as  such  ore  stibject  to  actions  u|M)n  their 
covenants  as  les.sees.  And  if  they  make  deeds  of  their  lands,  they  may  bind  them- 
Helves  by  covenant.s  which  will  run  with  the  lantl  conveyeil.  Laws,  lb<»7  ;  Ijiw.s, 
1S74,  c.  57,  §  1.  — Massachu-setUi,  she  may  liold  to  her  sole  ond  M-panite  use, 
all  land  whi<h  conies  to  her  by  descent,  devise,  gift,  or  gnint,  and  that  which 
she  nc({uires  by  tnule  or  business,  and  all  she  owns  at  her  marriage,  with  tho 
rents  and  jtrotits  of  the  some,  which  ore  not  to  lie  subject  to  the  control  of  her 
husband,  ami  which  she  may  tiargain,  .sell,  ami  convey,  and  enter  into  con- 
tracts in  reference  to,  in  the  same  manner  its  if  .she  were  sole,  with  tliis  limita- 
tion, that  she  cannot  convey  her  n-al  estate,  unless  her  hiisUind  joins  with  her 
in  the  deeil,  or  she  has  a  license'  for  such  sale  from  a  judge  of  the  courts.  She 
may  make  a  will  of  her  estate,  like  a  fiine  sole,  excejit  that  she  cannot  then-by 
ilcprive  her  hu.sband  of  his  curtesy.  But  this  statute  dix-s  not  alfict  any  mar- 
riagi'  settlement,  or  emjMtwer  a  huslmnd  to  convey  land  to  his  wife.  Pub.  Stat, 
c.  147-''  If  the  wife  of  a  mortgagor  acquire  his  rights,  the  mortgage*-  may  briiig 
u  writ  of  entry  to  foreclose  the  same  against  her  and  not  against  him.  Campltell 
f.  Ik-mis,  1ft  tJray,  485,  487  ;  Conant  v.  Warren,  6  Gray,  502.  A  marrieil  woman 
may  convey  shares  in  cor|>orations,  and  lease  and  convey  real  estate  as  if  sole, 
but  cannot  by  her  separate  conveyance,  cut  olT  lier  liusltand's  contingent  interest 
therein;  St4it.  1874,  c.  184,  §  1,  but  her  warranty  will  estop  her;  Knight  r. 
Thayer,  125  Mo-is,  25.  —  Michi'jan.  the  wife  may  devise  her  real  estate,  if  her 
liuslmnd  annex  his  as.sent  to  the  will  in  writing.  Her  ]iro|ierty  at  the  time  of  her 
marriage  and  any  that  she  aci|uires  during  covertun-,  remains  her  separate 
estate,  though  she  cannot  convey  it  away,  except  by  assent  of  her  huslvind,  or 
tJie  outhority  of  the  judge  of  pmbato.  Hev.  SUt.  c.  rtS,  §  1  ;  c.  S.*;,  §  25.  But 
by  Comp.  L  1871,  p.  1477,  the  prop«'rty  of  a  marrietl  woman  is  not  liable  for  tho 
iltbts  of  the  husliiind,  ond  may  l>e  contiolle<I,  mortgaged,  conveyed,  and  devise«I 
by  her  in  the  same  manner  as  if  she  were  unmarried.  If  a  judgment  be  renden**! 
against  a  liuslmnd  anil  wife  for  tho  wife's  tort,  the  execution  may  ho  levieil  on 
her  estate,. but  not  on  his.  Ijiws,  1807. — Misaixtiiipi,  all  the  projwrty  she  hoji 
on  her  marriage,  and  all  that  cornes  to  her  after  n)arriog»>,  by  tlevist-  or  de»«-ent, 
remains  her  M'lmrate  estate  ;  nor  is  it  liable  for  the  debts  of  the  huslvind,  or  ony 
incumbrances  created  by  him.  She  can  only  convey  by  joining  with  her  hus- 
band, who  is  enfitlisl  to  curtesy  in  her  n-al  estate.  Hev.  C<Hle,  1H57,  c  40,  j  5  ; 
Feb.  2b,  ld4(i,  §  6;  Ikyutou  p.  Finnall,  4  Sm.  &  M.  193.  But  sho  may  duiKwa 
»  See  also  SUts.  1834.  c.  801:  ]!«85.  c  255. 


350  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   L 

of  her  real  and  personal  estate  by  will  as  if  sole.  Eev.  Code,  1871,  §  1785.  — 
Missouri,  the  wife  may  convey  her  land  by  deed  executed  by  herself  and  husband, 
and  acknowledged  by  herself.     She  cannot  make  a  will  unless  authori2ed  by  a 

marriage  settlement,  or  her  husband's  written  agreement  before  marriage, 
[*284]  Her  property,  however,  is  not  liable  for  the  *  husband's  debts.     Kev.  Stat. 

1844,  c.  185,  §  3;  1845,  c.  32,  §  35;  1849,  §§  1-3.  She  may  now  de\'ise  her 
lands  by  will,  provided  the  husband's  curtesy  be  not  affected  thereby.  Gen.  Stat. 
1866,  c.  115,  §  13. —  3finnesota,  husband  and  wife  may  by  their  joint  deed  convey 
the  real  estate  of  the  wife  in  like  manner  as  she  might  do  by  her  separate  deed  if  she 
were  unmarried;  but  she  is  not  bound  by  any  covenants  therein.  She  may  devise 
any  real  estate  held  by  her,  or  to  wliich  she  is  entitled  in  her  own  right,  by  her 
last  will  and  testament,  with  the  consent  of  her  husband  in  writing  annexed  to 
such  will.  Stats.  Comp.  1858,  c.  35,  §  2,  and  c.  40,  §  1.  She  may  hold,  use, 
and  enjoy  her  property  and  the  rents  and  profits  thereof  free  from  the  control  of 
her  husband,  as  fully  as  if  she  were  sole.  Stat.  1873,  c.  37,  tit.  III.  §  47.  — 
Nev!  Hampshire,  if  of  age,  she  may  join  with  her  husband  in  conveying  her  land; 
and,  if  under  age,  their  deed  will  release  her  dower.  She  may  devise  her  lands  to 
any  one  except  her  husband,  though  not  so  as  to  bar  any  right  of  the  husband 
acquired  by  marriage  contract.  Stat.  1833,  c.  158,  §§  10,  11;  1854,  c.  15,  §  22; 
Gen.  Stat.  1867,  c.  164,  §§  1,  11.  And  estates  may  be  released  or  conveyed  to  a 
feme  covert,  to  be  held  to  her  sole  and  separate  use,  without  the  intervention  of 
trustees,  free  from  the  interference  of  the  husband,  in  respect  to  which  she  has 
the  same  rights  and  remedies,  and  will  be  liable  to  the  same  actions  asafcoic  sole. 
1846,  c.  327,  §§  3,  4  ;  Bailey  v.  Pearson,  29  N.  H.  77.  By  Laws  1860,  c.  2342, 
Gen.  Stat.  1867,  c.  164,  §§  1,  11,  a  married  woman  may  hold  to  her  own  use,  free 
from  the  interference  of  her  husband,  all  property  inherited  by,  bequeathed, 
given,  or  conveyed  to  her,  except  the  conveyance  or  gift  is  occasioned  by  jjaynient 
or  pledge  of  the  husband's  property.  She  may  make  a  valid  will  in  the  same 
manner  as  if  she  were  sole,  and  her  husband  may  be  a  devisee.  But  no  such  will 
shall  operate  to  alienate  or  affect  injuriously  the  life  estate  of  the  husband,  as 
tenant  by  the  curtesy. — New  Jersey,  the  property  she  has  at  her  marriage,  and 
what  she  acquires  by  gift,  grant,  or  devise,  continues  to  be  her  sole  and  separate 
estate,  as  if  she  were  still  sole,  together  with  the  rents  and  profits;  the  .same  being 
neither  liable  for  the  husband's  debts,  nor  subject  to  his  disposal.  She  cannot 
convey  her  lands  without  his  consent,  but  she  may  bind  herself  by  the  covenants 
in  her  deed  of  her  lands  in  the  same  way  as  if  sole.  Stat.  1852  ;  Id.  1857,  c 
189,  §  1;  Den  v.  Lawshee,  24  X.  J.  613.  And  now  a  married  woman,  if  of  the  age 
of  twenty-one  years,  may  devise  her  property,  but  not  to  affect  the  husband's 
interest  therein.  Laws,  1864.  —  In  Nevada,  all  property  owned  by  either  hus- 
band or  wife  before  marriage,  or  acquired  after  by  gift,  bequest,  devise,  or  descent, 
shall  be  hers  or  his  separate  property  respectively,  and  all  property  acquired  by 
other  ways  shall  be  common  to  both.  She  may  have  a  trustee  of  her  separate 
property  appointed  by  the  district  court.  They  may,  by  joint  deed,  convey  htr 
real  estate  in  like  manner  as  she  might  do  if  sole,  except  that  she  cannot  bind 
herself  by  covenant  further  than  is  necessary  to  effectually  convey  the  land. 
Laws,  1861,  1865. — N'ew  York,  the  estate  of  a.  feme  covert  at  the  time  of  her 
marriage,  as  well  as  the  rents  thereof,  continues  hers  as  if  .sole,  not  subject  to  the 
husband's  control  or  liable  for  his  debts.  She  may,  during  coverture,  take  an 
estate  by  descent,  gift,  grant,  or  devise,  from  any  person  but  her  husband,  and 
hold  the  same  to  her  separate  use.     She  may  convey  or  devise  her  estate,  or  the 


en.  IX.  §  1.]  ESTATES    BV   MARRI.VGE.  851 

n-nts  or  profits  thereof,  as  if  she  were  sole.  3  Uev.  StaL  5th  ed.  lSr»'.',  \i\>.  2:59, 
240,  §§  75,  77.  By  Uws  1860,  c.  90,  and  Laws  1802,  c.  172,  it  is  declariMl  that 
the  rt-ul  iirojKJrty  wliicli  a  iiiurried  woiuau  now  owns  as  her  sole  and  wjiarate  iirop- 
erty,  tliiit  which  coiiie.s  to  lier  l>y  dc-.scent,  devise,  gift,  or  grunt,  and  that  wlii<  li 
she  uwiiM  at  the  time  of  licr  marriage,  witli  the  renta  ami  iiroceidf  of  it,  hhall 
remain  ht-r  sole  anil  si-jxirate  jinijK'rty,  not  subjcit  to  the  interferenee  or  control 
of  tier  hushaud,  or  liable  for  his  debts.  She  may  Ixirgain,  sell,  and  eonvcy  smdi 
estate,  anil  cnti-r  into  any  eontruet  in  reference  to  the  sam.*,  with  like  I'llurt  a-s  if 
ahe  wure  unmarried;  and  she  may  in  like  manner  maki-  eov.naiits  for  title  whicli 
8hr.ll  Ixj  binding  »ijK)n  her  sc'panite  projM-rty.  Cashman  v.  Ili-nrj*,  75  N.  Y.  103. 
But  no  contract  of  here  in  resjK'ot  to  such  property  shall  be  binding  u|>on  tlie 
husband  in  any  way.  —  Xorth  Caroltiui,  the  huslxaiul  cannot  lea.so  or  convey  wife's 
lands,  except  by  her  consent,  evidenced  by  a  jirivate  examination  befoi-e  the  ma- 
gistrate taking  an  acknowledgment  of  the  sjinie.  Stut.  1849.  Married  women 
may  devis**  their  lands  \'\kc- femes  sole,  but  not  so  as  to  deprive  hu.sbjinds  of  thuir 
rights  of  curtesy  therein.  Ocn.  Stat.  1873,  c.  Cy,  §  31.  — Ofii>i,  the  sepanite 
property  of  a  wife  is  not  liable  to  l>e  t^iken  for  the  debts  of  her  husband  during 
her  life  or  that  of  lu-r  children.  She  can  convey  her  lands  by  joining  in  a  deed 
with  her  husband  and  acknowledged  by  her  upon  a  separate  e-xaminatimi.  Stat. 
1846,  Feb.  28,  §  1;  Swan.  Hev.  Stat.  1854,  c.  34,  §§  2,  3:  Rev.  Stat.  ISOO,  c.  34, 
§§  2,  3.  By  Laws  1861,  p.  54,  any  estate,  legal  or  eijuitable,  in  real  property  Ix?- 
longing  to  any  woman  at  her  marriage,  or  which  comes  to  her,  during  coverture, 
by  conveyance,  devis«>,  or  inheritance,  or  bj'  purchase  with  her  separate  money  or 
nieatis,  together  with  the  rents  and  Issues  thereof,  remains  her  sejmnite  projicrty 
and  under  her  sole  control ;  and  she  may  lease  the  same  in  her  own  name  for  any 
jtoriod  not  exceeding  three  years.  After  her  decease,  the  husliand  has  an  estate 
by  the  curtesy  in  her  real  jiropfi-ty;  but  during  the  life  of  the  wife,  or  any  h/ir  of 
her  lx>dy,  sueli  esUite  cannot  l>e  taken  by  any  process  of  law  for  the  paymc.t  of 
his  debts,  or  In*  conveyed  or  incundn-red  by  him,  unless  she  join  in  the  convey- 
ance. See  Westerman  v.  Wcst^-nnan,  18  Am.  L.  Heg.  690.  —  Orrym,  a  married 
woman  may  convey  In-r  real  estate  by  joint  deed  with  her  husband  acknowledged 
by  her.  She  n>ay  dis[>o.se  of  any  real  estate  hehl  in  her  own  right,  subject  to  her 
busltand's  right  as  tenant  by  the  curtesy.  Stats.  1855,  p.  519.  Married  women 
may  devise  their  estates  subject  only  to  their  husband's  right  by  curtesy.  And 
they  may  convey  them  by  deed  jointly  executed  by  them  and  their  husbands.  If 
the  husband  deserts  his  wife,  she  may  deal  with  her  jirojwrty  in  the  same  manner 
as  if  she  were  sole.  (Jen.  Laws,  jip.  288,  515,  663.  —  Peniuvjlvania,  all  her  jimp- 
erty  at  the  time  of  marriage,  or  acquired  by  her  during  coverture  by  will,  deed, 
descent,  or  otherwist-,  rt-niains  her  separate  jirojH-rty,  and  may  W  ilisjiosed  of  by 
her  last  will  and  testament.  It  is  subject  neither  to  the  husband's  debts  nor  to 
his  control.  The  law  reserves  certain  rights  to  husbands  in  jiarticular  cases  out 
of  lands  of  their  wives,  when  devi.s»'d  by  thi  m.  The  estate  by  the  curtesy  is  ex- 
empt from  levy  during  the  life  of  the  wife.  Purdon,  Dig.  1861.  pp.  699,  7(iO.  1018; 
Duidii]),  Dig.  996,  9H7.  The  wife  may  convey  her  sejwirate  projHTty  by  a  deed  in 
which  her  husltand  shall  join,  she  acknowledging  the  same  ujon  a  s<-|>arate  exam- 
ination. Id.  99.  She  may  take  or  purchase  lands,  and  bind  them  by  judgment 
to  secure  the  payment  of  the  purchase-money  ;  and  if  her  husband  neglects  or 
refuses  to  provide  for  her,  she  may  have  the  riglits  of  » /one  mlr  trader,  and  dis- 
pose of  her  real  or  personal  estate.  Patterson  r  Robinson.  25  IVnn.  St.  81; 
Stat.  1855,  No.  456.  — JUuxU  Island,  she  may  disi»oso  of  her  real  estate  by  will, 


352  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

or  convey  it  by  joint  deed  of  self  and  husband,  she  acknowledging  the  same 
upon  a  separate  examination.  Rev.  Stat.  c.  136,  §§  6,  7.  The  property  she  has 
or  may  acquire  during  coverture  is  secured  to  her  sole  and  separate  use,  and 
neither  that  nor  its  rents- or  profits  shall  be  liable  for  the  debts  of  the  husband; 
and  on  his  death  the  same  remains  her  sole  and  separate  property  if  she  survive 

him.  Gen.  Stat.  1872,  c.  152,  §  1.  —  Tennessee,  she  may  dispose  by  will 
[*285]  of  any  estate  *  secured  to  her  separate  use,  by  deed,  devise,  or  bequest,  or 

in  the  execution  of  a  specific  power  to  that  effect.  And  the  interest  which 
a  liusband  has  by  marriage  in  his  wife's  estate  is  not  subject  to  the  claim  of  his 
creditors.  Stat.  1852,  c.  180,  §  4;  1850,  c.  36,  §  1.  And  she  incurs  no  personal 
liability  by  her  deeds,  but  only  charges  her  land.  Jackson  v  Kutledge,  3  Lea, 
626.  —  Texas,  her  property  owned  at  the  time  of  marriage,  or  acquired  afterwards, 
by  gift,  devise,  or  descent,  is  secured  to  her  by  the  Constitution  as  her  separate 
property.  Art.  7,  §  19;  Stat.  1848,  c.  79,  §  2.  During  marriage,  the  husband 
has  the  management  of  the  wife's  separate  jjroperty.  Land  acquired  by  husband 
and  wife  during  coverture  becomes  the  common  property  of  both,  but  may  be 
disposed  of  by  the  husband  alone,  and  goes  to  the  survivor  if  there  be  no  children; 
if  there  are  children,  one  half  of  such  property  goes  to  the  survivor.  By  the 
Texas  laws,  husband  and  wife  are  distinct  persons  as  to  their  estates.  Wood  v. 
Wheeler,  7  Texas,  13.  See  Oldham  &  White's  Dig.  1859,  p.  24,  and  p.  312,  arts. 
1393,  1395. — Vermont,  husband  and  wife  may  by  their  joint  deed  convey  the 
real  estate  of  the  wife,  in  like  manner  as  she  might  do  by  her  separate  deed,  if  she 
were  unmarried;  but  she  is  not  bound  by  any  covenant.  If  real  estate  belonging 
to  the  wife  is  taken  for  any  public  use,  the  damages  therefor  are  secured  to  her. 
She  may  devise  any  lands  belonging  to  her  at  marriage,  or  any  interest  that  is 
descendible  to  her  heirs;  and  the  rents,  issues,  and  profits  of  these  lands  are 
exempt  from  liability  in  respect  of  any  debts  of  the  husband.  Kev.  Stat.  1863, 
c.  71,  §§  16,  17,  18,  and  c.  65,  §  2.  A  conveyance  of  real  estate  to  husband  and 
wife  does  not  make  a  tenancy  in  common.  Id.  c.  64,  §  3.  If  the  husband  aban- 
don the  wife  and  leave  the  State  without  providing  for  her,  the  Supreme  Court 
may  authorize  her  to  sell  her  real  estate.  Acts,  1866.  But  her  real  estate  is 
liable  for  her  debts.  Dale  v.  Robinson,  51  Vt.  20.  — Virginia,  the  wife  conveys 
her  estate  by  a  deed  in  which  her  husband  joins,  she  being  privily  examined. 
Lee  V.  Bank  of  United  States,  9  Leigh,  200.  She  can  only  dispose  of  her  separate 
estate  by  will  or  in  the  way  of  exercising  a  power  of  apjiointment.  Code,  1873, 
p.  910.  — Wisconsin,  the  real  estate,  with  the  rents  and  piofits  thereof,  belonging 
to  any  married  woman,  or  acquired  by  descent,  grant,  or  devise,  is  not  subject 
to  the  disposal  of  her  husband,  or  liable  for  his  debts,  but  remains  her  sole  and 
separate  property  as  if  she  were  sole.  She  may  join  with  her  husband  in  a  deed 
of  conveyance,  or  may  execute  it  as  if  sole.  She  may  dispose  of  her  estate  by  will. 
Rev.  Stat.  1858,  c.  95,  §§  1-3,  and  c.  86,  §  12.  She  may  bring  trespass  in  her 
own  name  for  an  injury  done  to  her  real  estate,  even  though  her  husband  lives 
with  her  and  cultivates  the  land  for  her.  Boos  v.  Gomber,  24  Wis.  499.  —  West 
Virginia,  a  married  woman  may  take  and  hold  to  her  sole  and  separate  use,  and 
convey  and  devise  the  same  as  if  sole,  any  real  or  personal  estate  or  interest 
therein,  and  the  rents  and  iirofits  thereof.  Nor  shall  the  same  be  subject  to  the 
debts  or  disposal  of  her  husband.  But,  in  order  to  convey  her  real  estate,  her 
husband  must  join  in  the  deed.     Code,  1868,  c.  66,  §§  1-3. 


(11.  IX.  §   ±] 


ESTATES    IIY    MAKUIACJK. 


353 


SECTION  II. 


incurs    OF    HOMESTEAD. 


Divis. 

1. 

Divis. 

o 

Divis. 

2. 

Divis. 

■I. 

Divis. 

5. 

Divis. 

G. 

Divis. 

7. 

Divis. 

8. 

What  are  lloirifstoad  Kijtjlits,  and  wlio  may  Claim. 
Ill  what  such  Rights  inny  be  Claimed, 
llow  such  Rights  are  Ascertained  and  Declared. 
How  far  such  Rights  answer  U^t  Estates. 
How  far  such  Right,s  are  exempt  from  Debts. 
How  far  such  Rights  prevent  Alienation. 
How  such  Rights  may  be  Waived  or  Lost. 
Of  Trocedure  affecting  such  Rights,  and  Effect  of  Change  in 
the  Condition  of  the  Estate. 


DIVISION  I. 


WHAT    ARE    HOMESTEAD   RIGHTS,   AND   WHO    MAY   CLAIM. 


1.  Nature  and  object  of  homestead  rights, 
la.  Constitutional  restrictions. 

2.  Rules  of  ronstruition  applied  to  them. 

3.  Divisions  of  the  subject. 

8(1.  NVlio  may  claim  in  Alabama  and  Arkansas. 

4.  Who  may  claim  homestead  rights  in  California. 
4n.  Who  may  claim  in  Florida. 

5.  Who  may  claim  in  Georgia. 

6.  Who  may  claim  in  Illinois. 

7.  Who  may  claim  in  Indiana. 

8.  Who  may  claim  in  Iowa. 

8  aS  c.  Who  may  claim  in  Kansas,  Kentucky,  and  Louisiana. 

9.  Who  may  claim  in  Maine. 

10.  Who  may  claim  in  Ma.ssachusetts. 

11.  Wlio  may  claim  in  Michigan. 

12.  Who  may  cLiim  in  Minnesota. 

13.  Who  may  claim  in  Mississippi. 

18  a,  18  6,  13  c.  Who  may  claim  in  Missouri,  Nebraska,  and  New  Jersey. 

14.  Who  may  claim  in  New  York. 
14  a.  Who  may  claim  in  Nevada. 

15.  Who  may  claim  in  New  Hampshire. 

16-19.     Who  may  claim  in  North  Carolina,  Ohio,  South  Carolina,  Tennes- 
see, Texas,  and  Vermont. 

1.  The  right  of  homestead,  wliich  has  been  established  by 
statute,  with  greater  or  less  stringency,  in  at  least  thirty -four 
of  the  States,  partakes  more  nearly  of  the  character  of  an 
vol.  I.— 23 


354  LAW   OF  REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   L 

estate  for  life  than  any  other,  and  is  treated  of  as  coming 
within  that  category.*  Indeed,  in  some  of  the  States  it  comes 
properly  within  that  class  of  estates.  The  common  law  has 
no  analogous  interest  or  estate,  and  it  owes  its  creation  wholly 
to  statutes.^  This  circumstance  renders  it  necessary  to  exam- 
ine these  in  detail,  pointing  out,  as  well  as  may  be,  wherein 
their  provisions  agree,  and  how  far  the  decisions  in  one  State 
have  served  by  way  of  analogy  to  harmonize  its  system  of 
homestead  rights  with  those  in  force  in  other  States.  The 
general  policy  under  which  these  laws  have  been  instituted 
has  been  to  secure  to  a  householder  and  his  family  the  benefit 
of  a  home  beyond  the  reach  of  legal  process  on  the  part  of 
creditors.  And  to  guard  this  more  effectually,  in  most  of  the 
States  no  release  or  alienation  of  an  estate  thus  secured  is  of 
any  avail  unless  assented  to  by  the  wife  of  such  householder, 
through  whom  the  interests  of  their  minor  children  are  also 
sought  to  be  guarded  and  protected. 

1  a.  The  question  has  been  raised  and  considered  in  several 
of  the  States,  whether  and  how  far  these  acts  exempting  estates 
from  liability  to  respond  to  creditors  for  the  debts  of  their 
owners  are  a  violation  or  otherwise  of  the  spirit  of  the  provi- 
sion of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  which  prohibits 

*  Note.  —  The  section  of  the  present  work  relating  to  homesteads  was  prepared 
when  there  was  no  separate  treatise  upon  the  subject.  Although  the  topic  seemed 
properly  to  call  for  notice  and  discussion  in  a  general  work  upon  real  property, 
and  was  in  so  far  consonant  to  the  character  of  this  treatise,  yet  the  pui'ely  statu- 
tory nature  of  the  right,  the  great  variety  of  the  legislative  enactments,  and,  still 
more,  the  various  and  conflicting  decisions  made  in  interpreting  these,  require  the 
larger  space  of  a  special  treatise  for  their  adequate  presentation.  This  want  has 
been  ably  supplied  by  Mr.  Thompson's  treatise,  to  which  the  reader  is  referred  ; 
where  the  order  of  treatment  differs  somewhat  from  that  of  the  present  work.  But 
even  since  the  publication  of  Mr.  Thompson's  volume  in  1878,  more  than  five 
hundred  cases  have  been  decided  in  the  courts  of  the  United  States,  the  substance 
of  which  has  been  incorporated  in  the  present  edition.  The  reader  will  also  find 
the  "Homestead  and  Exemption  Laws  of  the  Southern  States"  fully  considered 
and  explained  in  19  Am.  Law  Eeg.  1  and  137.  It  is  there  stated  that,  in  Georgia, 
homestead  is  exempted  to  the  value  of  $2,000,  which,  if  carried  into  effect  in 
respect  to  every  head  of  a  family  in  the  State,  would  amount  to  three  times  the 
value  of  all  the  land  in  it. 

^  And  these  have  no  extra-territorial  operation.  Stinde  v.  Behrens,  6  Mo.  App. 
309. 


CU.  IX.  §  2.]  ESTATFS   BY    MAIIKIACE.  Z')f) 

States  from  passin<'  laws  impairing;  tlio  olilipation  of  contracts. 
And  tlu'  coni'liisiims  f(»  wliicli  many  of  the  State  coiiits  came 
wore  in  favor  of  snstainin^r  the  validity  of  sn<di  exemptions,' 
In  Alahama  the  court  say,  "Thn*'  is  no  eonstitntional  ex- 
cei)tion  to  hiws,  which  exempt  certain  poitions  of  a  debtor's 
property  from  execution,  from  bein^^  so  modilie<l  as  to  increase 
the  exemptions  and  the  modifications  applicabl(!  to  contracts 
previously  »'nteri'd  into."-  In  a  case  from  (leoriria,  a  cre<litor 
had  obtained  a  judirment  airainst  his  debtor,  but,  before  the 
execution  was  levied,  the  State  passed  an  act  exemptiuL''  home- 
steads of  debtors,  which  extended  the  exemption  nmch  b<»yond 
what  it  was  at  the  time  when  the  judirment  was  recovered. 
The  United  States  court,  reversinj?  the  decision  of  tlie  State 
court,  hell!  the  exemjition  void  as  to  the  judirment,  bccansc 
impairintr  the  oliliiration  of  the  contract  l»y  withdrawinL^  )iroj>- 
erty  which  was  liable  for  the  debt  when  it  was  contract I'd.'' 
This  decision  was  followed  in  \'irL'"iuia,  where  it  was  held,  in  an 
able  opinion,  that  a  law  made  under  their  constitution.  exem|it- 
ing  homesteads,  was  unconstitutional  so  far  as  it  ajijilied  to 
contracts  entered  into,  or  debts  contracted,  before  the  adoi>- 
tion  of  the  constitution,  as  beinir  in  violation  of  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States."*  And  the  courts  of  the  several 
States  have  generally  followed  the  conclusion  of  the  PYxleral 
Court  as  of  binding  authority.^    In  South  Carolina,  the  consti 

»  Robert  r.  Cow,  25  Im.  Aim.  109;  Hardman  r.  Downer,  39  Go.  425  ;  Ste- 
phenson r.  Osliorne,  41  Miss.  119  ;  Haylor  r.  St.  Ant.  Bk.,  38  Ttx.  448;  Cusic 
r.  Douglas,  3  Knns.  123. 

'  Snciiler  r.  HeiilellMirRpT,  45  Ala.  134. 

■  Oimn  r.  Rorry,  15  Wall.  GIO.  The  .same  nilf  wa.s  laid  down  in  Missouri 
under  the  provisions  of  the  State  Constitution  of  1845,  art.  13,  §  17  ;  Har\'ey  p. 
Wickham,  23  Mo.  112;  Cunningham  v.  Gray,  20  Mo.  170;  Tally  r.  Thonqison, 
Id.  277.  *  Homestead  Ca-ses,  22  Gratt.  301. 

»  Chambliss  v.  Jordan,  50  Ga.  81  ;  Clarke  v.  Trawick,  56  Ga.  359  ;  Hawks  r. 
Hawk-s  64  Ga.  239  ;  Usslcy  r.  Phipps,  49  Miss.  700  ;  Ex  jtnrtc  Hewett,  5  S.  C. 
409  ;  Coehnin  r.  Darcy,  Id.  125  ;  Wilson  r.  Rrown,  58  Ala.  62  ;  Nelson  r.  McCrary, 
60  Ala.  801  ;  PreLss  p.  CampWl,  59  Ala.  635  ;  Corr  p.  Sthockelfonl,  68  Ala.  241  ; 
Harris  v.  Austell,  2  Baxt  148  ;  I^eonard  r.  Ma.son,  1  I^,  384  ;  and  the  Tenn. 
Const,  art.  X.  §  11,  and  Ijiw  of  1870,  c.  80,  creating  on  exemption  fnim  tlien- 
exi.-»ting  debts,  were  held  unconstitutional.  Hannnm  r.  Mclnturf,  »>  I'.axt.  225  ; 
and  see  Alexander  r.  Kili>afrirk.  14  Flo.  450;  Hannahs  v.  Felt.  15  b.wa,  141  ; 
Ryan  r.  W.-ss-ls.  Id.  145  ;  Martin  r.  Kirkimtrick,  30  La.  Ann.  I't.  'J.  1,  214: 
Cole  V.  I,n  Chambn-,  31  La.  An.  431. 


356  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  L 

tution  of  1868,  and  the  law  passed  by  virtue  of  it  excepting 
homesteads,  were  held  to  l)e  constitutional ;  ^  but  this  exemp- 
tion did  not  affect  a  mortgage  made  before  it  was  adopted.^ 
In  North  Carolina  it  was  held  that  the  constitution  of  1868, 
which  changed  the  homestead  exemptions  applied  to  debts 
then  existing,  was  constitutional,  because  it  did  not  diminish 
the  right  of  creditors.^  But  the  constitutional  objection  does 
not  apply  to  rights  of  action  for  torts.*  It  may  be  added  in 
this  connection  that  the  bankrupt  law  of  the  United  States  is 
held  valid  and  constitutional  which  exempts  from  its  effects 
such  property  as  is  exempt  from  levy  and  sale  under  execution 
by  the  law  of  the  State  in  which  the  bankrupt  has  his  domicil 
at  the  time  of  commencing  the  proceedings  in  bankruptcy.^ 

2.  But  while  the  statute  is  founded  upon  considerations  of 
public  policy,^  the  principles  of  construction  which  have  been 
applied  to  it  by  the  courts  of  the  different  States  have  often 
been  at  variance  with  each  other.  While  some  have  applied 
to  its  language  the  test  of  stringent  technical  rules,  others 
have  sought,  even  in  terms  of  rhetoric,  for  adequate  forms  of 
expressing  the  liberal  extent  to  which  it  should  be  carried. 
In  some  of  the  States,  it  was  thought  to  be  a  subject  of  suffi- 
ciently general  importance  to  incorporate  it  as  a  principle  into 
their  constitutions.''  In  Minnesota  the  courts  construe  the 
statute  strictly,  as  being  in  derogation  of  the  common  law,^ 
while  in  Illinois  it  is  treated  as  a  remedial  measure  and  is 
construed  liberally.^ 

A  homestead  in  law  means  a  home  place,  or  place  of  the 
home,  and  is  designed  as  a  shelter  of  the  homestead  roof,  and 

1  Re  Kennedy,  2  S.  C.  216.  2  Shelor  v.  Mason,  2  S.  C.  233. 

8  Hill  V.  Kessler,  63  N.  C.  437  ;  Garrett  v.  Chesire,  69  K.  C.  396  ;  Edwards 
V.  Kearsey,  74  N.  C.  241. 

*  Parker  v.  Savage,  6  Lea,  406. 

5  In  re  Deckert,  22  Am.  L.  Reg.  624.  But  exemption  under  the  bankrupt  law 
does  not  relieve  from  the  lien  of  a  previous  debt.  Hiley  v.  Bridges,  60  Ga.  375  ; 
Dixon  V.  Lawson,  65  Ga.  661.  And  the  setting  apart  a  homestead  by  the  bank- 
rupt's assignee  does  not  vest  it  till  it  is  set  apart  under  the  State  laws.  Burtz  v. 
Eobinson,  59  Ga.  763. 

6  Robinson  v.  Wiley,  15  N.  Y.  489. 

7  Const.  California,  art.  11,  §  15  ;  Texas,  art.  22  ;  Indiana,  art.  1,  §  22;  Wis- 
consin, art.  1,  §  17  ;  IVIichigan,  art.  16,  §  (2). 

8  Olson  V.  Nelson,  3  Minn.  53.  *  Deere  v.  Chapman,  25  111.  610. 


ni.  IX.  §  '2.]  ESTATRS   r.Y   M.vr.RIACE.  8o7 

not  as  a  inric  iiivostmeiit  in  real  ostatc,  or  llic  rents  and 
jjrolits  (IcriviMl  therefrom.  Nor  would  it  lose  this  eharacler 
hy  a  temporary  ahsenco  of  the  owner,  without  an  intent  t<> 
abandon  it.' 

3.  The  whole  system  is  of  recent  ori^'in,  Hcareely  reaching' 
hack  a  score  of  years  since  the  first  statiilc?  was  emieted.-  hi 
treatinu:  of  it,  it  is  projtosed  to  consider,  1.  Who  may  claim  a 
right  of  homestea<l ;  -.  In  what  inopeity  it  may  be  claimed, 
havlntr  referiMice  to  the  title  and  «'xteiit  and  manner  of  owner- 
ship; :{.  In  what  manner  the  right  is  limited  and  aseei-t:iined  ; 
4.  The  nature  <»f  the  right  regarded  as  an  estate;  A.  How  tar 
the  same  is  exempt  from  force<l  sale;  and,  (I.  ll(»w  the  suiiie 
may  be  sold,  released,  or  al)andone(l.* 

3  a.  In  Alal)ania  the  right  is  seeiired  to  every  resident-'  who 
is  the  '*  head  of  a  family,"  during  his  life  and  occiijianey,*  and 
after  the  death  of  the  owner,  the  exemjiticjii  continues  during 
his  wife's  widowhood  and  the  mim)rity  of  the  children.^ 

S  f>.  In  Arkansas  the  exemption  extends  to  residents  of  the 
State  who  are  married  men,  or  heads  of  families,  whether 
aliens  or  citizens;*'  and  by  construction  to  unmariiecl  men" 
and  to  every  male  and  female,  being  a  householder.'*  After 
the  death  oi  the  householder,  it  enures  to  the  benefit  of  the 
widow  during  widowhood,  and  of  the  minor  children  until 
adult  age.® 

•  XoTK.  —  Tlio  rrmlor  should  1>oar  in  miiul  that  the  statutes  in  relation  to 
honiesU'iul,  and,  in  some  of  the  States,  their  constitutions,  have  undergone  im- 
jiortant  changes  witliin  a  few  years,  esjK'cially  since  the  reconstruction  of  the 
seceded  Suites  ;  and  while  it  has  been  attenijited  to  stJite  the  law  a-s  it  now  exists 
in  the  dillerent  States,  it  is  exceedingly  dillicult  to  distinguish,  in  referring  to 
tl>e  ca-ses  cited,  to  which  period  of  the  law  they  are  to  be  assigned.  They  are  ac- 
conlingly  retained  Ix'cause  the  system  would  l)e  incomjilete  without  them. 

>  Austin  V.  Stanh-y,  46  X.  H.  52  ;  Davis  r.  Andrews,  30  Vt.  678  ;  Taylor  r. 
Boulware,  17  Tex.  74;  Benedict  r.  Bunnell,  7  Cal.  245;  Moss  v.  Warner,  10 
Cal.  296;  Barney  r.  I^eds,  51  N.  II.  253,  265.  It  is  "the  place  where  one's 
dw.lling  is."     Tnnilinson  r.  Swinney,  22  Ark.  400. 

•  This  was  writt.-n  in  1860.  So  Thompson,  Ilomest.  Pref.,  states  the  ear- 
lieat  known  to  him  to  have  ln>en  an  act  in  Texas  passed  Jan.  26,  1839. 

'  Talmadge  r.  Talniadge,  66  Ala.  199. 

•  Code.  1876,  §  2820.  '  Const.  1868.  art.  14,  §  2  ;  Co<le.  1876,  §  2821 

•  Const.  1868,  art.  12,  §  2  ;  M<  K. n/j.-  r.  Murphy,  24  Ark.  155. 

^  Ont-nwood  r.  Mad-lox,  27  Ark.  648.  8  Stat  1858,  c.  68. 

•  Const,  art.  12,  §§  4,  5. 


358  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

4.  Ill  California  the  right  extends  to  "  heads  of  families," 
which  includes  unmarried  persons  if  they  have  charge  of,  and 
residing  with  them,  minor  brothers  or  sisters,  or  minor  children 
of  brothers  or  sisters,  or  parents  or  grandparents  of  their  own, 
or  of  any  deceased  husband  or  wife,  or  an  unmarried  sister.^ 
''  Head  of  a  family,"  as  here  used,  has  no  reference  to  the  sex 
of  the  party,  and  if  a  husband  refuses  to  claim  a  homestead, 
the  wife  may.^  If  a  wife  die  without  children,  living  her  hus- 
band, he  ceases  to  have  a  right  of  homestead,  whereas,  if  she 
survive  him,  she  may  become  the  head  of  the  family .^  And,  as 
such,  she  may,  by  the  statute  of  1865-66,  have  a  homestead  set 
out,  if  none  was  set  out  in  her  husband's  life  ;^  and  upon  the 
death  of  husband  or  wife,  the  homestead  vests  absolutely  in  the 
survivor  by  the  statute  of  1862.^  But  this  statute  makes  no 
provision  for  an  interest  in  the  homestead  in  the  children,^ 
though  it  is  considered  that  if  a  widow  have  a  homestead  set 
out  to  her,  it  is  for  the  benefit  of  herself  and  minor  children.' 

4  (/.  In  Colorado  the  homestead  exemption  is  given  to  every 
householder  in  the  State,  being  the  head  of  a  family.^ 

4  b.  The  exemption  in  Florida  is  in  favor  of  the  head  of  a 
family  residing  in  the  State  ;  '^  and  if  the  owner  dies  intestate, 
the  homestead  descends  to  his  or  her  issue  then  living,  but  if 
no  children  are  living,  it  goes  to  the  widow,  if  there  is  one. 
It  continues  during  widowhood  and  minority. ^"^ 

5.  In  Georgia  the  right  was  given  by  an  early  statute  to 
the  head  of  a  family,  and,  to  a  limited  extent,  to  his  or  her 

1  Const,  art.  11,  §  15  ;  Hittell's  Code,  §§  6260,  6261. 

2  Id.  §  6262  :  Booth  v.  Gait,  58  Cal.  254. 

3  Revalk  v.  Kraemer,  8  CaL  66,  71  ;  Gee  v.  Moore,  14  Cal.  472,  476,  477  ; 
Bowman  v.  Norton,  16  Cal.  213. 

*  Busse's  Est.,  35  Cal.  310.     As  to  pleading,  see  Jones  v.  Waddy,  66  Cal.  457. 

5  Wi.xom's  Est.  35  Cal.  320  ;  and  is  subject  to  his  debts,  Watson  v.  Credit- 
ors, 58  Cal.  556.  This  act  was  held  to  apply  to  a  homestead  declared  pre- 
viously, when  the  husband  died  after  the  act  was  passed.  Henold  v.  Reen,  58 
Cal.  443. 

6  Rich  V.  Tubbs,  41  Cal.  34. 

■^  Hi^gins  V.  Higgins,  46  Cal.  259.  But  if  the  children  are  adults,  it  may  be 
set  out  for  her  benefit,  Ballaiitine's  Est.  Myrick,  Prob.  81;  and  even  though  she  has 
quitclaimed  the  land  in  which  it  is  included  during  her  husband's  lifetime,  lb. 

8  Gen.  L.  1877,  §  1343.  »  Florida,  Dig.  1881,  c.  104,  §§  1,  2. 

^^  Id.  §§  3,  8,  16.  A  special  exemption  for  farmers  is  also  given  by  §  7  of  the 
same  statute. 


("11.  IX.   §   ll.]  F«TATKS    ItY    M.VRHI.vr.K.  3r)0 

chlldrt'ii  under  tlic  si---  ■!  ni.\tocn  years. •  liut  by  flie  jjre.veiit 
constitutitm  the  huiue.stead  exonijjlioii  oxteiul.s  to  licad.s  of 
familie.s,  guardian.^  and  trustees  of  families  of  minor  children  ; 
to  every  a<red  and  inlirm  person  ;  to  any  one  havinjr  eare  of 
dejtendent  females  of  any  a^a-,  thon«:li  lutt  head  of  a  fam- 
ily ;''^  and  if  the  husliand  refuses  to  ajiply,  the  wife,  or  some 
one  in  her  liehalf  or  in  l)ehalf  of  minor  eliildren,  may  apply, 
mdess  the  hushand  fnrhids.'^  And  "  hea<l  of  a  family"  has 
been  hcdd  to  include  a  siii'_de  man  \n  hose  molhei-  and  sis- 
ters lived  with  him,  and  were  sui»|ioited  liy  him."'  Ihit  a 
i>achelor  livini;  ahtne,  thouirh  havinji;  servants,  is  not  a  head 
of  a  family.''  And  when  the  wife  and  hushand  are  in  a  state 
of  separation,  and  she  has  the  minor  children  in  her  custody, 
or  has  a  right  to  them,  she  is  the  head  of  her  family,  and  may 
have  homestead  out  of  her  sei)arate  property.**  Minor  chil- 
dren of  a  decca.sed  owner  of  a  homestead  arc  entitled  t<j  hold 
it  against  his  creditors."  And  no  second  homestead  can  he 
claimed  where  the  first  is  good  hy  estopjx'l.^ 

ti.  In  Illinois  it  attaches  (»nly  to  premi-ses  owned  hy  a  liouse 
holder  with  a  family.'*  The  language  of  the  .statute  is, ''owner, 
oceu|)ant,  resident,  and  h(»useholder  having  a  family,"  and  to 
the  widow  of  such  an  mie  and  family  till  the  youngest  child  is 

1  Davcnixirt  v.  .\lston,  14  Cin.  271.  This  statute  is  still  in  force.  Code,  1882, 
§  2040  ;  nnd  the  rights  under  it  are  nlteniative  with  the  present  homestead  act  ; 
Connally  v.  Ilardwick,  61  (!a.  501.  The  exemption  was  limited  to  lands  not  with- 
in any  city,  town,  or  village,  and  gave  fifty  acres,  &c,,  if  used  only  for  agriculture. 

'■'  Const.  1877,  in  Code,  1882,  §  ;'>'J10.  Guardian  of  one  minor  is  within  the 
statute.     Hountree  r.  Dennard,  [>9  Ga.  629. 

•  Code,  1882,  §  2022.  As  against  the  husband's  cn-ditors  his  ass<nt  to  liis 
wife's  application  will  be  presumed.     Connally  v.  Ilardwick,  61  Ga.  501. 

•  Marsh  V.  I..azenby,  41  Ga.  153  ;  but  in  Deiidy  r.  Gamble,  64  Ga.  52S,  where 
then-  Were  only  sisters  and  tlu-ir  children,  a  different  rule  was  held. 

'  Calhoun  p.  McI.*ndon,  42  Ga.  405. 

"  Code,  1882,  §  2019  ;  but  not  if  the  husUind  has  already  excmpte<l  one 
homestead  from  his  own  property,  Xeal  v.  Sawyer,  62  Ga.  352  ;  and  her  jietition 
niu.st  -^how  nllinnatively  her  right  to  apply,  Jones  r.  Crumley,  61  Ga.  105. 

^  lUAT  V.  .Johnson,  40  Go.  555. 

•  Tormnce  r.  Boyd,  63  Ga.  22.  And  where  the  daughters  of  the  homestead 
ownt-r  Wins  dependent,  though  ndult,  he  could  not  get  a  new  homestead  by  a  second 
mariiage.  lb.  An  exem]ition  to  farmers  sjx'cially  is  given  by  Code,  §  2040,  but 
this  is  alternative  with  that  alnady  .sjviken  of. 

»  KitcluU  r.  Hurg\viu,  21  111.  40  ;  Deeru  v.  Chapman,  25  111.  610  ;  Ryhiner  v. 
Frank,  105  111.  326. 


360  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK  L 

twenty-one  years  of  age,  and  during  the  widow's  life.^  Such 
exemption  continues  even  after  the  death  of  the  wife  and 
children.2  A  wife  also  may  be  a  householder,  and,  if  separated 
from  her  husband,  and  not  supported  by  him,  can  acquire  a 
homestead  in  land  bought  by  her.^ 

7.  In  Indiana  the  exemption  is  limited  to  a  "  resident 
householder  ;  "  but  it  has  been  held  to  extend  to  one  living 
with  liis  sister  who  contributes  to  the  expenses  of  the  house- 
hold ;  ^  and  extends  to  a  wife,  if  she  is  the  debtor  and  owns 
the  estate.^ 

8.  In  Iowa  the  exemption  is  to  the  "  head  of  a  family," 
owner  of  a  homestead.  But  a  widower  or  widow  may  be  such, 
though  without  children,  provided  he  or  she  continue  to  oc- 
cupy the  premises  which  they  occupied  during  the  life  of  the 
deceased.^  But  occupancy  and  use  of  the  dwelling-house  by 
the  family  as  a  homestead  are  essential  to  its  being  exempt. 
Intention  to  make  it  such  is  not  enough."  If  a  wife  survive 
her  husband,  the  owner  of  the  homestead,  she,  as  his  succes- 
sor, has  a  right  to  enjoy  it,  although  married  again.^  So  if 
he  survive  her,  he  will  take,  as  her  successor,  the  home- 
stead owned  by  her,  though  he  have  no  children.^  If  the 
owner  live  on  the  land,  he  may  claim  the  right,  although 
his  wife  and  children  have  never  resided  in  the  State.^*^  A 
son,  with  a  mother  and  brothers  and  sisters,  or  either,  depend- 
ent on  him,  may  claim  it.  But  a  brother  unmarried,  with 
whom  a  married  brother  and  wife  lived  and  kept  his  house, 
was  held  not  to  be  the  head  of  a  family .^^     It  does  not  attach 

I  Rev.  Stat.  1883,  c.  52,  §§  1,  2.  2  Kimbrel  v.  ^Ymis,  97  111.  494. 
3  Kenley  v.  Hudelson,  99  111.  493  ;  Hotclikiss  v.  Brooks,  93  111.  386, 

*  Ind.  Rev.  Stat.  1881,  §  703  ;  Graham  v.  Crockett,  18  Ind.  119. 

5  Rev.  Stat.  1881,  §  5124  ;  Crane  v.  AVaggoner,  33  Ind.  83. 

6  Rev.  Code,  1880,  §§  1988,  1989.  But  the  right  to  a  homestead  is  alternative 
with  the  right  to  one  third  in  fee  as  a  distributive  share,  Stevens  v.  Stevens,  50 
Iowa,  491  ;  Burdick  v.  Kent,  52  Iowa,  583  ;  though  the  homestead  may  be  taken 
as  part  of  such  share.  Whitehead  v.  Conklin,  48  Iowa,  478  ;  and  is  stUl  exempted 
from  debts  of  the  deceased,  Moningen  v.  Ramsey,  48  Iowa,  368  ;  Knox  v.  Hanlon, 
Id.  252  ;  Wilson  v.  Hardesty,  Id.  515. 

^  ELston  V.  Robinson,  23  Iowa,  208  ;  Givans  v.  Dewey,  47  Iowa,  414. 

8  Nicholas  v.  Purczell,  21  Iowa,  265  ;  Dodds  v.  Dodds,  26  Iowa,  311. 

9  Stewart  v.  Brand,  23  Iowa,  477,  481. 
1*^  Williams  v.  Swetland,  10  Iowa,  51. 

II  Whalen  v.  Cadman,  11  Iowa,  226  ;  Parsons  v.  Livingston,  11  Iowa,  104. 


CH.  IX.  §   2.]  ?NT\Ti^    i:V    MARIJIAGE.  .".CI 

until  till"  owner  ;u'tii;illv  occuincs  tin-  |ir(inisos;  und  tlie  .same 
tlirii  winild  In-  lialilc  lor  a  ilclit  cont iMclctl  before  sueli  occu- 
pancy.' 

8(/.  TIm'  I'onstitution  and  Statutes  of  Kansas  extend  thu 
homestead  exemption  to  premises  occupied  as  a  residence  by 
the  family  of  the  owner,  and  after  the  death  of  the  owner  the 
homestead  l)ecomes  the  absolute  property  of  the  widow  and 
children,  if  they  continue  to  occupy.''^ 

8/'.  The  statutes  of  Kentucky  exempt  a  liomestead  to  the 
owner  of  the  j)remis('s,  whether  man  or  woman,  who  is  a  bona 
fi'h  hou.sekeeper.  UjM)n  the  death  of  the  owner,  husband,  or 
wife,  it  g^oes  to  the  widow  or  widower,  as  the  case  may  be,  for 
l)is  or  her  use  and  that  of  the  children  unmarried  and  under 
ajjfe.^ 

8  c.  V>\  the  statutes  of  Louisiana,  a  h(;mestead  cxemjttion  ex- 
tends to  |»remi.ses  occupied  as  a  residence,  and  owned  l'»na 
fide  by  one  havini;  a  family,  or  father,  or  mother,  or  person 
dejiendent  uj)on  him  for  support.*  So  where  the  husband  is 
incapable,  the  wife  may  claim  a  homestead  ;''  but  not  other- 
wise.'' 

i>.  In  Maine  he  must  own  the  projierty  and  be  a  house- 
holder in  actual  occupation  of  the  same." 

10.  In  Massachusetts  he  must  be  a  householder,  liaving  a 
family  occupying  the  ])remi.ses  owned  or  j)osscssed  by  him  as 
a  residence;  and  on  his  death  it  passes  to  his  widow  or  chil- 
dren during  widowhood  or  till  majoiity  of  the  youngest.^  Xor 
does  he  lose  it  by  the  death  or  absence  of  his  wife  and  chil- 

»  Cole  V.  Gill,  14  Iowa,  527  ;  Halo  v.  Hfaslip,  16  Iowa,  451  ;  Caiiii>l)ell  v. 
Ayres,  18  Iowa,  252  ;  Hyatt  v.  Spcamian,  20  Iowa,  510  ;  Givans  v.  Dewey,  47 
Iowa,  414. 

'  Comp.  I^ws,  §§  235,  2103;  and  when  lx)uj;ht  it  must  be  for  pn?sent  ami  not 
future  or  uncertain  occupancy.  Swenson  v.  Kidil.  21  Kans.  533  ;  hut  where 
IK>»jje3sion  was  taken  by  digging  a  cellar,  the  exemption  attjiched,  Gilworth  i". 
Co<ly,  Id.  702. 

«  Gen.  SUt.  1873,  c.  38.  art.  13,  §§  14-1*].  Tliis  was  other\vise  under  the 
sutule  of  18G6.     Little  r.  Woo«lwanl,  14  Rush,  585. 

•  Uev.  Stat.  1870,  §  1691  ;  hut  the  owner  may  estop  himself  to  claim  home- 
8tea<'.  hy  denying  hi.s  own  title,  Gilmer  v.  O'Neal,  32  I^.  An.  l»7l». 

'  Hardin  v.  Wolf,  29  U.  An.  333. 

•  Ikirron  v.  SoUiUdlos,  28  La.  An.  355  ;  Taylor  v.  McElvin,  31  La.  An.  233. 
'  Rev.  Stilt.  1883,  c.  81,  §  63. 

•  Pub.  Sut.  c.  123,  §  1. 


362  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

dren,  because  he  may  adopt  otliei's  as  members  of  his  house- 
hold.^ An  umnarried  woman,  without  children,  cannot  claim 
it.2 

11.  In  Michigan  he  must  be  a  resident,  and  the  owner  and 
occupant  of  the  homestead  ;  ^  and  after  his  death  it  enures  to 
his  children  during  their  minority;  but  if  childless,  to  his 
widow  during  her  widowhood."* 

12.  In  Minnesota  the  exemption  is  to  the  owner  and  occu- 
pant of  the  premises  as  a  residence.  This  may  be  the  debtor 
himself,  his  widow,  or  minor  children,  who  shall  be  the  occu- 
pants for  the  purposes  of  a  home.^ 

13.  In  Mississippi  it  is  to  "the  head  of  a  family;"*^  and 
the  statute  of  1871  extends  it  to  every  citizen,  male  or  female, 
being  a  householder,  having  a  family,  the  owner  and  occupant 
of  the  estate  claimed  as  a  homestead ;  and  on  the  deatli  of  the 
owner  it  descends  to  his  widow  and  children,  during  the  min- 
ority of  children,  and  till  the  death  of  the  widow,  some  one  of 
them  being  an  occupant  thereof." 

13  a.  In  Missouri  every  housekeeper  or  head  of  a  family 
holds  exempt  the  premises  used  by  him  as  a  hoiiiestead ;  and 
the  same,  at  his  death,  passes  to  his  widow  during  widowhood, 
and  his  children  till  of  age.^ 

13  b.  In  Nebraska  the  exemption  is  to  an  owner  and  occu- 
pant who  is  a  resident  and  head  of  a  family,  descending  at  his 

1  Silloway  v.  Brown,  12  Allen,  30  ;  Doyle  v.  Coburn,  6  Allen,  71. 

2  Woodwortli  V.  Comstock,  10  Allen,  425. 

3  Beecher  v.  Baldy,  7  Mich.  488  ;  Tliarp  v.  Allen,  46  Mich.  389.  And  a  mere 
licensee  or  lessee,  though  son  of  the  deceased  owner,  has  no  right  to  homestead. 
lb. 

4  Const,  art.  xvi.  §§  3,  4  ;  Comp.  L.  1871  ;  Dei  v.  Habel,  41  Mich.  88.  And 
the  widow's  claim  cannot  be  barred  by  an  estoppel  in  pais.  Showers  v.  Robin- 
son, 43  Mich.  502.  And  while  she  and  the  children  continue  to  reside,  the  home- 
stead continues  though  the  husband  absconds,  at  least  until  he  acquires  a  new  one 
in  another  State.     He  Pratt,  1  Flip.  C.  Ct.  353. 

6  Folsom  V.  Carli,  5  Minn.  337  ;  Tillotson  v.  Millard,  7  Minn.  520  ;  Kresin  v. 
Mau,  15  Minn.  116  ;  Stat.  1878,  c.  68,  §  1. 

6  Morrison  v.  McDaniel,  30  Miss.  217  ;  Rev.  Code,  1880,  §§  1248,  1249. 

T  Code,  §  1249  ;  Smith  v.  Wells,  46  Miss.  71  ;  Campbell  v.  Adair,  45  Miss.  170; 
Glover  v.  Hill,  57  Miss.  240. 

8  Rev.  Stat.  1879,  §§  2689,  2693.  In  Whitehead  v.  Tapp,  69  Mo.  415,  a  man 
was  held  to  be  head  of  a  family,  though  his  wife  had  deserted  him  and  was  living 
in  another  State  with  another  man,  and  he  was  living  with  another  woman. 


CII.  IX.  ^  ±1  ESTATES    UV    MAUUIA(;E.  IJ(j3 

death  to  his  licirs  at  hiw,'  wht'th«T  aUi-n  or  citizen.-  Any 
uiie  who  has  the  same  ehiss  of  persons  dependent  on  liini  as 
enumerated  in  the  California  statute  already  stated  is  a  head 
of  a  family. 

l;ic.  In  New  Jersey  it  is  to  a  hou.seholder  havinj;  a  family, 
who  is  the  owner  and  oeeu|»ant  tlicrciil"  as  a  residence,  and  it 
continues  to  the  widow  and  fannly,  it  oceu|»ants  thereof,  until 
the  vouuLTest  child  is  of  a^''e  and  the  widow  has  deceased. '* 

II.  In  Xi'W  York  it  is  to  a  hou.seli<ildiT,  ami  it  is  to  liim  for 
a  residence.  And  l)y  lK)Useholder  is  meant  the  head,  master, 
or  j»erson  who  has  chai'ge  of  and  |)rovides  ft)r  a  family.^ 

14  </.  In  Nevada  the  e.\cm|tt ion  is  to  the  head  of  a  family, 
not  includiiiir  persons  unmarried,  unless  they  have  minor 
brothers  or  sisters,  or  childri'U  of  Ijrothers  or  sisters,  or  father 
or  mother,  or  hoth,  or  L'randjiarents,  or  unmarried  sisters, 
living  with  them.  I'pon  the  death  of  husliand  or  wife,  it 
goes  absolutely  to  the  survivor  and  his  or  lier  legitimate 
clnldren.'' 

1 .").  In  New  IIam])shire  it  enures  to  the  l)enerit  of  the  wife, 
willow,  and  children  of  every  owner  occupying  the  premises  as 
a  residence,*'  and  continues  (hiring  the  lifetime  of  the  wife  or 
widow  and  the  minority  of  the  cliildi"en  ;  and  tlien  to  the 
owner  if  living.  And  if  the  Avife  is  the  legal  owner  of  the 
lioinestead,  the  luisband  surviving  her  is  entitled  to  a  like  ex- 
emption in  her  estate.  And  it  has  been  held  that  a  widower 
with  a  child  living  with  him  is  a  "  head  of  a  family." "  An 
unmarried  person  may  also  have  a  homestead.^ 

IG.  In  North  Carolina  it  is  to  the  owner  and  occupant  of 
the  jtremises  who  is  a  resident  of  the  State,  and  to  his  children, 
if  he  leave  any,  during  their  minority  ;  and  if  he  have  no  chil- 

>  Comp.  Stat.  1881,  c.  3rt,  §§  1,  l."".,  17. 

*  People  V.  McClay,  2  Neb.  7  ;  Comj).  Laws,  c.  36,  §  15. 
»  Rev.  1877,  l>.  1055,  §  1. 

*  3  K.v.  Stat.  647;  Griirm  r.  Sutherland,  14  Burl).  450  ;  4  Stat,  at  Large, 
Pi.  3,  c.  200,  p.  032. 

*  Conip.  Uws,  1873,  §  186,  189  ;  Smith  i*.  Shrievcs,  13  Ncv.  303.  Tliat  is, 
where  the  homestend  is  by  a  file<l  lieelnrntion,  it  is  joint  and  goes  to  the  sur^•ivor  ; 
but  if  of  the  eoiiunnn  proix-rty  and  giiined  by  occupancy  only,  it  is  enually  di%-ided 
U'twii-n  the  survivor  and  the  children.     Il>. 

*  r.en.  Uws,  1878,  c.  138,  §§  1,  5.  *  Barney  r.  Leeds,  51  N.  IL  253. 

*  Gen.  Uw^  1878,  c.  138,  §  6. 


364  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  L 

dren,  it  enures  to  his  widow  in  her  own  right,  during  her  life 
or  widowhood,  unless  she  have  another  homestead  in  her  own 
right.  Actual  occupancy  as  a  residence  is  essential  to  its 
being  exempted  as  a  homestead.^ 

17.  In  Ohio,  widows  and  widowers  having  an  unmarried 
child  living  with  them  as  a  part  of  their  family  have  this 
right,  as  do  husbands  and  wives  living  together  without  chil- 
dren.    The  exemption  is  to  the  head  of  a  family .^ 

18.  In  South  Carolina  and  Tennessee  the  exemption  is  in 
favor  of  "the  head  of  a  family."  ^  In  the  former  State,  after 
his  death,  his  widow  and  children  succeed  to  his  right,*  and 
during  his  lifetime  if  he  claim  no  homestead  his  wife  may,  in 
her  own  property.^  In  the  latter  State  he  must  be  a  house- 
holder,*^ and  his  widow  during  widowhood,  and  minor  children 
until  adult,  take  the  homestead  on  his  death.'  But  the  death 
of  wife  and  children  does  not  defeat  his  homestead.^ 

18  a.  In  Texas  it  is  to  "  a  family,"  which  the  courts  of  that 
State  hold  to  be  a  collective  body  of  persons  living  together 
within  the  same  curtilage,  subsisting  in  common,  directing 
their  attention  to  a  common  object,  and  it  continues  so  long 
as  any  constituent  of  the  family  survives.^  A  single  man  with- 
out servants  or  other  persons  living  with  him  cannot  claim  a 
homestead  exemption ;  ^°  and  adult  children  are  not  included.^^ 

19.  In  Vermont  the  exemption  is  to  a  housekeeper  or  head 

1  Const.  1868,  art.  10,  §§  2,  5  ;  Code,  1883.  Under  the  constitution,  the  widow 
has  homestead  only  if  there  are  no  children,  minor  or  adult.  Wharton  v.  Leggett, 
80  N.  C.  169.  And  the  children  only  during  minority.  Hagar  v.  Nixon,  69  N.  C. 
108  ;  Simpson  v.  Wallace,  83  N.  C.  477. 

-  Stat,  of  1860  and  1868. 

3  S.  C.  Const,  art.  2,  §  2  ;  Gen.  Stat.  1882,  §  1994  ;  Tenn.  Const,  art.  11, 
§  11.  But  where  one  marries  a  person  marriage  with  whom  is  forbidden  by  law, 
he  cannot  claim  a  homestead.     Owen  v.  Bracket,  7  Lea,  448. 

*  Gen.  St.  §  1997  ;  Moore  v.  Parker,  13  S.  C.  486. 

5  Gen.  St.  §  2000.  6  Tenn.  St.  1871,  §  2030. 

'  Id.  §  2119  ;  Simpson  v.  Poe,  1  Lea,  701. 

8  Webb  V.  Cowley,  5  Lea,  722. 

9  Texas  Const.  §  22  ;  Rev.  Stat.  1879,  art.  2335,  2336  ;  Homestead  Cases,  31 
Tex.  680  ;  Abuey  v.  Pope,  52  Tex.  288.  Thus  where  a  widow's  only  family  were 
the  grandchildren  of  her  husband  by  a  former  marriage.  Wolfe  v.  Buckley. 
52  Tex.  641. 

If  Homestead  Cases,  31  Tex.  678. 

"  Rev.  Stat.  §§  2004,  2005  ;  Roco  v.  Green,  50  Tex.  483. 


ru.  IX.  §  2.]  EsTATh:.S  uv  makimage,  .%*> 

of  a  family  ;  ^  in  Virpiniii,  to  a  honsi-hoUlcr  or  licad  of  a  fam- 
ily,'-and  in  each  State  the  widow  and  minor  children  Hnccecd 
to  the  homestead  wliile  Buch.^  Hut  if  the  widow  has  no  ehil- 
dreu  and  the  estate  owes  uo  debts,  she  cannot  claim  homestead 
as  airainst  the  heirs,* 


DIVISION   II. 

IN    WHAT    IIOMRSTKAD    RIC.HTS    MAV    BE    CLAIMED. 

1.     0(TU|>aucy  and  n'sidcncc  essential  to  the  right. 
la,  1/'.   What  Ls  exempted  in  Alabama  and  Arkansas. 
2,  2ii.  What  is  cxcmiitcd  under  this  right  in  Califoniia  and  Florida. 

3.  What  is  exempted  in  Georgia. 

4.  What  i.s  exempted  in  Illinois. 

5.  What  is  oxeiniitod  in  Indiana. 

6-Gc.  What  is  exempted  in  Iowa,  Kansas,  Kentucky,  and  Louisiana. 
7,  7«.  Wiuit  is  e.xempted  in  ilaiiic  and  Maryland, 

8.  Wliat  is  exenn>ted  in  ilo^ssachusetts. 

9.  Wliat  is  cxeinjited  in  Michigan. 
10.     What  is  exempted  in  Minnesota. 

11-11  (T.  What  is  exemjjted  in  Mississijipi,  Missouri,  Nebraska,  and  Nevada. 

12,  12<i.   What  is  exempted  in  New  Hampshire  and  New  Jersey. 

13,  13'f.    Wliat  is  exempted  in  New  York  and  North  Carolina. 

14.  What  is  exempted  in  Ohio. 

15.  What  is  exempted  in  Pennsylvania. 

16,  16  a.  What  is  exempted  in  South  Carolina  and  Tennessee 

10.     What  is  exempted  in  Texas. 
18,  18  a.  What  is  exempted  in  VeiTnont  and  Virginia. 

19.  Wliat  is  exempted  in  Wisconsin. 

20.  Nature  and  extent  of  ownership  requisite. 

21.  What  is  exempted  from  execution  in  the  other  States. 

1.  When,  in  the  second  place,  it  is  considered  of  what  projv 
erty  a  homestead  right  may  be  predicated,  although  varying 
in  different  States  in  the  value  exempted  and  the  extent  and 
nature  of  the  ownership  required,  it  will  be  found  that  in  some 
respects  the  laws  of  all  the  States  substantially  agree,  especi- 

»  Rev.  Laws,  1890,  §  1894. 

'  Const,  art.  11,  §  1  ;  and  does  not  ext<>nd  to  an  unmarried  man  with  no  chil- 
dren or  dependent  persons  living  with  him.     Cnlbonn  v.  Williams,  32  Gratt.  18. 

•  Vt.  Rev.  Uws,  §  1898  ;  Va.  Co<le,  1873,  c,  183,  §  8. 

*  Helm  r.  H.lm,  30  Gratt  404, 


366  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [bOOK   I. 

ally  in  requiring  the  premises  to  be  occupied  for  family  pur- 
poses as  a  home  by  one  who  is  a  resident  thereon,  and  makes 
it  the  dwelling-place  of  his  family.  This  principle  runs  through 
almost  all  the  cases,  though  a  difference  of  construction  will 
be  found  to  have  been  applied  in  limiting  what  is  embraced  in 
the  term  homestead.  And  although  the  bankrupt  laws  of  the 
United  States  are  required  by  the  Constitution  to  be  uniform, 
what  is  meant  by  uniformity  relates  to  the  States,  and  not  to 
State  exemption  laws.  It  means  that  what  remains  after  such 
exemptions  shall  be  equally  distributed  among  creditors.^ 

1  a.  In  Alabama  the  amounts  exempted  under  the  home- 
stead laws  have  been  essentially  changed  from  time  to  time, 
which  has  raised  the  question  whether  an  increased  exemp- 
tion was  constitutional  as  to  existing  debts.^  The  constitu- 
tion of  1868  exempts  eighty  acres  of  land  and  the  dwelling 
thereon,  if  without  the  limits  of  a  city,  town,  or  village,  or 
any  lot  in  a  city,  town,  or  village,  with  a  dwelling  owned  and 
occupied  by  a  resident  of  the  State,  not  exceeding  in  value 
$2,000 ;  by  the  later  code  the  amount  is  increased  to  one  hun- 
dred and  sixty  acres.^  And  it  seems  to  be  necessary  that  it 
should  be  occupied  by  the  one  claiming  the  exemption.^  Hence 
the  parcels  of  which  it  is  composed  cannot  be  separate,  if 
not  adjacent  or  used  in  connection.^  A  widow  is  entitled  to 
homestead  in  lands  to  which  her  husband  was  equitably  en- 
titled.^ And  when  the  land  is  sold  by  legal  process,  the 
exemption  applies  to  the  proceeds."  The  homestead  may  be 
in  lands  held  in  common  as  well  as  in  severalty.® 

1  h.  The    exemption   in   Arkansas   is    not    to    exceed   one 

1  In  re  Beckerkord,  19  Am.  Law  Eeg.  57,  59. 

2  Tliis  was  held  in  the  negative  in  Wilson  v.  BrowTi,  58  Ala.  62,  oveiTuling 
Sneiderv.  Heidelbarger,  45  Ala.  126,  134. 

3  Const,  art.  14,  §  2  ;  Code,  1876,  §  2820  ;  and  this  may  be  in  land  leased,  where 
the  tenant  has  a  right  to  remove  his  house.  Watts  v.  Gordon,  65  Ala.  546  ;  Code, 
§  2820. 

*  McConnaughy  v.  Baxter,  55  Ala.  379  ;  Pettus  v.  McKinney,  56  Ala.  41, 
Carlisle  v.  Godwin,  69  Ala.  137,  1403  verruling  Melton  v.  Andrews,  45  Ala.  454. 
And  it  cannot  be  rented  to  a  tenant.     Dexter  v.  Strobach,  56  Ala.  233. 

5  Pettus  V.  McKinney,  56  Ala.  41,  overruling  Pizzala  v.  Campbell,  46  Ala.  35. 

6  Munchus  V.  Harris,  69  Ala.  506. 

''  Garner  v.  Bond,  61  Ala.  84  :  Giddens  v.  Williamson,  65  Ala.  439. 
8  Code,  §  2820. 


en.  IX.  §  2.]  ESTATKS    IIV    MAItlMAnE.  ?,l]' 

liim<lr(>d  and  .sixty  ini«-s  of  land,  or,  if  in  a  city  or  fnun,  a  li»t 
wliicli  is  the  iv.sidcnfc  of  tlic  hoiisrhnlder  clainiinLr  it  ;  '  not  to 
exceed  'i'5,0U0  in  value.''^  By  "city  nv  town  Int  "  is  ni*:int  the 
lot  on  wliii'li  tlie  debtor  lives,  irr('S|t(_'ctivc  (»f  the  lines  liy  which 
the  lots  of  (he  city  were  laid  out.  The  statute  is  held  to  he 
remedial  in  its  character,  and  is  to  he  liheiaiiy  construed.^ 
Continuous  oceupaney  is  not  required,  and  tenipoi-ary  use  for 
husiness  purposes  does  not  div(>rt  the  homestead  character.* 
Homestead  may  be  claimed  in  lands  held  in  common.'' 

*2.  In  California  the  exeni]i(ion  is  of  a  lot  of  land  and  a 
dwellin«r-house  thcre(jn,  and  its  apiturtenances  not  exceeding 
five  thousand  dollars  in  value.''  iJomestcad  docs  not  depend 
upon  the  nature  of  the  title;  a  naked  possessicm  will  he  suffi- 
cient as  to  everybody  but  the  ritrhtful  owner.'  It  will  he  ex- 
empt from  a  forced  sale,  except  for  certain  dcbts.^  Declaring 
it  a  homestead,  however,  does  not  protect  it  against  the  true 
owner.*'  The  occupancy  must  be  with  an  intent  to  make  it  a 
homestead. ^"^  And  accordingly  it  was  held  not  to  embrace  a 
store,  office,  billiard-room,  bar-room,  or  theatre,  gas-factory,  or 
storehouse,  although  the  family  might  occu]»y  rooms  upon  the 
second  floor  of  such  building.'^  It  need  not  be  in  a  compact 
form,  and  may  be  intersected  by  highways.  There  is  no  limit 
as  to  the  quantity ;  only  as  to  its  uses  and  value.  Xor  is  it  in- 
consistent with  its  being  a  place  of  business  by  the  family ,^2 
or  that  the  premises  were  a  hotel  kept  by  the  owner,  who 

»  Const.  186S,  art.  12,  §  3  ;  Stat.  1858,  c.  68  ;  Greenwood  v.  Maddox,  27  Ark. 
648,  6j7. 

'  Const,  ubi  supra :  19  Am.  L.  Reg.  4. 

•  Wassail  r.  Tunnah,  25  Ark.  101. 

•  EuiKT  V.  Atkins,  37  Ark.  283  ;  Klcnk  v.  KnoMc,  Id.  298  ;  Webb  v.  Davis, 
Id.  551. 

»  Greenwood  v.  Maddo.x,  27  Ark.  648  ;  Sentell  i'.  Armor,  35  Ark.  49. 

•  Hittell  Code,  §§  6237,  6260;  McDonald  v.  Badger,  23  Cal.  398;  Titcomb's 
Est.,  Myrick'H  Prob.  55.  And  if  the  declaration  be  for  a  lot  worth  more,  it  is  bad. 
Ames  r.  El.lred.  55  Cnl.  136.     Cf.  Read  ».  Rahm,  65  Cal.  343. 

^  Brook.1  V.  Hyde,  37  Cal.  366.  8  Code,  §§  6240,  6241. 

»  Spencer  v.  Geissman,  37  C.il.  96;  Brooks  r.  Hyd.-,  37  Cal.  366;  Code,  §  6240. 

•«  Ilolden  r.  Pinney,  6  Cal.  234;  Reek's  Est.,  Myrick's  Prob.  59. 

"  Heyuolds  v.  Pixley.  6  Cnl.  165;  A.kley  v.  Chamberlain,  16  Cal.  191;  Riley 
V.  Pehl.  23  Cul.  70;  Cameto's  Est..  Myri-k's  Pn.b.  42. 

"  Estnt."  nf  Dclnney,  37  Cal.  176;  Gregg  f.  Bostwick,  33  Cal.  220:  Mnnn  r. 
Bogers.  35  Cal.  316,  819. 


368  LAW   OF   REAL    PROPERTY.  [BOOK    I. 

claimed  the  right  of  homestead,  although  he  entertained 
boarders,  lodgers,  and  travellers  therein.^  It  has  been  said 
that  it  must  be  a  dwelling-place  where  the  family  permanently 
reside.^  But  it  need  not  be  a  permanent  residence,  only  there 
must  be  an  actual  occupancy  when  it  is  set  out ;  ^  and  the 
homestead  may  be  set  out  of  lands  held  in  joint  tenancy  or  by 
tenancy  in  common,  though  held  otherwise  under  an  earlier 
statute.*  "Where,  therefore,  the  owner  of  premises  had  a  wife 
in  another  State  from  which  he  had  removed,  he  was  held  not 
to  have  gained  for  them  the  character  of  homestead,  until  he 
had  removed  his  wife  and  commenced  actually  occupying  the 
same  with  her.^  So,  where,  during  the  absence  of  his  wife,  a 
husband  acquired  an  estate,  it  was  held  that  no  right  of  home- 
stead attached  thereto  until  she  returned,  and  they  began  to- 
gether actually  to  occupy  the  same.^  And  if  a  man  owning 
an  estate  marry  a  wife  and  carry  her  to  live  upon  it,  it  becomes 
a  homestead.  But  if  he  marry  a  woman  having  lands,  and  go 
to  live  with  her  upon  her  lands,  it  is  said  to  be  doubtful  if 
such  an  occupancy  gives  to  it  the  character  of  a  homestead." 
Citizenship  is  not  requisite.  A  residence  is  sufficient  to  entitle 
one  to  claim  a  homestead.^  Homestead  cannot  be  claimed  of 
estates  held  in  partnership.^ 

2  a.  By  the  constitution  of  Florida,  the  exemption  of  home- 
stead extends  to  one  hundred  aud  sixty  acres  of  land,  or  half 
an  acre  within  an  incorporated  city  or  town,  owned  by  the  head 
of  a  family  residing  in  the  State.  And  where  the  property  is 
in  a  city  or  town,  it  is  not  to  extend  to  any  buildings  other 
than  the  residence  or  business  house  of  the  owner.^"^  There  is 
also  exempted  real  property  to  the  amount  of  one  thousand 
dollars  as  selected  by  such  owner,  to  be  held  free  from  debts 

1  Ackley  v.  Chamberlain,  aup.  ^  Cook  v.  McChristian,  4  Cal.  23. 

8  Const,  art.  11,  §  15;  Stat.  1868,  p.  116;  Prescott  u.  Prescott,  45  Cal.  5S; 
Babcock  v.  Gibbs,  52  Cal.  629;  Dorn  v.  Howe,  Id.  630. 

*  Stat.  1868;  Seaton  v.  Son,  32  Cal.  481  ;  S.  Barbara  Bk.  v.  Guerra,  61  Cal. 
109. 

6  Gary  v.  Tice,  6  Cal.  625  ;  Benedict  v.  Bunnell,  7  Cal.  245. 

6  Rix  V.  McHenry,  7  Cal.  89  ;  Elmore  v.  Elmore,  10  Cal.  224. 

7  Revalk  v.  Kraemer,  8  Cal.  66,  71;  Eiley  v.  Pehl,  23  Cal.  74. 

8  Dawley  v.  Ayers,  23  Cal.  108.  »  Kingsley  v.  Kingsley,  39  Cal.  665. 
10  Con.st.  1868,  art.  9,  §  1;  19  Am.  L.  Reg.  4;  Fla.  Dig.  1881,  c.  104,  §  1. 


(11.  IX.   §   -2.]  ESTATFW    UV    M.UHU.vr.E.  8«)9 

iiitiuifd  bi'foi'o  May  lO,  Is*)');^  and  farnirrs  lioM  as  rxciuitt 
forty  acn-s,  with  an  adtlitioii  of  fivi'  lunrc  for  cacli  cliild.'- 

;'>.  In  (irniL-'ia  the  i'X(in|ition  originally  cxtcnd«'«l  t<>  fifty 
acn's  of  land  to  iIk-  lu-ad  of  the  family,  and  livo  acres  to  each 
of  lii.s  or  hur  ihildnn  nmli-r  the  au^c  of  fifteen  yeais.  I>nt  if 
the  lionu'stead  wa.s  in  a  eify,  town,  or  villajrc,  it  was  not  to 
exceed  two  hinidred  dujlai-s  in  valne.^  Cotton  and  wcjollen  fac- 
tories, mills,  and  machinery  propellecl  hy  water,  were  exclnded 
from  this  exemption."'  This  exemption,  which  is  alternative 
with  the  following:  one,''  is  now  limited  to  two  hnndrecl  dollars 
if  the  land  is  not,  and  live  hundred  dollars  if  it  is,  situated 
in  any  city,  town,  or  villa^^e  ;  and  the  additicjual  ])rovision 
extends  to  all  ehihlren  under  sixteen.*^  But  by  the  Constitu- 
tion of  ISOS,  art.  1>,  §§  1,  '2,  instead  of  the  prior  provision  as 
to  homestead,  it  is  competent  f(jr  the  head  of  a  family,  or  the 
guartlian  or  trustee  of  a  family  <jf  minor  children,  if  he  prefers 
it,  to  claim  an  exemption  in  real  and  j»ersonal  property  to  the 
value  of  ¥l,<)<)U  in  specie."  This  exemjttion  may  he  claimed 
in  new  laml  lioutdit  with  the  proceeds  of  the  old  Immestead,'* 
or  in  real  estate  held  in  partnershi]),'-'  or  held  iriider  a  bond 
for  a  deed,^''  hut  not  in  uninvested  eash,^'  nor  hy  the  lessee  in 
property  of  the  lessor. '- 

4.  In  lllin<»is  it  covers  the  lot  of  jrround  and  the  huildinirs 
thereon  occupied  as  a  residence,  of  a  value  not  exceeding  one 
thousand  dollars,^**'  and  if  the  homestead  is  sold  under  order  of 
court,  this  amount  of  the  i)rocceds  is  re.scrved  for  investment 
for  one  year.**  So  it  extends  to  each  of  two  lots  in  turn,  ex- 
cliauired  for  the  original  homestead,*^  and  continues  through 
mesne  conveyances,  though  made  with   the   intent  to   delay 

»  Dig.  1881,  c.  104,  §  2.  2  Dig.  1881,  c.  104,  §  7. 

»  Diiv.MiiKjrt  V.  ALston,  14  Ga.  271;  Cotlo,  1882,  §  20,  40. 

♦  (.'obb's  Dig.  38»,  390. 

*  «'i,niinlly  r.  Hanlwick,  61  Ga.  601;  Johnson  r.  RoWrta,  63  Ga.  167. 

•  e'od.-,  1882,  §  2040.  7  Code,  1882,  §  2002. 
'  Chfiiey  V.  IIohm-t,  59  Ga.  861. 

»  Newton  v.  Sununcy,  59  Ga.  397;  Huunicutt  v.  Summey,  63  Ga.  586;  but 
see  King  r.  Dillon,  66  Ga.  131. 

>•  Kalty  r.  Koss,  59  Ga.  862.  »  Jones  r.  Ehrlisch,  65  Ga.  546. 

"  Lht-rry  r.  Wan-,  63  Go.  289.  "  Kcv.  Stat.  1883,  c.  52,  §  1. 

"  IJ.  c.  52,  §§  6.  7. 
"  »,  niwfonl  r.  Richcson,  101  111.  3:.l. 
vol    I— 24 


370  LAW  OP  REAL  PROPERTY,  [cOOK  I. 

creditors.^  But  it  does  not  extend  to  two  lots,  though  of  a 
less  value  than  the  prescribed  sum,  where  the  dwelling-house 
is  upon  one  of  these,  and  the  other  is  used  to  supply  the  occu- 
pant of  the  first  with  firewood.  Whether  land  contiguous  to 
that  upon  which  is  the  dwelling-house  is  a  part  of  the  home- 
stead, is  a  question  for  the  jury.^  But  the  right  cannot  exist 
beyond  the  duration  of  the  estate  of  the  owner  in  the  prem- 
ises.^ If,  therefore,  his  title  expires  during  his  life,  his  widow 
can  claim  no  right  in  the  premises.'  Nor  can  the  right  of 
homestead  attach  to  a  building  standing  upon  another's  land.* 
It  is  enough,  however,  that  he  own  the  land  in  fee  for  life  or 
a  term  of  years,  or  that  he  holds  the  land  under  a  bond  for  a 
deed.^  But  he  can  have  but  one  homestead ;  and  he  must, 
moreover,  occupy  it  to  make  it  such ;  purchasing  it  for  that 
purpose  is  not  enough.^  To  constitute  a  homestead,  there 
must  be  a  dwelling-place  upon  the  premises.  But  it  may  be  a 
cabin  or  a  tent,  if  it  be  the  home  of  the  family.'^  And  under 
that  term  may  be  included  a  dwelling-house,  smoke-house, 
stable,  and  house-lot,  and  ground  connected  therewith  and 
used  for  domestic  and  family  purposes.  But  it  would  exclude 
d  store  or  warehouse,  and  grounds  occupied  for  the  business 
done  in  them.^  But  if  once  gained,  a  continuous  occupation 
as  a  residence  is  not  essential  to  maintaining  the  homestead 
right  in  the  premises.^ 

5.  In  Indiana,  the  exemption  is  of  six  hundred  dollars  value 
of  property ;  and  this  may  be  of  real  or  personal  estate,  as  the 
debtor  may  elect,  to  be  designated  by  him,  or,  in  his  absence, 
by  his  wife.^^     But  a  debtor    cannot  claim  exemption  from 

1  Jjcupold  V.  Krause,  95  111.  440. 

2  Walters  v.  People,  18  111.  194;  s.  c.  21  111.  178,179;  but  see  Darby  v.  Dixon, 
4  111.  App.  187. 

"  So  where  the  widow  receives  a  sum  in  gross  for  her  right,  it  is  not  $1,000,  but 
her  life  interest  only  in  that  sum.     Merritt  v.  Merritt,  97  111.  243. 

4  Brown  v.  Keller,  32  111.  151. 

5  Blue  V.  Blue,  38  111.  918;  Tomlih  v.  Hilgard,  43  111.  300;  Conklin  v.  Foster, 
57  111.  104.  «  Tousville  v.  Pierson,  39  111.  447. 

7  Kitehell  v.  Burgwyn,  21  111.  40;  Deere  r.  Chapman,  25  III.  610. 

8  Reinbach  v.  Walter,  27  111.  394. 

9  Walters  v.  People,  sup. ;  Miller  v.  Marckle,  27  111.  402,  405;  Vanzant  v.  Van- 
zant,  23  111.  536;  Kenley  v.  Hudelson,  99  111.  493. 

10  Rev.  Stat.  1881,  §  703;  State  v.  Melogue,  9  lud.  196;  Const,  ait.  1,  §  42; 
Stat.  1862  and  1870. 


ill.   IX.   !^   2.]  ESTATES    KV    M  MIKI  VCE.  ?,7^ 

k'vv  ol  himl  iK'lon^iuj^  tn  his  wile,  or  ni   which  she  and  i\"\  h'' 
holds  the  (h'cd.i 

•  ">.  Ill  Iowa,  it  extends  to  the  house  made  use  of  \\y  thf 
owner,  or,  if  he  have  two,  the  one  whieh  he  may  eh-et,  toj_'ethei- 
with  one  or  more  contiguous  h>ts  with  the  buihlin^s  thereon, 
if  huhitually  occupied  in  good  faitli  as  a  part  of  the  homestead, 
not  to  exceed  half  an  acre  if  within  a  town,  or  forty  acres  out- 
side of  any  town  plot,  pntvided  the  wh(»le  do  not  exceed  live 
hundri'd  dollars  in  value.  In  addition  to  this,  it  includes  a 
shop  or  other  bnildin<rs  properly  ai»purtenant  to  the  home- 
stead, and  used  with  them  by  the  owner  in  the  prosecution  of 
his  business,  not  to  exceed  three  hundred  dollars  in  value.''^ 
If  a  new  homestead  is  bou<rht  with  tlie  proceeds  of  the  old  one, 
the  new  one  is  to  that  extent  exempt.'^  It  may  be  securecl  to 
the  owner  of  the  soil  on  which  a  Ituildinu;  of  three  stories 
stands,  and  be  confined  to  the  second  and  tliinl  story,  leavinir 
the  first  story  and  cidlar  inuler  it  subje<'t  to  sale  on  (>xecu<ion, 
to  be  lield  by  a  |»urchaser  as  lontr  as  it  is  tenantable.  The 
tenements,  however,  would  not  be  regarded  as  held  in  com- 
mon, but  as  beiufj^  adjat'ent  to  ea<-h  other.'*  And  if  the  forty 
acres  l)e  of  less  value  than  five  hundre<l  dcillars,  it  may  be 
increased  in  (piantity  to  that  value.''  \n  oider  to  be  exempt 
as  a  part  of  the  homestead,  it  must  be  habitually  and  in  trood 
faitli  used  as  such."  Where,  therefore,  one  owned  a  building 
in  a  part  of  which  he  resided,  and  parts  of  it  he  rented  to 
others  for  stores,  it  was  held  that  only  such  ]»arts  as  he  him- 
self thus  occupied,  and  such  as  were  used  with  these  as  proj)- 
erly  appurtenant  thereto,  were  exempt.  The  stores  were  not, 
since  the  object  of  the  statute  is  to  i)rotect  and  [)reserve  a 
home  for  the  family,  and  not  stores,  ofiices,  shops,  or  hotels, 
rented  to  others,  and  occupied  by  them."  Nor  does  the  riirht 
attach,  till  the  premises   are  actually  occupied  as  a   home. 

>  Hdlmiui  r.  Martin,  12  In<l.  r>'>:i. 

»  lU'v.  CixK-,  1^S0,  §§  l<»iM-l<tH7.  The  town  limits  referred  to  are  only  to  the 
town  Ian«l.H  j.lattt'd.     M(I)nni<l  r.  Mart-,  47  lown,  501». 

"  Thoniiwon  r.  Ro;,'crs,  r»l  Idwn,  33.3;  Jones  r.  Hranilt,  59  Iowa,  332. 

♦  .Mt'onnic  r.  Bishoji,  2S  Iowa,  233. 

'  Thcini  V.  Thorn,  14  lowa,  49.  «  Code,  §  Ut'j". 

^  KhclrM  r.  Mclorniick,  4  Iowa,  3GS:  Kurz  r.  Bruscb,  13  lowa.  :iri.  So 
Mayfield  r.  Maas<U-u,  59  Iowa,  517. 


372  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [bOOK   I. 

^lere  intention  to  occupy  is  not  enough,  nor  setting  out  the 
liomestead  and  recording  it,  unless  occupied  as  a  home  b}'  the 
family.^  An  occupation  of  the  premises,  and  a  use  of  a  house 
upon  the  same,  are  essential  to  the  investing  of  an  estate  with 
the  character  of  a  homestead.^ 

6  a.  In  Kansas,  the  constitution  and  statutes  of  the  State 
exempt  a  homestead  of  one  hundred  and  sixty  acres  of  farm- 
ing land,  or  an  acre  within  an  incorporated  town  or  city,  if 
occupied  by  the  owner  as  a  residence  of  the  family.^  Only 
one  acre  within  the  limits  of  a  city  is  exempt,  whether  worth 
ten  or  ten  thousand  dollars,  whether  he  live  on  it  or  live  on 
an  adjacent  lot  which  extends  into  and  includes  a  part  of  the 
lands  within  the  city.  But  one  hundred  and  sixty  acres  of 
farming  land  are  exempt.*  If  one  purchase  an  estate  as  a 
homestead,  and  move  on  to  it  within  a  reasonable  time  after 
such  purchase,  he  will  hold  it  as  such  from  the  date  of  the 
purchase.^  The  exemption  extends  to  leased  lands,  where  the 
tenant  owns  the  house.^ 

6  b.  The  exemption  in  Kentucky  is  of  so  much  land,  includ- 
ing the  dwelling-house  standing  thereon,  as  does  not  exceed 
one  thousand  dollars  in  value,^  and  attaches  though  the  land  is 
only  held  under  a  bond  for  a  deed.^  And  if  the  land  is  sold 
under  order  of  court,  so  much  of  the  proceeds  as  are  exempt 
will  be  reinvested  by  the  court.^ 

6  c.  In  Louisiana  it  extends  to  one  hundred  and  sixty  acres 
of  land,  with  the  building  and  improvements,  occupied  as  a 
residence  by  the  owner  thereof,  and  owned  bona  fide  by  him, 
which,  with  sundry  enumerated  articles  of  personal  property, 
are  not  to  exceed  two  thousand  dollars.^*^  But  there  can  be  no 
homestead  in  property  not  held  in  severalty .^^ 

1  Christy  v.  Dyer,  14  Iowa,  438;  Davis  v.  Kelley,  14  Iowa,  523;  Cole  v.  Gill, 
14  Iowa,  527. 

2  Elston  V.  Robinson,  23  Iowa,  208. 

3  Const,  art.  15  §  9;  Comp.  Laws,  1879,  §  235. 
*  Sarahas  v.  Fenlon,  5  Kans.  592. 

s  Monroe  v.  May,  9  Kans.  475;  Gilworth  v.  Cody,  21  Kans.  702.  But  a 
liomestead  cannot  be  claimed  by  one  insolvent  in  lands  bought  with  the  proceeds 
of  goods  got  on  credit  and  by  fraud.     Long  v.  Murphy,  27  Kans.  375. 

e  Hogan  v.  Manners,  23  Kans.  551.  "'  Stat.  1873,  c.  38,  art.  13,  §  9. 

8  Griffin  v.  Procter,  14  Bush,  571.  ^  McTaggert  v.  Smith,  14  Bush,  414. 

10  Kev.  Stat.  1870,  §  1691.  "  Greig  v.  Eastiu,  30  La.  Ann.  pt.  2,  1130. 


ClI.  IX.  §  -.]  r-TMi-^    i:V    MKKItlAGE.  "1'^ 

7.  In  Maine  (lir  i\rni|iii(»ii  is  ul  a  lot  of  laml  and  tlwellin;:- 
honsi',  and  «»utljuildinir?<  tlifn-on,  not  rxcccdintr  five  luindrcil 
dollars  in  vulnc' 

7  a.  I5y  tho  l.iw8  of  M.iivland  a  dt  lit<»r  may  s(  left  ival   or 

personal    OStatO    of    tlu'    vl'"-  "f    "I|.'   liiml!-,  ,1   ilollirs.   in  lie  :iS- 

cCrdi'ncjl  by  appraisal.- 

8.  In  Massai'linsetts  the  honicHlcad  may  bo  a  farm  or  lot  ol 
land  and  buildlnirs  tla'rcon,  ownod  and  jtosscssed  by  lease  or 
i/lheruise,  oocn|>iod  by  Ihc  debtor  as  a  residence,  not  exceed- 
injj^  ci;rlit  hnndrcd  dollars  in  value  ;  and  the  widow  may  claim 
it,  thon^di  she  rent  a  part  or  all  of  the  j)remises.3  The  ritrht 
does  not  attach  until  the  owner  has  a  deed  of  the  estate;  nor 
would  it  retroact  to  the  date  of  the  bond  under  wliich  llie  f*m- 
veyance  is  nuide,  thou;^di  the  deed  be  delivered  in  aec<»rdanee 
with  ilH  provisions.''  Nor  does  the  riirlit  attach  in  fav(U"  of  one 
ownin;.^  an  estate  upon  which  he  has  bc_nin  to  erect  a  dwellinir- 
house,  imlll  he  has  be^'un  to  oeeii]iy  that  as  a  h<»usehoMer  for 
a  residence,  although  he  nuiy  formally  have  declared  his  inten- 
tion to  liold  it  as  a  homestead.^  IJut  if  an  estate  is  under  an 
e:;istin^  mort^jage,  when  made  a  lujmestead,  it  becomes  ex- 
empt as  such,  except  as  to  such  mortgage ;  nor  can  such  right 
be  creati'd  so  as  to  affect  existing  mortgages,  liens,  or  in- 
eumbrances.*  And  where  a  mortgagee,  having  an  existing 
mcrtgage,  gave  it  up  and  took  a  new  one  on  the  same  estate,  it 
was  held  not  to  let  in  the  wife's  claim  to  hcmiestead  as  against 
this  new  mortgage,  the  taking  of  the  new  being  a  jiart  of  the 
transaction  of  giving  up  the  old  one.'  The  right  may  attach 
to  an  estate  kejtt  by  the  owner  as  a  hotel  in  the  country,  though 
it  might,  perhaps,  be  otherwise  in  a  city;®  or  to  an  entire 
house,  though  the  owner  lease  some  of  the  rooms.^  It  does 
not  attach  to  land  held  in  common  and  undivided.'"     Nor  will 


»  Kev.  Stat.  1S83,  c.  81,  §  C3.  -  ll.v.  Code,  l57S,  uit.  G».  §  151. 

«  Pull.  Stat.  c.  123;  Mmier  v.  Chace,  11  AlKn,  KM. 

♦  Tliui>ton  V.  Maddocks,  6  Allen,  427.  »  Uv  v.  Miller,  11  Allen,  37. 

«  Tul).  Stat.  c.  1'23,  §  6.  ■    Hums  v.  Thayer,  lol  .Mn.ss.  42rt. 

•  ImzvW  v.  Ijuell,  8  Allen.  575.  »  .Merrier  r.  Cliaee,  11  Allen,  194. 
-'  Thurston  v.  MaiMock*,  6  Allen,  4'27;     Howes  r.  Hurt,  130  Ma-ss.  3»>8.     But 

the  n«!iignnicnt  to  a  widow  of  dower  in  .ipccific  purls  of  the  estate  whieh  her  lius- 
Intid  held  aa  a  homestead  at  his  death  does  not  rvnder  her  n  tenant  in  common 
with  the  heir  so  as  to  defeat  her  homestead.     Wellcr  v.  Wellcr,  131  3Ia&s.  446. 


374  LA"^  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

it  cover  land  lying  two  and  a  half  miles  from  the  home- 
stead farm  of  the  OTrner,  and  used  by  him  for  pasturing  his 
cattlc.i 

9.  The  constitution  of  Michigan  exempts  a  homestead  if 
not  exceeding  forty  acres,  with  a  dwelling-house  thereon,  if  in 
an  agricultural  district,  and  if  in  a  city,  village  or  town  plat, 
any  lot  or  parts  of  a  lot  equal  thereto,  with  a  dwelling-house 
thereon,  the  whole  in  either  case  not  to  exceed  fifteen  hundred 
dollars  in  value.^  But  it  is  essential  that  the  premises  should 
contain  a  dwelling-house  and  appurtenances,  and  should  be 
owned  and  occupied  by  him,  as  a  homestead,  who  sets  up  the 
right.^  Where,  therefore,  the  owner  of  a  lot  of  land  erected 
thereon  a  double  house,  and  rented  one  of  the  tenements,  and 
occupied  the  other,  he  was  entitled  to  exemption  as  to  one, 
and  not  as  to  the  other,  although  both  did  not  exceed  in  value 
fifteen  hundred  dollars,  and  the  back-yard  of  the  buildings 
was  occupied  by  the  tenants  of  the  house  in  common.^  A 
husband  may  have  a  homestead  in  property  to  which  he  has 
only  an  equitable  title ;  nor  does  he  lose  it  by  making  use  of 
the  rooms  in  the  dwelling-house  for  a  shop,  post-office,  or 
the  like.  The  estate  of  the  wife  occupied  by  her  and  her 
husband  may  be  exempt  as  a  homestead ;  ^  and  a  homestead 
can  be  owned  and  occupied  by  husband  and  wife  as  tenants 
in  common.^ 

10.  In  Minnesota,  the  exemption  by  the  constitution  is  "  a 
reasonable  amount  of  property."  And  this  was,  at  first,  lim- 
ited by  statute  to  land  and  buildings  of  the  value  of  one  thou- 
sand dollars.  But  afterwards  it  was  extended  to  include  one 
lot,  if  in  an  incorporated  city,  village,  or  town,  or  eighty  acres 
in  an  agricultural  district,  measured  by  area  and  not  value.'^ 

■  1  Adams  v.  Jenkins,  16  Gray,  146. 

2  Const,  art.  16,  §  2  ;  Coiup.  Laws,  1871,  §§  6137,  6138;  Dye  u.  Mann,  10 
Mich.  291 ;  McKee  v.  Wilcox,  11  Mich.  358. 

8  Beecher  v.  Baldy,  7  Mich.  488;  Coolidge  v.  Wells,  20  Mich.  79,  87. 

*  Beecher  v.  Baldy,  sitp.;  Dyson  v.  Sheley,  11  Mich.  527.  So  where  part  of 
the  homestead  lot  was  covered  by  a  building,  the  main  part  of  which  stood  on 
another  lot,  the  part  so  covered  was  held  not  to  be  exempt.  Geney  v.  Maynard, 
44  Mich.  578. 

6  Orr  V.  Shraft,  22  Mich.  260.  6  Lozo  v.  Sutherland,  38  Mich.  168. 

7  Stat.  1878,  c.  68,  §  1;  Tillotson  v.  Millard,  7  Minn.  513  ;  Sumner  v.  Saw- 
telle,  8  Minn.  321  ;   Cogel  v.  Mickow,  11  Minn.  475. 


CII.  IX.  §  -.]  ESTATES    UY    .MAK1MA(;E.  :""' 

It  is  essential  to  its  hciiii^  exoinj)t(:'(l,  that  it  should  ho  opciii.ittl 
by  the  dchtor  or  his  widow  or  luiiior  children,  and  continue  so 
to  bu.  But  it  mutters  not  how,  so  lon^  as  it  is  the  place  of 
their  residence  and  has  a  house  on  it.  If  the  owner  lets  it 
and  resides  elsewhere,  or  leaves  it  vacant,  it  cannot,  durinir 
such  time,  be  a  homestead.*  The  premises,  therefore,  nmst 
h.ivc  upon  them  a  dwellin<j:-houso  and  appurtenances,  and 
must  be  owned  by  the  occupant,  who  is  a  resident  of  the 
Stale,  and  he  alone  can  select  the  exempted  premises,  or 
srt  up  the  exeuijition.''*  But  the  exemption  extends  to  a 
house  o('cuj»ied  l)y  the  debtor,  though  not  his  own  jtrojtei-ty, 
if  he  claims  it  as  a  homestead.^  liut  to  sustain  a  home- 
sttad  exemption,  the  owner  nuist  have  or  must  have  had 
his  residence  thereon;  nor  can  he  claim  it  in  a  lot  which 
touches  his  homestead  at  one  corner  only ;  *  nor  in  an  undi- 
vided half  of  two  lots  which  together  do  not  exceed  one  city 
lot.*  But  ownership  of  an  undivided  interest  will  give  the 
occupant  homestead.^ 

11.  In  Mississipjji  eighty  acres  of  land  are  exempted  to  every 
citi/en  who  is  a  householder  with  a  family,  actually  occujjied 
by  the  owner,  and  not  exceeding  two  thousand  dollars  in  value  ; 
and  if  in  a  city,  town,  or  village,  every  householder  is  entitled 
to  the  land  and  buildings  actually  occupied  by  him,  of  the 
value  of  two  thousand  dollars,  exemj)t  from  seizure,  levy,  and 
sale  upon  execution,'  instead  of  what  had  jireviously  been  ex- 
empted. But  it  is  not  impressed  with  the  character  of  home- 
stead until  it  is  occupied  by  the  debtor;  and,  as  a  general  rule, 
to  constitute  a  homestead,  there  must  be  a  continued  occuj)a- 
tion  and  use  of  the  premises  as  a  home  for  the  familv,  thoutrh 
it  may  be  an  individual  interest  and,  in  some  cases,  an  occu- 
pancy by  a  tenant  will  be  sullicient,  if  the  family  cannot  occupy 

»  Folsom  V.  Carii,  5  Minn.  337  ;  Kelly  v.  Baker,  10  Minn.  154.  By  Stat. 
1878,  c.  68,  §  9,  8i.x  months"  absence  forfeits  it  unless  it  is  by  a  recorded  claim, 
and  tlien  five  years'  absence  is  ie<]uired. 

«  Sumner  r.  .Sawtelle,  sup.;  Tillotson  v.  Millard,  sup. 

«  Stat.  1373.  .  «  Kresin  r.  Mau,  15  Minn.  116. 

*  W:ird  V.  Huhn,  16  Minn.  159. 

•  Kaser  v.  Haas,  27  Minn.  406. 

7  Hev.  Co<le,  18S0,  §§  1248,  1249  ;  19  .Am.  L.  Keg.  11,  12  ;  Morrison  v.  Mc 
Daniel,  30  Mijis.  217  ;  Johnson  v.  Richardson,  33  Miss.  462. 


37G  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

it  themselves,  as  where  a  widow  died  leaving  an  infant  child 
who  was  entitled  to  a  homestead.^ 

11  a.  In  Missouri  the  law  exempts  a  dwelling  house  and 
appurtenances  used  and  occupied  as  a  homestead  ;  and  if  in  the 
country,  one  hundred  and  sixty  acres  of  land,  if  it  do  not 
exceed  fifteen  hundred  dollars  in  value ;  and  if  in  a  city  of 
forty  thousand  people,  not  more  than  eighteen  square  rods, 
and  not  exceeding  three  thousand  dollars.  If  in  a  city  of 
a  less  nmnber  of  inhabitants,  thirty  square  rods,  and  not  ex- 
ceeding fifteen  hundred  dollars  in  value.^  Under  the  law  of 
1864  a  less  amount  in  value  was  exempt.  And  it  was  held 
that  a  homestead  may  be  get  apart  in  leasehold  property  of  a 
debtor,^  or  in  property  where  the  owner  has  rented  all  but 
one  room,  if  he  still  controls  the  home.^  But  no  homestead 
can  be  claimed  in  the  proceeds  of  land.^ 

11  b.  The  exemption  in  Nebraska  is  of  a  homestead  con- 
sisting of  not  exceeding  one  hundred  and  sixty  acres,  with  a 
dwelling-house  thereon,  if  in  the  country ;  or  if  in  a  city  or  in- 
corporated town  or  village,  any  quantity  of  land  not  exceeding 
two  lots,  owned  and  occupied  by  the  debtor,  a  resident  and 
head  of  a  family ;  provided  the  value  does  not  exceed  two 
thousand  dollars.^     It  extends  to  aliens  as  well  as  citizens.'^ 

11  c.  The  homestead  exempted  by  the  law  of  Nevada  con- 
sists of  land  and  a  dwelling-house  not  exceeding  five  thousand 
dollars  in  value.  There  is  no  restriction  as  to  any  other  uses 
to  be  made  of  the  premises  if  occupied  for  a  homestead.^ 
Erecting  a  house  and  residing  in  it  dedicates  it  as  a  home- 
stead, though  large  enough  for  a  lodging-house,  and  used  for 
that  purpose,^  or  though  there  are  stores  on  the  homestead  lot.^^ 
But  there  can  be  no  homestead  in  partnership  real  estate. ^^ 

12.  In  New  Hampshire  the  exemption  extends  only  to  an 
estate  worth  five  hundred  dollars,  which  the  owner  occupies 

1  Campbell  v.  Adair,  45  Miss.  170  ;  Partee  v.  Stewart,  50  Miss.  717  ;  King  v. 
Sturgs,  56  Miss.  606  ;  McGrath  v.  Sinclair,  55  Miss.  89. 

2  Pub.  Stat.  1879,  §  2689.  3  jn  re  Beckerkord,  19  Am.  L.  Eeg.  58. 
*  Brown  v.  Brown,  68  Mo.  388.            ^  Casebolt  v.  Donaldson,  67  Mo.  308. 

6  Comp.  Stat.  1881,  c.  36,  §  1.  ^  People  v.  McClay,  2  Neb.  7. 

8  Const,  art.  4,  §  30  ;  Comp.  Laws,  1873,  §  186  ;  Clark  v.  Shannon,  1  Nev.  568. 
»  Goldman  v.  Clark,  1  Xev.  607. 
I'J  Smith  V.  Stewart,  13  Nev.  65.  "  Terry  v.  Berry,  13  Xev.  514. 


(Ml.  IX.  §  '2.]  EST.VTK.S    BY    M.VUIU.Vr.E.  "77 

as  his  doniicil  or  IioiikmiikI  does  n(»t  nITri't  lots  mid  trncintnts 
nut  occupifil  juTsonally  by  tlie  head  of  the  family.  Tiit-  home- 
stead ri^djt,  in  other  words,  protcets  only  the  h«mio,  the  housf, 
and  the  adjacent  lands,  where  the  head  of  the  family  dwells, 
as  a  family  homestead,  thon^'h  these  may  he  of  less  value  than 
the  sum  of  live  Inmdred  dollars."  IJut  he  may  embrace  a  parcel 
of  land  on  which  he  cuts  hay  for  a  cow,  thouirh  a  mile  from 
his  dwellimr-house,  if  used  with  that,  and  if  both  do  not  exceed 
five  hundred  dollars  in  value.- 

12  a.  The  law  of  New  Jersey  exempts  the  lot  and  buildinj; 
thereon  standinir,  occujiicd  as  a  residence,  and  owned  by  the 
debtor  who  is  a  househ(dder,  of  the  value  of  one  thousand 
dollars.^ 

13.  In  New  York  the  lot  and  buildintrs  thereon  occupied  as 
a  residence  are  exempted  to  the  value  of  one  thousand  dol- 
lars.* 

13  rt.  In  North  Carolina  the  exemption  is  of  every  home- 
stead and  the  dwellinir-house  and  buildings  therewith  used, 
not  exceeding  one  thousand  dollars,  or  a  lot  in  a  city,  town,  or 
village,  with  a  dwelling-house  thereon,  owned  and  occupied 
by  a  resident  of  the  State,  of  the  value  of  one  thousand  dol- 
lars. And  an  occuj)ancy  as  an  actual  homestead  is  essential 
to  its  being  exempted.''  Ihit  tracts  not  contiguous  maybe  a 
liomestead,  if  their  whole  value  is  under  one  thousand  dol- 
lars.'^ 

14.  In  Ohio  a  family  homestead  of  the  value  of  one  thous- 
and dollars  is  exempt,  and  the  right  extends  to  lessees  and 
owners  of  buildings  standing  on  another's  land,'  and  also  to 
the  proceeds  of  the  sale  of  a  homestead.^ 

15.  In  Pennsylvania  a  right  of  homestead  docs  not  attach 
to  any  land,  until  the  owner  shall  have  elected  to  hold  it  as 
such,  and  then  only  to  the  value  of  three  hundred  dollars. 
But  the  right  of  a  debtor's  widow  to  the  benefit  of  this  doe.'? 

»  Gen.  Laws,  1873,  c.  138  ;  Xorris  i;.  Moulton.  34  N.  H.  392  ;  Hoitt  r.  Wobb, 
86  N.  H.  15S  ;  Horn  r.  Tufts.  30  N.  H.  484  ;  .Austin  r.  Stanley,  46  X.  H.  .^2. 

«  Buxton  r.  Dearborn,  46  N.  H.  43.  Cf.  Cole  v.  Sav.  Bk.,  59  N.  H.  53:  Rogers  r. 
Ashlami  Sav.  Rk.,  63  N.  H.  428;  Squire  r.  Mudgett,  Id.  71;  Lake  v.  Page,  Id.  318. 

•  Rev.  1877,  p.  1855.  «  4  Stat  at  Urge.  Pt.  3,  c.  260,  p.  682. 

»  Const.  1868,  art.  10,  §  2;  Code,  1883.     «  Code,  1883.  §  509. 

^  Rev.  Stot.  1880,  $§  5435,  5436.  «  Jarkson  v.  Reid,  32  Ohio  St.  448. 


378  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   1, 

not  depend  npon  the  condition  of  her  husband's  estate,  as  to 
being  solvent  or  not.^ 

16.  In  South  Carolina  the  law  exempts  a  homestead  of  one 
thousand  dollars,  it  being  a  family  homestead,^  and  whether 
owned  in  fee  or  for  a  less  estate.^ 

16  a.  In  Tennessee  the  exemption  is  of  a  dwelling-house, 
out-buildings,  and  land  appurtenant,  occupied  as  a  homestead, 
of  the  value  of  one  thousand  dollars.*  The  exemption  extends 
to  equitable  estates,^  and  to  leaseholds  if  from  two  to  fifteen 
years'  term  but  these  last  are  subject  to  the  payment  of  the 
rent.^  And  when  the  homestead  is  once  acquired,  a  gain  in 
value  will  not  affect  it.'''  Continued  possession  is  not  required,^ 
and  no  homestead  can  be  obtained  in  undivided  or  partnership 
property.^ 

17.  In  Texas  the  exemption  is  of  two  hundred  acres,  if  in 
an  agricultural  district ;  but  if  situated  in  a  town  or  city,  of 
premises  worth  five  thousand  dollars.  The  value  of  the  former 
is  not  restricted.  The  house  which  is  exempt  may  be  a  palace, 
a  cabin,  or  a  tent.'*^  The  city  or  town  exemption  may  extend 
to  one  or  more  lots,  contiguous  or  otherwise,  provided  they  are 
all  used  by  the  debtor  as  a  homestead,  and  do  not  exceed  the 
prescribed  value,  and  are  occupied  or  destined  as  a  family 
residence.  Both  rural  and  city  homesteads  may  consist  of 
several  separate  parcels,  provided,  in  case  of  the  city  home- 
stead, it  do  not  exceed  five  thousand  dollars.^^     And  if  one 

1  Purdon's  Dig.  9th  ed.  433  ;  Compher  v.  Compher,  25  Petin.  St.  31 ;  Hill  v. 
Hill,  32  Penn.  St.  511  ;  Dig.  1872. 

2  Const,  art.  2,  §  32;  Gen.  Stat.  1882.  §  1994  ;  Mannings.  Dove,  10  Rich.  403. 
8  Gen.  Stat.  1882,  §  1994. 

*  Const,  art.  41,  §  11  ;  Stat.  1871,  §  2010  ;  19  Am.  L.  Keg.  14. 
e  Stat.  1871,  §  2015.  »  Id.  §  2013. 

T  Hardy  v.  Lane,  6  Lea,  379. 

8  Roach  V.  Hacker,  3  Lea,  633  ;  Mclnturf  u.  "Woodruff,  9  Lea,  671.  In  the 
former  case,  however,  the  circumstances  amounted  to  an  abandonment. 

*  Avans  v.  Everett,  3  Lea,  76  ;  Chalfant  v.  Grant,  3  Lea,  118.  So  one  who 
leases  his  land  on  shares  and  lives  on  adjoining  lot  cannot  claim  homestead. 
Wade  V.  Wade,  9  Baxt.  612. 

1''  Const,  art.  22  ;  Franklin  v.  Coffee,  18  Tex.  416  ;  Homestead  Cases,  31  Tex. 
678  ;  Rev.  Stat.  1879,  art.  2335,  2336. 

"  Homestead  Cases,  31  Tex.  678  ;  Williams  v.  Hall,  33  Tex.  215  ;  Ragland  v. 
Rogers,  34  Tex.  617  ;  Rev.  Stat.  art.  2335,  2336  ;  Miller  v.  Menke,  56  Tex.  539. 
And  whether  a  lot  adjacent  to  the  dwelling-house  is  so  used  as  to  become  a  part 


cu.  IX.  §  2.]  E^^T\TK>  in'  *!Ai:r:i.\':K.  "70 

acquiiT  a  lioinestcad  of  less  value  than  live  thousand  dnlhns, 
ho  may  add  to  it  to  the  extent  of  tliat  sum,  and  hohl  it  as 
homestrud.*  A  rural  homestead  does  not  cease  to  be  such 
hy  heinix  emhrac«'d  in  a  city  or  town  hy  its  ^'rowth  and  expan- 
Rion.-  A  homestead  may  1)0  acijuired  l»y  a  tenant  in  common, 
in  an  estate  heUl  in  common  with  others.=^  And  it  wouhl  em- 
hracf  the  dlliee  of  a  lawyer,  or  the  shop  of  a  mechanic,  if  it 
stand  upon  a  eity  lot,  thouirh  it  he  upon  another  than  the  lot 
on  whieh  the  owner's  house  stands,  if  it  he  used  hy  the  owner 
in  connection  with  his  occupancy  of  such  dwelling-house.  But 
the  ofliec  of  a  single  man  is  not  oxem]ited.*  So  when  one  oc- 
cujiied  a  room  in  a  house  for  a  grocery,  and  another  for  a 
sleeping-room,  wliile  he  took  his  meals  at  another  jdace,  it  was 
liold  not  to  he  making  such  house  his  residence  or  place  where 
he  usually  sIoojjs  and  eats,  nor  to  constitute  a  homestead.^ 
But  a  liomestead  may  he  gained  by  the  owner  making  prepara- 
tion to  im|»rove  the  land,  if  carried  so  far  as  to  show  beyond 
a  douV)t  his  intention  to  complete  the  improvement,  and  a  resi- 
dence uj)on  it  as  a  home.'^  By  the  statute  of  1846,  if  one  hav- 
ing a  homestead  die  leaving  a  widow,  she  may,  as  head  of  the 
family,  have  a  right  to  the  land  of  such  homestead,  and  the 
improvements  thereon,  not  exceeding  five  hundred  dollars.  If 
the  improvements  exceed  that  value,  she  must,  in  order  to 
retain  them,])ay  to  his  administrator  the  excess  of  such  value. 
Otherwise,  he  may  sell  the  estate,  paying  her  the  value  of  the 
homestead  and  the  live  hundred  dollars  for  herself  and  her 
children." 

18.  The  statute  of  Vermont  exempts  a  dwelling-house,  out- 

of  the  homestead,  is  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury.  Arto  v.  Maydole,  54  Tex. 
244  ;  Amlicws  r.  Hajjaclon,  Id.  571. 

'  Camplxll  V.  Macinanus,  32  Tex.  451  ;  Macmanus  v.  Catni>V)ell,  37  Tex.  267. 

«  liassett  V.  ilessner,  30  Tex.  604. 

*  WiUiiims  V.  Wethered,  37  Tex.  130  ;  Smith  v.  Deschaumes,  37  Tex.  42tt  ; 
Clcuieiits  V.  Lacy,  51  Tex.  150  ;  Jenkins  v.  Volz,  54  Te.x.  636. 

*  Hancock  v.  Morgan,  17  Tex.  582  ;  Piyor  r.  Stone,  19  Tex.  371  ;  Stiiiley 
r.  Greenwood,  24  Tex.  224. 

*  Phiileo  V.  Smalley,  23  Tex.  498. 

«  franklin  c.  Cotfee,  18  Tex.  413  ;  Barnes  v.  White,  63  Tex.  628.  But 
where  land  was  taken  in  exchange  for  the  homestead,  no  homestead  chani<  tet 
attaches  thereto,  if  the  owner  did  not  intend  to  reside  there,  but  elsewhere.  Whit 
tcnberg  v.  Lloyd,  49  Tex.  633. 

'  \\\oi  V.  Wheeler,  7  Tex.  1325. 


380  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [i300K   L 

buildings,  and  lands  appurtenant,  occupied  as  a  homestead 
to  the  value  of  five  hundred  dollars. ^  This  may  be  cither  an 
equitable  or  a  legal  estate,  incumbered  or  unincumbered,  if 
owned  by  the  one  claiming  the  exemption.^  Occupation  by 
the  debtor  is  an  essential  requisite.^  It  would  not  be  sufficient 
that  it  was  occupied  by  a  tenant,  to  entitle  his  widow  to  claim 
homestead  in  the  premises.  Nor  could  she  claim  it  in  a  sepa- 
rate parcel  of  wood-land,  though  used  by  him  during  his  life 
to  supply  wood  for  his  dwelling-house,  nor  in  a  shop  and  land 
on  which  it  stands,  nor  the  pew  in  a  meeting-house  which  he 
had  occupied,^  nor  a  separate  parcel  not  adjoining  the  house- 
lot.^  But  where  husband  and  wife's  estate  in  New  Hampshire 
was  sold  on  execution,  and  five  hundred  dollars  as  homestead 
reserved  and  paid  over  to  them,  and  they  removed  to  Vermont, 
it  was  held  tliat  this  specific  sum,  if  retained  by  them,  was 
exempt  from  their  debts  under  their  homestead  rights  in 
Vermont.^ 

18  a.  The  exemption  in  Virginia  is  of  real  and  personal 
estate,  or  either,  not  exceeding  two  thousand  dollars,  to  be 
selected  by  the  householder."  It  extends  to  equitable  estates 
and  lands  held  in  common.^ 

19.  In  Wisconsin  the  statute  fixes  the  amount  of  property 
which  is  exempt  at  forty  acres,  if  used  for  agricultural  pur- 
poses, with  a  dwelling-house  thereon  and  its  appurtenances,  or 
if  in  a  city,  town,  or  village,  one  quarter  of  an  acre  with  the 
dwelling-house  and  appurtenances  thereon  occupied  by  the 
debtor,  irrespective,  in  either  case,  of  the  value  of  the  premises.® 
But  it  must  be  held  in  severalty,  in  order  to  be  exempt  as  a 
homestead.  A  mortgage,  therefore,  made  by  a  husband  of 
land  held  by  him  in  common  with  others,  was   held  to  be 

1  Rev.  Laws,  1880,  §  1894.     Cf.  Canfield  v.  Hard,  58  Vt.  217. 

2  Morgan  v.  Stearns,  41  Vt,  398  ;  Doane  v.  Doane,  46  Vt.  485. 

8  Howe  V.  Adams,  28  Vt.  544  ;  Jewett  v.  Brock,  32  Vt.  65  ;  Davis  v.  Andrews, 
30  Vt.  683  ;  McClary  v.  Bixby,  36  Vt.  257.  And  where  the  owner  of  two  farms 
lived  on  one,  but  intended  to  remove  to  the  other,  it  was  held  he  could  not  claim 
homestead  in  the  latter  before  actual  removal.     Goodall  v.  Boardman,  53  Vt.  92. 

*  True  V.  Morrill,  28  Vt.  672  ;  Davis  v.  Andrews,  sup. 

6  Mills  V.  Estate  of  Grant,  36  Vt.  269.  «  Keyes  v.  Bines,  37  Vt.  260. 

T  Const,  art.  11,  §  1  ;  Code,  1873,  c.  183,  §§  1,  2  ;  22  Am.  L.  Reg.  625. 

8  Code,  1873,  c.  183,  §  4. 

9  Rev.  Stat.  1878,  §  2983  ;  Phelps  v.  Rooney,  9  Wise.  70. 


(11.  IX.   ^  -J.]  E.STATE.'?    nV   M.VRRIAGE.  .'^81 

C'llfCtiKil  jiiTiiinst  any  claim  in'  tlic  wife.  (■\0('|)t  fordowor.'  iiut 
it  i.s  no  objection  to  the  ('.xtMuption  takin'j- flTcct,  that  the  house 
for  which  it  is  chiinieii  stands  upon  another's  land.'-  Nor  need 
the  chiiniant  have  a  [K-rfect  title  to  the  iirojieity.  It  niiist, 
however,  he  oeeui>icd  hy  him  in  seveialty,  and  he  Husceittihle 
of  heinir  set  out  by  metes  and  hounds.-'  An  unmiirried  man 
may  claim  it  if  lie  have  a  family  oceupyini,'  the  house  with 
him.*  The  term  homestead,  under  which  property  is  tlius  e.\- 
empted,  implies  that  it  is  the  land  where  is  situated  the  dwell- 
injx  t)f  the  owner  and  family,  in  a  reasonai)ly  compact  form, 
and  does  not  intend  sejiarate  and  disconnected  lots.*^  One 
havin<r  a  j>rairie  lot  with  a  house  on  it,  and  a  parcel  of  wood- 
land a  mile  distant  from  the  same,  it  is  not  embraced  in  a 
homestead  ritdit,  althouirh  he  <ret  his  wood  from  such  lot  for 
the  u.se  of  his  Ikmisc.''  So  with  a  city  lot."  If  it  be  a  city  lot, 
the  exem|ttion  only  extends  to  such  jtarts  of  it  as  are  occupied 
for  a  residence  or  home.  It  would  not  cover  stores,  ware- 
houses, or  ollices,  and  the  like,  which  are  let  by  the  owner; 
though  if  the  shi>p  stand  upon  the  same  lot  as  the  dwellintr- 
house,  antl  is  occuj>ied  by  the  owner,  it  may  i»e  includi'd  in 
the  exemption.® 

20.  There  is  a  different  rule  applied  in  different  States  in 
res|)ect  to  the  nature  and  extent  of  property  or  ownersliip 
re(iuisite  on  the  i)art  of  the  one  claiming  exemption  in  the 
premises  in  respect  to  which  it  is  sought  to  be  aj)plieil.  In 
Iowa,  Mississippi,  Texas,  and  other  States,  it  may  be  claimed 
in  an  estate  for  years."  In  Illinois,  in  a  life  estate."*  In  Ma.ssa- 
chusetts,  Michigan,  New  Hampshire,  Ohio,  and  Wisconsin,  a 
homestead  may  be  claimed  in  a  dwelling  house  belonging  to 
the  debtor,  which  stands  upon  the  land  of  another  l)y  virtue 
of  a  lease  to  the  owner  of  the  house.     And  in   Massachusetts 

'   W.St  r.  War.!,  26  Wi.sc.  579.  *  Co«le,  1873,  §  2983. 

«  Wfst  r.  Ward,  sup.  *  ilyers  v.  Ford,  22  Wise.  139. 

*  liiitiker  r.  Locke,  15  Wise.  635. 

«  Bunker  v.  Ix)eke,  15  Wise.  635  ;  Hcrrick  v.  Graves,  16  Wise.  157,  106. 
"  Merrick  v.  Omves,  .«</>. 

•  Cn-swlinan  r.  Packanl,  16  Wise.  114  ;  and  a  homestead  may  be  claimed  in  a 
hotel.     Hnrrinian  v.  Quei-n  In.s.  Co.,  49  Wise.  71. 

»  Pelan  r.  De  Ilevard,  13  Iowa,  5:5  ;  .IoIuimjh  ,-.  i;i.  liinlM.n,  .33  Miss.  462. 
w  Dcero  v.  Chapman,  25  111.  610. 


382  LAW  OF  EEAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

the  right  extends  generally  to  premises,  whether  owned  by  the 
debtor,'  or  rightfully  possessed  by  him  under  a  lease  or  other- 
wise.^ In  Michigan,  Texas,  and  Wisconsin,  it  seems  to  be 
sufficient  if  the  debtor  has  a  title  to  the  premises,  or,  being  in 
possession,  has  a  contract  of  purchase  from  the  owner,  or  a 
patent  from  a  State,  with  a  right  to  demand  a  title  to  the 
same.2  But  in  Texas  it  does  not  attach  to  the  estate  of  a 
trustee,  although  the  trust  be  a  resulting  one.^  And  when  an 
unmarried  man,  in  embarrassed  circumstances,  incurred  debts 
by  erecting  a  dwelling-house  upon  land  belonging  to  him, 
knowing  he  was  insolvent,  and  then  married  a  wife  who  was 
cognizant  of  the  facts,  it  was  held  that  under  the  homestead 
right  it  was  exempt  from  a  creditor's  levy.*  A  different  rule 
prevails  in  different  States,  upon  the  homestead  being  allowed 
in  lands  held  in  severalty  or  in  common.  Thus  in  California, 
Indiana,  and  Massachusetts,  it  is  not  allowed  in  lands  held  in 
common  by  the  debtor  and  other  persons,^  even  though  held 
thus  by  husband,  wife,  and  child.*^  Whereas  in  Iowa  it  is  no 
objection  that  the  estate  is  held  in  common  with  others.'^  So 
in  Vermont,^  if  held  in  common  by  husband  and  wife,  the 
wife's  homestead  after  his  death  is  to  be  set  out  wholly  from 
the  husband's  share  of  the  land.^ 

1  Thurston  v.  Maddocks,  6  Allen,  427  ;  Mich.  Stat.  c.  132 ;  N.  H.  Com.  Stat. 
c.  196  ;  Ohio  Rev.  Stat.  1145  ;  Wise.  Stat.  c.  134,  §  23  ;  Norris  v.  Moulton,  34 
N.  H.  392  ;  Mass.  Gen.  Stat.  c.  104, 

2  McKee  v.  Wilcox,  11  Mich.  358  ;  Farmer  v.  Simpson,  6  Tex.  303  ;  McCabe 
V.  Mazzuchelli,  13  Wis.  478. 

3  Shepherd  v.  White,  11  Tex.  346,  354.  *  North  v.  Sheani,  15  Tex.  174. 
s  Wolf  V.  Fleischacker,  5  Cal.  244  ;  Holden  v.  Pinney,  6  Cal.  234  ;  Giblin  v. 

Jordan,  6  Cal.  416  ;  2  Ind.  Stat.  367  ;  Thurston  v.  Maddocks,  6  Allen,  427. 
^  Giblin  v.  Jordan,  sup.  ;  Smith  v.  Smith,  12  Cal.  216. 

7  Thorn  v.  Thorn,  14  Iowa,  49.  8  McClary  v.  Bixby,  36  Vt.  254,  257. 

9  McClary  v.  Bixby,  sup. 


Cll.  IX.   ^   -J  ESTATES    UV    MAUKlAGK.  883 

DIVISION    III. 
now    WHAT    I.S    EXHMIT    IS   ASCEUTAINKD    AND    DKCLARED. 

1.  I>iHViuiit  iiumIos  of  (li'tunnining  whut  i8  cxenii)t. 

la,  1  /).  How  (Ictoriiiiiifil  in  Alubumii  uiul  AikauHnii. 

2,  2  a.  Huw  M'liiit  is  t-xciiipt  in  ditennined  in  Culifoniia  and  P'lorida. 

3.  How  (UtiTiiiiucd  in  CJeoi^ia. 

4.  How  dcti-nnined  in  Hlinoiii. 
&.  How  ticti'rniinfd  in  Iiidiiina. 

6-0  li.  How  dctcTiniin-d  in  lowii,  Kansas,  nn<l  Kentucky. 

7,  7  'I.  How  (Utcrniintii  in  Maine  and  Maryland. 

8.  How  di'tiTtnined  in  ila.ssacliust'tts. 

9.  How  deUTniinc<l  in  Michigan. 

10-10  b.   How  detem)ini'd  in  Minnesota,  Mississippi,  Missouri,  and  Nebraska, 
11-11  b.   How  di'tennined  in  New  Hampshire,  NcwJereey,  and  Nevada. 
12,  12  a.   How  determined  in  New  York  and  North  Carolina. 

13.     How  determined  in  Ohio. 

H.     How  detennined  in  Pennsylvania. 

15.     How  detennined  in  South  Carolina. 

lt>.     How  determined  in  Vermont. 

17.      How  determined  in  Wisconsin. 

1.  While  in  some  of  the  States  a  homestead  cxcnijitioii 
attaches  as  an  incident  to  the  ownershii)  of  an  estate,  without 
any  previous  act  of  appropriation  on  the  part  of  the  owner,  in 
otlu-rs  it  re<juires  sonic  act  of  notoriety  in  selectiuL''  and  niuk- 
inj^  known  the  premises  which  are  to  he  exempted  from  hcing 
levied  upon  hy  creditors  hy  process  of  law. 

1  a.  In  Ahihama  it  is  chiimed  and  selected  hy  the  owner, 
or,  if  he  do  not  select  in  his  lifetime,  his  widow  or  the  <j:uardian 
of  liis  cliildren  may.'  If  creditors  are  dis.satisficd  as  to  the 
estimated  value  of  the  jiremises,  they  are  vuliied  l»y  three  free- 
holders and  set  out  hy  metes  and  iiounils.-  The  law  does  n<)t 
require  the  selection  to  he  made  in  one  hody  ;  the  hon.se  may 
he  on  one  lot,  and  the  land  exempted  may  he  in  another.^ 
And  in  making  their  estimate  of  value,  the  appraisers  are  not 

'  Ctxle,  1876.  §§  2820,  2840. 

'  Id.  §§  2332-2838.  And  the  debtor's  claim  hns  to  be  precisw  in  its  averments, 
filing,  and  other  re.piirements  of  the  statute.  Block  r.  Mrngg,  68  Ala.  2'Jl  ;  Hardy 
V.  Sulzljftt-her,  C2  Ala.  44  ;  Shcrr)-  r.  Ilrown,  66  Ala.  51. 

•  Melton  r.  Andrvws,  45  Ala,  454. 


38-1  LAW    OF   EEAL    PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

restricted  to  a  fraction  of  the  sum  prescribed  by  the  statute.^ 
But  a  claim  for  homestead  cannot  be  made  after  a  repeal  of 
the  law  which  gave  it.^ 

1  h  In  Arkansas  the  debtor  selects  his  own  homestead,  and 
if  he  resides  on  two  lots  upon  which  a  levy  is  made,  he  may 
elect  and  designate  which  is  to  be  exempted,  up  to  the  day  of 
sale.^  When  a  homestead  is  claimed  by  a  widow  or  minor 
children,  a  description  of  the  land  is  to  be  filed,  and  if  the 
value  of  the  lot  exceeds  five  thousand  dollars,  it  is  to  be  sold, 
and  the  proceeds,  to  the  amount  of  five  thousand  dollars,  in- 
vested by  the  court  for  their  benefit.'* 

2.  In  California  the  debtor  selects  such  part  of  his  estate 
as  he  wishes  to  hold  exempt,  and  makes  a  declaration  and 
record  of  this,  though  it  had  previously  been  held  otherwise. 
But  now,  as  formerly,  the  question  of  the  value  of  the  selected 
premises  may  be  determined  by  appraisers,  if  the  creditor  be- 
lieves the  selected  homestead  exceeds  in  value  the  sum  pre- 
scribed by  statute.^  And  the  commissioners  appointed  to 
appraise  the  value  may  set  apart  the  homestead  for  the  debtor.^ 
If  it  is  not  capable  of  being  set  out  by  itself,  the  whole  is  to 
be  sold  and  the  debtor  is  to  receive  his  share,  which  remains 
for  six  months  exempt  from  attachment.'  Upon  the  death  of 
the  husband,  the  judge  of  probate  may  set  out  the  homestead 
to  his  widow  and  her  children.^  If  it  has  been  set  off  in 
the  lifetime  of  the  owner  by  the  husband  and  wife,  or  either 
of  them,  it  is  exempt  from  administration.  If  it  is  not  set 
out  in  the  husband's  lifetime,  the  judge  of  probate  may  set  out 
to  the  widow  not  more  than  twenty  acres  of  land,  with  a 
dwelling-house  thereon,  if  not  in  an  incorporated  town  or  city, 

1  Pomeroy  v.  Buntings,  42  Ala.  250.  ^  Clark  v.  Snodgrass,  QQ  Ala.  233. 

3  Dig.  1874,  §§  3149-3162. 

*  Dig.  1874,  §§  3149-3157.  And  during  minority  a  child's  interest  will  be 
protected  by  the  court.     Altheimer  v.  Davis,  37  Ark.  316. 

6  Cohen  v.  Davis,  20  Cal.  187  ;  Hittell,  Code,  1876,  §§  6237,  6245  ;  Cook  v.  Mc- 
Christian,  4  Cal.  23  ;  Taylor  v.  Hargous,  4  Cal.  268  ;  Holden  v.  Finney,  6  Cal.  234. 

e  Hittell,  Code,  §§  6246-6252. 

7  Id.  §  6254.  Gregg  v.  Bostwick,  33  Cal.  220  ;  Mann  v.  Rogers,  35  Cal.  316  ; 
Code,  §  6257.  But  the  sale  is  void  unless  it  brings  more  than  the  exemption. 
Code,  §  6255. 

8  Hittell,  Code,  sup.,  and  §§  11474-11486  ;  Tompkins  Est.,  12  Cal.  125  ;  Mat- 
ter of  Orr,  29  Cal.  103  ;  Stat.  1868,  p.  116. 


en.  IX.  §   2.]  Fi^T.VTE.'^    BY    MUMMACK.  ^^'i 

ami  not  cxcoodinir  one  lot  in  any  .such  town  or  city,  with  a 
dwelling-house,  to  he  s<'leete(l  l)y  the  widow,  and  if  not  done 
by  her,  by  the  judge,  of  the  value  of  i'>,000j  The  hoiin-- 
Btead  may  be  selcetcd  l>y  the  husl)antl,  or  wife,  or  lioth,  by  a 
declaration  in  writing,  to  be  signecl,  acknowledged,  and  re- 
corded, and  from  that  time  the  husband  ami  wife  hold  aH  joint- 
tenants.  Nor  does  the  right  of  joint-tenancy  attach  till  sueh 
declaration  is  filed  for  reeord.^  IJy  the  statute  of  1802,  to 
give  an  estate  a  character  of  homestead  so  as  to  exempt  it 
from  a  forced  sale,  there  must  be  the  rcfjuisite  declaration 
filed,  so  that  where  a  husban<l  married  and  had  a  child,  and 
died  without  making  sueh  a  declaration,  it  was  held  to  be  a 
waiver  of  homestead  so  far  as  the  husband's  creditors  were 
concerned."'  A  homestead  formerly  could  not  be  claimed  in 
property  held  in  common  as  joint  tenancy.*  But  by  statute 
of  18G8,  it  may  be  set  out  in  lands  Jicld  in  joint  tenancy  or 
tenancy  in  common.''  A  failure  to  record  the  declaration  of 
homestead,  within  the  time  prescril)ed  by  law  is  a  waiver  of 
the  right  of  homestead,  so  that,  if  a  conveyance  has  been  made 
in  the  mean  time,  it  takes  eflect.*^ 

2  a.  In  Florida,  if  a  levy  is  made  upon  an  estate  claimed  as 
a  homestead  on  the  ground  that  it  exceeds  the  value  of  the 
exemjttion,  assessors  are  aj)pointed  to  set  off  such  part  of  it 
OS  is  of  that  value,  having  a  dwelling-house  thereon." 

3.  In  (Jeorgia,  if  the  debtor's  estate  do  not  exceed  the  limit 
of  a  homestead  right  under  the  statute,  he  has  no  occasion  to 
liave  it  set  out  as  such  in  order  to  secure  it.^  J?ut  if  it  is  of 
greater  value  than  the  amount  of  sueh  cxemittion,  he  mu.st 
have  such  part,  including  his  dwelling-hou.se,  set  out  as  he 
intends  to  hold  as  a  homestead,  if  he  would  prevent  or  defeat 

»  Hittell,  C<xle,  fiipra ;  Kich  v.  Tubbs.  41  Cnl.  34  ;  Scliadt  r.  Hei.i>c,  45  Cal. 
433.  But  if  the  widow's  declaration  does  not  set  out  tlie  true  vnluc  as  recjuired  by 
the  Code,  it  is  void.    Aahley  v.  Olmstcad,  54  Col.  616  ;  Ames  v.  Eldred,  55  Cal.  136. 

«  Hitt.ll.  Code,  §  6262  ;  ikguado  v.  Whalcy,  31  Cal.  526. 

•  (Vxie,  §  6241  ;   llee<l'3  Est.,  23  Cal.  410  ;  Noble  v.  Hook,  24  Cnl.  633. 
«  Bisljop  V.  Hubliord,  23  <'al.  514  ;  YXum  r.  Venlugo,  27  Cal.  418,  425. 

»  S«'aton  p.  Son.  32  Cal.  4S1  ;  Hipgins  r.  Hig^'ins,  46  Cnl.  251>.  But  there 
must  be  actual  oceunancy  of  .some  tract.     Kousset  v.  Green,  54  CoL  136. 

•  MoQunde  r.  Whaley,  31  Cal.  526. 
^  Fla.  Dig.  18Sl,c.  104,  §§  5,  6. 

•  Pinkerton  r.  Tumlin,  22  Go.  165  ;  Dcaring  v.  Thomas,  25  Ga.  223. 

VOL.  I.—  25 


386  LAW  OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

a  levy  upon  the  same  by  a  creditor.^  But  if  the  estate  be  a 
town  lot,  not  susceptible  of  division,  but  of  greater  value  than 
is  exempted  by  law,  the  ordinary,  on  application  by  the  credi- 
tor may  cause  the  same  to  be  sold,  and,  after  paying  the  debtor 
the  amount  of  such  exemption,  may  apply  the  balance  to  the 
creditor's  debt.^  By  the  Code  of  1873,  the  person  claiming  a 
homestead  applies  to  the  ordinary  to  lay  it  off  and  make  a  plat 
of  it,  and,  if  objection  is  made  as  to  its  estimated  value,  he 
may  set  it  out  by  appraisers.  So  if  set  out  in  a  town  lot  of  a 
greater  value  than  f  2,000,  the  ordinary  may  cause  it  to  be  sold, 
and  that  sum  to  be  invested  in  a  new  homestead  for  the  benefit 
of  the  owner's  family ;  or  the  owner  may  pay  whatever  it  ex- 
ceeds $2,000,  and  hold  such  excess  exempt  from  debts,  as  if 
the  same  had  been  settled  on  his  wife  and  minor  children,  or 
either  of  them.  If  the  claimant  owns  scattering  lots,  or 
money,  the  ordinary  may  direct  them  to  be  sold,  and  a  new 
homestead  in  a  single  lot  to  be  purchased  with  the  proceeds 
or  money.  Any  person  who  is  head  of  a  family,  who  lives  as 
a  housekeeper,  may  have  a  homestead  set  out  to  him  or  her 
out  of  his  or  her  land.  And  if  a  husband  refuses  to  apply  for 
it,  the  wife  or  next  friend  may  do  it.  So  if  a  widow  apply  for 
homestead  out  of  land,  and  the  same  cannot  be  divided,  it  may 
be  sold,  and  $2,000  out  of  it  invested  in  a  new  homestead.^ 
So  the  liomestead  may  be  sold  for  reinvestment  under  order 
of  a  judge  of  the  Superior  Court,  on  application  of  the  hus- 
band and  wife.*  Where  a  homestead  is  set  out,  it  carries  the 
crops  then  growing  upon  it.^  If  application  for  homestead  is 
not  made  until  a  levy  is  made  upon  the  land,  it  may  then  be 
made  to  the  ordinary,  and  it  will  have  the  effect,  if  notice  is 
given,  to  have  the  land,  when  sold  under  the  levy,  pass  subject 
to  the  right  of  homestead,*^  and  when  the  husband  is  in  bank- 
ruptcy, application  must  be  made  before  his  adjudication.'^ 

1  Code,  1882,  p.  2003  ;  Davenport  ■;;.  Alston,  14  Ga.  271. 

2  Bearing  v.  Thomas,  sup.  ;  Code,  1882,  §  2012. 

8  Code,  1882,  §§  2003-2012,  2022.  The  application  need  only  state  it  to  be  by 
the  head  of  the  family  ;  no  mention  of  children  is  required.  Cowart  v.  Page,  59 
Ga.  235.  But  it  must  show  in  whose  property  exemption  is  claimed.  Jones  v. 
V'rumle)^  61  Ga.  105.  And  see  Willinghani  v.  Maynard,  59  Ga.  330  ;  Flemister 
V.  Phillips,  65  Ga.  676,  as  to  requisite  allegations  and  proof. 

4  Code,  §  2025.  ^  Cox  v.  Cook,  46  Ga.  301. 

6  Blivins  v.  Johnson,  40  Ga.  297  ;  Harris  v.  Colquit,  44  Ga.  663. 

'  Smith  V.  Roberts,  61  Ga.  223  ;  Colquitt  v.  Brown,  63  Ga.  440. 


en.  IX.   §   2.]  ESTATKS    UY    MAUUIACK.  3>^7 

4.  In  Illinois  tho  (>.\t'ni|ition  reserves  one  lot  and  the  huild- 
ini^.s  thereon  occupiecl  as  a  residence.  Hut  if  a  creditor  Ixlievo 
tho  pronuses  to  exceed  one  thousand  dollars  in  value,  he  may 
have  the  same  appraised  hy  a  jury  of  six  men,  anil,  if  the 
same  be  snsceptilile  of  division,  nuiy  have  a  homestead  of  that 
value  set  out,  ami  the  residue  sold.  If  one  creditor  causes 
this  to  he  done,  and  another  afterwards  levies  upon  the  home- 
stead, on  the  jrroinid  that  it  has  hceome  of  jri'eater  value  than 
the  iKunestead  exemption,  the  same  process  may  he  frone 
throuirh  \viih,<tf  a  new  a|»]iraisal  and  sale  df  t he  excess,  if  any.* 
If  not  so  divisil)le,  the  jury  adjud^a*  how  much  it  exceeds  the 
prescribed  value,  and  the  delitor  may  retain  the  whole  uj)on 
payim;  such  excess;  otherwise  the  creditor  may  cause  the 
entire  estate  to  he  sold,  payiu}^  to  the  del)tor  the  sum  of  one 
thousand  dollars,  which  he  may  hold,  free  from  levy,  for  the 
term  of  one  year.^  But  the  law  does  not  require  the  husband 
and  wife  to  do  anythinir  in  ordtM'  to  create  this  rii^ht  of  home- 
stead exemption.  The  statiite  confers  it  ujton  them.^  It  is  a 
riirlit  cast  upon  the  wife  for  her  benefit  and  that  of  her  chil- 
dnMi."*  As  a  widow  is  entitled  to  dower  indcj)endent  of  her 
homestead,  the  latter  must  contribute  pro  rata  with  the  rest 
of  the  estate  in  settinj^  out  this  dower.^  Ami  what  shall  con- 
stitute "a  lot"  is  a  matter  for  a  jury  to  determine.  It  may 
inclr.de  more  than  an  orijrinal  lot,  if  embraced  in  one  enclosure 
anil  occujMed  as  one  lot.'"' 

5.  In  Indiana  the  debtor  has  to  select  the  jtroperty  which 
lie  |»roposes  to  hold  exemjit."  And  before  he  can  claim  the 
benefit  of  homestead  in  any  part  of  his  estate,  h.e  must  make 
out  and  deliver  to  the  sherilV  an  entire  list  of  his  proi)erty, 
though,  in  his  al)sence,  this  may  be  done  by  his  wife,  who  is 
authorized  to  set  uj)  the  claim.^  If  any  question  arises  as  to 
the  value  of  that  claimed  to  be  exempted,  the  debtor  is  to 

>  Stiibblofield  r.  Graves  50  111.  103  ;  R<-r.  Stat.  1883,  c.  .'52.  §§  K>-12. 
3  Rev.  Stat,   ubi  supra;    Hume   i*.  Gossett,   43   111.   297;  Young  r.  Morgan, 
89  III.  199  ;  Clark  r.  Crosby.  6  111.  Ajip.  102. 

»  Panlco  V.  Lindloy.  31  111.  174,  187  ;  Hubbell  v.  Cann.ly,  58  111.  425. 

*  IhiblwU  r.  Cnna<ly.  58  111.  425.  »  Knnj.p  r.  Giisa,  63  111.  492. 

«  Thornton  c.  Boy.lcn,  31  111.  200,  211  ;  Tanloc  r.  Lindley,  sup. 

'  Austin  r.  Swnnk,  9  Ind.  109  ;  Rpv.  Stat.  1881,  §  704. 

»  Rpv.  Stat.  §  713  ;  State  v.  Mcloijue,  9  Ind.  196. 


388  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

make  out  and  deliver  to  the  officer  a  description  of  the  same, 
by  metes  and  bounds,  and  the  same  is  to  be  sulnnitted  to  ap- 
praisers. If  a  debtor's  property  is  not  divisible,  so  that  his 
homestead  can  be  set  out,  he  may  hold  the  entire  estate,  if  he 
will  pay  the  difference  between  the  prescrilied  exemption  and 
the  value  of  the  estate.  If  he  do  not  do  this,  the  officer  may 
sell  the  whole,  and  pay  over  to  the  debtor  the  amount  of  the 
exempted  value. ^ 

6.  In  Iowa  the  debtor  may  select  his  homestead  and  have 
it  recorded  in  the  registry  of  deeds,  setting  out  a  full  descrip- 
tion of  it ;  or,  if  he  fail  to  do  so,  his  wife  may.  But  if  neither 
do  it,  the  officer  having  an  execution,  and  wishing  to  levy  upon 
the  debtor's  land,  must  cause  it  to  be  done  by  appraisers  whose 
proceedings  are  to  be  returned  into  court.^  And  if  a  debtor 
occupy  a  building  as  a  dwelling-house,  the  exemption  will  be 
understood  to  extend  to  the  whole  of  such  building ;  ^  if  he 
own  more  than  one,  he  must  elect  in  which  to  take  homestead.* 
The  right  vests  at  once  upon  the  marriage,  in  respect  to  the 
husband's  lands,  and,  so  far  as  the  wife  is  concerned,  was  of 
a  higher  nature  than  that  of  dower ;  ^  but  is  now  merged  in 
the  distributive  share  by  which  dower  has  been  replaced.*^ 

6  a.  In  Kansas,  if  a  homestead  has  not  been  actually  set 
apart,  and  is  levied  upon  by  a  creditor,  the  wife,  agent,  or  at- 
torney, as  well  as  the  householder  himself,  may  notify  the 
officer  what  is  claimed  as  homestead,  and  the  remainder  only 
of  the  debtor's  estate  is  liable  to  be  levied  on." 

6  h.  In  Kentucky,  if  a  debtor  claims  a  homestead  right  in 
land  levied  upon,  he  is  to  select  it,  and  the  officer  has  to  cause 
it  to  be  set  out  by  two  housekeepers,  and  if  it  is  of  greater 
value  than  |1,000,  and  is  not  divisible,  he  may  sell  the  same, 
and  pay  the  debtor  that  amount  in  money ;  but  if  not  more 
than  $1,000  can  be  obtained  for  it,  no  sale  is  made.^ 

7.  In  Maine  the  debtor  has  to  file  a  certificate  under  his 
hand,  in  the  registry  of  deeds,  containing  a  description  of  the 

1  Rev.  Stat.  §  710  ;  Const,  art.  1,  §  67. 

2  Rev.  Code,  1880,  §§  1998,  1999,  2002-2006. 

8  Rhodes  v.  McCoriiiick,  4  Iowa,  368  ;  Kurz  v.  Brusch,  13  Iowa,  371. 

*  Rev.  Code,  §  1994. 

s  Chase  v.  Abljott,  20  Iowa,  154,  160.       "  Rev.  Code,  §  2008. 

'  Comp.  L.  1879,  §  2498.  ^  Qen.  Stat.  1873,  art.  13,  §§  10-12. 


en.  IX.  §  2.]  ESTATES    BY    MARRIAGE.  889 

j)rcmisos  and  that  he  iiitcnd.s  to  make  tlinu  a  liumcstoad,  and 
they  must  ho  in  his  actual  posst-ssidu.  If,  however,  a  creditor 
contests  the  vahie  of  the  premises  so  selected,  appraisers  are 
to  he  aj»p()inted  to  set  out  jiremiscs  of  the  reipiisitt?  vahie,  the 
selection  of  which  lies  with  the  dchtor  if  he  will  exercise  it, 
otherwise  with  the  olVicer  who  may  levy  upon  the  residue  of 
his  estate.*  And  if,  after  once  makinir  a  selection  of  his 
lionu'steatl,  the  dehtor  sell  the  estate  and  a^'ain  repurchase  it, 
he  nmst,  in  order  to  hold  it  exempt,  lile  and  record  a  new 
cert  ill  cat  e." 

7  a.  In  Maryland  the  dchtor  may  select  one  hundred  dol- 
lars of  real  or  personal  estate,  to  he  ascertained  liy  ajipraisera; 
and  if  his  property  is  not  suscejitil)le  of  division,  it  may  he 
levied  upon  and  sold,  and  the  one  hundred  dollars  paid  to  the 
dehtor.3 

8.  In  Massachusetts,  cither  the  deed  under  ^vhich  the 
dehtor  claims  title  must  contain  a  declaration  that  the  prem- 
ises are  to  he  held  as  a  homestead,  or  such  a  declaration 
must  be  made  in  writing,  si<rned,  sealed,  and  recorded  in  the 
reiristry  of  deeds.*  From  the  nature  of  the  case,  the  home- 
stead is  for  the  personal  use  of  the  del)tor  and  his  family,  and 
must  he  several  and  exclusive  as  far  as  it  <:oes.'^  lliit  a  mak- 
inir and  recordinir  a  deelai'ation  of  an  intention  to  holii  jireni- 
ises  as  a  homestead,  hefori'  the  party  has  a  house  ujion  the 
same  fit  for  occupation,  and  occu])ied  l)y  him,  is  not  effective 
to  create  or  establish  a  homestead  riudit  in  the  same.  There 
must  be  an  occnjtalion,  to  jierfect  the  right.*^  And  if  a  i)art  of 
the  dwelling-house  upon  the  premises  is  occupied  by  the  owner, 
it  is  no  objection  to  extending  a  right  of  homestead  over  the 
whole,  that  other  parts  of  it  are  occuj)ied  by  tenants."  If 
creditors  contest  the  value  of  what  is  claimed  to  be  cxemjjted, 
appraisers  estimate  the  same,  and  may  set  off  estate  of  the 
recjuisite  value,  including  the  dwelling  house,  in  whole  or  in 
part,  and  the  residue  is  subject  to  levy,  or.  if  the  debtor  is  in- 
solvent, to  be  sold  by  his  assignees.**    If  tiie  husband  die  while 

>  Rev.  Stat.  1883,  c.  83.  §§  04,  C5.  «  Uwton  r.  Bniro,  3'.'  Mc.  481. 

•  Stat.  1861.  ♦   I'uh.  Stat.  c.  123,  §  '2. 

6  B.inis  r.  DriHrnU,  101  Maiis.  421.  "■•   1 r.  Miller,  11  All.-n.  37. 

»  MorciiT  r.  Chace,  11  Allen,  194.  8  Pub,  Stat.  c.  123,  §§  12.  13. 


390  LAW  OF  EEAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

in  possession  of  a  homestead,  his  widow  may  continue  to  oc- 
cupy the  same,  without  its  being  formally  assigned  by  the 
judge  of  probate,  provided  the  whole  estate  of  which  he  died 
seised  did  not  exceed  the  amount  exempted  by  law.  If  it  do, 
she  may  continue  to  occupy  such  part  as  may  be  of  that  value, 
until  partition  of  the  estate  be  made.^  The  assignment  to  a 
widow  of  her  dower  does  not  defeat  her  claim  to  homestead 
in  addition  to  it,  if  so  much  estate  remains  to  which  the  char- 
acter of  a  homestead  right  attaches.^  Nor  can  the  judge  exer- 
cise any  jurisdiction  in  the  matter  of  a  Avidow's  claim  for 
homestead,  if  her  right  thereto  is  denied  by  the  heirs  or  de- 
visees of  the  husband.^  She  must  in  such  case  sue  a  writ  of 
entry  to  recover  her  homestead.'^  The  homestead  of  an  insol- 
vent debtor  may  be  set  off  to  him  under  the  direction  of  the 
insolvent  court.  But  in  order  to  the  judge  having  jurisdic- 
tion, application  for  this  purpose  must  be  made  before  the 
assignee  sells  the  estate,  and  then  the  claimant  must  resort 
to  a  process  of  partition.  If,  after  his  insolvency,  a  debtor 
continues  to  occupy  his  estate,  and  it  is  of  greater  value  than 
his  homestead  right,  he  holds  the  latter  by  a  distinct  title, 
undivided  and  in  common  with  the  rest  of  the  estate,  defeasible 
by  his  alienation  of  it,  or  by  his  acquiring  a  new  homestead.^ 

9.  In  Michigan  no  form  of  declaring  or  making  known  an 
intention  to  claim  a  homestead  is  required,  provided  a  debtor 
lives  upon  and  occupies  an  estate  of  no  greater  value  than 
what  is  exempted  by  law.^  The  term  "  selection,"  as  used  in 
the  statute,  implies  only  the  separating  premises  of  the  requi- 
site value  from  those  of  a  greater  value,  and  defining  by  metes 
and  bounds  that  which  is  so  set  apart.  If,  therefore,  the 
debtor's  estate  be  of  greater  value  than  the  prescribed  exemp- 
tion, and  can  be  divided  so  as  to  set  apart  a  homestead  with  a 
dwelling-house,  which  will  not  exceed  the  statute  limit,  the 
debtor  may  select  it,  and  make  it  known  to  his  creditors.  But 
if  it  is  of  greater  value  than  that,  and  cannot  be  divided,  it 

1  Parks  V.  Reilly,  5  Allen,  77  ;  Pub.  Stat.  c.  123,  §§  8-10. 

'■^  Mercier  r.  C'hace,  11  Allen,  194  ;  Cowdrey  v.  Cowdrey,  131  Mass.  186. 

^  Lazell  V.  Lazell,  8  Allen,  575  ;  Woodward  v.  Lincoln,  9  Allen,  239. 

*  Jlercier  v.  Chace,  9  Allen,  242. 

6  Silloway  v.  Brown,  12  Allen,  30,  35.  ^  Thomas  v.  Dodge,  8  Mich.  51. 


en.  IX.  §  2.]  ESTATES    DY    MARRIAGE.  301 

may  be  sold,  ami  tlu'  valiu'  of  the  homestead  jtuiil  to  the  ilehlor. 
]f,  therefore,  u  creditor  insist  that  its  vahie  exceeds  the  stat- 
ute limits,  the  <|iiestion,  it  seems,  is  to  he  determined  hy  a  pro- 
cess out  of  the  court  of  (-(luity,  ami  if  hjuml  to  he  of  jrreater 
value  then  the  statute  ext'iupts,  the  (piestion  is  then  t(j  he 
determined,  whether  it  can  he  divided  so  as  to  have  a  jtropcr 
homestead  set  olT.  Hut  the  selection  neetl  n<jt  he  made  prior 
to  the  levy,  nor  nei-il  it  he  done  in  writintr.  It  is  enouLrh  that, 
when  the  levy  is  made,  the  ollicer  is  ii<»tilied  of  tlie  chiiui.'  If 
the  cretlitor  is  dissatislied  with  the  amount  claimed  hy  the 
debtor  as  bein^  exi'inpt,  he  may  have  the  homestead  surveyed 
and  appraised  and  set  off,  and  may  have  the  remainder  sold. 
And  if  it  cannot  l)e  divided  and  set  off  from  the  rest  of  the 
estate,  the  debtor  may  pay  the  excess  above  81,500,  and  i)re- 
vent  the  sale.  If  he  do  not,  the  officer  may  sell  the  whole  and 
pay  the  debtor  that  sum,  who  may  hold  the  same  exempt  from 
attachment  and  levy  for  one  year.'-*  But  unless  more  can  be 
pot  at  the  sale  than  the  amount  of  the  execution,  the  sale  is 
void.^ 

10.  In  Minnesota  and  Mississijipi  it  only  seems  necessary 
that  premises  of  the  prescribed  size  and  value  should  be 
actually  occupied  by  the  debtor  as  a  residence  or  home,  in 
order  to  secure  their  exemption  from  levy  i)y  a  creditor;*  al- 
though in  the  former  .State  the  statute  speaks  of  the  owner's 
selection.^  If,  in  that  State,  a  levy  is  made  before  the  home- 
stead has  been  selected,  the  householder  is  to  notify  the  olhcer 
making  it  what  he  regards  as  his  homestead,  with  a  descrijjtion 
of  it.  And  if  the  creditor  is  dissatisfied,  the  officer  may  have 
the  same  set  out  by  appraisal.^  In  Mississippi,  upon  a  levy  on 
execution,  the  officer  is  in  like  manner  to  set  off  the  home- 
stead." 

10  a.  In  Mis.souri,  if  a  levy  is  made  upon  the  premises  of  a 
debtor,  he  is  to  designate  the  part  which  he  wishes  to  hold  as 
homestead.    And  the  officer  making  it  is  to  appraise  the  same, 

»  Comp.  IjLwn,  1871,  §§  6137-6141;  Bccchcr  v.  Baldy,  7  Mich.  4SS;  Dyer. 
Mann.  10  Mich.  291,  298. 

'  Comp.  Uws,  1871.  §§  6140-6144.  »  Id.  §  CAih. 

*  Tillots<iii  V.  .Millnnl,  7  V.inn.  513;  Morrison  r.  McDanicl.  .30  Miss.  213,  217 

•  Suit.  1878,  c.  68,  §  1.  •  Id.  IJ^  3-5. 
»  Uev.  Codo,  1S80,  §§  1251-1254. 


392  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

and  may  proceed  to  sell  the  excess.  If  it  is  not  separable 
from  the  rest  of  the  estate,  the  whole  may  be  sold,  and  the 
value  of  the  homestead  paid  to  the  debtor,  and  the  surplus 
applied  to  the  benefit  of  creditors.  If  not  set  out  in  the  life- 
time of  the  debtor,  the  judge  of  probate  sets  out  a  homestead 
to  the  widow  by  commissioners.  But  if  it  is  less  than  the  al- 
lowed value,  it  vests  without  action  by  the  court.^  And  the 
same  is  true  where  it  was  set  out  in  the  owner's  lifetime.^  If, 
in  case  of  a  levy  upon  the  estate,  it  is  not  divisible,  and  the 
debtor  will  pay  the  excess  over  the  value  of  the  homestead,  he 
may  prevent  the  sale.  If  sold,  the  value  of  the  homestead  is 
invested,  by  order  of  the  court,  in  a  new  homestead.^  If  a 
wife  is  abandoned  by  her  husband  she  may  claim  as  if  he 
were  dead.*  In  setting  out  homestead  to  a  widow  after  her 
husband's  death,  commissioners  first  set  that  out,  and  then 
the  widow's  dower,  unless  the  homestead  takes  one  third  of 
the  estate.     If  it  does,  she  takes  no  dower.^ 

10  b.  In  Nebraska,  if  the  homestead  is  not  selected  till  the 
levy  is  made,  the  debtor  notifies  the  officer  what  he  regards 
as  his  homestead,  with  a  description  of  it.  If  the  creditor  is 
dissatisfied  with  what  is  claimed,  the  officer  is  to  have  the 
same  appraised,  and  the  same  set  off  as  such  homestead,  in- 
cluding the  dwelling-house,  and  tlie  balance  is  liable  to  be 
sold,  provided  the  sale  brings  an  amount  beyond  the  ex- 
emption.^ 

11.  In  New  Hampshire  no  previous  act  of  setting  apart  of 
the  premises  seems  to  be  necessary ;  the  right  attaches  to 
whatever  a  debtor  owns  and  actually  occupies,  not  exceeding 
the  prescribed  amount  exempted  by  law."  The  selection  is 
made,  when  an  officer  undertakes  to  levy  upon  the  debtor's 
estate,  of  such  part  as  the  debtor  elects,  to  be  appraised  by 
assessors  and  by  them  set  off  by  metes  and  bounds,  leaving 
the  surplus  to  be  levied  upon.     Upon  a  levy  being  made,  the 

1  Rogers  V.  Marsh,  73  Mo.  64.  2  pjate  v.  Koeliler,  8  Mo.  Apj).  396. 

3  Rev.  Stat.  1879,  §§  2690-2693;  In  re  Beckerkord,  19  Am.  L.  Reg.  58. 
*  Rev.  Stat.  1879,  §  2689. 

6  Rev.  Stat.  §  2694;  Seek  v.  Haynes,  68  Mo.  13. 
B  Comp.  Stat.  1881,  c.  36,  §§  r>-ll. 

1  Xorris  v.  Moulton,  34  N.  H.  392;  Hoitt  v.  Webb,  36  N.  H.  158;  Horn  v. 
Tufts,  39  N.  H.  484. 


CU.  IX.  §  2.]  ESTATF>>    »Y    MAKKIAGK.  893 

liushaiul  or  wifo,  t»r  lirr  next  fririul,  may  make  ajipliration  in 
writing  to  the  olliccr  to  have  a  liomcslt  ad  set  olT,  an<l  lir  is  to 
have  it  done  by  metes  and  hounds,  hy  appraisers.^  If  the 
hind  ehiinu'd  as  home.stead  exceed  -i'oUO  in  vahie,  the  shcrifT, 
in  8ettini;  olT  the  excess,  mu.st  first  set  out  the  liome.stead,  and 
then  proeerd  to  levy  upon  the  surphis.'-'  Ihit  if  it  is  levied  on 
hefore  the  homestead  is  set  out,  the  debtor  holds  his  homestead 
as  tenant  in  common  with  the  re.st  of  the  estate,  and  may 
have  partition  of  the  same.^  If  the  ajjpraisers  adjudge  that 
the  homestead  cannot  be  set  off  from  the  other  parts  of  the 
estate  without  injury  to  the  same,  they  ajfjiraise  the  whole  ; 
and  if  the  debtor  will  not  jtay  the  excess  over  the  amount 
excm|)tcd,  the  siurill'  may  sell  the  whole,  paying  the  amount 
of  the  exemption,  for  the  benefit  of  the  debtor  and  his  wife.* 
The  amount  of  this  exemption  the  ollicer  dej)Osits  in  a  sav- 
ings bank  to  the  credit  of  the  debtor  and  his  wife  or  children, 
to  i)e  drawn  out  «>nly  uj)on  the  joint  order  of  husband  and 
wife  if  living,  otherwise  of  the  guardian  of  their  children.^ 
After  the  debtor's  death,  the  judge  of  probate  may  set  off  a 
liome.stead  to  the  widow  in  the  same  manner  as  dower.  But 
the  right  of  homestead  is  not  lost  by  the  neglect  of  the  debtor 
to  claim  it  of  the  oflicer  when  levying  upon  the  same.*^  But 
if  the  debtor  or  wife  do  not,  when  the  levy  is  made,  apply  to 
havt  a  homestead  set  off,  the  oflicer  may  set  off  the  land 
upon  his  execution,  subject  to  the  homestead  right,  and  the 
debtor  and  creditor  will  thereuijon  hold  the  estate  in  common 
until  the  homestead  is  set  out  upon  jiartition  prayed  for."  If 
a  dei)tor  convey  his  estate  without  his  wife  joining  in  the  con- 
veyance, and  liavt.'  no  homestead,  his  wife  may  ap|ilyand  have 
a  homestead  set  out  in  the  land  thus  conveyed,  even  in  the 
lifetime  of  her  husband.''  If  the  wife  survive  the  husband, 
her  homestead  is  set  out  hy  the  judge  of  |)robate,  provided  he 
died  seised  of  the  premises.''     But  if  tlie  Inisband  convey  the 

>  (U-n.  Laws,  1878,  c.  138,  §§  7-11.  ^  Tucker  r.  Ki-nuiston,  47  X.  H.  267. 
»  Homey  v.  Lof.l.s,  51  N.  11.  'J.IS. 

«  Gen.  Ijiws,  1879,  c.  138,  §§  12-15;    Norris  r.  Moulton,  34  N.  II.  392;  Fogg 
r.  Fojy?,  40  N.  H.  289. 

»  Gen.  Ijiws,  c.  138,  §§  18,  19.  «  Id.  §  4. 

T  linrney  r.  I.«iU,  .11  N.  M.  253.  »  Tuld  v.  Quinn,  .''.2  X.  H.  ?,i\. 

•  Norris  r.  Moulton,  $up. ;  Horn  r.  Tufts,  sup. 


39-1  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  L 

premises  in  his  lifetime,  the  -wife,  after  his  deatli,  may  have 
partition  against  such  purchaser,  and  have  her  share  set  out 
to  hcr.i 

11  a.  In  Xew  Jersey,  the  deed  by  which  the  debtor  acquires 
his  estate  may  contain  a  declaration  that  it  is  designed  as  a 
homestead  ;  but  if  it  is  not  thus  declared,  a  notice  to  that  effect 
is  to  be  executed,  acknowledged,  and  recorded  by  the  owner, 
containing  a  description  of  what  is  claimed,  and  this  is  to  be 
])ublished  in  a  newspaper.  If  it  is  worth  more  than  81,000, 
the  officer,  in  making  a  levy  upon  it,  if  it  is  divisible,  has  it 
appraised  and  that  value  set  off.  But  if  it  is  not  divisible, 
and  the  debtor  will  pay  the  excess  above  the  value  of  the 
homestead,  he  may  do  so  and  prevent  a  sale.  If  he  do  not  do 
this,  the  estate  is  sold,  provided  it  brings  more  than  the  ex- 
emption, and  the  81,000  paid  to  tlie  debtor,  who  holds  it 
exempt  from  attachment  for  a  year.^ 

11  h.  In  Nevada,  a  homestead  is  to  be  selected  by  husband 
and  wife,  or  either  of  them,  or  other  head  of  a  family.  The 
claim  is  to  be  made  in  writing  by  one  residing  upon  the  prem- 
ises, stating  the  claimant's  interest  in  the  estate,  and  his  wish 
to  make  it  a  homestead,  which  writing  is  to  be  signed,  acknowl- 
edged, and  recorded.  If,  then,  a  creditor  makes  oath  that  the 
homestead  is  of  greater  value  than  85,000,  the  judge  appoints 
appraisers  to  value  it,  and  decide  whether  it  can  be  divided. 
If  it  can  be,  only  the  excess  can  be  levied  on.  If  it  cannot 
be,  the  whole  is  sold,  and  §5,000  paid  to  the  debtor,  subject  to 
the  order  of  the  court  that  it  be  deposited  in  court,  and  pay- 
able only  to  the  order  of  the  husband  and  wife  ;  and  the  same 
is  held  free  from  legal  process  or  conveyance  by  the  husband, 
as  the  original  homestead  was  held.  And  upon  the  death  of 
the  husband  or  wife,  the  homestead  is  set  apart  for  the  sur- 
vivor and  his  or  her  legitimate  children.^ 

12.  In  New  York,  either  the  deed  of  the  owner  must  show 
the  intention  that  it  should  be  to  him  a  homestead,  or  he  must 
by  a  proper  instrument,  executed  and  acknowledged,  give 
notice  that  the  premises  are  so  held ;  which  instrument  must 

1  Atkinson  v.  Atkinson,  37  N.  H.  434;  Gunnison  v.  Twitchel,  38  X.  H.  62, 
67;  Horn  i'.  Tufts,  sxij). 

2  liev.  1877,  p.  1055,  §§  1-6.  8  Comp.  Laws,  1873,  §§  186-189. 


CII.  IX.   ^   -.]  ESTATKS    UV    MAltltlAOK.  895 

contuiii  a  full  (k'scrijition  of  the  pii'uiiscs  ami  l»o  recorded  in 
the  clerk's  otlice.  If  the  sherilV,  ui»oii  making  ii  levy,  coiitestH 
the  vahie  of  the  premises  claimed  to  he  exempt,  he  may  have 
the  same  appraised  hy  six  jurors,  and  if  it  can  he  divided  and 
80  set  off  as  to  ;rive  the  dehtor  that  value,  emhracing  a  dwell- 
inu'-house,  the  surplus  may  be  levied  on.  If  it  is  not  suscepti- 
ble of  such  division,  and  the  delitor  will  pay  the  excess  of  the 
value  of  the  estate  over  the  amount  exemjjted,  ho  may  relieve 
the  same  from  levy.  Otherwise  the  sherilT  may  sell  the  whole, 
if  it  will  bring  more  tbaii  the  ainoiint  exemiitcd,  and,  l»y  pay- 
ing that  to  the  (lel>tor,  a|»|)ly  the  excess  upon  the  execuii(jn.' 

12  a.  In  North  Carolina,  a  homestead  is  selected  by  the 
owner,  and,  if  he  neglects  to  do  this,  appraisers  set  it  ofT  for 
him.  In  either  case  they  lay  ofT  hy  metes  and  boimds  prem- 
ises for  that  purpose  of  the  value  of  !?1,UU0.  Any  resident 
may  apply  to  have  this  done,  and,  if  he  do  not  do  it,  and  die, 
his  widow,  if  he  have  ont),  or  his  child  or  children  nmler 
twenty-one  years  of  age,  may  have  it  set  oft"  to  her  or  them. 
It  is  essential  to  its  being  excm|>ted  as  a  homestead  that  it 
should  he  occupied  as  sueh.^  A  homestead  may  consist  of 
tw(}  or  more  parcels  separate  from  each  other,  if,  collectively, 
they  do  not  exceed  >>1,0()(I.'*  Kefore  l^^<)•2  it  was  not  restricted 
to  the  lot  on  wliieh  the  debtor  resided  ; '  and  now  a  continued 
residence  is  not  necessary.^  It  may  i)c  claimed  in  an  equity 
of  redemj>tion  sul)jeet  to  tin*  mortgage.*^ 

I'i.  In  Ohio,  the  sherilT  lia\inL'  an  execution  against  the 
debtor,  if  applied  to  by  the  del)tor  or  his  wife,  causes  th(» 
homestead  to  be  set  oil"  by  ap|)raiscrs,  by  metes  and  bounds. 
And  the  same  is  done  after  his  death  in  favor  of  his  wife,  if  it 
is  not  done  in  the  lifetime  of  the  husband."  The  right  ex- 
tends to  lessees  of  lands  and  owners  of  buildings  standing  on 

>  4  Stat,  nt  Urge    Pt.  3,  c.  2M,  p.  fl32. 

•  Const,  art.  1(»,  §  2;  Co<lc.  18?;J,  §§  5(V.'-5,  .114.  The  constitutional  cxemp- 
tioti  hii»  b»fu  wiiil  to  Ix!  scir-«'xu<iitiiig.  Adriiin  v.  Slinw,  82  X.  C  474.  And 
tlie  oction  of  tlio  npimiiMTs  is  niinistcriiil  only  antl  ilooa  not  vest  tlie  rijilit.  Obti-n 
t».  Suiinnv,  80  N,  C.  187. 

•  OhIp.  §  509;  Martin  v.  Hughes,  67  N.  C  293;  Mayho  v.  Colton.  rt(»  X.  G 
28l>. 

«  Mayho  r.  Colton,  69  X.  C.  289.  *  A-lrinn  v.  Shaw.  82  N.  C.  474. 

•  Chatham  r.  Souls,  68  X.  C.  155.  ^  n^y   gut,  18S0,  §  5438  €t  acq. 


396  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  L 

others'  lands.  If  the  estate  claimed  as  homestead  exceed  in 
value  $1,000,  and  is  not  divisible,  a  creditor  may  have  set  off 
to  him  all  the  proceeds  of  the  estate  exceeding  one  hundred 
dollars  by  the  year,  until  his  debt  shall  have  thereby  been 
satisfied.^ 

14.  In  Pennsylvania  the  debtor  exercises  his  election  to 
claim  a  homestead,  when  the  officer  makes  his  levy,  and  if  he 
neglect  to  claim  it  then,  he  is  held  to  have  waived  the  right. 
If  made,  the  officer,  if  the  estate  exceed  in  value  the  amount 
exempted,  causes  the  same  to  be  appraised,  and  the  appraisers 
decide  whether  the  premises  can  be  divided  without  injury. 
If  they  can  be,  the  homestead  is  set  apart  and  the  balance 
may  be  sold.  If  they  cannot  be  divided,  the  officer  sells  the 
whole  estate  and  pays  the  exempted  amount  to  the  debtor. ^ 
Where  the  debtor  claimed  his  exemption  on  the  day  of  the 
sale  upon  execution,  the  sheriff  was  held  bound  to  allow  it. 
And  where  he  allowed  the  debtor  thirty  dollars  in  money  out 
of  the  personal  estate,  he  could  only  claim  two  hundred  and 
seventy  dollars  out  of  the  real.^  The  privilege  of  homestead 
is  not  in  itself  an  exemption,  but  a  riglit  to  obtain  one  in  the 
manner  prescribed ;  and  if  the  debtor  fails  to  avail  himself  of 
it,  it  is  of  no  effect.* 

15.  In  South  Carolina  a  debtor's  estate  is  subject  to  be  set 
off  to  satisfy  the  execution  of  a  creditor,  unless  he  apply  to  the 
officer  holding  the  same,  if  his  estate  exceed  in  value  the  home- 
stead exemption,  to  have  a  homestead  of  the  prescribed  value 
set  off  by  commissioners  ;  whose  return  becomes  final  in  forty 
days  after  it  is  recorded.  If  it  exceed  $1,000,  and  is  not  divi- 
sible, the  debtor  may  save  his  estate  from  sale  by  paying  the 
excess  of  the  estate  above  that  sum  ;  otherwise,  the  same  may 
be  sold  if  it  brings  81,000,  or  over,  and  out  of  the  proceeds 
that  sum  is  to  be  paid  to  the  debtor,  to  be  applied,  under  the 
direction  of  the  court,  to  the  purchase  of  a  new  homestead. 
And  if  he  pay  the  excess  of  the  estate  above  $1,000,  he  holds 
the  same  exempt  as  to  all  debts  contracted  prior  to  such  pay- 

1  Rev.  Stat.  §  5439. 

2  Purd.  Dig.  433;  Bowman  v.  Smiley,  31  Peiin.  St.  225;  Miller's  Appeal,  16 
Perm.  St.  300;  Dodson's  Appeal,  25  Peim.  St.  234. 

8  Seibert's  Appeal,  73  PeAii.  St.  361.       4_  Lines'  Appeal,  2  Grant's  Cases,  198. 


CU.  IX.  §  2.]  ESTATKS    IJV    MAUFIIAOK.  HOT 

nu'iit.'  Anil  if  tliis  is  not  done  in  his  lifrtinio,  tlic  same  may 
be  set  (lilt  by  conuuissioiierH  to  liis  widow.- 

\')  a.  In  Tennessee,  (lie  houselioKler  di-sirin^  to  seenre  a 
homestead  makes  a  deehiralion  to  that  elTect,  sipied,  seah'(l, 
witnessed,  and  rejristered.  When  it  is  set  out,  in  case  of  a 
lew,  it  is  done  hy  appraisers  hy  metes  and  hounds,  including 
a  dwelling-house.  And  if  it  is  not  divisible,  an  ollicer,  in  levy- 
in^r  ujion  the  estate,  may  sell  the  whole  and  pay  the  •'jKOOO 
into  the  eleik's  oflTiee  of  the  court,  to  be  laid  out,  under  <lircc- 
tion  of  the  court,  in  the  purchase  of  a  new  homestead.^ 

1')  f>.  In  Texas,  if  the  houjestead  C(jnsists  of  more  than  two 
hundred  acres  or  a  lot  of  greater  value  than  >=.'),0U0,  the  delftor 
selects  which  two  hundred  acres,  or  how  much  of  the  city 
or  town  lot,  shall  l)c  held  exempt.  If  he  fail  to  do  this,  the 
sherilY  holding  an  execution  aL^aiust  him  may  do  it  by  com- 
missioners.* 

1<>.  In  Vermont,  if  a  cretlitor  intend  t(j  set  ofT  a  jtortion  of 
a  debtor's  estate,  on  the  ground  that  it  exceeds  in  value  what 
is  exempted  l)y  law,  so  much  of  the  same  is  first  set  out  by 
appraisers  to  the  debtor  u|>on  the  hitter's  designation,  if  he 
elects  to  have  it  done,  and  the  suri»lus  may  be  levied  on.  But 
homestead  may  be  set  out  in  any  suit  aflecting  the  property, 
by  appraisers  appointed  by  the  court.^  After  the  debtor's 
death,  the  homestead  is  set  off  by  the  court  of  probate."  But 
if  the  premi.ses  left  by  a  householder  arc  of  greater  value 
than  the  homestead  exemption,  and  cannot  be  divided  so  as 
to  give  the  widow  her  homestead  therein,  there  may  be  a 
decree  in  equity  for  the  sale  thereof,  and  the  amount  of  the 
homestead  exemjition  paid  into  court  for  her  use  and  that  of 
the  children." 

10  a.  In  Virginia,  unless  the  deed  by  which  the  house- 
holder aciiuires  title  to  the  estate  declares  it  to  be  for  a  home- 
stead, he  does  it  by  a  deed  duly  recorded,  setting  forth  his 

»  Gen.  Sut.  1882,  §§  1094-1996.      In  the  application,  the  value  of  the  estate 
should  be  sc-t  out.      Kerchnt-r  i'.  Singletnry,  15  S.  C.  535. 
»  Act.  1851.  p.  85  ;    Manning  r.  Dove,  10  Rich.  403. 

•  .Stat.  1871,  §§2016,  2017,  2030  ;  19  Am.  Law  Reg.  14. 

«  R<v.  Sut  1879.  art.  2335,  2336.  »  Rev.  Laws,  1880,  §  1907. 

•  n.v.  Uwa,  1880,  §  1895  ;  Howe  r.  Adams,  28  Vt.  544. 
'  Id.  §§  1903,  1909  ;  Chaplin  r.  Sawyer,  35  Vt.  2S6. 


398  LAW   OF  EEAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

intention  to  claim  as  a  homestead  what  he  therein  describes. 
And  this  may  be  land  in  which  he  has  an  equitable  as  well  as 
a  legal  title.  So  if  it  is  levied  on,  he  may  select  it,  and  if 
what  he  selects  be  of  greater  value  than  the  homestead  exemp- 
tion, and  it  cannot  be  divided  and  set  apart,  the  whole  is  to  be 
sold,  and  out  of  the  proceeds  the  court  may  order  the  value  of 
the  homestead  to  be  invested  in  a  new  one.^  And  if  the  debtor 
does  not  select,  the  officer  may.^ 

17.  In  Wisconsin  the  debtor  selects  and  sets  out  his  home- 
stead by  metes  and  bounds,  and  is  to  notify  the  officer  who  is 
about  to  levy  upon  his  estate  what  he  claims  to  hold  exempt, 
with  a  description  of  the  same.  And  if  the  creditor  objects 
as  to  the  value  of  what  is  thus  claimed,  he  may  have  the 
same  surveyed  and  set  out  so  as  to  give  the  debtor  the  requi- 
site value.^  If  a  debtor's  farm  be  under  a  mortgage,  or  under 
a  lien,  and  he  die,  and  his  estate  sells  for  enough  to  pay  his 
debts,  leaving  a  surplus,  the  judge  may  order  enough  of  this 
to  be  invested  in  a  homestead  for  the  family  of  the  deceased. 
The  court  may  order  five  hundred  dollars  to  be  invested 
in  a  new  homestead ;  and  if  the  wife  is  insane,  the  court  may 
order  the  homestead  sold,  and  direct  as  to  the  investment  of 
the  proceeds.^ 


DIVISION  IV. 

HOW   FAR   HOMESTEAD    RIGHTS    ANSWER   TO    ESTATES. 

1,  1  a.  Their  analogy  to  estates  for  life.     In  Arkansas  and  Alabama. 

2.  Nature  of  the  interests  in  homestead  estates  in  California. 

2  a.  Nature  of  these  in  Florida. 

3,  3  re.  Nature  of  these  in  Georgia.     In  Illinois. 

4.  Nature  of  these  in  Indiana. 

5,  5  a.  Nature  of  these  in  Iowa.     In  Kentucky. 

5&.  Nature  of  these  in  Louisiana. 

6.  Nature  of  these  in  Maine. 

7.  Nature  of  these  in  Massachusetts. 

1  Code  1873,  c.  183,  §§  4,  6.  2  j^.  §  16. 

8  Eev.  Stat.  1878,  §  2984.  If,  however,  the  dwelling-house  is  on  a  lot  whose 
area  is  just  two  hundred  acres,  the  .statutory  exemption,  the  owner  is  presumed  to 
have  selected  this.     Kent  v.  Lasley,  48  Wise.  257. 

*  Stat.  1873,  p.  111. 


en.  IX.  §   2.]  ESTATKS    UY    MAIUUACK.  399 

8.  Nature  of  tlu-sp  in  Mitlii^'iin. 

9.  Niituri'  of  tlit-Mc  ill  Miniu-itota. 

10-10 c.  Ill  .MiH!(iHHi|i|ii,  MisHouri,  Nilirn«kii,  and  XcvaJa. 

11.  Niitiin-  ol  ihcse  in  New  Hiiiiipsliire. 

12.  Natiin-  of  thcM)  iu  Ni'w  York. 

12a.  In  Ni'Viulu,  Nortli  Carolinii,  and  New  Jersey. 

13.  Nature  of  tlii-jM-  in  Oliio. 

14.  Nature  of  these-  iu  IVniihylvania. 
14  a.  In  South  Cttroliim  and  Tennessee 

15.  Nature  in  tlie.ne  in  Texiw. 

10,  l(5'i.  Natun-  of  thise  in  Ycrniont.     In  Yirginia. 
17.      Natuiv  of  tlifse  in  Wisconsin. 

1.  \\'iiKN  it  is  souirlit  to  define  the  iKitiirc  :iinl  clianiclcr  of 
the  projierty  or  estate  wliii-h  one  has  in  the  lionicsfeail  which 
the  hiw  creates  in  his  favor,  ami  wliat  riirhts  and  duties  are 
attached  to  the  same,  it  will  he  fdiiiid  dilhcult  to  do  more 
than  horrow  the  lanirua«xe  of  the  statutes  and  of  courts  in 
construin<r  them  in  the  diflerent  States,  tliou;ili,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  a  few  where  the  wife  and  children  take  estates  of 
inheritance,  most  of  the  incidents  of  estates  for  life  would  be 
considered  as  attachinfj  to  liomestead  riirhts.^ 

1  a.  In  Arkansas,  the  homestead  riLdit  continues  after  the 
death  of  the  owner,  to  the  use  of  his  widow  and  child  or  chil- 
dren, so  lonir  as  they  continue  to  occupy  the  premises.-  So  in 
Alal)ama,  the  homestead  is  regarded  as  merely  a  continuation 
of  the  husl)and's  estate;^  and  durinfj  his  lifetime  the  wife  has 
notiiinu:  which  can  he  called  an  estate.*  If  the  land  holden  hy 
the  husliand  be  held  by  lease  for  a  term  of  years,  the  right 
does  not  attach  so  as  to  go  to  his  widow  at  his  death.^ 

2.  In  California,  the  homestead  is  somethin<jr  cnminir  out  of 
the  general  property  in  the  land  of  the  husband,'^  in  which 
case  the  wife  has  no  estate  therein,'  or  out  of  the  estate  of 
husl)and  and  wife,®  and  consists  of  a  qualified  right  in  the 
hu.'iband  to  convey  it,  and  a  right  in  the  hu.sband  and  wife  to 
enjoy  the  premises  until  a  new  homestead  is  acquired,  or  its 
character  as  homestead  is  lost.     So  it  may  come  out  of  the 

>  Kerley  v.  Kerlcy,  13  Allen,  286.  '  Const,  art.  12.  §§  »,  .1. 

»  Hunter  v.  Law,  68  Ala.  365.  *  Seaman  r.  Nolen,  68  Ala.  463. 

*  Piz.'iilft  V.  Campljcll,  46  Ala.  35.  «  Oec  r.  Moore,  14  Cal.  472. 

^  Bowman  v.  Norton,  16  Cal.  213.  •  Gee  c.  Moort;,  tup 


400  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

estate  of  the  wife  with  her  consent.^  But  this  right  of  occu- 
pancy has  nothing  of  the  character  of  joint-tenancy  in  it.  All 
the  present  right  which  the  wife  acquires  during  the  life  of  the 
husband  is,  that  this  right  of  homestead  shall  continue  until 
she  consents  to  its  being  aliened,  or  another  homestead  is  ac- 
quired, or  the  same  is  abandoned.^  But  in  an  earlier  as  well 
as  a  later  case,  it  was  declared  by  the  court  that  they  became 
joint  owners  of  the  property,  with  the  right  of  survivorship, 
and  that  the  homestead  right  in  a  husband  and  wife  is  one  of 
joint-tenancy  under  the  act  of  1860.^  Tliis  homestead  right 
may  be  released,  but  not  sold  or  transferred  to  another,  since, 
being  a  personal  privilege,  it  cannot  be  assigned.*  But  so 
far  as  the  wife's  right  is  concerned,  she  can  only  protect  it 
through  the  husband,  or  enforce  it  by  uniting  with  him ;  and 
the  same  is  true  of  the  protection  of  the  rights  of  the  chil- 
dren.^ She  cannot,  therefore,  sue  to  recover  the  premises 
without  joining  her  husband ;  ^  though,  where  a  purchaser 
from  the  husband,  in  whose  deed  the  wife  did  not  join,  brought 
ejectment  for  the  premises,  and  the  husband  neglected  to  de- 
fend, the  wife  was  allowed  to  do  so  alone."  But  if  the  wife 
dies  in  the  lifetime  of  the  husband,  the  homestead  is  left  to  his 
control,  so  that,  if  he  mortgage  the  premises,  it  will  bind  the 
children,  or  a  second  wife  who  shall  marry  him  subsequently 
to  such  mortgage.^  And  if  the  homestead  was  from  his  sepa- 
rate estate,  he  may  devise  it  subject  only  to  the  temporary 
assignment  of  the  probate  court.^  If  the  wife  survive  the 
husband,  the  judge  of  probate  may  set  apart  the  premises  for 
the  benefit  of  the  wife  and  children,  each  to  have  property  in 
one  half,  or  of  the  wife  if  there  are  no  children  ;  and  if  he  have 
no  wife  nor  children,  it  may  be  set  out  to  his  next  heirs  at 
law.^^     She  can  recover,  however,  only  one  homestead,  though 

1  Hittell's  Code,  1876,  §§  6238,  6239. 

2  Gee  V.  jroore,  14  Cal.  472  ;  Bowman  v.  Xorton,  16  Cal.  213. 

3  Dunn  V.  Tozer,  10  Cal.  167  ;  Barber  v.  Babel,  36  Cal,  11. 
*  Bowman  v.  Norton,  su]).  ;  Stat.  1862. 

6  Guiod  V.  Guiod,  1 4  Cal.  506.  «  Pode  v.  Gerrard,  6  Cal.  71. 

'  Cook  V.  McChristian,  4  Cal.  23. 

8  Benson  v.  Aitken,  17  Cal.  163  ;  Himmelmann  v.  Schmidt,  23  Cal.  117. 

9  Hittell's  Code,  1876,  §  6265. 

10  Hittell's  Code,  §§  11474-11486. 


cii.  IX.  §  2.]  estatf:s  by  marriaoe.  401 

lier  liusluincj  may,  iluriiij;  his  life,  have  owiK-d  several.^  But 
whether  she  takes  this  in  her  own  riirht  or  in  trust  for  the 
children  is  unsetth'(l.-  On  the  (U-ath  of  husliaiid  or  wife,  the 
homestead  in  community  property  vests  ahsohitely  in  the  sur- 
vivor, free  from  any  liability  for  any  deitt  of  either, contracted 
before  his  or  her  death,  except  such  as  it  w  as  subject  to  in  the 
lifetime  of  both.^  And  althou^di  it  is  subject  to  valid  existing 
liens,  it  ceases  to  be  assets  for  t'-e  payment  of  the  deltts  of  the 
deceased.*  If  one  owning;  land  in  |)artnership  dies,  his  widow 
cann()t  claim  homestead  out  of  it/'  If  a  widow  have  a  home- 
stead set  out  in  lu-r  deccast-d  husband's  estate,  she  holds  it  for 
the  benelit  of  herself  and  children.  Hut  if  she  marries  again, 
and  her  second  husband  has  a  homestead,  she  may,  on  his 
death,  claim  a  homestead  also  out  of  his  estate  to  her  own  use. 
Under  the  statute  of  1862,  however,  the  children  of  parents 
having  a  homestead  have  no  interest  in  it.  Upon  the  death  of 
one,  it  survives  to  the  other.*^ 

2  </.  In  Florida  the  owner  of  a  homestead  may  dispose  of  it 
by  last  will,  and  if  he  or  she  die  intestate,  it  descends  to  his 
or  her  issue  then  living.  If  there  be  no  children,  it  goes  to 
the  widow  ;  and  if  there  is  no  widow  nor  children,  it  may  be 
sold  to  satisfy  debts.' 

3.  In  (icorgia  a  widow  takes  the  homestead,  whether  she 
have  children  or  not  ;  but  her  dower  nmst  first  be  set  out  be- 
fore the  homestead  can  be.^  Miiutr  children  take  the  home- 
stead subject  to  the  widow's  right  of  dower,  to  the  exclusion 
of  the  father's  creditors.'^  And  where  the  father  died,  having 
devised  his  estate  to  his  minor  children,  whose  guardian  chose 
to  have  the  same  set  oil"  as  homestead  rather  than  claim  it 
under  the  devise,  it  was  held  to  take  the  estate  from  the  con- 
trol of  the  ordinary,  and  to  give  it  to  the  children  by  right  of 
liomestead.io  It  is  to  be  held  for  the  use  of  the  widow  and 
children  during  her  life  or  widowhood,  and  upon  licr  death  or 

>  Taylor  t.  Hiirgous,  4  Cat.  268.  -  Tompkins  Kst.,  12  Cal.  114. 

*  Hitti-ll's  (o>U-,  §  6265.  ♦  Muttc-r  of  Orr,  29  C'nl.  101. 

*  Kinjfsley  r.  Kinpiloy.  39  Citl.  Ge^u  «  Hi<  li  v.  Tubljs,  41  Cal.  34. 
'  1%.  1881.  c.  104.  5§  8,  16. 

«  C.kIo  1882.  §  2024  ;  Ha-slain  v.  Cuuiplx;!!,  60  Ga.  650. 

*  RofT  V.  Joliiison,  40  Cti.  5r»5. 

"  SWru<  r.  Nance,  45  Ga.  310  ;  HcmIo  r.  Johnson,  40  Ga.  439. 
VOL.  I. —  26 


402  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

marriage  it  is  equally  divided  among  the  children,  as  the  wife 
and  children  are  regarded  the  principal  beneficiaries  under  the 
homestead  law.i  But  the  estate  of  a  wife  in  a  homestead  is 
not  one  of  inheritance  ;  it  ceases  upon  her  death  or  ceasing  to 
be  a  member  of  the  family,  and  if  both  husband  and  wife  die 
without  leaving  minor  children,  the  homestead  right  is  gone, 
and  the  same  reverts  to  the  estate  of  the  husband.^  But  this 
reversion  or  remainder  dependent  on  the  termination  of  the 
homestead  cannot  be  levied  upon  while  the  homestead  lasts.^ 
It  is,  however,  subject  to  the  dower  right  of  the  widow,  and  she 
does  not  take  the  full  value  of  the  homestead  in  addition  to 
her  dower.*  Whether  minor  children  can  claim  a  homestead  in 
their  father's  estate  depends  upon  its  being  insolvent.  If  it  is, 
they  may  claim  it  against  creditors ;  if  it  is  not,  there  is  no 
homestead,  the  estate  passes  at  his  death  to  his  heirs,  subject 
only  to  the  widow's  right  of  dower,  she  having  no  right  to 
claim  a  homestead  in  such  case.^  If  the  husband  in  his  life- 
time neglect  or  refuse  to  have  a  homestead  set  out,  his  widow 
may  have  it  done  after  his  deatli.^ 

3  a.  In  Illinois  the  right  of  a  widow  continues  during  her 
life,  and  that  of  her  children  until  tAventy-one  years  of  age, 
provided  they  or  some  of  them  continue  to  occupy  the  same  as 
a  homestead.'''  But  the  interest  of  homestead  in  land  is  not 
an  estate  :  it  is  merely  an  exemption  and  suspension  from  the 
conveyance  of  a  fee  in  the  land  until  the  premises  are  aban- 
doned or  possession  is  surrendered.^  It  does  not  merge  in 
a  widow's  right  of  dower  in  the  same  premises.  These  rights 
are  distinct  from  and  independent  of  each  other,  and  a  widow 
may  have  both  out  of  the  same  estate.^  But  a  sale  of  land  in 
which  there  is  a  homestead,  by  the  administrator  of  the  de- 
ceased owner,  carries  no  title,  even  if  the  homestead  be  ex- 
cepted.^''    But  if  husband  and  family  remove  from  or  abandon 

1  Bumside  v.  Terry,  45  Ga.  621,  629. 

2  Heard  v.  Downer,  47  Ga.  629  ;  Ga.  Code  1882,  §  2024. 

3  Haslam  v.  Campbell,  60  Ga.  650. 

4  Adams  v.  Adams,  46  Ga.  630  ;  Hickson  v.  Bryan,  41  Ga.  620. 

5  Kemp  V.  Kemp,  42  Ga.  523.  '  Hodo  v.  Johnson,  40  Ga.  439. 
'  111.  Stat.  p.  650. 

3  McDonald  v.  Crandall,  43  111  231  ;  Black  v.  Curran,  14  Wall.  463. 

»  Vanish  V.  Rels,  50  111.  477.  ^^  H:irtman  v.  Schultz,  101  111.  437. 


CM.  IX.  §  2.]  f:states  by  marriaoe.  403 

the  humestoad,  nt-itlior  ho  nor  tlicy  can  nsume  it  80  as  to  cut 
ofT  liens  crcatnl  diirinir  such  abandonment. •  But  tlie  aban- 
donuicnt  l)y  one  only  does  not  uttVet  the  rights  of  the  others.'* 
Tin;  wife  cannot  claim  the  benefit  of  the  statute  while  her  hus- 
l)an<l  is  alive  ;  but  be  oidy  can  assert  the  clain».^  And  if  both 
wife  anil  children  ilie,  he  still  retains  the  homestead*  If  the 
wife  shall  have  been  divorced  for  her  husljand's  fault,  she  may 
claim  it  as  a  widow/'  So  she  may  if  he  abandons  her,  an*l 
she  continues  to  occupy  the  homestead.''  >o  if  he  ill-treats 
lier,  and  drives  her  away  from  lu-r  home,  and  she  then  obtains 
a  divorce,  and  the  children  are  committed  to  her  charjre,  she, 
as  the  head  of  a  family,  may  have  homestead  assigned  to  her 
as  alimony,  and  hold  it  for  hersidf  and  her  children  after  her." 
And  if  a  husband  abandon  his  wife  and  family,  and  she  is 
forcibly  expelled,  she  may  have  process  in  her  own  name  to 
recover  possession  of  the  premises.^  As  the  right  of  homestead 
was  designed  for  the  ^>rotcction  of  the  wife  and  children  more 
than  of  the  husband,  he  holds  the  estate,  to  a  certain  extent, 
as  a  trustei'.  And  though,  if  necessary,  he  may  purchase  in 
an  outstanding  title  for  the  |»rotection  of  tin;  estate,  and  bind 
it  for  tin*  piirebase-money,  he  cannot  thus  bind  it  if  such  pur- 
chase was  not  necessary." 

4.  In  Indiana  the  right  of  homestead  in  the  widow  is  inde- 
pendent of  :iny  provision  made  lor  her  by  devise  of  her  hus- 
band.'" The  widow  of  a  deceased  owner  may  have  >^oOO  of 
her  husbanils  I'state  set  off  to  her.'^  So  a  wife  may  have 
this  h(jmestead,  if  sIk'  is  tlic  debtor  and  have  estate  of  her 
own. '2 

5.  In  Iowa,  upon  the  death  of  the  husband  or  wife,  the  estate 
goes  to  the  survivor,  whether  there  are  children  or  not,  and  if 

>  Titman  r.  Moore,  43  111.  169  ;  Vasey  v.  Tnistoi's,  59  111.  158. 
«  Uiv.  Sut.  1883,  c.  52,  §  2. 

«  r,et2l.T  r.  Saroni,  18  111.  511.  *  Kimbrel  r.  WillU,  97  111.  494. 

'  Vanzant  v.  Vaiizant,  23  III.  536.  But  in  any  case  of  divorce,  tlie  luutur  ia 
ill  the  control  of  the  court.     Kev.  Stat.  c.  52,  §  5. 

«  Titman  r.  Moore,  43  111.  169  ;  People  r.  Stitt,  7  111.  App.  294. 
'  lionn.ll  r.  Smith.  53  111.  375.  3S3.  »  .Mi.x  v.  King,  55  111.  434 

•  Ca-wl  r.  Rww,  33  111.  244.  257. 

»o  Ix>ring  r.  Cmff,  IC  Ind.  110.  "  Stat.  1862,  p.  368. 

"  Crane  r.  Waggoner,  33  In.!.  83. 


404  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

there  be  no  survivor,  it  descends  to  the  issue  of  the  husband 
or  wife,  unless  otherwise  disposed  of,  to  be  held  by  such  issue 
exempt  from  any  antecedent  debts  of  the  parents  or  issue. 
By  "  issue  "  in  the  statute  is  meant  the  issue  of  husband  or 
wife,  whichever  it  may  be,  who  owned  the  fee.^  But  setting 
off  a  distributive  share  is  such  a  disposition  as  will  terminate 
it.2  The  same  may  be  devised,  subject  to  the  rights  of  the  sur- 
vivor.3  The  right  of  the  widow  or  widower  is  to  occupy  the 
estate  during  life,  and  to  take  the  rents  and  profits  thereof  to 
his  or  her  own  use.  At  the  death  of  the  survivor,  without 
issue,  the  exemption  ceases.*  The  survivor  does  not  take  a 
fee  in  the  homestead,  and  cannot  sell  it  to  another.^  If  he  or 
she  do  so,  the  heirs  of  the  other  spouse  may  come  in  and  divide 
the  estate  between  them.^  Homestead  laws  are  simply  statutes 
of  exemption,  rather  than  a  conferring  of  primitive  rights.'''  But 
the  wife's  dower,  by  the  law  of  Iowa  prior  to  1853,  and  since 
1862,  is  an  estate  in  fee.^  She  cannot  claim  dower  or  the  dis- 
tributive share  in  fee,  in  lieu  of  dower,  and  homestead  out  of 
the  same  estate.  If  she  claims  dower,  she  waives  her  right  of 
homestead.^  But  the  widow  has  a  right  to  enjoy  the  home- 
stead, although  she  marries  again  ;  nor  can  the  heirs  of  the 
husband  have  partition  while  she  occupies  it,i°  and  she  may 
have  damages  for  a  continuing  trespass  or  adverse  occupancy, 
though  it  began  while  her  husband  was  living.  ^^ 

5  a.  In  Kentucky,  after  the  death  of  the  owner  of  the  home- 
stead, his  widow  and  unmarried  children,  so  long  as  she  occu- 
pies it  at  all,  occupy  the  same  together,  until  the  youngest 
is  twenty-one  years  of  age.  Nor  will  her  abandonment  of  the 
estate  affect  the  rights  of  the  minor  children.  And  the  same 
rule  applies  to  husband  and  children,  if  the  homestead  estate 

1  Burns  v.  Keas,  21  Iowa,  257  ;  Rev.  Code,  1880,  §§  1989,  2007,  2008,  2010. 

2  Rev.  Code,  §  2008. 

8  Rev.  Code,  §  2010  ;  Bums  v.  Keas,  21  Iowa,  257  ;  Floyd  v.  Hosier,  1  Iowa, 
512  ;  Rhodes  v.  McCormick,  4  Iowa,  368. 

*  Rev.  Code,  §  2009.  ^  Srnith  v.  Eaton,  50  Iowa,  488. 

6  Size  V.  Size,  24  Iowa,  580  ;  Meyer  v.  Meyer,  23  Iowa,  359. 

'  Burns  v.  Keas,  21  Iowa,  257  ;  Cotton  v.  Wood,  25  Iowa,  48. 

8  See  ante,  *149.  »  Meyer  v.  Meyer,  23  Iowa,  359. 

10  Nicholas  v.  Purczell,  21  Iowa,  265  ;  Dodds  v.  Dodds,  26  Iowa,  311. 

11  C-iiii  V.  Chic,  &c.  R.  R.,  54  Iowa,  255. 


rii.  IX.  §  l'.]  kstates  iiy  mai:uia(;e.  -IOo 

bt'loiiiTH  to  tlio  wife  ami  slie  dit'H.  Ilrr  intorcst  in  tlic  homcHtoad 
is  takrii  into  t'stiiniili'  in  setting  ont  her  dowor.' 

5  A.  In  Louisiana,  while  it  enures  to  the  widow's  lieni-llt 
durins;  widowhood,''  if  a  wife  die  leaving  real  estate,  and  also 
a  husliand  and  ehihlren,  he  cannot  claim  homestead  out  of  it 
against  the  creditins  of  the  wife.'' 

().  In  Maiiir  iinil  -Massachusetts  the  widow  may  occupy  the 
premises  (iiirin<r  her  widowhood,  and  the  chihlrcn  dui-in^'  their 
minority  after  the  father's  death.' 

7.  In  Massachusetts  this  right  is  set  off  to  the  widow  in  the 
same  manner  as  dt)wer.  Hut  what  of  the  estate  is  over  and 
ahove  this  homesteatl  right  is  suhjeet  to  devise,  descent, 
dower,  ami  sale  for  payment  of  del)ts  ol  ilie  deceased.''  This 
right  of  homesteatl  is  something  in  addition  to  the  wid<»w's 
right  of  dower  and  allowance  made  l)y  the  jndgc  of  probate, 
and  does  not  depend  upon  the  husband's  owing  debts  or  not 
at  his  decease.^  And  if  tlu'  husband  were  in  i)Os.session  of  the 
pn'mises  at  his  death,  the  widow  may  continue  to  occupy  them 
without  their  having  been  .set  out  to  her  by  the  judge  of  pro- 
bate, if  they  do  not  exceed  the  amount  in  value  of  what  is  cx- 
cmi)ted.'  It  is  something,  moreover,  which  she  may  sell,  and 
is  not  obliged  to  make  use  of  to  enjoy. ^  This  homestead  right 
is  not  a  fee-simple  estate.  It  is  a  freehold  estate  in  the  |»rem- 
ises,  to  be  held  while  the  husband  is  a  householder,  an<l  bv 
liis  widow  after  his  death,  and  his  children  l>y  her,  during 
widowhood,  and  by  the  children,  or  by  such  of  tliem  as  choose 
to  occupy  it,  to  be  enjoyed  by  them  together,  until  the  youmr- 
cst  is  twenty-f)nc  years  of  age,  provided  some  one  of  them 
continues  to  occupy  the  same.  The  right  of  pos.se8sion  and 
enjoyment  is  in  those  only  of  the  family  who  remain  in  occu- 
pation of  the  homestead,  and  this,  free  from  intrusion  of  cred- 
itors or  strangers.      Nor  can   cither  member  of  the  family 

>  Ot-n.  St.  1873,  c.  38,  nrt.  13,  §§  1  J,  15.  2  Kov.  Stat.  1870,  §  1694. 

»  llumott  r.  Walker,  23  La.  Ann.  335. 

*  Rev.  Stnt,  1883.  c.  83,  §  66  ;  .Mus.s.  Pub.  Stat  c.  123,  §  8. 
»  Tub.  Stat.  c.  123,  §§  8.  9. 

•  Monk  r.  Capen,  5  Allen,  146  ;  Mcrcicr  r.  fhnso,  11  All.  n.  104  ;  Bates  p. 
Bftt.-S  97  MflM.  892  ;  Cowdrey  r.  CowJrey,  131  Maas.  186  ;  Woller  r.  Wellei; 
Id.  446. 

»  Tarks  v.  RviUj,  5  Allen,  77.  •  Mcrcicr  v.  Ch&ae,  sup. 


406  LAW    OF    REAL    PROPERTY.  [BOOK    I. 

transfer  any  right  to  a  stranger  without  the  consent  of  the 
others.^  The  title,  while  there  is  such  occupancy  hy  the 
widow  and  children,  most  nearly  resembles  that  of  husband 
and  wife  at  common  law,  under  a  grant  to  both,  by  which  they 
became  seised,  not  of  moieties,  but  of  the  entirety,  per  tout  et 
nan  per  my,  and  neither  could  dispose  of  any  part  without  the 
assent  of  the  other.^  Nor  can  the  husband  affect  the  right  of 
his  wife  to  enjoy  the  homestead  by  any  provision  of  his  will. 
And  continuing  to  occupy  a  room  in  a  dwelling-house  owned 
by  a  husband  at  his  death,  as  a  homestead,  by  the  widow,  for 
the  purpose  of  storing  her  furniture,  is  such  an  occupancy  as 
preserves  her  right  of  homestead  in  the  premises.^  And  it  is 
this  estate,  exclusive  of  the  reversionary  interest  in  the  prem- 
ises, which  a  husband  cannot  convey  unless  his  wife  join  in 
the  conveyance.^  The  estate  of  homestead  exists  for  the  benefit 
of  the  widow,  though  the  husband  died  owing  no  debts,  and 
though  she  has  already  taken  her  dower  out  of  the  estate, 
and  she  may  claim  it  against  the  adult  heirs  of  the  husband.^ 
8.  In  Michigan,  both  the  constitution  and  statutes  secure 
to  the  widow  the  rents  and  profits  of  the  homestead  during 
widowhood,  unless  she  sooner  acquire  a  homestead  of  her  own, 
and  they  do  the  same  to  the  minor  children  of  the  householder 
so  long  as  they  are  minors.  But  these  rights  depend  upon  its 
being  occupied  by  the  widow  and  children,  if  any  ;  ^  though  the 
widow's  removal  will  not  affect  the  children's  right.'"  And 
the  law  has  given  a  feme  covert  all  the  power  in  relation  to  a 
homestead  estate  which  a  feme  sole  has.  But  it  is  no  more 
than  she  has  in  respect  to  her  right  of  dower.     The  only  way 

1  Abbott  V.  Abbott,  97  Mass.  136. 

2  Ibid.  But  where  a  deed  to  a  married  woman  conveyed  the  land  to  her  in 
fee  as  a  homestead,  this  was  held  to  become  separately  hers  on  divorce,  so  that  she 
could  maintain  an  action  against  her  husband  for  remaining  in  occupancy  thereof. 
Dunliam  v.  Dunham,  128  Mass.  34. 

3  Brettun  v.  Fox,  100  Mass.  234. 

*  Smith  V.  Provin,  4  Allen,  516  ;  White  v.  Rice,  5  Allen,  73  ;  Doyle  v.  Coburn, 
6  Allen,  71  ;  Silloway  v.  Brown,  12  Allen,  30  ;  Kerley  v.  Kerley,  13  Allen,  286  ; 
Abbott  V.  Abbott,  97  Mass.  136  ;  Swan  v.  Stephens,  99  Mass.  7. 

^  Monk  V.  Capen,  5  Allen,  146 ;  Silloway  v.  Brown,  12  Allen,  33. 

«  Const,  art.  16,  §§  3,  4  ;  Stat.  1848,  c.  132  ;  Drake  v.  Kinsell,  38  Mich.  232 ; 
Dei  V.  Ilabel,  41  Mich.  88. 

'  Showers  v.  Robinson,  43  Mich.  502. 


CU.  IX.  §  2.]  ESTATES    UY    MAKRIAGR.  i07 

«lic  can  convey  citluT,  or  a(Tcct  her  i-'\<j:hi  to  tho  sanu-,  is  hy 
joinin^i;  with  her  hushantl  in  a  deed  of  niort^ajxe.'  I5ut  her 
dower  and  the  honientead  are  independent  rights,  and  she  is  en- 
titled to  hoth, —  to  dower  first,  and  honiestea<l  from  the  resi- 
due.'' Suhject,  liowever,  to  these  rights,  tlie  hmd  may  he  sold 
hy  tho  administrator;^  or  a  valid  contract  may  he  made  hy 
the  hushand  with()ut  the  wife,  as  to  everything  hut  tlie  estate 
of  homesteatl* 

!».  In  Minnesota  the  exemption  secures  the  enjoyment  of  the 
estate  to  the  widow  so  long  as  she  remains  unmarried  and  oc- 
cupies th(»  jiremises,or  to  the  wife  if  her  hushand  ahscond,and 
to  the  children,  in  either  case,  until  the  youngest  is  of  the  age 
of  twenty-one  years,  provided  the  widow  or  some  one  of  the 
children  continue  to  occupy  the  same  ;  hut  neither  of  them 
can  sell  or  convey  the  homestead.'' 

1<|.  In  Mississipjii,  upon  the  decease  of  the  hushand  and 
father,  whatever  may  he  his  estate  in  the  premises,  whether 
in  fee,  freehold,  or  for  years,  it  descends  to  his  widow  and 
children,  and  after  her  ceasing  to  he  his  widow,  to  the  chil- 
dren. And  if  he  leave  no  widow,  the  children,  if  any,  take  the 
same  hy  descent.^  The  estate  is  not  the  suhject  of  administra- 
tion, nor  does  it  interfere  with  the  dower  right  of  the  widow. 
It  descends  to  the  widow  and  children;"  and  tho  latter  take 
it  only  during  minority.^  But  during  the  owner's  life  tho  estate 
is  his,  an»l  can  he  disjiosed  of  hy  him,  and  during  that  time 
neither  the  wife  nor  children  have  any  vested  interest  in  the 
same;*  and  where  the  wife's  signature  and  acknowledirment 
are  requisite,  yet  if  the  deed  Ije  part  of  an  act  of  ahandon- 
ment,  it  will  he  good  without  the  wife's  execution,  though 
made  licfore  actual  removal. ^'^  The  widow  and  children  take 
it.  on  the  husltand's  decease,  as  land  descends  to  heirs.^' 

'  Kniji  V.  Burt,  17  Mich.  465.  '  Showers  r.  Rohinson,  43  Mich.  502. 

'lb.  *  Sti'vonson  v.  Jncksoii.  40  Mi-h.  7"^2. 

»  Stat.  1878.  c.  68.  §  1  ;  Folsom  r.  Carii,  5  Minn.  333,  337  ;  TilloUson  r.  Mil- 
lanl.  7  Mmn.  513,  520. 

•  Smith  c.  E.stell.  34  Miss.  527  ;  Morrison  r.  McDnniol,  30  Miss.  213  ;  AVhit^ 
»ml>  r.  H«'i<l,  31  Miss.  5«>7  ;  C'nnii>Ull  v.  A«lnir,  45  Miss.  170. 

'  Smith  V.  WelU.  46  Mivs.  04.  *  McCaleb  r.  Burnett,  55  Miss.  83. 

•  Mi.-w.  Kev.  Code,  1880,  §  1257.  •»  Wilson  p.  Gray.  59  Miss.  525. 
a  Thorns  P.  ThoDu,  45  hlias.  275,  276  ;  Parker  v.  Dean,  45  Miss.  403,  423. 


408  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

10a,  In  J\rissonii,  if  the  owner  die  leaving  a  widow  and 
children,  the  homestead  goes  to  thcni  nntil  the  death  of  the 
foi'uuM-  and  (he  laiter  are  of  age,^  but  nmy  he  sold  snbject  to 
their  I'ights;-  and  these  are  not  de))endent  on  the  existence 
of  d(>b(s.3  JVior  to  the  act  of  ISTA  the  widow  took  an  abso- 
lute estate ; '  willi  a  I'ight  to  lh(>  minor  cliiidren  if  she  died 
during  their  minority;^'  but  dower  was  fii'st  assigned  to  her 
]>ro  tanto  in  lieu  of  homestead ;  ^  but  this  is  now  altered  by 
that  statute. 

10?).  In  Nebraska,  at  the  death  of  the  owner  or  del)tor,  the 
homestead,  if  from  his  or  her  separate  property,  descends  and 
vests  in  the  survivor  for  life,  and  then  in  the  heirs  at  law  or 
legatees  of  the  owner.  But  it  remains  cxem|^  from  forced 
sale  as  long  as  it  is  owned  and  occupied  by  the  debtor.'^ 

10  c.  In  Nevada,  when  a  claim  for  a  homestead  exemption 
has  been  i)rop(M-ly  made,  the  husband  and  wife,  if  he  have  one, 
hold  the  homestead  as  joint  tenants  during  life,  and,  on  de- 
cease of  either,  it  ])asses  to  the  survivor  and  the  minor  cliii- 
dren.^^ ]>ut  until  recorded  the  husband  may  mortgage  it 
without  the  wife.^ 

11.  In  New  Hampshire  some  of  the  earlier  decisions  Avould 
seem  to  warrant  the  proposition  that  a  homestead  right  is  not 
an  estate ;  it  is  inchoate,  not  assignable  or  transferable,  as 
something  of  ascertained  value,  by  the  one  in  whom  it  vesti^, 
until  the  same  shall  have  been  separated  and  set  apart  from 
the  general  estate  out  of  which  it  issues.^^  l>ut  by  Tucker  v. 
Keniston,  since  decided,  the  homestead  to  be  set  off  is  the 
whole  property,  and  is  not  to  exceed  five  hundred  dollars. 
Not  a  contingent  life  estate  merely,  but  the  entire  estate,  and 
against  that  there  shall  be  no  further  proceedings.  And  it  is 
not  to  be  considered  a  contingent  or  inchoate  estate,  except  as 

1  Kcv.  Stat.  1879,  §  2693.  ^  Pohiiul  v.  Vesper,  67  Mo.  727. 

8  Frounde  v.  ]\I(Cixll,  73  Mo.  343. 
*  lb. ;  Schneider  v.  Hoiriimn,  9  Mo.  App.  280. 
'  Skouten  v.  AVood,  57  Mo.  380. 

6  Seek  V.  Hnynes,  68  Mo.  13.  ^  Conip.  Stat.  1881,  c.  36,  §  17. 

8  Conip.  L.  1873,  §  189. 
»  Child  V.  Smgh'ton,  15  Nev.  461. 

If  Atkinson  v.  Atkinson,  37  N.  H.  434  ;  Gunnison  v.  TwiohcU,  38  N.  H.  62, 
67  ;  Horn  v.  Tiil'ts,  39  N.  II.  478,  485  ;  Koss  v.  Strachu,  42  N.  IL  40. 


ni.  IX.  §  2.]  k-tatj:^  nv  m  \i;i:i  \';k.  409 

it  may  Imj  voluntarily  hoM  or  abfin<l«>in(l.'  r.ul  tho  widow  han 
no  v('Ht«'<l  cHfatr  until  tin-  lionifrttea*!  in  nrt  out  to  lu-r,  I'ntil 
tlien  it  iH  an  inclioat^j  ri;rlit.^  No  niorfyfi(,'r',  howevf-r,  by  llio 
owner  alono  \h  jrood,  except  for  imr<liaHf-n)onoy.'  The  c«tat<i 
of  I  i\  in  a  conditional  lif^  eHtale.*     If  a  dditor'n  cHtate 

in  I'  lore  the  honMHt<'ad   in  set  out,  Im*  owuh  Ium  honj''- 

Hfead  as  tenant  in  coninion  with  the  owner  of  the  rent  of  the 
estate,  and  may  have  partition  of  the  Hanje/'  The  Ktatute 
ventH  the  homestead  in  the  head  of  the  family  in  hin  own  prei*- 
ont  rijfht  an  general  owner,  and  not  a8  a  trustee  of  any  one. 
It  ROcureH  to  the  wi«low  the  oreiiftation  of  the  estate  durinj^ 
life  if  hIio  choose,  and  to  the  ehildn*n  while  minorH."  if  the 
estate  is  un<ler  motiga^re,  and  she  has  to  pay  it  in  onler  to 
gave  lier  rijrht,  she  bi-eonies  subrogated  to  the  rijrhts  of  the 
mortjra'/ee  for  contribution  from  the  other  part-owners.'  At 
the  liiisband's  <leath,  the  statute  gives  the  homestead,  whether 
set  off  or  not  from  the  part  which  is  subject  to  his  d(;bts, 
to  the  widow  and  minor  children,  in  her  or  their  own  right." 
IJut  if  the  children  Hhall  have  arrive*!  at  age,  the  widow  alone 
is  entitled  to  the  homestead'-*  Dn  the  other  hand,  if  the  Mifc 
was  the  legal  owner,  and  there  are  no  minor  childn.'n,  the 
husband  receives  the  exemjition.''* 

12.  The  same  is  the  general  doctrine  in  New  York.  It  can- 
not be  s^ild  or  made  over  to  another.**  It  is  intended  for  the 
benefit  of  the  widow  for  life,  and  the  children  until  the  young- 
est is  of  age,  if  they  continue  to  occupy  the  same.'*  The  house- 
holder is  the  owner  of  the  estate,  but  the  homestead  e.xemi»tion 
continues  tintil  the  death  of  the  householder  for  the  iK'nefit  of 
his  widow  and  family,  until  the  yotingest  child  is  of  age,  or  the 
death  of  the  widow,  they  or  some  one  of  lh<'m  continuing  to 

»  Barney  v.  Le^ls,  51  N,  H.  253,  272  ;  Tucker  r.  KcnUton,  47  N.  II.  2*57. 

•  Ti'l<i  V.  QuinD,  52  N.  H.  341  ;  and  it  to  be  ict  out  like  dower,  Gi-n.  Uws, 
1878,  c.  138.  I  4. 

•  Gen.  Uw«,  c.  138,  |  2.  *  I>ocke  v.  Rowell,  47  >'   II.  4<5. 

•  Bnmey  r.  ly^i*.  51  N.  H.  253.  •  Gen.  Uwi,  c.  138 

'  N..rrn  r.  M'.ull/)n.  34  N.  H.  392  ;  Norria  r.  Morri*on, ».  c,  45  N.  H.  4»a  Wl 

•  FW-uber  r.  8ut«  liank,  37  N.  II.  8<59,  391. 

•  Mile*  r.  Mile*,  4«  K.  H.  2«1.  »•  Gen.  Uwi,  c  188,  «  6. 
"  All-n  r.  Cook,  2«  Barb.  374  ;  Smith  v.  Brmckctt,  8«  Barb,  671. 

"  3  aut.  647. 


410  LAW   OF   EEAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

be  an  occupant  of  the  premises.^  But  the  right  does  not  run 
with  the  land  so  as  to  give  the  purchaser  a  right  to  claim  what 
his  vendor  might  have  enforced.^  Nor  is  it  regarded  as  an 
incumbrance  or  lien  on  an  estate.  The  householder  is  thereby 
none  the  less  the  owner  of  the  entire  estate.^ 

12  a.  In  North  Carolina  a  homestead  estate  is  a  determinable 
fee ;  the  entire  interest  in  and  control  of  it  is  vested  in  the 
holder  of  it.  The  holder  is  not  impeachable  for  waste.  But 
there  is  still  an  interest  in  the  owner  over  and  above  the  home- 
stead right,  answering  to  a  reversionary  interest,  but  it  is  not 
the  subject  of  levy  by  a  creditor  of  the  reversioner.*  At  the  death 
of  the  owner,  it  enures  to  the  widow  during  widowhood,  if  she 
have  no  children  and  no  homestead  in  her  own  right.  If  he 
have  children,  it  is  exempt  in  their  hands  during  the  minority 
of  any  of  them.^  If  the  husband  die  owing  no  debts,  no  home- 
stead can  be  set  out  of  his  estate  to  his  widow  and  children, 
since  this  is  only  done  to  protect  the  estate  from  creditors.^ 
Nor  does  the  homestead  right  interfere  with  that  of  dower,  so 
that  if  the  widow  claims  a  homestead,  the  children  would  take 
it  subject  to  her  right  of  dower  in  the  same  estate.'^ 

In  New  Jersey  the  estate  continues  after  the  death  of  the 
householder  for  the  benefit  of  his  widow  and  family,  if  some 
one  of  them  occupy  it,  until  the  youngest  child  is  of  the  age 
of  twenty-one  years  and  during  the  life  of  the  widow  ;  but  no 
release  or  waiver  thereof  is  valid.^ 

13.  In  Ohio  the  exemption  enures  to  a  widow  or  widower, 
unmarried  daughter,  or  minor  son,  and  continues  in  favor  of 
an  unmarried  minor  child  who  resides  upon  the  premises,  al- 
though the  widow  may  be  dead,  or  the  parent  from  whom  the 
child  inherits  died,  leaving  neither  husband  nor  wife.^ 

14.  lu  Pennsylvania  the  widow's  right  is  special  and  pecu- 
liar.    It  is  paramount  to  all  liens,  except  that  of  a  vendor  for 

1  4  Stat,  at  Large,  Pt.  3,  c.  260. 

2  Smith  V.  Brackett,  36  Barb.  571  ;  Allen  v.  Cook,  26  Barb.  374. 

3  Eobinson  v.  Wiley,  19  Barb.  157.  *  Poe  v.  Hardie,  65  N.  C.  447. 

6  Const,  art.  10,  §§  3,  5.  The  widow  takes  no  homestead  whether  the  children 
be  minors  or  adult,  Wharton  v.  Leggett,  80  N.  C.  169  ;  but  the  homestead  vests 
only  in  the  minor  children,  Simpson  v.  Wallace,  83  N.  C.  477. 

6  Hager  v.  Nixon,  69  N.  C.  108.  "^  Watts  v.  Leggett,  66  N.  C.  197. 

«  Pvev.  1877,  p.  1055,  §  1.  »  Rev.  Stat.  1880,  §§  5435,  5437. 


v'n.  IX.  §  2.]  E.STATK>  liV  M  \i:i:i\(;i;.  Ill 

tho  purchase-money.'  It  does  not  depend  upon  her  accept ini^ 
provision  or  otherwise,  which  is  nuuh.'  for  her  hy  her  husband's 
will.-  If  she  have  eliil<h'en,  she  takes  it  fcjr  licrsclf  and  tlicni, 
for  the  use  of  the  family.  Hut  if  she  have  none,  she  takes 
the  whole  altsolutely.^  And  where  there  are  no  children,  she 
can  convey  the  premi.ses,  when  set  out  to  her,  in  fee  by  her 
own  deed,  not  as  trustee,  but  as  owner. ^ 

14  <i.  In  South  Candina,  the  exenijition  continues  to  the 
widow  of  the  owner  and  his  minor  children  until  the  death 
or  marriajje  of  the  widow  and  until  the  youufrest  child  is  of 
ajro.  If  hoth  husband  and  wife  be  dead,  leaving;  children, 
the  children,  whether  minors  or  not,  take  the  homestead  in 
the  same  manner  as  the  parents.  JJut  it  is  said  there  is  a 
reversion  after  such  estate  whieli  is  the  subject  of  sale  or 
dcvist\^ 

In  Tennessee,  at  tlie  death  of  the  owner,  a  liomestcad  froes 
to  his  widow  duriutj:  life  or  until  attain  married,  ami  on  her 
death  or  marriaire  it  p)es  to  the  minor  children  durintr  mi- 
nority, and  ujion  termination  of  their  interest  becomes  p'ueral 
assets  of  his  estate.  If  the  wife  is  divorced  for  his  fault,  the 
title  vests  in  her  by  a  decree  of  the  court.^  And  so  much  of 
a  Inisband's  homestead  remains  to  the  widow  for  her  use  as 
shall  make  her  dower  in  the  estate  worth  one  thousand  dol- 
lars. Hut  she  cannot  have  a  homestead  of  that  value  and 
dower  also.' 

15.  In  Texas,  the  homestead  rifrht,  so  far  as  the  children 
are  concerned,  depends  uj»ou  there  being  a  wife  to  take  at  the 
householder's  deatli.  If  he  have  a  wife  she  will  take,^  but  if 
he  have  no  wife,  he  may  convey  the  estate,  or  it  may  be  levied 
on  for  his  debt,  and  thereby  the  rights  of  the  children  thereto 
be  defeated.^     The  right  as  far  as  the  widow  and  children  are 

>  Robinson  v.  Wullat-o,  39  Penn.  129  ;  rompher  v.  Comphcr,  25  Penn.  31. 

'  C'ompli.T  r.  Compiler,  sup.;  Hill  v.  Hill,  32  Penn.  511. 

»  Purd.  Dig.  291;  Conipher  v.  ('oinpher,  sup.;  Hill  v.  Hill,  sup. 

•  Sip.s  V.  Mann,  39  Penn.  St.  414;  Nevins's  .\pp.,  47  Penn.  St  230. 

»  Const  art.  2,  §  32;  Gen.  Stat.  1882,  §§  1997,  2002;  Moore  r.  Parker,  13 
S.  r.  486. 

«  Sut  1871,  §§  2119,  2120,  2121.  ^  M.rriinan   r.  Lnnfield,  4  Heisk.  209 

•  Rev.  But  1879,  art.  1996. 

•  Tadlock  v.  Eccles,  20  Tex.  782,  792;  Brewer  v.  Wall,  23  Tct  5S5. 


412  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

concerned  is  the  same  whether  the  homestead  is  in  the  com- 
munity or  the  separate  property,^  and  is  moreover  held  sub- 
ject to  the  equities  and  incumbrances  existing  thereon  at  the 
time  it  was  acquired,  and  the  husband  may  discharge  these  by 
his  own  act,2  or  may  substitute  new  ones.^  But  he  cannot  create 
new  ones  without  his  wife's  written  assent.^  The  adminis- 
trator of  one  having  had  a  homestead  set  out  has  nothing  to 
do  with  the  estate  thus  assigned.^  And  if  he  leave  a  widow, 
the  children  cannot  have  partition  of  it  so  long  as  she  lives 
and  remains  the  head  of  the  family  ;  ^  unless  she  sells  her  in- 
terestJ  And  where  the  court  grant  her  a  decree  of  divorce 
and  the  custody  of  the  children,  she  may  have  the  use  of  the 
homestead  assigned  to  her  during  life.^  When  the  homestead 
belonged  to  the  wife,  it  descends  on  her  death  to  her  children, 
subject  only  to  her  husband's  right  of  occupancy  during  his 
lifetime,  and  no  partition  can  be  made  before  his  death.^ 

16.  In  Vermont  this  right  does  not  vest  any  title  in  the 
wife.  It  is  only  a  kind  of  lien  upon  the  estate  of  the  husband 
in  favor  of  the  wife.  It  only  becomes  an  estate  in  the  wife 
and  family  after  the  decease  of  the  husband.^^  But  though 
contingent  and  inchoate  during  his  life,  she  may  enforce  it 
after  his  death,  although  he  may  have  conveyed  it  absolutely 
in  his  life,  if  she  did  not  join  in  the  conveyance.^^  In  such 
case,  it  passes  to  the  widow  and  children,  if  any,  in  due  course 
of  descent,  to  be  set  out  by  the  court  of  probate.^^  And  they 
take  the  estate  subject  to  such  debts  of  the  intestate  as  he 
owed  at  the  time  of  purchasing  the  same,^^  and  to  taxes."   By 

1  Eev.  Stat.  art.  2006. 

2  "White  V.  Shepperd,  16  Tex.  163,  172;  Rev.  Stat.  art.  2000, 

3  Gilluin  V.  Collier,  53  Tex.  592. 

*  Gaylord  v.  Loughridge,  50  Tex.  573;  Barnes  ».  "White,  53  Tex.  628, 
6  Bassett  v.  Messner,  30  Tex.  604. 

6  Rev.  Stat.  art.  2004;  Hoffman  v.  Xeuhaus,  30  Tex.  633. 

7  Rev.  Stat.  art.  2005.  ^  Tieman  v.  Tieman,  34  Tex.  522. 
9  Rev.  Stat.  art.  2009. 

1'^  Howe  V.  Adams,  28  Vt.  541;  Jewett  v.  Brock,  32  Vt.  65. 

11  Davis  V.  Andrews,  30  "Vt,  678;  Jewett  v.  Brock,  sup.  ;  McClary  v.  Bixbj", 
36  Vt.  254,  260;  Day  v.  Adams,  42  "Vt,  510. 

12  Rev.  Laws  1880,  §  1898;  Day  v.  Adams,  42  Vt.  516. 

"  Rev.  Laws,  §  1901;  Simonds  v.  Powers,  28  Vt.  354;  Perrin  v.  Sargeant, 
33  Vt.  84.  "  Rev,  Laws,  §  1902. 


cii.  IX.  §  2.]  estatf:8  iiv  mauiuage.  11  o 

the  act  of  lSo.">,  the  lioiuL-.slcad  is  limitcii  to  the  Nsidow  and 
minor  chilUivu.'  But  it  pu'S  a»  an  entire  thing,  and  is  to  he 
occupied  accordingly.  If,  therefore,  the  ehihlren  he  Hcatt«nMi 
or  Hve  away  from  the  e.state,  they  can  neither  claim  partition 
of  the  estate,  nor  rent  for  its  use  hy  the  widow.  She  has  a 
right  to  hohl,  conti-ol,  and  enjoy  it,  without  abatement  by 
any  of  the  ehihlren  wlu)  are  not  members  of  the  family.'-*  It 
is  indep'-ndent  of  her  right  of  dower;''  the  homestead  belongs 
to  her  in  fee,  vesting  upmi  the  death  of  the  husband,  an<l  on 
her  death  descends  to  her  heiis,  and  may  be  set  out  to  her  in 
the  same  lands  which  have  already  been  set  to  her  for  life  as 
dower.'  Ihit  by  statute  18G2,  the  same  connnissioners  who 
set  out  a  widow's  homestead  may  set  out  her  dower,  provided 
the  homestead  do  not  eijual  one  third  of  the  estate.  If  it  do, 
she  can  claim  no  dower;  if  it  do  not,  the  dower  is  set  out 
after  the  homesteail ;  though  the  giving  a  deed  of  her  home- 
stead does  not  aflV-et  her  right  of  dower.  ^ 

10  a.  In  Virginia,  a  homestead,  after  the  death  of  the 
owner,  goes  to  the  widow  and  minor  children  initil  her  death 
or  nuirriage,  antl  after  that  event  it  remains  to  the  exclusive 
benefit  of  the  minor  childri'U  until  the  youngest  is  of  age. 
Ami  if  she  is  divorced  for  his  faidt.  she  t:iki's  the  homestead 
for  herself  and  children  in  the  same  manner  as  if  he  were 
dead  ;  and  if  it  is  not  set  out  in  his  lifetime,  the  widow  and 
children,  if  she  is  alive  ami  unmarried, otherwise  the  children 
may  claim  it  in  the  same  manner  as  if  it  had  been  set  off  in 
the  husband's  lifetime.'^ 

17.  In  Wisconsin,  the  estate,  if  not  devised  by  the  owner, 
descends  to  the  widow  if  there  are  no  issue ;  if  there  arc  issue, 
then  to  her  during  widowhood,  and  afterwards  to  such  issue  or 
other  heirs  ;  if  issue  only,  then  to  them ;  if  neither  issue  nor 
widow,  it  becomes  part  of  the  owner's  general  estate." 

»  Porrin  r.  SarReant,  33  Vt.  86;  Rev.  Ijiws,  §  1898. 
«  Kcy.s  r.  Hill,  30  Vt.  759.  «  Rev.  Uws  §  1899. 

«  Doaiio  r.  Doauo,  33  Vt.  649  ;  Chaplin  r.  Sawyer.  35  Vt.  286  ;  McClary  t» 
Bixbv.  36  Vt.  254,  257.  6  i{,.v.  Uws,  §  lltOO. 

•  Code,  1873,  c  183,  §§  8,  9.  <  Kuv.  Stat  1S7S,  §  2271. 


414  LAW  OF  REAL  PEOPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

DIVISION  V. 

HOW   FAR   SUCH   RIGHTS   ARE    EXEMPT    FROM    DEBTS. 

I,     Principle  upon  which  homesteads  are  exempt  from  debts, 
la,  lb.  To  what  extent  in  Alabama  and  Arkansas. 
2,  2  a.  To  what  extent  exempt  in  California  and  Florida. 

3.  To  what  extent  in  Georgia. 

4.  To  what  extent  in  Illinois. 

5.  To  what  extent  in  Indiana. 

6,  6  a.  To  what  extent  in  Iowa,  Kansas,  and  Louisiana. 

7.  To  what  extent  in  Maine. 

8.  To  what  extent  in  Massachusetts. 

9.  To  what  extent  in  Michigan. 

10,  10  a.  To  what  extent  in  Minnesota,  Mississippi,  and  Missouri. 

11,  11a.  To  what  extent  in  New  Hampshire,  Nebraska,  Nevada,  and  North 

Carolina. 

12.  To  what  extent  in  New  York  and  New  Jersey. 

13.  To  what  extent  in  Ohio. 

li.     To  what  extent  in  Pennsylvania. 

15.  To  what  extent  in  South  Carolina. 

16.  To  what  extent  in  Tennessee  and  Texas. 
17,  17  a.  To  what  extent  in  Vermont  and  Virginia. 

18.     To  what  extent  in  Wisconsin. 

1.  The  exemption  from  liability  for  the  debts  of  the  owner, 
while  in  some  States  it  is  all  but  absolute,  in  others  is  limited 
and  conditional.  It  does  not  extend  to  taxes,  nor,  with  few 
exceptions,  to  what  is  due  for  the  purchase-money  of  the 
premises.  In  some  it  is  no  bar  to  a  recovery  mider  a  me- 
chanic's lien,  and  does  not  apply  to  debts  existing  at  the 
time  of  acquiring  the  estate.  The  modes  of  levying  upon  the 
estate,  so  as  to  reach  what  interest  the  debtor  has  therein  over 
and  above  the  exempted  right,  are  provided  for  in  the  statutes 
of  the  different  States,  and  are  not  uniform.  Most  of  the 
statutes  exempt  the  homestead  from  a  "  forced  sale,"  but  this 
is  not  limited  in  all  cases  to  sales  under  process  of  law  upon 
execution,  but  in  Louisiana  extends  to  sales  made  for  the  pur- 
poses of  foreclosing  mortgages.^ 

1  a.  Though  in  Alabama  a  homestead  is  not  exempt  from 
process  to  enforce  the  payment  of  the  purchase-money,  if  a 
mortgage  be  given  for  the  purchase-money  of  an  estate  larger 

1  Le  Blanc  v.  St.  Germain,  25  La.  Ann.  289. 


ClI.  IX.  §  2.]  ESTATES    UY    MAUUIA(;E.  415 

in  cxtt'ut  than  tin-  li<.»ni('strail,  and  a  creditor  levy  on  the  en- 
tire estate,  he  cannot  relieve  liis  share^  hy  coniiK-'lling  the  mort- 
gagee to  htok  first  to  the  homestead  for  the  Hatisfaction  of  hin 
deht.  The  rij^lit  t)f  exenjjition  comes  in  next  to  the  contract 
lien.*  The  exemption  «)f  homestead  does  not  exten<l  to  lahor- 
cr's  and  nu-chanic's  liens.'^  Ihit  it  extends  to  any  other  dehts 
contracted  after,  and  in  some  cases  to  dehts  contracted  be- 
fore, the  adoption  of  the  constitution,  in  all  ca.ses  during  the 
minority  of  the  children.^  IJut  statutory  penalties  arc  not 
♦'  debts."  * 

1  />.  In  Arkansas  the  exeniplion  is  from  executi<»n  on  final 
process;  but  this  is  not  to  include  taxes,  or  dues  to  the  State, 
laborer's  or  meihanic's  liens  for  labor,  or  improvements  on  the 
estate,  and  .securities  or  obligations  for  the  jiurchase-money.'* 

li.  In  California  the  homestead  estate  is  exempt  from  forced 
gale,  but  is  lialile  for  vendor's  and  mechanic's  liens,  taxes, and 
mortgages  lawfully  created."  So  all,  except  the  iirojter  home- 
stead, may  Ix"  levied  (»n.  If  that  be  twenty-live  hundred  square 
yards  or  less,  and  is  of  greater  value  than  live  thousand  dol- 
lars, the  sheriir  may,  if  the  creditors  so  elect,  sell  the  whole, 
and  out  of  the  proceeds  i)ay  the  debtor  that  sinn.  If  it  ex- 
ceed that  quantity  of  land,  and  is  of  greater  value  than  the 
I)rescribed  sum,  such  portion  of  it,  including  the  dwelling- 
house,  as  near  as  may  l)e  of  that  value,  may  be  set  ajtart,  and 
the  remainder  may  be  sold.      If  a  levy  ami   sale  be  made  of 

>  Ray  r.  Adams,  45  Ala.  168.  »  Code,  1876,  §  2822. 

•  19  Am.  Law  Keg.  2;  Oxle,  1876,  §  2844.  The  re.sult  of  l.-gislatimi  in  Ala- 
bama U  Homi'what  i>c(uliar.  The  law  sUmvI  as  in  the  text  under  the  constitution 
of  1868  until  the  act  of  1873,  April  2.3,  which  repealed  nil  exenjjition  from  any 
delitA  contract**!  prior  to  the  constitution;  and  this  n-niained  .so  until  the  act  of 
Feb.  9,  1877,  when  tlie  old  exemptions  were  re-enactetl.  Consocjuently,  in  the 
interval,  no  liomcstead  could  l)e  acijuired  as  apiinst  such  debts.  I>)velace  v.  Webb, 
62  Ala,  271;  Carlisle  v.  Codwin,  68  Ala.  137,  140;  Slnu^hter  v.  McBride,  69  Ala. 
510;  Horn  r.  Wintt,  60  Ala.  297.  On  the  other  hand,  ns  to  all  debts  contracttnl 
after  the  constitution,  all  former  laws  wen*  Knj«or.s<iled  by  that  instniment  until 
the  net  of  1873.  Nels<m  r.  McCrary,  60  Ala.  301.  Hence,  against  a  debt  con- 
trdcte<l  in  1872,  the  larger  homestead  of  160  acres  given  by  the  act  of  1873  in 
lands  acquirtnl  after  its  passage  cannot  be  claimed.  lb.  The  like  exemption  given 
by  the  Code,  1876,  §  2820,  is  limite<l  to  debts  contracted  since  the  ai-t  of  1873. 

•  Williams  r.  IViwden,  69  Ala.  433;  M.-rdith  r.  Holmes,  68  Ala.  190. 
»  Const,  art.  12,  §§  2,  3. 

•  nittell's  Code,  1876,  §§  6240,  6241;  Graliam  p.  Oviatt,  58  Cal.  423. 


416  LAW   OF  EEAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

what  is  a  debtor's  actual  homestead,  the  same  is  void  and  no 
title  passes.!  And  even  if  the  judgment  be  upon  the  debt 
due  for  the  purchase-money,  it  would  make  no  difference. 
The  only  way  to  avail  of  the  vendor's  lien  is  by  proceedings  in 
equity .2  And  it  seems  that  a  wife  may  claim  a  homestead 
against  an  officer  who  levies  upon  the  estate  of  her  husband, 
and  may  apj)ly  to  the  court  to  prevent  a  levy  by  injunction, 
even  if  the  declaration  of  homestead  has  not  been  made  and 
recorded,  so  far  as  to  require  the  officer  to  exhaust  the  hus- 
band's other  assets  before  levying  on  the  homestead.^  The 
levy,  it  seems,  must  be  upon  the  proportion  of  the  whole  es- 
tate over  and  above  the  value  of  the  homestead.  If  the  wliole, 
for  example,  be  ten  thousand  dollars,  the  levy  may  be  upon 
five  tenths  of  the  estate.^ 

2  a.  In  Florida  the  exemption  applies  to  forced  sales,  but 
does  not  reach  claims  for  the  purchase-money,  taxes,  or  erec- 
tion of  improvements,  or  for  labor  performed  upon  the  premi- 
ses.^ Hence,  where  the  consideration  failed,  a  vendee  could 
not  claim  homestead  as  against  the  vendor.^ 

3.  In  Georgia  it  is  exempt  from  levy  for  any  debt'  except 
for  the  purchase-money,^  taxes,^  and  for  improvements  on  the 
homestead,  and  for  labor  done  and  materials  found  for  that 
purpose,  and  for  removal  of  incumbrances  thereon,!'^  but  is  not 

1  Cohen  v.  Davis,  20  Cal.  187;  Kendalls.  Clark,  10  Cal.  17;  Ackley  v.  Chani- 
berlain,  16  Cal.  181. 

2  AVilliaius  v.  Young,  17  Cal.  403.  »  Bartholomew  v.  Hook,  23  Cal.  277. 
*  McDonald  v.  Badger,  23  CaL  39   ;  Gary  v.  Eastabrook,  6  Cal.  457. 

5  Const.  1868,  art.  9,  §  1;  Dig.  1881,  c.  104,  §§  1,  2. 

e  Porter  v.  Teate,  17  Fla.  813. 

'  Thus,  even  from  any  debt  due  the  State,  except  for  taxes,  Colquitt  v.  Brown, 
63  Ga.  440;  or  from  a  decree  of  the  court  of  probate  against  the  homestead  owner 
for  a  balance  on  settlement  of  a  probate  account,  Merritt  v,  Merritt,  66  Ga.  324; 
or  from  a  farm  laborer's  wages  for  labor  preceding  the  homestead,  Stokes  v.  Hatcher, 
60  Ga.  617. 

8  Smith  V.  Merritt,  61  Ga.  203;  Gunn  v.  Wades,  65  Ga.  537;  Griffin  v.  Elliott, 

60  Ga.  173.  Thus  a  mortgage  to  secure  a  loan  to  pay  off  the  purchase-money 
(Middlebrooks  v.  Warren,  59  Ga.  230)  and  an  assignment  of  a  mortgage  given  by 
a  husband  to  a  wife  to  secure  her  part  of  the  purchase-money  (Neal  v.  Perkerson, 

61  Ga.  345)  are  superior  to  homestead. 

8  Davis  V.  State,  60  Ga.  76;  and  an  execution  against  a  defaulting  tax-collector 
is  for  taxes.     Cahn  v.  Wright,  66  Ga.  119. 

i»  Const.  1868,  art.  7,  §  1;  19  Am.  Law  Reg.  5;  Code,  1882,  §  2002. 


I  U.  IX.  §   2.]  ESTATF>»    UV    MAUUIACE.  417 

exempt  tri)in  :i  ju(l):;mcut  ivcoverrd  lor  a  tort  cominittcd.' 
Aiul  if  the  husbaml  becomes  bankrupt  and  is  declared  so  oe- 
foro  homestead  is  set  out,  the  property  will  have  passed  from 
him,  so  that  it  w»)uld  be  too  late  to  claim  the  ri^dit.- 

4.  In  Illinois,  it  cannot  bo  set  up  against  a  claim  for  the 
purchase-money,  nor  taxes,  nor  for  the  expenses  of  improve- 
ments upon  the  jiremises.'^  Hut  all  othrr  debts  arc  excluded,* 
and  a  judirment  thereon  forms  no  lien  in  fav<jr  of  a  creditor, 
ui>on  a  debtor's  liomestead.''  Nor  is  it  a  fraud  to  liuy  an 
estate  as  a  homestead,  althou<;h  at  the  time  the  |)urchaser  is 
insolvent,  and  the  proj)erty  is  thereby  placed  beyond  the  reach 
of  creditors.^  A  mortgage  of  a  homestead  estate,  if  made  to 
secure  the  j)urchase-money,  is  valid  thoiiLdi  not  signed  l)y  the 
wife.'  If  a  homestead  is  not  exempt  when  the  debt  is  C(jn- 
tractcd,  a  subsc(iuent  possession  of  it  as  a  homestead  W(juld 
not  exempt  it.^  Hut  the  exemption  continues  from  the  old 
homestead  to  a  new  one  b(jught  with  the  proceeds  of  the  old 
as  against  an  intermediate  debt.^  And  the  homestead  is  ex- 
empt as  well  from  judgments  ex  delicto  as  ex  contractu,^^  and 
from  line  and  costs  in  criminal  prosecutions.^'  The  same  rule 
applies  to  a  sale  under  a  decree  of  a  court  of  etjuity.  Jlenco 
a  sale  under  a  mortgage  made  by  husband  and  wife,  in  which 
she  does  not  expressly  waive  her  homestead  right,  would  be 
of  no  avail  against  her  claim  under  that  right,  ior  a  mortgagee 
gets  no  right  as  against  such  a  claim  unless  she  has  proj)erly 
released  it  in  the  deed. '2  The' rule  as  to  a  homestead  being 
liable  for  purchase-money  seems  to  be  this :  If  the  debt  is  for 

'  Cobb's  Dig.  389,  390;  Davis  r.  Heuson,  29  Ga.  345. 
'  Luini«kiii  r.  Kiison,  44  Ga.  339. 

»  H.-v.  Stat.  1883,  c.  52,  §  3;  rhoI|)s  r.  Conover,  25  111.  309;  Mnppo  r.  Magee, 
61  111.  500;  Tourvillo  r.  Pierson,  39  111.  446;  HubU-11  r.  Caiiady,  58  111.  42(5. 

•  Tnislws  V.  IJeale,  98  111.  248.  Thus  the  lii-n  f^ivcn  by  statute  for  the  amount 
of  a  colloitiir's  IhjiuI  upon  his  land  Joes  not  iuchulc  his  homestead.  Trustees  r. 
Hovcy.  94  111.  394. 

»  Green  r.  Marks,  25  111.  221;  Watson  r.  Saxer,  102  111.  585. 

•  Cippcrly  v.  Rhodes,  53  111.  346. 

'  Toun-ille  r.  Pierson,  39  111.  446;  Kimble  r.  Esworthy,  6  III.  App.  51". 

•  Titnmn  v.  Moore.  43  111.  169.  »  Watson  r.  Saxer,  102  111.  535. 
»"  (.'onroy  r.  Sullivan,  44  III.  451.                       "   Loomis  p.  Ger>*on,  62  111.  11. 
»2  Wing  V.  Cropper,  35  IlL  256;  Moocre  v.  Dixon,  35  111.  208,  221;  lvc«  p. 

Mills,  37  111.  73. 

vuL.  I.— 27 


418  LAW   OP  EEAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

money  loaned  to  pay  a  pre-existing  debt  due  for  the  purchase- 
money,  the  homestead  would  not  be  liable  for  it.  If  it  was 
borrowed  at  the  time  of  the  purchase,  to  pay  the  purchase- 
money,  the  homestead  would  be  liable  ;  so  it  would  if  it  be  due 
for  the  purchase  of  a  part  of  the  premises  constituting  the  en- 
tire homestead  ,1  or  if  upon  notes  given  in  renewal  of  the  pur- 
chase-money notes.2  If  a  debtor  is  shown  to  be  a  householder, 
and  in  occupancy  of  a  lot  of  land  as  a  residence,  the  creditor 
who  undertakes  to  claim  it  by  a  levy  of  an  execution  or  under 
a  mortgage  must  show  affirmatively  that  it  is  not  exempted  as 
a  homestead.^  But  if  the  debtor's  homestead  exceed  one  thou- 
sand dollars  in  value,  liis  creditor  may  cause  the  same  to  be 
sold,  reserving  for  the  debtor  that  sum,  to  be  held  free  from 
attachment  for  a  year,  and  to  be  paid  to  the  debtor.*  If  a 
homestead  estate  is  levied  on  and  is  sold  for  more  than  one 
thousand  dollars,  the  purchaser  acquires  such  a  lien  as  to  en- 
title him  to  the  estate  whenever  the  homestead  right  ceases.^ 
So  if  the  owner  convey  the  estate,  out  of  which  a  homestead 
has  been  claimed,  without  consent  of  his  wife,  and  still  retains 
the  possession,  the  grantee  gets  a  riglit  thereby  to  have  the 
estate  when  the  right  of  homestead  ceases,  but  not  to  disturb 
the  grantor  in  his  possession.^  It  would  seem,  therefore,  that 
a  homestead  right  was  of  the  nature  of  a  particular  estate,  with 
a  right  of  reversion  in  the  owner  which  might  be  reached  by 
levy  or  a  grant  from  the  owner.  But  it  was  held  that  if  the 
homestead  did  not  exceed  in  value  the  amount  exempted  by 
law,  a  levy  upon  the  estate  and  sale  thereof,  or  conveyance 
by  way  of  mortgage  without  the  wife's  joining  therein,  would  be 
void.'^  In  the  United  States  court,  however,  it  was  decided 
that  a  levy  and  sale  of  the  fee  of  a  debtor's  estate  passed  it  to 

1  Austin  V.  Underwood,  37  111.  438;  Eyster -y.  Hatheway,  50  111.  521;  Magee 
V.  Magee,  51  111.  500.  But  a  trust  deed  for  money,  part  only  of  which  was  to  remove 
an  incumbrance  on  the  homestead,  did  not  bind  this.    Best  v.  Gholson,  89  111.  465. 

2  Kimble  v.  Esworthy,  6  111.  App.  517;  Williams  v.  Jones,  100  111.  362. 
8  White  V.  Clark,  36  111.  285;  Stevenson  v.  Marony,  29  111.  532. 

*  Walsh  V.  Horine,  36  111.  238. 

6  Blue  V.  Blue,  38  111.  918;  Tomlin  v.  Hilyard,  43  111.  300. 
6  McDonald  v.  Craudall,  43  111.  231;   Coe  v.  Smith,  47  111.  225;  Hewitt  «. 
Templeton,  48  111.  367;  Finley  v.  McConnell,  60  111.  259,  263. 

^  Wiggins  V.  Chance,  54  111.  175  ;  Browning  v.  Harris,  99  111.  456. 


en.  IX.  §  2.]  ESTATKS    DV    MARIII  \i:K.  410 

thn  piircliasor  sjiUjcct  to  tlio  hoinosfciid  riu'lit,  ami  when  lliat 
t'.\|»inMl  tlir  |»iircli!iser's  title  bccaiiu'  alisolnte.^ 

5.  In  Intliana  it  cannot  bo  set  up  against  taxes  or  a  jm-occsh 
tnidtT  a  nu'chanir's  lirn,  or  for  the  recovery  of  the  punhase- 
nioney,  or  a  judj^uient  for  a  tort.-  And  if,  \vh».'n  an  olliccr 
levies  an  execution  upon  a  (h'htor's  ]>reniises,  he  do  not  set  up 
his  rijrht  nf  homestead  therein,  he  will  lie  eunsiderecl  us  havinjr 
waived  it,  and  the  levy  will  hi'  estahlished.*^ 

»>  In  Iowa,  not  only  is  the  homestead  liahlc  for  taxeh  and 
mechanic's  liens,  and  lor  dclits  contracted  lietore  the  purchase 
of  the  estate,  hut  also  all  delits  to  which  it  is  made  .subject  by 
the  debtor  when  he  contracts  them.*  The  exemption  cannot 
be  set  uj)  a<rainst  a  vendor's  claim  for  his  |iurcliase-money.' 
And  if  a  creditor  obtains  a  jndiiinent  airainst  a  ddjtor,  it  be- 
comes a  lien  u]»on  the  land,  which  is  not  defeated  by  the  debt- 
or's haviiiLT  a  homestead  afterwards  set  out  before  a  levy  has 
been  made.''  Such  would  be  the  case  if  a  creditor  were  to 
obtain  a  jud<rment  beft)re  the  debtor  had  bc<run  to  occupy 
the  homestead  set  olT  to  him,  and  he  may  afterwards  make  a 
levy  upon  the  estate,"  A  jmlj^ment  attaches  a  lien  to  the 
liomestead  of  a  d«'btor  the  moment  it  ceases  to  l>c  used  as 
stich,  tliough  not  as  a«rainst  a  jturchaser  to  whom  he  conveys 
it  while  the  riirht  continues.*'  And  if  he  die  without  leaving 
widow  or  children,  his  homestead  may  be  soM  to  jiay  his 
debts."  And  beinir  a  matter  of  renKMJy,  it  is  p)verne(l  l)y  the 
lex  fori ^  so  that  if  a  debt  be  contracted  in  a  State  where  there 

>  nin.k  V.  Curmii,  14  Wall.  -IfiS  ;  niitl  see  McDonnM  i-.  Cnindiill,  43  111.  231. 

"^  It.v.  Stat.  1881.  §§  717,  718  ;  State  r.  Melopiio,  9  Iiid.  19G. 

'  ^U\\.c  V.  .Mflo;;uc,  sup.;  Sullivan  v.  Winslow,  22  Ind.  153. 

«  BalK:ock  v.  Hoey,  11  lown,  S7^>  ;  l>aing  r.  runiiinghani,  17  Iowa,  510  ;  Kcv. 
Coile.  1880,  §§  1991,  1992.  1993.  Aii«l  a  luisban-rs  part-i>aymcnt  of  tho  purchase- 
money  of  a  homesteail  taken  in  his  wife's  name  lets  in  his  prior  dehts,  Croup  r. 
Mo.-lnn,  53  Iowa,  599  ;  but  a  debtor  who  declares  a  homestead  after  contnictiiig 
with  a  non-resiilent  for  a  loan,  but  Ix-fore  re<'eivinp  it,  holds  it  sujH-rior  to  tho 
debt,  Tolman  t.  leathers,  1  McCrarj  C.  Ct.  329  ;  and  a  wife  may  hold  apiinst 
cnslitors  land  Iwught  with  thi-  jiroi-eeds  of  a  former  homestead  and  conveyed  to 
her  by  her  liusband,  .Tones  v.  lirandt,  59  Iowa,  332. 

»  llamca  r.  Gay,  7  Iowa,  26  ;  Christy  t>.  Dver,  14  Iowa,  438,  442  ;  Cole  r.  Oill, 
M.  .127. 

«  Klston  r.  Robinson.  21  Iowa.  531.  ^  F.lston  r.  Tiobinson,  23  Iowa,  208. 

•  I>amb  r.  Shays,  14  Iowa,  567. 

•  Floyd  r.  Mosier,  1  Iowa,  512  ;  Rhodes  r.  McCormick,  4  Iowa,  868. 


420  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

is  no  homestead  exemption,  it  is  not  entitled  to  any  prece- 
dence in  that  respect,  if  sued  in  Iowa,  over  debts  contracted 
there. 1 

6  a.  In  Kansas  the  exemption  does  not  avail  against  claims 
for  taxes,  the  purchase-money  of  the  estate,  or  improvements 
made  upon  the  same.^  A  judgment  or  levy  creates  no  lien 
if  made  upon  the  homestead,  either  upon  tlie  present  interest 
of  homestead  or  upon  the  estate  which  remains  after  the  home- 
stead shall  have  ceased.^  There  is  the  same  exception  from 
exemption  from  levy  and  forced  sale  for  taxes  and  purchase- 
money  in  Louisiana  as  in  Kansas.  And  in  addition  the  home- 
stead is  also  subject  to  privileged  rents.*  And  a  mortgage 
made  before  the  law  of  homestead  was  passed  was  not  affected 
by  it.5 

7.  In  Maine  the  exemption  is  no  bar  to  a  mechanic's  lien, 
nor  a  claim  for  damages  by  flowing  the  lands  of  another,^  nor 
a  judgment  for  a  debt  contracted  before  a  certificate  of  home- 
stead recorded,  nor  a  judgment  for  costs  prior  thereto.'^ 

8.  In  Massachusetts  a  homestead  is  not  exempt  from  sales 
for  taxes,  nor  from  the  vendor's  claim  for  his  purchase-money, 
nor  from  debts  due  before  the  right  shall  have  accrued,  includ- 
ing money  loaned  to  pay  the  purchase-money  at  the  time  of 
the  purchase ;  ^  nor  from  the  payment  of  ground  rent,  if  the 
Ijuildings  claimed  under  such  homestead  right  stand  upon  the 
land  of  another  person.^  Nor  does  the  right  affect  existing 
mortgages,  liens,  or  incumbrances.i^  With  these  exceptions, 
no  such  homestead  is  liable  to  attachment  or  levy  upon  execu- 
tion for  the  owner's  debts.^^  If  the  debtor's  estate  exceeds 
the  amount  of  the  exemption,  the  appraisers  who  set  off  his 
estate  on  execution  may  set  off  all  over  that  value  ;  and  if  it 
be  under  mortgage,  the  officer  may  sell  the  same,  subject  to 

1  Helfensteiu  v.  Cave,  3  Iowa,  287. 

2  Corn  p.  Laws,  1879,  §  205  ;  Morris  v.  Ward,  5  Kans.  239,  244  ;  and  a  pur- 
chaser from  the  widow  takes  subject  only  to  these  excepted  debts,  Dayton  v. 
Donart,  22  Kans.  256. 

3  Morris  v.  Ward,  sup.  *  Rev.  Stat.  1870,  §  1692. 

5  D'lle  Roupe  v.  Carradine,  20  La.  Ann.  244. 

6  Rev.  Stat.  1883,  c.  81,  §  66.  ''  Mills  v.  Spaulding,  50  Me.  57. 

8  Stevens  v.  Stevens,  10  Allen,  146  ;  N.  E.  Jewelry  Co.  v.  Meriani,  2  Allen,  390. 

9  Pub.  Stat.  c.  123,  §  4.  ^  Id.  §§  5,  6.  "  Id.  §  1. 


en.  IX.  §  2.]  F<T\Tr-;  my  marriage.  421 

th(!  niiirr^riitri'  and  linim.sti'uil.  rjion  tlic  snmo  princijilc,  at 
the  dt'Jith  of  tlu'  (Iflitor,  all  liis  estate  over  ami  iibovc  his 
honiesteud  may  he  sold  for  the  jia\iiitiit  of  his  debts,'  This 
ri^ht  would  not  he  lost  if,  liavinj;  estiililished  it,  the  deljtor 
should  convey  the  estate  to  a  stranger,  who  should  convey  it 
to  the  debtor's  wife  with  an  intent  to  defraud  his  creditors.-* 
But  whatever  reversionary  interest  helonj^s  to  the  debtor  after 
satisfy in;r  the  homestead  claim  may  be  Imied  on  by  his  cred- 
itors, and  will,  if  insolvent,  |»a.ss  to  his  assijrnees."*  In  levying: 
an  execution  upon  an  estate  in  which  the  del)tor  holds  a 
homesteail  ri<rht,  the  appraisers  are  to  set  olT  the  value  of 
ei^dit  hundred  dollars  l»y  itself,  and  then  levy  upon  the  re- 
mainder.^ A  writ  of  entry  may  ite  l»rou<^ht  against  a  woman, 
and  jud<j:ment  rendered  in  respect  to  an  estate  claimed  by  her 
as  a  honirstead,  which  will  be  elVectual  as  to  all  purjxjses  ex- 
cejtt  such  homestead  right.^  'IMie  surplus  or  reversionary 
inti-rest  of  the  husban<l,  subject  to  the  homesti-ad  riirht  of  his 
wife  an<l  children,  may  be  levied  on  by  his  creditors  for  his 
debts;  but  a  levy  upon  the  homestead,  even  by  consent  of 
the  wife,  woidd  be  void.*^  The  re(|uest  or  assent  of  a  wife  to 
a  sah'  on  execution  does  not  give  validity  to  the  sale,  inas- 
much as  the  protection  from  levy  is  as  much  in  favor  of  tlie 
husband  as  the  wife."  A  mortgage  In'  the  husbaml  will  carry 
liis  reversionary  right,  tlxtULdi  his  wife  do  not  join  in  the 
deed.* 

[K  In  Michigan,  homesteads  are  exempt  from  forced  sale 
for  any  deiit.  Hut  this  may  ])e  waived  by  the  debtor  if  un- 
married;  liut,  if  married,  it  can  only  be  done  by  the  action  of 
the  husband  and  wile.'-*  When,  however,  th(>  debt  is  fur  th<' 
improvement  of  tin*  estate,  a  mortgage  therefor  is  good,  though 
not   siL'ned  by  the  wii'e."^     If  what    is  claimed  as  a  homeste.id 

'    i'uii.  M^u.  c.  12.1,  §  8.  '^  Cnstlf  v.  I'Mlnior,  (5  All.n,  jni. 

•  Smith  r.  rrovin,  4  Allen,  51 «  ;  Wliiti-  tJ.  Rice,  5  Allen,  73  ;  Doyle  v.  Culnirn, 
6  Allt-n,  71  ;  Wcxxls  r.  Sanfonl,  9  <Iniy,  1«5. 

<  Pub.  Stnt.  c.  123,  §  13.  »  St.bt.ins  r.  Millor,  12  Allon,  .''.91. 

•  Sillowny  r.  Hrown,  12  Allon,  30.  '  Custl.'  r.  Palmer,  fi  All.n.  4iil. 

•  IJuni.s  r.  Lymle.  6  Allen.  30.1.  312  ;  .'^illowny  r.  Brown.  12  Allen,  30. 

•  Const,  nrt,  Irt.  ?  2  ;  Ik-eelier  r.  lUl.ly.  7  Mieli.  488  ;  Slierri.l  r.  Southwick, 
43  Mich.  515  ;  nml  this  is  so,  even  th<'Uj,'h  sli.-  is  not  Ijvini;  witli  liini,     !)•. 

'^  Fournier  r.  Chi-sholni,  45  Mich.  417. 


422  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

be  of  greater  value  than  the  amount  exempted  by  law,  a 
creditor  may  levy  upon  the  surplus,  and,  in  ascertaining  this 
value,  reference  is  had  to  the  time  of  the  levy,  and  not  to  any 
former  estimated  value.^  But  in  order  to  authorize  a  creditor 
to  do  this,  he  must  be  able  to  show  that  the  homestead  ex- 
ceeded this  value,  and  that  it  was  not  susceptible  of  division, 
so  as  to  leave  a  separate  homestead  of  the  prescribed  value  for 
the  debtor.2 

10.  In  Minnesota  there  is  an  exception  in  the  matter  of 
homestead  exemption,  as  to  any  indebtedness  connected  with 
the  land  itself,  or  improvements  upon  it,  including  liens  for 
labor  and  materials  of  workmen,  mortgages  for  purchase- 
money,  and  taxes.'"^  And  any  judgment  becomes  a  lien  upon 
the  land,  so  that  the  moment  the  premises  cease  to  be  occupied 
as  a  homestead,  it  may  be  enforced  by  sale.  The  owner,  how- 
ever, may  convey  the  estate,  or  temporarily  abandon  it,  with- 
out subjecting  it  to  the  creditor's  process.*  If  husband  and 
wife  fraudulently  convey  land  to  another  who  conveys  the  same 
to  the  wife,  the  husband  cannot,  as  tenant  by  curtesy,  set  up  a 
homestead  right  gained  thereby  by  her.^ 

10  a.  In  Mississippi,  homestead  exemption  does  not  avail 
against  a  claim  for  the  purchase-money  of  the  estate,  taxes, 
rent,  mechanic's  lien,  or  a  recognizance  on  a  bail  bond;^  and 
the  husband  can  give  a  deed  to  secure  the  purchase-money 
without  joining  his  wife.^  But  the  exemption  in  Missouri  is 
complete  as  to  all  liabilities  of  the  debtor,  subsequent  to  the 
date  of  filing  the  declaration,  but  not  those  anterior  thereto.^ 

11.  In  New  Hampshire  there  is  a  like  exception  to  ex- 
emption of  vendor's  and  mechanic's  liens,  and  taxes  and  debts 
of  less  than  one  hundred  dollars  due  for  labor.     And  by  labor 

1  Herschfeldt  v.  George,  6  Mich.  456,  468. 

2  Beecher  v.  Baldy,  7  Mich.  488.  »  Stat.  1878,  c.  68,  §§  2,  7. 

*  Id.  §§  8,  9  ;  Folsom  v.  Carli,  5  Minn.  333  ;  Tillotsonv.  Milkrd,  7  Minn.  513, 
.520  ;  Piper  v.  Johnston,  12  Minu.  60  ;  Tuttle  v.  Howe,  14  Minn.  145  ;  Kasor  v. 
Howe,  27  Minn.  406. 

^  Piper  V.  Johnston,  12  Minn.  60. 

8  Buckingham  v.  Nelson,  42  Miss.  417  ;  Rev.  Code,  1880,  §  1255. 

7  Billingsley  v.  Niblett,  56  Miss.  537  ;  and  upon  sale  on  execution  therefor, 
the  vendee  acquires  the  absolute  title,  Patrick  v.  Rembert,  55  Miss.  87. 

8  Rev.  Stat.  1879,  §  2695  ;  Jackson  v.  Bowles,  67  Mo.  609. 


en.  IX.   §  -J. J  ESTATKH    HV    MAKUIACH.  428 

is  meant  what  is  popularly  understood  liy  the  term,  ami  does 
not  include  services  ol  a  physician.  Nor  would  it  make  any 
difTerenco  that  husband  and  wife  ^avc  the  creditor  a  note 
for  the  same.  Other  than  this,  the  homestead  is  not  assets 
for  the  payment  of  debts,  except  such  as  are  contracted  before 
the  homestead  is  set  out.  But  tin."  rii^ht  does  not  attach  to 
property  fraudidently  aeipiired  by  one,  he  being  in  insolvent 
circumstances.  No  dt'vise  alTeets  it  while  it  is  occupied  by 
the  wid()W  or  minor  children.  It  the  estate  «»xceed  in  value 
the  amount  ot  the  homesteail  exemption,  and  is  n(»t  8usce|>- 
tible  of  division,  appraisers  estimate  its  (-ntire  value,  and  the 
debtor  may  save  it  from  levy  and  sale  if  he  will  i)ay  the  e.\- 
cess  over  and  alxtve  the  value  of  the  homestead.  If  lie  neglect 
to  do  this,  the  sheritV  may  sell  the  whole,  paying  t»j  the  dc-ljtor 
the  value  of  such  homestead,  if  his  wife  consents,  otherwise 
into  some  institution  for  savings  to  the  credit  of  the  husband 
and  wife,  and  the  surjilus  he  may  ajijily  upon  the  execution.^ 
IJut  a  homestead,  when  set  out,  is  exempt  from  a  levy  of  any 
kimi.  This  is  true  also  of  the  reversion  of  the  owner,  subject 
to  the  homestead  estate,  and  of  an  equity  of  redemption  of  the 
homestead  estate.  Otherwise  the  debtor  could  not  sell,  moii> 
gage,  or  exchange  the  homestead  estate,  becau.se  the  levy 
would  take  clTect  the  moment  the  debtor  cca.sed  to  occupy  the 
premises.^ 

11  a.  In  Nebraska  the  exemption  docs  not  extend  to  taxes, 
vendor's  liens,  mechanic's  wages,  or  money  due  fidiu  an  at- 
torney collected  by  him.''  In  Nevada  it  does  not  extend  to 
vendor's,  laborer's,  or  mechanic's  liens  or  debts  for  improve- 
ment of  the  estate.*  In  North  Carolina  the  exemption  is  as 
to  "  any  del)t,"  not  including  taxes,  or  the  purcha.se-money 
of  the  homestead,  or  laborer's  or  mechanic's  liens  thereon.'* 
It  docs  not  extend  to  a  judgment  recovered  in  an  action  of 

»  Gftj.  Uws,  1878.  c.  1.38.  §§  23,  24  ;  Norris  v.  Moulton,  34  N.  H.  392  ;  Wey- 
month  r.  Sanitoni,  43  N.  H.  171. 

*  TuckiT  r.  Kciiiiiston,  47  N.  H.  2(J7. 
»  I'omp.  Stjit.  1881,  c.  36. 

*  Conii..  Uws,  1873,  §  186;  Const,  nrt.  4,  §  30  ;  Hopper  r.  r«rkinson,  5  Xev. 
23.1.  Thns  »  niortgimf  and  note  for  nionfj*liormw(*<l  to  l>nil<l  hou.sc-8  on  the  hom& 
»U»a<l  wtUto  hind  it.     Com.  Bk.  r.  CorK-tt,  5  Sawyer  C.  Ct  172. 

*  Const,  ort.  10,  §§  3,  4. 


424  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [bOOK   L 

tort.^     And  subject  to  the  homestead  the  mortgagee  of  the 
owner  may  sell  his  interest.^ 

12.  In  New  York  the  exemption  does  not  affect  taxes,  debts 
for  purchase-money,  or  such  as  were  contracted  before  notice 
given  of  the  homestead  having  been  set  out.  And  a  judgment 
so  far  forms  a  lien  upon  the  premises,  that,  though  they  can- 
not be  sold  upon  it  so  long  as  the  debtor  retains  a  homestead 
right  therein,  the  moment  he  conveys  the  estate  to  a  stranger 
the  creditor  may  levy  thereon,  and  his  lien  will  take  prece- 
dence of  this  conveyance.^  And  even  this  qualified  exemption 
does  not  extend  to  judgments  for  torts,  or  costs  of  suit  re- 
covered by  a  defendant,  nor  for  any  other  wrongs  than  the 
non-payment  of  debts.*  But  the  assertion  by  the  debtor,  when 
he  contracted  the  debt,  that  his  estate  was  subject  to  execu- 
tion, provided  the  homestead  had  been  duly  recorded  as  such, 
would  not  affect  the  debtor's  right  to  set  up  tlie  same,  since 
the  statute,  being  founded  upon  public  policy,  is  not  to  be  de- 
feated by  the  representation  of  a  party .^  In  New  Jersey  the 
exemption  does  not  include  taxes,  or  the  purchase-money  of, 
or  claims  for  labor  on  the  homestead  estate.^ 

13.  In  Ohio  the  exemption  is  not  against  mechanic's  liens, 
purchase-money,  nor  taxes.  And  if  an  officer  holding  an  exe- 
cution undertakes  to  levy  it  upon  the  debtor's  land,  who  sets 
up  the  claim  of  homestead  exemption,  he  must  have  this  set 
off  by  appraisers  by  metes  and  bounds,  if  susceptible  of  divi- 
sion, and  may  levy  upon  the  surplus  of  the  estate.  If  it  is 
not  divisible,  the  officer  may  levy  upon  the  whole  estate,  and 
have  the  rents  and  profits  over  one  hundred  dollars  a  year  set 
off  to  the  creditor  till  the  debt  is  paid."  And  where  the  home- 
stead has  been  sold  for  a  debt  valid  against  it,  the  debtor  holds 
the  surplus  proceeds  exempt  from  other  debts.^ 

14.  In  Pennsylvania,  liens  for  purchase-money,  mechanic's 

'  Dellinger  v.  Tweed,  66  N.  C.  206. 
'■2  Murphy  v.  McNeill,  82  N.  C.  221. 

8  3  Stat.  647  ;  Smith  v.  Brackett,  36  Barb.  571  ;  Allen  v.  Cook,  26  Barb.  374. 
*  Lathrop  v.  Singer,  39  Barb.  396  ;  Schouton  v.  Kilmer,  8  How.  Pr.  527  ; 
Robin.son  v.  Wiley,  15  N.  Y.  489,  493. 

^  Robin.son  v.  Wilej',  sup.;  s.  c.  19  Barb.  157. 

6  Rev.  1877,  p.  1055,  §  2.  ^  Rev.  Stat.  1880,  §§  5434,  5438-5439. 

8  Jackson  v.  Reid,  32  Ohio  St.  443. 


rU.  IX.  j5  2.]  ESTATES    UV    MARRIAGE.  42.' 

liens,  ami  jml>_Mn«Mifs  itcovimviI  for  any  oauso  of  action  other 
than  contracts,  <jr  lor  breaches  of  ullicial  duty,  are  not  alTected 
by  homestead  cxenijition  rights.  And  such  would  be  the  case 
if,  when  the  contract  was  made,  or  the  jndirment  was  rendere<l 
thereon,  the  owner  of  the  homestead  waived  this  right.'  Nor 
can  a  debtor  who  has  fraudulently  conveyed  his  estate  to  de- 
feat his  creditors  set  up  a  hounstead  elaim  against  one  of 
them  who  shall  levy  upon  the  same.'-  If  a  judgment  be  re- 
covered for  the  purchase-money,  it  may  be  levied  on  the  home- 
stead, although  the  (lel>tor  may  have  become  ami  been  declared 
n  l)ankrupt,  because  the  baukrujtt  law  d(jcs  not  reach  a  debtor's 
liomeslead,  but  exemj)ts  it.*' 

15.  In  S(»ulh  Carolina  it  is  understood  that  a  debtor  waives 
his  riL'ht  to  set  up  a  homestead  exemption,  if  he  neglects  to  tlo 
so  when  the  olVicer  makes  a  levy  upon  his  estate.^  And  the 
statute  does  not  exempt  the  estate  from  claims  for  taxes  or 
for  the  purchase-uioney,  or  for  imj»rovements  made  on  it.6 
Nor  docs  it  avail  against  a  debt  contracted  or  a  mortgage 
made  before  the  adoption  of  the  constitution.'' 

1<5.  In  Tennes.see,  liy  the  constitution,  the  homestead  estate 
is  subject  to  taxes,  purchase-money,  and  claims  for  improve- 
ments." The  legislature  has  added  claims  for  the  expense  of 
public  roads,  and  certain  lines.^  A  leasehold  homestead  also 
is  subject  to  rent.^  A  deed  of  land  occuiiied  as  a  homestead, 
made  by  husband  to  wife,  will  vest  a  right  superior  to  cictlitors, 
though  made  with  the  jiurpose  of  delaying  them  ; '"^  ••tlierwisc  if 
there  were  no  such  actual  occu|)ancy,"  or  if  both  husljaiid  and 
wife  had  joined  in  the  mortgage  to  the  creditor.'-  IJut  the 
homestead  is  not  exempt  from  a  debt  contracted  before  its  ac- 
quisition, and  revived  in*  a  promise  subse(iuent  thereto.'^ 

»  runl.  Dig.  9th  oi\.  281  ;  Lau.ks'  Ai>|»onl,  24  r.-nii.  St.  426  ;  liownian  v. 
Smiley,  31  IVnn.  St.  22.^> ;  Kirki«tri.k  r.  White,  21»  IVnti.  St.  179. 

s  Mii.'y's  A|>p»nl,  '^9  IVnn.  St.  21<.».  ■  Fihky  r.  lUn,  66  Pcnn.  St.  196. 

*  MniiiiiiiK  r.  Dovp.  10  Kich.  Sli."),  403. 

•  Ct-n.  Stat.  18S2,  §  200l  ;  K.<lwnr<ls  r.  K.lwnnls,  14  S.  C.  11. 
«  Sholor  r.  Mitson,  2  .S.  C.  233  ;  Bull  v.  Howe.  13  S.  f.  S.SS. 

'  CoiiNt.  nrt.  11.  §  11.  8  Stat.  1S71,  §  2111. 

»  Stat.  1871,  §  2113.  »"  Uiiohs  c.  Hooke,  3  Lea,  802. 

»  fJihlw  r.  Patt.n.  2  I>oa,  ISO. 
»  Nirhol  r.  Ihiviilst.n  C«i.,  3  Ttnn.  Ch.  547. 
M  Wootllie  F.  Towlc*,  9  Baxt,  592. 


426  LAW    OF    REAL    PROPEETY.  [BOOK    I. 

16  a.  Ill  Texas  a  "  forced  sale  "  means  one  made  under 
process  of  com't,  in  a  manner  prescribed  by  law.i  And  a 
debtor's  property  is  liable  to  be  sold,  in  this  way,  for  the  satis- 
faction of  any  lien  created  thereon  before  the  same  is  declared 
a  homestead.2  But  it  makes  no  difference  whether  the  debt  is 
incurred  before  or  after  such  declaration  of  homestead/^  The 
exemption  does  not  extend  to  a  claim  for  purchase-money,* 
or  for  mechanic's  liens,  taxes,  improvements,  or  expenses  for 
the  last  sickness  and  funeral.^  And  if  a  debtor  acquire  a  new 
homestead,  his  former  one  becomes  liable  to  be  levied  upon  for 
his  debts.^  If  a  debtor  abandons  his  homestead,  he  subjects  it 
to  lev}',  and  the  abandonment,  in  order  to  have  that  effect, 
must  be  with  an  intent  not  to  come  back  and  claim  the  ex- 
emption.' With  these  exceptions  the  homestead  right  is 
above  all  liens  and  claims  for  the  satisfaction  of  debts,  and 
cannot  be  sold  upon  any  judgment  or  legal  process.  Such 
sale,  if  made,  would  be  void.^ 

17.  In  Vermont  a  homestead  is  liable  to  levy  for  a  debt 
or  cause  of  action  accruing  previous  to  the  purchase  of  the 
estate  and  record  of  the  deed  ;  and  if  one  acquire  a  new  home- 
stead, this  is  exempted,  but  the  former  one  becomes  liable  to 
be  levied  on,  as  if  it  had  never  been  exempt.^  The  homestead 
is  also  liable  for  the  purchase-money.^*^  After  the  death  of  the 
debtor,  his  estate  is  not  subject  to  sale  for  his  debts,  unless 
the  debt  is  made  specially  chargeable  thereon,  or  it  be  for 

1  Sampson  v.  Williamson,  6  Tex.  102,  110  ;  Rev.  Stat.  1879,  art.  2335,  2336  ; 
Lanahan  v.  Sears,  102  U.  S.  318. 

2  Fanner  v.  Simpson,  6  Tex.  313.  »  North  v.  Shearn,  15  Tex.  174. 

*  Stone  V.  Darnell,  20  Tex.  11,  14  ;  McCreery  v.  Fortson,  35  Tex.  641  ;  Clem- 
entsu  Lacy,  51  Tex.  150  ;  Baird  v.  Trice,  Id.  555. 

5  Rev.  St.  1879,  §§  2007,  2008. 

6  Stewart  v.  Mackey,  16  Tex.  56  ;  Berlin  v.  Burns,  17  Tex.  532,  537. 

7  Gouhenant  v.  Cockrell,  20  Tex.  96. 

8  Stone  V.  Darnell,  20  Tex.  14  ;  Lanahan  v.  Sears,  102  U.  S.  318.  And  see 
Black  V.  Rockmore,  50  Tex.  88,  that  a  sale  cannot  be  made  under  a  mortgage  of 
community  property  after  the  death  of  the  husband,  though  signed  by  both  hus- 
band and  wife. 

9  Rev.  Laws,  1880,  §§  1901,  1903  ;  Howe  v.  Adams,  28  Vt.  541  ;  Jewett  v. 
Brock,  32  Vt.  65.  Whether  it  is  necessary,  also,  that  the  debtor  should  have 
taken  possession  before  action  brought,  see  W.  River  Bk.  v.  Gale,  42  Vt.  27  ; 
Lamb  v.  Mason,  45  Vt.  500. 

10  Lamb  v.  Mason,  50  Vt.  345  ;  Davenport  v.  Hicks,  54  Vt.  23. 


CH.  IX.  §   -.]  ESTATK.S    HV    MAIUUA(;K.  1^7 

taxes.'  If  a  deWtor  convey  his  estate,  there  is  nothing  left 
whirli  can  Ito  n-achcd  hy  a  creditor,  althoii;,d»  his  wife  do  not 
join  in  the  cdnvryunee,  evon  thoiiirh  the  (U-ht  of  the  creditor 
was  contracted  before  the  jiurcha.se  by  the  debtor  of  his  h(jnie- 
stead,  nor  thoiiirli,  if  his  wife  siirvivi-  him,  .shi- may  (h-ftat  such 
pak»  as  bciii^  void,  uidcss  he  shall  in  the  meantime  have  ac- 
(|iiircd  a  new  homestead.-  And  where  a  debtor  mort^a<red  his 
estate,  '*  savinj;  always  the  homestead  t'.xemption,"  it  was  held 
that  this  related  oidy  to  the  wife's  continu'i'ut  ri^rht,  and  did 
not  open  it  to  be  levied  ujton  l»y  a  creditor  for  a  debt  due  be- 
fore the  debtor's  |)nrelia.sc  of  his  estate.^ 

17  a.  In  Virginia  the  JKjmestead  exemption  extends  to  ''any 
demand  for  any  debt  heretofore  or  hereafter  contracted."  I>ut 
it  does  not  exten<l  to  the  purcha8e-j)rice  of  the  property,  ser- 
vices ren<lered  l>y  a  laborer  or  a  mechanic,  liabilities  incurred 
by  a  pui)lie  ollicer,  oHicer  of  court,  a  fiduciary,  or  attorney  for 
money  collected,  taxes,  rent,  or  letral  or  taxable  fees  of  a  pul)- 
lic  ofticer  or  olVicer  of  a  court.  X(jr  does  it  interfere  with  the 
sale  of  the  estate  by  virtue  of  any  mortiraL^',  deed  of  trust, 
pledjre,  or  other  secuiity.'  And  if,  in  making  a  contract,  the 
debtor  expressly  waive  the  right  of  lioniestead  exemption,  it 
will  be  Hal  lie  to  levy  for  such  debt/* 

18.  In  Wisconsin  the  exemjition  extends  to  judgments  in 
actions  for  torts,  and  no  lien  attaelies  to  the  homestead  in  fav(jr 
of  a  judgment  creditor,  though  the  debtor  sell  his  estate  or 
rcni(»ve  from  the  homestea<l.  But  the  exemption  is  sul)ject  to 
mechanic's  liens,  taxes,  liens  for  labor,  and  for  the  jairchase- 
nioney,  and  to  all  mortgages  properly  executed.*^  A  levy  and 
sale  of  a  homestead,  without  first  having  it  surveyed,  and  then 

»  Rev.  Uws,  §  H»02. 

•  Howe  r.  Aduuiii,  suj).;  Davis  v.  Aiidnws,  ;ju   Vt.  h7^  ;  .Iiwcit  r.   Brock,  3i 

vt.  c:., 

•  Jewett  r.  Bn>ck,  sup. 

•  <  onst.  l.stiS.  art.  11,  §  1  ;  lit  Am.  1j»w  lU^.  Ifi  ;  Code  1873,  c.  183. 

•  Code,  1873,  c.  183.  Hut  it  dot-s  not  let  in  ertditors  that  tho  debtor  made  a 
fraudultut  tru.'.t-dcfd  of  the  homestead  e.stat<>,  which  waa  ufterwania  set  asuk-, 
Boyntoti  V.  McNeal,  31  Gratt,  456  ;  thcMigh  where  tlio  homestead  In  itaelf  crt-ated 
by  «uch  a  de^l.  It  is  void.  Rose  r.  SIiarjdeM*,  33  Gratt.  153. 

•  Uev.  .Stat  1S78,  9  21>83  ;  Upmun  r.  Second  Wa'rtl  Bk.,  15  Wise.  449,  over, 
rulinj?  Hoyt  c.  Howe,  3  Wise.  752;  sec  also  Simmons  r.  Johnson,  14  Wise.  523  ^ 
Smith  r.  Omans,  17  Wise.  395. 


428  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  1. 

selling  the  excess  above  the  homestead  value,  is  void.^  This 
exemption  continues  after  the  debtor's  death,  if  he  have  any- 
surviving  infant  children.  And  if  an  officer,  holding  an  exe- 
cution against  a  debtor,  is  dissatisfied  with  the  estimated  value 
of  the  homestead,  he  may  have  it  surveyed  and  set  off  to  him.^ 
But  where  a  mortgage  covered  the  homestead  and  other  lands, 
and  the  creditor  had  a  judgment  lien  upon  the  other  lands,  the 
court  refused  to  interfere  to  compel  the  mortgagee  to  first 
apply  the  other  lands,  in  order  to  protect  the  debtor's  home- 
stead.^ 


DIVISION  VI. 

HOW   FAR   HOMESTEAD   RIGHTS   PREVENT   ALIENATION. 

1.  Eeasons  for  exempting  homesteads  from  sale. 

1  a.  Alienation  of  homestead,  how  limited  in  Alabama  and  Arkansas. 

2.  How  limited  in  California. 

2  a.  How  limited  in  Florida. 

3.  How  limited  in  Georgia, 

4.  How  limited  in  Illinois. 

5.  How  limited  in  Indiana. 

6,  6  a.  How  limited  in  Iowa,  Kansas,  Kentucky,  and  Louisiana. 

7.  How  limited  in  Massachusetts. 

8.  How  limited  in  Michigan. 

9,  9  a.  How  limited  in  Minnesota,  Mississippi,  Nebraska,  and  Nevada. 

10.  How  limited  in  New  Hampshire. 

11.  How  limited  in  New  York. 

12.  How  limited  in  Oldo. 

13.  How  limited  in  Texas. 

14.  How  limited  in  Vermont. 
If).  How  limited  in  Wisconsin. 

1.  This  homestead  estate  is,  nevertheless,  the  subject  of 
sale,  mortgage,  release,  and,  in  some  States,  of  being  lost  by 
abandonment.  How  and  by  whom  this  may  be  done  depends 
upon  the  law  of  the  particular  State  in  which  the  premises  are 
situate.  From  the  circumstance,  however,  that  the  purposes 
of  tlie  exemption  have  reference  more  especially  to  the  debtor's 
family  than  himself,  in  many  of  the  States  the  owner  is  dis- 

1  Myers  v.  Ford,  22  Wise.  139.  «  Kev.  Stat.  §  2984. 

3  White  V.  Polleys,  20  Wise.  503. 


en.  IX.  §  2.]  t-sT.vTus  iiv  m.vi:uia(1k.  420 

abli'tl  from  coiiv«'yinjr  the  jtreinisrs  so  as  to  alTect  the  hoiuc- 
stomi  ri^'ht,  umIl's.s  his  w  ik-  joins  in  the  ('onvcyanco.  Tlie  siiW- 
joct  ilividos  \txv\(  into  tin-  nnxli'  in  which  a  convoviinco  may  be 
Uia(U\  and  how  the  riLrljt  of  honicstcad  ni:iy  lie  htst  or  ahan- 
donrd. 

1  rt.  In  Arkansas  an  ajLrreenitiit,  In  fore  cnterinfi;  on  the 
honu'steail,  to  sell  a  part  of  it  is  voitl.'  In  Akibania  no  niort- 
gairc  or  alienation  «>f  the  homestead  estate  is  valid  when  mado 
by  the  owner,  if  a  marrifd  man,  without  the  voluntary  sijrna- 
turo,  assent,  and  aeknowled<;mcnt  of  the  wife.^  And  this  is 
so  at  law,  thiJULrh  the  conveyance  is  in  |»ayment  of  a  drbt  duo 
before  the  constituti(jn  of  iStlS  -/-^  and  no  acknowledgment  by 
the  wife,  after  th«'  deed  is  delivered,  will  be  of  any  elTect.* 
IJut  the  wife  need  not  join  as  jrrantor  ;  it  is  snUicient  if  she 
is  mentioned  in  the  deed  as  conveying.''  Jler  I'elease  of  dower 
will  have  no  oj)eration  on  the  homestead.^  No  specific  release 
of  homestead  is  recpiired  where  the  wife  conveys  her  separate 
property  ;'  or  where  the  conveyance  was  before  the  homestead 
act  was  jiassed  ;  or  the  property  exceeded  the  statutory  limit 
of  two  thousand  dollars.^  A  conveyance  by  the  husband  with- 
out the  wife's  joining  is  good  as  a  contract  to  convey,  as  to  all 
the  estate  except  the  homestead.^' 

'2.  In  California  a  mortgage  or  alienation  of  any  kind,  in 
order  to  be  valiil,if  the  owner  is  married,  must  be  a  joint  deed 
of  the  husband  and  wife,  unless  it  i>e  given  to  secure  the  jmr- 
chasi^raoncy  of  the  estate,  and  the  deed  must  be  acknowledged 
as  well  as  signed  by  the  wife.  It  must  be  the  concurrent  act 
of  the  two  done  in  conformity  with  the  law.  A  8ei)arate  deed 
by  each,  though  of  the  same  estate,  will  not  have  the  effect.^® 

»  Cox  V.  Donnelly,  34  Ark.  702. 

•  Const.  1808,  art.  U,  §  2;  Code,  1876,  §  2822;  19  Am.  Liw  Kcfj.  2. 

•  Slnughtir  v.  Litiiner,  69  Ala.  510.  *  lialkum  v.  Wood,  58  Ala.  642. 
»  Dooley  r.  Villalunga,  61  Ala.  129;  Long  r.  Mostyn.  65  Ala.  543. 

•  Long  r.  Mo.styn,  65  Ala.  543.  t  \V,incr  r.  .Sterlinfr,  61  Ala.  9S. 

•  Forsyth  v.  Trecr,  62  Ala.  443;  Farley  r. Whitehead,  63  Ala.  295. 
'  Jenkins  v.  Harrison,  66  Ala.  345. 

•o  Mittell's  fVle.  §§  6242-6243;  Poole  v.  Oerrnnl.  6  Cal.  71;  Taylor  p.  Ifarpous, 
4  Cal.  268,  273;  Dunn  r.  Tozer,  10  Cd.  167;  Dorsey  v.  McFarland,  7  Cal.  342; 
Toinj.kins"  Est.,  12  Cal.  125;  Lie-s  v.  De  Diablor,  12  Cal.  327.  But  on  innocent 
pun-lL-uscr  has  a  right  to  rely  on  the  a^jMireut  foruj  of  the  deed.  Mabury  i-.  Kuiz, 
68  Cal.  11. 


430  LAW  OF  REAL  PEOPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

A  deed  of  a  homestead  by  husband  alone  gives  the  grantee  no 
right  of  entry,  so  long  as  the  grantor  continues  to  occu})y  the 
premises  as  a  homestead.  He  is  neither  tenant  at  will  nor  ten- 
ant by  agreement  of  his  grantee.^  The  statute  of  1862  author- 
izes a  mortgage  of  a  homestead  for  any  purpose,  if  it  is  signed 
by  the  wife  of  the  owner  and  acknowledged  by  her.^  But  it 
would  have  the  effect  to  defeat  the  homestead  right,  if  their 
deed  convey  an  undivided  share  of  the  estate.^  And  a  deed 
by  the  husband  alone  would  be  effectual  to  pass  all  of  the  es- 
tate occupied  as  a  homestead,  which  should  exceed  the  amount 
of  the  legal  exemption.^  So  a  mortgage  by  him  alone  would 
have  been  good  before  1860  to  secure  the  purchase-money, 
whether  made  directly  to  the  vendor,  or  to  one  who  loaned  to 
the  debtor  the  money  with  which  he  paid  the  purchase-money, 
it  being  a  part  of  the  transaction  of  purchasing  and  paying 
for  the  land.^  A  deed  of  the  homestead  made  by  a  husband 
alone  is  simply  void.*^  By  the  act  of  1860,  when  a  homestead 
had  once  been  declared  and  recorded,  no  mortgage  or  aliena- 
tion of  the  same  could  be  made  for  any  purpose,  unless  it  be 
to  secure  the  payment  of  the  purchase-money,  and  then  only 
by  being  signed  by  the  husband  and  wife  and  acknowledged 
by  her  J  But  if  the  husband  survive  the  wife,  he  may  convey 
the  estate  by  a  separate  deed.  If  he  make  a  mortgage  and 
then  abandon  his  homestead,  as  he  may  do,  the  mortgage  be- 
comes a  valid  incumbrance.^  But  as  the  law  stood  before, 
the  debtor  might  have  mortgaged  the  estate  subject  to  the 
homestead  right.^  Thus,  where  the  debtor  made  a  mortgage 
to  secure  a  part  of  the  purchase-money,  and  then  made  a  new 

1  Brooks -y.  Hyde,  37  Cal.  366. 

2  Peterson  v.  Homblower,  33  Cal.  266;  Hittell's  Code,  §  6243.     But  this  can- 
not  be  done  by  attorney.     Gagliardo  v.  Dumont,  54  Cal.  496. 

3  Kellersberger  v.  Kopp,  6  Cal.  563. 

4  Sargeant  v.  Wilson,  5  Cal.  .004;  xMoss  ^.Warner,  10  Cal.  296. 

5  Montgomery  v.  Tutt,  11  Cal.  190;  Skinner  v.  Beatty,  16  Cal.  156;  Lassen  v. 
Vance,  8  Cal.  271;  Carr  v.  Caldwell,  10  Cal.  380. 

6  Lies  V.  De  Diablar,  13  Cal.  327,  329;  Bowman  v.  Norton,  16  Cal.  213;  Swift 
V.  Kraemer,  13  Cal.  526;  Peterson  v.  Homblower,  33  Cal.  266. 

^  Cohen  v.  Davis,  20  Cal.  187;  Bowman  v.  Norton,  16  Cal.  213;  McHendry  v. 
Reilly,  13  Cal.  75. 

8  Himmelmann  v.  Schmidt,  23  Cal.  117. 

9  Gee  V.  Moore,  14  Cal.  472;  Bowman  v.  Norton,  16  Cal.  213. 


cii.  IX.  §  '2.1  E><TATKS  iiY  M.vnui  Vf^E.  431 

int>rt;4;i_u'f  to  >sf(iiic  iliis  uinl  a  in\\  lu:iii,  it  was  llrld  lliat,  H<» 
far  as  tin'  second  loan  was  ct)Mc'«'nu'(l,  tlio  niort^ajre  was  voul.' 
So  whoiv  liMsl)aii(l  luatlf  a  niort^a^c  alone,  and  tlit-n  made  a 
second  one  in  wliiih  his  wife  joined,  and  the  first  inort^Mireo 
foreclosed  his  nioif >j-aL''e  withont  ^'ivin^^  ntitice  to  tin-  second 
mortjrajfoc,  it  was  lieM  \oid  as  against  the  second  niortjrafrcc.'-' 
lint  it  seems  that  not  only  nuist  the  drhtor  have  a  wife,  in  or- 
der to  alTect  his  right  to  convey  his  homestead,  Imt  she  must 
have  shared  with  him  in  occnj>ying  tlie  same,  in  order  to  at- 
tach the  cliaracter  of  homestead  to  the  premises.  Thus  whero 
n  man  came  from  another  State  without  his  wife,  and  j)nr- 
chased  lands,  hut,  hefore  she  removed  into  tlic  State,  mort- 
gngetl  them,  it  was  held  that  the  mortgage  was  good,  and  that 
until  she  came  and  occupied  the  premises  with  him,  it  did  not 
ac«|uire  the  incitlents  of  homestea<l.'^  And  after  the  wife's 
death,  the  hushand  may  mortgage  the  premises,  though  ho 
have  children  living.* 

2  a.  In  PMorida  no  alienation  of  the  homestead  can  Im-  made 
without  the  joint  assent  of  hoth  husband  and  wife,  and  in  cer 
tain  cases  the  consent  of  the  judge  of  jirobate.''  13ut  the  ex- 
emptecl  estate  is  devisal)le  by  the  owner.^ 

8.  In  CIcorgia  the  liusl)and  cannot  sell  the  homestead  with- 
out consent  of  the  wife,  nor  defeat  her  right  therein  l)y  remov- 
ing from  the  sanie."  But  it  may  be  aliened  by  the  joint  act 
of  the  husban<l  autl  wife,  done  with  the  approbation  of  the 
ordinary,"  or  without  it,  or  any  formal  examination  and 
acknowledgment  of  the  wife,  if  to  secure  a  debt  and  the  wife's 
assent  is  witnessed,  even  by  the  husband.®  So  it  may  be 
waived  by  a  mortgage  made  pending  the  application  to  set  it 

»  Dillon  r.  Byrno,  5  Cal.  455. 

«  Dorw-y  r,  McFarlaml,  7  L'al.  342;  Van  Hf-yncRan  r.  Revalk,  8  Cal.  75; 
Kraemcr  c.  Revalk,  8  L'al.  74. 

•  Can-  V.  Tice,  6  Cal.  625;  Bene<lict  r.  Bunnell,  7  Cal.  245. 

•  Benson  v.  Aitken,  17  Cal.  163. 

»  r)ig«»8t,  1881,  c.  104.  §§  1.  20.  «  M.  §  8. 

Draring  p.  Thomas,  25  Go.  223. 

•  Bumsido  v.  Terry,  45  Ga.  621,  629;  Moughon  r.  Ma.sterson,  50  Ga.  835.  But 
tlie  purchaser  is  bonn<l  to  see  that  the  a.ssent  of  the  ordinary  has  been  obtained. 
Brown  r.  Driggers,  62  Ga.  354. 

»  Wynn  r.  Fi.klin,  64  Ga.  529;  Cnrswell  r.  Ilartidpc,  55  G«^.  412;  Johnson  r. 
Griffin  Tr.  Co.,  Id.  691;  Christopher  r.  Williams,  69  Ga.  779. 


432  LAW    OF   REAL    PROPERTY.  [BOOK    L 

off.i  And  where  the  wife  mortgaged  her  real  estate  in  which 
there  was  a  homestead,  but  did  not  mention  it,  it  was  held 
waived  in  favor  of  the  mortgagee.^  A  creditor  to  whom  a 
release  is  made  has  precedence  over  a  prior  creditor  without 
such  release ;  ^  and  a  purchaser  of  the  homestead  will  be  pro- 
tected in  equity.^  But  a  deed  or  contract  tainted  with  usury 
is  no  bar  to  homestead ;  ^  and  a  general  waiver  in  a  note  not 
applied  to  any  particular  parcel  is  wholly  inoperative.^ 

4.  In  Illinois  no  alienation  of  the  premises,  nor  mortgage, 
nor  release  or  waiver  of  homestead  therein,  aiTects  the  home- 
stead right,  unless  it  be  by  the  same  mode  in  which  convey- 
ances of  real  estate  are  made,  and  is  signed  by  the  wife  of  the 
householder,  and  is  acknowledged  by  her,  and  this  condition 
precedent  applies  to  mortgages  and  deeds  of  trust,  as  well  as 
other  alienations.'^  The  deed,  moreover,  must  contain  an  ex- 
press release  or  waiver  of  the  homestead  right.  A  general 
form  of  grant  would  not  be  sufficient,^  and  both  the  wife  and 
husband  must  also  acknowledge  that  they  thereby  release  their 
right  of  homestead.^  A  deed  with  general  covenants  of  war- 
ranty would  not  be  sufficient,  unless  tliere  was  in  the  deed  an 
express  reference  to  the  right  of  homestead.^*^  A  husband 
cannot  sell  his  homestead  estate  so  long  as  he  occupies  it  as 
the  head  of  a  family.  But  he  may  abandon  it  as  a  residence, 
and  then  be  at  liberty  to  sell  and  convey  it.^^     And  the  law 

1  Smith  V.  Shepheard,  63  Ga.  454. 

2  Roberts  v.  Robinson,  63  Ga.  666;  Cheney  v.  Rodgers,  54  Ga.  168. 

8  Moore  v.  Frost,  63  Ga.  296.  *  Bonds  v.  Strickland,  60  Ga.  624. 

8  Tribble  v.  Anderson,  63  Ga.  31;  Anderson  v.  Tribble,  66  Ga.  584. 

6  Stafford  v.  Elliott,  59  Ga.  837. 

">  Rev.  Stat.  1883,  c.  52,  §  4;  Kitchell  v.  Burgwin,  21  111.  40;  Vanzant  v. 
Vanzant,  23  111.  536;  Patterson  v.  Kreig,  29  111.  514;  Best  v.  Allen,  30  111.  30; 
Smith  V.  Miller,  31  111.  157;  Boyd  v.  Cudderback,  31  111.  113;  Thornton  v. 
Boyden,  31  111.  200;  Connor  v.  Nichols,  31  111.  148;  Pardee  v.  Lindley,  31  111. 
174,  186;  Brown  v.  Coon,  36  111.  243. 

8  Kitchell  V.  Burgwin,  sup.  ;  Vanzant  v.  Vanzant,  sup.  ;  Miller  v.  Marckle, 
27  111.  402,  405;  Moore  v.  Titman,  33  111.  358;  Redfern  v.  Redfern,  38  lU.  509; 
Hutchings  v.  Muggins,  59  lU.  29;  Asher  v.  Mitchell,  92  111.  480. 

9  Boyd  V.  Cudderback,  81  111.  113;  Warner  v.  Crosby,  89  111.  320;  Best  v. 
Gholson,  Id.  465;  Panton  v.  Manley,  4  111.  App.  210. 

i»  Vanzant  v.  Vanzant,  23  111.  536;  Miller  v.  Marckle,  27  111.  402;  Boyd  v.  Cud- 
derback, sup. 
"  Russell  V.  Rumsey,  35  111.  362,  375;  Philips  v.  Springfield,  39  111.  83;  White 


(.11.  IX.  §  2.]  ESTATES    IJY    M.VltKlA(;K.  433 

Hiinuucd  up  in  a  lat<'  case  that  tlK'ic  an-  two  ways  of  releasing 
a  lioiucstcail,  —  abamloiunc'iit  ami  the  jointly  executed  deed  of 
husband  and  wife.'  IJut  where  he  made  a  deed  and  8ur- 
rcndered  pos.session  on  condition,  tfnd  this  was  not  |)erformed, 
the  homestead  was  heUl  not  released.^  If  a  husliand  alono 
convey  his  homestead,  he  may  set  uj»  this  right  against  his 
own  grantee  in  an  action  of  ejectment  to  recover  it.^  lint  a 
mortgage  hy  a  husliand  alone  will  create  a  lien  upon  whatever 
he  has  in  excess  ahove  the  value  of  the  homestead  which  is 
exempted  liy  law.'  Hut  if  the  husliand  (Convey  the  estate, 
though  with  an  intent  to  defraud  his  cx'editors,  he  could  not 
himself  claim  the  henelit  of  homestead  therein.^  Nor  would 
the  giving  to  premises  the  character  of  honustead  all'ect  an 
existing  mortgaire  thereon.*^  And  if  the  deed  of  mortgage 
embrace  premises  of  greater  value  than  is  exem|ited  by  law,  it 
would  be  good  as  to  such  excess,  although  the  wife  do  not  join 
in  the  deed."  Before  the  statute  of  lbo7,  a  sale  under  a  deed 
of  trust  or  power  of  sale  mortgage  of  a  homestead  estate 
might  i»e  good,  although  it  did  not  contain  an  express  release 
or  waiver  of  the  homestead  right.  IJut  it  is  otherwise  under 
that  statute.®  There  is  no  lien  created  by  a  judgment  against 
a  debtor  upon  his  homestead  which  alTects  his  right  to  ccjnvey 
it  unincumbered.^  Hut  a  judgment  would  be  a  lien  ujxui  the 
excess  in  value  of  his  estate  above  >!l,000.*^  Xo  act  of  omis- 
sion or  commission  on  the  jiartof  the  husliand  or  his  creditors, 
can  affect  the  homestead  right  of  a  wife  or  children,  until  she 

V.  Plummer,  96  111.  31»4.  .So  n  widow's  alienation  is  controlled  by  a  lioniestcad  set 
off  and  oociijiifd.  riununer  v.  White,  101  111.  474.  And  when  the  sale  and  re- 
moval wero  one  trnnsjiction,  the  former  was  held  valid,  though  it  shortly  preceded 
the  latter.     Cobb  v.  .Smith,  88  111.  191>. 

»  McMuhill  r.  MeMaiiill,  105  III.  Stttf.  »  Barrett  P.Wilson,  102  111.  302. 

•  Marsliall  v.  liarr,  35  III.  I(i6.  .So  where  he  conveys  his  U-naney  by  curtesy 
ho  may  .itill  occupy  during  the  minority  of  his  children.  Loeb  v.  McMalion,  89 
III.  487. 

•  Booker  V.  Anderson.  35  111.  60,  i^n.  *  Getzler  r.  Saroni,  18  111.  511,  518. 
«  .Mc<  orii'i.k  r. Wilcox,  25  III.  274. 

7  Smith  r.  Miller,  31  111.  157;  Young  r.  Graff,  28  III.  20;  Boyd  v.  Cudderbock, 
31  III.  113;   Brown  r.  Coon,  36  111.  243. 

•  Kly  t>.  hji.Htwoo.1.  26  111.  107;  Smith  r.  Marc,  26  111.  150. 
»  Orwn  ti.  MnrkH,  25  III.  221. 

^  McDonald  t.  Crundall,  43  111.  231. 
YOU  I.—  23 


434  LAW   OP   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

has  done  what  the  statute  requires  in  order  to  release  it.^ 
But  where  husband  and  wife  joined  in  a  deed  of  the  premises, 
though  not  in  such  a  form  as  to  be  in  itself  a  release  of  the 
homestead,  and  then  removed  from  the  premises,  and  the  pur- 
chaser entered  upon  the  same  and  sold  them,  it  was  held  to 
work  an  estoppel  upon  the  wife  as  to  claiming  a  homestead 
right  therein.2  Independent  of  such  act  of  abandonment, 
the  grantee  of  a  husband,  without  the  concurrence  of  his  wife, 
cannot  maintain  ejectment  upon  such  conveyance  against  tlie 
claim  of  homestead  on  the  part  of  the  tenant.^  A  grant  by 
the  husband  alone  conveys  a  fee  subject  to  the  homestead  right 
in  the  grantor.  Where,  therefore,  the  husband  conveyed  the 
homestead  by  deed  of  trust  in  which  the  wife  did  not  join, 
and  gave  the  grantee  possession,  he  held  it  against  a  second 
deed  of  trust  in  which  the  wife  did  join,  because  by  the  first 
deed  and  surrender  of  possession  his  homestead  right  was 
gone.'*  But  a  mortgage  given  to  secure  the  purchase-money 
is  valid.^  And  the  purchaser  from  the  homestead  owner 
holds  against  the  grantor's  creditors.^ 

5.  In  Indiana,  a  conveyance  or  mortgage  of  homestead 
land,  in  order  to  be  valid,  must,  if  the  mortgagor  be  a  married 
man,  be  acknowledged  by  the  wife.  But  if  the  debtor  mort- 
gage his  estate,  and  a  decree  be  made  to  sell  the  same  in 
order  to  foreclose  the  estate,  he  could  not  avail  himself  of  the 
right  of  homestead,  even  though  his  wife  did  not  join  in  the 
deed.'^ 

6.  In  Iowa,  a  deed  of  mortgage  or  trust  conditioned  to  pay 
a  debt,  executed  by  husband  and  wife,  is  good  and  valid, 
though  it  contain  no  special  grant  or  release  of  the  homestead 

1  Boyd  V.  Cudderback,  sup.;  Pardee  v.  Lindley,  31  111.  17-t;  Hoskins  v.  Litch- 
field, 31  111.  137,  144. 

2  Brown  v.  Coon,  36  111.  243.  So  taking  a  lease  from  the  vendee  cures  a  de- 
fective conveyance.     Winslow  v.  Noble,  101  111.  194. 

3  Connor  v.  Nichols,  31  111.  148,  153;  Pardee  v.  Lindley,  31  111.  174;  Patterson 
V.  Kreig,  29  111.  514,  518. 

4  McDonald  v.  Crandall,  43  111.  231;  Coe  v.  Smith,  47  111.  225;  Hewitt  v. 
Templeton,  48  111.  367  ;  Finley  v.  McConnell,  60  111.  259,  263. 

5  Weider  v.  Clark,  27  111.  251. 

6  Shackelford  v.  Todhunter,  4  111.  App.  271. 

7  Rev.  Stat.  1881,  §  716;  Slaughter  v.  Detiney,  15  Ind.  49;  Sullivan  u.Wins- 
low,  22  Ind.  153. 


en.  IX.  §  2.]  ESTATRS    nV    MARRlAflE.  435 

right,  uikI  muiv  ho  onforrod  ncconliuL'lN .'  Hut  a  mortgncro  or 
conveyance  by  huKl)and  alone  would  he  of  no  validity  unle8« 
piven  for  the  purchase-nioney.*  St)  a  conveyance  or  contract 
by  a  husband  to  convey,  for  which  he  receives  the  considera- 
tion, will  be  void  lus  to  the  wife,  and  not  pass  the  honn'stead 
or  authorize  its  transfer,  if  she  does  not  join  therein,  and  will 
be  set  aside  at  her  suit  if  joined  by  the  husband.'  Hut  a  con- 
veyance, to  be  jrood,  must  be  a  joint  one,  if  both  be  livin'_^  If 
made  by  either  alone,  it  would  be  void.*  And  in  order  to  fore- 
close a  mortgage  made  by  husband  ami  wife  aLMinst  her,  she 
must  be  m:ide  a  party  to  the  process,  it  niiirht  be  elVectual 
against  him  althouirh  she  was  not  a  party.^  And  where  del)t(jr 
and  wife  joined  in  a  mortgage  of  the  homestead  and  other  es- 
tate, and  then  made  other  mortgages  of  the  same,  in  which  the 
wife  dill  not  join,  and  proceedings  were  had  to  foreclose  them, 
it  was  held  that  the  ollicer  must  first  sell  the  parcels  exclusive 
of  the  homestead  right,  and  could  only  sidl  that  to  make  up 
a  deficiency  in  the  first  mortgage,  since  the  homestead  was 
•wholly  exempt  from  the  second  and  other  mortgages.  If  he 
sold  the  whole  in  "  a  lump,"  it  would  be  void.''  A  mortgage  of 
a  homestead  is  so  far  a  p(M-sonal  lien  in  favor  of  the  mortgagee, 
that,  where  a  debtor  and  wife  mortgaged  to  secure  his  debt, 
and  he  then  Ix'came  a  bankrupt,  and  the  mortgagee  released 
his  mortirage,  he  was  admitted  to  prove  his  whole  debt   and 

•  lialxock  r.  llocy,  11  Iowa,  375;  Stevens  v.  Myers,  11  lown,  183;  Vun  Sickles 
V.  Tovii,  53  IiiWH,  2.'>y.  Bui  if  hhe  joins  to  n-leiise  ilowir  it  will  U-  ino]M'nitive  as 
to  the  honie.stcail.  Wilson  r.  I'liristopherson,  53  Iowa,  481.  It  does  not  seem  to 
be  nrnti-rinl,  however,  that  the  wife,  when  signing,  was  ignorant  that  she  had  home- 
•t-'ad  in  the  land  conveyed.  Edgell  v.  Ilagcns,  53  Iowa,  223;  iEtna  Life  Ins.  Co. 
r.  Fnink.H,  Id.  618. 

'  IJumap  V.  Cook,  16  Iowa,  149;  O'Brien  r.  Young,  15  Iowa,  5;  Morri.s  r. 
8nrg.nt,  18  Iowa,  90;  Co«le  1873,  tit.  18,  e.  2,  §  3072. 

"  Eli  r.  GrJdlfV,  27  Iowa,  376;  Yost  v.  Devault,  9  Iowa,  60;  Davis  r.  K.ll.y, 
14  Iowa,  525;  Andt-rson  v.  CuIIktI,  .15  Iowa,  233. 

*  Kev.  C.Kle  1880,  §  IJtftO;  Alley  P.  Bay.  H  Iowa,  510;  Urson  p.  Reynolds  13 
Iowa,  581;  Davis  p.  K' lley,  U  Iowa,  523;  Clay  r.  I{i(lianl.s4)n.  5li  I.iwn,  483; 
Sjwon  r.  Von  Fowien,  53  Iowa,  494.  And  one  cannot  act  hy  the  authority  of  the 
other  therein,     /ft. 

•  I^rson  r.  Reynold",  mip.  Ami  a  purchaser  from  the  homestead  owner  is 
entitle«l  to  set  off  against  the  wife,  wlio  did  not  nlease  amounts  ]iaid  to  reduce 
judgmenta  against  the  homestead.     Stinson  v.  Richardson,  44  Iowa,  373. 

*  Lay  r.  Gibltons,  14  Iowa,  377. 


436  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   L 

take  his  dividend,  although  objected  to  by  the  other  creditors.^ 
But  a  mortgage  to  secure  the  purchase-money  takes  precedence 
of  a  homestead  claim.^  And  after  entry,  but  before  the  home- 
stead is  fully  established,  a  valid  lien  against  it  may  be  created.^ 
If  a  debtor  clearly  and  actually  abandon  the  premises,  it  de- 
feats the  right  of  homestead,  and  a  mortgage  then  made  by 
him  will  be  valid,  nor  will  a  subsequent  reoccupation  of  the 
homestead  estate  affect  the  validity  of  the  mortgage.*  So  if 
one  sells  an  old  homestead  and  invests  the  proceeds  in  the 
purchase  of  a  new  one,  he  will  hold  the  second  exempt  in  the 
same  manner  as  he  held  the  prior  one.^  And  if  a  householder 
sell  his  homestead  to  acquire  another,  or  if  he  do  acquire 
another,  the  sale  would  be  good.  So  a  husband  or  wife  may 
make  a  good  devise  of  the  premises,  subject  to  the  homestead 
right  of  the  other  party .^  So  he  may  sell  it,  free  from  any 
lien  by  judgment  in  favor  of  a  judgment  creditor.'^  But  one 
taking  a  deed  from  a  debtor,  in  which  is  a  recital  that  the 
premises  are  those  on  which  the  grantor  resides,  is  estopped 
to  set  up  that  the  grantor  had  abandoned  the  premises  as  his 
residence.*^ 

6  a.  A  deed  is  voidable  in  Kansas,  though  signed  by  the 
wife,  if  she  did  it  by  duress,  even  as  against  a  purchaser  who 
is  not  cognizant  of  the  duress.^  But  a  deed  by  the  husband 
or  wife  alone  is  void,  and  does  not  even  throw  a  shadow  upon 
the  title.i*^  And  the  husband  and  wife  may  sell  the  land  inde- 
pendent of  any  lien  by  judgment  or  by  mortgage  executed  by 
one  of  the  parties  alone.^^  And  a  deed  by  the  widow  and  part 
of  her  children  will  not  affect  the  other  children  who  continue 
to  occupy.i2  jn  Kentucky  the  estate  may  be  sold  subject  to 
a  homestead  right.     But  no  mortgage  release  or  waiver  of  a 

1  Dickson  v.  Chorn,  6  Iowa,  19.  -  Christy  v.  Dyer,  14  Iowa,  438. 

8  Fuller  V.  Hunt,  48  Iowa,  163.  *  Davis  v.  Kelley,  14  Iowa,  523. 

6  Robb  V.  McBride,  28  Iowa,  386  ;  Marshall  v.  Ruddick,  28  Iowa,  487. 
6  Stewart  v.  Brand,  23  Iowa,  477.  ''  Lamb  v.  Shays,  14  Iowa,  567. 

8  Williams  v.  Swetland,  10  Iowa,  51  ;  Christy  v.  Dyer,  14  Iowa,  438. 

9  Anderson  v.  Anderson,  9  Kaus.  112  ;  Wicks  v.  Smith,  21  Kans.  412. 

1"  Comp.  L.  1879  ;  Const,  art.  15,  §  19  ;  and  see  Coughlin  v.  Coughlin,  26 
Kans.  116  ;  Ott  v.  Sprague,  27  Kans.  620  ;  Chambers  v.  Cos,  23  Kaus.  393 ;  even 
though  the  wife  is  absent  or  non-resident.     lb. 

"  DoUraan  v.  Harris,  5  Kans.  597  ;  Morris  v.  Ward,  5  Kans.  239  ;  Gen.  Stat. 
c.  38,  §  1.  .  12  Gatton  v.  Tolley,  22  Kans.  678. 


en.  IX.  vj  2. J  F>TvTF->A  HY  m.M{hi.\(;k.  AM 

hoimstt'iul  will  Itt'  jrotxl  mih'SH  Kifrn('<l  by  the  debtor  and  wife 
and  didy  recorded.'  A  in«»rtpit;:e,  liowever,  ^iven  Ity  the  liome- 
8tead  owner  uirui  a  new  homestead  bought  with  the  proeecdH 
of  the  old,  hut  not  y<'t  oecu|»ifd,  \v:is  held  to  hind  tin-  new 
homestead.^  In  LouiHiana  it  is  now  held  that  the  homestead 
owiuT  may  waive  the  liomestead  when  m«»rtj^:iirinf^  it.^ 

7.  In  Massachusetts  a  lionu'stead  estate  may  he  conveyed 
or  releasril  hy  a  dee<|  in  which  the  hushantl  an«l  his  wife,  if  he 
have  one,  join  with  proper  wtuds  expressly  eoverinj^  the  Imme- 
stcad  riirht,  and  a  declaration  tluit  kIic  joins  to  release  tiie 
8am(» ;  otherwise,  it  will  he  of  no  avail,  even  hy  estopj»el, 
thouirh  the  LM-antor  covenant  as  to  the  tille.^  IJut  if  it  embrace 
other  land  as  well  as  the  homestead,  il  will  be  jrood  as  to  sikIi 
other  lands.  And  if  the  wife  j  )in  in  a  deed  of  morttraire  of  n. 
ht»mestead  estate,  the  riirht  <»f  homestead  remains  unimpaired 
as  to  nil  the  excess  over  and  al»ove  the  niortL'^ap',  and  those 
interested  in  tl>(»  same  may  re(loem  the  jtremises  from  such 
mortijage.^  The  husbanil  may  convey  l>y  deed  the  suri)liis  or 
reversionary  interest  which  he  has  after  satisfy inc^  the  home- 
gteid  riiriit  of  his  wife  and  children."  Nor  would  a  conveyance 
of  this  ri«.rht  of  surplus  or  reversion,  with  a  fraudulent  int«Mit 
as  to  creditors,  affect  his  own  rijrht  of  homestead  durini^  his 
wife's  life."  If  a  homestead  come  to  a  widow  and  miixjr 
children,  the  same  may  be  sohl  by  her  and  the  fjuardian  of 
such  children,  and  the  purchaser  will  thereby  have  the  riLdits 
of  the  widow  and  children.'^  A  jruardian  of  minor  children 
can  <'onvey  no  riirhts  of  his  ward  in  a  homestead  estate  l»y  a 
separate  deed,  if  the  widow  be  alive;  it  must  be  by  a  joint 
deed  of  him  and  the  widnw.      I'.iit    if  there  be  no  widow,  he 

»  Gfn.  Stnt.  1873,  c.  38,  §  13  ;  Griffin  v.  Proctor,  14  I'.usli,  571. 

*  HiinHf..rd  r.  Hol.lain,  14  Bush,  214. 

•  AUi'U  p.  Corruth,  32  La,  Ann.  444,  overruling  Hnnlin  v.  WollF,  29  Ia.  Ann. 
833. 

«  Pub.  Sut.  c,  123,  §  1  ;  Doyle  r.  Cobum,  «  Allon,  71. 

»  Pub.  Stat.  c.  12.'J,  §  7  ;  (;n-enouf,'h  r.  Tunier,  11  Cray,  334;  .Silloway  r. 
Bruwn,  12  Allon,  32  ;  Connor  v.  .McMurn»y,  2  Alb'n,  202  ;  McMurray  r.  Connor, 
2  .Mien,  205  ;  Ailnm.s  r.  Jonkinn,  16  Gniy,  14*?.  But  the  mortgng»-o  is  not  oblijffj 
to  have  n«cour»o  to  the  otluT  lancU,  if  any,  inrlnilf«l  in  his  niortgngu  before  fore- 
closing on  thi>  ho(ne<<ten<l.      S«'arl<'  v.  riiapninii,  121   Mn.ss.  H». 

«  Sillowny  r.  Brown,  12  A11.M1,  .12  ;  M.  Murray  r.  «onnor,  sup. 

'  I'-i'l-  '  Pub.  Stilt,  c.  123  ;  Abliott  r.  Abbott,  97  Maw.  136. 


438  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK    I. 

may  convey  it  upon  being  licensed.  If  there  are  no  children, 
the  widow  alone  can  convey.  The  object  of  the  statute  is  to 
provide  a  home  for  the  householder's  widow  and  children 
during  their  widowhood  and  minority,  or  for  such  of  them  as 
choose  to  occupy  it,  to  be  held  and  enjoyed  by  them  together, 
neither  of  them  having  a  right  which  they  can  transfer  to  a 
stranger  without  the  consent  of  the  others.  The  estate  of  the 
widow  and  children,  after  the  death  of  the  husband,  most 
nearly  resembles  that  of  entirety  of  husband  and  wife.^  So  a 
homestead  may  be  mortgaged  to  secure  the  purchase-money, 
if  done  as  a  part  of  the  transaction  of  purchase.^  And  what- 
ever reversionary  interest  there  is  in  a  husband,  after  answer- 
ing the  wife's  and  childien's  rights  of  homestead,  may  be  sold 
or  mortgaged  by  him  subject  thereto ; "  and  the  mortgagee 
may  foreclose  the  mortgage  by  suit  or  entry,  provided  he  do 
not  disturb  the  possession  of  any  one  holding  under  the  home- 
stead right,  though  it  be  the  mortgagor  himself,  and  though 
he  covenanted  in  his  deed  for  the  title.* 

8.  In  Michigan  a  mortgage  given  for  the  purchase-money 
is  good,  but  for  any  other  purpose  it  is  of  no  validity,  if  the 
mortgagor  be  married,  unless  his  wife  joins  in  the  deed.  Nor 
can  a  homestead  be  conveyed  or  incumbered  without  the  sig- 
nature and  acknowledgment  of  the  wife  to  the  deed.^  Nor 
would  it  be  valid  though  made  by  the  husband  alone,  and 
in  pursuance  of  a  parol  agreement  between  the  husband,  wife, 
and  grantee,  that  the  latter  was  to  support  them,  which  he 
has  ever  been  ready  to  perform.^  But  if  it  covers  more  than 
the  homestead,  it  will  be  good  for  all  such  excess,  though  not 
signed  by  the  wife.^     Accordingly,  where,  upon  a  process  to 

1  Abbott  V.  Abbott,  97  Mass.  136. 

2  N.  E.  Jewelry  Co.  v.  Merriam,  2  Allen,  390. 

8  Smith  V.  Provin,  4  Allen,  516  ;  White  v.  Rice,  5  Allen,  73  ;  Doyle  v.  Co- 
burn,  6  Allen,  71. 

*  Doyle  V.  Cobnrn,  6  Allen,  71  ;  Connor  v.  McMurray,  2  Allen,  202  ;  Castle 
V.  Palmer,  6  Allen,  401. 

5  Fisher  v.  Meister,  24  Mich.  447  ;  Const,  art.  16,  §  2  ;  Comp.  Laws,  1871, 
§§  6137,  6138.  But  if  she  had  signed,  she  cannot  avoid  it  on  the  ground  of  not 
having  read  it.     Peake  v.  Thomas,  39  Mich.  584. 

6  Ring  V.  Burt,  17  Mich.  465. 

7  Const,  art.  16;  Stat.  c.  132  ;  Beecher  v.  Baldy,  7  Mich.  488  ;  Dye  v.  Mann, 
10  Mich.  291  ;  McKee  v.  Wilcox,  11  Mich.  360. 


fll.  IX.  §  -.]  ESTATES    BY   MARRIAfiE.  439 

fort'closi!  a  inort;.'a;;(',  the  luortgii^or  (.'hiiiucd  cxemjjtiuii  of  the 
hoim'stead,  the  court  ordered  it  to  be  appraised  and  set  out 
from  the  niorti:a<^ed  pn-iuises,  so  as  to  iuelude  the  dwellin^r 
house  and  other  necessary  hiiihlinjrs,  and  the  remainder  of  the 
estate  to  he  soUl.' 

9.  In  Minnesota  no  sale  of  a  homestead  can  he  made  hy 
hushand  and  wife,  and  no  mortgaire  unless  the  wife,  if  the 
grantor  has  one,  joins  in  the  deed,^  with  the  excejttion  of 
mortgages  given  to  secure  the  innciiiise-moncy,^  and  liens 
for  Work  done  u|M)n  the  house.*  A  husljand  forfeits  his  rights 
under  the  homestead  law  hy  a  conveyance  to  the  wife  to  de- 
fraud creditors.'' 

9  a.  By  the  statute  of  Mississipjii  of  ISilT,  a  husband  may 
sell  the  homestead  for  the  purpose  of  reinvesting  it  in  a  new 
homestead,  and  he  has  a  year  in  which  to  do  this.  The  hus- 
band, having  the  right  to  select  ami  fix  the  homestead,  is 
at  liberty  to  change  it.*^  He  may  sell  the  homestead,  or  any 
part  of  it,  free  from  any  lien  of  judgment  existing  during  the 
homestead  right.  Nor  could  a  judgment  creditor  follow  it 
into  a  purchaser's  hands."  And  a  widow  may  sell  the  rever- 
sion subject  to  the  homestead  right  during  the  chihlren's 
minority.^  In  Missouri,  husband  ami  wife  may  alien,  but  l»nth 
must  join."  In  Nebraska,  a  husbiiml  and  wife  may  make  a 
valid  mf)rtgage  of  their  homestead.''^  In  Nevada,  a  husband 
cannot  convey,  mortgage,  or  lease  the  homestead  without  the 
concurrent  act  of  the  wife,  unless  she  is  insane,  when  the 
court  may  authorize  it  to  be  done,  and  the  proceeds  invested 
as  the  court  shall  direct." 

10.  In  New  Hampshire  the  only  way  in  which  a  homestead 
estate  can  be  cfl'ectu.illv  w.iivnl  or  released  is  by  a  deed  cxe- 

•  Dye  r.  Mann,  10  Mich.  '.ii*!.  *  Ferguson  r.  Kumlcr,  25  Minn.  183. 

•  Olson  r.  Nelson,  3  .Minn.  53  ;  I^wver  r.  Slingerlund,  11  Minn.  447. 

<  Stnt  1878.  c.  68,  §§  1.  2.  »  PilH-r  i;.  Johnston,  12  .Minn.  60. 

•  Thorns  r.  Thorns,  45  Miss.  263  ;  Parker  r.  Dean,  45  Miss.  4u8  ;  Wilson  p. 
Gray,  59  Mijis.  525. 

»  Kev.  Code,  1880,  §  1257  ;  Parker  v.  Dean,  sup. 

•  McCaleb  v.  Humett,  55  Miss.  83.  •  Rev.  Stat.  1879,  §  2689. 
•'  lif  CroM,  2  Dill.  320  ;  Conip.  .Stat.  1S81,  c.  36,  §§  3.  4. 

"  Clark  r.  Shannoii,  1  Nev.  568  ;  GoUlman  v.  Clark,  1  Xev.  607  ;  Comp.  L 
1873,  §§  187.  190. 


440  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  L 

cuted  by  a  husband  and  wife,  if  she  be  alive,  or,  if  dead,  leav- 
ing minor  or  insane  children,  the  judge  of  probate  must  assent 
thereto.  The  exception  to  this  is  a  mortgage  to  secure  the 
purchase-money.^  But  the  right,  as  such,  is  not  the  subject 
of  grant  or  assignment  to  a  third  person  any  more  than  that 
of  a  wife  to  dower  during  coverture. ^  But  so  far  as  a  hus- 
band has  an  interest,  independent  of  his  wife  and  children, 
in  a  homestead  estate,  he  is  at  liberty  to  convey  it  subject  to 
their  rights,  and  may  enter  into  covenants  in  respect  to  the 
same  which  will  bind  and  estop  him,  as  in  the  conveyance  of 
any  other  estate.  Thus,  if  he  make  a  deed  in  which  his  wife 
does  not  join,  the  purchaser  takes,  subject  to  her  right,  upon  her 
becoming  the  grantor's  widow,  of  having  the  same  set  out  to 
her  and  the  minor  children  to  hold  as  long  as  it  is  occupied 
as  a  homestead.^  In  such  cases  the  husband  conveys  the  es- 
tate, subject  to  her  homestead  right,  in  the  same  way  as  he 
conveys  one  subject  to  the  right  of  dower  in  the  wife,  if  she 
survives  him.  But  it  may  be  demanded  by  husband  and  wife 
during  her  life,  and  perhaps  l^y  her  alone,  or  after  the  hus- 
band's death  she  and  the  minor  children  may  demand  it.^ 
But  if  he  convey  with  covenants  of  warranty,  he  would  be 
estopped  to  claim  it  against  his  grantee  or  his  assigns.  Nor 
would  it  be  any  bar  to  an  action  by  such  grantee  to  recover 
possession  of  such  estate,  that  the  grantor's  children  were 
entitled  to  a  homestead  therein,  unless  the  same  had  been  set 
out  and  assigned  as  such.  And  if  such  grantor  attempted  to 
have  a  homestead  set  out  agahist  a  grantee,  he  would  be  es- 
topped in  equity  from  so  doing.  Nor  could  his  wife  and 
minor  children  do  this  during  the  husband's  life,  in  proceed- 
ings against  a  purchaser  with  covenants.  They  would  be  as 
much  estopped  thereby  as  the  husband.^  If,  when  a  husband 
conveys  a  part  of  his  estate,  he  leaves  enough  to  answer  the 
homestead  claim,  his  conveyance  will  be  good.^ 

1  Norris  V.  Monlton,  34  N.  H.  392  ;  Gen.  Laws,  1878,  c.  138,  §  2. 

2  Gunnison  v.  Twitchel,  38  N.  H.  62;  Foss  v.  Straclin,  42  N.  H.  40. 

»  Atkinson  v.  Atkinson,  37  N.  H.  434;  Gunnison  v.  Twitchel,  38  N.  H.  62; 
Horn  V.  Tufts,  39  N.  H.  478,  485. 

*  Gunnison  v.  Twitchel,  38  N.  H.  62;  Foss  v.  Strachn,  42  N.  H.  40. 

^  Foss  V.  Strachn,  sup.  ^  Horn  v.  Tufts,  39  K.  H.  478 


CIl.  IX.  §  2.]  ESTATKS    BY    MAimiAf:K.  441 

10  tt.  Ill  \»'w  .Torscy  a  liomost«>nil  ramiot  be  sold  nor  IcaKcd 
for  luorL'  than  »»n»'  vt-ar,  unlt-ss  l»y  the  citnsi'nt  of  husl»an<J  and 
wifo  bv  dtcMl  duly  iicknowled>ri'd  and  for  its  full  value,  and 
the  sum  iiivt-stcd  in  a  new  honu'stcad.  It  cannot  be  leased 
without  th«^  wile's  consent.' 

11.  In  New  York  a  householder  niiLrht  release  his  home- 
stead rii;ht  by  conveyiu:.^  the  land  in  the  mode  reijuired  for 
ordinary  et)nveyances.- 

11  a.  In  North  Carolina  if  husliand  convey  the  estate  in 
which  he  has  claimed  the  liirlit  of  homestead,  under  circum- 
stances to  be,  otherwise,  fraucbdcnt  as  to  creditors,  it  will  not 
alTect  the  vendee's  rijrht  to  hold  the  homestead  ajrainst  the 
creditors,  inasmuch  as  what  he  had  conveyed  could  not  have 
been  levied  on  for  his  chbts.''  JJut  no  sale  of  a  Innnestead  can 
be  valid,  where  the  grantor  has  a  wife,  unless  she  voluntarily 
signs  and  acknowledires  the  deeil  of  conveyance.'' 

12.  In  Ohio  the  wife  must  join  with  the  husband  in  making 
a  pood  mortgage  of  the  homestead  estate,  whereby  either  she 
or  her  family  are  to  be  affected.  And  where  husband  and 
wife  by  joint  deed  conveyed  the  estate  t<j  defraud  his  cretlitors, 
and  the  deed  was  set  aside  as  fraudulent  ujion  aj)i»lication  of 
a  creditor,  it  was  held  tiiat  the  debtor  might  set  up  a  claim  of 
homestead  airainst  such  ci'eilitor,  on  the  ground  that  he  i;im- 
self  had  held  the  deed  to  be  of  no  elTect.'' 

12  (I.  In  South  Carolina  the  title  of  the  alienee  or  mort- 
gagee of  the  homestead  is  declared  t<j  l>e  valid. ^  A  sale  of  an 
intestate  estate  by  order  of  the  judge  of  probate  is  no  bar  to 
a  widow's  claim  of  homestead  out  of  the  same.''  In  Tennes- 
see, prior  to  the  Constitution  of  1870,  the  husband  had  unre- 
strained power  of  aliening  the  homestead.^  If  the  owner  is 
married,  his  wife  must  join  with  him  in  aliening  or  mortgaging 

«  Rev.  1877,  p.  1055,  §  7. 

'  3  Rev.  Stet.  647;  Smith  r.  Brnckett,  36  Barb.  £71;  4  Stat,  at  Largo,  Pt.  3, 
c.  260. 

'  Crutnmen  r.  Bennet,  68  N.  C.  404.  «  Tonst.  1868,  art.  10,  §  8. 

»  Rev.  Stat  1880,  $  .'■)434;  Scars  r.  Hanks,  14  Ohio  St.  298. 

•  Cien.  Stat.  1882.  §  1998;  Smith  r.  Mallone.  10  S.  C.  39. 

7  Ex  pnrU  StrotK'l,  2  S.  C.  309. 

»  HilW  V.  Poston,  4  Baxt.  232.  At  least  if  the  homestead  is  not  laid  off 
Kincaid  v.  Burem,  9  Lea,  553. 


442  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

the  homestead  to  be  valid,  except  that  he  may  mortgage  it  for 
tlie  purchase-money.  But  tlie  homestead  need  not  be  ex- 
pressly mentioned  to  pass,^  and  the  reversion  will  pass  by 
their  joint  deed,  where  her  acknowledgment  is  defective.^ 
He  can,  moreover,  convey  by  his  separate  deed  a  part  of  his 
farm^  if  enough  remains  for  a  homestead  ;  ^  and  where,  subse- 
quent to  his  mortgage,  both  joined  in  conveying  the  home- 
stead, the  mortgage  was  held  superior  to  the  exemption.*  If 
he  ceases  to  occupy  it,  it  becomes  liable  to  be  levied  upon  by 
his  creditors.^ 

13.  In  Texas  a  householder  having  no  wife  might  convey 
the  estate,  though  by  so  doing  he  defeats  the  rights  of  his  chil- 
dren therein.  And  a  creditor's  judgment  binds  such  estate  as 
against  the  debtor's  children.^  But  if  he  have  a  wife,  he  can 
only  alienate  the  estate  by  her  assent."  And  this  assent  must 
be  evidenced  by  a  deed  signed  and  acknowledged  by  her.^ 
Nor  would  a  sale  by  the  husband  affect  the  wife's  right  of 
homestead,  although,  before  it  had  taken  place,  she  had  sepa- 
rated from  him.^  A  sale  by  the  husband,  without  the  wife's 
joining  in  the  conveyance,  is  a  nullity .i*'  But  if  he  surviv§ 
her,  he  may  dispose  of  the  homestead  for  the  purpose  of  pro- 
curing a  new  one.^^  And  a  mortgage  with  power  of  sale,  or  a 
deed  in  trust  to  sell  the  premises  made  by  husband  and  wife, 
whereby  the  mortgagee  or  trustee  might  sell  without  any  action 
or  decree  of  the  court,  would  be  good.  But  if,  to  enforce  it,  it 
became  necessary  to  have  the  mortgaged  premises  sold  under 
process  of  the  court,  it  would  come  under  the  character  of 
forced  sale,  and  would  not  be  sustained  even  though  signed  by 
the  husband  and  wife.'^   Nor  can  any  contract  of  sale  of  a  home- 

1  Lover  v.  Bessenger,  9  Baxt.  393.  ^  Mash  v.  Eussell,  1  Lea,  543. 

8  Hildebrand  v.  Taylor,  6  Lea,  659.  *  Crook  v.  Limsford,  2  Lea,  237. 

6  Stat.  1871,  §  2110;  Const,  art.  11,  §  11. 

«  Tadlock  v.  Eccles,  20  Texas,  782;  Brewer  v.  Wall,  23  Texas,  585;  Jordan  v. 
Imthurn,  51  Texas,  276;  Wright  v.  Doherty,  50  Texas,  34. 

"^  Const,  art.  22;  Eev.  Stat.  1879,  art.  560;  Sampson  v.  Williamson,  6  Texas, 
102,  116. 

8  Cross  V.  Evarts,  28  Texas,  523,  532;  Houghton  v.  Marshall,  31  Texas,  196. 

9  Homestead  Cases,  31  Texas,  692.  ^'^  Rogers  v.  Renshaw,  37  Texas,  625. 
"  Morrill  v.  Hopkins,  36  Texas,  686. 

12  Sampson  v.  Williamson,  6  Texas,  102,  118;  Lee  v.  Kingsbury,  13  Texas,  68; 
Stewart  v,  Mackay,  16  Texas,  56. 


CH.  IX.  §  -.]  KSTATKS    llV    M\i:i:iA(JE.  413 

stead  bo  enforced  without  or  apiin.st  tlic  consent  of  the  wife.' 
But  the  |»iesence  of  u  wife,  nnd  the  oceupaney  by  them  both, 
seems  to  be  re(|uisite  in  order  to  n-ndei-  hei-  siirniituie  neces- 
sary to  a  dr«'(l.  Tlnis,  wheic  tlii;  hiisl»an<l  eann-  into  the  State, 
and  purchased  bind,  iind  aequirecl  ii  homestead  and  sold  it  be- 
fore she  hail  removed  into  the  State,  it  wouhl  seeui  that  such 
sale  wouhl  be  ;^ood  ajrainst  her  claim  of  homestead  ri^dit.'^ 
And  where  a  husliand  sold  his  estate,  and  then  he  and  his 
wife  abandoned  it,  it  was  held  to  make  his  conveyance  of  it 
good.^  And  as  the  object  of  the  statute  is  principally  to  secure 
to  a  wife  her  right  of  homestead,  if  a  husband,  without  her 
joining  in  it,  sell  or  mortgage  one  homestead  and  then  ac«juiro 
a  n»'w  one,  it  will  give  validity  to  the  alienation  of  the  first. 
And  the  first,  in  such  case,  would  be  subject  to  levy  by  the 
husband's  ereditors.*  If  a  householder  contract  to  convey  his 
homestead  and  fail  to  do  so,  he  would  be  liable  in  damages  for 
such  lireaeh.  But  if  he  have  a  wife,  the  court  would  not  com- 
pel him  to  convey  the  premises,  so  long  as  the  premises  were 
occupied  as  such.  But  if,  in  such  ease,  he  ac(iuire  a  new  home- 
stead, or  his  wife  were  to  die,  the  court  woidd  enforce  a  spe- 
cific performance,  by  decree,  as  he  then  becomes  al)le  to 
convey.''  A  sale  of  the  debtor's  homestead,  though  with  an 
intent  to  defraud  creditors,  cannot  be  impeached  on  that  ac- 
count, as  by  such  sale  he  does  not  take  away  any  right  of  levy 
from  the  creditor.*^ 

14.  In  Vermont  a  mortgage  to  secure  the  j)urchase-money 
is  good.  So  a  mortgage  by  a  husband  alone  would  be  good 
as  against  anything  but  the  contingent  homestead  interest  of 

>  Berlin  v.  Burns,  17  Texas,  532;  Brewer  r.  Wall,  23  Texas,  585;  Allison  v. 
Shilling?.  27  Texas,  450.  But  the  liushand  may  lie  liable  in  damages.  Brewer  r. 
Wall;  CroHS  f.  Evarts,  28  Texas,  523.  In  CampU-ll  v.  Elliott,  52  Texas,  151,  it 
is  held  that,  under  the  constitution  of  1845,  the  mortgage  of  the  husband  alono 
is  void  to  all  intents ;  and  the  court  intimate  that  the  same  rule  obtains  under  the 
constitution  of  1875.  The  decisions  in  other  States  relied  on  by  the  court  in 
8Uii[»<5rt  of  this  latter  conclusion  have,  however,  been  in  some  instances  overruled. 
See  Goilfrey  F.  Thornton,  46  Wise.  677;  jxist,  pi.  15. 

*  .Meyer  v.  Claus,  15  Texas,  516.  »  Jordan  r.  Gotlman,  19  Texas,  273. 

♦  Berlin  r.  Bums.  17  Texas,  535;  Stewart  v.  Mackay,  16  Texas,  56. 
«  Brewer  p.Wall,  23  Texas,  585. 

«  Wood  V.  Chambers,  20  Texas.  247;  Cox  v.  Shropshire,  25  Texas,  113; 
Martel  r.  Soraers,  26  Texas,  551. 


444  LAW   OP   EEAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   T. 

the  wife.  And  if  he  acquire  a  new  homestead,  his  conveyance 
of  his  former  one  will  be  effectual,  to  all  intents,  on  the  ground 
that  one  cannot  have  two  homesteads  at  the  same  time.  But 
so  long  as  it  is  the  homestead  of  a  party,  he  cannot  do  any- 
thing to  impair  his  wife's  right  therein,  unless  she  joins  in 
a  deed  thereof.  And  this  must  be  done  by  deed,  in  which  she 
is  to  join  as  well  in  signing  as  in  acknowledging  it,  though  the 
husband  may  mortgage  the  estate  for  the  purchase-money. 
But  the  wife's  joining  in  releasing  or  conveying  her  right  of 
homestead  does  not  affect  her  right  of  dower  in  the  premises, 
or  enure  to  the  benefit  of  any  one  except  the  grantee.^  A 
conveyance  by  husband  and  wife  of  a  homestead  estate  can- 
not be  impeached  by  creditors  on  the  score  of  fraud,  although 
it  might  have  been  if  it  had  not  been  a  homestead.^  A  deed 
by  the  husband  alone  would  not  be  effectual  to  disturb  the 
occupancy  of  the  husband  and  family,  so  long  as  they  con- 
tinued such  occupancy.^  This  right  is,  if  she  survive  him,  to 
enjoy  it  as  a  homestead.  So  that,  with  this  limitation,  a  hus- 
band has  full  power  of  disposal  of  the  estate,  and  the  purchaser 
under  him  may  have  a  right  to  the  use  and  possession  of  the 
premises  during  coverture.  And  this  right  of  a  wife  in  one 
homestead  may  be  lost  by  his  gaining  a  new  one.*  The  home- 
stead, upon  the  death  of  the  husband,  descends  to  the  widow 
and  children  free  from  his  debts,  and  vests  in  them.  The 
husband  cannot  affect  this  right  by  will,  though  he  may  devise 
property  to  her  upon  condition  she  waives  her  homestead, 
and  compel  her  to  elect.  She  cannot  take  dower  and  home- 
stead too,  except  that,  if  she  claim  both,  the  homestead  value 
is  to  be  deducted  from  the  dower,  and  that  will  be  set  out 
accordingly.  The  husband  may  make  provision  for  her  by 
will  in  lieu  of  dower.  But  in  such  case  her  homestead  right 
is  not  affected.^ 

14  a.   In  Virginia,  a  homestead  can  only  be  conveyed  or 


1  Rev.  Laws,  1880,  §§  1904-1906.  2  Danforth  v.  Beattie,  43  Vt.  138. 

8  Day  V.  Adams,  42  Vt.  510. 

*  Comp.  St.  390,  391;  Lleech  v.  Meech,  37  Vt.  414;  Howe  v.  Adams,  28  Vt. 
541;  Jewett  v.  Brock,  32  Vt.  65;  Davis  v.  Andrews,  30  Vt,  678;  Stat.  1862, 
App.  70. 

6  Meech  v.  Meech,  37  Vt.  414;  Acts  1866. 


ClI.  IX.  §  2.]  ESTATES   BY    MARRIAGE.  445 

incuml)Cre(J  l>y  the  wifo  jolninj]^  with  tlir  Imshainl  in  the  act, 
unless  the  inviu'i*  be  siiiirN'.  A  lioiiicstcad  may  lie  stdd  aiitl 
the  proceeds  iiivestetl  in  u  new  homestead.^ 

15.  In  Wisconsin,  the  si^nutnic  of  the  wife  to  the  hushaiid's 
deed,  and  her  aeknowledjrnjent  of  it,  are  essential  to  its  valid- 
ity as  airainst  the  homestead  ri<::ht,  hut  not  as  against  his  own 
claim.-  IJiit  he  may  without  her  assent  sell  a  dwellinfr-house 
standing'  on  the  land  of  another,  and  assig:n  a  lease  thereof,^ 
or  of  any  other  than  the  homestead  estate.^  The  homestead 
exemption  creates  no  estate  in  the  wife  livini;  her  hushand, 
and  his  sole  mortira<;e  is  valitl  as  aLMinst  him.''  A  Milmitary 
conveyance  Ijy  hushand  and  wife,  of  a  homestead,  does  not 
subject  it  to  levy  for  his  dcljts,  althou<.^h  made  with  intent  to 
defraud  creditors,  and  althonLdi  the  <:;rantee  convey  the  same 
to  the  wife,  j»i-o\idi'd  they  lioth  continue  to  reside  thereon.*' 
If  a  husband  hold  a  jiatent  for  land  under  the  t>tatc,  so  that  a 
homestead  riirht  attaches  to  the  same,  he  cannot  convey  it  so 
as  to  bind  the  homestead,  without  his  wife  joins  in  the  deeil." 
If  husljand  and  wife  mortgage  a  iKnuestead,  and  it  is  fore- 
closed, the  mortgagee  comes  into  the  mortgagor's  place  of 
luiving  a  right  to  select  the  homestead,  and  to  have  it  set 
out.^  Where  husband  and  wife  ccmveyed  the  estate,  and  he 
was  afterwards  declared  bankrupt,  and  the  conveyance  was 
set  aside  as  fraudulent  and  void,  it  w;is  held  that  his  deed  tlid 
not  bar  his  claim  of  homestead,  that  it  passed  to  the  assigns 
subject  to  this  riLdit,  and  a  sale  of  the  estate  by  order  of  the 
bankrupt  court  had  inj  efVect  to  cut  oil"  this  homestead  right.^ 

»  Code  of  1871,  c.  183,  §  7;  Const  art.  11,  §  1;  Wliite  r.  Owen,  10  Onitt.  41. 
a  Ki'v.  Sirtt.  1878,  §  2203;  Godfrey  v.  Thornton,  46  Wise.  (377;  overruling  ll;iit 
r.  Hoiile,  19  Wise.  472. 

•  Plitto  V.  Cady,  12  Wise.  401.  *   Ilait  r.  Houle,  sup. 
'  Cltxlfiry  t».  Thornton,  4(5  Wise.  677. 

•  Urwutzer  ».  Bell,  11  Wise.  114;  McFarlnnd  i-.  Goodman,  22  Am.  Law  Reg. 
697. 

^  MeCalio  V.  Mozzuehelli,  13  Wise.  478.  *  Kent  v.  Agord,  22  Wise.  150. 

•  MeFarland  r.  Goodman,  22  Am.  Law  Reg.  697. 


446  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  T. 

DIVISION  VII. 

HOW   HOMESTEAD   RIGHTS   MAY   BE   WAIVED    OR   LOST. 

1.  Grounds  on  which  homestead  may  be  lost. 

1  a.  How  homestead  lost  in  Alabama  and  Arkansas. 

2.  How  lost  in  California. 

3.  How  lost  in  Georgia. 

4.  How  lost  in  Illinois. 

5.  How  lost  in  Indiana. 

6.  How  lost  in  Iowa. 

6  a.  How  lost  in  Kentucky. 

7.  How  lost  in  Massachusetts. 

8.  How  lost  in  Michigan. 

9.  How  lost  in  Minnesota,  Mississippi,  Missouri,  and  New  Jersey. 

10.  How  lost  in  New  Hampshire. 

10  a.  How  lost  in  Nebraska  and  Nevada. 

11.  How  lost  in  New  York  and  North  Carolina. 

12.  How  lost  in  Ohio. 

13.  How  lost  in  Pennsylvania. 

14.  How  lost  in  Tennessee. 

14  a.  How  lost  in  Texas. 

15.  How  lost  in  Vermont. 

15  a.  How  lost  in  Virginia. 

16.  How  lost  in  Wisconsin. 

1.  The  same  diversity  prevails  in  the  different  States,  as  to 
how  far  and  by  what  means  a  homestead  right  once  acquired 
can  be  lost  by  abandoning  the  premises,  though,  as  a  general 
proposition,  whenever  a  new  homestead  is  gained,  the  prior 
one  is  lost. 

1  a.  In  Alabama,  letting  the  homestead  and  absence  there- 
from for  a  year  will  forfeit  it.  So  letting  and  a  removal  as 
against  a  prior  judgment.^  In  Arkansas  a  temporary  absence 
from  a  homestead  is  not  a  forfeiture  of  it.^ 

2.  In  California,  merely  removing  from  the  premises  to 
occupy  rented  land  elsewhere,  or  because  it  was  dangerous  to 
occupy  the  homestead  as  such,^  does  not  defeat  such  a  right. 
But  where  the  owner  sold  the  premises  without  his  wife's 

1  Boyle  V.  Shulman,  59  Ala.  566;  Stow  v.  Lillie,  63  Ala.  257. 

2  Tumlinson  v.  Swinney,  22  Ark.  400;  Euper  ?;.  Alkire,  37  Ark.  283. 

8  Holden  v.  Pinney,  6  Cal.  234;  Dunn  v.  Tozer,  10  C.il.  167;  Moss  v.  Warner, 
Id.  296.     Only  done  as  by  statute.    Porter  v.  Chapman,  65  Cal.  365. 


CH.  IX.  §   2.]  ESTATES    IIY    MMtUIACE.  447 

joininj;  in  tlif  drrd,  mitl  they  tlion'UjKin  removed  from  tlie 
premises,  it  \v;is  held  to  i)e  an  al»aiul<»iimcnt  of  the  homestead 
rijjht.'  Hut  now  no  homesteail  will  hf  ludd  to  he  ahantlonctl, 
unless  In  a  written  dcelaration  to  that  eflect,  sifni'd  by  tin' 
hnsl'tand  and  wile,  or  other  head  of  the  fanjily,  and  aeknowl- 
cd;red  and  recorded.'-^  And  no  mort^ra^a'  is  valid  even  if 
sijrned  hy  both  of  th,eni.^  And  where  a  homestead  rijjht  has 
once  nttaehed,  thouirh  the  wife  h)ses  her  ridit  therein  Ity  el»»j)- 
injr  and  livinu:  in  ailnltery,*  a  mort«ra<re  by  the  hnsband,  after 
such  elopement,  will  not  avail  a<rainst  his  family  of  children.^ 
Uniler  the  act  of  \Hi\'2  the  majority  of  the  children  will  defeat 
the  homestead  estate  of  a  widower.*^ 

3.  In  Georgia,  as  the  hnsband  cannot  defeat  the  wife's  right 
of  homestead  by  removing  from  the  premises,  if  he  occupies 
a  new  estate  he  does  not  afTect  his  right  of  homestead  already 
pained  in  the  former  one,  unless  he  owns  the  new  estate." 
But  he  can  waive  the  right  of  homestead,  and  thereby  bind 
liis  wife  and  children;^  and  a  right  of  homestead  terminated 
by  death  of  the  wife  and  majority  of  the  children,  dues  not 
re-attaeh  upon  a  second  marriage.^ 

4.  In  Illinois,  a  right  of  homestead  may  be  lost  to  a  house- 
liolder,  if  he  ceases  to  occupy  it  as  a  residence,  or  ceases  to 
have  a  family."'  Hut  if  a  husband  abandon  the  premises,  leav- 
ing his  wife  and  children  thereon,  he  does  not  affect  the  right 
of  homestead  even  as  to  himself,  unless  he  shall,  in  the  mean 
time,  have  acquired  a  home  and  settlement  elscwhere.^^  He 
would  not  lose  this  right  by  a  temj)orary  absence,  or  for  a 
temporary  purpose,  or  if  he  leaves  the  premises,  and  going  to 
another  State  to  find  another  home,  and  failing  to  lind  one, 


»  Tnylor  p.  Hnrgons,  4  Cnl.  268.  '  TlittoU's  fodo,  1876.  §§  6243,  6244. 

•  C'olien  r.  Diivis,  20  Cal.  187.  *  ("nnieto's  Kst.  Myrick  (I'rol.J,  42. 

•  Lu'H  V.  I)e  Dial.lar,  12  Ciil.  327.        •  Snntu  Cruz  I'.k.  v.  Coopr,  66  Cal.  339. 
^  Drarinn  r.  Thoiiia.s,  2.')  Oa.  223. 

'  TaliafiTTor.  Pry,  41  Ga.  622.  But  it  i.s  no  waiver,  ns  against  a  cre»litor,  tliat 
the  ili-btor  iii«l  not  set  up  the  exemption  in  defence  to  a  foreclosure  suit  by  a  prior 
mortgage.     Fmst  v.  Borders,  59  Oa,  817. 

»  Wright  V.  James,  64  Oa.  533. 

JO  Oreen  v.  Marks,  25  111.  221  ;  Tourville  v.  Pierson,  39  111.  446. 

"  Moore  r.  Dunning.  29  111.  135  ;  Best  v.  Allen,  30  111.  30  ;  White  v.  Clark, 
36  111.  285  ;  People  v.  Stitt,  7  111.  App.  294. 


448  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

returns  to  his  original  home.^  A  husband,  however,  controls 
the  subject  of  his  own  residence,  and  if  he  and  his  family 
leave  his  homestead  for  a  new  residence  it  is  conclusive  aban- 
donment of  the  former  one.^  But  it  would  not  be  such  an 
abandonment  if  he  leave  the  premises  and  go  into  another 
county  in  search  of  another  home,  until  he  shall  have  gained 
one.  And  if,  having  removed  his  family  in  this  way,  the  hus- 
band abandon  them  before  he  has  provided  a  new  home  for 
them,  he  might  return  to  the  one  he  had  abandoned,  and 
resume  possession  of  it.  Nor  can  a  widow  who  has  minor 
children  affect  their  rights  by  intentionally  abandoning  the 
homestead.^  A  wife's  right  may  be  barred  or  lost  by  her  join- 
ing her  husband  in  a  release,  by  the  estate  being  sold  to  pay 
the  purchase-money  or  money  expended  in  improvements,  or 
by  final  abandonment.  But  on  no  other  ground  can  a  husband 
affect  his  wife's  right.*  And  no  release  or  waiver  of  homestead 
is  valid  unless  made  in  writing,  subscribed  and  acknowledged 
by  husband  and  wife,  in  which  there  is  an  express  release  of 
the  homestead  right.^  And  where  the  parents  died  leaving 
minor  children,  and  the  estate  was  rented  by  their  guardian 
while  they  lived  in  his  family,  it  was  held  not  to  be  conclusive 
abandonment  of  the  homestead.^  If  the  husband  reuKJve  with 
his  family  on  to  another  farm  than  that  in  which  he  has  a 
homestead,  and  sells  the  latter,  it  is  a  conclusive  abandonment 
and  his  homestead  is  lost.'^  So  if  one  sells  his  homestead  and 
surrenders  the  possession  to  the  purchaser,  and  leaves  it  him- 

1  Kituhell  V.  Burgwin,  21  111.  40  ;  Walters  v.  People,  18  111.  194. 

2  Titman  v.  Moore,  43  111.  169  ;  Wiggius  v.  Chance,  54  111.  175  ;  Cipperly  v. 
Khodes,  53  111.  346. 

8  Kev.  Stat.  1883,  c.  52,  §  2  ;  Walters  v.  People,  21  111.  178  ;  Vanzant  v.  Van- 
zant,  23  111.  536  ;  Miller  v.  Marckle,  27  111.  402  ;  Ives  v.  Mills,  37  111.  73  ;  Ca- 
been  v.  Mulligan,  lb.  230  ;  Kingman  v.  Higgins,  100  111.  319. 

*  Booker  v.  Anderson,  35  111.  66,  87  ;  White  v.  Clark,  36  111.  285  ;  McMahill 
V.  McMahill,  105  111.  596. 

6  Kev.  Stat.  1883,  c.  52,  §  4  ;  1873,  p.  226  ;  Hutchins  v.  Huggins,  59  111.  29  ; 
Eldredge  v.  Pierce,  90  111.  474.  But  a  certificate  of  acknowledgment  is  not  enough 
under  Rev.  Stat.  1874,  p.  278,  §  27  (Hev.  Stat.  1883,  c.  52,  §  4),  if  it  merely  .says 
that  it  was  "freely  and  voluntarily  done  for  the  purposes  therein  expres.sed." 
School  Trustees  v.  Hovey,  94  111.  394. 

6  Brinkerhoff  v.  Everett,  38  111.  263. 

7  Phillips  V.  Springfield,  39  111.  83  ;  Titman  v.  Moore,  43  111.  169. 


til.  I\.  §  J.]  ESTATIvS    DY    MAUUIACC.  449 

self,  tliiH  is  sncli  an  abandonment  as  to  lose  the  liomostoail.' 
After  the  Inisbaiul's  death,  the  \vid(jw  Ih  the  head  of  the  family 
and  can  abandon  the  homestead  if  she  aeijiiires  a  new  home, 
unless  it  be  a  temporary  one.^  And  by  such  aband<jnment 
the  homestead  is  lost  to  the  ehildnii,  she  being  the  head  of 
the  family.^  Hut  an  al)andonment  l»y  the  owner  of  a  h«jme- 
stcad,  after  it  has  liei-n  sold  upon  execution,  has  no  flVrd  to 
give  validity  to  such  sale.*  The  right  of  homestead  may  bo 
lost  bv  removal  or  abandonment  and  chanire  of  residenct*  by 
the  husband,  l)Mt  not  l»y  any  laches  on  his  part  in  allowing 
a  juilgmeiit  in  ejectment  to  be  rendere(l  against  him.''  If  a 
debtor  remove  from  the  State,  and  remain  two  years,  it  would 
be  held  an  abanilonmcnt  of  homestead.^  A  sale  by  husband 
and  wife,  followed  by  j)ossession  given  to  the  purchaser,  who 
pays  the  purchase-money,  would  bar  the  right  of  homestead, 
as  amounting  to  an  abanilonmcnt,  although  nothing  were  said 
of  this  right  in  the  deed.  But,  l)eing  in  the  nature  of  an 
estoppel,  it  would  only  bar  it  as  to  the  ])urchaser,  and  those 
clainnng  under  him.'  If  homestead  is  cITectuaily  al)andoned 
or  barred  by  husbaiul  ami  wife,  during  their  joint  lives,  it 
binds  the  rights  of  the  children  also.^  IJy  removing  his 
family  from  the  homestead,  intending  to  liave  it  no  longer 
a  homestead,  it  is  said  the  husband  may  defeat  an  existing 
right  therein,  though  the  court  intimate  that,  in  order  to  do 
this,  it  might  be  necessary  that  he  should  first  have  acquired 
another  home.^  But  if  husband  and  wife  make  a  deed  of  the 
premises,  and  then  remove  therefrom,  it  wouUl  work  a  con- 
clusive abandonment  as  to  a  third  person,  to  whom  the  grantee 
had  conveyed  the  ])reinise8.^^  Under  the  Acts  of  1851,  the 
second  marriage  of  the  widow  did  not  divest  the  homestead 
where  there  were  minor  children.'^ 

»  McDonald  v.  Crnntlall,  43  111.  231. 

«  Wright  r.  DuniiiiiK,  46  III.  275  ;  Buck  v.  Cnolopip,  49  TIL  391  ;  McCormack 
V.  Kimtnel,  4  111.  Ajip.  121. 

»  Hu.k  p.  Coiilofxue,  sup.  *  Wifigins  r.  Chance,  54  III.  175. 

•  Hulibel  F.  Canmly,  58  111.  425  ;  Yimoy  v.  Trustt-es.  &c.,  59  111.  191. 

•  Cobeen  v.  Mulligan,  37  111.  230,  tlic  presumption  being  that  he  has  acquired 
a  new  residence  there.     But  .-iee  Cipi>erly  v.  Rliodes,  53  111.  346. 

■  Brown  r.  Coon,  36  111.  243  ;  Fishback  r.  Une,  36  111.  437. 

•  Mrown  r.  Coon,  sup.  »  Hoskins  r.  I, itch  field.  31  III.  137. 
w  Brown  r.  Coon,  sup.                               U  Yeates  v.  Briggs,  05  ILL  79. 

VOL.  I.— 29 


450  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

5,  In  Indiana,  this  right  is  one  that  may  be  waived,  being 
of  a  personal  character,  as  where  the  debtor  allowed  a  cred- 
itor to  go  on  and  levy  his  execution  upon  the  premises,  with- 
out asserting  his  homestead  right  therein,  it  was  held  to  be  a 
waiver  of  the  same.^  But  a  mere  absence  from  the  premises 
does  not  defeat  the  debtor's  right  as  a  "  resident  house- 
holder." 2  Nor  would  he  have  lost  his  homestead  right  by 
removing  from  one  part  of  the  State  to  another,  with  his 
family,  but  not  at  the  time  occupying  a  home.^ 

6.  In  Iowa,  a  householder  may  change  his  homestead  from 
time  to  time,  at  his  election.*  Nor  have  his  wife  or  children 
any  control  in  the  matter.^  But  his  merely  selling  an  estate, 
though  accompanied  by  a  declaration  that  it  was  not  his  home- 
stead, will  not  affect  her  rights  to  the  same.  Nor  will  a  writ- 
ten agreement  to  confess  judgment  to  waive  be  a  sufficient 
written  waiver.^  The  husband  may  so  abandon  the  premises 
as  to  defeat  the  existing  homestead  in  the  premises.  But  a 
mere  temporary  absence  will  not  do  this.'  If  he  have  one 
homestead  and  remove  on  to  another  estate  as  his  home,  he 
would  thereby  lose  the  homestead  right  in  the  first.^  So  if  he 
sell  that  part  of  his  homestead  on  which  the  dwelling-house 
stands,  the  residue  becomes  subject  to  his  debts.^  So  a  re- 
moval to  another  town,  intending  to  remain  there  if  successful 
in  business,  defeats  his  first  homestead.^^  And  if  he  neglect 
to  set  it  up  in  defence  to  a  lien  suit,  it  is  waived.^^  And  where 
the  claimant  had  been  absent  from  her  homestead  about  three 
years,  and  had  offered  to  sell  it,  and  made  declaration  that 
she  did  not  intend  to  return,  it  was  held  to  be  an  abandon- 
ment, and  that  the  estate  had  thereby  become  subject  to  be 

>  State  V.  Melogue,  9  Ind.  196  ;  Sullivan  v.  Winslow,  22  Ind.  153  ;  Stat.  1862, 
p.  368. 

2  Austin  V.  Swank,  9  Ind.  109. 

8  Mark  v.  State,  15  Ind.  100  ;  Norman  v.  Bellman,  16  Ind.  156. 

*  Code,  197  ;  Flo.yd  v.  Hosier,  1  Iowa,  512. 

6  Collins  V.  Chantland,  48  Iowa,  241.  "  Rutt  v.  Howell,  50  Iowa,  535. 

'  Bradshaw  v.  Hurst,  57  Iowa,  745  ;  Griffin  v.  Shelley,  58  Iowa,  513. 

8  Williams  v.  Swetland,  10  Iowa,  51  ;  Christy  v.  Dyer,  14  Iowa,  438  ;  Morris 
V.  Sargent,  18  Iowa,  90  ;  Davis  v.  Kelley,  14  Iowa,  523  ;  Fyffe  v.  Beers,  18  Iowa, 
4  ;  Robli  V.  McBride,  28  Iowa,  386  ;  Marshall  v.  Ruddick,  28  Iowa,  487. 

9  Windle  V.  Brandt,  55  Iowa,  221. 

10  Kimball  v.  Wilson,  59  Iowa,  638.         ^^  Collins  v.  Chantland,  48  Iowa,  241. 


rn.  IX.  §  -.]  ESTATES  ny  marriage.  451 

It'vicd  ujion  In-  cn-ditiirs.'  If  ii  widow  who  hns  a  homostpad, 
ns  survivor  of  tin*  nwncr  of  a  lioincstcad,  sell  it,  or  altuiiduu 
it,  «ho  loses  the  ri^dit  to  it.-  A  Imshaiid  would  not  hjse  his 
hoincstcad  riirlit  in  con.scinn'ncc  of  jii.s  wifr  (»l)taininir  a  divorce 
from  him,  even  if  the  ciihtody  of  llu*  fhildrcii  i.s  committed  to 
lier,  or  render  it  liahle  to  be  levied  ou.'^ 

0  a.  In  Kentucky,  a  homestead  is  not  waived  by  a  mortL'aL'o 
executed  by  the  liu.sband  alone  ;  *  nor  where  it  con.si.st.s  nf 
two  tracts  will  a  sale  of  one  affect  the  right  in  the  othcr.^ 
Whether  a  morttrage  by  the  husband  alone,  followed  by  an 
aimndonment,  waives  the  exemption  as  to  the  mortgage  is 
doubted.'^ 

7.  In  Massachusetts,  acquiring  a  new  homestead  defeats  one 
already  existing.  Hut  removing  from  the  premises  for  a  tem- 
porary purpose  does  not  aflect  an  existing  right  of  homestead, 
unless  a  new  one  or,  at  least,  a  new  domicil  has  been  accpiired. 
Nor  does  it  seenj  to  l)e  settled  whether  such  a  right  can  be  lost 
by  more  aliandonment.  If  it  can  be  done  at  all,  it  must  be 
done  voluntarily  and  with  that  iinder.^tanding.  Removing  on 
to  other  land  of  the  owner  would  not  have  that  effect."  Xo 
altandonmeut  of  the  j)remises  to  which  a  homestead  right  has 
once  attached  will  be  suflicient  to  terminate  it,  until  a  new 
homestead  has  been  acf|uired  elsewhere.^  But  the  widow  may 
by  her  own  act  so  change  the  condition  of  the  estate  in  which 
she  has  a  homestead  right,  as  to  bar  Iierself  of  it.  Thus, 
where  she  had  a  right  to  dower  as  well  as  homestead,  and 
had  her  dower  set  out  in  the  rents  and  profits  of  one  undi- 
vided third  part  of  the  whole  of  her  husband's  estate,  under 
the  Gen.  Stat.  c.  90,  §  5,  and  then  sold  her  dower  interest,  she 
thereby  waived  her  right  of  homestead,  and  could  not  claim 
it,  having  changed    the   estate   into  a   tenancy  in  common.^ 

'  Dunton  r.  Woo<lbury,  24  lown,  74. 

a  Size  c.  Siz*-,  24  Iowa,  5S0  ;  Onnim  v.  Orman,  20  Iowa,  361. 

•  Woo<ls  r.  Davis,  34  Iowa,  264. 

•  Oriflin  r.  Proctor,  14  Rush,  571.  »  Franks  r.  Lucn.s,  14  Bush,  39.1. 

•  l^ar  r.  Totten,  14  Bush,  101  ;  hut  tho  cxomption  docs  not  attach  to  the 
procc<<!s,  lb. ;  and  see  Gideon  r.  .Stmvf,  7S  Ky.  134. 

^  Pub.  Stat.  c.  123,  §  2;  Silloway  r.  Brown.  12  Allrn.  35;  Dul.uity  r.  Pyn- 
chon,  «  Allon.  510  ;  I^.»ll  v.  Ijizell,  8  Allen,  575. 

<»  Woodbury  r.  Luddy,  14  Allen,  1.  »  Bates  v.  BaU-j.  {>7  }>ln.sa.  396. 


452  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY,  [bOOK  I. 

Nor  would  a  widow's  selling  her  right,  or  leasing  the  premises, 
deprive  her  of  the  benefit  of  the  right.^  If  the  husband  mort- 
gage the  homestead,  and  the  wife  join  in  releasing  her  right 
of  homestead  in  the  premises,  it  has  the  effect  to  subject  the 
homestead  right  as  well  as  the  rest  of  the  estate  to  the  pay- 
ment of  the  mortgaged  debt.^  But  it  has  no  other  effect.^  If 
a  minor  child  cease  to  live  upon  the  homestead,  while  the 
widow  continues  to  occupy  it,  he  thereby  waives  his  possession, 
though  not  his  title  or  right  to  resume  his  occupancy,  and  if 
an  act  of  trespass  were  done  to  the  estate  while  he  is  thus  out 
of  possession,  the  action  would  have  to  be  in  the  name  of  the 
widow,  and  such  children,  if  any,  as  were  in  occupancy  of  it.^ 

8.  In  Michigan,  the  right  is  a  personal  one,  and  an  unmar- 
ried man,  in  order  to  lose  his  homestead,  must  do  some  act  of 
relinquishment  of  it.  And  if  married,  it  can  only  be  done  by 
a  joint  conveyance  of  himself  and  wife.^  But  where  after  a 
contract  by  the  husband  to  sell  a  tract  on  which  he  lived,  of 
greater  size  than  the  homestead  exemption,  the  vendee  paid 
and  both  husband  and  wife  removed  and  resided  elsewhere,  it 
was  held  that  no  homestead  rights  continued  to  attach.^  But 
no  estoppel  in  pais  or  waiver  bars  a  widow  to  claim  her  home- 
stead in  a  suit  at  lawJ 

9.  In  Minnesota,  the  privilege,  being  a  personal  one,  may  be 
lost  by  abandonment.^  If  the  owner  remove  from  the  estate 
and  ceases  to  occupy  it  for  more  than  six  months,  he  loses  the 
right,  unless  he  files  a  declaration  in  the  register's  office  that 
he  continues  to  claim  it,  which  will  remain  in  force  for  five 
years.^  In  Mississippi,  the  husband  is  the  one  who  selects 
and  fixes  a  homestead,  and  he  may  change  it.  Ceasing  to  re- 
side on  it,  unless  temporarily  only,  forfeits  the  exemption.^'' 
But  if  he  leave  it,  while  his  wife  and  children  continue  to  oc- 
cupy it,  it  does  not  operate  as  an  abandonment  of  the  home- 

1  Mercier  v.  Chace,  11  Allen,  194.  ^  Searle  v.  Chapman,  121  Mass.  19. 

8  Swan  V.  Stevens,  99  Mass.  9. 

*  Abbott  V.  Abbott,  97  Mass.  1 36.    Widow  loses  homestead  if  she  leaves  the  place 
permanently,  before  or  after  husband's  death.     Foster  v.  Leland,  141  Mass.  187. 
s  Dye  V.  Mann,  10  Mich.  291 ;  McKee  v.  Wilcox,  11  Mich.  360. 
6  Lamore  v.  Frisbie,  42  Mich.  186.  '  Showers  v.  Robinson,  43  Mich.  502. 

8  Folsora  V.  Carli,  5  Minn.  333,  337 ;  Tillotson  v.  Millard,  7  Minn.  513. 
«  Stat.  1878,  c.  68,  §  9.  ^^  Rev.  Code,  1880,  §  1256. 


en.  IX.  §  2.]  ESTATES   BV   MARRIAGE.  453 

stead  until  he  shall  have  aciiuired  a  new  one'  In  >ri.«<sf)uri, 
the  aciini.sition  of  a  new  homestead  defeats  tiie  old  one.-  l>ut 
a  widow  was  held  not  to  have  waivrd  honu-stead  hy  leeeiving 
dower,  in  i^'noranei'  of  her  homesteatl  rights  ;  ^  aiid  her  home- 
stead rights  arc  not  alVected  by  getting  a  divoree,  alter  her 
hnsliand  had  ahmdoncd  her,  and  she  still  oecupied  with  her 
ehildrcn.'  In  New  Jersey,  where  a  homestead  has  passed  to 
a  widow  for  ihe  henelit  of  lin-  and  the  children,  no  relea.se  or 
waiver  of  the  e.\eni|itiiin  is  Nalid.^ 

10.  In  New  Ilani|ishire,  a  lemporary  absence  from  the  ]ircm- 
ises  does  not  alTcct  the  JKiiucstcad  right.  The  leasing  of  a 
homestead  for  a  year  is  not  an  abandonment  «jf  the  right  of 
homestead.*'  Nor  is  leaving  it  for  a  temporary  j)urp(jse."  So 
when  an  owner  had  hegnn  to  occupy  the  jiremises,  as  by  mov- 
ing his  furniture  into  the  dwelling-house,  pre|»aratory  to  re- 
moving his  family  into  the  sjime,  it  was  held  tliat  the  right  of 
homestead  attached  thereby,  and  was  not  lost  during  the  time 
in  which  the  family  were  moving  into  the  premises.^  Nor 
would  a  separation  from  her  husband  by  the  wife,  without 
her  faidt,  aiTcct  lier  right  of  lujmestcail  in  the  premises,  nor 
to  tho.se  he  should  actpiirc  during  such  separation,  if  he  lived 
tliereon.  Nor  would  the  aliscnce  of  a  husband  for  a  tempo- 
rary jtin'poso  afl'ect  the  wife's  right,  though  he  were  to  die 
abroad."  Nor  does  a  widow  lose  her  right  of  ii(»uiesteail  bv 
marrying  again.'"  I>ut  the  ac(piiring  of  a  new  homestead  is 
the  abandonmi'ut  of  a  prior  one.'^ 

10  rt.  In  Nebraska,  it  is  held  that  a  wife's  leasing  ))art  of 
the  l)uildings  on  the  premises  during  lier  husband's  temjiorary 
absence  is  no  aljandoument.'^  In  Nevada,  there  can  be  no 
abandonment  of  a  homestead  except  by  a  written  declaration 
signed  and  acknowledged  by  the  husband  and  wife,  or  other 
head  of  the  family.i^ 

»  Thorns  r.  Thonis,  4.''.  Miss.  275  ;  Parker  v.  Dean,  -15  Miss.  423. 

2  i:.-v.  .Stat.  1879,  §  26l»G. 

'  Seek  r.  Hayues,  G8  Mo.  13.  *  Hlandy  r.  Aslior,  72  M...  27. 

'  Rev.  1877,  p.  1055,  §  1.  o  I^)cke  v.  Rowt-U,  47  N.  II.  40. 

T  WcmhI  r.  UnU  51  N.  H.  448.  '  Fogg  v.  Fogg,  40  X.  H.  2S2. 

9  Mea.ler  r.  Tlaee,  43  N.  H.  307.  >"  Miles  v.  Miles,  4fi  N.  II.  'Jrtl. 

"  Wcxi  r.  Ur.l.  51  X.  H.  448.  "  Guy  v.  Downs,  12  Xeb.  5:32. 
'»  Comj..  Laws.  1>73.  §  1S7. 


454  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

11.  In  New  York,  the  exemption  is  regarded  as  made  for 
the  benefit  of  the  family,  rather  than  the  householder  him- 
self. So  that  if  he  temporarily  cease  to  occupy  the  premises, 
and  store  his  goods  intending  to  resume  the  occupation,  it  is 
no  impeachment  of  the  right.^  No  release  or  waiver  of  home- 
stead is  valid  unless  it  is  in  writing  subscribed  by  the  house- 
holder, and  acknowledged  as  other  convey ances.^  In  North 
Carolina,  while  an  owner  may  be  estopped  from  setting  up  a 
homestead  claim  against  a  judgment  in  a  suit  to  which  he  has 
been  a  party ,3  yet  removal  from  the  State  is  no  abandon- 
ment by  him.^ 

12.  In  Ohio,  it  is  not  lost  by  leasing  the  homestead  estate, 
and  removing  to  another  part  of  the  State,  if  for  a  temporary 
purpose.^ 

13.  In  Pennsylvania,  there  may  be  a  waiver  of  this  right 
in  several  ways,  as  by  the  terms  of  the  contract  upon  which  a 
judgment  is  rendered,  not  to  insist  upon  the  exemption ;  or 
the  widow  may  do  it  by  neglecting  to  claim  it  within  a  rea- 
sonable time  after  her  husband's  death,^  and  the  giving  of 
a  mortgage  upon  the  premises  is  held  to  be  a  waiver  pro 
tantoJ 

14.  In  Tennessee,  the  continued  possession  required  by  the 
Code  ^  was  held  not  satisfied,  where  the  owner  went  to  another 
State  to  begin  business,  moved  his  family  away  and  let  the 
})rcmises ;  and  these  acts  constituted  an  abandonment.^  So 
a  homestead  is  defeated  by  a  fraudulent  conveyance  by  husband 
to  wife  which  is  set  aside. ^°  But  the  failure  of  the  levying 
officer  to  set  out  the  homestead  does  not  bar  the  right.^^ 

14  a.  In  Texas,  this  right  may  be  lost  by  abandonment.  But 
what  shall  be  a  sufficient  act  to  constitute  an  abandonment 
may  depend  upon  circumstances.  It  must  be  done  with  an 
intention  totally  to  relinquish  the  same,  and,  even  if  the  owner 

»  Griffin  v.  Sutherland,  14  Barb.  456.  2  4  stat.  at  Large,  Ft.  3,  e.  260. 

8  Corpening  v.  Kincaid,  82  X.  ('.  202.  *  Adrian  v.  Shaw,  82  N.  C.  474. 

5  Wetz  V.  Beard,  12  Ohio  St.  431. 

6  Davis's  Appeal,  34  Penn.  St.  256  ;  Baskin's  Appeal,  38  Penn.  St.  65  ;  Burk  v. 
Gleason,  46  Penn.  St.  297. 

^  McAuley's  Appeal,  35  Penn.  St.  209  ;  Gangwere's  Appeal,  36  Penn.  St.  466. 
«  §  2114.  »  Roach  v.  Hacker,  2  Lea,  633. 

w  Nichol  V.  Davidson  Co.,  8  Lea,  389.  "  Gray  v.  Baird,  4  Lea,  212. 


til.   I\.   $   -J  ESTATF-S    II V    MARRIACE.  4')0 

leave  the  jiremises  with  this  intent,  he  niuy  change  thin  intent 
up  to  the  time  that  h«'  ae(|uireH  a  new  honiesteatl.'  But  h-n^^th 
of  time  is  nut  nuitfrial  where  the  intent  and  act  are  clear.''' 
Thus  ii  wiiliuv  who  lenioved  from  the  State,  and  ac(|uiivd  a 
new  domifil  in  another  State,  was  hehl  to  have  lost  her  homc- 
steail.'"'  So  if  ji  wife  without  ^^ood  cause  leave  her  husl):iu(l, 
and  remain  separated  until  his  tleath,  she  loses  the  ri^rht.' 
So  where  the  hushand  sold  the  estate  without  his  wife  joining- 
in  the  deed,  and  l»oth  removed  from  the  State,  aiul  he  died 
altroad,  she  was  not  allowed,  several  years  after,  to  return  antl 
claim  her  homestead/'  But  rentinj^  the  premises  temp<jrarily 
is  not  such  an  ahandonment.  Nor  would  the  death  of  the 
wife  of  a  householder  aflect  his  ri<;ht  of  homestead,  if  he  con- 
tinues to  occupy  the  premises,  thouudi  he  have  no  children,'' 
If  a  hushand  removes  his  family  from  an  established  home- 
stead, and  then  abandons  them  without  providing  a  home  for 
them,  the  wife  may  resume  possession  of  the  premises  and 
homestead."  A  removal  from  the  St<ite  is  an  abandonment  of 
a  homestead,  unless  it  be  for  a  temporary  purpose.'^  If  the 
husband  gain  a  new  domicil  and  the  wife  follows  and  accepts 
it,  it  is  an  abandonment  of  first  homestead.  So  any  actual 
abandonment  of  the  homestead  sui)jects  it  to  a  creditor's  exe- 
cution. If  the  wife  voluntarily  join  with  in  r  biisliaiiil  in  <'on- 
vcying  the  homestead,  it  is  of  itself  an  abandonment;''  if  a 
deljtor  having  a  homestead  convey  it  away  merely  to  keep  it 
from  his  creditors,  and  lie  abandons  possession,  it  subjects  the 
estate  to  levy  by  any  of  his  creditors.^''     But  no  fraudulent 

1  Slicplierd  r.  Cassiday,  20  Tuxa-s,  24  ;  aud  sie  Thoinus  v.  Williams,  50  Tex. 
269. 

'■'  Cliru-  V.  I'litoi),  56  Tfxn.s,  319.  «  Trawick  r.  llarri.s,  8  Tfxn.s,  312. 

*  ¥at\c  v.  pjirlf,  9  Texas,  630  ;  Const  §  22. 

»  Joniuii  V.  (Sodniiin,  19  Te.xa.s,  273  ;  Smith  r.  Tzzell,  56  Texas,  315. 

•  Taylor  v.  lioulware,  17  TexiLs,  74  ;  Tryor  v.  Stt.iie,  19  Texas,  371  ;  Kessler 
r.  Drnub,  52  Texas,  575  ;  ami  his  tempornrj'  absenco  also  does  not  make  an 
ahandonment,  lb. 

T  Franklin  v.  ColToe,  18  Texas,  413. 

*  Cl.-ments  v.  Uey,  51  Texas,  150  ;  but  education  of  children  is  such  a  j.ur- 
I>os4',  lb. 

•  rasohal's  Dij{.  p.  96  ;  but  a  mortKnj;e  by  Ixith  is  ineffectual  as  against  chil- 
dren who  i-outinue  to  rei>ide  on  the  homestead  after  the  father  is  dead  aud  the 
mother  has  aljandoned,  Abney  r.  I'(>i>f,  52  Texas,  288. 

i»  Cox  r.  Shroiishire,  25  Texas,  113  ;  Muriel  r.  Somers,  26  Texas,  551. 


456  LAW   OF  EEAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

representations  made  by  the  owner  as  to  the  estate  of  home- 
stead can  affect  the  right  to  it  then  existing,  if  the  wife 'is  not 
a  party  to  it.^ 

15.  In  Vermont,  there  can  he  but  one  homestead,  so  that  by 
acquiring  a  new  one  the  owner  loses  the  old  one.^  And  some- 
tliing  answering  to  a  personal  occupancy  is  necessary  to  retain 
the  homestead  right,  though  a  temporary  absence  will  not 
defeat  it.  But  a  change  of  the  residence  or  home  of  the 
family  would.^  And  after  an  abandonment  an  earlier  attach- 
ment takes  precedence  of  a  conveyance  by  the  owner.* 

15  a.  In  Virginia,  a  debtor  may  waive  his  homestead  right 
by  a  statement  to  that  effect  in  any  bond,  note,  or  deed,  given 
by  him ;  but  if  he  has  other  property  that  is  to  be  taken 
first.^ 

16.  In  "Wisconsin,  one  does  not  lose  his  homestead  by  leas- 
ing it  to  another,  temporarily,  and  absenting  himself  from  the 
same.^  But  if  he  voluntarily  removes  from  it  and  takes  up  a 
new  residence,  not  for  a  temporary  purpose,  such  as  repairing 
his  former  one,  but  for  the  accommodation  of  his  business,  it 
would  seem  that  he  would  thereby  lose  his  right  of  homestead, 
•though  this  is  questioned  under  the  statute  of  1858.''  If  a 
widow  marry  again,  her  right  of  homestead  ceases,  but  she 
does  not  thereby  affect  her  right  to  recover  the  intermediate 
rents  and  profits  from  the  death  of  her  husband,  if  she  has 
been  kept  out  of  possession.^  She  does  not  lose  her  home- 
stead as  having  abandoned  it,  if  she  is  driven  from  her  home 
by  the  cruelty  of  her  husband.^  Nor  would  it  be  deemed  an 
abandonment  if  father  and  mother  sell  a  homestead  to  a  son 
to  induce  him  to  live  with  them  and  support  them.  It  would 
be  a  mode  of  carrying  on  the  estate. i<^ 

1  Eckhardt  v.  Schleclit,  29  Texas,  129. 

2  Howe  V.  Adams,  28  Vt.  541,  544  ;  and  conveying  the  homestead,  collecting 
materials  for  a  new  house,  living  several  years  in  ditt'erent  towns,  and  filing 
l)etition  for  a  new  homestead,  is  evidence  of  abandonment-  Whiteman  v.  Field, 
53  Vt.  554. 

8  Davis  V.  Andrews,  30  Vt.  678  ;  W.  Riv.  Bk.  v.  Gale,  42  Vt.  27  ;  Lamb  v. 
Mason,  45  Vt.  500.  *  Labaree  v.  Woodward,  54  Vt.  452. 

6  Code,  1873,  c.  183,  §  3.  «  Rev.  Stat.  1878,  §  2983. 

''  Phelan's  Est.,  16  Wise.  76  ;  Herrick  v.  Graves,  16  Wise.  157. 

8  Anderson  v.  Cobuni,  27  Wi.sc.  558. 

9  Barker  v.  Dayton,  28  Wise.  367.  i"  Murphy  v.  Cranch,  24  Wise.  365. 


en.  IX     §   2.]  ESTATES    BY    MARRIAOE.  457 


DIVISION    VIII. 

OF    rUOCEDUIlE    IN     RESPECT    TO     Ilo.MKSTKAl)     RIGHTS,    AND    OP 
CHANGE    IN    CONDITION    OF    TllK    E.STATE. 

1.  CaACfl  of  proi-eduro  in  Arkansas,  Alabama,  and  Califoniia. 

2.  Of  priK-L-diin!  in  Illinuis  and  luwu. 
8.     Of  prtKH-^lun-  in  Massacljubctts. 

4.     Of  juxicfduiv  in  Mi<liij;uii. 

4a.  Of  proofdiuv  in  Nortli  Carolina  and  Tennessefl. 

6.     Of  jiroccduri'  in  Tfxa.s. 

6.     Elfi'ct  of  changing  countr}'  into  city  lots. 

1.  In  cnforcinij  homestead  rights,  various  questions  of  [)rac- 
tice  have  arisen  in  the  courts  as  to  the  mode  of  procedure,  and 
wlio  must  l)e  made  jtarties  to  the  same.  Thus  in  Arkansas,  if 
a  widow  does  not  chiim  her  homestead  in  a  partition  suit 
anionir  tlie  heirs  to  which  she  is  a  |iarty,  she  cannot  afterwards 
by  a  direct  proceedinL^'  In  Ahihunia  it  was  held  that  the 
jurisdicti()n  of  the  proliate  court  to  set  out  homestead  was  dis- 
solved l»y  the  act  of  ls73.-  In  California  both  husband  and 
wife,  if  livinjr,  must  join  in  assertin":  the  right  of  homestead, 
nor  can  a  binding  decision  i)e  made  when  only  one  of  them  is 
a  party .^  So  in  a  suit  to  foreclose  a  mortgage,  both  should  L-. 
made  parties,  if  the  defendant  sets  up  the  iiomestead  right. 
And  without  this,  no  (piestion  can  be  conclusively  settled.*  A 
judgment  against  the  husband  alone,  the  wife  not  having  been 
made  jiarty  to  the  suit,  does  not  bind  either  of  them  as  to  the 
right  of  homestead.^  Nor  would  the  right  of  homestead  be 
affected  by  a  decree  of  foreclosure  u])on  a  mortgage,  made  by 
the  husi)and  alone,  when  the  proceedings  arc  against  him 
only.®  If  a  divorce  be  granted  to  a  wife,  she  may  have  a 
homestead  in  the  common  j)ro|)erty  bdoutiing  to  her  and  her 
husband,  and  have  it  set  ofT  hy  jtartition." 

1  a.  In  Georgia  it  is  held  that  equity  alone  has  jurisdiction 

>  Ilo)»ck  r.  Iloback,  33  Ark.  399.  "  Tpttiis  r.  McKinney,  56  Ala.  41. 

•  (cK.k  r.Klink,  8  Cnl.  ^47  ;  Marks  r.  Marsh.  9  Cal.  96. 

♦  Murks  r.  .Mursh,  su]).;  Mohs  t'.  Warner,  10  Cal.  296. 

*  Hiviilk  r.  Kraonicr,  8  Cal.  60  ;  Murks  v.  Marsh,  sup. 

•  Cook  V.  Klink,  sup.  ^  Gitnmy  v.  Doane,  22  Cal.  635l 


458  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

for  the  recovery  of  a  homestead  set  apart  and  sold  under  the 
earlier  homestead  acts;  and  that  the  husband  alone  must  bring 
the  bill.^  Also  that  although  the  action  of  the  assignee  in 
bankruptcy  does  not  vest  the  exempted  estate,  but  defines  it 
only ,2  it  must  be  claimed,  if  at  all,  before  the    adjudication.^ 

2,  In  Illinois  a  foreclosure  is  no  bar  to  a  claim  of  home- 
stead if  this  was  not  expressly  mentioned  in  the  mortgage.* 
In  Iowa,  if  a  mortgagor  would  insist  upon  his  homestead  rights 
against  a  mortgage,  he  must  do  it  while  the  suit  to  foreclose 
is  pending.  If  he  neglects  to  set  it  up,  and  the  estate  is  sold 
upon  a  decree  of  court,  it  is  too  late  to  insist  upon  it  against 
the  purchaser  at  such  a  sale.^  And  if  he  has  never  claimed 
them  before,  it  is  too  late  to  do  so  after  the  foreclosure  suit  is 
begun,*^  Nor  is  his  ignorance  any  excuse  for  such  omission  ; 
and  his  minor  children  are  bound  thereby  and  cannot  assert 
any  independent  right.'^ 

3.  In  Massachusetts,  a  party  having  a  right  of  homestead  in 
property  held  in  common  with  others,  may  have  partition  of 
the  same  like  other  tenants  in  common,^  except  that  the  home- 
stead is  set  out  by  value,  without  regard  to  the  proportion  it 
bears  to  the  whole  estate,  and  this  applies  where  it  is  to  be 
carved  out  of  a  larger  estate.  Nor  does  it  make  any  difference 
in  this  respect  that  the  estate  of  homestead  is  for  life  only.^ 
If  one  who  has  come  into  possession  of  the  estate  of  the  hus- 
band, which  includes  more  than  the  homestead,  keeps  the 
owner  of  the  homestead  out  of  possession,  the  latter  may  have 
trespass  against  him,  upon  the  same  principle  that  one  co- 
tenant  may  have  trespass  against  a  co-tenant  for  ousting  him 
from  the  common  estate.  And  the  same  rule  would  apply  if 
the  owner  of  a  homestead  which  is  a  part  of  a  larger  estate, 
being  in  possession,  keeps  out  the  owner  of  the  surplus  of  such 
estatci*^  If  the  holder  of  a  mortgage  not  subject  to  a  home- 
stead right  enter  upon  the  premises,  and  hold  the  same,  and  a 
second  mortgagee,  whose  mortgage  is  subject  to  such  right, 

1  Zellers  v.  Beckman,  64  Ga.  747.  ^  gurtz  v.  Robinson,  59  Ga.  763. 

8  Smith  V.  Roberts,  61  Ga.  223,  *  Asher  v.  Mitchell,  92  111.  480. 

^  Haynes  «.  Meek,  14  Iowa,  320.  ^  Kemerer  ■!;.  Bournes,  53  Iowa,  172. 

"!  Collins  V.  Chantland,  48  Iowa,  241.  »  Pub.  Stat.  c.  123. 

8  Silloway  v.  Brown,  12  Allen,  35.  ^^  Silloway  v.  Browu,  sup. 


("II.  IX.  §   ll.]  ESTATES    IIV    M  AltIJIA(;K.  -1.'9 

ofl'cr  to  redeem  from  the  first,  lu-  lius  a  ri^dit  to  reiiuiro 
the  first  m()rt<^ii{j:ue  to  account  for  tlic  rents  and  profits  of  the 
entire  estate  while  in  liis  jtossession,  without  rc^ardinjr  tlie 
homestead  riirhts  of  a  stran;j:er.'  If  a  wife  be  sm-d  for  himl 
liv  a  creditor  of  the  hiisli;in<l,  who  h:is  srt  it  oH"  uiiou  an  e.\c- 
cutiun,  upon  the  ^'•rDund  that  he  had  frauchdeiitly  cnnveyeil  it 
tit  her  to  (hday  Ins  creilitors,  she  may  set  iiji,  in  l»ar  of  an  altso 
hite  recovery,  a  ri^lit  of  homestead,  and  a  special  ju<l<rmrnt 
will  be  rendt-red  in  accordance  with  the  fact.- 

3  a.  A  homestead  ri,<:;ht  is  such  a  freehold  estate  as  will 
avail  the  tenant  in  defence  to  a  writ  of  entry.  And  if  it  cover 
tiie  entire  jjremises  sued  for,  it  will  defeat  the  action.  Hut  if 
it  fall  short  of  this  in  value  or  extent,  and  there  is  n(j  dis- 
claimer as  to  the  residue,  the  demandant  may  recover,  but  his 
judirment  will  be  limited  to  what  is  not  covered  by  the  home- 
stead ri^dit.''  Hut  in  New  Ilamiishire,  such  right  will  not 
bar  a  writ  of  entry  until  the  same  has  been  set  olT  and  as- 
si<rned.^ 

4.  In  Michiiran,  a  husband  was  in  possession  of  jjremises 
under  a  contract  of  purchase,  and  suri'cndcred  the  C(jntract 
and  claim  to  the  laud.  It  was  held  that  the  wife  mitrht  have 
a  bill  in  her  own  name,  for  a  sjtecilic  j)crformance  of  the  con- 
tract. And  the  decree  in  such  case  would  be  for  a  convey- 
ance to  the  husband,  subject  to  the  wife's  lien  for  whati-ver 
smn  she  was  obli<red  to  pay  for  fulfillini^  the  contract.  Nor 
could  a  ])urchaser  from  the  original  vendor  take  advantage  as 
a  purchaser  without  notice,  since  her  being  in  j)ossession  was 
enough  to  put  him  upon  iiKpiiry,  by  what  right  she  held.^  In 
another  case  she  was  allowed  to  maintain  a  bill  in  her  own 
name  to  set  aside  a  mortgage  of  the  homestead  estate  which 
she  had  been  induced  to  make  liy  misrepresentation."  And 
the  minor  children  are  not  necessary  parties  to  her  jtetition  to 
recover  the  exempted  proiterty.' 

4  (/.  In  North   Carolina,  the  homestead  vests  witliout  decla- 

»  Richnnlsoii  r.  Wnllis,  5  Alltii,  7S. 

«  Castli-  c.  PftltiuT,  6  Allen,  404  ;  Stobbins  r.  Miller,  12  Allen,  597. 

•  Swiin  V.  SUvenn,  99  Ma-ss.  10.  *  Hiiraey  r.  Utd.s,  51  X.  H.  253. 

»  McKi-e  V.  Wilcox,  11  Mich.  358.  «  Sockner  r.  Sackner,  39  Mich.  39. 

'  Showers  r.  liubiu^on,  43  Mich.  502. 


460  LAW  OP  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

ration  by  the  owner  ;  and  the  action  of  the  sheriff  has  no 
other  force  than  to  ascertain  what  is  so  exempt.^  But  if  the 
owner  does  not  assert  his  claim  in  a  suit  concerning  the  land 
to  which  he  is  a  part}'^,  he  is  estopped  to  maintain  it  against 
the  judgment  sale.^  In  Tennessee  also,  the  neglect  of  the 
levying  officer  to  set  apart  the  exempted  land  has  been  decided 
to  be  without  prejudice  to  the  owner's  claim ;  ^  and  it  is  also 
immaterial  that  the  premises  as  set  out  increase  in  value 
thereafter.* 

5.  In  Texas,  a  married  woman  is  recognized  as  competent 
to  appear  and  litigate  her  rights  in  court.  But  where  to  a 
process  against  her  and  her  husband,  involving  a  question  of 
selling  the  estate  in  which  the  homestead  interest  of  the  par- 
ties existed,  she  neglected  to  appear,  and  her  husband  forbore 
to  insist  upon  the  right,  it  was  held  that  she  could  not  set  up 
a  claim  of  homestead  against  such  judgment.^  In  Vermont, 
husband  and  wife  were  tenants  in  common,  and  he  mortgaged 
his  estate  without  joining  her.  After  his  death  it  was  decreed 
that  her  land  should  be  divided  from  his  by  partition,  that  her 
homestead  should  be  set  out  of  his  share  of  the  estate  irrespec- 
tive of  hers,  and  that  the  mortgage  should  foreclose  upon  the 
balance  of  his  estate.^ 

6.  The  distinction  which  is  made  in  some  of  the  States  be- 
tween city  lots  and  those  used  for  agricultural  purposes  in 
fixing  the  quantity  of  land  to  be  exempted  as  homestead,  has 
led  to  a  consideration  of  the  effect  of  extending  the  corporate 
bounds  of  a  city  or  town,  so  as  to  embrace  homesteads  already 
acquired  in  agricultural  lands. 

In  Iowa  it  has  been  held  that  such  extension  does  not  af- 
fect existing  homestead  rights,  unless  thereby  brought  within 
the  part  of  the  city  or  town  which  has  been  laid  out  into 
streets,  alleys,  and  lots.''  In  Texas  it  was  held  that  such  a 
change  from  country  to  town  changed  the  character  of  the 
homestead  so  as  to  conform  to  the  limits  of  a  town  or  city 

1  Gheen  v.  Summey,  SO  N.  C.  177.  ^  Corpening  v.  Kincaid,  82  N.  C.  202. 

8  Gray  v.  Baird,  4  Lea,  212.. 

*  Hardy  v.  Lane,  6  Lea,  379.  5  Baxter  v.  Dear,  24  Texas,  17. 

<^  McClary  v.  Bixhy,  36  Vt.  254,  260. 

">  Fiuley  v.  Dietrick,  12  Iowa,  516. 


CII.  IX.  §  l'  J  ESTATKS    UY    MAUUIAGE.  |(U 

projaTty.'  And  a  simihir  doctrinu  in  settled  in  WisconHin.- 
liut  \ty  statute  of  1«GU,  though  the  vuhie  of  the  town  or  citv 
lots  in  Texas  exempt  as  homesteads  is  limited  to  two  thousand 
dollars,  no  subsc«|uent  inerease  in  the  value  thereof,  by  reason 
of  imj)rovements  or  otherwise,  will  subject  the  .same  to  u 
forced  sale.'^ 

'  Tiiylor  t».  Ik)nhvaro,  17  Texaa,  74. 

2  Hull  V.  (.'on roe,  13  Wise.  1>33. 

•  LawH,  1800,  c.  3S  ;  Uwiaflt  v.  Mcaauer,  30  Texas,  604. 


462  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [bOOK  L 


Sect. 

1. 

Sect. 

o_ 

Sect. 

3. 

Sect. 

4. 

Sect. 

5. 

Sect. 

6. 

Sect. 

7. 

Sect. 

8. 

Sect. 

9. 

Sect. 

10. 

Sect. 

11. 

CHAPTER  X. 

ESTATES   FOR  YEAES. 

Nature  and  History  of  Estates  for  Years. 

Modes  of  Creating  Estates  for  Years. 

Of  Conditions  in  Leases. 

Of  Covenants  in  Leases. 

Of  Ai-sigmnent  and  Sub-tenancy. 

Of  Eviction,  Destruction,  and  Use  of  Premises. 

Of  Surrender  and  Merger. 

Lessee  Estopped  to  deny  Lessor's  Title. 

Of  Disclaimer  of  Lessor's  Title. 

Letting  Land  upon  Shares. 

Of  Descent  and  Devise  of  Terms. 


SECTION  I. 

NATURE   AND    HISTORY   OF   ESTATES    FOR   YEARS. 

1,  la.  History  of  terms  for  years. 

2.  What  makes  an  estate  for  years. 

3.  Creation  and  character. 

4.  What  is  imi)lied  by  term. 

5.  Terms  when  may  he  made  to  commence. 

6.  Terms  must  have  a  certain  beginning  and  end. 

7.  Tenant  for  years  is  not  seised. 

8.  Of  Interessc  termini  and  leases  by  uses. 

9.  Of  entry  before  bringing  ejectment. 

10.  How  far  possession  necessary  to  perfect  a  lease. 

11.  Lessee  liable  for  rent  before  possession  taken. 

1.  Next  in  importance  in  the  admeasurement  of  estates, 
to  those  of  freehold,  are  those  for  years.  But  so  far  arc  these 
from  being  derived  from  the  feudal  law,  or  known  as  estates 
to  that  system,  that  the  tenant,  at  first,  was  not  regarded  as 
the  owner  of  any  interest  in  land  which  he  could  claim  as 


ril.  X.  §    1.]  ESTATKS    FOR    YKAIW.  U)^ 

siu'h,  but  (li'pciitlcd  upon  tl>o  imtsohuI  a^roomont  of  <lio  frcc- 
lioldcr  lor  his  riirlit  to  occupy  tlio  huiuc.  The  account  given 
hy  II  niodcin  writ*  r  upon  conveyancing,  is,  that  leiweH  for 
years,  at  will,  or  ut  sulTcrnnce,  were  ori^nnaily  pranted  to 
mere  fanners  or  hushandmen,  who,  every  year,  rendered  some 
ecpiivalent  in  nionev,  provisions,  or  other  rent  to  the  leHHors 
or  lauillords.  Hut  the  latter,  iu  order  to  encourage  tlieni  to 
manure  or  cultivate  the  <rround,  gave  them  a  sort  of  perma- 
nent interest  for  a  limited  period,  founded  upon  a  contract  ex- 
j)ress  or  implied,  which  was  not  drterminablo  at  their  will,  l»ut 
which  should  endure  for  a  time  certain.  Their  jxjsscssion, 
nevertheless,  was  esteemed  of  so  little  conseipience  that  \\wy 
were  considered  as  haililTs  oi*  seivaiits  of  the  lord,  holding 
possession  of  the  land  juri-  alifno  and  nut  jure  jir-iprin,  \s  ho 
were  to  receive,  and  had  contracted  to  account  for,  the  profits 
at  a  settled  price,  rather  than  as  having  .'my  iiroj)erty  of  their 
own.  Ab.»ut  the  time  of  Edward  I.,  estates  for  years  seem  to 
have  Ijccome  of  importance,  and  io  have  been  considered,  after 
entry  made,  as  actual  interests  in  the  land  vest<}d  in  the  lessee.^ 
It  will  be  recollected  that  i»ri(^r  to  the  statute  of  quia  emptores 
(18  Eilw.  I.),  the  owners  of  lands  in  fee  could  not  freely  alien 
the  same,  but  resorted  to  the  custom  of  subinfeudation,  as  it 
was  called,  by  which,  while  they  continued  to  hold  of  their 
superior  lord,  they  created  a  temn*e  between  themselves  and 
the  tenants  whom  they  j)ermitted  to  occupy  their  lands  ujjon 
such  services  as  they  saw  fit  to  prescribe,  which  were  payal)lo 
to  themselves.  But  unless  the  owner  of  the  feud  created  a 
freehold  interest  in  the  one  to  whom  he  gave  the  right  of  occu- 
j)ation,  it  was  not  considered  in  law  as  an  estate,  but  a  mere 
agreement  l)y  which,  if  the  occu|)ant  was  deprived  of  the  jios- 
session  of  the  land,  his  only  remedy  was  by  an  action  for  a 
breach  of  such  agreement.  There  is  an  act  of  6  Edw.  I.  c.  11, 
made  to  protect  such  tenants  from  being  ousted  from  their 
possession  by  actions  fraudulently  commenced  in  the  names 
of  third  persons,  nominally  against  the  owners  of  the  land 
under  whom  the  tenants  held.  And  in  that  statute  it  is  said, 
"  if  any  man  lease  his  tenement  in  the  City  of  London  for 

1  1  Powell,  Ed.  Wood,  Conv.  pp.  iv-vi.     See  also  Maine,  .\nc.  L.  C7r.. 


464  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

term  of  years,"  &c.,  by  which  it  would  seem  that  the  same 
form  of  expression  was  then  in  familiar  use  which  is  adopted 
at  this  day.  Still,  it  seems  that,  if  deprived  of  his  possession, 
the  tenant  had  no  mode  of  regaining  it  by  action,  as  one  having 
an  estate  in  land  might.  This  was  only  accomplished  by  a  suc- 
cession of  remedial  acts.  A  form  of  action  of  covenant  was 
the  first  devised,  whereby  the  tenant  might  demand  his 
term  as  well  as  damages,  but  could  only  *  maintain  it  [*291] 
against  his  immediate  covenantor.  In  the  time  of 
Henry  III.,  the  writ  of  Quare  ejecit  infra  terminum  was 
framed,  which  lay  against  any  one  in  possession  of  the  land, 
and  upon  a  judgment  in  the  termor's  favor,  he  recovered  pos- 
session of  the  land  itself.  But  this  writ  did  not  reach  a 
case  where  a  stranger  had  entered  and  tortiously  ousted  the 
tenant,  and  in  such  cases,  his  only  remedy  was,  to  sue  for  pos- 
session in  the  name  of  his  lessor.  In  the  time  of  Edw.  III.  the 
writ  of  ejectment,  substantially  like  that  now  in  use,  was  in- 
vented, and  so  shaped  as  to  enable  the  tenant  of  a  term  to 
recover  it,  when  deprived  of  the  possession  of  the  premises 
leased.  And  in  this  way,  at  last,  tenants  for  years  were  placed 
upon  the  same  level  with  freeholders,  in  regard  to  the  security 
of  their  estates,  and  their  remedy  for  recovering  them  if  dis- 
possessed thereof.^  As  an  estate  in  lands,  however,  a  tenancy 
for  years  has  long  been  familiar  to  the  common  law,  and,  as  a 
contract,  seems  to  have  been  well  known  as  early  as  the  reign 
of  Edward  I.  from  the  language  of  the  statute  above  referred 
to,  though  it  is  still  held  to  be  not  a  freehold  estate  but  a  chat- 
tel interest.^ 

1  a.  But  it  was  not  before  the  time  of  Henry  VI.  that  the 
plaintiff  in  ejectment  recovered  the  term.  At  and  after  that 
time  he  recovered  this,  and  with  it  the  possession  of  the  land,  if 
his  term  had  not  expired ;  and,  if  it  had  elapsed,  he  recovered 
damages.  When  it  became  established  that  the  term  should 
be  recovered,  "  the  ejectment  was  licked  into  the  form  of  a 
real  action,  the  proceeding  was  in  rem,  and  the  thing  itself, 
the  term,  only  was  recovered,  and  nominal  damages,  but  not 

1  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  8-12  ;  1  Reeves,  Hist.  Eng.  Law,  341  ;  Bacon,  Abr. 
Leases  ;  Doe  v.  Errington,  1  Ad.  &  E.  750 ;  Adams,  Eject.  8. 

2  Com.  Dig.  Land.  &  Ten.  5. 


CII.  X.  §  1.]  ESTATES    FOR    VK.VHS.  465 

the  mcHnc  profits,"  ^  Kji-ctnu-nt  is  the  form  of  action  now 
retained  in  use  in  Knjrland  under  the  statute  of  3  tt  4  Wni. 
IV.  c.  7,  §  3(i,  whirh  aholishi'd  all  other  forms  of  real  aetions 
except  do\ver.2  It  is  in  general  use  in  some  form  in  this 
country,  and  by  it  the  plaintilT  reeovcrs,  if  at  all,  upttn  the 
strenirth  of  his  own  titli',  and  not  upon  the  wcakiu-ss  of  that 
of  the  tenant,  since  possession  is  deemed  conclusive  evidence 
of  title  as  to  all  persons  except  such  as  can  show  a  better 
one.^ 

2.  Estates  for  years  embrace  such  as  aic  f(jr  a  sinirle  year, 
or  for  a  period  still  less  if  definite  and  ascertaine<l,  as  a  term 
for  a  fixed  number  of  weeks  or  months,  as  well  as  for  any 
definite  number  of  years,  however  great.*  This  was  held  in 
respect  to  a  parol  letting  of  premises  for  the  term  of  one  year, 
althouirh  the  rent  was  payable  in  grain  to  be  raised  upon  a 
certain  parcel  of  the  premises  during  that  year.'' 

3.  An  estate  for  years,  as  understood  in  this  chapter,  is  one 
that  is  creat<Hl  by  a  contract,  technically  called  a  lease,  whereby 
one  man,  called  the  lessor,  lets  to  anotlier,  culled  the  lessee, 
the  jtossession  of  lantls  or  t<'Mements  for  a  term  of  time  fixed 
anil  agreed  upon  l»y  the  j»arties  to  the  same."'  i>y  this  some- 
thing more  is  implied  than  a  mere  grant  of  a  certain  interest 
in  land  ;  it  involves  a  contiact,  umw  or  less  explicit,  as  to  the 
terms  and  con<litions  ujion  which  the  same  is  to  be  held  and 
managed  ;  and  this  contract,  in  some  form,  is  inciilent  to  every 
proi>er  leasehold  estate.'^  Nor  is  it,  perhaps,  easy  to  describe 
more  definitely  what  the  les.see  accjuires  by  this  lease,  since, 
being  so  much  the  creature  of  contract,  there  are  not,  as  in 
other  estates,  uniform  incidents  belonging  to  terms  for  years, 

»  Gocxltitle  V.  Tombs,  3  Wils.  120  ;  Cnnii.lxll  v.  LoatU-r,  3  Hurlst.  &  C.  527  n. 
In  the  former  cam?  this  wa.s  8ai»l  to  la-  about  tlic  time  of  lleury  VII.;  but  the  duto 
as  fixi'il  by  .Mr.  Smith,  supra,  is  uot  later  than  145S. 

«  AhU,  p.  •230.  note. 

•  Unfile  1-.  Torter.  45  111.  318. 

*  Hurton,  Keal  Proi..  §  863  ;  2  Flint.  Real  Prop.  200  ;  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten, 
(ed.  l.S5«>)  14  ;  Hrown  v.  BniR^',  22  Iiid.  122  ;  People  r.  Goclet,  64  Barb.  476. 

*  Gould  r.  School  District,  8  Mnin.  427,  431. 

•  Smith,  Und.  &  Ten.  18  ;  Com.  bind.  &  Ten.  4. 

'  Somlers  v.  Partridge,  108  Mass.  556  ;  7  .\m.  Ijiw  Rev.  240.     From  this  two- 
fold charactor  of  a  loa^te,  aa  at  once  an  estate  and  a  contract,  arises  the  doublo 
privity  of  cAtatv  and  contract,     lb. 
VOL.  I.— 30 


466  LAW  OF  EEAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

■which,  necessarily  and  as  a  matter  of  course,  pass  "with  them. 
The  lessee  does  not  own  tlie  soil  and  freehold,  and  has  a  lim- 
ited property  only  in  it.  But  within  these  limits  he  is  the 
owner  of  the  possession  and  profits  of  it,  and  of  all  the  use 
that  can  be  made  of  it  during  the  continuance  of  his  term. 
Thus,  where  one  hired  a  store  upon  the  outer  wall  of  which 
persons  posted  advertisements  and  paid  for  the  privilege,  it 
was  held  to  be  his  perquisite  and  not  that  of  the  lessor.  The 
lessee  may  use  such  wall  to  hang  his  sign  or  an  awning  upon, 
to  the  exclusion  of  the  lessor.^  What  these  limits  are  may  be 
fixed  by  the  agreement  of  the  parties,  or  are  implied  by  law 
from  the  nature  of  the  estate.  Within  these  limits,  the  estate 
of  a  tenant  for  years  ranks  with  that  of  a  freeholder  in  regard 
to  stability  of  enjoyment.^  The  use  and  products  of  the  prem- 
ises are  his  as  owner.  Thus  a  tenant,  whether  for  life,  years, 
or  a  single  year,  may  work  an  open  mine  on  the  premises,  or 
a  quarry,  and  the  products  of  the  mine  or  quarry  are  a  part  of 
the  profits  of  the  estate  to  which  he  is  entitled.^  So  he  may 
erect  buildings  upon  the  premises,  and  remove  them  while  he 
retains  possession  of  them,  and  cannot  charge  the  cost  of  their 
erection  to  the  landlord,'^  So  he  may  attach  fixtures  to  the 
premises  and  remove  them  before  giving  up  possession  at  the 
end  of  the  term.  It  seems  he  may  exercise  this  right  until  he 
yields  possession,  although  the  term  may  have  expired ;  and 
if  the  term  be  uncertain  in  duration,  and  is  determined  with- 
out his  act,  the  tenant  may  have  a  reasonable  time  thereafter 
in  which  to  remove  them.  But  these  are  exceptions  to  the 
general  rule  by  which  the  tenant  forfeits  these  fixtures  if  he 
do  not  remove  them  during  the  term,  for,  being  then  a  part  of 
the  premises,  his  ownership  ceases  as  to  all  alike.^     In  other 

1  Riddle  i;.  Littlefield,  53  N.  H.  503.  The  lease  of  a  "store"  includes  land 
under  it  and  to  the  middle  of  a  private  way  owned  by  a  lessor.  Hooper  v.  Farns- 
worth,  128  Mass.  487.  So  a  lessee  is  entitled  to  hold  land  gained  by  accretion 
during  his  term.     Cobb  r.  Lavalle,  89  111.  331. 

2  1  Piatt,  Leases,  5.  The  extent  of  a  demise  may  be  qualified  by  implication 
from  the  limited  character  of  the  lessor's  interest.  Booth  v.  Alcock,  L.  R.  8  Ch. 
A  pp.  663. 

3  Freer  v.  Stotenbur,  36  Barb.  641. 

*  Kutter  V.  Smith,  2  Wall.  491,  497  ;  ante,  *2,  3. 

^  Davis  V.  Buffum,  51  Me.  160  :  Leader  v.  Homewood,  5  C.  B.  n.  s.  546  ; 
Weeton  v.  "Woodcock,  7  M.  &  W.  19  ;  Stansfeld  v.  Mayor,  &c.,  4  C.  B.  n.  &  119, 


CH.  X.  §  1.]  ESTATES   FOR   TEARS.  467 

■words,  he  has  an  eiitatr  in  Iho  domisr(l  promisofl  for  tho  term 
pn'scrihod  in  his  h-asf,  ami  if  dcprivctl  of  tlic  possession  and 
cnjoynu-nt  thurcof,  the  law  supplies  a  n-niedy  hy  which  he 
may  retrain  these  specifically,  instead  of  recoverinfr  damages 
only  for  the  violation  of  a  contract  riirht.*  In  sonic  cases,  a 
lease  may  he  presumed  to  have  lieeii  made  from  long  posses- 
sion of  lands,  as  other  deeds,  and  grants  are  sometimes  pre- 
Bumed  under  similar  circumstances.''*  It  is  customary 
to  •  jtrovide  in  the  K'ase,  hy  stipulation,  that  the  lessee  [*2'.t2] 
shall  pay  to  the  lessor  money  or  other  consideration 
in  the  way  of  rent  or  retuin,  for  the  use  of  the  jiremises^ 
But  the  reservation  of  rent  is  not  essi-ntial  to  the  validity  of  a 
tenancy  for  years  l)y  lease.^ 

4.  As  an  estate  for  years,  as  above  explained,  necessarily 
implies  a  certain  and  definite  |»ei-iod  for  which  possession  is  to 
be  held,  it  has  ac(pured  a  designation  ]»roper  to  this  charac- 
ter, namely,  that  of  a  term,  derived  from  trnnlnuH,  signifying 
that  it  is  l)oun(led  and  precisely  deterinined,  having  a  certain 
beginning  and  a  certain  end.''  And  a  lease  for  years  from  the 
first  day  of  July  begins  the  term  on  the  second  day,  and  lasts 
through  the  anniversary  of  the  day  from  which  it  is  granted.^ 

135,  aiitl  note  to  Am.  ed.  of  Am.  Cnscs  ;  Hcip  v.  Barton,  12  C.  FJ.  274  ;  Preston 
r.  IJrii«s  16  Vt.  124  ;  Mason  r.  F.nn,  13  111.  525  ;  Dulwis  r.  Ki-lly,  10  Burb. 
496  ;   F)iMKl.'y  r.  Buirnm,  57  Mc.  381  ;  ante,  •S,  6,  7,  30. 

1  Co.  Lit.  345  n  ;  IJouvicr,  "  Estite  for  Years";  Steani.s,  Rial  Act.  53;  antr, 
pi.  1. 

'  Carver  r.  .Ia<kson,  4  Pet.  1S4.  A  more  expreswive  t<'rm  jn-rlinps  might  be  "a 
Icnaeholil  estate,"  or  "a  tenanry  for  years,"  aa  it  i.s  not  intt-mle*!  to  embnice,  in 
thiH  chapter,  estates  for  years  creatwl  by  way  of  particular  estates  in  case  of 
reniaimlers  or  executory  devises,  which  are  not  created  by  a  letting  and  hiring, 
but  by  uniut  or  <levise. 

»  All.-n  V.  Ijinilxlen,  2  Md.  279. 

«  Failing  r.  Schmck,  3  Hill.  344  ;  State  r.  Page,  1  Specrs,  408  ;  Knight's  Ca.'«e, 
6  Kep.  ;'.5  a  ;   1  I'liitt,  L<-a.s<'s,  9. 

*  2  Flint,  Heal  Prop.  203  ;   Wms.  Renl  Prop.  (Rawle's  e<l.)  328. 

«  Atkins  r.  SleeiK.r,  7  Allen.  487  ;  Ackland  v.  Lutley,  9  Ad.  &  E.  879. 
Whether  tho  word  "from"  shall  be  reckoned  to  include  or  exclude  the  date 
tlejM-nds  on  the  apparent  intent,  gathered  from  the  instrument.  Thus,  whfp-  in 
a  lease  for  five  years  "from  "  Aj)ril  1st,  th<-  rent  was  made  payable  on  April  1st. 
that  day  was  included,  Oeyo  v.  Bleakly,  24  Barb.  9  ;  but  if  nnthing  controls  the 
force  of  this  won!,  it  exdudi's,  Bemis  r.  I^-onanl,  118  Ma-ss.  502  :  Pugh  r.  I>h«<1s, 
Cowp.  714  ;  Sh.-ets  r.  .S.Klen.  2  Wall.  190;  Onlway  v.  Hemington.  12  H.  I.  319. 
Where  a  term  was  from  au  act  as  of  delivcrj',  the  day  of  the  act  is,  in  New  Harap- 


468  LAW   OF  REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

But  as  this  word  term  may  express  not  only  the  duration  of 
the  interest  of  the  lessee  in  the  lands  leased,  but  also  the  in- 
terest itself,  it  may  often  be  so  used  that  this  last  shall  expire 
before  the  number  of  years  mentioned  in  the  lease.^  And 
whether  the  one  sense  or  the  other  is  to  be  attaclied  to  the 
form  of  expression  depends  upon  the  construction  of  the  in- 
strument containing  it.  Thus  the  case  put  by  Coke,  in  the 
passage  cited,^  is  of  a  lease  for  twenty-one  years,  and  after- 
wards a  second  lease  to  begin  at  the  expiration  of  the  term 
aforesaid  of  twenty-one  years.  If  the  first  lessee  surrenders 
his  estate,  the  second  lease  would  take  effect  at  once.  But  if 
the  second  lease  had  been  from  the  expiration  of  the  twenty- 
one  years  aforesaid,  it  would  have  to  wait  the  effluxion  of  the 
whole  term  mentioned.  A  case  similar  in  effect  is  put  in  Shep- 
pard's  Touchstone,^  which  is  cited  and  commented  on  by  Lord 
Mansfield,  who  says,  "  the  word  term  may  signify  the  time 
as  well  as  the  interest,  for  then  it  becomes  merely  a  question 
of  construction,  which  sense  the  word  ought  to  be  used  in."* 
And  where  a  lease  was  made  to  A  B  for  a  year,  with  liberty 
in  the  lessee  to  occupy  as  long  as  he  chose,  and  a  surety 
became  responsible  with  him  for  the  rent,  it  was  held  that 
if  the  tenant  continued  to  occupy  after  the  year,  it  would 
be  at  the  rate  and  upon  the  terms  originally  agreed  upon,  but 
that  the  surety's  responsibility,  unless  renewed,  continued 
only  during  the  first  term  of  one  year!' 

5.  A  term  for  years,  it  should  be  remembered,  may 

[*293]  be  created  *  to  take  effect  at  a  future  date,  since  it 

affects  the  possession  only  and  not  the  seisin  of  the 

lands.    Nor  is  there  any  limit  within  which  the  term  must 

take  effect,  in  order  to  be  valid,  provided  the  period  do  not 

shire,  Pennsylvania,  Indiana,  Illinois,  Kentucky,  and  perhaps  some  other  States 
included  ;  but  the  more  generally  prevailing  rule  is  to  exclude  it,  Taylor,  Land.  & 
Ten.  (7th  ed.)  §§  78,  79,  notes  ;  and^jos^,  *386. 

1  Burton,  Eeal  Prop.  §  835  ;  Co.  Lit.  45  b  2  Co.  Lit.  45  b. 

8  Sheppard,  Touchst.  274. 

<  Wright  V.  Cartwright,  1  Burr.  284  ;  Evans  v.  Vaughan,  4  B.  &  C.  261  ; 
whore  under  a  power  to  lease  for  years,  determinable  on  three  lives,  the  lease  was 
for  the  three  lives  with  a  covenant  of  quiet  enjoyment  during  said  term,  it  was 
held  to  mean  during  the  whole  period  of  the  three  lives. 

6  Brewer  v.  Thorp,  35  Ala.  9. 


ru.  X.  §  1.]  ESTATES    FOR   TEARS.  400 

reach  (liat  which  constitiitos  wlial  the  law  calls  a  perpetuity!/, 
that,  nanu'ly,  of  a  life  or  lives  in  Iteiiiir,  and  twenty-one  years 
and  a  fraction  of  a  year  afterwards.'  IJnt  a  covenant  in  a 
lease  for  its  renewal  indefinitely,  at  the  option  of  the  lessee,  is 
not  within  the  doctrine  of  iierpetuity.'^  As  the  title  and  estate 
of  snch  lessee  is  not  consnnunate  until  he  has  taken  jtossession 
under  his  lease,  the  interest  which  he  has  in  the  same,  prior 
to  such  consummation,  is  called  an  interesse  ti'rmiui.^  I'.nt  in 
Ohio  the  execution  and  delivery  of  a  lease  ])erfecf8  the  title  in 
the  lessee  without  an  actual  entry.''  Although  a  lease  is  said 
generally  to  take  effect  from  the  time  of  its  making,  it  is  ajr 
preheiided  that  the  time  at  which  only  it  takes  effect  is  when 
it  is  delivered.  It  is  uiiimjiortant  when  it  was  written,  and  it 
is  competent  to  show,  hy  parol,  when  it  was  delivered,  although 
no  date,  or  a  dilTerent  one  from  that  i)i  its  actual  delivery,  was 
inserted  in  the  indenture.^  And  though  the  ]»urpos(^  of  the 
haht-ndum  is  to  lix,  for  (tne  thing,  the  time  fn)ni  which  the 
duration  of  the  term  of  the  holding  undi'r  the  lease  is  to  he 
reckoned,  yet  where  it  j)rofesses  to  do  this  by  a  reference  to  the 
making  of  the  lease,  the  true  time  may  be  shown  by  parol. 
Thus,  where  a  lease  purported  to  bear  date  >rarch,  1783, 
hahrmiuiH  from  "March  last  past"  for  thirty-five  years,  it 
was  hehl  comj)etcnt  to  show  by  parol  that  the  lease  was  not 
executed  until  after  March,  1783,  and  consequently  the  hihen- 
dum  was  from  that  year  and  not  1782."     But  where  the  ImM- 

J  Hiirton,  n.iil  Trop.  §  S3G  ;  Sand.  Uses,  11*9  ;  Wins.  Keal  Prop.  32S  ;  i':u\A\ 
V.  ralmor,  1  CI.  &  F.  372  ;  Fi.'M  r.  Howdl,  6  Ga.  423  ;  Whitmy  r.  Allaire,  1  N.  Y. 
ai.";  ;  Wl-1.1  v.  Traip,  14  Cray,  330,  333. 

"  Piijre  V.  E.sty,  .'')4  Me.  319;  JMackinoiv  r.  Boanlman,  28  Mo.  420;  I?oylc  r. 
IValKKly  H.  Co.  46  Md.  623 ;  and  will  be  enforced  in  equity,  IgRiiMcn  r.  May, 
9  Yes.  925  ;  Banks  v.  Haskic,  45  Md.  207.  In  an  early  case  in  California  the 
opposite  doctrine  was  stated,  Monison  r.  Rossignol,  5  Cal.  64  ;  but  this  turned  on 
a  hjwcial  statute.  The  act  of  renewal  is  no  new  demise.  House  r.  Burr,  24  Barb. 
625  ;  Brown  r.  Parsons,  22  Mich.  21.  The  rule  is,  of  course,  the  same  wliere 
the  further  term  is  at  the  lessee's  option  by  occupancy  merely.  HoUey  v.  Young, 
66  .Me.  520  ;  Sweetscr  r.  McKenney,  65  >ie.  225. 

«  2  Flint.  Heal  Prop.  204,  205  ;  Wnis.  Real  Prop.  329  ;  Smith,  I^nd.  .^  Tm.  13, 

*  Walk.  Intro<l.  278. 

'  Mall  V.  Cazenove,  4  East,  477,  481  ;  Trustees  r.  Robinson,  "Wright  (Ohio), 
436  ;  Stone  v.  Bale,  3  Ix?v.  348  ;  Co.  Lit  46  b  ;  Jackson*.  Schoonmakcr,  2  Johua. 
230  ;   Batcheld.r  r.  Dean,  16  N.  II.  265,  2''.8. 

«  Steele  v.  Mart,  4  B.  &  C.  272  ;  Co.  Lit.  46  b. 


470  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

ing  is  to  be  "  from  the  day  of  the  date,"  its  duration  will  be 
measured  from  that  day  as  written,  and  not  from  the  day  of  its 
execution,  if  these  are  in  fact  variant.^  But  if  the  day  named 
as  the  commencement  of  the  holding,  or  of  the  term,  be  ante- 
rior to  the  date  and  actual  execution  of  the  lease,  no 
[*294]  interest  thereby  passes  to  the  *  lessee  until  the  actual 
execution  and  delivery  of  the  lease,  the  purpose  of 
the  habendum  being  to  mark  the  duration  of  the  lessee's  in- 
terest.2  Accordingly,  it  was  held  in  respect  to  a  lease  made 
and  dated  in  July,  1851,  demising  the  premises  for  fourteen 
years  from  December,  1849,  with  a  right  to  determine  it  at  the 
expiration  of  seven  years,  that  this  term  of  seven  years  was  to 
be  reckoned  from  1849.^ 

6.  It  seems  to  be  regarded  as  essential  to  a  good  lease  for 
years  that  it  should  be  either  for  a  certain  period,  measured 
by  years,  months,  or  the  like,  or  for  a  period  uncertain  only 
from  the  circumstance  that  it  may  be  determined  before  its 
natural  expiration  by  the  happening  of  some  event,  or  that  it 
be  for  a  purpose  which,  of  itself,  serves  to  ascertain  the  length 
of  time  for  which  the  premises  are  to  be  held.  Thus  Littleton 
says,  "  Tenant  for  term  of  years  is  where  a  man  letteth  lands 
or  tenements  to  another  for  term  of  certain  years."  *  And  the 
illustrations  given  by  Coke  are,  if  a  man  shall  make  a  lease  to 
J.  S.  for  so  many  years  as  J.  N.  shall  name,  it  is  a  good  one, 
for,  when  J.  N.  has  named  the  number  of  years,  the  duration 
of  the  term  becomes  fixed.  If  the  lease  be  to  J.  S.  for  twenty- 
one  years,  if  he  live  so  long,  it  is  a  good  one.^  But  a  lease  by 
a  parson  for  so  many  years  as  he  shall  be  parson  of  Dale,  or  so 
many  j^ears  as  he  shall  live,  would  be  not  only  for  an  uncer- 
tain time,  but  it  never  could  be  made  certain  so  as  to  be  valid 
as  a  term.^    And  though  it  might  be  good  as  a  freehold  estate, 

1  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  83  n. ;  Styles  v.  Wardle,  4  B.  &  C.  908  ;  Doe  v.  Day, 
10  East,  427  ;  Co.  Lit.  46  b  ;  Kelly  v.  Patterson,  L.  E.  9  C.  P.  681. 

2  Shaw  V.  Kay,  1  Exch.  412  ;  Wybird  v.  Tuck,  1  Bos.  &  P.  458  ;  Mayn  v. 
Beak,  Cro.  Eliz.  515. 

8  Bird  V.  Baker,  1  Ellis  &  E.  12.  <  Lit.  §  58. 

®  Goodright  v.  Piichardson,  3  T.  Pu  462.  So  if  for  a  term  fixed  but  determina- 
ble on  sale,  &c.,  by  the  landlord.  Munigle  v.  Boston,  3  Allen,  230  ;  Shaw  v. 
Holfman,  25  Jlich.  162. 

•  Co.  Lit.  45  b ;  2  Prest.  Conv.  159  ;   2  Flint.  Real  Prop,  203  ;   Murray  v. 


ru.  X.  §  1.]  ESTATES    FOR   YEARS.  171 

if  (irtijM'ily  iiiadf  hy  drcd,  it  cniilti  not  bo  pood  iis  !i  term  uikIit 
u  lease.  iJut  u  devise  to  A  diiriiiL^  his  niinority  woidd  l»e  pond, 
as  it  is  stiseejttildc  of  i)einp  ascertaineil  in  resjieet  to  its  dura- 
tion.' So  u|)t)n  the  principle  that,  id  certiim  ext  quod  certum 
reddi  potest^  a  lease  ioY  seven  or  fourteen  years  will  he  pood 
as  one  for  seven  at  least,  and  for  fourteen  as  soon  as  the  lessee 
shall  .so  eloct.^  And  if  a  lease  be  to  one  for  a  year,  with  a 
privilept!  of  holdinp  for  three  years,  and  he  continues  to  hold 
after  the  expiration  of  the  fir.st  year,  it  will  be  held  to  be  an 
election  on  his  jtart  to  hold  for  the  three  years.^  And  a  lea.se 
for  one  year,  and  so  on  from  year  to  year,  is  reparded  as  one 
for  two  years,  and  a  lease  "for  years,"  without  any  number 
fixed,  is  for  two  years  certain.*  It  is  apjirehcnded 
that  it  is  upon  the  idea  that  the  teini  for  which  *  the  [*29")] 
estate  is  to  be  ludd,  can  be  ascertained,  by  coniputinp 
how  lonp  it  will  re(piirc  the  income  tliereof  to  raise  a  piven 
snm,  that  an  executor  takes  an  estate  for  years  under  a  devi.se 
of  lands  for  the  payment  of  del)ts,  or  until  the  devisor's  debts 
are  |)aid.^  And  a  lease  of  j»remise8  until  the  les.see  shall,  out 
of  the  rents,  repay  himself  for  a  certain  amount  of  expense 
incurred  by  him  in  repairs,  was  held  to  be  a  snfficiently  defi- 
nite term  to  be  a  valid  one.*^  The  only  circumstance  recpiired 
in  these  limitations  of  terms  of  years  is,  that  a  preci.se  time 
shall  be  fixed  for  the  continnancc  of  the  term,  so  that  wh.ii 
the  commencement  of  the  term  is  ascertained,  the  period  of 
determination  by  eflluxion  of  time  may  be  known  with  cer- 
tainty."    And  it  was  held  l)y  the  court  of  Vermont,  that  an 

Cberriiigton,  99  Ma.ss.  2J9.  WlutluT  a  lease  for  so  ni.iny  ytars  as  the  lessor 
hiiiiseir  may  name,  would  become  a  fixed  term,  if  he  were  to  name  a  certain 
nunilxr  of  years,  quccre.     West.  Transp.  Co.  r.  LansiHg,  49  N.  Y.  499,  508. 

>  .Smith,  I>!ind.  &  Ten.  l.'i ;  Burton,  Kcal  Prop.  §  J87. 

2  Doe  r.  Dixon,  9  East,  15. 

»  Di-lnshnian  v.  Berr)-,  20  Mich.  292  ;  Kramer  v.  Cook,  7  C.rny,  550  ;  Clarke 
r.  Merrill,  51  X.  H.  415  ;  Dix  v.  Atkins.  130  Mass.  171.  But  it  is  otherwise  if 
written  notice  is  first  to  be  given.     Btller  v.  Robinson,  50  Mich.  264. 

«  Di-nn  V.  Cartright,  4  I-Jist,  29  ;  Com.  Dig.  I>and.  k  Ten.  91,  92. 

'  1  Crui.se,  Dig.  223.  But  it  has  Ix-en  held  that  an  instrument  granting 
premi.ne.s  "  for  any  term  of  years  "  the  les.see  might  think  jiroiK'r,  taken  in  con- 
nection with  the  uses  for  which  they  were  to  be  applied,  namely,  .sjilt  works,  is  a 
valid  lease  for  a  term  deternunable  upon  the  lessee's  alwindoning  that  manufacture. 
Horner  i-.  Ix>eds,  25  X.  J.  106  ;  and  we  I.emington  v.  Stevens,  48  Vt.  3S. 

0  Batchelder  v.  Dean,  16  N.  H.  265,  268.  ^  2  Prest.  Conv.  160. 


472  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   L 

instrument  with  the  usual  features  and  incidents  of  a  lease, 
such  as  reserving  rent,  with  a  right  of  entry  for  non-payment 
of  it,  or  for  breach  of  conditions  expressed  therein,  may  be 
good  if  properly  executed,  although  in  terms  creating  a  per- 
petual estate  in  the  premises.^  And  in  Massachusetts,  it  was 
held  tliat  one  might  convey  a  fee  in  land  in  the  form  of  a 
lease,  although,  ordinarily,  applied  to  the  creation  of  terms 
only. 2 

7.  A  tenant  for  years  is  never  said  to  be  seised  of  the  lands 
leased  ;  nor  does  the  mere  delivery  of  a  lease  thereof  for  years 
vest  in  him  any  estate  therein.  He  thereby  acquires  a  right 
of  entry  upon  the  land,  and  when  he  shall  have  entered,  he  is 
said  to  be  possessed,  not  of  the  land,  but  of  a  term  for  years, 
while  the  seisin  of  the  freehold  remains  in  the  lessor,  and  the 
lessee's  possession  is  the  possession  of  him  who  has  the  free- 
hold.^ 

8.  Until,  as  already  stated,  the  lessee  should  have  entered 
upon  the  leased  premises,  he  was  formerly  held  to  acquire  no 
estate  in  the  same.  The  interest  which  he  acquired  by  the 
delivery  of  the  lease,  and  before  entry  made,  is,  as  already 
stated,  called  an  interesse  termini ;  and  accordingly,  Littleton, 
in  defining  what  is  a  tenancy  for  years,  after  stating  that  it 
"  is  awarded  between  lessor  and  lessee,"  adds,  "And  the  lessee 
entereth  by  force  of  the  lease."  '^     And  if  the  lessee  die  before 

entry,  his  executors  or  administrators  may  enter  in  his 

[*296]  stead.^     But  while   the  lessee  until  he  *  shall  have 

taken  possession,  cannot  have  trespass  quare  clausum 

1  White  V.  Fuller,  38  Yt.  193. 

2  Jamaica  Pond  Co.  v.  Chandler,  9  Allen,  159,  168  ;  Co.  Lit.  43  b.  Snch  are, 
also,  the  so-called  manor  leases  in  New  York  and  the  fee-farm  leases  in  Pennsyl- 
vania. See  Yan  Rensselaer  v.  Hays,  19  N.  Y.  68  ;  Wallace  v.  Harinsted,  44 
Penn.  St.  492. 

8  1  Cruise,  Dig.  224  ;  Lit.  §  59  ;  Yanduyn  v.  Hepner,  45  Ind.  589.  But  the 
tenant  only,  and  not  the  landlord,  can  maintain  trespass  quarc  clausum.  French 
V.  Fuller,  23  Pick.  104  ;  Austin  t-.  Hud.  Pav.  R.  R.,  25  X.Y.  334  ;  Geer  v.  Fleming, 
110  Mass.  39. 

4  1  Cruise,  Dig.  225  ;  Lit.  §  58  ;  Doe  v.  Walker,  5  B.  &  C.  111.  Nor  does  it 
make  any  difference  at  common  law  whether  the  lessee  has  a  present  or  future 
right  of  entry,  until  entry  actually  made.  Id. ;  Co.  Lit.  46  b  ;  Co.  Lit.  270  a ; 
Bacon,  Abr.  Lease,  M  ;  Wood  v.  Hubbell,  10  N.  Y.  479. 

6  Co.  Lit.  46  b. 


en.  I.  §  1.]  ESTATKS    FOR    YKAR3.  473 

fregit  aijainst  a  8tran<riM' ;  '  :iii  oiitrv  is  held  not  ncccssurv  to 
the  vestinjx  of  a  term  of  years  in  him.-  And  a  leaHc  may  ln'  so 
made,  wliere  a  suflieient  eonsideratictn  is  e.xpressed,  as  huviiijr 
heen  (>.\eciitt'tl  or  paid,  antl  it  is  in  the  form  of  a  har^rain  and 
8:de,  as  to  operate,  und»  r  the  statute  of  usrs,  as  an  elTcctual 
creation  of  an  estate,  without  a  foi-mal  entry.  Thus,  if  the 
words  "  l)arirain  and  sah*,"  in  eonsi<leration  of  money,  he  con- 
tained in  the  k\a.se,  or  in  eonsidoi'ation  of  ninney,  the  lessor 
demises  the  j)remises,  a  use  will  arise  in  favor  of  the  lessee. 
Jhit  if  it  be  made  without  any  money  consiik-ration,  the  lessee 
has  not  strictly  an  estate  until  entry  made  hy  him.^  Before 
that  has  been  done,  he  has  only  an  intcrcsHe  termini,  hut  not  a 
possession.*  How  this  is  made  to  jji-oduce  this  efl'ect  will  be 
explaine<l  in  connection  with  the  law  of  uses.**  But,  it  seems, 
that  even  when  the  lease  takes  elTect  under  the  statute  of 
uses,  it  is  necessary  that  the  lessee  should  have  made  an 
actual  entry  before  he  could  maintain  trespass;*^  since  such 
action  is  founded  on  an  actual  possession. 

9.  It  is  also  laid  down  by  some  writers,  that  a  lessee,  before 
entry  made,  cannot  maintain  an  action  of  ejectment.'  And 
rcijardinfr  such  action,  as  it  was  ori^rinally  designed  for  the  re- 
covery of  a  term,  where  it  was  a  writ  of  trespass  in  its  nature,^ 
the  proposition  may  still  be  regarded  as  true.  But,  according 
to  the  modern  mode  of  proceeding,  the  action  being  a  fictitious 
one  where  the  tenant  is  required  to  confess  lease,  entry,  and 
ouster,  it  will  doubtless  be  sufficient  if  the  demandant  has  a 
title  and  right  of  entry .^  And  if  the  lease  be  future  in  its 
terms,  the  lessee  by  delivery  of  the  lease  acquires  such  an 

'  Bacon,  Abr.  Lease,  XI  ;  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  13  ;  AVheeliT  r.  Muntefiore, 
2  Q.  R  133. 

2  Harrison  r.  Blnckhum,  17  C.  B.  n.  .s.  678  ;  Ryan  r.  Clark,  14  Q.  B.  65,  73. 

■  I'irckhead  v.  Cummings,  33  N.  J.  44. 

«  Wood's  Conv.  157,  159  ;  Co.  Lit.  46  b. 

»  1  Cruise,  Dig.  225  ;  4  Kent,  Com.  97  ;  Baron,  Abr.  I^sc,  M. 

«  Smith,  I^nd.  &  Ten.  14,  n.;  Com.  Dig.  Trespass,  B.  3  ;  1  Piatt,  Leases,  23  ; 
2  S.md.  Uses,  56. 

^  liaoon,  Abr.  I^ase,  M  ;  Saffyn  v.  Adams,  Cro.  Jac.  61 ;  1  Piatt,  L.ii^s.  23. 
But  see  Mechan.  Ins.  Co.  t>.  Scott,  2  Hilton,  550. 

'  Adams,  Eject.  6  ;  10. 

•  Adams,  Eject.  14;  10,  61;  Gardner  v.  Kctelta.i,  8  HHl,  330;  Trull  r. 
Gmnger,  8  N.  Y.  115  ;  but  see  Sennett  v.  Buchcr,  3  Peiin.  392. 


474  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [bOOK   I. 

interest  in  the  term,  that  he  could  maintain  ejectment  to 
recover  it  without  any  further  act  on  his  part,  if  possession 
were  withheld  when  his  right  to  claim  it  had  become  com- 
plete.^ 

10.  This  interesse  termini,  however,  may  be  granted  or  as- 
signed by  the  lessee,^  but  upon  technical  grounds,  the  subtle- 
ness of  which  renders  it  hardly  worth  the  time  to  attempt  to 
explain  them,  it  cannot  be  surrendered,  though  it  may  be  ex- 
tinguished by  a  surrender  by  law,  or  by  an  assignment,  or 
by  a  release,  while  it  can  neither  promote  nor  hinder  the 
merger  of  an  estate.^  These  propositions  may  perhaps  be 
sufficiently  illustrated  by  the  following  cases.  The  lessee  of 
a  term,  to  commence  at  the  ensuing  Michaelmas,  took  a  new 

lease  for  years,  commencing  in  proesenti,  and  it  was 
[*297]  held  to  be  a  surrender  of  the  *  first  lease.     So  had  the 

new  lease  been  made  to  take  effect  at  Michaelmas. 
And  where  a  lessor  made  a  lease  which  was  to  expire  in 
1809,  and  then  made  a  second  lease  of  the  same  estate  to  the 
same  lessee,  to  take  effect  at  the  expiration  of  the  first,  the 
last  bearing  date  in  1799,  and  the  lessor,  in  1800,  died  having 
devised  the  leased  estate  for  life  to  the  lessee,  who  conveyed 
his  life-estate  before  1809,  it  was  held  that  this  interest  of  the 
lessee,  in  the  term  to  commence  in  1809,  was  not  merged  in 
the  life-estate  which  he  took  under  the  will,  because  the  two 
estates  were  not  in  him  at  the  same  thne,  as  the  interesse 
termini  was  not  an  estate  till  entry  made,  and,  before  that 
could  be  done,  he  had  parted  with  his  life-estate.*  It  should 
have  been  remarked  that  the  rules  which  apply  to  an  interesse 
termini  at  common  law  apply  equally  to  all  leases  to  com- 
mence infuturo.^  And  where  A  made  a  lease  to  B,  of  a  hotel 
for  a  term  of  years,  from  a  future  day,  and  before  that  day  it 
burned  down,  it  was  held  that  the  lease  never  took  effect  so  as 
to  make  the  lessee  liable  for  rent.  The  lessor  must  give,  or  offer 
to  give,  possession  of  the  premises,  in  order  to  create  any  lia- 

1  Whitney  v.  Allaire,  1  N.  Y.  305,  311. 

2  Co.  Lit.  46  b  ;  1  Piatt,  Leases,  22. 

8  Burton,  Real  Prop.  §§  907,  998  ;  2  Prest.  Conv.  215  ;  Co.  Lit.  338  a  ;  Doe 
V.  Walker,  5  B.  &  C.  111.     See  4  Kent,  Com.  97,  note  a. 

*  Doe  V.  Walker,  5  B.  &  C.  Ill  ;  Sheppard,  Touchst.  324  ;  Co.  Lit.  270  a. 
6  Doe  V.  Walker,  5  B.  &  C.  Ill  ;  4  Kent,  Com.  97. 


en.  X.  §   1.]  ESTATES    FOU    YEARS.  475 

hilitv  f'T  till'  rent,  ami  it  inattcrs  imt  wlifthcr  In-  can  not  nr 
will  not  <lo  this,  ."-^o  where  the  owner  of  a  hall  agreed  with  an- 
other to  t'nrnish  him  tlie  use  of  it  for  a  concert  upon  certain 
niirhts,  fi>r  a  certain  a;rree(l  sum  of  ni(jnev,  ami  the  hall  was 
liiuneil  Itet'ore  the  first  of  thcso  nights,  it  was  held  to  excuse 
both  parties  respectively  from  performing  the  contract,  unless 
tlie  owner  of  the  hall  had  expressly  agreed  to  assume  the  risk 
of  providing  it.  The  court  would  a|>ply  tlie  sanu^  rule  to 
such  a  contract  as  to  an  agreement  hy  on('  man  to  serve  an- 
other who  should  die,  or  an  agreement  by  an  artist  to  paint  a 
picture  and  lie  should  lose  his  sight  before  executing  it.'  In 
either  event  he  is  without  remedy  for  the  rent  reserved.^  Hut 
it  is  no  answer  to  a  claim  for  rent,  that  the  premises  are  in 
the  possession  of  another,  unless  held  by  a  title  paramount  to 
that  of  the  lessor,  since  by  the  act  of  letting  the  premises,  the 
lessor  does  not  warrant  against  the  acts  of  strangers,  nor  does 
he  engage  to  put  the  lessee  into  actual  possession.''  But  where 
the  lessor  himself  has  only  a  reversion  or  remainder,  subject 
to  an  intermediate  jtarticular  estate,  a  lea.se  by  him  will  be 
considered  as  a  conveyance  of  so  much  of  his  estate  in  rever- 
sion or  ri'inainder,  and  not  the  creation  of  an  interesse  termini.^ 

11.  A  forbearance  (»n  the  j>art  of  a  lessee  f«jr  years  to  turn 
his  interease  termini  into  an  actual  estate  by  making  an  entry, 
will  not  affect  his  liability  for  rent,  if  the  fault  is  not  on  the 
part  of  tlie  lessor,  for  the  rent  becomes  due  by  the  lease,  and 
not  by  the  entry  or  by  occupation,''  and  the  action  is  upon  the 

»  Tnylor  v.  C'oldwcll,  3  Best  k  S.  826. 

«  Woo.l  ,•.  Hul)l)ill,  5  Barb.  601  ;  s.  c.  10  N.  Y.  479,  487,  489. 

•  Mi'dian.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Scott,  2  Hilton,  550.  A  contmrj-  rule  prevails  in  Eng- 
Innd  nn<l  some  States,  and  the  lessor  is  held  to  warrant  possession  to  the  lessee, 
"and  not  merely  the  chance  of  a  lawsuit."  Coe  v.  ("lay,  5  Bing.  440  ;  Jenks  v. 
Edwnr-ls.  11  K.xch.  775  ;  L'Hussicr  v.  Zallee,  24  Mo.  13  ;  Hughes  v.  Hood,  50  .Mo. 
350  ;  King  r.  Heynolds,  67  Ala.  220.  But  the  rule  in  the  te.xt  generally  j>revail3 
in  this  country.  Clark  v.  Butt,  26  Ind.  236  ;  Trull  r.  Granger,  8  N.  Y.  115  ; 
Mix>re  r.  W.U-r,  71  Pa.  St.  429  ;  IVmli-rgnst  r.  Youn;;,  21  N.  H.  234  ;  Siguiuiid 
r.  Howaid  Bk..  29  Md.  324  ;  Un<lerwoo«l  r.  Binhanl,  47  Vt.  305  ;  Gazzolo  v. 
Chaii.lHra.  73  111.  75  ;  Field  r.  Herrick,  101  111.  210. 

*  Dm-  V.  Brown,  2  El.  &  Bl.  331. 

»  Bfllajiis  r.  Burbriche,  1  Ld.  Raj-ni.  171  ;  s.  c.  Rep.  Temp.  Holt.  199  ;  1 
Piatt,  leases,  23;  Maverick  v.  I^wis,  3  McConl,  211  ;  Williams  r.  Bosanciuet, 
1  Broti.  k  B.  238  ;  Mechau.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Scott,  2  Hilton,  550  ;  Whitney  v.  Allaire, 
1  N.  Y.  305,  311. 


476  LAW  OF  HEAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

covenant  as  for  a  breach  of  an  executory  covenant ;  ^  and, 
though  the  lessor  may  die  before  lessee  enters  under  his  lease, 
he  may  do  so  after  the  lessor's  death,  at  his  pleasure.^ 


[*298]  *  SECTION   11. 

HOW   ESTATES   FOR   YEARS   MAY   BE    CREATED. 

1.  Forms  of  doing  this  at  common  law,  and  by  the  Statute  of  Frauds. 

2.  What  is  requisite  by  the  Statute  of  Frauds. 

3.  Of  the  proper  terms  to  create  a  lease. 

4.  Distinction  between  a  lease  and  an  agreement  to  lease. 
4«.  When  a  lease  and  when  an  agreement  form  one. 

5.  Importance  of  this  distinction. 

6.  Of  leases  operating  by  estoppel. 

7.  Of  parties  who  may  be  lessors. 

8.  Leases  made  good  by  ratification, 

9.  Of  ratification  by  wife  of  husband's  lease. 

10.  Lease  by  guardian,  executor,  &c. 

11.  Of  making  leases  under  powers  of  appointment. 

12.  Of  leases  by  tenants  in  common. 

13.  Who  may  be  lessees. 

14.  What  may  be  leased. 

15.  When  terms  for  years  made  freeholds. 

16.  Of  terms  attendant  upon  the  inheritance. 

17.  Of  the  chattel  character  of  terms. 

18.  What  leases  need  to  be  recorded. 

19.  Leases  under  the  Statute  of  Uses. 

20.  Effect  of  possession  by  lessee  or  lessor. 

21.  How  far  lessee  is  liable  before  entry  made. 

22.  Lease  must  be  accepted  in  order  to  bind. 

23.  Consequences  of  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant. 

24.  Of  the  tenure  and  privity  between  lessor  and  lessee. 

25.  What  is  implied  by  such  relation,  and  where  it  exists. 

1.  There  were  three  modes  of  creating  an  estate  for  years 
at  the  common  law,  namely,  by  deed,  by  writing  not  under 
seal,  and  by  parol,^  though,  if  it  was  of  an  incorporeal  heredit- 

1  Lafarge  v.  ilansfield,  31  Barb.  345.  By  a  statute  of  Illinois,  the  lessor  has 
a  lien  for  rent  upon  the  crops  growing  or  grown  upon  the  demised  land  in  any 
year,  for  the  rent  of  that  year,  and  this  will  extend  over  two  years  in  respect  to 
such  crops  as  require  that  length  of  time  to  mature  them.  Miles  v.  James,  36  111. 
399. 

2  Lit.  §  66  ;  Co.  Lit.  51 1). 

8  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  60  ;  Den  v.  Johnson,  15  N.  J.  116. 


CU.  X.  §  2.]  ESTATES   FOR    YEARS.  177 

{iiuriit,  it  was  ulwavH  rt'tiiiisitu  to  hv  done  by  deed,'  and  liv 
llic  statute  H  <S:  U  \'ict.  c.  lU(j,  leases  of  corporeal  as  \v«'ll  as 
inc()r|M)real  luoperty  must  be  l>y  deed.-  The  statute  (»f  '2'J 
Car.  11.  c  3,  called  the  Statute  of  I'lauds,  uliieli,  with  s(»mc 
luodilications,  has  been  adopted  l>y  nearly  all  the  several  States, 
declared,  among  other  things,  that  all  leases  for  more  than 
three  years,  "  not  put  in  writing  and  signed  by  tiie  parties," 
A:e.,  shoidd  have  the  force  and  elTect  of  estates  at  will  oidy.^ 
Ihit  as  terms  were  coupled  with  estates  of  freehold,  which 
reipiired  a  deed  to  create  them,  the  (juestion  arose  whether  a 
lease  of  a  term  must  not  also  be  by  deed.  But  it  seems  to  be 
settled  that  it  will  be  sullicient  that  such  a  lease  is  in  writing, 
thtjugh  not  under  seal,  to  comply  with  the  reipiirements  of 
that  statute."'  It  is  hanlly  necessary  to  remind  the  nader 
that  the  estates  which  are  embraced  in  this  chajtter  mv,  thr»se 
only  which  are  valid  as  estates  for  years  within  the  Statute  of 
Frauds,  since  estates  at  will  and  tenancies  from  year  to  year 
will  form  the  subject  of  another  chapter.  The  laws  of  the 
varitms  States  vary  in  respect  to  lea.ses  being  by  deed,  [ii 
most  of  them  it  is  enough  that  the  instrument  Ijc  i»roperly 
sub.scribed.  In  Virginia  and  Kentucky,  if  the  lease  be  for 
more  than  five  years,  it  must  be  under  seal.  So  in  ^'crmont 
and  Rhode  Island,  if  it  exceed  one  year.''  So  in  Minnesota, 
if  it  i»e  for  three  years  or  njore."  A  lease  for  ninety-nine  years 
in  Maryland  must  be  l»y  deed."  And  a  lease  of  a  married 
woman's  estate  in   Pennsylvania,  for  any  term,  to  be  valid, 

>  Wins.  Henl  Prop.  195  ;  I.l.  3'27. 

"  Wilis.  K.-jiI  Prop.  VM;  .Smith,  I^iii.l.  &  T.-n.  66,  n.  9. 

•  The  Kiiglisli  statute  \ktuA  is  mloptetl  in  New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  North 
and  South  l':in)liiiii,  .Maryhiiul,  Georgia,  ami  Indiana.  In  Massachusetts,  Maine, 
New  Hiuiipsliire,  Veriiiont,  .Mi.ssouri,  and  Ohio,  all  parol  leases  are  at  will.  But 
in  New  York  and  most  other  Stat4'a  they  are  valid  if  not  exceeding  one  year, 
llrowne,  Stat.  Fr.  Ai)p,     And  see  jmt,  •646. 

«  Den  V.  Johnson.  15  N.  J.  116;  Allen  r.  Ja.iui.sh,  21  Wen.l.  628;  Wheeler 
V.  Newton,  Pn-c.  in  ('h.  16.  A  ]vxs>n  would  not  he  entitled  to  sue  for  and  recover 
from  the  leasee  his  jxirt  of  the  indentun'  of  lease  U'fore  the  expimtion  of  the  term, 
aithnu^h  he  may  have  entered  and  dispo.sses.sed  the  lessee  for  a  brenoh  of  covenant 
and  condition.  On  the  other  han<l,  if  he  gets  jwssession  of  the  lessee's  ]>art,  he 
nuiy  have  an  action  to  n-cover  the  sjime  from  the  lessor.  Hall  v.  Ball,  3  Mann,  k 
G.  '212;   Klworthy  r.  Sanfonl,  3  HurLst.  A:  C.  330. 

•  Taylor,  Uml.  &  Ten.  §  34.     Five  years,     Stewart  i-.  AihI.  5  Houst.  189. 

•  Chandler  r.  Ken^  8  Minn.  524,  526.  t  Bratt  f.  Bralt,  21  Md,  578. 


478  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

must  be  acknowledged  by  her,  separate  from  her  husband.^ 
In  New  Hampshire,  signing  onl}^  is  necessary .2  In  Ohio,  the 
lease,  if  for  more  than  three  years,  must  be  attested  by  two 
witnesses  and  acknowledged.^  In  Massachusetts,  if  it  be  for 
more  than  seven  years,  it  must  be  by  deed,  and,  in  order  to 
be  valid  against  third  persons  without  notice,  it  must  be  re- 
corded.^ 

2.  The  first  section  of  the  Statute  of  Frauds  requires  the 
writing  which  is  sought  to  be  availed  of  as  a  lease,  to  be 
"  signed  by  the  parties,  &c.,  making  the  same,  or  their  agents 
thereunto  lawfully  authorized  by  writing."  In  some  of  the 
States  the  appointment  of  the  agent  is  not  required 
[*299]  to  be  in  writing,  while  *  in  others  the  English  rule 
upon  the  subject  is  copied  and  adopted.^  *  A  question 
growing  out  of  these  statutes  has  arisen  as  to  the  mode  of 
signing  leases  when  done  through  an  agent  in  the  actual  pres- 
ence of  the  lessor,  and  by  his  direction.  In  South  Carolina, 
the  court  of  appeals  were  equally  divided  upon  the  point,  a 
part  holding  that  if  an  instrument  is  signed  by  a  person  in  the 
presence  of  another,  in  the  name  and  by  the  ex])ress  direction 
of  the  latter,  it  is  a  good  signing  of  the  party  himself  at  com- 
mon law,  and  that  the  statute  did  not  intend  to  extend  to 
cases  like  this.  But  the  other  part  of  the  court  api^lied  a  strict 
construction  to  the  language  of  the  act,  and  regarded  an  agent 
as  no  less  an  agent  while  acting  in  presence  of  his  princijjal 
than  he  would  be  in  his  absence.^  In  Massachusetts,  on  the 
contrary,  it  has  been  held  that  a  signature  placed  by  a  third 

*NoTE. — In  the  following  States  the  English  rule  prevails:  Alabama,  Ark- 
ansas, Georgia,  Maryland,  Michigan,  Missouri,  New  Hampshire,  New  Jersey, 
New  York,  Ohio,  Pennsylvania,  South  Carolina,  and  Wisconsin,  while  in  the 
others  the  requirement  is  either  simply  that  it  may  be  executed  by  a  party  or  his 
"agent,"  or  "attorney,"  or  it  adds  "lawfully  authorized,"  without  stating  how. 
In  Connecticut  it  must  be  signed  by  the  lessor,  and  in  Delaware  it  must  be  done 
by  deed. 

1  Miller  v.  Harbert,  25  Leg.  Int.  29. 

2  Olmstead  v.  Niles,  7  N.  H.  522,  52G. 

8  Richardson  v.  Bates,  8  Ohio  St.  257,  260.  *  Pub.  Stat.  c.  120,  §  4. 

*  See  the  statutes  of  the  several  States  collected  in  the  Appendix  to  Browne 
on  the  Stat,  of  Frauds,  50.3-.^31.     Of.  Jennings  v.  McConib,  112  Penn.  St.  518. 
6  Wallace  v.  McCullough,  1  Rich.  r:^.  426. 


CU.  X.   §   -.]  ESTATES    FOR    YEAIW.  JTO 

person  in  the  jrrantor's  [in'scnec  Mini  hy  his  (lirection,  oi-ully 
^ivm,  will  ijc  a  valiil  exceiitiun  of  Ji  derd.'  It  may  l)e  adth-d, 
tliat  if  the  Hijrnin;^  is  not  liv  the  \r.w\y  liiniself,  hut  hy  his 
n'^cnt,  it  should  he  exjuessed  as  the  aet  of  the  principal  done 
hy  his  a^ent ;  as  A  IJ,  hy  his  attorney,  C  1),- while 
•merely  signin;^  the  name  of  the  principal,  as  A  15,  [*3U0] 
without  addinir  hy  whom  done,  would  not  he  a  good 
siirninir,^  nor  would  it  l»e  if  in  the  agent's  own  name.^ 

;}.  In  respect  to  the  piopcr  trrms  hy  which  an  estate  for 
years  may  lie  created,  any  form  of  expression  is  sullicient  if  it 
shows  an  intention  on  the  part  of  the  lessor  to  part  with  and 
divest  himself  of  the  possession  in  favor  of  the  lessee,  and  a 
corresponding  intention  on  tlit."  part  of  the  lessee  to  come  into 
the  possession  of  the  premises  for  a  determinate  period  of 
time.  The  words  generally  used  fortius  |)Ui"pose  are, "grant," 
"demise,"  and  "  to  farm  let,"  some  of  whirji  have  a  technical 
and  extensive  signification.  "  Do  lease,  demise,  and  let,"  in 
a  lease,  import  the  creation  of  a  term  to  hegin  presently,  and 
not  at  a  future  day  or  upon  a  contingency.^  But  neither  of 
them  is  indispensahle  to  constitute  a  valid  lease,^  and  even 
when  adopted  they  may  he  controlled  by  the  connection  in 
which  they  are  used.'  Thus,  where  A  gave  B  a  bond  condi- 
tioned to  convey  land  upon  being  paid  a  certain  note  on  dc- 

•  Gardner  r.  G.inlncr,  5  Cush.  483;  Woo<l  r.  Gootlriilge,  6  Cusli.  117. 

*  Riuon,  Alir.  Loasc,  I.  §  10;  Opinion  of  Mr.  Hoirnian,  3  Am.  .lur.  67;  Elwell 
r.  Sh.iw,  16  MiKss.  42.     Post,  vol.  2,  pp.  *  573-.'i75. 

»  \Vo<h1  v.  Gooilridge,  6  Cusli.  117,   1  Am.  Lead.  Cas.  3d  ed.  579. 

♦  ('omlH''8  ('a.se,  9  IJfp.  76  h;  1  Am.  Lead.  Cas.  3d  ed.  579. 
'  So.  Cong.  Meeting  House  r.  Hiltun,  11  Gray,  409. 

«  .laekson  v.  Dehuroi.x,  2  Wend.  433,  43S;  Wms.  Real.  Prop.  327.  "Agree  to 
let,"  "agree  to  take,"  lield  to  be  words  of  jjresent  demise.  Doe  v.  Kies,  8  Bing. 
178,  182,  per  Tindal,  C.  J.;  Doc  v.  Benjamin,  9  Ad.  k  E.  644,  650,  per  Denman, 
C.J.  So  are  "shall  hold  and  enjoy."  Doe  v.  Ashlmrner,  5  T.  R.  163  ;  Bur- 
ton, Real  Prop.  §  838;  Watson  r.  O'Heiii,  6  Watts,  362;  Moshier  t).  Reding,  12 
Me.  478;  Mooiv  r.  Miller,  8  Penn.  St.  272;  Baron,  Abr.  I^'ase,  K. 

^  Putnam  f.Wise,  1  Hill,  234,  where,  though  the  terms  were  those  of  a  lea.se, 
it  w.as  held  to  eonstitute  the  parties  tenants  in  eommon  of  the  erops,  the  return 
for  the  oecupation  Ix-ing  a  shan-  of  the  crops.  See  Walker  r.  Fitts,  24  Piek.  191. 
Pof/.  •364.  Doc  r.  Derrj',  9  Car.  &  P.  494.  A  let  to  B  his  farm  for  seven 
years,  and  B  at  the  same  time  in  writing  agreed  to  employ  A  to  carry  on  the 
farm  at  certain  wages,  and  to  allow  him  to  occupy  the  house  fn-e  of  rent;  it  was 
held  to  be  a  contract  for  rcmunenitiun  fur  services  and  not  a  demise  of  the 
house. 


480  LAW  OP  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

mand,  with  interest  quarterly,  and  that  the  obligee  should 
have  possession  of  the  same  until  such  conveyance  should  be 
made,  it  was  held  to  be  a  demise  so  long  as  B  paid  the  inter- 
est on  the  note  quarterly,  and  did  not  fail  to  pay  the  principal 
on  demand,  and  that  the  tenancy  created  was  not  one  at  will.i 
It  is  indispensable,  however,  that  the  lease  should,  by  its 
terms,  ascertain  the  premises  intended  to  be  demised,  for,  if 
defective  in  this  respect,  it  cannot  be  made  good  by  parol  evi- 
dence.2 

4.  Some  of  the  most  difficult  questions  under  this  head  have 
been,  whether  the  language  of  tlie  parties  is  to  be  construed 
as  a  present  demise  or  a  contract  for  a  future  one.  And 
whether  it  is  the  one  or  the  other,  depends  upon  the  intention 
of  the  parties,  as  gathered  from  the  whole  instrument,  rather 
than  any  particular  form  of  expression  in  any  particular  part 
of  the  agreement,  though,  as  a  general  proposition,  if  there 
are  apt  words  of  a  present  demise,  followed  by  possession,  the 
instrument  will  be  held  to  pass  an  immediate  interest.^ 
[*301]  The  cases  are  numerous,  *  and  many  of  them  appar- 
ently conflicting.  Thus  in  Jackson  v.  Kisselbrack, 
the  memorandum  stated  that  L.  "  hath  set  and  to  farm  let " 

1  White  V.  Livingston,  10  Gush.  259.  The  permissive  possession  of  a  vendee 
before  purchase  is  not  a  demise,  but  a  bare  license.  Doe  v.  Stanion,  1  M.  &  W. 
695,  700;  Thompsons.  Bower,  60  Barb.  463;  Dunham  v.  Townsend,  110  Mass.  440; 
Taylor,  Land.  &  Ten.  (7th  ed.)  §  25,  and  note;  and  this  will  be  more  fully  con- 
sidered, jjost,  Book  L  c.  12,  §  2.  A  contract  for  lodging  also  is  not  a  lease  prop- 
erly, see  Cook  v.  Humber,  11  C.  B.  N.  s.  33,  46;  7  Am.  Law.  Rev.  253;  White  v. 
Maynard,  111  Mass.  250;  and  of  course  not  where  for  board  and  lodging,  ib.; 
Taylor,  Land.  &  Ten.  (7th  ed.)  §  66;  Wilson  v.  Martin,  1  Denio,  602.  But  where 
the  contiact  is  a  clear  lease  it  does  not  lose  this  character,  because  it  also  contains 
an  agreement  to  board  at  the  lessee's  option.     Porter  v.  Merrill,  124  Mass.  534. 

2  Diiigman  v.  Kelly,  7  Ind.  717. 

3  Hallett  V.  Wylie,  3  Johns.  44;  Thornton  ■;;.  Payne,  5  Johns.  74.  In  the 
latter  case,  the  judge,  Spencer,  says:  "In  every  case  decided  in  the  English 
courts  where  agreements  have  been  adjudged  not  to  operate  by  passing  an  interest, 
but  to  rest  in  contract,  there  has  been  either  an  express  agreement  for  a  future 
lease,  or  construing  the  agreement  to  be  a  lease  m  pi'ccsenti  would  work  a  forfeit- 
ure, or  the  terms  have  not  been  fully  settled,  and  something  further  was  to  be 
done."  Jackson  v.  Delacroix,  2  Wend.  433;  Burton,  Keal  Prop.  §  845;  War- 
man  V.  Faitlifull,  5  B.  &  Ad.  1042;  Averill  v.  Taylor,  8  N.  Y.  44;  Baxters. 
Browne,  2  W.  Bl.  973;  Morgan  v.  Bissell,  3  Taunt.  65;  Wright  i?.  Trevezant, 
3  Car.  k  P.  441.  See  Weed  v.  Crocker,  13  Gray,  219;  Hurlburt  v.  Post. 
1  Bosw.  28. 


CII.  X.  §  2.]  ESTATES    FOR    YEARS.  481 

iiiifi)  K.,  At'.,  hut  if  ('ontaiiu'tl  a  rlaiist',  "tlif  \ih\co  t<»  !•<'  sur- 
veyed on  or  before,  tVe.,  «'nsuinjr  tlie  date,"  "and  then  K.  is  to 
take  a  lease  for  the  same."  The  eourt  (SjK'neer,  .1.)  say, 
"This  hist  eirennistanee  has  pMierally  given  a  character  to 
the  instrument  of  an  ajrreement  for  a  lease  as  contradistin- 
piished  from  a  present  demise."  Hut.  it  is  addeil, '*  none  of 
the  cases  will  he  found  to  contradict  the  |»osition  that  where 
there  are  ajtt  words  of  j)rcscnt  demise,  and  to  these  is  sujier- 
addeil  a  covenant  for  a  future  lease,  the  instrument  is  to  he 
considered  as  a  leas(>,  and  the  covenant  as  o])eratini>;  in  the 
nature  of  a  covenant  for  fui-ther  assurance"  The  airrccinciit 
in  that  case,  havinir  lieen  i'ollowed  hy  jtossession,  was  held 
to  Ijc  a  present  demise.'  The  (piestion  seems  to  tui'U  ujion 
whether  the  writinir  shows  that  the  ])artics  intend  a  present 
tlemise  and  partintr  with  the  jiossession  by  the  lessor  to  the 
lessee,  fur,  if  it  does,  it  will  ojierate  as  a  lease,  though  it  is 
contemplated  that  a  future  writing  should  be  drawn,  more 
exitlicit  in  its  terms.  And  it  may  be  a  good  lease  in  distinc- 
ti»jn  from  an  executory  contract  to  lease,  though  it  be  to  com- 
mence in  fuluror  But  if  a  fuller  lease  is  to  be  jjrepared  and 
executed  before  the  demi.sc  is  to  take  effect,  and  possession 
given,  it  is  an  agreement  for  a  lease,  and  not  a  lease 
which  creates  an  estate.^  Thus,  where  it*  was  cov-  [*302] 
enanted  between  A  A-  n'Mhat  A  doth  let  the  said 
lamls  for  and  during  (he  years,  A'c,  to  begin,  Ac,  provided 

1  Jiuksnii  1-.  Kissell.rnck,  10  Jdhn.s.  336;  Clmiinmn  v.  Bliuk,  5  Scott,  51.5; 
Al.lennaii  v.  Nt-ntc,  4  M.  &  W.  704.  But  see  Uootltitle  r.  Way,  1  T.  H.  735; 
Poole  r.  Bciitley,  12  East,  168;  Wnis.  Heal.  Prop.  327;  rin.io  r.  Jtulson,  G  BiiiR. 
206;  Doe  V.  Uies,  8  Bing.  178;  Jones  v.  Rt-ynoltls,  per  Wightinan,  J.,  1  Q.  B. 
517. 

2  Wliituey  V.  Allaire,  1  N.  Y.  305,  311;  Holley  r.  Young,  66  Me.  520;  Buss- 
man  V.  Ganster,  72  Penn.  St.  285;  People  v.  Kelsey,  14  AM).  Pr.  372. 

■  Aiken  v.  Smith,  21  Yt.  172;  People  v.  Gillis,  24  \Vend.  201;  Jackson  r. 
F:i.lri.lge,  3  Story,  325;  Griffin  i-.  Knisely,  75  111.  447;  Buell  v.  Cook,  4  Conn. 
23s,  where  the  agreement  was  lield  to  bc!  for  a  lea.se  and  not  a  lea.se  itself,  as  it 
.showed  the  lessor  was  to  get  an  authority  from  another  i>arty  Ix'fore  he  could 
make  a  valid  demise.  So  Brown  v.  N.  Y.  C.  H.  U.  44  X.  Y.  70,  wlure  the  cove- 
nnn'.s  were  not  settled.  In  Doe  v.  Benjamin,  9  Ad.  &  E.  C44,  "  agree  to  let " 
was  held  eipiivalent  to  an  actual  present  letting,  though  no  time  was  fixed  for 
comniencenjent  of  the  same,  and  the  agreement  contained  a  clause,  "a  lease  to 
be  drawn  upon  the  usual  tenns."  So  Hand  v.  Hall,  2  E.xch.  Div.  355.  See 
Jackson  v.  Myers,  3  Johns  388,  395;  Sturgion  r.  Painter,  Noy,  123. 
Vol.  I.— 31 


482  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

that  B  shall  pay  to  A  annually  during  the  term  at,  &c.,  .£120, 
also,  the  parties  do  covenant  that  a  lease  shall  be  made  and 
sealed  according  to  the  effect  of  these  articles,  before  the 
Feast,"  &c.,  it  was  held  to  be  a  good  present  lease ;  "  that 
which  follows  the  demise  is  in  reference  to  further  assur- 
ance." ^  And  it  is  said  that  acts  and  declarations  of  the  par- 
ties may  be  looked  to,  to  aid  in  the  construction  which  is  to 
be  given  to  their  agreements  in  this  respect,  where  the  agree- 
ment is  equivocal,  especially  the  yielding  of  possession  by  the 
one  and  accepting  it  by  the  other,^  And  sometimes  an  agree- 
ment which  might,  otherwise,  be  defective  for  want  of  stipu- 
lations as  to  the  terms  of  the  letting,  may  be  made  good  by 
providing  these  shall  be  "  such  as  are  usually  contained  in 
leases."  ^ 

4  a.  The  test  whether  a  written  instrument  is  a  lease  or 
only  an  agreement  for  a  lease  is  sometimes  stated  to  be,  that 
if  the  agreement  of  the  parties  leaves  nothing  incomplete,  it 
may  operate  as  a  present  demise.  Thus,  "  we  agree  to  let" 
certain  land  to  a  gas  company  to  place  sand,  &c.,  on,  for  the 
construction  of  a  gas-holder,  to  be  occupied  during  the  con- 
struction of  the  same,  was  held  to  be  an  actual  letting,  by 
which  the  lessors  were  bound,  although  they  never  .built  their 
gas-holder  upon  the  proposed  site.^    So  where  A  wrote  B  that 

1  1  Eolle,  Abr.  847.  In  Jackson  v.  Delacroix,  2  Wend.  433,  where  there  were 
words  of  present  demise,  but  the  agreement  showed  that  alterations  were  to  be  made 
in  the  estate  before  the  lease  was  to  take  effect,  it  was  held  not  to  be  a  lease.  So 
McGrath  v.  Boston,  103  Mass.  369;  where  repairs  were  to  be  done  and  then  a  lease 
given.  But  in  Bacon  v.  Bowdoin,  22  Pick.  401,  though  the  lessor  was  in  terms 
to  complete  a  building,  the  agreement  was  a  present  demise  of  it  for  a  certain  time, 
and  the  lessee  was  to  have  a  right  to  use  it  for  certain  purposes  from  the  date  of 
the  agreement,  it  was  held  to  be  a  present  lease.  So  People  v.  Kelsey,  14  Abb. 
Pr.  372.  In  Chapman  v.  Towner,  6  M.  &  W.  100,  there  were  words  of  demise  in 
the  agreement,  but  the  amount  of  rent  or  terms  of  holding  were  not  mentioned  in 
it,  except  as  to  be  contained  in  a  lease  to  be  prepared,  it  was  held  to  be  an  agree- 
ment and  not  a  lease.  See  6  M.  &  W.  104  ;  Am.  ed.,  note  ;  Morgan  v.  Bissell,  3 
Taunt.  65;  Jones  v.  Reynolds,  1  Q.  B.  506,  515.  But  in  Doe  v.  Benjamin,  1  Perr.  & 
D.  444,  Lord  Denman  declares  Morgan  v.  Bissell  overruled,  so  far  as  that  provi- 
sion for  giving  a  future  lease  controls  a  present  demise. 

2  Chapman  v.  Bluck,  5  Scott,  515,  533,  per  Parke,  J.,  s.  c.  4  Bing.  N.  C.  187; 
Doe  V.  Ashburner,  5  T.  R.  163. 

3  Alderman  v.  Neate,   4  M.  &  W.   704. 

*  Kabley  V.  Worcester  Gas  Co.,  102  Mass.  392. 


ril.  X.  §   2]  ESTATES    FOR    YEARR.  483 

he  woiiM  takt'  liis  houso  at  a  certain  n-iit  for  throe  years,  if  ho 
woiihl  |iut  a  fiiniaci'  into  it,  and  II  n-plii'd  liy  h'tti-r  that  ho 
aoo('j)to(l  the  oflor  and  at  once  procnn-d  and  iihicotl  u  furnace 
in  the  house  hefore  the  day  fixed  for  the  three  years  to  hejrin, 
it  was  hcM  to  he  a  lease  and  not  a  mere  offer  to  take  one.' 
In  another  case,  A  i)roj>()seil  to  H,  in  writin<r,  to  hire  a  shop  of 
certain  dimensions  on  a  certain  piei'e  of  hmd  for  a  certain 
time,  at  a  certain  rent,  if  II  would  erect  it;  and  15  accepted 
the  offer  ami  erected  the  shop,  and  A  went  into  occu|tation  of 
it.  IJut,  in  fact,  15  did  not  own  th<'  land  and  did  not  com|il('t<' 
the  shoj)  within  the  time  aLTced.  It  was  licld  that  Iiy  accept- 
ing aiul  cntcriuiT  into  occupancy  of  th(!  premises,  the  aurree- 
nient  heeame  an  effectual  lease  for  the  a<rrec(l  term,  thouudi 
A  might  recoil])  the  damap^s  he  sustained  l»y  ITs  delay  in 
completinir  the  shop.^  Uut  in  such  a  case,  a  failure  of  the  lessor 
to  have  the  building  completed  by  the  time  fixed  in  the  agree- 
ment would,  if  the  lessee  chose,  release  him  from  his  obliga- 
tion to  accept  it  and  pay  rent.^  And  whore  there  was  an 
agreement,  not  under  seal,  on  one  part  to  let  and  on  the  other 
to  hire,  and  that  a  good  lease  should  be  made  at  the  joint  ex- 
pense of  the  parties,  it  was  held,  though  not  to  be  a  lease,  to 
be  binding  as  an  agreement  to  take  a  lease.'' 

5.  The  importance  of  this  distinction  between  agreements 
to  lease,  and  agreements  which  operate  as  leases,  results, 
among  other  things,  from  this,  that  as  an  executed  written 
contract  must  si)eak  for  itself,  and  cannot  be  added  to  or  cor- 
rected by  parol,  if  the  agreement  be  held  to  be  a  lease  the  jiar- 
tics  will  be  bound  by  it,  as  written,  with  its  impUvd  as  well  as 
express  covenants  and  stipulations ;  whereas,  if  it  is  a  mere 
agreement  to  lease,  these  may  l)c  rectified  or  supjdicd  before 
it  is  executed,  or  the  party  may  rcfu.se  to  execute  it.'* 

*  G.  In  treating  thus  far  of  what  may  be  a  lease,  [*303] 
and  of  its  effect,  it  has  been  assumed  that  he  who 
makes  the  agreement  is  the  owner  of  the  interest  or  estate 
which  he  assumes  to  demise.     There  is,  however,  a  class  of 
cases  where  a  lease  may  become  operative,  though  the  lessor, 

>  Shaw  V.  Fnrnsworth,  103  Mns.s.  357.  "^  Mnven  r.WakcficM.  39  111.509. 

»  Till,  y  r.  Mall.-tt.  16  C.  B.  N.  s.  21*3.  «  Bond  r.  Rosliiig,  1  Best.  &  S.  371. 

'  Sugden'8  LotU-re,  118. 


484  LAW   OF  REAL   PROPERTY.  [bOOK   I. 

at  the  time  of  making  it,  has  no  estate  in  the  subject-matter  of 
the  lease.  This  is  by  way  of  what  is  called  an  estoppel.  Thus 
suppose  A  makes  a  deed  of  indenture  of  lease  of  premises  to 
which  he  has  no  title,  and  afterwards  acquires  one  during  the 
term  ;  he  will  not  be  admitted  to  deny  that  his  lessee  had  a 
good  title  to  the  same,  nor,  on  the  other  hand,  will  the  lessee, 
if  permitted  to  occupy  under  such  a  lease,  be  at  liberty  to  deny 
the  title  of  his  lessor.^  In  one  case,  one  in  possession  of 
premises  leased  them,  but  without  any  covenant  except  that 
the  lessee  should  enjoy  without  interference  by  the  lessor  or 
any  one  claiming  under  him,  and  the  lessor  having  acquired 
title  to  the  premises,  it  was  held  that  the  lessee  might  hold  as 
against  this  newly  acquired  title  by  force  of  the  lessor's  per- 
sonal covenant.^  To  produce  the  effect  above  stated,  it  has 
been  laid  down  that  the  lease  must  be  by  indenture,  whereby 
the  deed  becomes  the  act  of  both  parties,  in  order  that  the 
estoppel  thereby  created  may  be  mutual ;  ^  and  as  a  corollary 
thereto  that  infants  and  femes  covert  cannot  avail  themselves 
of  the  benefit  of  a  lease  where  the  lessor  demises  premises 
without  having  any  estate  in  the  same.*  But,  inasmuch  as  the 
estoppel  of  the  tenant  to  deny  the  lessor's  title  flows  from  pos- 
session and  not  the  form  of  the  instrument,  neither  of  these 
propositions  are  probably  tenable  at  the  present  day.^  So,  by 
the  American  law,  if  one  having  no  estate  grant  land  by  deed 
with  covenants  of  warranty  of  title,  and  afterwards  acquire  a 
title  to  the  granted  premises,  it  will  enure  and  pass  to  the 
grantee  by  estoppel.^     But  this  doctrine  of  creating  a  demise 

1  Burton,  P>eal  Prop.  §  850,  and  n.;  Smith,  Land.  &Ten.  32,  andn.;  Co.  Lit. 
47  b;  Sturgeon  i;.  Wingfield,  15  M.  &  W.  22-1;  Utica  Bk.  y.  Mersereau,  3  B;irb. 
Ch.  528,  5G7;  Wms.  Real  Prop.  329;  Eawlyn's  case,  4  Rep.  53;  Bac.  Abr.  Lease,  0. 
This  class  of  cases  should  be  distinguished  from  that  hereafter  treated  of,  where 
leases  are  made  by  donees  of  powers,  and  held  good,  though  such  donee  had  no  in- 
terest in  the  premises  demised. 

2  Burr  V.  Stenton,  43  N.  Y.  462,  466.  It  was  also  held  that  the  tenant  would 
have  uo  recourse,  if  evicted  by  a  foreclosure  sale,  against  the  surplus  therefrom 
arising.     But  this  is  qualified  by  Clarkson  v.  Skidmore,  46  N.  Y.  297. 

8  Burton,  Real  Prop.  §  850;  Co.  Lit.  352  a;  1  Piatt,  Leases,  55. 
<  1  Piatt,  Leases,  55. 

6  Bigelow,  Estoppel,  c.  15;  Taylor,  Land.  &  Ten.  (7th  ed.)  §§  89,  90. 
6  Somes  V.  Skinner,  3  Pick.  52;  Baxter  v.  Bradl)ury,   20  Me.  260;  2  Smith, 
Lead.  Cas.  5th  Am.  ed.  625;  White  v.  Patten,  24  Pick.  324;  Knight  v.  Thayer, 


CU.  X.  §  2.]  ESTATES    FOR   YEARS,  4S.J 

of  a  certain  oxtoiit  of  estate  by  estoppel  does  not  apjdy  wliere 
the  lissor  1ms  any  le^al  estate  in  the  picniises  which  jiasses  liy 
the  lease,  thini^h  less  than  that  which  hr  has,  in  ternjs,  de- 
mised.* One  pretty  ohvious  reason  for  this  luic  would  be,  that 
to  lix  what  tlie  amount  of  estate  is  which  actually  passes  l>y 
the  lease,  would  open  the  very  in(piiry  by  eviilencc  which  it  is 
the  purpose  and  elTect  of  an  estoi>pel  to  preclude. 

•  7.  In  respect  to  who  may  be  parties  to  such  leases  ["304] 
as  have  been  mentioned  ab(iV(>,  it  may  be  said,  gener- 
ally, that  the  same  rules  ajtply  as  in  other  cases  of  contract. 
In  treating  of  who  may  be  lessors,  it  may  bo  stated,  that  the 
lease  of  a  person  non  cum/ios  7}icufi><,  regarded  as  an  executory 
contract,  is  void.  l>ut  it  has  been  held  otherwise  in  England, 
in  respect  to  an  executed  contract,  where  the  jiarties  cannot 
be  restored  in  stdta  ijuo,  especially  in  the  case  of  a  lunatic,  if 
the  unsoundness  of  mind  was  unknown  to  the  other  party,  and 
no  adxantage  was  taken  of  him.^  In  the  United  States,  it 
W(juld  seem  that  it  makes  no  difVerence  with  the  parties  as  to 
the  right  of  a  jtcrson  non  composio  avoid  any  and  all  his  con- 
tracts, that  the  party  dealing  with  him  was  not  apprised  of 
his    incapacity,  ami    did    not    overreach    liim.'^      And   in   this 

125  Miiss.  25;  Utica  Bk.  r.  Mersert-au,  3  Barb.  Ch.  528,  5G7;  Hawle,  Cov.  c.  9; 
Wrw.  Kval  Fr-.p.  330,  IJawle's  note. 

1  Co.  Lit.  45  a;  Burton,  Keal  Prop.  §  850;  Wms.  Real  Prop.  330;  Blake  f. 
Foster,  8  T.  R.  487,  496;  Doe  v.  Seaton,  2  C.  M.  k  R.  728.  See  Cuth'x-rtson  v. 
Irving,  4  Hurl,  k  N.  742,  8.  c.  6  Id.  135,  where  tiie  oM  doctrine  supjiosed  to  lie 
derived  from  Noke  r.  Awder,  Cro.  El.  436,  that  such  a  lease  by  estopjiel  carries 
no  riglits  to  assignees  wliich  tliey  could  enforce,  is  limited  to  casi's  where  tlie  want 
of  actual  interest  appears  in  tlie  instrument  of  demise  in  the  plejidings.  And  even 
this  re.fuirement  is  denied,  except  in  actions  of  covenant  or  ejectment,  in  Morton 
r.  Womls,  L.  R.  4  Q.  B.  293,  303. 

"  Smith,  Land,  k  Ten.  47,  and  note  ;  Molton  v.  Caniroux,  2  F.xch.  487,  s.  c. 
4  Exeh.  17;  Dane  v.  Kirkwall,  8  Car.  A:  P.  679  ;  Beavan  v.  M'Donnell,  9  Exrh.  309. 

■  Seaver  v.  Plielps,  11  Pick.  304  ;  Mitchell  v.  Kingman,  5  Pick.  431  ;  Rice  r. 
Peet,  15  Johns.  503  ;  Bensell  v.  Chancellor,  5  Wliart  371  ;  Desilver's  Est.. 
6  Rawle,  111,  where  it  waa  held  that  a  deetl  of  Imrgain  and  sale  by  a  lunatic  was 
void,  thougii  a  feoffment  and  livery  of  seisin  by  him  would  only  K-  vnidalde. 
C.rnnt  r.  Thompson,  4  Conn.  203  ;  Lang  r.  Whidden,  2  N.  H.  435.  In  Fit;rg.Tald 
c.  Heed,  9  Sm.  k  M.  94,  the  court  .say,  "The  contracts  of  non  coyajx-fc*  tnnifijt 
are,  if  not  wh(dly  void,  at  all  events  voidable."  This  was  a  case  of  a  puniiast-  of 
hind.  But  in  some  States  the  opiwsite  rule  prevails,  and  the  deed  of  a  lunatic 
will  bind  in  favor  of  such  bonn  fidr  jmrchaser  for  value.  Riggan  r.  Green,  80  N.  C. 
230  ;  Rusk  v.  Fenton,  14  Bush,  490.     Posly  voL  2,  pp.  'iSS,  •559. 


486  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

respect,  insane  persons  and  infants  are  placed  upon  the  same 
ground,  substantially,  as  to  their  acts  being  voidable  and  not 
void,  provided  the  insane  person  be  not  under  guardianship. ^ 
But,  in  New  York,  the  deed  of  a  person  non  compos  mentis  is 
entirely  void.^  Leases  made  by  infants  are  voidable  and  not 
void ;  ^  but  to  disaffirm  an  act  which  is  voidable  only,  requires 
some  positive  act  on  their  part,  while,  as  will  appear,  it  may 
be  ratified  by  slight  circumstances  and  in  some  cases  even  by 
inaction.  What  is  necessary  in  order  to  disaffirm  such  act, 
has  received  different  constructions  at  different  times,  and 
must  obviously  depend  much  upon  the  nature  of  the  original 
act.  If,  for  instance,  an  infant  has  made  a  deed  of  convey- 
ance of  land,  inasmuch  as  he  has  parted  with  his  seisin  there- 
by, it  has  been  held,  and,  it  is  believed  is  the  better  doctrine, 
that  he  can  only  avoid  it  by  re-entry,  unless  he  has  retained  pos- 
session, or  unless  it  was  wild  and  vacant  land,  in  which  case 

a  deed  of  it  to  a  stranger  would  be  a  disaffirmance  of 
[*305]  his  first  conveyance.^    All  the  cases  agree  *  that  such 

an  entry  would  be  sufficient  and  effectual.  But  in 
several  it  was  held  that  a  deed,  without  a  formal  prior  entry 
to  regain  a  seisin,  would  be  sufficient.^  So  one  who  executes 
an  agreement  while  so  intoxicated  as  not  to  understand  its 
meaning  and  effect  may  avoid  it.^     Leases  by  married  women 

1  Hovey  v.  Hobson,  53  Me.  45],  456  ;  Thompson  v.  Leach,  3  Mod.  296,  310; 
Somers  v.  Pumphrey,  24  Ind.  231,  238. 

'^  Van  Deusen  v.  Sweet,  51  N.  Y.  378.  So  in  Oregon.  Farley  v.  Parker,  6 
Oreg.  105. 

8  Co.  Lit.  308  a  ;  Zoueh  v.  Parsons,  3  Burr.  1806  ;  Worcester  v.  Eaton,  13 
Mass.  371,  375  ;  Scott  v.  Buchanan,  11  Humph.  46S  ;  Kendall  v.  LawTence,  22 
Pick.  540  ;  Roof  v.  Stafford,  7  Cow.  179  ;  Stafford  v.  Eoof,  9  Cow.  626  ;  Roberts  v. 
Wiggin,  1  N.  H.  73  ;  Tucker  v.  Moreland,  10  Pet.  58,  71  ;  Jackson  v.  Carpenter, 
11  Johns.  539  ;  Drake  v.  Ramsay,  5  Ohio,  251  ;  Bool  v.  Mix,  17  Wend.  119. 
Post,  vol.  2,  pp.  *558,  *559. 

*  Worcester  v.  Eaton,  13  Mass.  371  ;  Whitney  v.  Dutch,  14  Mass.  457,  462  ; 
Roberts  v.  Wiggin,  1  N.  H.  75,  unless  the  land  be  wild  and  vacant  :  Murray  v. 
Shanklin,  4  Dev.  &  B.  289 ;  Bool  v.  Mix,  17  Wend.  133,  explaining  Jackson  v. 
Burchin,  14  Johns.  124,  and  Tucker  v.  Moreland,  10  Pet.  58. 

6  Cresinger  v.  Welch,  15  Ohio,  156,  192  ;  Scott  v.  Buchanan,  11  Humph.  468  ; 
Drake  v.  Ramsay,  5  Ohio,  251  ;  Jackson  v.  Carpenter,  11  Johns.  539  ;  Jackson 
V.  Burchin,  14  Johns.  124,  where  the  land  was  vacant  ;  Tucker  v.  Moreland,  10 
Pet.  58,  the  minor  having  been  all  the  time  in  occupation  of  the  premises. 

6  Gore  V.  Gibson,  13  M.  &  W.  623. 


CH.  X.  §   2.]  ESTATKS    FOR    YKARS.  487 

are  void,  unloss  tlioy  relate  to  tlu-ir  own  hoIc  property  over 
which,  hy  chiinccry  or  the  statute  of  the  State  wlicre  tlicy 
live,  they  are  authorized  to  act  as  femes  sole}  'I'Iiuh  in 
New  York  and  Massachusetts  a  wife  can  hiri'  or  let  lands,  or 
enter  into  any  contract  in  respect  to  thcni,  us  fully  and  clTect- 
ually  as  w  f\me  xole  could  do.-  Leases  oljtained  l>y  duress  are 
voidable,  hut  U(tt  void/'  So  a  lease  may  he  avoided  for  fraud. 
IJut  if  the  lessee  he  tlu'  party  defrauded,  he  should  act 
promptly  in  resciudiuj^  the  contract  ;  and  so  lonir  as  he  retains 
possession  of  the  premises,  he  is  liahle  lor  the  I'ent.^  And  if 
the  jjiantor  in  a  ilwd  seeks  to  avoid  it  on  the  ground  of  fraud, 
he  must  rescind  the  contract,  and  return  the  consideration 
within  a  reasonable  time  after  discovering  it,  or  it  will  he  too 
late.^  Hut  this  does  not  ai)ply  to  cases  of  an  infant's  convey- 
ini^  lands,  especially  if  the  money  has  been  spent  or  wasted  by 
him  while  a  minor.** 

8.  Such  leases  may  conscrpicntly  he  affirmed  and  made 
effectual  by  ratification,  or  disailirmed  and  avoided,  by  the 
acts  and  declarations  of  the  lessor,  done  or  made  at  a  proj)cr 
time.  In  the  first  jdiice,  the  right  to  disanirin  a  lease  is  a  |)er- 
sonal  jirivileire,  and  must  l»e  exercised  l)y  the  lessor  himself  or 
his  heirs,  and  not  by  a  stranger."  So  far  as  a  lease  is  to  be 
regarded  as  having  the  properties  of  a  deed  of  conveyance  of 
land,  the  authorities  above  cited  may  be  ap])licable.  But,  as 
will  be  seen,  the  law  is  much  more  liberal  in  allowing  an 
infant  to  disaflirm  the  sale  of  a  chattel  than  the  conveyance 
of  land,  since  he  may  do  the  one  before  arriving  at  age,  hut  he 
cannot  disallirm  his  deed  of  conveyance  while  an  infant.'^     It 

»  Smith,  Ijin.I.  &  Ten.  4S  ;  1  Plutt,  Leases,  48;  Murray  v.  Kmnioiis,  1«J  N.  H. 
483. 

«  Prcvot  V.  Lawri'iict',  51  N.  Y.  219  ;  Mass.  Piil).  Stat.  c.  147,  §  2  ;  Mtllcy  r. 
Casey,  99  Ma-sij.  241  ;  ChilJs  v.  Saini>sou,  117  Mass.  62;  were  decitled  umler  a 
prior  statute. 

•  IVrkins,  §  16  ;  1  Piatt,  Leases,  47;  Worcester  v.  Eaton,  13  Mass.  371. 

*  MoCarty  r.  Kly,  4  K.  I).  Smith,  375. 

»  WnsMtt  V.  Brown,  105  Mass.  551  ;  Barth-tt  v.  Drake,  100  Moss.  174. 

«  Walsh  p.  Young,  110  Mass.  396,  399  ;  Chandler  r.  Simmons,  97  Mass.  508; 
Bartlett  r.  Drake,  100  Mass.  174. 

'  1  Piatt,  Incases,  32  ;  Worcester  v.  Eaton,  13  Mass.  371  ;  Whuatou  r.  East, 
5  Yerp.  41,  61. 

■  Uolwon  V.  Flight,  4  De  G.  J.  &  S.  608. 


488  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  L 

would  seem  by  the  analogy  there  is  between  the  chattel  inter- 
est in  a  term  for  years,  in  which  no  seisin  passes,  and 
[*306]  the  property  in  *  personal  chattels,  that  a  lease  may 
be  disaffirmed  by  an  infant  before  arriving  at  age,  and 
from  the  well-settled  principle,  that,  though  an  infant  cannot 
defeat  his  deed  until  he  is  of  age,  he  may  enter  and  take  the 
profits  of  the  land  while  an  infant,  an  infant  lessor  may  enter 
and  avoid  his  lease  during  his  infancy.  However  this  may  be 
held  by  the  courts,  the  following  authorities  are  clear,  that 
while  an  infant  may  not  avoid  his  deed  until  after  arriving  at 
age,  he  may  disaffirm  and  avoid  a  sale  of  a  chattel.^  In 
respect  to  the  time  within  whicJi  an  infant  may  or  must  dis- 
affirm the  act  which  he  would  avoid,  in  some  cases  it  has  been 
held  that  he  may  avoid  his  deed  of  lands  at  any  time  after 
arriving  at  age,  within  the  period  of  limitation  for  making  an 
entry .2  In  others  it  has  been  held  he  must  do  it,  if  at  all, 
within  a  reasonable  time  after  arriving  at  age,  and  if  not  done 
within  such  time  it  becomes  irrevocable.^  And  others  hold, 
that  in  regard  to  contracts,  in  order  to  make  them  binding  as 
such,  the  minor  must  affirm  them  after  coming  of  age,  by 
some  distinct  act,  with  full  knowledge  that  it  would  not  be 
binding  without  such  confirmation.*  Slight  circumstances 
often  amount  to  a  confirmation  by  a  minor  after  coming  of  age, 
as,  in  the  cases  above  cited,  a  mere  omission  to  do  any  act 
of  disaffirmance  within  a  reasonable  time.  In  Wheaton  v. 
East,  the  infant  vendor,  after  coming  of  age,  saw  his  vendee 
making  expensive  improvements  on  the  land,  and  said  he  had 

1  Zouch  V.  Parsons,  3  Buit.  1808  ;  but  he  may  enter  and  take  the  prolits.  s.  P. 
Bool  V.  Mix,  17  Wend.  119,  132  ;  Scott  v.  Buchanan,  11  Humph.  468,  473  ;  Roof 
V.  Stafford,  7  Cow.  179,  that  he  can  avoid  neither  as  to  jjersonalty  nor  lands  until 
of  age.  But  overruled  as  to  personalty,  and  affirmed  as  to  lands.  Stafford  v.  Roof, 
9  Cow.  626  ;  Shipman  v.  Horton,  17  Conn.  481  ;  Matthewson  v.  Johnson,  1  Hoff. 
Ch.  560,  though  an  infant  may  not  avoid  his  deed  till  of  age,  he  may  enter  and 
take  the  profits  of  the  land. 

2  Drake  v.  Ramsay,  5  Ohio,  251  ;  Cresinger  v.  Welch,  15  Ohio,  156,  193. 

8  Richardson  v.  Boright,  9  Vt.  368  ;  Holmes  v.  Blogg,  8  Taunt.  35  ;  Kline  v. 
Beebe,  6  Conn.  494  ;  Scott  v.  Buchanan,  11  Humph.  468  ;  2  Kent,  Com.  238  ; 
Holt  V.  Underhill,  9  N.  H.  436  ;  Keil  v.  Healey,  84  HI.  104. 

*  Curtin  v.  Fatten,  11  S.  &  R.  305  ;  Thompson  v.  Lay.  4  Pick.  48  ;  2  Kent, 
Com.  8th  ed.  239,  n.;  Hoyle  v.  Stowe,  2  Dev.  &  B.  320.  So  of  a  deed.  Tucker 
V.  Moreland,  10  Pet.  58,  76  ;  Gillespie  v.  Bailey,  12  W.  Va.  70. 


ClI.  X.  §  2.]  ESTATPS   FOR   YEARS.  480 

lu't'M  paiil  anil  was  Katisfu'd,  aii<l  it  was  licld  a  confir- 
mation, •  thoiiL'li  this  was  within  two  years  aftt-r  liis  [•307] 
niajnrity.'  In  liuusur  v.  He}  noUls,  the  vendor,  after 
eoniin^  of  ajre,  said  he  never  would  take  advantaj^c  of  hi-; 
having  heen  an  infant  when  lie  made  the  deed,  and  told  tin- 
jj;rantec  it  was  his  wish  he  should  kee|)  the  deed.'-*  And  the 
receipt  of  rent  ujion  a  lease  after  arriving  at  age,  would  of 
itself  allirm  the  Icase.^ 

•J.  As  hy  eonnnon  law  the  hushand  is  entitle«l  to  the  rents 
and  profits  of  his  wife's  lands,  a  lease  l)y  him  of  these  was 
good  during  eovcrfure,  though  she  did  not  join  in  the  same;* 
and  if  she  joined  in  the  lease,  the-  covenant  as  to  payment  of 
rent  enureil  to  his  benefit  alone,  and  might  he  di'clared  on 
accordingly.''  But  his  lease  was  only  good  during  c(tverture, 
and  on  his  decease  his  wife  can  avoid  it  ;''  but  her  acceptanci: 
of  rent  would  allirnj  it." 

lU.  The  guardian  of  a  minor  may  lease  his  lands. "^  iJul  this 
is  limited  by  the  term  of  his  ollice,  and  a  demise  for  a  hjuger 
period  than  the  minority  of  his  ward  would  be  void  as  to  the 
excess  at  the  election  of  the  ward."  Thus,  in  New  York,  it 
was  held,  that  while  a  guardian  might  lease  his  ward's  lands 
for  a  term  as  long  as  he  continues  guardian,  or  for  any  num- 

'  Whfuton  V.  Eiuit,  5  Y«Tg.  41,  fi2.  So  Davis  v.  Dudluy,  7u  .Me.  'SM,  wlurc 
the  iiii|iruvuiuciits  wore  luadu  duriug  the  iiiiuority.  Se«  Wallace  r.  Lewis,  4  Ilur- 
rin^jt.  75. 

■•'  Hmu.mt  r.  Reynolds,  1  Il.iyw.  14.3. 

«  Smith,  Liind.  &  Tt-n.  48.  See  also  Cheshire  v.  Barrett,  4  .M.Cor.i.  L'il  ; 
Siiiitli  r.  Low,  1  Alk.  489.     And  see  post,  vol.  2,  •5.10,  on  this  whole  siilijiit. 

♦  1  Piatt.  lA^iises,  138  ;  Rurton,  Real  Prop.  §  S95  ;  Smith,  Und.  k  Ten.  41  ; 
WniK.  Real  Proj).  330.     Slie  may  lease.     Sullivan  r.  Barry,  4(5  N.  .T.  L.    1. 

'•  Arnold  V.  Uevoult,  1  Brod.  &  B.  443  ;  Wallis  v.  Harrison,  5  .>L  .^  W.  142  ; 
Bret  r.  ("umlierlanil,  ('ro.  .lac.  399. 

•  WinsUdl  r.  Held,  G  Bush,  58. 

">  Tnmt  r.  .McDonald,  S3  I'enn.  St.  144. 

■  2  Kent,  Com.  228 ;  King  v.  Oakley,  10  Ea.st,  491,  494  ;  but  in  Ma.i-uichuM'tts 
a  guanlian  inii.st  do  this  in  the  wani's  name.  Hicks  r.  Chapman,  10  Allen,  463  ; 
and  if  he  make  it  in  his  own,  he  only  binds  himself,  Manstir  v.  Pratt,  lol  Mass. 
60. 

»  1  I'latt,  I.«iscs,  380  ;  Bacon,  Abr.  I^aso,  I.  9  ;  Smith,  Und.  k  Ten.  46. 
The  acceptance  of  rent  by  the  minor,  after  coming  of  age,  would  allinn  sudi  lease, 
and  make  it  valid.  Ross  v.  Gill,  4  Call,  250;  Van  Doren  v.  Kveritt,  5  X.  J. 
46ii.  It  is,  however,  the  duty  of  the  guardian  to  lease.  Hughes  Minors  App., 
53  Penn.  St.  500. 


490  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

bcr  of  years  within  the  minority  of  his  ward,  it  is  subject  to 
be  defeated  by  the  appointment  of  a  new  guardian ;  and  a 
similar  princiijle  is  recognized  in  Illinois.^  The  same  rule 
applies  to  guardians  of  insane  persons.  The  lease  would  de- 
termine upon  the  death  of  the  ward,  whatever  its  terms 
may  have  been.  But  whether  it  would  bind  the  lessee  for  the 
original  term,  if  the  heirs  of  the  ward  chose  to  affirm  the  lease, 
seems  to  be  left  unsettled.^  But  a  parent  is  not  such  a  guar- 
dian as  to  have  a  right  to  lease  or  deal  with  the  lands  of  his 
minor  child.^  Executors  and  administrators,  as  having  the 
property  in  a  term  for  years,  may  dispose  of  the  whole  or 
carve  out  a  less  estate  by  under-lease.*  Nor  can  an  executor 
or  administrator  of  a  lessee  disclaim  the  leasehold  interest  of 
the  deceased.^  And  in  the  case  of  two  or  more  executors,  a 
lease  or  transfer  of  a  term  by  one,  if  purporting  to  be 
[*308]  of  *  the  entire  interest,  will  pass  it.^  Trustees  who 
have  the  legal  fee  in  lands  may  lease  them  to  any 
extent,  the  right  being  incident  to  the  legal  estate.'  Corpora- 
tions have  a  power  to  lease  their  lands,  as  incident  to  the 
power  to  hold  them,  and  this  they  may  do  either  with  or  with- 
out a  seal.^ 

11.  As  the  making  of  leases  comes  more  properly  under 
the  head  of  conveyancing  than  an  inquiry  into  the  nature  and 
properties  of  estates  for  years,  it  is  not  proposed  to  enlarge 
upon  the  question  how  these  parties  already  mentioned  may 
exercise  this  power.  It  may  be  added  that  while  ever}'  one 
who  has  an  interest  in  lands  in  possession,  may,  at  common 
law,  transfer  the  same,  and  only  such  may  lease  lands,  it  is 
competent,  under  the  statute  of  uses,  to  convey  lands,  so  that 
the  seisin  shall  be  in  one,  with  an  authority  in  another  to 

1  Emerson  v.  Spicer,  46  N.  Y.  594  ;  Webster  v.  Conley,  46  111.  13. 

2  Campau  v.  Shaw,  15  Mich.  226,  232. 

8  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  46,  n.;  May  v.  Calder,  2  Mass.  55  ;  Anderson  v.  Darby, 
1  Nott  &  M.  869  ;  Magi'uder  v.  Peter,  4  Gill  &  .1.  323. 
*  Bacon,  Abr.  Lease,  L  7  ;  1  Piatt,  Leases,  366. 

5  Burton,  Eeal  Prop.  §  972. 

6  Wins.  Ex'rs,  778  ;  Id.  810,  n.  Am.  ed.;  Doe  v.  Sturges,  7  Taunt.  217.  See 
also  George  v.  Baker,  3  Allen,  326,  note. 

1  Hill,  Trust.  482. 

8  Ang.  &  Ames,  Corp.  §  220  ;  2  Kent,  Com.  233. 


en.  X.  §  2  ]  ESTATES   FOR   YEAItS.  l!tl 

create  ji  leasehold  interest  in  a  tliinl  pfison,  l»y  aj»i>ointin;r  or 
dcelarinj;  who  this  third  j>erson  or  lessee  shall  he.  The  au- 
thority to  do  this  is  called  u  I'ower,  the  exercise  of  which  has 
the  same  elVect  in  creating  a  leu.se  in  the  lessee,  as  if  he  who 
has  the  power  had  an  interest  in  the  land  as  well  as  the  power, 
althon^h  he  has  none.  Of  this  character  are  the  powers  ordi- 
narily inserted  in  marriage  settlements,  wherel)y  tenants  for 
life  are  anthorized  io  create  leases  which  shall  extend  heyond 
the  perioil  of  snch  tenant's  own  estate.^  The  person  naniccl 
or  appointed  derives  his  estate  from  and  imder  the  oriirinal 
deed  conveying  the  seisin,  the  donee  of  the  power  hi'imr  the 
medium  only,  throULrh  which  it  is  ascertaine(l  in  whose  favor 
the  lease  shall  take  elTect.-  Such  a  jiower  as  is  ahove  su|ipose(l 
is  somethinir  distinct  fi'om  a  power  of  attorney  hy  which  an 
aireiit  is  authorize(l  to  make  a  lease.  It  is  not  necessary  to 
add  to  what  has  already  lieen  said  on  the  subject  of  airents, 
except  to  say  that  where  one  without  authority  acts  in  the 
name  of  another  in  leasing  his  lands,  and  the  lessee  enters 
upon  and  occupies  the  same  under  the  lease,  if  the  one  named 
as  principal  sees  fit  to  avail  himself  of  the  lease,  the 
lessee  will  he  estopped  to  deny  that  the  agent  acted  [*300] 
•  with  authority,*  nor  could  he  deny  such  agency 
against  an  assignee  of  lessor  who  should  sue  thereon  for  the 
rent.* 

12.  From  the  nature  of  the  estates  of  tenants  in  eounnon, 
their  seisins  being  separate  and  distinct  though  their  possession 
is  one,  each  must  demise  his  own  share  distinct  from  the 
other,  though  the  covenants  in  the  leases  in  which  they  join 
in  demising  their  common  land  may  be  so  framed  as  to  become 
joint.  IJut,  unless  expressly  made  so,  they  will  Ite  construed 
to  be  separate  acconlingto  their  resj)ective  interests.^  But  no 
tenant  in  common  can  make  a  lease  of  a  part  in  .severalty  valid 

'  /'ufit,  vol.  2,  p.  *305. 

«  Smitli,  Land.  &  Ten.  43,  44  ;  Wms.  lli-a]  Prop.  254,  Rawlc'a  e<l.,  n.  ;  2 
Crabb,   Keul   Prop.  769  ;  Maundnll   r.   Mauudrcll,   10  Vis.  256.      /'us/,   vol.   2, 

p.  "joe. 

'  Mt-riain  v.  Doe,  5  Iinl.  237. 

*  Ktii.lall  r.  Carlnnd,  5  Ciish.  74. 

*  Mantlf  I'.  W.lliii^rton,  ("ro.  Jno.  16fl  ;  Hcnthprly  r.  Weston.  2  Wils.  232; 
1  Pltttl,  Leases,  131  ;  Be«-r  v.  Beer,  12  C.  13.  60,  80  ;  Smith,  LamL  &  Ten.  49,  n. 


492  LAW   OF  REAL   PROPERTY,  [BOOK   I. 

as  against  liis  co-tenants.^  If  the  letting  be  a  joint  one,  and 
one  lessor  dies,  the  survivor  may  recover  the  entire  rent  re- 
served.2  But  one  of  two  partners  cannot  lease  partnership 
property  so  as  to  bind  his  copartner.^  And  where  one  of  sev- 
eral partners  let  his  estate  to  the  company,  to  be  used  in  the 
business  of  the  firm,  and  the  partnership  was  dissolved  by  the 
death  of  one  of  its  members,  the  lease  was  held  to  be  thereby, 
ipso  facto,  determined.  But  it  would  be  otherwise  if  the  lease 
was  from  a  third  person.*  Thus,  where  one  leased  premises 
to  a  partnership  for  three  years  with  a  covenant  to  renew  the 
lease  for  two  years  if  lessees  gave  notice  during  the  three 
years,  and  one  of  the  partners  died  during  that  term,  and  the 
survivor  gave  notice  of  his  wish  to  renew  the  lease,  it  was  held, 
that,  as  survivor,  he  had  a  right  to  insist  upon  the  renewal. 
It  was  not  the  assumption  of  a  new  debt,  which  a  surviving 
partner  has  no  right  to  make.^  A  lease  made  by  one  partner 
in  the  company  name  was  held  to  be  binding  upon  both  where 
the  other  partner  attested  the  lease.^ 

13.  As  to  who  may  be  lessees,  there  is  less  limitation  than 
in  respect  to  lessors.  In  general  terms,  any  one  may  be  made 
a  lessee,  although  every  one  may  not  be  capable  of  entering 
into  covenants  as  a  lessee.  Thus  lunatics  and  drunkards  may 
be  made  lessees,  because,  prima  facie,  it  is  a  beneficial  act  for 
them."  So  a  feme  covert  may  be  made  a  lessee.^  And  an  in- 
fant may  not  only  be  a  lessee,  but,  if  the  hiring  may  be  con- 
sidered in  law  as  necessary,  he  will  be  bound  to  pay  rent ;  ^ 
and  if  he  continues  to  retain  the  leased  premises  after  coming 
of  age,  beyond  a  reasonable  time  in  which  to  disaffirm  it,  he 
will  thereby  affirm  the  lease  and  render  it  binding.^*^    The  con- 

1  Austin  V.  Ahearne,  61  N.  Y.  6  ;  Cunningham  v.  Pattee,  99  Mass.  248  ; 
Tainteru.  Cole,  120  Mass.  162. 

2  Codman  v.  Hall,  9  Allen,  335.  »  Dillon  v.  Brown,  11  Gray,  179. 
*  Johnson  v.  Hartshorn,  52  N.  Y.  173. 

5  Betts  V.  June,  51  N.  Y.  274,  279  ;  and  see  Eaton's  Appeal,  66  Penn.  St.  483. 

6  Bussman  v.  Ganster,  72  Penn.  St.  285,  289. 
'  Co.  Lit.  2  b  ;  1  Piatt,  Leases,  530. 

8  1  Piatt,  Leases,  531  ;  Co.  Lit.  3  a  ;  but  she  may,  when  discovert,  disavow 
and  defeat  the  lease,  nor  does  this  apply  to  married  women  whose  husbands  have 
abjured  the  realm. 

9  Lowe  V.  Griffith,  1  Scott,  458  ;  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  54. 

^  Holmes  v.  Blogg,  8  Taunt.  35,  where  holding  four  months  after  age  was  held 


CH.  X.  §  2.]  KSTATKs  r«)U  vi:\us.  493 

elusion  to  bo  drawn  fnmi  tho  cases  seems  to  be,  that  hirinjr  a 
trncniciit  for  earn  in;^'  on  busiiioss  beyond  a  manual  oecupa- 
tion  hv  which  he  ;rains  a  liviuL',  wonhl  not  l)e  nci'cssary  in 
the  eve  of  the  law.  IJut  a  liarlx-r,  for  instanee,  mifrht  hire  a 
8uital)li'  shop,  or  a  student,  while  ol»tainin'_'-  an  education,  a 
lod<,Mn,ir-rooni,  which,  under  the  cirt-unistanees,  might  be  neces- 
sary for  him,  and  render  him  liable  for  the  rent  aeeordingly. 
And  of  this  the  jury  is  to  judge.  In  Lowe  v.  Orillith, 
Parke,  J.,  said,  "  What  *  are  neee.s.saries  must,  in  all  [*310] 
cases,  depend  upon  the  station  and  circum.stances  of 
the  party." 

14.  If,  now,  it  is  inquire<l  what  may  be  leased  or  demised 
in  the  manner  and  by  the  parties  above  mentioned,  it  may  be 
said,  in  ireneral  terms,  to  be  only  what  might  have  passed  by 
livery  of  seisin  at  common  law,  such  as  lands,  houses,  and  the 
like,  or,  in  other  words,  corporeal  hereditaments.  On  the 
otherhand,  though  contracts  in  respect  to  incorporeal  heredita- 
ments may  lie  gO(jd  as  contracts,  they  do  not  create  the  rela- 
tion of  landlord  and  tenant  as  ordinarily  understood.^  But 
where  one  owning  land  to  which  a  right  of  way  was  appurte- 
nant, leased  the  premises,  the  law  reserved  to  him  the  right  to 
make  use  of  the  way  so  far  as  it  was  necessary  to  enter  to 
view  waste,  demand  rent,  and  remove  obstructions  from  the 
premises.2  It  is  indeed  true  that  goods  and  chattels  may  be 
leased  for  years.^  But  in  a  treatise  upon  real  estate,  such  leases 
may  be  properly  omitted.  There  are,  however,  many  con- 
tracts in  relation  to  interests  in  lands,  which  acquire  more  or 
less  of  the  character  of  leases  of  real  estate,  especially  in 
the  matter  of  covenants,  although  the  interests  are  incorj)oreal, 
as  a  right  of  wharfage,*  a  right  of  flowage  of  lessor's  lands, 

to  be  an  atJirniiince  of  the  lease.  Ketscy's  Cnse,  ("ro.  Jiic.  320  ;  Doe  r.  Smith, 
2  T.  H.  436,  within  a  week  or  fortnight  would  be  reasonable. 

1  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  58. 

a  Wash.  Ease.  3d  ed.  257. 

»  Com.  Dig.  Und.  &  Ten.  13  ;  Micklo  r.  Miles,  31  Penn.  St.  20.  And  whero 
the  lease  includes  both  real  and  personal  proi)erty,  such  as  a  sheep-fann,  it  is  now 
generally  held  that  rent  flows  from  both.  lb.;  and  see  Wliitakor  v.  Hawley, 
25  Kans.  674. 

*  Mayor  v.  Mabie,  3  N.  Y.  151  ;  Smith  r.  Simons,  1  Root,  318  ;  "Wallace  v. 
Ileadliv,  23  I'enn.  St.  106,  where  the  demise  was  of  the  lands  which  might  bo 
tiowed  by  a  dam  of  certain  dimensions. 


494  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

and  the  like,^  •where  many  of  the  rules  adopted  to  leases  of 
corporeal  hereditaments  are  applied.  It  has  accordingly  been 
held  that  a  lease  by  a  widow  of  her  right  of  dower,  before  the 
same  has  been  set  out  to  her,  is  invalid.^ 

15.  Though,  as  has  been  already  stated,  a  term  for  years, 
when  created,  is  but  a  chattel  interest  in  lands,  however  long 
may  be  its  duration,^  in  some  of  the  States  long  terms  have 
had  annexed  to  them,  by  statute,  the  properties  of  freehold 
estates  of  inheritance.  Thus,  for  instance,  in  Massachusetts, 
if  the  original  term  be  for  an  hundred  or  more  years,  it  is 
deemed  a  fee  so  long  as  fifty  years  remain  unexpired.*  So  in 
Ohio,  perpetual  leases,  or  those  renewable  forever,  though  in 
law  estates  for  years  only,  are  by  statute  regarded  as  real  es- 
tate, so  far  as  judgments  and  executions  are  concerned. 

[*311]  So  *  also  as  to  descent  and  distribution,  they  are  re- 
garded freehold  estates.^ 

16.  This  power  of  creating  terms  of  any  number  of  years, 
still  retaining  their  chattel  cliaracter,  especially  in  respect  to 
descent  and  distribution,  gave  rise,  in  England,  to  a  mode  of 
raising  money  upon  lands,  in  favor  of  particular  branches  of 
the  family  of  the  owner,  such  as  his  daughters  or  younger 
sons,  without  interfering  with  the  title  to  the  inheritance. 
One  mode  of  doing  this  was  by  mortgaging  the  estate  for 
a  long  term  of  years,  for  the  purpose  of  raising  portions  for 
others  than  the  heir,  which  was  generally  done  through  the 
medium  of  trustees,  the  legal  property  in  the  term  being  vested 
in  such  trustees  as  mortgagees.  So  it  might  be  done  by  a 
marriage  settlement,  where  a  term  was  created  and  given  to 
trustees.  The  powers  and  duties  of  the  trustees,  as  well  as 
the  nature  of  the  trusts,  were  expressed  in  the  deed.  But, 
generally,  these  were  only  to  take  possession  of  the  estate,  or 
sell  so  much  of  the  term  as  was  necessary  if  the  money  in- 
tended to  be  raised  was  not  paid,  and  in  the  mean  time,  the 
grantor  of  the  term,  or  his  heir,  remained  in  possession  as  the 

1  Provost  V.  Calder,  2  "Wend.  517,  case  of  a  lease  of  a  stream  of  water,  and 
privilege  of  erecting  a  dam,  &c. 

2  Croade  v.  Ingrahani,  13  Pick.  33.  ^  1  Piatt,  Leases,  3. 
4  Pub.  Stat.  c.  121,  §§1,2. 

&  Rev.  Stat.  1841,  p.  289  ;  Walker,  Am.  Law,  279  ;  Northern  Bank  of  Ken- 
tucky V.  Pioosa,  13  Ohio,  334. 


en.  X.  §  2.]  ESTATES    FOR    YFARfl.  495 

freeholder  of  the  lands,  whicli  lie  could  sell  or  devise  subject 
to  this  iin)rl;^a;;r,  or  the  same  would  dt'sccnd  to  his  heirs.  It 
was  ufti'ii  i»rovidetl  that  the  term  shouM  cease  as  soon  as  the 
money  was  raised,  in  which  case  hy  tin-  |iayni(nt,  this  lease, 
by  way  of  mort^'atre,  became,  ijjxo  farto,  nidi.  Or,  if  no  siieh 
provision  was  inscrtcil  in  the  deed,  the  trustees  mi^rht  release 
to  the  holder  of  the  freehold,  and  thereby  terminate  the  estate 
which  had  l)een  in  the  trustees,  since  the  term  would  at  once 
merjri'  in  the  freehold.  To  do  this  now  in  Entrland  re(|uires 
the  lease  to  be  by  deed.  If  there  was  no  j)rovision  in  the  deed 
by  which  the  term  became  void  ni)on  the  {)ayment  of  the 
money,  and  no  release  was  made  i)y  the  trustees  to  the  free- 
holder, the  elTect  was  to  leave  a  leiral  estate  in  the  term  still 
outstan«lini^  in  the  tiustecs,  though  the  money  might  have 
been  raised  or  i)aiil,  or  the  purpose  answered  for  which  the 
term  had  been  created.  There  was,  ordinarily,  no 
•practical  iui-onvenience  in  this,  for  it  could  be  no  [*.312] 
object  in  the  trustees  to  enter  upon  and  occupy  the 
premises,  since  by  so  doing  they  would  be  liable  to  be  called 
upon  in  ecpiity  to  account  for  the  rents  and  profits  they  might 
receive,  to  him  who  had  an  e(piitable  right  to  them,  who,  in  the 
case  su|)poaed,  was  the  owner  of  the  freehold.  The  practical 
operation  of  this  was,  that  one  might  own  the  freehold,  while 
the  legal  estate  or  ownershij)  of  the  term  was  in  trustees,  and 
this  took  the  name  of  a  "  satisfied  outstanding  term."  This 
became  a  very  common  mode  of  protecting  the  estate  of  a 
rightful  owner  of  the  freehold,  where  there  happened  to  be 
contlicting  claims  to  the  same.  As  for  instance,  a  jturchaser 
of  an  estate  in  fee.  without  notice  of  any  incundjrance  upon  it, 
finds  there  is  an  existing  outstanding  charge  or  mortgage.  In 
order  to  jtrotect  himself  from  this,  he  gets  the  trustees  of  some 
such  outstanding  term  to  assign  the  same  to  other  trustees  to 
hold  for  his  benefit.  Tlie  effect  is,  that  if  the  legal  right  of  the 
trustees  to  the  term  is  prior  to  that  of  any  one  clainiinir  this 
charge  upon  the  freehold,  these  trustees  may  enter  and  hold 
possession  and  account  for  the  rents,  or  suflfer  the  purchaser  for 
whom  they  hold  to  take  them, and  thus  postpone  the  other  claim- 
ants until  the  term  shall  have  expired,  the  term  in  the  mean 
time  attending  and  preserving  the  possession  of  the  premises  for 


49G  LAW  OP  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

the  owner  of  the  freehold.  This  is  called  "  an  outstanding 
term  to  attend  the  inheritance."  And,  by  reason  of  the  want 
of  notice,  by  means  of  registration,  of  the  making  of  charges, 
mortgages,  and  conveyance  of  lands,  this  mode  of  protecting 
an  innocent  purchaser  by  means  of  an  outstanding  term  to 
attend  the  inheritance,  came  to  be  very  general  prior  to  the  8 
&  9  Vict.  c.  112,  §  2,  which  abolished  all  such  terms  as  soon 
as  satisfied.  In  speaking  of  such  terms.  Lord  Mansfield  says, 
"  The  lease  is  one  of  his  [the  owner's]  muniments.  No  man 
has  a  lease  of  2,000  years  as  a  lease,  but  as  a  term  to  attend 
the  inheritance.     Half  the  titles  in  the  kingdom  are  so."  ^     It 

cannot,  however,  be  profitable  to  devote  time  to  con- 
[*313]   sidering,  what  occupies  so  much  *  space  in  treatises 

upon  the  English  law  prior  to  the  reign  of  Victoria, 
which  of  several  claimants  might,  in  certain  cases,  insist  upon 
availing  himself  of  a  satisfied  outstanding  term,  or  when 
courts  of  law  and  equity  will  presume  a  surrender  and  ex- 
tinguishment of  such  terms  to  have  been  made,  since  they  not 
only  have  been  abolished  in  England,  but  were  never,  practi- 
cally, applied  in  this  country  to  any  considerable  extent,  if  at 
all.  Indeed,  with  the  universal  custom  of  registering  deeds,  it 
is  not  easy  to  see  any  occasion  or  principle  of  application  for 
any  such  theory  as  gave  rise  to  these  terms,  originally,  in 
England.2  The  terms  here  spoken  of,  are,  moreover,  so  unlike 
leasehold  terms  for  years,  wherein  there  is,  properly,  the  rela- 
tion of  landlord  and  tenant,  with  its  reciprocal  rights  and 
duties,  that  it  only  seemed  proper  to  refer  to  them  at  all,  as 
being  one  species  of  estates  for  years. 

17.  To  recur,  then,  to  leasehold  estates.  With  the  excep- 
tions created  by  statute,  estates  for  years  have  the  properties 
of  chattel  interests,  however  long  they  may  be  to  endure,  such 
as  merging  in  the  freehold,  descending  to  personal  representa- 
tives instead  of  heirs,  not  being  subject  to  dower,  passing  by 

1  Cowp.  597.  See  also  Burton,  Real  Prop.  §§  858-860  ;  Co.  Lit.  290  b, 
Butler's  note,  249,  §  13  ;  Wms.  Real  Prop.  338-445  ;  4  Kent,  Com.  87-93  ; 
Hill,  Trust.  326.  See  Sugd.  Vend.  c.  15  ;  Willoughby  v.  Willoughby,  1  T.  R. 
763. 

2  4  Kent,  Com.  93  ;  Hill,  Trust.  327.  See  Williamson  v.  Gordon,  5  Mumf. 
257,  where  a  purchaser  who  had  satisfied  an  outstanding  truest  was  permitted  to 
avail  himself  of  it  in  equity. 


CII.   X.   i^    -  ]  ESTATES    FOR    YEARS.  -lit? 

11  will,  and  bi-iiiLr  liable   to  1)0  sold  as  jiorsoiial  itrojicrty,  and 
the  likr." 

18.  l>iit  to  guard  ajrainst  tVaml  ihm»ii  jmrehasfTH  in  luiyintr 
lands  subject  to  leasuH,  many  of  the  States  reijuir*'  llnin  to  be 
rciristered,  to  be  elTectual  airainst  subsetiuent  puieliasers  with- 
out notice;  or  crcditoi's,  if  they  exceed  a  prescribed  len<jtli  of 
time.  Tills  in  .Massachusetts  is  seven  years,-  in  Ken- 
tucky hve,-'  •  New  Hamiishire  seven,*  Helaware  twenty-  [*-'5HJ 
one  years,  if  for  a  fair  rent  ai-comj)anied  by  posses- 
sion,'* Maine  seven  ycars,^  Michigan  the  same,'  Ohio  and  New 
York  three,**  Rhode  Island  one,"  and  in  North  Carolina  all 
lea.ses.  re(|nired  to  be  in  writimr,  must  be  recorded.'" 

19.  To  what  has  bi'on  said,  it  may  be  added,  that  if  the 
language  and  consideration  exprcssetl  in  a  lease  arc  suflicient 
to  raise  a  use,  the  Statute  of  Uses  comes  in  and  annexes  the 
possession  to  the  u.se,  for  most  jjurposes,  without  an  actual 
entry  l»y  the  les.see." 

20.  And  as  .soon  as  the  lesset*  shall  have  entered  under  a 
written  leas(\  the  lessor  is  so  elTectuall}'  divested  of  the  j)o.s- 
session  that  he  cannot  maintain  li-espass  against  a  stranger 
who  siionld  enter  and  cut  trees  upon  the  j)remises,  although 
the  tenant  himself  is  restricted  from  cutting  them,'-  though, 
liad  he  excepted  them  in  his  lease,  he  might  have  maintained 

*  K.r  ]y\rU.  flay,  5  M.ass.  419  ;  f'liapiiuin  r.  Gray,  15  llass.  445  ;  SiKingUr 
t».  StJiiil.r.  1  Md.  Ch.  Dec.  36  ;  BrcwsUr  r.  Hill,  1  N.  H.  350  ;  Mimlmk  v. 
iLitoliir,  7  Ohio,  119;  Bis»)ec  r.  Hall,  3  Ohio,  449;  Dillinglmm  r.  Jenkins, 
7  Sin.  &  -M.  479.  The  constitution  of  New  York  has  alKilisht-d  all  long  leases 
of  agrirultunil  land,  limiting  them  to  twelve  years.  4  Kent,  Com.  93,  8th  ed., 
note.  It  is  usual  in  a  leiuse  to  deniiso  to  the  lessee,  "his  executors  and  ad- 
ministratons"  hut  such  words  of  limitation  are  unnecessar)-.  Burton,  Uial  Proji. 
§  849. 

>  Put..  Stat.  c.  120,  §  4  ;  Chapman  r.  Gray,  15  Milss.  439.  Must  not  exceed 
seven  yciirs  from  making  of  the  lease. 

*  LiH^ke  c.  Coleman,  4  Mon.  315.  <  Brewster  r.  Hill.  1  X.  H.  350. 

*  Thornton,  Con  v.  125.  «  Kev.  Stat.  c.  73,  §  8. 
^  Hev.  Stat.  1838,  200. 

»  (^hio,  1  Rev.  Stat.  461  ;   N*.  Y.  1  Stat,  at  Urge,  pp.  707-714. 
'  Gen.  StJit,  1872.  p.  S.-iO. 

><»  Hev.  <V„|e,  X.  C.  c.  37,  §  26.  These  citations  are  given  rather  by  way  of 
iHustrntion  than  as  a  full  statement  of  the  several  laws  on  the  .su1'ji<t. 

"  4  Kent,  Com.  97  ;   1  (rui.se.  Dig.  249  ;  2  Sand.  L'ses,  56.     AnU,  p.  •296. 
*'  Gn-Wr  r.  Kleckner,  2  Penn.  Sl  2S9. 
Vol.  I.  — 32 


498  LAW  OF  EEAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

trcvspass  for  cutting  them.^  In  the  former  case,  the  tenant 
might  have  trespass  for  the  cutting  of  the  trees,  if  done  by  a 
stranger,  and  the  owner  of  the  inheritance  trover  for  the  value 
of  them.2  But  the  lessor  would  have  no  right  to  enter  upon 
the  ])rcmiscs,  although  the  lessee  should  have  actually  left 
and  abandoned  possession  of  the  same.'^  Questions  similar  to 
those  respecting  trees  have  arisen  in  relation  to  minerals  in 
the  earth,  wliere  the  soil  has  been  leased,  and  no  reserve  of 
these  has  been  made.  If  no  mine  had  been  opened  within 
the  premises,  the  lessee  had  no  right  to  work  the  minerals, 
and  had  he  done  so  he  would  be  liable  in  waste,  but  not  in 
trespass ;  whereas,  had  another  entered  and  worked  these,  or 
dug  any  of  them,  though  without  breaking  the  surface,  the 
tenant  might  have  trespass  against  him.  So  if,  in  the  case 
supposed,  a  lease  were  made  of  the  minerals  to  the  tenant  of 
the  surface  and  another,  the  possession  of  the  tenant  would 
enure  to  both  lessees  of  the  minerals  and  create  an  actual 
estate  and  not  a  mere  interesse  termini  therein,  and  they  might 
work  the  mines.*  The  general  rights  of  lessees  of  lands,  in 
which  there  are  minerals,  are  these.  If  there  is  an  open 
mine  on  the  premises,  they  may  work  it.  But  they  may  not 
open  a  new  one,  unless  a  right  to  do  so  is  expressly  granted. 
And  if  the  land  and  mines  under  it  are  described  as  the  sub- 
jects of  the  lease,  and  there  be  no  open  mine,  the  lessee  may 
open  one  and  work  it.^ 

21.  So  far  as  liability  upon  his  covenants  is  concerned,  debt 
or  covenant  will  lie  against  a  lessee  who  has  accepted  a  lease, 
notwitlistanding  he  may  not  have  entered.  The  privity  of 
contract  between  lessor  and  lessee  is  complete  without  entry ,^ 
wliile  the  privity  of  estate  depends  upon  the  entry  having 
been  made.^     And  though  a  lessee,  by  assigning  his  interest, 

1  Schermerhorn  v.  Buell,  4  Denio,  422  ;  Reynolds  v.  Williams,  1  Texas,  311 ; 
Van  Rensselaer  v.  Van  Rensselaer,  9  Johns.  377. 

2  Burnett  v.  Tliompson,  6  Jones  (N.  C),  210,  213. 
2  Shannon  v.  Burr,  1  Hilton,  39. 

*  Keyse  v.  Powell,  2  Ellis  &  B.  132  ;  Lewis  v.  Branthwaite,  2  B.  &  Ad.  437. 
■      6  ciegg  V.  Rowland,  L.  R.  2  Eq.  160  ;  Co.  Lit.  54  b. 

6  Salmon  v.  Smith,  1  Saund.  203,  n.  1  ;  Bellasis  v.  Burbrick,  1  Salk.  209. 

^  f^aton  V.  Jaques,  Douf;;.  455-461.  The  point  decided  was,  that  a  mortgagee 
of  a  term  would  not  be  liable  upon  the  covenants  in  the  lease  creating  it,  imtil 


en.  X.  I   -]  KSTATKS    FOIl    YK  \RM.  I'.tO 

deHtrovH  'this  privity  of  cHtatc,  ho  Htill  remains  liahlr   [*'''1'>J 
on  liis  contract. 

2-.  In  all  llicsi'  cix.scs,  in  order  to  cjiar^'*-  a  jtarty,  nmlir  an 
instrinncnt,  as  l»cinir  l<onntl  l>y  it,  it  is  essential  to  show  hit* 
acceptance  of  it,'  thon;.fli,  where  it  is  ohvionsly  for  his  henelit, 
snch  an  acceptance  will  often  ht;  presnnied.'*  And  his  ac- 
c«!ptance  may  often  he  inferred  from  his  acts.  As  where,  l)y 
tlie  terms  of  liis  lease*  for  three  years,  tlu,'  tenant  had  a  lij^ht 
to  hold  for  two  more,  hut  at  an  enhanced  rent,  and  he  eon- 
tiinied  ta  hold  after  the  expiiatiijn  of  the  three  years,  and  |taid 
the  enhan(-e(i  rent  for  one  or  two  (juarters,  it  wa.s  ludd  to  he 
snch. an  election  as  honnd  him  for  the  wIkjIo  term.''  And  it 
may  he  statetl  in  this  c(jnnection,  that  a  lea.se  of  j»reniises 
hired  for  nnlawful  pnrposes,  such,  for  instance,  as  those  of 
prostitution,  where  the  lessor,  knowint,'  this,  aids  the  lessee  in 
any  way  in  accomiilishiii'/  his  purpose,  would  he  void.  Ihit 
the  mere  knowledj^c  on  the  part  of  the  lessor  that,  the  ptem- 
isi's  are  intended  to  he  usecl  fitr  such  purposes,  unless  he  j»ar- 
ticipates  in  the  design,  does  not  i-ender  the  lease  void.  If  the 
Ijouse  is  so  used  hy  the  tenant,  the  lessor  may  enter  and  oust 
him.* 

28.  It  now  hecomes  proper  to  restate,  that  as  soon  as  pr(»j»er 
]>arties  have  entered  into  an  agreement,  in  projter  form,  in  re- 
hition  t<j  lands  ov  tenements,  to  create  an  estate  for  years,  hy 
one  in  favor  of  the  other,  it  constitutes  the  relation  known  to 
the  law  as  that  of  landlord  ami  tenant,  as  soon  as  the  tenant 

entry  iiunlo.  4  Kent,  Coin.  17^.  Com.  Liml.  k  Ten.  271,  ImweviT,  lays  it  <l<iwii 
umjuiililicdly,  "  IiniUL-(liat<-ly  ui»on  the  assiijiiiiuiit  tKjiiig  nuwlc,  the  assij^icf  Im-- 
coiues  lialile  evi-n  befori-  liis  entry  ui><jii  the  |ireiiiiHes."  See,  neeonlin^ly,  Wil- 
liams V.  B<)Hiiii<|Uut,  1  Brofl.  i  U.  '2:JS.  The  8ubject  is  further  examined  in  another 
part  of  thin  ehapter.      I'ost,  *'Hi). 

1  Jackson  r.  Hichanls,  0  Cow.  617  ;  i^htppanl,  Toiu.h.  Ist  Am.  ed.  57;  .lack- 
son  V.  Dunlap,  1  Johmt.  Ca.s.  114  ;  Maynard  v.  Maynard,  10  Mmts.  456  ;  Hedj^e 
r.  Drew,  12  Pick.  141  ;  Hatch  v.  Hateh,  9  Maj«.  307.  Hut  lessees  will  Iw  iN.nnd 
by  the  terms  of  an  indenture,  not  exeeuti-d  hy  them  so  as  to  bind  them,  if  they 
enter  and  wcujty  under  it ;  though  their  liability  will  be  in  assumpsit.  Carroll 
V.  St.  John's  .Sor.,  125  Mass.  565  ;  Clark  v.  Oonlon,  121  Mass.  330  ;  Lamsun  Co. 
V.  KuHsell,  112  .Ma.HS.  387. 

'  Jackson  p.  liodle,  20  Johns.  184. 

•  Kramer  r.  Cook,  7  Gray,  550  ;  and  see  Dix  r.  Atkins,  130  .Mass.  171. 

*  rjMlike  V.  Campli.ll.  4  E.  I).  .Smith,  57<»  ;  OBrien  r.  Bri.tenlrteh,  1  Hilton, 
304  ;  liaistou  v.  Bomly,  20  Go.  44y  ;  Cuium'th  r.  Harrington,  3  Pick.  26. 


500  LAW    OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [bOOK   I. 

shall  have  entered.^  The  lessor  and  lessee  thereby  become 
bound  to  one  another  in  respect  of  covenants  in  law,  and  the 
duties  prescribed  in  law,  as  incident  to  that  relation  by  reason 
of  a  privity  of  estate.  In  respect  to  covenants  in  deed,  they 
are  bound  by  a  privity  of  contract,  and  the  j^'^iviti/  of  estate 
exists  no  longer  than  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  con- 
tinues.2 

24.  There  is  a  tenure  between  lessor  and  lessee  for  years, 
to  which  fealty  is  incident,  by  theory  of  law,  as  well  as  a  priv- 
ity of  estate  between  them.^ 

25.  Such  relation  implies  a  tenancy  limited  in  point  of  time, 
and  not  so  extensive  in  duration  as  to  render  the  landlord's 
interest  practically  worthless,  and  accompanied  by  some  re- 
munerative incidents  to  the  reversion,  such  as  rent,  or  some- 
thing which  is  a  substitute  for  it,  as  well  as  certain  obligations 
which  have  already  been  referred  to.*  But  this  relation  of 
landlord  and  tenant  does  not  embrace  that  between  sovereign 
and  subject,  nor  between  a  reversioner  and  him  who  enjoys 

the  particular  estate  on  which  the  reversion  depends, 
[*316]  where  no  rent  is  reserved,  *  although  a  kind  of  ten- 
ancy subsists  between  them.^  Nor  does  it  exist  be- 
tween mortgagor  and  mortgagee,^  or  vendor  and  vendee  in 
possession,'  nor  licenser  and  licensee,  since  a  license  may 
always  be  revoked  so  far  as  it  extends  to  the  occupation  of 
the  licenser's  land.^  If  there  is  a  sealed  lease  between  the 
parties,  and  rent  is  due  under  it,  the  lessor  cannot  recover 
this  rent  in  assumpsit  for  use  and  occupation,  the  principle 
in  such  case  being,  that  expressum  facit  cessare  taciturn.^    So 

1  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  3.  2  Com.  Land.  &  Ten.  275  ;  1  Cruise,  Dig.  223. 

3  Lit.  §  132  ;  Lausman  v.  Drahos,  10  Neb.  172  ;  Thrall  v.  Omaha  Co.,  5  ISeb. 
295. 

*  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  4.  *  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  3. 

6  Coote,  Mortg.  332,  372. 

'  Redden  v.  Barker,  4  Harringt.  179  ;  Dolittle  v.  Eddy,  7  Barb.  74  ;  Watkins 
V.  Hohiiau,  16  Pet.  25,  54  ;  Jackson  v.  Miller,  7  Cow.  747  ;  Stone  v.  Sprague, 
20  Barb.  509. 

8  Dolittle  V.  Eddy,  7  Barb.  74  ;  Stone  v.  Sprague,  20  Barb.  509. 

9  Gibson  v.  Kirk,  1  Q.  B.  850  ;  Kiersted  v.  Orange  &  A.  R.  R.,  69  N.  Y.  343  ; 
and  before  the  statute  of  11  Geo.  IL  c.  19,  §  14,  which  is  generally  adopted  in  the 
United  States,  a  written  lease  precluded  this  action.  See  jws(,  *326  ;  Taylor, 
Land.  &  Ten.  (7th  ed.)  §  635. 


en.  X.  §   2.]  ESTATES   FOR    YEARS.  -OUl 

tliat  iicitlicr  tlu«  court  of  eciuity  nor  i\  court  of  law  couM 
aid  a  party  in  such  a  case  to  any  greater  extent  than  is 
provided  for  in  the  leaijc.* 


SECTION   III. 

OF    ("ONDITIOXS    IN    LEASES. 

1.  How  the  Inw  regarils  thoso  and  their  use, 

2.  Kirt-ct  of  lici'iise  to  viohite  a  condition. 

8.  Condition  not  broken  by  involuntary  act. 

4.  Assij^niuent  of  condition  under  32  lliu.  VIII.  c.  34. 

6.  Condition  if  broken  not  iissi^^nable. 

6.  All  covenants  may  I*  guardetl  by  conditions. 

7.  Of  entry  for  condition  broken  ami  its  effect. 

8.  Conditions  strictly  construed,  illustrations  of. 

0.  What  dcni:ind  rei|uired  to  take  advuutage  of  a  condition. 

10.  For  what  demand  must  be,  &c. 

11.  Demand  may  bo  waived. 

12.  Advanta;,'e  of  condition  taken  only  by  entry. 

13.  When  forfeiture  may  Iw  saved,  by  tender,  &c. 

14.  When  forfeiture  waived  by  lessor. 

15.  When  demand  neressary  Wfore  a  forfeiture 
IG.  Tendt'r  of  nnt  in  court  sjives  forfeitun-,  &c. 

Before  proceeding  to  consider  the  oldigations  ordinarily 
existing  between  lessor  and  lessee,  some  of  w  hicli  are  created 
hy  the  exj>ress  terms  of  their  agreement,  and  some  im|»lie»l 
from  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant,  it  may  l)e  well  to 
refer  to  some  of  the  conditions  which  are,  ordinarily,  annexed 
to  every  term  for  years.  And  by  condition  is  meant,  in  the 
words  of  Black.stone,  "a  clause  of  contingency  on  the  lia]»- 
pening  of  which  the  estate  granted  may  be  defeated."  ^  Xnr 
is  it  necessary,  in  order  to  a  lessor  availing  himself  of  a  con- 
dition in  defeating  an  estate,  that  such  breach  was  the  cause 
of  damage  to  him.^  The  word  condition  does  not,  necessarily, 
imply  a  condition  under  seal.* 

1.  Though  the  j)rop()sition  may  l)e  Ix^tter  tmderstood  when 
the  nature  of  conditional  estates  shall  have  been  explained,  it 

>  Sheeta  r.  Selden,  7  Wall.  U(\,  424.  »  2  BL  Com.  299. 

'  Wlutwell  r.  Harris,  10«5  MiL-^s.  532. 

♦  Hayno  v.  Cummings,  16  (.'.  li.  .v.  s.  420. 


502  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

may  be  observed,  that  such  conditions  as  are  annexed  to  estates 
for  years,  are,  as  a  general  thing,  more  favored  by  the  law 
than  those  which  tend  to  defeat  a  freehold  estate,  as,  for  in- 
stance, a  grant  to  one  of  a  fee,  with  a  condition  that  he  should 
not  alien  his  estate  to  any  one,  would  be  void,  though  such  a 
condition  annexed  to  the  estate  of  a  lessee  for  years  is  un- 
doubtedly good.i  So  a  stipulation  in  a  lease  is  a  valid  one, 
that  the  crops  shall  be  the  lessor's  until  the  rent  is  paid,  bind- 
ing not  only  the  parties  to  the  contract,  but  third  parties  also.^ 
But  the  words  of  reservation  in  a  lease  of  "yielding"  and 
"paying"  may  attach  a  condition  to  a  fee.^  And  in  this  way 
it  is  often  a  means  of  securing  the  performance  of  stipulations 
in  a  lease,  to  make  such  performance  a  condition  for  the  breach 

of  which  the  lessor  may  enter  and  defeat  the  lessee's 
[*317]  estate,  or,  as  is  sometimes  the  case,  the  lease  *  is  to 

cease  and  become  void,*  which  means,  however,  at  the 
option  of  the  landlord.^  But  where  there  is  a  covenant  in  a 
lease  to  pay  rent  on  certain  days,  and  a  condition  that  if  the 
same  was  unpaid  the  lessor  might  enter  and  hold  possession 
till  the  arrears  of  rent  were  paid,  it  was  held  to  be  no  bar  to 
an  action  upon  the  covenant  to  pay  the  rent  as  soon  as  the 
same  was  in  arrear.  Nor  would  an  agreement  in  the  lease  to 
refer  all  questions  in  dispute  between  the  lessor  and  lessee  to 
arbitration  be  a  bar  to  a  suit  upon  a  covenant  in  the  lease, 
although  the  covenantor  has  not  offered  to  submit  the  question 
to  arbitration.^ 

2.  If  such  a  condition  were,  for  instance,  not  to  do  some 
particular  act  by  the  lessee,  such  as  aliening  his  term  without 
lessor's  assent,  and  the  latter  were  to  give  an  express  license 
to  the  lessee  to  do  this,  the  right  to  enforce  it  as  to  any  subse- 
quent breach  would  be  gone  forever.  On  this  point  Dumpor's 
case  is  the  leading  authority,  and  is  based  upon  the  notion 

1  Burton,  Real  Prop.  §  852  ;  Chickeley's  Case,  Dyer,  79. 

2  Cooper  V.  Cole,  38  Vt.  185,  191  ;  Smith  v.  Atkins,  18  Vt.  461. 

3  Van  Rensselaer  v.  Smith,  27  Barb.  104  ;  Van  Rensselaer  v.  Ball,  19  N.  Y. 
100. 

«  Wms.  Real  Prop.  332  ;  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  108. 

6  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  112  ;  Jones  v.  Carter,  15  M.  &  W.  718  ;  Clark  v.  Jones, 
1  Denio,  516. 

«  Rowe  V.  "Williams,  97  Mass.  163- 


CII.  X.  §  3.]  ESTATES    FOR    YEARS.  003 

that  every  comlitioii  nf  rc-ciitn  ,  w  liidi  is  llie  appropriate  niotlo 
by  whieh  the  hrciich  ot  ('oiidificjii  in  a  ditil  or  h'ase  is  nia<l<'  in 
be  avuihible,  is  an  entire  and  indivisiljle  thinjr,  and,  havini^ 
been  onee  waived,  tannnt  l»e  enforced  a^ain.'  And  so  far  has 
this  been  carried,  that,  wliere  th(!  orij.Mnal  k'ssee  had  a^ain 
come  into  jxissession  of  the  estate  by  nn'sne  assijjnnients,  he 
took  the  term  dischar<red  of  the  condition.-  JJut  a  mere  waiver 
by  acquiescence  without  any  actual  license,  as,  for  instance,  by 
takinjr  rent  of  an  assi^niee  where  the  oriL'inal  tenant  had  l)een 
restraiiu'd  from  assitrninir  by  a  eondilion  in  his  lease,  thou<rh 
it  would  ratify  such  assiLnnnent,  would  not  extend  to  future 
breaches  of  the  same  kind,  so  as  to  [jrcvent  the  lessor's  enter- 
intr  and  defeat ini;  the  demise  for  a  new  assiirnment  niade.^ 
If  a  breach  of  the  condition  n(jt  to  underlet  has  been  eom- 
mittetl,  and  the  lessor,  with  a  knowledge  of  its  havinir  been 
done,  acee])t   rent  after  such   subU'ttinir,  it  would  l)e  a  waiver 

NoTK.  —  DurniHjr's  Case  lias  always  Ix'on,  it  is  ln-lii-vt'il,  a  stuiiibliiig-lilock  in 
the  way  of  the  proffssioii  ;  ami  a  writer  of  iimcli  ilisiriiiiiiiatioii,  in  an  artitle  in 
7  Am.  I^iw  Rev.  61»}-04O,  assumes  that  the  cnso  "was  originally  without  foun- 
dation in  the  law  of  conditions,"  "  was  without  subseijuent  coniirmation  by  deci- 
sion, until"  Brummel  r.  Muoiiherson,  14  Ves.  173  ;  that  "it  hail  no  greater  claim 
to  Im?  recognized  at  that  time  as  settled  law  than  any  other  venerable  error ; "  that 
"since  that  n-cognition  it  h(u<,  with  liardly  an  exception,  Itet-n  confiniied  by  no 
decision,"  and  has  In-en,  with  almost  entire  uniformity,  disapproved  of  in  r»*gard 
to  the  iloctrine  it  proi>ounds,  and  that  "the  idea  on  which  it  was  actually  founded 
has  U'en  entindy  controverted  by  moilcrn  decisions."  The  reader  is  referred  to 
the  article  for  the  grounds  upon  which  the  writer  attemjits  to  sustain  these  |>osi- 
tioiis.  See  also  Wins.  Keul  Prop.  ♦•273.  Fortunately  the  case  is  of  rare  applica- 
tion, and  in  England  the  difli«ulty  is  cured  by  the  Stat.  22  &23  Vict.  c.  35,  §§  1,  2, 
and  3,  by  which  a  license  to  ilo  anytliing  which  would  be  otherwise  a  breach  of  a 
conilition  or  covcnunt  in  a  1i-;lsi!  will  fxt<iiil  unlv  Ui  tlic  s|M'i-ific  ai-t  Iji'i-nsi'il  t.>  Iw 
done. 


>  Dumpers  Cose,  4  Rep.  119  ;  Cartwright  v.  Gardner,  5  Cush.  273,  281  ;  Wms. 
Real  Prop.  332  ;  1  Smith,  L^ad.  Cas.  .''.th  Am.  ed.  85  ;  Burton,  Real  Prop.  §  S53  ; 
Doc  V.  Bliss,  4  Taunt.  735  ;  Dickey  v.  McCuUough,  2  Watts  &  S.  88  ;  Bleecker  r. 
Smith,  13  Wend.  630  ;  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  117  ;  Chipmnn  v.  Enieric,  5  Cul.  49  ; 
McKildoc  r.  Darracott,  13  Gratt.  278  ;  Murray  v.  Hanvay.  56  N.  Y.  337,  343  ; 
Gannett  v.  Albroe,  103  Mass.  372  ;  Penno<-k  r.  Lyons.  118  Mass.  92  :  Dougherty 
V.  Matthews,  35  Mo.  520  ;  Porter  v.  Merrill,  124  Mass.  534. 

'  Doe  r.  Smith,  5  Taunt.  795. 

»  Burton,  Real  Pmp.  §  853  :  Doe  v.  Bliss,  4  Taunt.  735  ;  Lloyd  r.  Crispe, 
6  Taunt.  249.     See  7  Am.  Law  Rev.  633. 


504  LAW   OF   EEAL   PROPEKTY.  [bOOK   I. 

of  forfeiture  for  that  act  of  underletting,  but  not  of  any  subse- 
quent breaches  by  a  new  underletting.^ 

3.  Nor  would  a  condition  not  to  alien  be  broken,  so  as  to  work 
a  forfeiture  of  the  estate,  where  it  is  done  in  mvitum,  as  by  a 
decree  in  bankruptcy,  unless,  as  may  be  done,  there  is  an  ex- 
press condition  that  such  an  act  of  assignment  shall  form  the 
ground  of  forfeiture.^  The  term  assignee  is  very  comprehen- 
sive, and  extends  to  all  persons  taking  the  estate  in  the 
lease  either  by  the  act  of  the  party  or  of  law.^  A  covenant 
and  condition  in  a  lease  may  be  so  framed  that  neither  tlie 
lessee  nor  his  executors  or  administrators  can  assign  the  term. 
But  to  have  the  effect  to  restrict  an  assignment  by  executors, 
it  must  be  in  express  terms,  otherwise,  upon  the  death  of  the 
lessee,  his  estate  passes  to  his  executor,  as  coming  into  the 
place  of  the  lessee.  In  the  language  of  the  court,  it  is  "  an 
alienation  by  the  act  of  God ; "  and  it  was  held  to  be  clear 
law  that  the  executors  of  such  lessee  may  dispose  of  the  terra, 
unless  they  are  clearly  restricted  by  the  terms  of  the  lease.* 
Of  the  same  character  is  an  assignment  by  process  of  in- 
solvency against  the  lessee.  Such  assignment  not  only  passes 
the  estate,  but  passes  it  discharged  of  the  covenant  not  to 
assign,  if  the  proceedings  were  bona  fide  and  not  colorable.^ 
Nor  is  it  a  breach  that  one  member  of  a  partnership,  to  whom 
the  premises  are  let  with  a  condition  not  to  alien  or  assign, 
goes  out  of  the  company,  and  another  comes  in  and  takes  his 
place  as  copartner.*^  And  courts  are  strict  in  construing  both 
covenants  and  conditions  which  work  a  forfeiture.  Thus  a 
condition  not  to  let  or  underlet  on  the  part  of  the  lessee  is  not 
deemed  to  be  broken  by  an  assignment  of  the  entire  term,  as 
held  by  the  court  of  New  York,  though  the  contrary  was  held 

1  Ireland  v.  Nichols,  46  N.  Y.  413. 

2  Burton,  Real  Prop.  §  854  ;  Lear  v.  Leggett,  1  Euss.  &  M.  690 ;  Doe  v. 
Carter,  8  T.  R.  57  ;  Jackson  v.  Corliss,  7  Johns.  531  ;  Smith  v.  Putnam,  3  Pick. 
221  ;  Yarnold  v.  Moorehouse,  1  Russ.  &  M.  364  ;  1  Smith,  Lead.  Cas.  1st  Am.  ed. 
66  ;  and  a  release  to  a  railway  company  of  land  taken  by  them  by  eminent  do- 
main was  held  no  breach  of  this  covenant.    Baily  v.  De  Crespigny,  10  Best  &  S.  1. 

3  2  Piatt,  Leases,  410  ;  Becker  v.  Werner,  98  Penn.  St.  555. 

*  Comyn,  Land.  &  Ten.  238  ;  Seers  v.  Hind,  1  Ves.  Jr.  295  ;  Piatt,  Leases, 
265,  266  ;  Taylor,  Land.  &  Ten.  §  408. 

5  Bemis  v.  Wilder,  100  Mass.  446  ;  Doe  v.  Bevan,  3  Maule  &  S.  353. 

°  Roosevelt  v.  Hopkins,  33  N.  Y.  81  ;  Hargi-ave  v.  King,  5  Ired.  Eq.  430. 


ill.  X.  §  3.]  ESTATES    FOK    YEARS.  505 

bv  tlif  cniirt  of  Now  Jersey,  foll<)\vin<^  tlio  nilinpof  Sir  William 
(Iraiit,  Muster  of  ilie  lloli.s.'  Ami  ilu-  ruling  in  the  hist-uu'ii- 
tionril  cases  was  expressly  i»vernjle(l  in  a  later  casir  in  New 
Jersey,  where  it  was  lieUl  that  an  assignment  is  not  a  breach 
of  the  covenant  not  to  nntlerlet.-  ]>ut  the  cases  seem  to  aj?rec 
that  a  covenant  or  condition  n(jt  to  assign  is  not  broken  by 
unilerlettinu;  the  premises.  A  covenant  not  to  assi^rn  is  not 
broken  l)y  an  nnderlcttinfr,  unless  the  underletting  be  for  the 
entire  term  ;  if  it  be,  it  will  be  rcgardt-d  as  an  assi;_'"nment.''^ 
If  one  would  restrain  his  lessee  from  assiirninjr  or  underlettintr, 
he  must  insert  words  to  that  effect  in  the  lease.*  A  condition 
can  only  be  taken  advantage  of,  if  broken,  by  the  lessor  or  his 
assigns ;  and  where  a  tenant,  holding  under  assignment  of  a 
lease  containing  a  condition  not  to  underlet  or  assign,  let  a 
part  of  the  premises  to  a  thiid  paity,  it  was  held  that  he  could 
not  set  uj)  against  his  lessee,  that  the  lease  imder  which  he 
held  was  void.  The  original  landlord  or  his  assigns  were  the 
only  persons  who  could  terminate  the  estate  l)y  an  entry  for  a 
breach  of  the  condition.^  The  right  to  enter  in  order  to  en- 
force a  forfeiture  for  a  breach  of  a  condition  must  be  reserved 
to  the  party  to  the  lease,  who  is  the  legal  owner  of  the  rever- 
sion, and  not  to  a  stranger.*'  And  if  the  estate  of  the  tenant 
be  one  for  life,  the  reversioner  can  only  defeat  it  by  entry." 
J>ut  if  it  be  for  years,  no  entry  is  necessary  ;  ^  unless  it  is  stipu- 
lated in  the  lease  that  the  lessor  shall  re-enter,^  and,  in  this 
case  he  may,  after  breach,  bring  ejectment,  without  first  mak- 

»  Lyiule  r.  Hou^'h,  27  Barb.  415  ;  Dl-ii  v.  Post,  25  N.  J.  285  ;  r.nfiiaway  v. 
Adams,  12  Ves.  395,  400. 

a  FieM  V.  Mills,  33  N.  J.  254. 

•  UnrRrave  r.  King,  5  Ired.  Eq.  430  ;  Beardman  r.  Wilson,  L.  R.  4  C.  B.  57  ; 
ParmentiT  r.  Webber,  8  Taunt.  593.  As  to  what  is  such  an  a.'jsignnient,  st'c  ju'sl, 
•333. 

•  Den  V.  Post,  25  N.  J.  285  ;  Crusoe  r.  Buj-by,  3  Wils.  234.  Sec  1  Smith, 
Lend.  ("as.  20,  21  ;  Roe  r.  Sales,  1  Maule  &  S.  297. 

'  Shumway  v.  Collins,  6  Oray,  227,  230. 

•  S;inder«  V.  Merryweather,  3  Hurlst.  k  C.  902.  909  ;  Morton  v.  Woods,  L.  K. 
4  Q.  B.  293,  303  ;  18  Jim.  L.  Reg.  525  ;  Taylor,  Uud.  k  Ten.  §  293  ;  2  Piatt, 
Leases,  318. 

'  Corn.  Und.  k  Ten.  327. 

'  Roberta  c.  Davey,  4  B.  &  Ad.  CG4  ;  Hughes  r.  Palmer,  19  C.  B.  N.  8.  391.  405. 
»  Shattuck  r.  Lovejoy,  8  Gray,  204  ;  Gamhart  v.  Finney,  40  Mo.  449  ;  Doc  v. 
Birch,  1  M.  k  W.  402.     Posi,  •322. 


506  LAW   OP  REAL   PROPEETY.  [bOOK   I. 

ing  a  formal  entry .^  Even  though  the  lease,  by  its  terms,  is 
to  be  void  if  the  condition  is  broken  by  the  lessee,  this  is  only 
at  the  election  of  the  lessor/^  The  lessee  could  not  set  up  in 
defence  a  breach  of  his  own  covenant  not  to  assign,  if  the 
lessor  does  not  object  to  such  assignment.^  Conditions  re- 
straining the  underletting  or  assignment  of  the  premises,  with- 
out the  lessor's  assent,  are  intended  solely  for  the  benefit  of 
the  lessor.*  And  this  doctrine  was  applied  under  the  statute 
of  Massachusetts,  declaring  all  leases  forfeited  if  the  premises 
are  used  for  illegal  purposes.  It  constitutes  a  condition  sub- 
sequent, of  which  the  lessor  may  avail  himself  or  not  at  his 
election.  It  is,  moreover,  a  personal  right,  which  a  purchaser 
from  the  lessor  cannot  take  advantage  of  in  respect  to  any 
breaches  arising  before  he  becomes  owner.^  The  insertion  of 
a  condition  in  a  lease,  moreover,  is  the  only  by-way  of  defeat- 
ing the  same  for  a  breach  of  covenant  therein,  unless  such 
breach  can  be  construed  into  a  determination  of  a  conditional 
limitation,  by  which  the  lease  is  to  continue  ivhile  or  so  long  as 
the  lessee  keeps  his  covenant,  and  the  like.^  Wliere  one  made 
a  lease  for  three  years,  and  two  more  if  he  did  not  sell  the 
estate,  in  which  case  the  lease  for  two  years  was  to  be  void, 
it  would  make  no  difference  as  to  the  effect  of  such  sale 
whether  made  before  the  two  years  begin,  or,  during  that 
time,  it  avoided  the  provision  as  to  a  continuance  for  two 
years.'' 

4.  As  the  law  stood  before  the  32  Hen.  VIII.  no 
[*318]  one  could  *  avail  himself  of  the  benefit  of  a  condition 
to  defeat  an  estate  by  entry,  except  the  lessor  or  his 
heirs,  because  such  right  was  not  assignable  at  common  law, 
more  than  any  other  chose  in  action.  The  consequence  was, 
if  a  lessor  conveyed  his  reversion,  although  the  estate  would 

1  Com.  Land.  &  Ten.  327. 

2  Jones  V.  Carter,  15  M.  k  W.  718  ;  Clark  v.  Jones,  1  Denio,  516  ;  Shumway 
V.  Collins,  6  Gray,  227  ;  2  Piatt,  Leases,  328  ;  Taylor,  Land.  &  Ten.  §§  238,  492  ; 
Blyth  V.  Dennett,  13  C.  B.  178,  180 ;  Bowman  v.  Foot,  29  Conn.  331.     Post,  *324. 

8  Bemis  v.  Wilder,  100  Mass.  446  ;  Webster  v.  Nichols,  104  111.  110. 
*  Way  V.  Reed,  6  Allen,  364.  ^  Trask  v.  Wheeler,  7  Allen,  109. 

6  Taylor,  Land.  &  Ten.  §  291  ;  7  Am.  Law  Rev.  256  ;  Elliott  v.  Stone,  1  Gray, 
571  ;  Com.  Land.  &  Ten.  104  ;  Ashley  v.  Warner,  11  Gray,  43. 

'  Knowles  v.  Hull,  97  Mass.  206.     So  Morton  v.  Weir,  70  N.  Y.  247. 


Cll.  X.   §  o.]  ESTATES    FOR    YEARS.  .007 

pass,  ami  tlir  assij^nce  of  llif  reversion  mijrht  recover  rent 
from  the  tenant  in  an  action  of  ilel»t,  no  covenant,  as  sueh, 
passed  to  the  jrrantee  or  assi^Miee  of  sueh  reversion.  And 
tlioiijih,  for  breach  of  sueh  covenant,  the  assignee  might  have 
sued  in  the  name  of  the  covenantee,  the  lessor,  yet  the  lessor, 
as  he  had  parti-d  with  all  his  estate,  could  not  enter  and  de- 
feat the  estate  of  the  lessee  for  a  l)reaeh  of  the  comlition.  The 
effect  of  this  was,  that  when  the  Crown,  in  the  time  of  Henry 
VIII.,  undertook  to  convey  the  lands  of  the  dissolved  monas- 
teries, the  grantees  found  themselves  unalile  to  enforce  the 
covenants  and  conditions  under  which  the  tenants  held  these 
lands.  And  to  jirovide  a  remedy  for  the  Crown,  and  partly  for 
the  people  at  large,  a  statute  was  jiassed,'  hy  which,  omitting 
the  provisions  as  to  the  Crown  lands,  grantees  or  assignees  to 
or  by  any  person  and  tlu'ir  heirs,  executors,  administrators, 
and  assii/ns,  should  "  have  like  advantages  against  the  lessees, 
their  executors,  administrators,  and  assigns,  by  entry  for 
non-payment  of  the  rent,  or  for  doing  of  waste  or  other  forfei- 
ture, and  by  action  only  for  not  performing  other  conditions, 
covenants,  or  agreements  expressed  in  the  indentures  of  leases, 
A'C, against  the  said  lessees.  Arc, their  executors,  administrators, 
and  assigns,  as  the  said  lessors  and  grantors,  their  heirs  or 
successors,  might  have  had."  And  a  corresponding  authority 
is  given  to  lessees  and  their  assigns  to  enforce  covenants 
in  their  favor.*  ^  And  an  assignee  of  an  undivided  share  may 
maintain  an  action  for  a  breach  in  respect  of  that  share.-^    IJut 

•  Note.  —  For  the  puqwscs  of  convenient  reference,  the  reader  will  fin<l  ex- 
tnu'ta  from  this  and  some  other  early  English  statutes  inserted  nt  the  close  of  the 
present  book.  This  statute  is  not  in  force  in  Ohio,  f'onnecticut,  or  South  Cnro- 
lina. 

•  Stat.  32  Henrj*  VIII.  c.  34.  It  is  stated  l<y  a  writer  in  the  1(51  No.  of  West- 
minster Review,  p.  59,  upon  the  authority  of  St  John  on  the  Land  Revenues  of 
the  Trown,  p.  68,  that,  at  the  suppression  of  the  monasteries  and  other  chnritnMe 
foumlations,  one-fifth  part  of  the  soil  of  the  whole  ri*alm,  estimatetl  at  tliirty  mil- 
lions of  iK)nnd»,  fell  at  once  to  the  ilisjKtsal  of  the  Crown,  and  that  this  was  all 
di.ttributi-d  amonj;  the  creatures  of  Henry. 

'  Wms.  Real  Prop.  202,  and  n. ;  Co.  Lit.  215  a  ;  1  Burton,  Real  Prop.  §  855  ; 
Hare's  note  to  Dumpor's  Case,  1  Smith,  Ixad.  Cas.  5tli  Am.  etl.  92  ;  Smith,  Ijind. 
&  Ten.  283-285  ;  Fenn  v.  Smart,  12  East,  444  ;  Van  Rensselaer  v.  Hays,  19 
N.  Y.  «8,  81. 

•  1  Piatt,  Leases,  734. 


508  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

a  condition,  if  entire,  is  not  apportionable  by  the  act  of  the 
parties,  and  will  be  wholly  destroyed  by  a  severance  of  any 
part  of  the  reversion  by  their  act.^  It  has  accordingly  been 
held,  that  if  a  lease  is  made  reserving  rent,  and  with  condition 
of  re-entry  for  non-payment,  and  the  lessor  demise  the  reversion 
for  a  term  of  years,  it  would  carry  with  it  the  benefit  of  the 
condition,  under  the  statute  of  32  Hen.  YIII.  But  if  he  lease 
three  acres,  and  then  grant  the  reversion  in  two  of  these,  it 
does  not  pass  the  benefit  of  the  condition,  because  the  con- 
dition is  entire  and  indivisible,  although  the  rent  in  such 
case  will  be  apportioned.^  The  effect  is  that  one  of  several 
heirs  of  a  reversioner  may  avail  himself  of  the  benefit  of  the 
condition  contained  in  the  lease,  and  recover  in  ejectment 
liis  share  for  the  breach  of  the  same.^  Yet  the  assignee 
of  the  reversion  of  a  part  of  the  land,  though  he  cannot 
enter  for  a  condition  broken,  may  maintain  an  action  of  cov- 
enant by  virtue  of  the  statute.'*  This  statute  applies  only  to 
leases  under  seal,  where  there  is  a  reversion  in  the  lessor,  and 
does  not  extend  to  covenants  in  deeds  in  fee.^ 

5.  But  a  covenant  or  condition  already  broken  can- 
[*319]  not  be  *  assigned  so  as  to  be  taken  advantage  of  or 
enforced  by  an  assignee  in  his  own  name.^ 
6.  As  the  law  now  stands,  therefore,  not  only  the  payment 
of  rent,  but  the  performance  of  any  other  covenant  running 
with  the  estate,  may  be  provided  for  by  a  condition  for  re-entry 
and  forfeiture,  by  which  the  lessor  or  his  heirs  or  assigns  may 
enter  and  repossess  the  premises  as  if  no  lease  had  been  made. 
Thus  a  covenant  by  lessee  not  to  carry  off  any  hay,  under  a 

1  2  Piatt,  Leases,  332.  ^  Twyiiam  v.  Pickard,  2  B.  &  A.  105. 

8  Cruger  v.  McLaury,  41  N.  Y.  219,  225;  Co.  Lit.  215  a;  Wright  v.  Bur- 
roughs, 3  C.  B.  685,  700. 

*  Taylor,  Land.  &  Ten.  §  296. 

5  Wallaces.  Vernon,  1  Kerr,  IST.  B.  5,  22,  25  ;  Lewes  v.  Eidge,  Cro.  Eliz.  863  ; 
Standeu  v.  Chrismas,  10  Q.  B.  135  ;  Smith  v.  Eggington,  L.  R.  9  C.  P.  145.  In 
Allcock  V.  Moorhouse,  9  Q.  B.  Div.  366,  it  was  held  that  the  assignees  of  a  lessor 
from  year  to  year  could  not  sue  the  assignees  of  the  lessee,  because,  as  there  wa3 
po  seal,  the  statute  Hen.  VIIL  did  not  ai)ply,  and  Statute  4  Anne,  c.  16,  did  not 
because  there  was  no  privitj'  of  estate. 

6  Burton,  Keal  Prop.  §  857  ;  Burden  v.  Thayer,  3  Met.  76  ;  Crane  v.  Batten, 
28  E.  L.  &,  E.  137,  where  the  covenaut  was  to  insure.  Trask  v.  Wheeler,  7  Allen, 
109. 


ClI.  X.   §   :i.]  ESTATES    FOR    YEARS.  .000 

penaltv  uf  Xr>,  uitli  a  LTntial  clause  of  rij^lit  of  rc-t'iitrv  for 
breach  of  iiny  of  the  covenants,  woikeil  a  forfeiture  of  the 
estate,  the  lessee  having  hroken  that  covenant.'  So  a  c(»n- 
dition  in  a  lea.sc  tlmt,  if  the  lessee  should  fail  to  j»erforni  any 
of  the  covenants  in  the  same,  the  lessor  might  enter  and  re- 
possess the  premises,  and  one  of  the  covenants  was,  that  the 
lessee  should  not  occupy  or  sufl'er  the  jiremises  to  be  occupied 
in  a  j»articular  numner,  which  was  broken,  it  was  held,  the 
devisees  of  the  lessor  mi^dit  enter  and  defeat  the  estate  for 
such  occupation.'^  Hut  in  order  to  have  the  non-payment  of 
nut  a  ground  of  forfeiture  of  the  estate  on  the  part  of  the 
lessee,  the  lease  must  contain  a  C(judition  to  that  elVect.^  And 
it  is  hardly  necessary  to  add,  that,  in  const ruin-r  and  applying 
such  causes  of  forfeiture,  courts  apply  the  rules  of  law  .strictly.* 
And  where  the  lessor  entered  upon  and  took  jtossession  of  the 
premises,  and  while  he  so  held  them  the  lessee's  covenant  as 
to  keei)ing  the  premises  in  repair  was  broken,  it  was  held  that 
the  lessor  could  not  take  advantage  of  the  condition  in  the 
lease  in  respect  to  such  rej)airs,  on  account  of  any  breach 
arising  while  in  his  possession.''  So  where,  by  the  terms  of 
his  lease,  the  tenant  was  to  remove  certain  buildings  in  a 
manner  therein  prescribed,  it  was  helil  that  he  niiLdit  do  this 
at  any  time  during  his  term.'' 

7.  Thf  effect  of  such  an  entry  by  a  lessor  or  his  assigns, 
where  he  may  lawfully  make  it  for  lu'each  of  some  con<lition, 
as  the  jicrformance  of  a  covenant  in  a  lease,  is,  as  already 
stated,  to  determine  the  estate  of  the  tenant  altogether,  and 
wholly  revest  the  same  in  the  lessor  or  his  assigns."  Hut 
this  does  not  impair  the  lessor's  right  to  recover  rent  ujt  to 
the  time  of  the  forfeiture  incurred.^  And  where  the  lessor 
was  by  the  terms  of  his  lease  to  pay  for  improvements  at  the 
end  of  the  term,  but  entered  and  put  an  end  to  the  lea.se  for 

»  !).«'  1-.  Jepson,  3  B.  &  Ad.  402.  ^  Wheelir  r.  Earlc,  5  <"iish.  31. 

•  Brown  r.  linfm,  22  I  ml.  122. 

•  I)(H-  r.  Bond,  5  B.  Ac  C.  855  ;  Doc  v.  .Stevens,  3  B.  &  Ad.  299  ;  Doo  r.  J(i>- 
son.  Id.  402. 

<*  r.llHlt  r.  Boosey,  11  C.  B.  N.  8.  865  ;  1  Roll.  Abr.  453. 

•  I'alithoqi  r.  IWjjner,  52  I'enn.  St.  149. 

^  Mnekuhin  r.  \Vlut.r«ft,  4  H.irr.  &  McH.  135. 

•  Mattice  r.  Lord,  30  Barb.  362. 


510  LAW  OF  REAL  PEOPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

acts  of  forfeiture  done  by  the  lessee,  it  was  held  that  the  lessee 
had  no  claim  to  recover  for  such  improvements  until  the  natu- 
ral expiration  of  the  original  term.^  But  until  such  re-entry 
is  actually  made,  the  estate  remains  in  the  lessee  or  his  as- 
signs, in  the  same  manner  as  before,  since  the  breach  of  the 
condition  does  not,  of  itself,  operate  like  a  conditional  limita- 
tion to  determine  the  estate.^  And  the  courts,  moreover,  are 
strict  in  construing  the  terms  of  the  condition  so  as  to  save  a 
forfeiture,  if  it  can  fairly  be  done.^  Among  the  cases  illus- 
trative of  the  strictness  which  courts  apply  in  questions  of 

this  kind  are  the  following :  In  Doe  v.  Stevens,  the 
[*320]   *  clause  giving  the  right  of  re-entry  was, "  if  the  lessee 

shall  do  or  cause  to  be  done  any  act,  matter,  or  thing 
contrary  to,  and  in  breach  of,  any  of  the  covenants."  Tlie 
lease  contained  a  covenant  to  repair.  It  was  held,  that  the 
condition  only  related  to  some  act  done,  and  not  to  an  omis- 
sion to  make  the  repairs.^  In  Crane  v.  Butler,  there  was  a 
covenant  by  lessee  to  insure,  with  a  condition  of  re-entry  for 
the  breach.  The  insurance  was  to  be  made  in  the  joint  names 
of  lessor,  his  heirs  or  assigns,  and  lessee,  in  such  office  as 
lessor  or  his  assigns  should  direct.  The  lessor  notified  the 
lessee  in  what  office  to  insure,  but  soon  after  assigned  his 
estate  to  plaintiff,  who  waited  three  days,  and,  the  lessee  not 
having  insured,  entered  for  the  breach.  But  it  was  held  no 
breach  which  gave  the  plaintiff  a  right  to  enter,  first,  not  for 
what  took  place  before  the  assignment  by  the  lessor  ;  secondly, 
nor  for  neglect  after  that,  inasmuch  as  it  was  requisite  he 
should  notify  the  lessee  of  the  assignment,  and  indicate  in 
what  office  the  insurance  should  be  procured.^  In  Spear  v. 
Fuller,  the  lessee  covenanted,  among  other  things,  not  to 
assign  or  underlet,  and  a  condition  was  inserted  that  the 
lessor  might  enter  and  expel  the  lessee  if  he  failed  to  pay 
rent   or   committed   waste.      An   assignment   by  lessee  was 

1  Lawrence  v.  Knight,  11  Cal.  298. 

2  Fifty  Assoc,  v.  Howland,  11  Met.  99  ;  Western  Bank  v.  Kyle,  6  Gill,  343  ; 
Proctor  V.  Keith,  12  B.  Men.  252  ;  Doe  v.  Birch,  1  M.,&  W.  402  ;  Garner  v.  Han- 
nah, 6  Duer,  262  ;  Elliott  v.  Stone,  1  Gray,  571. 

»  Spear  v.  Fuller,  8  N.  H.  174 ;  Doe  v.  Stevens,  3  B.  &  Ad.  299. 

*  Supra. 

6  Crane  v.  Batten,  28  E.  L.  &  E.  137. 


en.  X.  §  n.]  ESTATES   FOR    YEAFtS.  ',11 

held    to   Itr  a  incre    bri'uch   of  the  ccnriiant,  but   imt   of  (lit- 
comlition.' 

8.  So,  tlioii;j:li  out'  covenant  in  n  It-asc  is,  to  snricndir  the 
preiuiscs  upon  a  certain  continj?en<  y,  it  does  not  give  tin-  lessor 
a  riirlit  to  enter  and  expid  the  lessee  u|>on  the  haj>penin^  of 
such  continireney,  unless  there  is  a  ri^:ht  of  re-entry  therefor 
reserved  to  the  lessor  in  the  lease.^  And  this  applies  to  all 
covenants  in  leases:  the  lessor  piins  no  right  to  re-enter  and 
oxjK'l  the  lessee  for  a  breach  thereof,  unless  there  is  some  pro- 
viso or  condition  contained  in  the  lease  givinj^  such  ri-rht  of 
re-entry.^  So,  wiiere  the  lessee  agreed  to  surrender  the  prem- 
ises at  any  time  after  so  many  months,  on  being  paid  so  nnich 
money,  it  was  iield  to  be  a  covenant  only  and  not  a  condition, 
nor  a  conditional  limitation  wliicli  would  determine  the  lease. 
And  it  may  l»e  statecl  as  a  general  proposition,  that  courts 
always  construe  similar  clauses  as  covenants  only,  rather  than 
conditions  or  conditional  limitations.^  'riius  where  the 
•lease  was  to  l)e  void  if  the  lessee  assigned,  it  was  [*;121] 
held  to  be  no  breach  to  take  in  one  or  more  co-tenants, 
or  to  underlet  the  premises.^  Nor  is  it  a  i)reach  of  a  ccjndition 
in  a  lease  not  to  alien,  sell,  ass^ign,  transfer,  and  set  over,  or 
otherwise  part  with,  the  lease  or  premises  witlnmt  license,  to 
deposit  the  lease  by  way  of  security  for  money  loaned."^  Nor 
is  it  a  breach  of  such  condition  to  take  in  a  lodger,  although 
it  be  giving  him  exclusive  j)osses8ion  of  a  chamber  for  a  year, 
provided  the  lessee  retain  possession  and  control  of  the  leased 
premises  as  a  whole." 

»  SjH-ar  r.  FuII.t,  8  N.  IT.  174  ;  Burnes  r.  McCubbin,  3  Kans.  221. 

'  iK-nnLson  v.  Ucatl,  3  Diina,  r,8t). 

»  Dtlaiicy  F.  Caiionj,',  i>  N.  Y.  «  ;  Den  v.  Post,  25  N.  J.  285  ;  Brown  r.  Bra^^g, 
22  Iiul.  122  ;  Talliiian  v.  Coffin,  4  N.  Y.  134  ;  Shaw  v.  ColUn,  14  C.  H.  N.  s.  372  ; 
Crawltv  c.  I'rice,  L.  U.  10  g.  B.  302. 

♦  Wht-eUr  p.  Dasconilw,  3  Cush.  285  ;  Doe  v.  Phillips,  2  Bing.  13. 

*  Margnive  v.  King,  5  Ireil.  E4.  430  ;  SjK'ar  v.  Fuller,  8  N.  H.  174  ;  Crusoe 
r.  Bugby,  2  Wm.  Bl.  76C.  But  a  condition  not  to  "st-t,  let,  or  assign  ovi-r  the 
whole  or  any  jxirt  of  the  preniist's,  on  jiain  of  forfeiturr,  &c.,  would,  by  undrr- 
letting,  work  a  forft-iture."  Hoc  r.  Harrison,  2  T.  IC.  425  ;  Smith,  I^and.  &  Tin. 
116,  n. 

«  Doe  r.  Hogg,  1  C.  &  P.  1*50  ;  Dw  v.  Ijiniing,  Uy.  &  M.  36  ;  Taylor,  Und. 
k  Ten.  §  406. 

^  Taylor,  Und.  k  Ten.  §  405  ;  Com.  Ijind.  &  Ten.  236  ;  Bnwer  r.  .MeT.owon, 
L.  R.  5  C.  P.  23l>  :  Cook  r.  Humb.T,  11  C,  B.  n.  ».  3J,  i>;  ■  i.r.  .i.sl.id.-  r.  Taj- 
Bcott,  1  Cr.  .M.  &  K.  55  ;  Bier)'  r.  Zeiglcr,  93  Penn.  St,  307. 


512  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  L 

9.  In  order  to  avail  himself  of  his  right  to  enter  and  defeat 
the  estate  of  the  lessee  for  a  breach  of  condition,  there  are  cer- 
tain things  required  by  the  common  law  to  be  done  by  the 
reversioner,  in  respect  to  whicli  the  law  is  quite  strict,  unless 
the  parties  shall,  by  agreement,  have  substituted  something  in 
its  stead.  These  are  enumerated  in  a  note  to  Saunders's  Re- 
ports, and  are  as  follows.  If  the  condition  be  for  the  payment 
of  rent,  there  must  be,  1.  A  demand  of  the  rent  precisely  upon 
the  day  when  the  rent  is  due  and  payable  by  the  lease,  to  save 
the  forfeiture.^  But  where  the  covenant  with  condition,  and  a 
right  of  re-entry  for  a  breach,  was  to  pay  the  taxes  assessed 
upon  the  premises,  it  was  held,  that  the  lessor  need  not  make 
demand  of  the  taxes  in  order  to  give  him  a  right  to  enter  for 
the  non-payment.^  But  in  a  case  in  Indiana,  where  by  the 
terms  of  the  lease  the  lessee  was  to  pay  the  taxes,  it  was  held, 
that  the  lessor,  before  entering  to  enforce  a  forfeiture  for 
neglect  on  the  part  of  the  lessee  to  pay  them,  ought  to  demand 
payment  of  him.^  2.  It  must  be  made  a  convenient  time  before 
sunset.^  3.  It  must  be  made  upon  the  land,  at  the  most  no- 
torious place  upon  it,  which  would  be  the  front  door  of  the 
dwelling-house  if  there  was  one  upon  the  land,  unless  some 
other  place  is  agreed  upon  by  the  parties.  Nor  does  it  obviate 
the  necessity  of  an  actual  demand  that  there  is  no  one  present 
upon  whom  to  make  it.  And  a  demand  made  after  or  before 
the  proper  time,  or  at  an  improper  place,  will  not  authorize  an 
entry  to  defeat  the  estate.^  The  rule  above  stated  has  been 
substantially  reaffirmed  by  the  modern  English  cases  as  well 
as  by  numerous  American  cases.  In  one,  the  time  at  which 
the  rent  must  be  demanded  is  fixed  at  sunset.^     In  another,  a 

»  Duppa  V.  Mayo,  1  Saiind.  287,  n.  16  ;  Doe  v.  Wandlass,  7  T.  R.  117. 

2  Byrane  v.  Rogers,  8  Minn.  281. 

'  Meni  v.  Ratlibone,  21  Ind.  454.  *  Jenkins  v.  Jenkins,  63  Ind.  415. 

5  Jackson  v.  Kipp,  3  Wend.  230  ;  M'Murphy  v.  Minot,  4  N.  H.  251  ;  Jones  v. 
Reed,  15  N.  H.  68  ;  Mackubin  v.  Whetcroft,  4  Harr.  &  McH.  135  ;  Jackson  v. 
Harrison,  17  Johns.  66  ;  Rerasen  v.  Conklin,  18  Johns.  447  ;  Bradstreet  v.  Clark, 
21  Pick.  389  ;  Co.  Lit.  202  a  ;  Maund's  Case,  7  Rep.  28  ;  Smith  v.  Whitbeck, 
13  Ohio  St.  471  ;  Byrane  v.  Rogers,  8  Minn.  281  ;  Tate  v.  Crowson,  6  Ired.  65  ; 
McGlynn  v.  Moore,  25  Cal.  384;  Chapman  v.  Harney,  100  Mass.  353  ;  Bacon  v. 
W.  Furn.  Co.,  53  Ind.  229;  Chapman  v.  Kirby,  49  111.  211  ;  Chadwick  v.  Par- 
ker, 44  111.  326.  But  by  statute  in  Illinois,  the  tenant  has  ten  days  after  demand 
made  in  which  to  pay  the  rent  and  save  a  forfeiture.     lb. 

«  Per  Ld.  Hale,  Duppa  v.  Mayo,  1  Saund.  287. 


CII.  X.  §  :l.]  ESTATES    FOR    ^-EARS.  r>13 

demanil  at  ttMi  o'clnrk  in  the  foroiiomi  «if  the  last  day  was  IhM 
to  l)(!  too  early.'  In  anutlRT,  \>rnn{  of  its  having'  hem  ///  t/tr 
afternoon  was  hold  not  to  ho  siinicinitly  jin'risc-  Ihit  the 
statcmont  of  the  time  as  altove  jrivcn  hy  Coke  seems  to  he 
the  rule  now  recoj::ni/ed  hy  the  eourts. 

10.  Tlie  (U-mand,  moreover,  must  he  of  the  jtrecise  amount 
due  on  the  (hiy  it  hecomes  due.^  And  yet,  thoujrh  it  must  ho 
demanded  heforc  sundown  hm^  enough  to  have  litdit  hy  wliich 
to  count  tlie  money  in  orch'r  to  enforce  a  forfeiture,  the  rent  is 
not  in  fact  due  till  the  last  minute  of  the  natural  day,  for  if 
the  lessor  dies  after  sun.sct,  and  hefore  midnight,  tlie  rent  goes 
to  the  heir  with  the  reversion,  and  not  to  the  executor.* 

•  11.  Sometimes  the  j)arties  agree  that  upon  the  non-  [*3:i'2] 
payment  of  tlu"  icnt  the  lessor  may  enter  for  hn-ach  of 

the  condition  without  jtrevious  demand,  and  in  such  ease  a 
previous  demand  is  unnecessary.^ 

\'l.  But  independently  of  the  effect  arising  from  the  con- 
fession of  entry,  in  an  action  of  ejectment,  it  seems  to  he 
necessary  that  an  actual  entry  should  always  he  made  l)y  the 
owner  of  the  reversion  for  hrcach  of  a  condition  of  renting  in 
order  to  complete  the  forfeiture  and  defeat  the  lease.^  But  it 
does  not  appear  that  it  is  requisite  that  this  entry  sljould  he 
made  at  any  particular  time  after  the  right  to  make  it  accrues, 
provided  the  lessor  do  no  act,  such  as  accepting  rent  for  the 

«  Acocks  r.  Phillips,  5  Hurlst.  k  N.  183. 

'  Jackson  v.  Harrison,  17  Johns.  66.  In  Jenkins  r.  Jenkins,  G3  Iml.  415.  it 
was  required  to  Ix- just  before  sunset.  See  also  Chaptnan  i*.  Wright,  2f>  111.  1'20  ; 
McQuesten  v.  Morgan,  34  N.  H.  400  ;  Acad,  of  Music  v.  Hackett,  2  Hilton,  217, 
229,  232  ;  Jewett  v.  Bern,',  20  N.  H.  36  ;  Kimball  r.  Rowlan.l,  6  Gniy,  224  ; 
Phillips  V.  Doe,  3  Ind.  132  ;  Gaakill  v.  Trainer,  3  Cal.  334  ;  and  American  cases 
in  note,  5  Hurlst.  k  X.  184. 

'  Doe  V.  Paul.  3  C.  &  P.  613  ;  MTonnick  r.  Connell,  6  S.  &  R.  151  ;  Sperr>- 
V.  Sjierry,  8  N.  H.  477  ;  Conner  v.  Hradlej-,  1  How.  211  ;  Acad,  of  Music  v. 
Hackett,  2  Hilton,  232  ;  People  v.  Du<lley,  68  N.  Y.  323. 

«  Co.  Lit.  202  0,  n.  87  ;  Duppa  r.  .Mayo,  1  Saund.  287  ;  Rockingham  r.  Oxen- 
den,  2  Salk.  578  ;  Acad,  of  Music  v.  Hackett,  sup. 

*  Doe  t?.  Masters,  2  B.  &  C.  490  ;  Fifty  Assoc,  r.  Howland,  5  Cush.  214  ;  2 
PUtt,  lx>a.ses,  333  ;  BjTane  r.  Rogers,  8  Minn.  281  ;  Sweeney  v.  Garratt,  2  Dis- 
ney, 601. 

«  Duppa  r.  Mayo,  1  Saund.  287  c,  note  ;  1  Smith,  Lead.  Cas.  5th  .\m.  oil.  89  ; 
Jones  r.  Carter,  15  M.  &  W.  "18.    Unless  by  its  terms  the  lease  is  to  Itocome  void, 
and  th-n  it  is  at  lessor's  option  to  determine.     See  pi.  14. 
You  I.  — 33 


514  LAW    OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

premises  accruing  after  the  breach  of  the  condition,  which 
would  amount  to  a  waiver  of  the  forfeiture.^  Such  acceptance 
of  rent  would  have  that  effect,  but  it  must  be  rent  which  be- 
came due  after  the  breach  of  the  condition. ^  And  the  same 
would  be  the  effect  of  bringing  an  action  for  rent  accruing 
after  the  breach  of  covenant,  if  this  were  known  to  the  lessor 
at  the  time  of  commencing  the  action.^  But  in  England,  and, 
it  would  seem,  in  those  States  where  the  technical  action  of 
ejectment  is  in  use  for  the  recovery  of  lands,  a  lessor  may  re- 
cover his  term  for  a  breach  of  a  condition  which  works  a  forfeit- 
ure, without  any  formal  entry  made,  as  the  form  of  the  process 
assumes  such  entry  to  have  been  made.* 

13.  A  forfeiture  may  be  avoided,  even  after  such  a  demand 
has  been  made  by  lessor  as  before  mentioned,  by  the  lessee's 
tendering  the  rent  due  at  any  time  long  enough  before  twelve 
o'clock  at  night  to  count  the  money,  although  as  a  general 
rule  a  tender  to  be  effectual  must  be  made  before  sundown. 
And  if  there  is  no  place  fixed  for  making  the  payment,  the 

tenant  may  save  a  forfeiture  by  going  upon  the  prem- 
[*323]  ises  at  a  proper  *  time,  and  actually  tendering  it  there. 

But  merely  having  the  money  there  without  offering 
it  would  not  be  sufficient.^ 

14.  There  are  other  cases  where  the  acceptance  of  rent  may 
be  a  waiver  of  a  forfeiture,  where  the  breach  of  the  condition 
has  consisted  in  other  things  than  the  non-payment  of  rent ; 
and,  in  still  other  cases,  such  acceptance  of  rent  will  not  be 
construed  into  a  waiver ;  while  it  is  universally  true,  that  no 
such  act  as  acceptance  of  rent  will  be  construed  into  a  waiver 
of  a  forfeiture,  unless  the  fact  of  the  breach  of  the  condition 

1  Doe  V.  Allen,  3  Taunt.  78  ;  Doe  v.  Bancks,  4  B.  &  A.  401. 

2  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  114  ;  Hartshorne  v.  Watson,  4  Bing.  N,  C.  178  ;  Price 
V.  Worwood,  4  Hurlst.  &  N.  512  ;  Toleman  v.  Portbury,  L.  R.  7  Q.  B.  244  ;  2 
Piatt,  Leases,  468,  470  ;  Co.  Lit.  211  b  ;  Bleecker  v.  Smith,  13  Wend.  530  ;  Hun- 
ter V.  Osterhoudt,  11  Barb.  33  ;  Richburg  v.  Bartley,  Busbee  (N.  C),  418.  Coon 
V.  Brickett,  2  N.  H.  163,  and  a  dictum  in  Bacon  v.  W.  Furn.  Co.,  53  Ind.  779, 
contra,  are  clearly  not  law.     See  also  1  Smith,  Lead.  Cas.  5th  Am.  ed.,  96. 

3  Dendy  v.  Nichol,  4  C.  B.  N.  s.  376. 

*  2  Piatt,  Leases,  331  ;  Doe  v.  Masters,  2  B.  &  C.  490  ;  Goodright  v.  Cator, 
Doug.  478,  485  ;  Little  v.  Heaton,  2  Ld.  Raym.  751 ;  1  Smith,  Lead.  Cas.  5th  Am. 
ed.  70  ;  Jones  v.  Carter,  15  M.  &  W.  718  ;  Jackson  v.  Crysler,  1  Johns.  Cas.  125. 

^  Sweet  V.  Harding,  19  Vt.  587  ;  Haldane  v.  Johnson,  8  Exch.  689. 


t'll.  X.  §  '')  ]  ESTATES    FOR    YEARS.  515 

was  known  to  the  lessor  at  the  time'  Tlins,  wIktc  tin-  ron- 
(lition  was  that  Irsscc  slionM  not  undi-ilct,  uml  lir  <li<l,  ami 
lessor  reccivcii  rent  of  the  undci'-tcnant,  it  was  licM  to  In-  a 
waiver  of  that  hrcat-h,  luit  diil  not  pn-vmt  the  lessor  from 
treating  a  subseqnent  umlerletting  as  a  jrronnd  of  forfeiture.- 
So  where  the  condition  was  for  non-repair,  and  lessor  had 
given  notice  to  repair,  and  then  the  tenant  jiaitl  rent,  it  was 
held  to  be  a  waiver  of  forfeitnre  for  that  ijistance,  btit  not  for 
want  of  repair  after  such  payment.""'  So  where  the  l>reach  con- 
sisted in  entting  timl)er,  and  the  lessor  accepted  n-nt  for  a 
|)criod  of  time  sMliseipient  to  snch  entting,  if  this  was  known 
to  the  lessor,  he  there!)}'  waived  the  forfeiture.*  So  where  the 
condition  was  to  plant  a  certain  nnml)er  of  apj)lc-trees,  which 
the  lessee  failed  to  do,  it  was  held  that  the  payment  of  rent 
was  a  waiver  of  forfeiture  up  to  the  time  of  its  being  received, 
but  a  failure  to  j)lant  them  afterwards  would  lie  a  n(>w  ground 
for  f(U'feiture.''  And  a  like  doctrine  was  hebl  where  the  breach 
consisted  in  not  building  a  house  ujiou  the  premises  by  a  jire- 
scribed  time,  and  then^  was  an  ai'cej)tance  of  rent  after  such 
breach.^  So  where  the  conditicju  was  not  to  obstruct  a  way, 
and  tenant  obstructed  it  prior  to  December,  1819,  when  the 
rent  fell  due,  and  continued  to  do  so  till  April,  1H20.  In 
September,  1820,  lessor  received  the  rent  up  to  Decemlx-r, 
1810,  and  it  was  licld  not  to  be  a  waiver  as  to  the  time  from 
December  to  April."  But  in  those  cases  where  the  condition 
is,  that  for  non-j)ayment  of  rent  and  the  like,  the  lease 
shall  be  null  and  void,  and  the  lessor  demamls  *  the  [*324] 
rent,  and  lessee  neglects  to  pay,  or  lessee  is  guilty  of 
any  other  lireaeli  of  the  comlition,  giving  the  right  of  re-<'ntry 
accordingly,  the  lease  is  alisolutely  determined,  and  cannot  Ite 
set  ujt  by  subsequent  acceptance  of  rent.^     But  this  is  at  the 

'  Clnrkc  v.  Cuminings,  5  Barb.  33l»  ;  Jackson  r.  Brownson,  7  Johns.  227. 

«  Doc  r.  nii.s8.  4  Taunt.  735  ;  OKeefo  v.  Kennedy,  3  Cush.  325  ;  Murray  v. 
Hnnvay.  56  N.  Y.  343. 

»  '"'ryitt  r.  Jt-fTreys,  1  Esp.  393. 

«  r.oinJwr  r.  Hn.ki-tt,  6  Wise.  323  ;  Camp  v.  rulvor,  5  Barb.  91. 

»  Bktxker  r.  Smith,  13  Wend.  530.  «  McGlynn  v.  Moore,  25  Cal.  894. 

^  Jockson  r.  Allen,  3  Cow.  220.  See  nlso  the  American  cases  collected  in  note 
to  4  C.  B.  X.  .s.  Am.  e<l.  387  ;  Barroillut  r.  Battelle,  7  Cal.  450. 

»  Duppa  r.  .Mayo,  1  Sauud.  2S7  c,  n.;  Piuuant's  Case,  3  Rep.  64. 


516  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

election  of  the  lessor,  as  the  lessee  can  never  set  up  his  ovrn 
right  as  avoiding  a  lease.^  If  the  lease  provides  that  it  may 
be  lawful  for  the  lessor  to  re-enter  upon  the  non-payment  of 
rent,  and,  instead  of  doing  this,  he  distrains  for  it  after  having 
demanded  it,  he  thereby  affirms  the  lease,  and  admits  its 
continuance.^  But  the  mere  standing  by,  while  the  tenant 
does  acts  which  violate  the  terms  of  the  lease  and  work  a  for- 
feiture would  be  no  waiver  of  the  condition  or  the  right  to  en- 
force it. -5 

15.  In  one  case,  the  condition  of  the  lease  was,  that  lessee 
should  give  a  bond  at  the  end  of  each  year,  with  surety,  for 
the  rent  of  the  succeeding  year ;  it  was  held,  in  order  to  avail 
himself  of  this  condition  as  a  forfeiture,  the  lessor  must  first 
demand  the  bond  at  the  end  of  the  year.* 

16.  And  it  is  now  settled,  that  in  order  to  save  a  forfeiture 
for  non-payment  of  rent,  if  the  lessor  brings  his  action  of 
ejectment,  and  the  lessee  will  bring  the  money  due  into  court 
for  the  lessor,  the  courts  of  law  as  well  as  equity  will  stay  the 
proceedings,  provided  the  failure  to  pay  was  by  accident,  and 
not  wilfully  done.'^  But  whether  courts  of  equity  will  relieve 
from  forfeiture  where  the  liability  for  a  breach  of  condition 
may  be  compensated  in  damages,  "  may  be  regarded  as  yet  un- 
settled in  the  jurisprudence  of  this  country."  But  this  remark 
is  to  be  taken  in  connection  with  other  breaches  than  the  non- 
payment of  rent.  In  respect  to  that,  the  English  and  Ameri- 
can law,  as  well  as  courts  of  law  and  equity,  substantially 
agree  in  gi^^ng  relief  if  the  arrears  of  rent,  interest,  and  cost 
are  paid  or  tendered.^  The  extent  to  which  courts  aid  parties 
who  are  not  in  fault  in  saving  their  estates  from  forfeiture  by 
reason  of  non-performance  of  conditions  in  leases  is  illustrated 

1  Cartwright  v.  Gardner,  5  Cush.  273,  281  ;  Bemis  v.  Wilder,  100  Mass.  446  ; 
Eogers  v.  Snow,  118  Mass.  118  ;  ante,  p.  *317. 

2  Duppa  V.  Mayo,  1  Saund.  287  c,  n. ;  Pennant's  Case,  3  Kep.  64  ;  Jackson  v. 
Sheldon,  5  Cow.  448  ;  MeKildoe  v.  Darracott,  13  Gratt.  278.  In  Illinois,  a  dis- 
tress warrant  for  rent  cannot  issue  after  six  months  from  the  time  the  rent  falls 
due.     Werner  v.  Ropiequet,  44  111.  522. 

3  Perry  v.  Davis,  3  C.  B.  N.  s.  769,  773.  *  Den  v.  Crowson,  6  Ired.  65. 

5  Atkins  V.  Chilson,  11  Met.  112  ;  Gamer  v.  Hannah,  6  Duer,  262. 

6  Sheets  v.  Selden,  7  Wall.  416 ;  Story,  Eq,  §§  1315,  1316.  See  also  Chad- 
wick  V.  Parker,  44  111.  326,  330. 


CH.   X     §  4.]  ESTATES    FOR    YKAIlfl.  517 

in  the  case  where  the  t«iiij  was  for  uno  thouHaiid  years,  tlic 
rent  hciiiir  payal)le  in  Jitmifiu  .SV</</«m<  Jro/i,  for  which  thr  h'ssijr 
luul  fur  forty  yi'ars  acccptrd  money  without  ohjrclion  hy  way 
of  ('(iiiiniiitatioii.  At  the  t-nd  of  that  tinn-,  the  iron  was  do- 
niandcd  and  insistrd  on  ;  hut  none  was  to  hu  had  in  the  njarkrt, 
as  it  had  ceased  to  l)e  imported.  'I'hc  court,  upon  application 
made,  j;ave  tlie  lessee  time  in  which  t(i  send  to  Russia  for  the 
requisite  iron  before  enforcing  the  forfeiture.^ 


SECTION   IV. 

OP   COVENANTS    IN    LEASES. 

1.  Of  tho  kinds  of  covcimiits. 

2.  Iiiipliftl  covi'imiit  by  lessor,  what  is. 
2  a.  Siiine  subjift. 

3.  Iiiii>lic(I  covfimnt  by  lessee. 

4.  Distinction  in  the  etfei^t  of  impliol  and  express  covenant. 
6.     Of  covenants  running  with  tho  liiml. 

6a.  Same  subject. 

6.  Covenants  run  with  part  of  the  land. 

7.  Sub-lea.se  us  distinguished  from  a.ssignnicnt. 

8.  Covenant  by  iLH.signee  at  common  law. 

9.  Helatiun  of  landlord  and  tenant  extends  to  assignees. 

10.  Wliat  covenants  run  with  the  land. 

11.  When  necejtsjiry  to  name  a.s.signees  to  bind  them. 
I'J.     Covenant-s  attaching  to  parts  of  premises. 

13.  Liability  of  assignee  dejiends  on  privity  of  estate 

14.  I^vssees  liable  by  privity  of  estate  and  contract, 
l.'i.     Act  of  forfeiture  by  one  of  several  assignees. 

liJ.     Liability  to  repair,  pay  rent,  &c.,  if  preuiises  are  injured. 

As  it  is  difticult  to  conceive  of  a  lease  wliich  (h)es  not  con- 
tain .some  covenant,  express  or  imi)lied,  upon  tlie  j)art  of  U'ssiu- 
or  lessee,  or  l)oth,  covenants  in  lea.ses  for  years  become  an  im- 
portant l)ranch  of  the  subject  of  such  estates.  A  question 
has  been  raised  by  conflicting  decisions  of  different  courts, 
whether  one  can  be  sued  in  covenant  who  is  named  in  a  .sealed 
instrnujent,  de»'d  poll,  or  in<lenture,  as  a  partv  to  it.  which  is 
accepted  by  him,  if,  Ity  the  t«rms  of  it,  he  is  to  do  certain 

1  Lilly  V.  Fifty  Associates,  101  Moss.  432. 


618  LAW   OF  REAL   PROPERTY.  [bOOK   I. 

things  which  he  fails  to  perform,  but  the  same  has  not  been 
executed  on  his  pai't ;  while  in  New  York  it  is  now  held,  as  it 
is  in  New  Jersey,  that  an  action  of  covenant  broken  would 
lie  in  such  a  case.^  The  cases  cited  below  hold  that  the 
proper  remedy  is  in  assumpsit,  or  at  least  that  covenant  would 
not  lie.^  "  The  word  '  covenant,'  in  strictness,  does  not  apply 
otherwise  than  to  such  agreements  as  are  executed  under  the 
solemnity  of  a  seal ;  but,  in  common  parlance,  it  is  applied 
to  any  agreement,  whether  under  seal  or  not."  And  it  is  so 
applied  in  the  case  cited  below.^ 

1.  These  covenants  are  either  implied  or  express,  or,  what 
is  the  same  thing,  covenants  in  law  or  in  deed.  And  the  same 
covenant  may  be  the  separate  covenant  of  one  of  the  parties, 
or  that  of  both,  according  as  it  applies  to  one  or  both  of  them.* 

Implied  are  such  as  arise  by  construction  of  law  from 
[*325]  the  use  of  certain  terms  *and  forms  of  expression 

which  are  uniformly  held  to  constitute  an  agreement, 
though  no  express  words  of  covenant  or  agreement  are  con- 
nected with  them.  Among  these  are  "grant,"  "demise," 
"  lease,"  and  the  like.  From  the  word  "  demise,"  in  a  lease 
under  seal,  the  law  implies  a  covenant,  in  a  lease  not  under 
seal,  a  contract  for  title  to  the  estate  merely,  that  is  for  quiet 
enjoyment  against  the  lessor  and  all  that  come  in  under  him 
by  title,  and  against  others  claiming  by  title  paramount  during 
the  term  ;  and  the  word  "  let,"  or  any  equivalent  words  which 


1  Atlantic  Dock  Co.  v.  Leavitt,  54  N.  Y.  35  ;  Finley  v.  Simpson,  22  N.  J.  311. 
But  where  a  lease  under  seal  was  taken  in  the  name  of  an  agent,  no  action  would 
lie  against  the  principal,  though  he  had  entered  and  occupied.  Kiersted  v.  Orange 
R.  R.,  69  N.  Y.  343.  The  rule  of  ratification  seems,  however,  different  in 
other  States.  See  Cady  v.  Shepherd,  11  Pick.  400  ;  Mclntyre  v.  Park,  11  Gray, 
102. 

2  Post,  3  vol.  589,  pi.  49  ;  Goodwin  v.  Gilbert,  9  Mass.  510  ;  Nugent  v.  Eiley, 
1  Met.  117  ;  Newell  v.  Hill,  2  Met.  180  ;  Pike  v.  Brown,  7  Cush.  133  ;  Hinsdale 
V.  Humphrey,  15  Conn.  431  ;  Maule  v.  Weaver,  7  Penn.  St.  329  ;  Johnson  v. 
Mussey,  45  Vt.  419  ;  Gale  v.  Nixon,  6  Cowen,  445  ;  Trustees,  &c.  v.  Spencer,  7 
Ohio,  pt.  2,  149  ;  Burnett  v.  Lynch,  5  B.  &  C.  589  ;  Piatt  on  Cov.  18  ;  Clark  v. 
Gordon,  121  Mass.  330  ;  Carroll  v.  St.  John  Soc,  125  Mass.  565. 

8  Hayne  v.  Cummings,  16  C.  B.  N.  S.  421,  426.  Garranter  signifie  d  defendre 
son  tenant  en  sa  seisin.  Britton,  197  b.  Nihil  aliud  est  quam  de/enderc  el  acquie- 
tare  te')ientein  in  seisina  sua.     Bracton,  lib.  5,  480. 

4  Beckwith  v.  Howard,  6  R.  I.  1. 


CM.   X.   §    I.]  KSTATKS    FOR    YKMtS.  TjIO 

constitute  a  lease,  liave  the  Hamc  efl'cot,  but  no  more*  The 
teiiileiicv  of  inotleiii  deeisioiis  is  a^'jiiiist  iinplyinj;  covenants, 
whiih  niiL'iit  and  nuirlit  to  have  been  expressed,  if  intended. - 
The  |)iesnnipti(>n,  where  parties  have  entered  into  written 
enj^a'^enients  with  express  stipulations,  is  that,  iiavin^  ex- 
pressed some,  they  have  ex|»resse(|  ail  the  conditions  hy  which 
they  intend  to  be  bitnnd  nndei*  the  instrument.' 

2.  Thus  the  word  "  ^nant,"  or  "  demise,"  once  implied  an 
absolute  covenant  on  the  j)art  of  the  lessor  for  the  h-ssee's 
quiet  enjoyment  duriny;  the  term,  miless  this  were  ((Ualiiied, 
as  it  may  be,  l)y  a  more  limited  express  covenant.*  So  the 
word  "  lease  "  has  been  held  to  lu;  ecpiivalent  to  "  demise  " 
in  creatint;  an  implied  covenant.''  These  words  lease  or  demise 
imply  a  covenant  against  a  paramount  title,  ami  against  acts 
of  the  landlord  which  tlestroy  the  beneficial  enjoyment  of  the 
pHMuises  ;'' and  this  extends  to  a  demise  of  a  right  to  ct^llect 
wharfage  for  a  ti-rm  of  time,  although  not  corporeal  ju'operty 
in  its  character,"  and  furthermore  that,  if  the  lessee  is  evicted 
by  a  paramount  title,  ho  will  he  <liseharged  from  payment  of 
rent.**  I>ut  if  one  lease  the  mines  or  veins  of  ore  in  certain 
lands,  he  does  not  tluM-ehy  warrant  that  there  arc  such  min- 
erals there ;  and  if  it  turns  out  that  there  arc  none,  uothiuff 

»   lliirt  r.  Windsor,  12  .M.  &  W.  (\^,  h:>  ;   Liuigaii  v.  Kille,  97  Pcnn.  St.  120. 

*  Shet'ts  c.  Selileii,  7  Wiill.  410,  423. 

>  AsjKliu  r.  Austin,  5  Q.  B.  671,  684.  Thus,  in  New  York,  it  was  licM  that 
in  a  carffuUy  drawn  Knisc  no  covenant  on  ttie  nart  of  a  lessee  to  take  a  renewal  Ls 
iinpliiMl  from  a  covenant  on  tlie  part  of  the  lessor  to  gnmt  one,  Bruce  c.  Fulton 
Bunk,  79  N.  Y.  154. 

*  Burton,  Real  Prop.  §  84C.  But,  hy  statute  now  in  Enf;land,  "  grant  "  no 
longer  implies  a  covenant  in  law.  St«L  8  &  It  Vict.  c.  1<I6,  §  5  ;  Smith,  Ijind. 
&  Ten.  OS.  But  tJie  word  "demise"  still  retains  this  power.  Wms.  Keal  Prop. 
367.  In  New  York  all  actions  ujwn  implied  covenants  in  the  conveyance  of 
lands  arc  taken  away  hy  statut*>,  as  held  in  Kinney  v.  Watts,  14  Weml.  38,  the 
correctni'ss  of  which  lias  been  (piestioncd.  See  I^ihjr,  R«-al  Est.  246  ;  Tone  r. 
Brace,  8  Paigi",  597  ;  Williams r.  Burnll,  1  C.  B.  402.  429  ;  Piatt,  Cov.  47  :  Kawle, 
Cov.  362.  n.;  Mayor  r.  Mahie,  13  N.  Y.  151,  160,  commenting  on  Kinney  r. 
Watts.     See  Mack  r.  Patchin,  infra. 

•  Maulo  r.  Ashmead,  20  Penn.  St.  482  ;  Koss  v.  Dysart,  33  Penn.  St,  452  ; 
Moeder  v.  ("arond.let,  26  Mo.  112  ;  Hamilton  r.  Wright,  28  Mo.  199.  See  nrntra^ 
Levering  r.  b)vering.  13  N.  H.  513. 

•  Wad.-  c.  Hallignn,  16  HI.  507  ;  Playter  r,  Cunningham.  21  Cal.  229.  "Grant 
and  d.-mise"  in  a  lease  amount  to  an  implied  covenant  for  (piiet  enjoyment. 

'  Mayor  v.  Mabie,  13  N,  Y,  151.  *  Wells  p.  Mason,  4  Scam.  84. 


520  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

passes  by  the  lease.^  The  law  as  well  as  the  reason  of  it,  in 
respect  to  these  implied  covenants,  so  far  as  it  was  applicable 
to  the  case  then  under  consideration,  was  thus  satisfactorily 
stated  by  Shaw,  C.  J.,  in  Dexter  v.  Manley,  where  the  terms 
used  were  "  has  demised  and  leased."  "  It  is  sufficient  for 
the  present  case  that  the  lease  contains  an  implied  covenant 
which  is  a  good  warranty  by  the  defendant  (the  lessor)  against 
his  own  acts.  Every  grant  of  any  right,  interest,  or  benefit, 
carries  with  it  an  implied  undertaking  on  the  part  of  the 
grantor  that  the  grant  is  intended  to  be  beneficial,  and  that, 
so  far  as  he  is  concerned,  he  will  do  no  act  to  interrupt  the 
free  and  peaceable  enjoyment  of  the  thing  granted."  ^  "  Every 
lease,"  say  the  court  of  Pennsylvania,  "  implies  a  covenant 
for  quiet  enjoyment.  But  it  extends  only  to  the  possession ; 
and  its  breach,  like  that  of  a  warranty  for  title,  arises  only 
from  eviction  by  means  of  title.  It  does  not  protect  against 
entry  and  ouster  of  a  tort  feasor."  A  tenant  has  a  right  to 
call  his  landlord  into  defence  ;  and,  if  eviction  follows  as  the 
result  of  the  failure  to  defend  him,  he  can  then  refuse  to  pay 
rent,  and  fall  back  upon  his  covenant  for  quiet  enjoyment  to 

recover  his  damages.^     What  the   measure  of   these 
[*326]  is  will  be  considered  later.^     So  a  covenant  for  *  quiet 

enjoyment  is  implied  in  a  lease  of  an  incorporeal  her- 
editament.^ 

2  a.  Though  the  subject  of  implied  covenants  in  leases  is 
too  broad  to  be  embraced  in  its  details  in  a  work  like  the  pres- 
ent, the  reader  may  find  it  discussed  in  some  of  its  bearings 
by  Mr.  Butler.^  And  it  may  be  remarked  that  a  covenant  of 
quiet  enjoyment  in  a  lease,  whether  express  or  implied,  relates 
only  to  possession  under  title,  and  not  to  the  undisturbed  en- 
joyment of  the  premises  demised,  where  there  has  been  no 

1  Harlan  v.  Lehigh  Coal  Co.,  35  Penn.  St.  287.  No  implied  covenant  that 
premises  are  lit  for  occupation.  Edwards  v.  N.  Y.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  98  N.  Y.  245; 
Naumberg  v.  Young,  44  N.  J.  L.  332. 

2  Dexter  v.  Manley,  4  Cush.  14,  24.  A  lessor  is,  therefore,  as  liable  for  the 
acts  of  one  under  his  authority  as  for  his  own.  Sherman  v.  "Williams,  113  Mass. 
481.  Where  there  is  an  implied  contract  in  a  lease,  it  relates  only  to  the  estate, 
not  the  con<lition  of  the  property.     Hart  v.  Windsor,  12  M.  &  W.  86. 

8  Schuylkill,  &c.  R.  R.  v.  Schmoele,  57  Penn.  St.  271,  273. 

<  Post,  *345.  s  Mayor  v.  Mabie,  13  N.  Y.  151.         ^  Co.  Lit.  384  a,  note. 


CH.  X.  §  4.]  ESTATES    FOR    YEARS.  .021 

eviction.'  The  lessor  does  not  wurrant  ajjainst  the  acts  of 
Ktranirer.H,'-  nor  jiiriTc  to  put  the  k'ssoe  into  jjosseHsion.*^  The 
extent  of  his  inipliiMl  (•n^:a^«'ini'ut  is,  that  he  has  a  piod  titk*, 
and  can  jrive  a  free,  unineunibeied  lease  for  the  time  demised.* 
And  wheic  the  k'ssor  iiad  only  an  estate  for  life,  and  dies  Ik*- 
fore  the  rn<l  of  the  term,  the  lessre  cannot  have  an  action 
ajjainst  the  lessor's  estate  for  eviction  In-  the  remaimlernian,  if 
the  only  covenant  was  that  im[ilied  from  tlie  word  '*  demise."'' 
It  wotdd  be  otherwise,  if  the  lessor  had  further  a  power  of  a\>- 
pointmcnt  under  the  exercise  of  which  the  term  could  have 
been  nuule  good.*'  Still,  every  lease  implies  a  covenant  of 
(piiet  enjoyment ;  and  if  the  premises  are  recovered  by  a  third 
party  airainst  the  tenant,  the  rent  is  gone,  though  the  tenant 
attorn  to  the  one  recovering  such  judgment,  before  the  luifiere 
facias  shall  have  been  served.  Xor  could  the  lessor  recover 
of  the  tenant  rent  accruing  during  such  period  of  eviction, 
even  though  he  may  sue  a  new  action,  and  recover  a  judgment 
for  possession  of  tin*  premises.  The  lessor's  remedy  for  the 
intermetliate  rents  would  be  against  his  adversary  in  such  sec- 
ond suit,  while  the  tenant,  in  such  a  case,  would  attorn  to  him 
again  as  his  lessor."  A  lessor,  as  such,  in  the  alnsenceof  some 
covenant  or  agrciunent  to  that  eft'ect,  is  not  bound  to  make 
repairs  ujion  the  leased  premises.^      But  if  the  lessen*  volun- 

'  Eilgfrton  r.  Pago,  1  Hilton,  320,  333  ;  Piatt,  Cov.  312  ;  UmlenvcHHl  v.  Birch- 
anl,  47  Vt.  305. 

a  Loun»l>erry  v.  Snider,  31  N.  Y.  f.l4;  Schilling  r.  Holmes,  23  Cni.  227; 
Bmnger  v.  .Mnnciet,  30  Cal.  624  ;  Iliiyes  v.  Bickerstiiff,  Vaughan,  US  ;  Moore  r. 
\\\W-T,  71  Piiin.  St.  429. 

»  Antf,  •297. 

♦  ilecliun.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Scott,  2  Hilton,  550  ;  Playtcr  v.  Cunningham,  21  (.'al. 
229. 

»  McClowry  r.  Croghan,  1  Orant  Cos.  307,  311. 

'  Hamilton  r,  Wright,  28  Mo.  199  ;  A<lnms  r.  Oibnoy,  6  Bing.  65*5. 

'  KoHS  r.  Dysart,  33  IVnn.  St.  452.  See  Morse  r.  ('o«lJartl,  13  .Met.  177.  Xor 
is  the  lp.«wor,  if  the  premises  are  ilestroyeil,  bound  to  nj»i>ly  the  insurnnco  money 
to  rebuilding  them.  Ix-edji  v.  Cheetham,  1  Sim.  146  ;  HoltzajjiTel  r.  Baker,  18  Ves. 
115  ;  Uft  r.  Dennis,  1  Kllis  &  E.  474.     Se  ;>.<  •346. 

■  C'olelHJck  V.  Oinller's  Co.,  1  Q.  B.  Div.  234  ;  Estep  r.  Estep,  23  Ind.  114  ; 
Oott  V.  (jaudy,  2  Ellis  &  B.  845  ;  Ix>avitt  r.  Fletcher,  10  Allen.  119  :  Elliott  r. 
Aikin,  45  N.  H.  30  ;  Witty  r.  .Matthews,  52  N.  Y.  512  ;  Benjumiii  r.  H.-.ny, 
51  HI.  492;  Morris  r.  Tillson,  81  111.  6o7  ;  Fisher  r.  Thirkell.  21  Mich.  1.  And 
the  same  was  the  rule  of  the  Civil  Ijiw,  1  Brown,  C.  L.  l<tr>  ;  Sh.-et.s  r.  S«lden, 
7  Wall.  416  ;  Gill  v.  Middlvtou,  lo5  Mans.  477.     And  a  promise  by  him  mo  to  do 


522  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPEETT.  [bOOK  L 

tarilj  undertakes  to  repair  the  premises,  and  do  it  m  so  care- 
less a  manner  as  to  cause  an  injury  thereby  to  the  tenant,  he 
will  be  liable  in  damages  therefor.^  K  he  covenants  to  build 
a  certain  building  upon  the  premises,  and  do  so,  and  the  same 
is  destroyed,  he  is  not  bound  to  rebuild  it.^  Nor  is  he  bound 
to  compensate  the  lessee  for  repairs  made  by  him.^  But  where 
one  made  repairs  or  did  work  upon  premises  under  a  parol 
promise  of  the  owner  to  let  them  to  him,  and  the  owner  then 
refused  to  lease  them  to  him,  it  was  held  he  could  recover  of 
the  owner  for  the  same,*  and  conversely  when  the  lessor  agrees 
to  do  repairs  before  the  lease,  the  tenant  may  refuse  to  occupy 
if  these  are  not  done.^  Nor  is  he  bound  to  protect  his  tenant 
from  the  consequences  of  the  act  of  an  adjoining  owner,  whether 
lawful  or  not,  in  excavating  his  land  so  near  the  demised  prem- 
ises as  to  cause  injury  to  them.^  So  where  one  held  a  term 
under  a  lease,  by  which,  if  the  lessors  sold  the  premises,  they 
could  determine  the  lease  by  giving  so  many  days'  notice,  and 
made  an  underlease  for  a  certain  time,  using  the  words  "  lease, 
demise,  and  let,"  but  in  the  underlease  there  was  a  proviso 
that  the  sub-tenant  could  carry  away  improvements  made  by 
him,  "  in  case  the  land  is  sold,"  it  was  held  that  the  latter 
had  no  cause  of  action  upon  the  implied  covenant  in  his  lease 
in  consequence  .of  the  term  being  defeated  by  a  sale  of  the 
premises  by  the  original  lessors.  So  far  as  the  words  above 
mentioned  implied  a  warranty  of  title,  they  were  qualified  by 
the  proviso  in  the  lease.'  But  a  lessor  may  bind  himself  to 
repair  the  premises,  and  if  by  the  terms  of  his  lease  he  has  a 
right  to  enter  and  view  and  make  improvements,  he  is  bound 
to  make  the  necessary  repairs,  without  waiting  for  a  special 
demand  or  notice  so  to  do.^     The  lessee,  however,  is  not  ab- 

made  subsequent  to  the  lease,  is  without  consideration.     Libbey  v.  Tolford,  48  Me. 
316.     As  to  the  implied  duty  of  the  tenant  to  repair,  see  further,  post,  *347. 

1  Gill  V.  Middleton,  105  Mass.  477. 

2  Cowell  r.  Lumley,  39  Cal.  151.  ^  Cases  note  supra. 
*  WTiite  r.  Wieland,  109  Mass.  291 ;  Williams  v.  Bemis,  108  Mass.  91. 

6  Stroliecker  v.  Barnes,  21  Ga.  430. 

6  Sherwood  v.  Seaman,  2  Bosw.  127  ;  McCarty  v.  Ely,  4  E.  D.  Smith,  375  ; 
Howard  v.  Doolittle,  3  Duer,  464.  See  Pargoud  v.  Toume.  13  La.  An.  292  ;  Gill 
r.  Middleton,  sup.  "^  O'Connor  v.  Daily,  109  Mass.  235. 

8  Hayden  v.  Bradley,  6  Gray,  425.  See  Vyse  v.  "Wakefield,  6  M.  &  W.  442, 
452,  453 ;  Keys  r.  Powell,  2  A.  K.  Marsh.  254. 


CH.  X.  §  4.]  h>rAii>  Kui  vK.vns.  r>-3 

solved  from  paying  rent,  if  the  lessor,  in  such  a  case,  fails  (o 
make  the  njtairs,  nor  would  it  amount  to  an  eviction,  or  jtihtify 
his  almudt»nini;  the  |M)s.sessittn  ttf  tin*  jiremises.  Uis  renitdy 
is  hy  an  action  against  the  lessor  u|H>n  his  covenant  or  agree- 
ment.' Si>  where  a  lessee  has  actually  ent«'red  under  his  lease, 
and  is  sued  for  rent,  he  cannot  set  up  in  tlefence  a  failure  on 
the  part  of  his  lessor  to  d»)  certain  agreed  acts  in  relation  to 
the  prenjises.  He  may,  in  such  case,  recoup  in  damages  ftir  the 
lessor's  breach,  or  may  have  a  separat*.'  action  (hrntoi.  Iiut  is 
not  exonerated  from  liahility  to  pay  rent.'- 

3.  There  are  covenants  also  implied  on  the  part  of  the 
lessee,  as  that  to  pay  the  rent,  resulting  from  the  formal  words 
"yieUling  and  j»aying"  a  stipulated  sum.^  And  the  very  ac- 
ceptance of  a  lease  imj)oses  upon  the  lessee  an  implied  obliga- 
tion to  use  the  premises  in  a  j)ropcr  and  husl)an<llike  manner.* 
Mr.  Comyn  states  the  imi)lied  covenant  or  (»l)ligation  of  a  lessee 
growing  out  of  the  relation  of  landlord  an<l  tenant  to  l)e,  to 
treat  the  premises  diMuised  in  such  manner  that  no  injury  be 
dt)ne  to  the  inheritance,  but  that  the  estate  may  revert  to  the 
lessor  undeteriorated  by  the  willul  or  negligent  conduct  of  the 
lessee.  He  is  b()und,  therefore,  to  keej)  the  soil  in  a  proper 
state  of  cultivation,  to  preserve  the  timber,  and  to  sujijiort  and 
repair  the  buildings.  These  duties  fall  upon  jiim  without  any 
express  covenant  on  his  part,  and  a  Ijreach  of  tlu'm  will,  in 
general,  render  him  liable  to  be  punisheil  for  waste.''  Where 
one  took  a  lease  of  a  farm  dated  July  18,  while  there  was  a 

'  TibUtt-*  c.  Percy,  24  Barb.  39  ;  SjH'ckeU  r.  Sax,  1  E.  I).  Smith.  253  ;  Hextcr 
r.  Knox,  63  N.  Y.  5tfl  ;  Leavitt  v.  Fletthcr,  10  Allen,  119  ;  Wright  r.  Lattin, 
38  111.  293.  But  by  sUtute  in  New  York,  Laws  of  1800,  c.  343,  if  the  jinnuses 
are  ilesln»yed  by  sudden  aiaualty,  the  tenant  is  not  held  for  rent,  if  the  landlord 
dues  not  rebuild.     Suydam  r.  Jaeksun,  54  N.  Y.  450. 

*  Kels«'y  r.  Wanl,  38  N.  Y.  83.  But  mere  tn'sj>a.s.se8  by  the  landlord  do  not 
give  the  tenant  a  rijjtht  to  ri'coup.     Ikrtlett  v.  Farrington,  120  )Ia.ss.  284. 

*  Smith,  Ijind.  &  Ten.  9tJ  ;  I'liitt,  Cov.  42  ;  Uoy.-r  r.  Ake,  3  Penn.  461  ;  Kiinp- 
ton  r.  Walker,  9  Vt.  191  ;  Van  Rensselaer  p.  Smith,  27  Barb.  104.  140.  See  fur- 
ther as  to  rent,  poai,  •341. 

«  Nave  c.  Berr)-,  22  Ala.  382  ;  Milhr  r.  Shiel.ls  55  Ind.  71  ;  U.  S.  r.  Bost- 
wick,  94  U.  S.  53  ;  and  «?«  Aughinlwugh  r.  Cop|K-nheffer,  55  Penn.  St.  347.  An 
express  covenant  to  fwrsonally  j-ieM  up  the  premi.sea  in  good  n-pair  is  not  broken 
by  leaving  quantities  of  rubbi&h  uiwn  the  prcmi&es.  Tlionidike  v.  Burnige,  111 
Mass.  531. 

*  Com.  Land,  k  Ten.  188. 


624  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

crop  of  hay  upon  the  premises,  for  five  years,  and  in  the  fifth 
year  cut  the  grass  on  the  lOtli  of  July,  and  took  the  crop,  it 
was  held  to  be  no  violation  of  his  covenant  as  being  against 
the  rules  of  good  husbandry,  although  he  thereby  took  six 
crops  from  the  land  within  his  term  of  five  years.^  In  Illinois, 
it  is  held  to  be  the  duty  of  a  tenant  to  pay  all  taxes  assessed 
u})on  the  premises  during  his  tenancy ;  and  if  he  fails  to  do 
this,  and  the  land  be  sold  for  taxes,  and  he  purchases  it,  he 
cannot  hold  it  against  the  owner  of  the  inheritance.^  If  the 
lessee  covenant  to  pay  the  taxes  assessed  upon  the  leased 
premises,  and  fails  to  do  so,  the  lessor  can  recover  the  amount 
assessed,  although  he  himself  may  not  have  paid  them  ;  ^  and 
if  the  premises  are  destroyed  after  the  day  when  the  tax  is 
laid,  but  before  the  time  for  which  it  is  payable  has  ex- 
pired, the  whole  tax  is  recoverable  under  lessee's  covenant.* 
What  the  extent  of  the  lessee's  covenant  is  may  be  seen  more 
properly  in  a  work  of  more  special  character  than  the  pres- 
ent.^ 

4.  There  is  an  important  distinction  to  be  observed  between 
express  and  implied  covenants  in  a  lease,  since  one  who  enters 
into  an  express  covenant  remains  bound  by  it  though  the  lease 
be  assigned  over,  while  such  as  are  implied  are  coextensive 
only  with  the  occupation  of  the  premises,  the  lessee,  for  in- 
stance, not  being  liable  under  his  implied  covenant  for  rent 
after  his  assignment  to  another,  and  the  acceptance  of  rent  by 
the  lessor  from  the  assignee.^     The  lessee  remains  liable  upon 

1  Willey  V.  Connor,  44  Vt.  68. 

2  Piettymau  v.  Walston,  34  111.  175,  191.  So  in  Maryland.  Huglies  v.  Young, 
5  Gill  &  J.  67.  In  Massachusetts  the  landlord  is  ultimately  liable  for  the  taxes 
assessed  upon  leased  estates  in  the  absence  of  a  special  agreement  between  him 
and  the  tenant.  Pub.  Stat,  c  11,  §  17.  Whether  the  landlord  or  the  tenant  is 
ultimately  liable  for  the  taxes,  if  no  stipulation  exists  in  regard  to  them,  depends 
in  England  on  the  ijarticular  tax  ;  but  generally  the  claim  being  against  the  laud 
the  lessor  is  to  bear  it,  and  the  tenant,  if  paying  in  the  first  instance,  may  deduct 
from  the  rent  of  the  year,  but  not  later.  Taylor  v.  Zamira,  6  Taunt.  524  ;  Carter 
V.  Carter,  5  Bing.  406  ;  Stubbs  v.  Parsons,  3  B.  &  A.  516 ;  Denby  v.  Moore,  1 
B.  &  A.  123. 

8  Trinity  Ch.  v.  Higgins,  48  N.  Y.  532. 

*  Sargent  v.  Pray,  117  Mass.  267  ;  Minot  v.  Joy,  118  Mass.  308. 
6  Taylor,  Land.  &  Ten.  (7th  ed. )  §§  397-399. 

«  Aiiriol  V.  Mills,  4  T.  R.  94,  98  ;  Rawle,  Cov.  363,  n.;  Kimpton  v.  Walker,  9 
Vt.  191  ;  Walker  v.  Physick,  5  Penn.  St.  193.     The  language  of  Shaw,  C.  J.,  in 


CJ!.  X.  §    }.]  ESTATES    FOR   YEARS.  625 

his  express  covenant  to  |>!iy  nut,  notwithstanding  liis  liuvin^ 
assiimt'tl  his  h'usc  with  the  U'ss(jr's  assent,  and  the  h'ssor  may 
have  acceptt'il  rent  from  the  assi^fiiee.'  The  K-ssor,  in  such 
case,  may  sne  the  K'SHec  or  hiH  assi^iee,  or  both,  at  his 
election,  and  at  the  same  time,  thoiiirh  he  can  have  hut  one 
satisfaction.  Tlie  lessee  continues  lialde  npon  liis  jxTsonal 
covenant,  in  the  nature  of  a  surety  for  his  assipiee,  who  is 
ultimately  lialde  to  him  for  the  amount  paid  by  him.^  Hut  the 
liability  of  a  les.see  upon  the  implied  covenants  in  his  lease 
continues  only  so  louj^  as  he  holds  the  estate,  where  he  assij^is 
with  the  consent  of  the  lessor,  as  it  depends  upon  the  privity 
of  estate.  This  is  true  in  respect  to  assitrnees,  both  as  to  ex- 
press and  implied  covenants,  and  their  lialjility  dej>ends  uptjn 
and  ceases  with  the  privity  of  estate  between  them  and  the 
lessors.  Such  assiirnce,  therefore,  is  not  liable  for  any  l)reach 
committed  Ix'fore  he  became  assijinee,  nor  for  any  such  breach 
occurring  after  he  has  parted  with  the  estate  and  possession 
to  a  new  assitrnee,  althou'.rh  he  did  this  for  the  very  purpose  of 
escaping  such  liability,  because,  by  so  doing,  he  destr(jys  the 
privity  of  estate  on  which  it  depends.^  But,  while  the  assignee 
continues  to  hold  the  estate,  he  would  be  liable  for  the  rent 

PiUt«n  r.  Deslion,  1  Clmy,  330,  applies  only  where  the  lessor  has  expressly  agreed 
to  occept  the  nssignee  as  alone  liahle  for  the  rent,  it  Wing  in  effi-rt  a  surremU-r 
by  lessee.  Thursby  r.  Plant,  1  Snund.  240  ;  Way  v.  Ket^l,  6  Alh-n,  364,  3t>9  ; 
7  Am.  1..  Kev.  244  ;  Pfulf  r.  Golden,  126  .Mass.  402.  But  where  the  assignee  of 
the  lessee  assigned  with  the  lessor's  permission  for  a  different  business  than  that 
which  the  h-sseo  stipulated  for,  it  was  held  to  discharge  lessee  ;  Fifty  Assoc,  r. 
Grace,  125   Mass.  161. 

>  Greenlcaf  r.  Allen,  127  Mass.  248  ;  Deane  r.  Caldwell,  Id.  242,  and  cases  in 
preceding  note.  But  it  is  otherwi.se  if  the  le.ssee  was  holding  over  when  he  as- 
Bign«-<1.     l»dge  V.  White,  30  Ohio  St.  569. 

'  But  the  le.ssee  cannot  recover  till  he  has  himself  paid.  Farrington  r.  Kim- 
ball. 126  -Ma-ss.  313  ;  Moulc  v.  Garrett,  L.  K.  5  E.xch.  132  ;  8.  c.  7  Id.  101. 

•  Hintze  v.  Thomas,  7  Md.  346  ;  Walton  v.  Cronly,  14  Wend.  63  ;  Piatt,  Cov. 
490,  494  ;  Paul  c.  Nurse,  8  B.  &  ('.  486  ;  Wolveridge  r.  Stewart,  1  Cr.  &  .M,  t'.44  ; 
Taylor  r.  Shum,  1  B.  &  P.  21  ;  Ilarley  r.  King.  2  Cr.  M.  k  R  18,  22  ;  Smith, 
I.and.  &  Ten.  294  ;  Patten  r.  Deshon,  1  Gmy,  325,  329  ;  Cuthliert-son  r.  Irving, 
4  Hurlst.  &  X.  742  ;  Bagley  r.  Fneman.  1  Milt.  196  ;  Kain  r.  Hoxie,  2  Hilt.  311  ; 
Johnson  r.  Sherman,  15  Cal.  287  ;  Quackenlxwis  r.  Clarke,  12  Wend.  555  ;  Arm- 
strong r.  Wheeler,  9  Cow.  88  ;  Williams  c.  Earle,  9  Best  k  S.  740.  But  in  this 
last  ciisc  it  is  held  that,  though  the  assignee  is  relieved  from  liability  for  suhae- 
quent  breaches  of  coTenant,  he  is  still  liable  for  assigning  to  a  i>en>on  of  known 
irresponsibility. 


526  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

fixed  by  the  lease  as  it  falls  due  without  regard  to  the  value  of 
the  premises,!  and  he  may  by  his  conduct  or  representations  to 
the  lessor  be  estopped  to  set  up  his  assignment.^  Nor  does 
it  matter  how  he  becomes  such  assignee.  His  liability 
would  attach  although  he  purchased  the  estate  at  a  sheriff's 
sale.3 

5.  Another  important  distinction  in  respect  to  covenants  in 
a  lease  is  between  such  as  run  with  the  land,  binding  assignees, 
or  enuring  to  the  benefit  of  assignees,  and  such  as  are  personal 
only  and  do  not  bind  the  estate.  It  is  also  laid  down  by  one 
writer  of  high  authority,  that,  "  by  the  common  law,  covenants 
between  the  lessor  and  the  lessee  relating  to  land  would,  in 
general,  run  with  it  on  both  sides."  "  But  the  benefit  of  a 
condition  was  entirely  lost  by  alienation  of  tlie  reversion."* 
But  that  this  right  existed  at  common  law  for  the  assignee  of 
a  reversion  to  sue  upon  a  covenant  of  a  lessee  to  pay  rent  is 

denied  by  other,  and,  it  would  seem,  better  authorities.^ 
[*327]   *  However  this  may  have  been,  the  statute  32  Hen. 

Vin.  c.  34,  referred  to  in  a  former  page  of  this  work, 
attaches  both  the  benefit  and  the  obligation,  of  covenants  as 
well  as  of  conditions,  to  the  reversion  in  the  hands  of  a  grantee 
or  assignee.^ 

5  a.  The  reader  is  referred  to  what  is  found  in  a  later  part 
of  this  work ''  for  an  attempt  to  define  how  far,  and  in  what 
cases,  covenants  run  with  lands.  The  subject  is  fully  treated 
of  in  the  American  edition  of  Smith's  Leading  Cases,^  in  com- 

1  Sanders  v.  Partridge,  108  Mass.  556  ;  Taylor,  Land.  &  Ten.  §  449  ;  Pitcher 
'0.  Tovey,  4  Mod.  71  ;  Graves  v.  Porter,  11  Barb.  592  ;  Burnett  v.  Lynch,  5  B.  &  C. 
589  ;  Grundin  v.  Carter,  99  Mass.  15. 

2  Meister  v.  Birney,  24  Mich.  435,  440. 

8  Sutliff-y.  Atwood,  15  Ohio  St.  186, 198  ;  Hornby  v.  Houlditch,  Andrews,  40  ; 
Taylor,  Land.  &  Ten.  214  ;  Thursby  v.  Plant,  1  Saund.  241  b,  note  ;  Post,  *331  ; 
Com.  Land.  &  Ten.  257,  275. 

*  Burton,  Real  Prop.  §§  855,  856. 

5  Crawford  v.  Chapman,  17  Ohio,  449  ;  Thursby  v.  Plant,  1  Saund.  240,  n.  3  ; 
Patten  v.  Deshon,  1  Gray,  325.  See  Thrale  v.  Cornwall,  1  Wils.  165  ;  Barker  v. 
Darner,  3  Mod.  337  ;  Vyvyan  v.  Arthur,  1  B.  &  C.  410,  See  Piatt,  Cov.  532. 
But  debt  always  lay  for  arrears  of  rent.  Ards  v.  Watkin,  Cro.  El.  637,  651  ; 
Allen  V.  Bryan,  5  B.  &  C.  512  ;  Williams  v.  Hayward,  1  Ellis  &  E.  1040  ;  AVat- 
son  V.  Hunkins,  13  Iowa,  547.     And  see  ^ms/,  *337. 

6  Burton,  Real  Prop.  §  856  ;  Piatt,  Cov.  533. 

">  Vol.  2,  pp.*13-*17.  8  Vol.  1,  5th  Am.  ed.  p.  139  et  scq. 


en.  X.  §    I.]  ESTATES   FOR    YEARS.  527 

nienting  upon  Spencer's  Case,*  where  the  early  law  is  enjlnKli<'(l, 
There  were  sonu'  covenants,  that,  tur  instance,  to  pay  nnt, 
which  raised  a  liability  against  the  tenant  in  favor  of  an  as- 
signee of  the  reversion  at  the  common  law,  the  remedy  being 
in  debt  but  not  in  covenant,  as  the  only  privity  between  the 
parties  was  in  estate  and  not  in  contract,-  though  it  was  held 
in  one  case  hereafter  referred  to,  that  a  covenant  to  grind  at 
the  lessor's  mill  might  be  sued  by  llic  devisee  of  the  lessor 
against  the  administiatrix  of  the  lessee.'*  The  object  of  the 
statute  of  ;52  Hen.  \'11I.  c.  M  was  to  extend  the  privity  of  con- 
tract from  reversioner  to  reversitiUfi",  and  the  right  to  sue  in 
covenant  to  actions  by  and  against  assignees.*  Before  the 
statute  of  4  Anne,  c.  l<i,  §  1>,  although  by  an  assignment  of 
the  reversion  there  was  a  privity  of  estate  created  between  the 
tenant  and  the  assignee,  there  was  no  privity  of  contract,  and 
the  assignee  could  not  sue  in  covenant  in  his  own  name,  unless 
the  tenant  had  attorned  to  him.  And  now,  inasmuch  as  the 
statute  of  Anne  is  not  in  force  in  Illinois,  a  purchaser  of  a 
reversion  cannot  sue  for  rent  in  his  own  name  ujton  the  cove- 
nant of  the  lessee  without  .showing  something  answering  to  an 
attornment.''  The  statute  of  lien.  VIII.  is  held  to  be  in  force 
in  New  IIamj)shire,''  Mas.sachusetts,"  Connecticut."  Maryland.'^ 
New  Jersey,'"  IVnusylvania,"  Virginia,'^  Illinois,'"'  Missouri,'^ 
North  Carolina,""'  and  Alabama,"'  but  was  not  in  New  York 
till  re-i' n acted ;  and  it  is  there  made  to  extend  to  grants 
in  fee  where  rent  is  reserved,  and  to  leases  for  life  or  for 

>  5  Rt-p.  16. 

»  Tliiirsl.y  V.  Plnnt,  1  Saund.  240  ;   Patten  v.  Deshon,  1  Gmy,  325. 

»  Vyvyiiii  I'.  Artlmr,  1  B.  &  C.  4lO.  Si-e  also  Piatt,  Cov.  532  ;  2  Piatt,  Leases, 
87,  382  ;  Brett  r.  (.'umlxTlnnil,  Cro.  Jac.  522  ;  Porter  r.  Swetnam,  Styles,  406  ; 
Van  Rensselaer  v.  Hays,  19  N.Y.  68,  81. 

♦  Patt«n  V.  Deshon,  sup. ;  Piatt,  Cov.  533,  584  ;  Van  Rensselaer  v.  Smith,  27 
Barb.  104,  151  ;  Cook  v.  Brightly,  46  Peun.  St.  439,  445. 

»  Fisher  v.  Deering,  60  III.  114  ;  overruling  Chapman  r.  McOrew,  20  111.  101. 

«  MusJM-y  V.  Holt,  24  N.  H.  248. 

^   Howluml  r.  Coffin,  12  Pick.  125  ;  Patten  r.  Deshon,  *i/;). 

»  Balilwin  r.  Walker,  12  Conn.  163. 

»  Funk  r.  Kincaiil,  5  Mil.  404.  w  Rev.  Stat.  643. 

"  Streai>er  r.  Fisher,  1  Rawie,  155,  161.     See  3  Binn.  620. 
"  Seott  r.  Lunt.  7  Pet.  606. 

"  Plnml*-igh  c.  Cook.  13  111.  669.  >«  Rev.  SUtt  32,  5  II. 

»*  Koniegay  v.  Collier,  65  N.  C.  69.  W  English  v.  Key,  39  Ain.  113. 


528  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

ycars.^  Nor  is  it  in  force  in  Ohio.^  It  would  be  transcend- 
ing the  objects  proposed  in  this  work  to  attempt  to  define  with 
any  considerable  minuteness  of  detail  the  line,  often  subtle 
and  refined,  which  distinguishes  between  covenants  running 
with  land  and  other  covenants  relating  to  it.  Tlie  language  of 
Best,  J.,  illustrating  this,  Avill  be  found  cited  upon  a  later  page 
(*330)  ;  and  the  language  of  the  same  judge  in  another  case, 
where  the  covenant  was  to  insure,  is  this  :  "  A  covenant  in  a 
lease  which  the  covenantee  cannot,  after  his  assignment,  take 
advantage  of,  and  which  is  beneficial  to  the  assignee  as  such, 
will  go  with  the  estate  assigned."  "  It  is  a  covenant  beneficial 
to  the  owner  of  the  estate,  and  to  no  one  but  the  owner  of  the 
estate,  and  therefore  may  be  said  to  be  beneficial  to  the  estate^ 
and  so  directly  within  the  principle  on  which  the  covenants  are 
made  to  run  with  the  land."  ^  Where  the  lessee  was,  by  the 
terms  of  his  lease,  at  liberty  to  purchase  the  estate  at  a  certain 
price  at  the  end  of  the  term,  it  was  held,  that,  by  the  sale  and 
assignment  of  his  lease,  his  assignee  had  a  right  to  claim  the 
conveyance.^  And  so  far  as  a  covenant  imposing  a  burden  upon 
land  is  held  to  run  with  the  estate  or  otherwise,  the  rule  as 
stated  by  Gould,  J.,  may,  perhaps,  be  still  more  definite,  in- 
telligible, and  easy  of  application,  depending  upon  whether  such 
covenant  entered  or  not  into  the  original  consideration  upon 
which  the  conveyance,  with  which  it  was  connected,  was  made ; 
"  since  where  the  covenants  are  in  the  very  conveyance  by 
which  the  covenantor,  &c.,  acquired  his  land,  the  performance 
of  those  covenants,  &c.,  plainly /orms  a  part  of  the  considera- 
tion without  which  the  conveyance  would  not  have  been 
made."^  An  assignee  of  a  lessor  may  have  debt  for  rent 
against  an  assignee  of  the  lessee  where  the  letting  has  been  by 
an  indenture  of  lease.^ 

1  Van  Rensselaer  v.  Smith,  27  Barb.  104,  151  ;  Van  Rensselaer  v.  Hays,  19 
N.  Y.  68,  81,  84  ;  Nicholl  v.  N.  Y.  &  E.  R.  R.,  12  N.  Y.  121,  131,  132  ;  Willard 
V.  Tillman,  2  Hill,  274,  276. 

2  Masury  v.  South  worth,  9  Ohio  St.  340  ;  Crawford  v.  Chapman,  17  Ohio,  4*9. 
'  Vernon  v.  Smith,  5  B.   &  A.  1.     See  also  Laffan  v.  Naglee,  9  Cal.  662,  a 

covenant  of  pre-emption  ;  Piatt,  Cov.  534. 

*  Napier  v.  Darlington,  70  Penn.  St.  64  ;  Kerr  v.  Day,  14  Penn.  St.  112. 

*  Van  Rensselaer  v.  Smith,  27  Barb.  104,  146. 
«  Howland  v.  CofBn,  12  Pick.  125. 


CIl.  X.  §    }.]  ESTATES    FOR    YE.VFLS.  {"t^O 

G.  Tho  Ktatuto  of  Tfcii.  VIII.  docs  not  extend  to  co\-onant« 
mon>Iy  collatonil,  hut  only  hihIi  as  coiicitm  tlic  land  dcniiscd  ;  • 
and,  iindt'i-  if,  covenant  will  lie  hoth  liy  and  avrainsl  tiu-  as- 
sij^ieo  of  the  reversion  of  part  of  the  premises,-  allhouLdi  the 
assiirnee  of  tin;  reversion  of  such  part  eainiot  avail  himself  of 
a  condition  afl'ectin^  the  whoh',  since  a  condition  cannot  he 
apportione(1.3  IJut,  to  render  one  liahle  to  covenant  as  as- 
siirnee, ht!  must  tak(?  an  assiirnment  of  the  whole  or  of  a  part 
of  the  premises  for  tlu>  whole  term.^ 

7.  If  a  lessee  transfers  the  wlnde  oi-  a  part  of  the  estate  for  a 
part  of  tho  time,  it  is  a  snlnlease,  and  not  an  assiLniment ;  an<l 
the  oriirinal  lessor  has  no  ri^ht  of  action  against  the  sidn 
lessee,  who  remains  liahle  only  to  his  lessor.  If  the  whole  or 
a  part  of  the  leased  premises  ho  transferred  hv  the  ori^^inal 
lessee  for  the  residue  of  the  term,  it  is  an  assiirnmcnt,  thou^rh 
if  it  h(!  in  form  a  lease  with  the  usual  reservations  the  lessee 
or  his  assif^ns  can  treat  it  as  snch.  Therefore,  where  a  tenant 
for  years  underlet  a  part  of  tho  premises  for  the  entire  term, 
and  then  assiirned  to  a  thii'd  person  all  his  interest  in  and  to 
the  oriirin:il  lease,  it  was  held  that  his  assi<rnee  nii;xht  recover 
rent  of  th(?  person  to  whom   his  assignor  had   let   a 

part  'of  the  leased   jiremises.'''  [*828] 

8.  And    it   is   true,   that,   at   the   common    law,   an 
assignee  of  a  rcversitju  might   hav(!  maintainecl  an  action  of 
covenant  for  any  of  the  implied  covenants  in  a  lease.''     And 
in  Ohio,  where  an  e.xpress  covenant  has  heen  assigned  with  a 
reversion,  the  assignee  may  sue  for  its  l^reach  in  his  own  name, 

>   Plntt,  Cov.  534  ;   Co.  Lit.  215  b. 

'  IMiitt.  C.v.  5S«  ;  Twvimin  r.  Tickanl,  2  B.  A:  A.  105.  The  only  (!ifrt>rrnrc 
between  the  first  and  socoml  suctions  of  tlic  slatnte  is.  that  the  words  in  tin-  lii.st 
Bet-tioii  apj.ly  to  tlie  ansif^noe  of  the  reversion,  those  in  the  second  to  the  assi-^ec 
of  the  term.     Patten  r.  De.shon,  1  Omy,  .3'25. 

»  1).M.  r.  F^Mvis.  5  A.l.  &  K.  277  ;   1  .Smith.  I.e.id.  Cm.  5th  Am.  ed.  03. 

♦  Holfonl  r.  Hatch,  DonR.  183:  Pafton  r.  Tti-shon,  1  Omv,  32.''.:  Ba^lev  v 
Freeman.  1  Milton.  196  ;  Knin  ...  H..xie.  2  Hilton.  311,  316  ;  Bedfor.1  r  Terhnne 
30  N.  Y.  4.13.  4«?0. 

»  Patten  r.  TVshnn.  1  P. my.  325  :  MrXi.l  r.  K.nd.ill.  12fi  Mn<.A.  24.-;  •  A^tor 
••  Miller.  2  Paipe.  68.  In  Fnlton  r.  Stnnrt.  2  Ohio.  2U.  it  i.  said  that  n«itm- 
ment  of  a  jwrt  of  the  promises  for  the  whole  term  i*  an  nnderlettinp.  But  this 
ia  eleftrly  an  error.     .«W  Van  Rensselner  r   .Smith.  27  Birl..  I04.  I4rt. 

•  I'latt.  Pov.  532  :  also  per  Bron^i,  .1..  Willard  r.  Tillman,  2  Hill,  274. 

voT..  I. -34 


530  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK  1. 

under  the  code  of  that  State,  althoiigli  the  statute  of  32  Hen. 
YIII.  c.  34  was  never  adopted  there.^  But  neither  at  common 
law,  nor  by  the  statute  of  Hen.  VIII,,  could  an  assignee  sue 
upon  a  breach  of  covenant  which  had  happened  before  the 
assignment.^ 

9.  Where  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  has  become 
established,  it  attaches  to  all  who  take  through  or  under  the 
tenant  as  assignee,  as  distinguished  from  sub-lessee,  as  above 
explained,  whether  immediate  or  remote.^  And  an  assignee 
of  a  lease  is  bound  to  know  the  contents  of  the  lease  itself.* 
A  recital  in  a  lease  that  the  premises  are  occupied  and  to 
be  occupied  as  a  lumber-yard  is  a  covenant  running  with  the 
land,  and  binds  the  assignee.^  And  even  if  the  tenant  convey 
in  fee,  the  lessor  may  elect  to  treat  the  purchaser  as  entering 
as  his  tenant,  or  he  may  treat  him  as  a  disseisor.^  But  it  may 
be  remarked  in  passing,  that  the  relation  of  landlord  and  ten- 
ant does  not  exist  between  the  tenant  of  a  mortgagor  and  the 
assignee  of  a  mortgagee,  although  there  is  a  kind  of  tenancy 
between  mortgagor  and  mortgagee.' 

10.  In  further  considering  what  covenants  bind  the  as- 
signees, it  was  before  stated  that  they  must  touch  and  concern 
the  thing  demised,  and  as  such  they  run  with  the  lands,  where 
there  is  a  privity  of  estate  between  covenantor  and  covenantee. 
Among  these  are  all  implied  covenants,  that  is,  all  such  cove- 
nants as  the  law  implies  from  the  usual  terms  of  leases  as 

before  explained,  such  as  "  lease  and  demise,"  "yield- 

[*329]  ing  and  paying,"  and  the  *  like.^     Also  all  covenants 

for  quiet  enjoyment,^  whether  they  are  expressed  or 

1  Masury  v.  Southworth,  9  Ohio  St.  340. 

2  Lewes  v.  Eidge,  Cro.  Eliz.  863;  1  Smith,  Lead.  Cas.  5th  Am.  ed.  172; 
Piatt,  Cov.  538  ;  Gibbs  v.  Ross,  2  Head,  4'37. 

8  Jackson  v.  Davis,  5  Cow.  123,  129  ;  Benson  v.  Bolles,  8  "Wend.  175  ;  Overman 
V.  Sanboni,  27  Vt.  54  ;  Rowland  v.  Coffin,  12  Pick.  125. 

*  Barroilhet  v.  Battelle,  7  Cal.  450.  ^  De  Forest  v.  Byrne,  1  Hilton,  43. 

6  Jackson  v.  Davis,  5  Cow.  123,  130  ;  Jaquesr.  Short,  20  Barb.  269. 

'  .Tackson  v.  Rowland,  6  "Wend.  666  ;  Jackson  v.  Laughead,  2  Johns.  75. 

8  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  287,  n. ;  Piatt,  Cov.  42744  ;  1  Smith,  Lead.  Cas.  5th 
Am.  ed.  123. 

8  Shelton  V.  Codman,  3  Cush.  318;  Markland  v.  Crump,  1  Dev.  &  B.  94  ; 
Campbell  v.  Lewis,  3  B.  &  A.  392  ;  s.  c.  8  Taunt.  715  ;  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten. 
288,  note  ;  Williams  v.  Burrell,  1  C.  B.  402,  433. 


,  h.  A     §    i.]  ESTATES    POIt    YKARS.  531 

iin|ilieii ;  covt-nanta  to  j>ay  rent;'  to  insure;'  to  ropiiir,  or  to 
deliver  uj>  in  goo«i  c(jnilition  ;'  to  reside  on  the  premises  ;*  or 
to  i)ay  tuxes.*  iJut  though  an  uMsipiec  of  the  lessee  would 
he  hound,  a  Hui>lessee  would  not,  nor  the  assifpiee  of  such 
8uh-h'ss«'t'.'^  So  various  covenants  not  to  do  certain  acts  u\H)n 
the  jirrniises  are  of  this  character,  as  where  the  lessor  of  a 
mill  covcnantrd  in  his  lease  not  to  let  or  employ  any  other 
place  or  site  on  tin'  same  stream  for  a  mill  of  a  certain  kind, 
the  covruiint  was  held  to  run  with  the  land,  and  its  lireach 
mijrht  he  sued  for  hy  an  assignee.'  So  a  covenant  not  to  sell 
any  wood  or  timljer  (»fT  the  deujised  premises,**  or  one  for  a 
particular  mode  of  cultivation  or  occupancy  of  the  proiK-rty,'-* 
or  which  concerns  husbandry  and  repairs,  runs  with  the  land, 
and  hinds  an  a.'*signee.'"  So  a  covenant  for  a  ]R'r|M'tual  or 
limited  renewal  runs  with  the  land."  Ihit  where  the  lea.se  pro- 
vi<led  for  the  lessee  enjoying  the  estate  for  a  certain  term,  with 
a  right  to  hold  it  as  much  longer  as  he  should  choose  after  the 
expiration  of  the  term,  at  the  .same  rate,  no  definite  time  being 
prescribed,  it  was  held  not  to  be  a  covenant  running  with  the 
reversion  so  as  to  bind  the  assignee  of  the  lessor ;  an<l  the 
lessor  having  died  during  the  term,  the  lessee  having  cho.sen 
to  hold  l>eyond  the  term,  his  tenancy  became  one  from  year 


»  Hum  V.  Rwlnoy.  1  Wash.  C.  C.  375  ;  Howlwid  r.  Coffin,  12  Pick.  125  ; 
Main  r.  Feathers.  21  Barl<.  646  ;  Ja^jues  v.  .Short,  20  Barb.  269  ;  D<man«t  r. 
WilUnl.  8  Cow.  206  ;  (;rave«  r.  I'ort^r,    11  B.irb.  592. 

•  Vernon  r.  Smith,  5  B.  A:  A.  1  ;  Doe  r.  Tetk,  1  B.  k  A<L  428  ;  Tliomaa  r. 
Von  Ka|.ff.  «  Gill  4  J.  372. 

•  Denianwt  t>.  WilUnl,  8  Cow.  20«  ;  Pollard  r.  ShaafTer,  1  Dall.  210  ;  Broom's 
Maxims,  553  ;  Dean  of  Windaor'n  Caoe,  5  Hep.  24,  thougb  the  covenant  did  not 
in  t^rma  bin<l  aaitignces.     Sj^-no-r's  Ca.'^e,  5  Uep.  16. 

«  Tateni  r.  Chaplin,  2  H.  B:.  133,  though  assignee  be  not  named.  Van  Ren»- 
•eUer  r.  H.-a.l,  26  N.  V.  558,  576.     . 

•  Dean  of  Wintl9or'»  Case,  5  Rep.  24  ;  Kearney  r.  Port,  1  S«ndf.  105  ;  Aitor  r. 
Miller.  2  PaiRe,  68  ;  Post  r.  Kearney,  2  N.  V.  394. 

•  Martin  r.  UConnor,  43  Barb.  514  ;  (f.  Odell  r.  Solomon,  &»  N.  Y.  635. 

^  Nonnau  r.  Wells,  17  Wend.  136.  .See,  also,  as  to  corenantA  in  a  b-ase  of 
w«t«r-[>ower  running  with  the  Und  u»e«i,  Noonan  r.  Orton,  4  Wlv.  335,  341  ; 
Mo.-ne  r.  Aldrich.  19  Pirk.  449  ;  Wooliscrofl  v.  Norton,  15  Wiic.  198,  204. 

•  VerpUnck  v.  Wright,  23  Wen.l.  506. 

»  Woodfall,  l^id.  k  Ten.  81  ;  .St  And.  Church  App.  67  Penu.  St.  512. 
»»  Gonion  r.  George,  12  Ind.  408, 
»i  Blackmore  r.  Boardman,  28  Mo.  420 ;  Pifijot  9.  Mason,  1  Paige,  412. 


632  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

to  jear,  determinable  by  notice  from  the  lessee  or  the  owner  of 
the  reversion.^  In  order  to  avail  himself  of  the  benefit  of  a 
covenant  to  renew,  the  lessee  must  give  notice  of  his  election 
so  to  do  before  the  expiration  of  the  term.^  So  a  covenant 
made  by  the  lessor  with  the  lessee  to  pay  for  new  erections 
upon  the  premises  runs  with  the  land,  and  may  be  enforced 
by  an  assignee  of  lessee  against  the  lessor.^  The  general  prin- 
ciple applicable  to  these  cases,  as  laid  down  by  Best,  J.,  in  Vyv- 
yan  v.  Arthur,  which  was  a  case  where  the  lessee  of  part  of  an 

estate  covenanted  with  the  lessor  to  do  a  service  at  a 
[*330]   *  mill  belonging  to  the  lessor  upon  another  part  of  the 

estate,  in  which  the  lessee  bound  his  assigns,  is  as 
follows :  "  If  the  performance  of  the  covenant  be  beneficial  to 
the  reversioner  in  respect  of  the  lessor's  demand,  and  to  no 
other  person,  his  assignee  may  sue  upon  it ;  but  if  it  be  bene- 
ficial to  the  lessor  without  regard  to  his  continuing  owner  of 
the  estate,  it  is  a  mere  collateral  covenant,  upon  which  the 
assignee  cannot  sue."  And  in  that  case,  as  the  performance 
of  the  covenant  would  have  been  beneficial  to  the  owner  of 
the  reversion  and  to  no  other  person,  it  was  held  to  run 
with  the  land.*  If  the  covenant  be  to  do  some  act,  but  not 
upon  the  premises,  and  only  collateral  to  these,  such  as  to 
build  a  house  upon  other  land  of  the  lessor  than  that  which  is 
demised,  or  to  pay  a  collateral  sum  to  the  lessor  or  to  a  stranger, 
it  would  not  run  with  the  land.^ 

11.  While,  as  has  been  said,  there  are  many  covenants  which 
run  with  the  land,  binding  assigns  as  well  as  operating  in  their 
favor,  there  is  a  distinction  between  such  as  bind  assigns  with- 
out being  named,  and  such  as  require  them  to  be  named  in 
order  to  charge  them  with  their  performance.     And  the  dis- 

1  AVest  Trans.  Co.  v.  Lansing,  49  N.  Y.  499. 

2  Reiioud  V.  Daskam,  34  Conn.  512. 

8  Hunt  V.  Danforth,  2  Curt.  C.  C.  592.  But  it  does  not  run  with  the  rever- 
sion so  as  to  bind  the  assignee  thereof.  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  290,  291  ;  2  Piatt, 
Leases,  406  ;  Tallman  v.  Coffin,  4  N.  Y.  134.  See  Verplanck  v.  Wright,  23 
Wend.  506,  embracing  in  summary  most  of  the  above  supposed  covenants.  See 
also  1  Smith,  Lead.  Cas.  5th  Am.  ed.  177. 

*  Vyvyan  v.  Artliur,  1  B.  &  C.  410,  417  ;  Aikiu  v.  Alb.  R.  R.,  26  Barb.  289  ; 
Vernon  v.  Smith,  5  B.  &  A.  11  ;  Piatt,  Cov.  534. 

5  Spencer's  Case,  5  Rep.  16  ;  Piatt,  Cov.  473  ;  Mayho  v.  Buckhurst,  Cro.  Jac. 
438 ;  Keppell  v.  Bailey,  2  Mylue  &  K.  517. 


,  H.  X.  §  ■{.]  KSTATES    FOR    YKAIW.  o33 

tinction  sceins  to  be  wlictluT  the  .sul)j<ct-Mi;ittcr  of  tlio  covi'iiaiit 
is  in  I'ifae  at  the  time  of  the  demise!  or  not.  If  it  is,  (lir  ((.\r- 
naiit  binds  the  a.ssi<j:nee,  whether  named  or  not;  if  it  is  not,  it 
does  not  bind  him,  unleHs  expressly  named  therein.  Thus  if 
the  covenant  be  to  keep  houses  thi-n  on  the  premises  in  n-pair, 
it  runs  with  the  hind,  and  binds  the  assignee,  thou^di  not 
nanifil,  Ihit  if  to  liuihl  a  new  house  on  tlic  (h'mised  pn-mises, 
it  will  not  bind  assii^nees,  unless  named  ;  thouj:h,  as  remarked 
by  a  writer,  **  the  good  sense  of  this  is  not  very  easily  discov- 
erable." '  The  rule  as  laid  down  i)y  Jjord  Ellen- 
borough  •  upon  the  subject  is  this:  "The  assignee  is  [*o31] 
speeifically  named,  and  though  it  were  for  a  thing  not 
in  ease  at  the  time,  yet,  being  sju'cilieally  named,  it  would  bind 
him,  if  it  atfeeted  the  nature,  (piality,  or  value  of  the  thing 
demised  independently  of  collateral  circumstances,  or  if  it 
affeeted  the  mode  of  enjoying  it."^  Nor  would  itj)e  necessary 
to  make  use  of  the  word  "assigns,"  if  the  intent  to  bind  them 
is  inferrible  from  the  language  of  the  lease.  In  the  case 
cited  below,  the  court  say,  "We  think  the  real  question  must 
be,  the  covenant  l>eing  one  which  may  be  annexed  to  the 
estate,  and  run  with  the  land,  whether  such  was  the  intention 
of  the  parties  as  expressed  in  the  deed."  On  the  other  hand, 
if  the  covenant  be  not  of  a  nature  that  the  law  permits  it  to  be 
attached  to  the  estate,  it  canncjt  beccjme  so  by  the  agreement 
of  the  i)arties.3  Whether  the  covenant  to  surre-nder  at  the 
end  of  the  term  runs  with  the  estate,  so  as  to  l)ind  an 
assignee,  unless  exjiressly  named  in  the  lease,  is  treated 
by  the  court  of  Massachusetts  as  an  undccidetl  cpiestion, 
although  it  was  held  by  Parke,  !>.,  that  it  did  not  run  with 
the  land.'» 

IJ.  Where  a  covenant  which  runs  with  the  land  is  divisible 
in  its  nature,  if  the  entire  interest  in  dilTerent  parts  or  parcels 
of  the  land  passes  by  assignment  to  separate  and  distinct  in- 

>  .Si.enccr'8  Ca*-,  6  Rep.  IG  ;  Piatt,  Cov.  466  ;  M.  471  ;  Hunt  v.  lUiiforth, 
2  Curt.  C  C.  604  ;  .'vnnjison  r.  Eastt-rby,  9  B.  &  C.  605  ;  Bream  p.  Dickereon, 
2  Humph.  120.  Sec  also  Masury  r.  .Southworth,  9  Ohio  St.  340  ;  Hauscu  c. 
Miy.T,  81  ni.  321. 

"  Congli'ton  p.  Pattiaon,  10  East,  139. 

•  Masur)-  p.  .»»<)uth\vorth,  9  Oliio  St.  340. 

*  Sargent  v.  Smilli,  12  Uray,  420,  423  ;  Doe  r.  Scoton,  2  Cr.  M.  k  R.  730. 


534  LAW   OP   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

dividuals,  the  covenant  will  attach  upon  each  parcel  pro  tanto} 
In  such  case  the  assignee  of  each  part  would  be  answerable 
for  his  proportion  of  any  charge  upon  the  land  which  is  a 
common  burden,  and  would  be  exclusively  liable  for  the  breach 
of  any  covenant  which  related  to  that  part  alone.^ 

13.  The  liability  of  an  assignee,  however,  during  the  time  that 
the  term  remains  vested  in  him,  does  not  depend  upon  his  ever 
having  actually  entered  into  possession  of  the  premises,  unless, 
perhaps,  the  assignment  be  by  way  of  a  mortgage,  in  respect 
to  which  different  opinions  have  prevailed.^  Different  courts 
have  held  differently  upon  the  point  whether  the  assignee  of  a 
lease  is  liable  for  rent  before  he  shall  have  entered  under  his 
assignment.  In  Illinois,  such  assignee  is  liable  before  entry 
made.  In  New  York,  the  converse  is  held ;  while  in  Massa- 
chusetts, although  a  term  created  by  a  lease  under  seal  may  if 
the  assignee  enter  upon  the  estate,  be  effectually  transferred 
by  a  writing  not  under  seal,  an  assignment  to  be  effectual  in 
rendering  the  assignee  liable  for  the  rent  must  either  be  made 
by  deed,  or  completed  by  an  entry  or  actual  change  of  posses- 
sion on  the  part  of  the  assignee.*  An  executor  of  a  lessee, 
though  an  assignee  in  law  of  the  lease,  does  not  become  liable 
as  such  de  bonis  propriis,  unless  he  actually  enters  into  the 
demised  premises.^  He  continues  to  be  liable  for 
[*332]  breaches  committed  while  he  *  holds  as  assignee, 
though  he  should  have  subsequently  assigned  the 
lease.^  Nor  would  he  escape  the  liability  of  assignee  by  any- 
thing short  of  an  assignment,  and  an  actual  transmission  of 
possession.    If  he  retain  possession  of  any  part  of  the  premises 

1  Van  Eensselaer  v.  Bradley,  3  Denio,  135  ;  Van  Rensselaer  v.  Jones,  2  B:irb. 
643  ;  Garaon  v.  Vemon,  2  Lev.  231 ;  Astor  v.  Miller,  2  Paige,  68  ;  Van  Horn  v. 
Grain,  1  Paige,  455. 

2  Id. ;  Piatt,  Gov.  495. 

8  Wms.  Real  Prop.  331  ;  Smith  ■;;.  Brinker,  17  Mo.  148  ;  Bagley  v.  Freeman, 
1  Hilton,  196  ;  Joumeay  v.  Brackley,  1  Hilton,  447,  452  ;  Felch  v.  Taylor,  13 
Pick.  139.  So  the  assignee  remains  liable,  though  he  agreed  when  he  took  the 
assignment  to  reassign.     Simonds  v.  Turner,  120  Mass.  329. 

*  Babcock  v.  Scoville,  56  111.  461 ;  Damainville  v.  Mann,  32  N.  Y.  197  ;  San- 
ders  V.  Partridge,  108  Mass.  556. 

5  Wollaston  v.  Hakewell,  3  Mann.  &  G.  297,  320  ;  Taylor,  Land.  &  Ten.  §  451. 

^  Harley  v.  King,  2  G.  M.  &  R.  18  ;  Quackenboss  v.  Clarke,  12  Wend.  555-557; 
Joumeay  v.  Brackley,  1  Hilton,  452  ;  Donelson  v.  Polk,  64  Md.  501. 


(11.  X.  §    1.]  t:STATES    FOU    YKAIW.  535 

until  the  nnt  falls  duo,  either  liy  himself  or  his  tenant,  he  is 
li:il)lo  for  the  same.*  Hut  to  rend«'r  an  assi^rnee  lial)le  as  such, 
ho  must  have,  l»y  virtue  of  tlie  assif.Mimeut,  actual  jxmHCSsion  or 
an  immetliate  ri;,'ht  to  possession  of  the  premises.'-'  So  the 
hcnelit  of  the  eovenants  hy  the  lessor  with  the  lessee  passes 
to  the  assignee  of  tin-  hitter  l»y  reason  of  sueh  i»rivity  of 
estate.^ 

14.  From  the  twofold  character  of  a  lessee's  liahility,  first, 
arising  from  privity  of  estate,  secondly,  from  privity  of  con- 
tract on  his  exi)ress  covenants,  the  eflect  of  an  assignment  of 
his  lease  is  that  he  ceases  to  be  lialile  iijion  the  inijilicd  cove- 
nants in  his  lease,*  because  tlie  privity  of  estate  is  gone,  but  re- 
mains still  liable  upon  his  express  covenants  as  if  no  assiL^i- 
ment  had  been  made,  the  original  privity  of  contract  still  sub- 
sisting,'' even  though  the  lessor  assent  in  writing  to  the  assign- 
ment, and  though  he  has  actually  received  rent  of  the  assignee,*' 
unless  the  lessor  shall  have  accepted  a  surrender  from  the 
lessee  and  released  him.'  If  the  lessor  accept  rent  from  the 
assignee,  the  lessee  ceases  to  be  liai>le  in  deU  for  the  rent,  for 
that  liability   results    from  a  jirivity  of  estate.^      liut  if   the 

>  Xi-gluy  V.  Morgan,  46  IViin.  St.  281  ;  Siuul.Ts  v.  Partridge,  108  .M;ui.s.  656. 
But  ajj  iLHsigiioo  at  law  of  the  lessor  ho  is  liable  </«■  lionis  Ifstatorus  to  tho  end  of  the 
tcnr,  though  he  as.<igns  over.     Orccnleaf  r.  Alien,  127  Miuw.  248. 

»  Ilannen  v.  Ewnlt,  18  IVnn.  St.  9  ;  Thoujas  v.  Connell,  5  Penn.  St.  13  ;  Wiik- 
crsliam  f.  IrAvin,  14  Penn.  St.  108. 
»  Wins.  IJeal  Prop.  331. 

«  Knnckle  v.  Wyniek,  1  Dall.  30r. ;  Ifarley  r.  King,  2  C.  M.  &  IL  19,  Am.  c<l. 
note  ;  Kimi.ton  v.  Walker,  9  Vt.  191  ;  Blair  v.  ILuikin,  11  Mo.  440  ;  Thurshy  r. 
Plant,  1  Snund.  241  h  ;  Waldo  v.  Hall,  14  Ma.ss.  486  ;  Swan  v.  Strnnshani,  Dyer, 
257  ;  Donelson  r.  Polk,  64  Md.  501. 

»  Wall  V.  Hinds,  4  Gray,  256  ;  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  293  ;  Thursby  v.  Plant, 
1  S.unid.  240,  241  a,  note  ;  Oliegan  r.  Young,  23  Penn.  St  18  ;  W^alton  v.  Cronly, 
14  Wend.  63  ;  Williams  r.  Burrill,  1  C.  B.  402,  433  ;  Dewey  r.  Dupuy,  2  W.  k  S. 
653  ;  Howland  v.  Collin,  12  Pick.  125  ;  correcting  and  ovemiling  tho  doctrine  in 
Walker 9  Case,  3  Ucp.  24,  that,  after  airejiting  rent  of  the  n.ssignee  of  leviec,  a 
lessot  cannot  sustain  an  action  against  the  lessee.  Sec  also  Jounieay  r.  Hniikley, 
1  Hilton.  417.  451  ;  2  Piatt,  I.ea.ses,  352. 

•  Bailey  v.  Wills,  8  Wis<-.  141  ;  Port  r.  Jackson,  17  Johns.  239  :  Qunek-nlKWS 
V.  Clarke,  12  Wen<l,  556  ;   Danib  r.  Hoffman,  3  K.  D.  Smith,  361  ;  auic,  •32'5. 
^   Frank  r.  Magiiire,  42  Penn.  St.  77. 

»  Fletcher  V.  M  Farlnne,  12  Majw.  43  ;  Auriol  p.  Mills.  4  T.  R.  94.  98  ;  Wall  p. 
Hinils,  4  Ciray.  256;  Pine  r.  I^icester.  Holiart,  37a,  Wms.  notes;  Thursby  v 
Plant,  1  Saund.  240  ;  Com.  Land.  &  Ten.  275. 


536  LAW   OP  REAL   PROPERTY.  [bOOK   I. 

lessor  refuses  to  accept  the  assignee  as  his  tenant,  he  may 
continue  to  sue  his  lessee  in  debt  for  the  rent.^ 

15.  Another  incident  may  be  remarked  in  respect  to  the 
consequences  of  an  assignment  when  made  to  several  persons, 
that  if  an  act  of  forfeiture  is  committed  by  a  breach  of  cove- 
nant, it  is  immaterial,  so  far  as  its  effect  in  defeating  the 
estate  is  concerned,  whether  it  be  done  by  one  or  all  of  the 
assfgnees.2 

16.  It  is  competent  and  usual  for  the  parties  to  an  indenture 
of  lease,  instead  of  leaving  their  rights  and  duties  in  respect 
to  the  leased  premises  to  be  determined  by  the  rules  of  law, 
however  well  defined,  to  insert  express  limitations  or  cove- 
nants affecting  these  common-law  rights,  especially  in  regard 
to  the  mode  of  using  the  premises,  and  the  consequences  of 
fault  or  accident  connected  with  such  use.  Though  these  are 
more  fully  treated  of  hereafter,^  it  may  be  remarked  that  if  no 
such  limitation  is  inserted,  the  lessee  will  be  bound  by  his 
covenant  to  pay  rent,  although  the  premises  be  destroyed  or 
rendered  untenantable  from  other  causes.*  The  court  cannot 
inteipolate  what  the  contract,  as  written,  does  not  contain. 
Thus,  in  the  lease  of  a  water-power,  provision  was  made  for 
abating  the  rent,  in  case  of  loss  of  power  in  proportion  to  the 
deficiency  of  the  power  :  the  court  could  adopt  no  other  rem- 
edy for  the  party  injured  by  such  loss,^  So  where  lessee  cove- 
nanted to  pay  rent  during  the  term,  but  the  lessor  had  agreed, 
orally,  that  if  the  building  were  burned  the  rent  should  cease, 
the  court  excluded  this  evidence,  as  it  expressly  contradicted 
what  the  tenant  had  covenanted  to  do.*^  Though  the  common 
law  of  New  York  coincides  with  the  doctrine  above  stated, 
rendering  the  lessee  liable  for  rent  though  the  premises  may 
have  been  destroyed ;  by  a  statute  of  that  State,  where  the 
premises  have  become  untenantable  by  the  force  of  the  ele- 
ments, without  the  fault  of  the  tenant,  he  is  not  bound  to 

1  Anriol  v.  Jlills,  4  T.  R.  94  ;  Thursby  v.  Plant,  1  Saund.  241  b,  note  ;  Coghil 
V.  Freelove,  3  Mod.  325  ;  Hobart,  37  a,  note. 

2  Clarke  v.  Cummings,  5  Barb.  339.  »  Post,  *345. 

*  Fowler  v.  Bott,  6  Mass.  63  ;  Bigelow  v.  Collamore,  5  Cush.   226  ;  Beach  v. 
Farish,  4  Cal.  339  ;  Leavitt  v.  Fletcher,  10  Allen,  119,  121. 
5  Sheets  v.  Selden,  7  Wall.  416. 
^  Martin  v.  Berens,  67  Penn.  St.  459. 


CIl.  X.  §    t.]  ESTATES    FOlt    VKARS.  537 

repair  thcni,  ;intl  is  at  liberty  U)  HurrtiHJrr  jiiui  al)aiui(iii  llitiu.' 
IJiit  neither  the  lessor,  nor  the  lessee,  if  he  uses  the  i)remises 
ill  a  hushundlike  manner,  will  be  bound  to  rebuild  or  rejtair 
the  |)reniises,  il  destroyed  or  dania;ri'd  witlujut  his  fault,  in 
the  absenee  of  an  express  covenant  to  that  effect  in  the  leaae;* 
thouirh  it  is  competent  for  the  lessor  or  the  lessee  to  cove- 
nant to  rej)air  or  rebuild,  either  absolutely  or  to  a  limiti-d 
extent."'  If  the  lessee  covi-nants  to  npair  and  n-store  tiir 
prrmises  or  to  surrender  tln-m  in  L'ood  condition,  or  in  terms 
to  that  effect,  he  will  be  ijound  to  make  pjod  his  covenant,  and 
rebuild  the  premises  if  destroyed,  and  in  the  meantime  to  j)ay 
his  rent,  thouiih  the  loss  may  have  hap|)ened  without  his  fault, 
and  even  if  caused  by  storm.  Hood,  lire,  inevitable  accident,  or 
the  act  of  a  stranjjer,  by  the  wind,  or  by  lightninu;.*  Even 
where  a  thing  becomes  imj)os8ible  of  performance  by  the  act 
of  a  third  jjcrson,  or  the  act  of  God,  its  imj)Ossibility  affords 
no  excuse  U)V  its  non-performance.  It  is  the  jiarty's  folly  that 
led  him  to  make  such  a  bargain  without  jjroviding  against  the 
possible  contingency/'     From  using  blank   forms   in  making 

>  Stat.  1SG(»,  c.  345  ;  Cmves  v.  Bi-nlnn,  2G  N.  V.  •lltS  ;  Taylor,  I>an<l.  k  Ten. 
S  520  ;  Siiydaiii  r.  Jackson,  54  N.  Y.  450.  Hut  tin-  tt-iiaiit,  to  avail  hiii>s«-lf  of 
this  statute,  must  cutircly  surruntlur  tho  pn-miscs.  Johnson  v.  Op[>cnhi-ini,  55 
N.  Y.  280. 

"  Post  r.  Vettcr,  2  E.  D.  Smith,  248  ;  Wtlles  v.  Castles,  3  Gray,  323  ;  '2  Piatt, 
Lea-ses,  1S2  ;  HoRefall  v.  Mather,  Holt,  N.  P.  7  ;  Leavitt  v.  Fletcher,  10  Alk-M, 
121  ;  Elliot  V.  Aiken,  45  N.  11.  30,  36. 

*  Walton  I'.  Waterhouse,  2  Wnis.  Saun.l.  422,  n.  2  ;  Phillips  r.  Stevens,  16 
MaiM.  238. 

*  2  \Vn>s.  Saund.  422,  n.  2  ;  Abby  r.  Billuj.s,  35  Miss.  618  ;  Bigelow  v.  Colla- 
nion>,  .tup.;  Shep.  Touch.  173;  Flynn  i-.  Trask,  11  Allen,  550.  Hoy  r.  Holt, 
PI  Pe!in.  .St.  88.      Post,  •345. 

*  I'aradine  r.  Jane,  Aleyn,  27  ;  Hickman  v.  Rnyl,  55  Ind.  551.  So  Hills  v. 
Thonii>8on,  13  M.  &  W.  487,  where  the' lessee  was  held  to  his  covenant  to  raise  a 
certain  ipiantity  of  coal  from  the  demi.scd  premises,  though  there  was  not  thnt 
ipiantity  there,  because  this  waa  in  effect  warranted  as  a  payment  of  rent.  But  in 
Clilford  V.  Watt*,  L.  H.  5  C.  P.  577,  le-H.see's  a^frcvment  to  dig  not  less  than  1,000 
tons  of  rliiy  was  held  excused,  as  there  was  not  so  much  in  the  land  h-.t-wd  to 
him.  And  it  seems  that,  in  like  manner,  as  the  absolute  non-existence  of  tho 
subject-matter  of  the  covenant  will  excuse  {>crformance,  unU>s.s  then-  is  an  exprt-ss 
warranty  of  the  possibility  of  jn-rfonnance,  so  will  the  absolute  destruction  of  the 
thing  demised,  a.s  in  case  of  the  lease  of  single  room.t  in  a  buihliiig.  Shawmut 
Bk.  V.  Boston,  118  Mass.  125.  In  the  ordinary  case  of  destruction  of  preiui&cs,  tba 
land  remains.     Kolle,  Abr.  236. 


538  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [bOOK   I 

leases,  it  sometimes  happens  that  printed  and  written  clauses 
in  the  same  lease  are  inconsistent  with  each  other ;  and  the 
rule  in  such  case  is,  to  regard  the  written  clause  as  the  con- 
tract of  the  parties,  because  the  printed  may  have  been  left 
standing  by  inadvertence.^  If,  by  the  terms  of  the  lease,  the 
covenant  to  pay  rent  is  partially  or  wholly  suspended  when 
the  premises  are  partially  or  wholly  destoyed  by  unavoidable 
casualty,  or  words  of  similar  import,  this  does  not  apply  to  a 
gradual  decay  of  the  premises,  but  is  limited  to  damage  arising 
from  uncontrollable  force  and  accident.^ 


[*333]  *  SECTION  V. 

OP   ASSIGNMENT   AND    SUB-TENANCY. 

1.  Assignment  of  lease  must  be  by  writing,  &c. 

2.  May  be  done  by  a  general  deed  of  grant. 

3.  When  assignment  presumed. 

4.  What  an  assignment,  and  what  an  underlease. 

5.  No  privity  between  lessor  and  sub-lessee. 

6.  Lessee  may  convey  and  carve  up  his  estate. 

7.  Lessor  may  assign  his  reversion. 

8.  Eeversion  carries  rent,  in  part  or  in  whole. 

9.  Of  apportionment  of  rent. 

10.  Reversion  and  rent  may  be  separately  conveyed. 

H.  Assignee  of  rent  sues  in  his  own  name. 

12.  Descent  of  rent  to  several  heirs. 

13.  Of  forms  of  action  by  and  against  assignees. 

14.  Necessity  of  notice  of  assignment  made. 

15.  When  mortgagee  liable  as  assignee. 

15  «.  Effect  of  assignment  by  an  insolvent  lessee. 

16.  Assignee  may  not  deny  validity  of  assignment. 

1.  In  the  first  place,  it  may  be  stated  as  a  general  if  not  a 
universal  proposition,  that  a  lease  is  assignable  unless  its  as- 
signability is  restricted  by  some  covenant  or  condition  therein 

1  Ball  V.  Wyeth,  8  Allen,  275,  278. 

■•2  Hatch  V.  Stamper,  42  Conn.  28  ;  Phillips  v.  Sun  Dye  Co.,  10  R.  L  458.  But 
such  deterioration  as  is  the  result  of  the  casualty  is  within  the  purview  of  this 
stipulation.  Cary  v.  Whiting,  118  Mass.  863.  And  upon  such  termination  the 
lessee  may  recover  back  proportionately  rent  paid  in  advance.  Rich  v.  Smith, 
121  Mass.  328. 


CII.  X.  §  .").]  ESTATES   FOR   YEARS.  539 

to  that  cfTirt.'  So  the  lossec  may  underlet  the  premises,  im- 
les8  restrained  in  like  manner.*  In  eonsidering  the  form  of 
niaklni!;  an  assiirninent  of  n  leasehold  interest,  and  the  rijrhta 
arisin;^  under  a  written  lease,  by  the  acts  of  the  parties,  and 
what  will  operate  in  law  as  such  assijrnnient,  it  may  l>c  stated 
that  the  Statute  of  Fraiuds  reipiires  it  to  be  don(,'  by  deol  or 
note  in  writ injr,  signed  by  the  party  assiirniu)^  the  same,  or  his 
agents  thereunto  lawfully  authorized  in  writing.^  Statute  29 
Car.  II.  c.  3,  §  3.  An<l  now  by  the  statute  of  Victoria  it  can 
only  be  done  by  deed.*  The  statute  32  Henry  VIII.  c.  34,  as 
to  assignment  of  covenants,  «tc.,  in  leases,  applies  only  to 
cases  of  demise  by  deed.  Consefjuently,  the  assignee  of  sueh 
a  reversion  cannot  sue  in  assumpsit  on  the  contract  made 
by  the  assignor.  And  the  very  definition  of  a  covenant 
implies  that  the  agreement  constituting  it  should  be  under 
seal.' 

2.  It  may  be  stated,  in  general  terms,  that  the  grant  by  a 
les.scc  of  his  entire  estate  will  be  an  assignment  of  the  lease, 
whi'ther  done  in  the  form  of  a  lease,  or  by  an  instrument  in 
terms  an  assigmnent.*  So  a  conveyance  in  fee  by  a  les.see  for 
years  in  the  form  of  a  deed  will  operate  as  an  assignment,  and 

»  Robinson  r.  Perry,  21  Ga.  183. 

•  King  r.  Al.lbonjugh,  1  tJist,  597  ;  Taylor,  I^ml.  k  Ten.  22  ;  Crommelin  r. 
ThiMis  31  Alft.  412,  •121.  But  in  Georgia,  a  tenant  is  proliihited  l>y  statute  from 
•ub-lftting  premises  without  consent  of  his  landlord.  McBumey  v.  Mclutir«^  38 
Ga.  2(M. 

•  Bedford  r.  T.rhnne,  30  X.  Y.  453,  459.  «  Wms.  Real  Trop.  133. 

•  Standeii  V.  Clmsma-s,  10  (^.  B.  135  ;  Piatt,  Cov.  3.  But  the  same  rights  may 
enun'  in  favor  of  the  reversioner  on  an  oral  or  written  demise  where  there  has  l>een 
an  attornment  or  adoption  of  tlio  transfer  by  payment  of  rent  or  the  like,  and 
Assumpsit  will  lie.  Rennie  v.  Robinson,  1  Bing.  147  ;  Buckworth  r.  .SimpMjn, 
1  Cr.  M.  &  R.  834  ;  Cornish  v.  Stubbs  I-  R.  5  C.  P.  334  ;  Smith  r.  Eggington, 
L.  R.  9  C.  P.  145.  Especially  where  the  attornment  i.s  disp<>nsed  with  by  the 
statute  of  ,\nne,  or  the  same  rule  obtains  nt  common  law.  Perrin  r.  I>'pj»er, 
S4  Mich.  21»2.  And  see  Shine  r.  Dillon.  1  Ir.  R.  C.  I..  277.  In  AllxH-k  r.  M.x.r- 
hou.He,  9  <J.  B.  Div.  366,  recover)'  by  the  assignee  of  a  lessor  from  year  to  year 
waa  denied,  for  want  of  privity  of  estate,  in  an  action  of  use  and  occujvition 
■gaiiist  the  b's.ve,  who  had  a.<4signed  tliough  without  the  leaser's  assent,  and  the 
statute  of  4  Anne,  c.  16,  {  9,  held  not  to  apply. 

•  2  Pn-st.  Conv.  124.  See  Palmer  r.  Edwanls,  Doug.  1S7.  n.;  Poultney  9. 
Holmes,  1  Str.  405  ;  Lyndc  r.  Hough,  27  Barb.  415  ;  B«anlman  r.  Wilson.  L.  R. 
4  ('.  P.  57  ;  or  by  will,  Martin  r.  Tobin,  123  ilasa.  85  ;  Sanders  v.  Partridge, 
108  Mass.  556,  558. 


540  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

hold  his  grantee  as  tenant  of  the  first  lessor ;  nor  could  the 
grantee  set  up  his  possession  as  adverse  to  that  of  such  lessor.^ 
If  a  lessor  during  the  term  mortgage  the  premises,  it  may- 
operate  as  an  assignment  of  the  reversion  pro  tanto,  and  carry 
with  it  the  rent  as  incident  to  it ;  and  all  that  would  he  neces- 
sary in  such  a  case  for  the  mortgagee  to  avail  himself  of  the 
rent  would  be  to  notify  the  tenant  to  pay  it  to  him.'^  But  if 
the  mortgage  of  the  premises  be  antecedent  to  the  lease,  it  is 
not  enough  for  the  mortgagee,  in  order  to  claim  the  rent,  to 
give  the  tenant  notice  to  pay  it.  He  must  gain  possession  of 
the  mortgaged  premises  before  he  can  compel  the  tenant  to 
pay  him  the  rent.^  And  the  reason  of  this  is,  that  the  lessee 
of  the  mortgagor  has  his  rights  as  assignee,  and  the  mortgagor 
would  not  himself  be  liable  to  the  mortgagee  for  rent  until  the 
latter  should  have  taken  possession  of  the  premises  under  his 
mortgage.  But  while  this  is  true,  it  is  not  true  that  by  ac- 
cepting rent  the  mortgagee  affirms  the  lease  for  the  whole 
term.  It  would  only  create  a  tenancy  from  year  to  year  at 
the  farthest.*  But  an  assignment  by  a  lessor  in  writing  of  a 
lease  which  is  under  seal  is  not  a  transfer  of  the  legal  title  to 
the  lease  so  as  to  enable  the  assignee  to  sue  thereon  for  the 
rent  reserved.  The  assignment  to  be  effectual  must  be  under 
seal.^  But  an  assignment  by  a  lessee,  in  writing,  of  a  lease 
under  seal,  would  so  far  be  effectual,  that,  if  followed  by  an 
entry  on  the  part  of  the  assignee  upon  the  leased  premises,  he 
would  be  liable  as  assignee  for  rent  accruing  due  during  his 
tenancy  by  reason  of  the  privity  of  estate  thereby  created  be- 
tween him  and  the  reversioner.^ 

3.  In  an  action  by  a  lessor  against  one  in  possession  of 
leased  premises  to  recover  rent,  the  latter  will  be  presumed  to 
be  the  assignee  of  the  lessee  unless  the  contrary  is  shown ."^ 
And  a  surrender  made  by  the  lessee  to  the  lessor  and  accepted 

1  Sands  v.  Hughes,  53  N.  Y.  287,  293, 

2  Kimball  v.  Lock  wood,  6  R.  L  138  ;  Russell  v.  Allen,  2  Allen,  42. 

8  Evans  v.  Elliott,  9  Ad.  &  E.  342  ;  Baldwin  v.  Walker,  21  Conn.  168. 

4  Gartside  v.  Outlej%  58  111.  210. 

6  Bridghani  v.  Tileston,  5  Allen,  371  ;  Brewer  v.  Dyer,  7  Cush.  837  ;  Wood  v. 
Partridge,  11  Mass.  488.  Sanders  v.  Partridge,  108  Mass.  556. 

T  Cross  V.  Upson,  17  Wise.  618;  Mariner  v.  Crocker,  18  Wise.  251  ;  Bedford 
V.  Terhune,  30  N.  Y.  453. 


ril.  X.  §  5.]  ESTATES    KOIl    YKAllS.  641 

by  him,  diirinp  the  poriod  of  an  o(cu|iancy  by  one  in  posscH- 
sion,  will  bo  concliisivo  «'vi(i(Mico  tlmt  thr  leHsec  and  nut  the 
occupant  is  the  one  who  hoMs  nn<k'r  the  lessor.  By  tins,  as 
well  as  oth«M'  evidence,  the  |>rrsunipti()n  of  an  assijfnnient  may 
be  n'butti'd,  as  well  as  that  of  sneh  a  j>ii\ ity  of  estate  as  makes 
a  tenant  rcsponsiljlc  to  the  Irssor  for  n-nt.'  lUil  tlie  assi^iu-e 
of  the  lease  would  n<»(  he  JiaMc  f«tr  lufaelu'S  of  covenant  aris- 
injx  |>rior  to  tin*  assij^nmcnt,'-  uidi'ss  the  performance  of  such 
covenant  shall  liave  b.  en  secured  liy  a  mortgage  in  the  lease 
of  sonu'thing  to  he  |iii(  u|Mtii  the  prtinises  Ity  the  lessee,  in  which 
case  the  assignee  would  hold  the  pi-emises  subject  to  the  les- 
sor's right  as  mortgagee  for  such  prior  breach.'' 

4.  Questi(Mi8  have  sometimes  arisen,  whether  a  certain  act 
of  a  lessee  is,  in  law,  an  assignment  or  an  undeiletting.  And 
this  Ix'comes  important  when  the  ellectof  the  one  or  the  other 
is  considered.  The  determination  of  the  cpicstion  docs  not 
depend  upon  the  form  of  the  instrument  alone,  but  upon 
whether  the  les.see  has  thereby  parted  with  his  entire  interest 
in  the  term  as  a  term.  If  he  has  aliened  his  entire 
interest,  it  'is  an  assigniment.  If  it  is  for  a  period  [*334] 
which  is  to  expire  before  the  exjtiration  of  the  original 
lease,  it  is  a  subletting.  In  the  one  case  he  has  a  reversion 
left,  ill  the  iitherhe  has  none.  And  the  retaining  the  smallest 
reversionary  interest  gives  to  the  instrument  the  mere  <'fTect 
of  an  underlease.*  (Jiving  it,  however,  th<'  form  of  an  under- 
letting, does  not  change  its  character.  It"  it  be  for  the  whole 
term,  it  will  be  an  assignment  with  all  its  conseciuenees.''  So 
if  a  lessee  underlet  a  portion  of  the  leased  premises  for  a 
term  as  long  or  longer  than  his  own,  such  underlessee  becomes 

>  Duniinl.)  r.  Wyiiinri,  2  Samlf.  597  ;  Qunckeuboss  r.  Clarke,  12  Wi-iid.  565  ; 
Kaiu  r.  iicixic.  2  Hilton,  311. 

>  Day  r.  .SwnckhaiiuT,  2  Hilton,  4.  *  Bnrmilhot  r.  Battoll.-,  7  Cal.  450. 

*  Burton.  l!i-al  Trop.  §  8cSa  ;  2  Prost.  Conv.  124;  rannentor  r.  W.I.Ut,  8 
Taunt.  5'.<:{  ;  Pollmk  r.  Stacy,  9  Q.  B.  lt»33,  when-  the  form  was  an  untltrlctling  ; 
ratten  c.  Deshon,  1  (Jrny,  325,  where  tho  underletfinp  was  of  a  i>nrt  of  the  juvm- 
ine*  for  the  entire  temi  ;  1  I'latt,  Iawh-s,  102  ;  2  I<J.  420  ;  Derby  v.  Taylor,  1  VmsU 
602  ;  3aoon,  Abr.  Uasc,  I.  3  ;  Bagley  v.  Freeman,  1  Hilton,  196,  198  ;  Kain  v. 
Hoxie,  2  Hilton,  311. 

*  San.UrH  r.  Tartridgo,  108  Mass.  556  ;  Beanlman  r  Wilson,  L.  R.  4  C.  I?. 
67  :  Wolla-ston  r.  Hakcwdl,  3  Mann.  &  G.  297,  323  ;  Taylor,  UnJ.  k  Ten. 
(7tli  vd.)  S  16  and  uotc. 


642  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

thereby  assignee,  and  liable,  proportionably,  for  the  perform- 
ance of  the  covenants  which  relate  to  the  estate.  Nor  would 
it  make  any  difference  in  this  respect,  though  the  premises  be 
underlet  for  a  larger  rent  than  that  reserved  in  the  original 
lease.  The  undertenant  would  be  liable  to  his  lessor,  under 
his  lease,  for  such  excess.^  But  though  it  would  be  an  under- 
letting unless  the  lessee's  whole  estate  and  interest  passes,  if 
it  be  the  lessee's  whole  estate  and  interest  in  a  part  of  the 
leased  premises,  it  will  as  to  that  part  be  an  assignment,  and 
the  tenant  will  be  liable  as  assignee  for  a  proportionate  part  of 
the  rent  reserved  in  the  original  lease.^  A  judicial  sale  of  the 
interest  of  the  lessee  creates  in  the  purchaser  the  obligation  of 
an  assignee  to  pay  the  rent  subsequently  accruing.^  The  cases 
upon  the  point,  whether  a  subletting  by  a  lessee  of  his  entire 
term  amounts  to  an  assignment,  or  creates  a  new  relation  of 
landlord  and  tenant,  with  a  right  to  distrain  for  rent  and  the 
like  between  him  and  the  undertenant,  are  numerous,  and  it 
is  not  proposed  to  examine  them  any  further  than  as  it  affects 
the  question,  whether  such  subletting,  in  terms,  creates  a 
privity  of  estate  between  the  sublessee  and  the  original  lessor. 

And  here  unfortunately  the  law  seems  to  be  unsettled, 
[*335]  no  case  having  been  found  expressly  in  *  point.     In 

England  the  rule  seems  established  that  unless  the 
sublease  is  less  in  point  of  time  than  the  original  term,  it  is  an 
assignment.  Thus  it  is  laid  down  by  Preston  that  a  right  of 
entry  or  a  reservation  of  rent  will  not  change  the  nature  of  the 
estate,  but  that  to  make  it  an  underlease  a  reversion  must  be 
retained  by  the  former  owner,  and  that  the  underlease  must 
be  for  a  period  less  in  point  of  time  than  the  term  or  estate  of 
the  lessee,  and  a  day,  an  hour,  or  a  minute  will  be  sufficient.* 
The  language  of  Bacon  is,  "  When  the  whole  term  is  made 
over  by  the  lessee,  although  in  the  deed  by  which  that  is  done 
the  rent  and  power  of  entry  for  non-payment  are  reserved  to 
him  and  not  to  the  original  lessee  (lessor),  this  is  an  assign- 

1  Wollaston  v.  Hakewell,  sicp. ;  Smith  v.  Mapleback,  1  T.  R.  441 ;  Taylor,  Land. 
&  Ten.  (7tli  ed. )  §  16  and  note. 

'■^  2  Piatt,  Leases,  421  ;  Pingrey  v.  Watkins,  15  Vt.  479,  488.  See  Holford  v. 
Hatch,  Doug.  174. 

8  D'Aquin  V.  Arraant,  14  La.  An.  217  ;  and  see  McNeil  v.  Kendall,  128  Mass.  245. 

*  2  Piest.  Conv.  124,  125,  citing  Palmer  v.  Edwards,  Dougl.  187,  n. 


CU.  X.  §    ').]  ESTATKf^    FOR    YKAR3.  543 

nient  ami  not  an  inuU'iU'aso,  ami  thfreforc  tho  orifrinal  K-ssur 
or  his  assipu'c  of  the  revi-rsion  may  sue  or  be  sued  <»m  the  re- 
8|H'ctive  eovemmts  in  the  original  lease,  and  this  although 
new  covenants  are  introduced  in  assi^:nment."  *  In  Pluck  v. 
Diifires,  then.'  was  a  lease  for  lives,  and  the  lessees  demised 
the  lands  in  common  form,  reserving  rent,  A-e.,  for  the  same 
numlM.'r  of  lives  as  mentioned  in  the  original  hase,  though  not 
80  menlionecl  in  the  second  demise.  The  heail-note  of  the 
ease  thus  states  the  law:  "Tlu'  whole  interest  having  been 
granted,  it  operated  as  an  assignment.'"-  In  the  latter  case  the 
Chief  Justice  says,  "  In  I'armenter  v.  Wiliher,"^  although  the 
intention  of  the  parties  to  make  an  underlease  was  manifest 
and  acted  upon,  yat  the  fact  of  the  whole  interest  being  granted 
was  held  decisive  of  the  instrument  being  an  assigmnent" 
(p.  9l»)-  And  the  elaborate  note  of  the  reporter  to  the  case  of 
King  r.  Wilson,*  to  the  efl'ect  that  tenure  could  subsist  be- 
tween tlie  lessee  and  the  sublessee  of  the  whole  term  indepen- 
d;'ntly  of  a  reversion,  because  such  was  the  intenti(tn  of  the 
parties,  is  controverted  by  the  Viee-Chaucellor  in  the  case  of 
Langford  v.  Selnies,''  saying,  "  It  was  ne\(T  before  suggested 
that  there  could  be  any  tt-nure  between  a  lessee  for  years  and 
a  person  to  whom  he  granted  his  whole  term."  In  a  still 
more  recent  case,"  the  general  rule  above  stated  is  reasserted ; 
ami  the  conclusion  contende(l  for,  as  derived  from  Pollock  v. 
Stacy,"  that  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  could  subsist 
without  a  reversion,  is  denied,  and  that  case  limited  to  its 
special  circumstances.  Hut  in  the  United  States  a  difl'erent 
rule  seems  to  have  prevailed.  Thus  where  the  lessee  demised 
to  another  the  leased  premises  for  the  residue  of  the  term,  but 
reserved  a  didivery  of  possession  on  the  last  day  of  the  term, 
and  a  right  to  possession  if  the  biiildings  were  lea.sed  during 
the  t<^'rm,  it  was  held  to  be  an  underletting  and  not  an  assign- 
ment.*    So  where  the    assignee  of  a  lea.se  demised  his  entire 

'   lijuon,  Ahr.  I^jnso,  I.  3  ;  Doe  v.  IkUnmn,  2  B.  k  A.  168. 

"  5  BlijCli.  N.  ».  31,  65. 

»  8  Taunt.  2(t3.     S«h^  Micks  r.  Dowling.  1  Ul.  IUjtt!.  99. 

♦  .1  Mnnn.  &  H.  l.'>r  n.  »  3  Kny  &  .T.  226,  229. 

•  Bt-ardinan  r.  WiWn,  L.  K.  4  C.  1".  :>7 ;  nnJ  «-o  Bamtt  r.  Ui.lpli,  1 4  M.  &  W. 
8^8-  '  9  Q.  B.  1033. 

«  Post  r.  Kearney,  2  N.  Y.  394  ;  Linden  r.  Hepburu,  3  Sandf.  6ti8. 


544  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   L 

interest,  reserving  a  rent  larger  than  that  reserved  in  the 
original  lease  with  a  right  of  entry  for  the  non-payment  there- 
of, it  was  held  to  be  an  underlease  and  not  an  assignment.^ 
So  in  a  case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  New  York,  where  the 
lessee  underlet  for  the  entire  term,  but  took  a  covenant  from 
the  sublessee  to  surrender  up  possession  to  him  at  the  expira- 
tion of  the  term,  and  a  right  of  re-entry  was  reserved  in  case 
the  rent  was  not  paid,  it  was  held  a  subletting  and  not  an 
assignment.^  It  is  obvious  that  the  original  lessee  intended 
to  reserve  an  interest  in  and  a  control  over  the  premises ;  and 
the  court  held  that  the  original  lessor  could  not  avail  himself 
of  a  covenant  by  the  sublessee  to  the  mesne  lessor  in  respect 
to  taxes.  But  in  another  case  decided  in  the  Court  of  Appeals 
a  somewhat  different  conclusion  was  reached.  Here 
[*336]  *  there  was  a  letting  for  a  term  of  years,  with  a  re- 
striction as  to  underletting  ;  the  defendants  went  into 
possession  and  paid  several  quarters'  rent,  though  they  were 
not  the  lessees,  and  it  did  not  appear  what  the  agreement  was 
between  them  and  the  lessee.  The  lessee  having  become  bank- 
rupt, the  lessor  sued  them  as  assignees  for  the  rent  in  arrear 
at  the  expiration  of  the  term,  they  being  then  in  possession. 
The  court  say,  "The  defendants  held  for  the  whole  of  the 
residue  of  the  unexpired  term  of  the  lease.  When  the  trans- 
fer is  of  the  whole  of  a  term,  the  person  taking  is  an  assignee 
and  not  an  undertenant,  although  there  is,  inform,  an  under- 
letting. It  is  essential  to  an  undertenancy  that  it  be  of  a  part 
only  of  the  unexpired  term."^  The  case  turns  very  much 
upon  the  presumption  arising,  in  the  absence  of  proof  to  the 
contrary,  that  the  tenant  is  an  assignee  rather  than  a  sub- 
lessee. But  the  inference  seems  to  be  that  if  the  holding  be 
by  a  sui>lease,  if  that  be  for  the  same  time  and  upon  the  same 
terms  as  the  original  letting,  it  would  be  an  assignment.  In 
a  later  case  in  the  same  court  this  conclusion  was  adopted  as 
law,  and  the  efficacy  of  the  reservation  of  a  mere  right  of  re- 
entry to  alter  a  demise  of  the  entire  term  from  an  assignment 
into  a  sublease  was  denied.*     The  court  refer  to  the  English 

1  Kearny  v.  Post,  1  Sandf.  105.  ^  Martin  v.  O'Connor,  43  Barb.  514. 

8  Bedford  V.  Terhune,  30  N.  Y.  453,  457  ;  Sanders  v.  Partridge,  108  Mass.  556. 
*  Woodhull  V.  Rosenthal,  61  N,  Y.  382. 


en.  X.  !;   ').]  ESTATES   FOa   TEARS.  545 

caBOR  alroady  citod,  ns  snstainiiifr  tho  fiamo  rulo.  Hut  whatovor 
tho  souikIik'ss  of  llit'so  two  cases  upon  the  pivciso  state  of  facts 
involved  in  them,  tlieir  authority  upon  the  jioint  un<ier  consid- 
eration has  heen  weakened  if  not  wholly  overruled  hy  two  very 
recent  decisions  in  the  same  court  :  one  slitrhtly  j)recedinir  in 
time  the  case  of  Woodhull  v.  Rosenthal,  i)ut  not  referred  to 
therein,*  and  the  other  since  that  casc.^  In  l,oth  of  these  the 
doctrine  was  maintained  un(iualifiedly  that  a  covenant  of  the 
sublessee  to  di'liver  up  the  jiremises  to  the  mesne  lessor  at 
the  expiration  of  the  term,  and  the  reservaticm  hy  the  latter  of 
a  right  of  re-entry,  made  a  lease,  and  not  an  assijrnment,  though 
the  demise  was  of  the  entire  term.  In  Massachusi.'tts,  in  a 
leading  case,^  the  lessee's  assignee,  after  a  demise  hy  the  les- 
see for  his  entire  terra,  was  allowed  to  recover  rent  from  the 
person  to  whom  the  demise  was  mide,  as  if  the  latter  were 
clearly  a  sul>-lessce,  though  the  point  under  consideration  was 
not  adverted  to,  nor  d(»es  it  appear  whether  re-entry  hy  and 
redelivery  to  the  mesne  lessor  were  stipulated  for  in  the  demise. 
This  decision,  however,  has  been  relied  on  as  an  authority  in 
later  cases,  which  place  the  law  in  this  State  on  the  same 
ground  as  that  occupied  by  the  latest  decisions  in  New  York.* 
Simihir  decisions  have  also  been  made  in  California  ^  and 
lowa,^  while  in  Pennsylvania  the  English  doctrine  is  adtjpted 
that  a  termor  for  years  who  demises  the  estate  to  another  for 
the  same  or  a  greater  term  than  that  for  which  he  holds  imder 
his  own  demise,  is  considered  thereby  ipso  facto,  to  assi^/n  his 
term,  and  his  lessee,  so  far  as  the  original  lessor  is  concerned, 
holds  as  assignee  of  such  term,  and  not  as  a  sub-tenant.  And 
the  same  doctrine  seems  to  apply  whether  the  original  demise 
was  by  parol  or  in  writing."     Strictly  speaking,  a  tenant  at 

»  Collins  r.  Hoahrouck,  50  N.  Y.  157.  '  Ganson  v.  Tifft,  71  N.  Y.  48. 

•  Patten  r.  Deshoii,  1  Gray,  325.     So  in  Shumway  r.  Collins,  6  Gray,  227. 

*  McNiel  V.  Kendall,  128  Mass.  215  ;  Duiilnp  r.  Rnllnnl,  131  Mn.ss.  161.  Sm 
also  Prcscott  v.  Kyle,  103  Mass.  381.  It  is  somewhat  diClcijlt  to  apprehend  the 
ground  of  the  first-named  case,  which  professes  to  reat  on  Patten  r.  Deshon.  but 
puta  the  decision  on  the  singular  ground  that  because  the  jvircel  trnnsffrred  by 
the  leaae  had  certain  easements  in  the  parcel  retained  by  the  lessor,  thus  gave  tho 
latter  revcrsionan.-  rights  as  to  tho  former. 

»  Blumenlwrg  v.  Myres.  32  Cal.  93.  •  Collamer  v.  Kelly.  12  Iowa,  319. 

^  Lloyd  r.  Cozens,  2  Ashni.  131,  137;  Holford  r.  Hatch,  Doug.  187.     Se«  also 
Palmer  r.  Edwards,  Doug.  187,  note. 
VOL.  I.— 35 


546  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

will  has  no  estate  which  ho  can  assign.  Whether,  therefore, 
he  assigns  or  underlets,  it  creates  no  privity  of  estate  between 
the  tenant  to  whom  he  gives  possession  and  the  original  lessor. 
Tlie  lessor  may  treat  him  as  a  disseisor  in  possession  without 
right.  But  if  he  accepts  rent  from  him,  he  creates  between 
them  the  relation  of  tenant  at  will.  But  what  the  relations 
between  such  intermediate  tenant  and  his  lessor  may  be,  more 
properly  comes  under  the  head  of  tenancies  at  will.^  And  the 
same  authorities  seem  also  to  settle,  that  if  the  intermediate 
lessor  reserve  rent  in  his  demise  to  the  second  lessee,  he  can- 
not distrain  for  it,  since  he  has  no  reversionary  interest  re- 
maining in  himself.2 

5,  The  respective  rights  of  the  original  lessor  and  the  ten- 
ant of  a  lessee,  regarded  as  sub-lessee,  are  well  settled.  There 
is  no  privity  of  estate  between  them,  and  therefore  the  lessor 
cannot  sue  the  undertenant  upon  the  lessee's  covenant  to  pay 
rent,  nor  recover  rent  of  him  in  any  form  of  action.^  The  fol- 
lowing case  will  serve  to  illustrate  the  above  proposition,  and 
suggests  another  point  of  much  difficulty,  how  far  a  mortgagee 
of  a  lessee  is  regarded  in  law,  as  an  assignee  with  correspond- 
ing liabilities  as  such.  A.  made  a  deed  to  J.  S.  with  a  condition 
indorsed,  that  it  should  become  void  if  the  grantor  paid  a  cer- 
tain sum  by  a  certain  time,  "  together  with  the  use  of  the 
farm."  This  sum  was  orally  fixed  by  agreement  to  be  paid 
annually.  A.  continued  to  occupy  the  farm,  and  made  a  mort- 
gage to  the  defendant  of  the  same,  still  retaining  possession. 
The  agreed  "  use "  or  rent  being  in  arrear,  J.  S.  sued  the 
defendant  for  the  same  as  assignee  of  A.,  the  lessee  and  mort- 
gagor. But  it  was  held,  that,  as  the  defendant  never  was  in 
possession  of  the  premises,  no  action  lay  against  him  in  favor 
of  J.  S.  But  the  court  do  not  decide  whether,  if  this  transac- 
tion had  been  clearly  a  lease  between  the  original  parties, 
instead  of  a  mortgage  of  real  estate,  and  to  be  treated  accord- 

1  Reckhow  v.  Schanck,  43  N.  Y.  448  ;  Cunningham  v.  Holton,  55  Me.  33  ; 
Dingley  v.  Buffum,  57  Me.  381  ;  Holbrook  v.  Young,  108  Mass.  83  ;  post,  p.  *373. 

2  Lit.  §  215  ;  Hicks  v.  Dowling,  1  Ld.  Raym.  99  ;  Parmenter  v.  Webber,  8 
Taunt.  293. 

8  :\IcFailan  v.  Watson,  3  X.  Y.  286  ;  Dartmouth  Coll.  v.  Clongh,  8  N.  H.  22  ; 
Campbell  v.  Stetson,  2  Met.  504  ;  Wms.  Renl  Prop.  336  ;  Jennings  v.  Alexaniler, 
1  Hilton,  154 ;  Holford  v.  Hatch,  Doug.  187 ;  Grundin  v.  Carter,  99  Mass.  15. 


ril.  X.  §  .'.]  ESTATES    FOR    YEARS.  '17 

iiifily,  the  (lofoiulant,  as  niortjjngce  of  tlio  lonschold  inton'st, 
would  bo  liahh"  for  rent  as  assiirnro  of  llio  lesseo.'  But  if 
one  enters  ami  holds  possession  of  jtrenjises  as  assignoe  of  the 
lessee,  lie  will  he  liahle  for  the  rent  So  lonj^  as  ho  Continues  to 
liold  it.'-  I  iilrss,  however,  the  tmaiit  holdiiiL'"  under  a  h'sseo 
can  be  changed  as  assignee,  he  is  no  more  liable  in  equity  than 
at  hiw  to  the  original  lessor,'  even  though  the  occupation  by 
tlic  t<'nant  be  without  permission  or  objection  of  any  onc^ 
But  in  one  ca.se  it  was  held,  that  where,  by  the  terms  of  the 
original  lease,  the  les.sor  h;id  a  right  to  enter  for  non-payment 
of  rent,  an  undertenant  might  pay  his  rent  to  the  original 
lessor  in  order  to  protect  his  estate.'' 

6.  As  the  owner  of  a  well-defined  interest  or  estate  in  lands, 
a  tenant  for  years,  imless  restrained  by  the  covenants  and  con- 
ditions of  his  lease,  may  underlet  the  premises  or  any  j)art  of 
them,  as  has  already  been  more  than  once  assumed,  or  carve 
up  his  estate  into  such  forms  as  he  sees  fit,  and  during  the 
continuance  of  the  teru)  th»^  (MMgiual  lessor  is  so  far  divested 
of  the  pos.session,  that,  if  he  were  to  find  the  premises  vacant, 
he  would  have  no  more  right  to  enter  upon  tliiiu  than  a 
stranger.'' 

7.  Corresponding  to  the  right  of  lessee  to  assign  or  underlet 
his  interest  is  the  right  which  the  lessor  has  to  convey  or  as- 
sign his  reversion,  and  thereby  bring  in  a  new  party  with  the 
rights  of  a  reversioner."  Nor  is  it  necessary,  now,  that  the 
tenant  should  attorn  to  such  grantee  or  assignee,  to  give  effect 
to  the  grant  or  assignment,  in  those  States  Avhcre  the  8tat.  4 
Anne,  c.  It),  §  0,  is  adopted,"  or  its   princijtle  existed   inde- 

•  Graham  v.  Way,  33  Vt  19  ;  jmt,  p.  •340. 
3  Davis  V.  Morris,  36  X.  Y.  660,  576. 

"  Bodronl  r.  Ttrhuno,  30  N.  Y.  453  ;  Davis  r.  Morris,  36  N.  Y.  574. 

•  Knin  r.  Hoxic,  2  Hilton,  311,  316. 

'  Took  p.  Ingcrsoll,  7  N.  Y.  52S.     Sop  nlso  Collins  r.  Whillilin.  3  riiiln.  102. 

•  Nave  r.  Bcrrj',  22  Ala.  382  ;  Brown  v.  Kite,  2  Overt.  233  ;  Brown  v.  Powell, 
25  Penn.  St  229  ;  Wms.  Real  Prop,  335,  336  ;  Shannon  v.  Burr,  1  Hilton,  39  ; 
Crommctiii  v.  Thiess,  81  Ala.  412. 

'  C'alliighan  r.  Hawkcs,  121  Mass.  299.  Here  it  was  held  that  an  agreement 
in  a  lcas<«  that  the  landlord  might  sell  the  leased  premises,  first  giving  the  tt-nant 
notice,  meant  that  he  might  \>y  such  sale  tenninate  the  lease,  as  he  had  the  right 
to  transfer  tlie  n-vt-rsion  without  such  notice. 

•  Wma.  Ecal  Prop.  203  ;  5  B.  &  C.  512,  note.  Am.  ed.;  New  York,  iloffat  r. 


548  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

pendently  at  law.^  So  if  the  estate  of  the  lessor  as  owner  in 
fee  is  sold  on  execution  before  the  rent  is  due,  it  would  carry 
the  right  to  recover  the  rent  to  the  purchaser.^ 

8.  As  a  general  proposition,  having  few  exceptions, 
[*337]  the  *  transfer  of  a  reversion  carries  with  it  the  rent 
due  and  accruing  thereafter,  by  the  lease  creating  the 
term  for  years,^  whether  the  assignment  of  the  reversion  be  by 
deed  or  mortgage.*  This  right  of  a  lessor  to  recover  rent  of  the 
assignee  of  the  lessee  is  founded  not  on  contract,  but  on  privity 
of  estate,  and  after  he  has  parted  with  his  reversion  he  cannot 
recover  the  rent.^  And  it  seems  to  be  of  little  consequence  how 
one  becomes  a  reversioner  as  to  the  assignee  of  the  lessee  so  far 
as  it  concerns  his  right  to  recover  rent  of  whoever  is  assignee 
and  tenant  when  the  rent  falls  due.  Thus,  after  a  lease  for  five 
years,  a  second  lease  for  ten  years,  including  the  period  of  the 
first,  transfers  the  right  to  the  rent  of  the  first.^  But  the  as- 
signee cannot  recover  rent  then  due  and  in  arrears.  Thus 
where  rent  was  reserved  generally  in  a  lease,  and  the  lessor 
died,  only  the  rent  accruing  afterwards  belonged  to  and  was 
recoverable  by  his  heirs  as  being  his  reversioners.'^  And  if  the 
administrator  collect  it,  he  will  hold  it  in  trust  for  the  heirs 

Smith,  4  N.  Y.  126  ;  New  Hampshire,  Mussey  v.  Holt,  24  N.  H.  248  ;  Maryland, 
Funk  V.  Kincaid,  5  Md.  404 ;  New  Jersey,  Rev.  Stat.  1847,  p.  643  ;  Missouri, 
Rev.  Stat.  c.  32,  §  11  ;  Connecticut,  Baldwin  v.  Walker,  21  Conn.  168  ;  Alabama, 
English  V.  Key,  39  Ala.  113  ;  Pennsylvania,  3  Biun.  625  ;  Tilford  v.  Fleming, 
64  Penn.  St.  300.  In  Maine  it  is  doubted.  Fox  o.  Corey,  41  Me.  81.  The  Stat, 
of  Anne  is  not  in  force  in  Illinois.     Fisher  v.  Deering,  60  111.  114. 

1  Massachusetts,  Farley  v.  Thompson,  15  Mass.  18,  6  ;  Keay  v.  Goodwin,  16 
Mass.  1  ;  Michigan,  Perrin  v.  Lepper,  34  Mich.  292. 

2  Shelton  v.  Codman,  3  Cush.  318  ;  Hart  v.  Israel,  2  P.  A.  Browme,  22  ;  Bk. 
of  Penn.  v.  AVise,  3  Watts,  394  ;  Scheerer  v.  Stanley,  2  Rawle,  276. 

3  Burden  v.  Thayer,  3  Met.  76  ;  Keay  v.  Goodwin,  16  Mass.  1  ;  Newall  v. 
Wright,  3  Mass.  138  ;  Johnston  v.  Smith,  3  Penn.  496  ;  York  v.  Jones,  2  N.  H. 
454;  Farley  v.  Craig,  11  N.  J.  262;  Scott  v.  Lunt,  7  Pet.  596  ;  Van  Rensselaer 
V.  Gallup,  5  Denio,  454  ;  Wilson  v.  Delaplaine,  3  Harringt.  499  ;  Stout  v.  Keene, 
Id.  82  ;  Snyder  v.  Riley,  1  Speers,  272  ;  Gibbs  v.  Ross,  2  Head,  437.  Although 
the  transfer  be  by  way  of  mortgage,  Russell  v.  Allen,  2  Allen,  42.  For  the  effect 
of  a  mortgage  of  his  estate  by  a  reversioner  and  the  rights  of  mortgagees,  generally, 
to  rents  of  leased  premises  mortgaged  before  and  after  leases  made,  the  reader  is 
referred  to  c.  16,  sect.  4,  pp.  *529-*533  of  this  work.  Gale  i'.  Edwards,  52  Me. 
363. 

4  Kimball  v.  Pike,  18  N.  H.  419.  ^  Grundin  v.  Carter,  99  Mass.  15. 
6  Harmon  v.  Flanagan,  123  Mass.  288.  ''  Jaques  v.  Gould,  4  Cush.  384. 


ril.  X.  §  T).]  ESTATES    FOR    YEARS.  540 

;it  law  1111(1  the  widow. i  The  Kunu'  nilr  a|)itlic8  if  the  intestato 
dio  insolvent.  The  heirs  are  enlitU'd  Ut  the  rents  until  the 
estate  is  sold  hv  the  ndniinistrutor  hy  leave  of  eourt  tor  the 
payment  of  debts.*  And  the  sanu'  jtrinciide  apjdies,  thoii^di 
the  rent  ho  payable  in  a  share  of  the  ^nain  raised  ujton  tliu 
I)reniis('s.'' 

l>.  If  a  part  only  of  the  reversion  is  conveyed,  the  grantee 
or  a.ssijrnee  may  recover  his  share  of  the  rent  jiro  rata  aceord- 
ini?  to  tlu'  relative  values  of  the  respective  jiarts  of  the  rever- 
sion ,*  and  this  doctrine  of  ajtportionment  of  the  ri^dit  to  rent 
amonjr  the  several  assignees  of  the  reversion  applies  where 
this  reversion  has  descended  to  several  heirs;''  and  one  of 
several  heirs  at  law  can  sue  for  his  alicpiot  part  of  rent  accru- 
in«r  dne  after  the  death  of  his  ancestor,  the  lessor ;''  or  where 
a  part  of  the  reversion  is  levied  upon  by  execution  f(U-  debt,  or 
is  set  ofT  to  a  widow  for  her  dower.'  This  apportionment  of 
rent  is  never  made  in  reference  to  the  length  of  time  of  occu- 
pation;  hut  whoever  owns  the  reversion  at  the  time  the  rent 
falls  due  is  entitled  to  the  entire  sum  then  due."  Hut  where 
by  agreement  the  tenant  was  to  pay  so  nnieh  rent  and  taxes 
by  the  year,  and  if  he  occupic<l  for  a  lougi-r  time  lie  was  to 
pay  pro  rata  for  such  time,  it  was  held  to  include  a  pro  rata 
of  the  taxes  for  the  year  as  well  as  of  the  rent.'-'  The  rent,  in 
such  cases,  accrues  to  the  holder  of  the  reversion  by  reason  of 
his  privity  of  estate  with  the  lessor,  and  not  as  the  assignee 
of  a  chose  in  action;  and  when  a  lessor  has  once  parted  with 
his  reversion,  he  cannot,  except  as  hereafter  stated,  maintain 
any  action  for  subsecpiently  accruing  rent  against  his  lessee.*" 

»  Kobli'a  Ajipoal,  41  Peiin.  St.  45  ;  Drinkwater  v.  Drinkwntrr,  4  Mass.  353, 
358  ;  Mills  v.  MiTryiimn,  41*  .Me.  65  ;  King  r.  Amlerson,  20  In<l.  3S5. 

■•'  Gil«9on  V.  Farley,  10  .Miuss.  230  ;  Newcomb  r.  Stebbiiw,  9  Met.  540,  544. 

•  Bums  V.  Coojwr,  31  Pcnii.  St.  420;  Cobel  r.  Cobel,  8  Pcnn.  St.  342. 

*  .Montajrue  v.  Gay,  17  Mass.  J3'J  ;  Ncllis  v.  Lnthrop,  22  Wend.  121;  Rcod  r. 
Wanl,  -^2  IViiii.  Si.  144  ;  Ikiik  of  Pt  nnsylvania  r.  Wise,  3  Watt-s  394. 

*  Rceil  r.  Wanl,  22  Pcnn.  St.  144  ;  Hk.  of  Penn.  r.  Wise,  3  Watts.  394  ;  Crosby 
V.  Loop.  13  111.  »52j  ;  Chin's  (as.',  10  iJei).  128  ;  Cole  V.  Patterson,  25  Wen.l.  456  ; 
Com.  Und.  k  T.n.  422. 

•  .lone.s  r.  Fil.h,  3  Bosw.  63.  ^  1  Rollc's  Abr.  237.  pi.  4,  5. 

'  .Martin  r.  Martin,  7  Md.  308  ;  Bunbn  v.  Tliaycr,  3  Met.  76  ;  Bk.  of  Penn. 
V.  Wisio.  3  Wntt.s  394.  »  .May  r.  Rico,  108  .Ma.Hs.  150. 

'"  Peck  V.  Nortlirop,  17  Conn.  217  ;  Breeding  r.  Taylor,  13  B.  Mon.  477  ;  Sanip- 


650  LAW   OF  REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   L 

The  right  to  rent,  pro  rata^  passes  at  once,  and  the  law  comes 
in  to  apportion  it  in  reference  to  that  time,  so  that  nothing 
done,  subsequently,  by  either  of  the  original  parties,  can  affect 

the  rights  of  the  others.^    And  where  rent  is  reserved 
[*338]  generally,  *  without  naming  to  whom,  the  law  comes 

in  and  appropriates  it  to  whoever  is  entitled  to  the 
estate,  including  the  heirs  of  the  lessor .^ 

10.  Still,  as  above  intimated,  the  rent  and  reversion  may  be 
separated  by  the  holder  of  the  same.  Thus  where  a  rever- 
sioner conveyed  his  entire  estate,  including  his  reversion,  and 
reserved  the  rent  to  himself.^  So  where  the  demise  is  by  in- 
denture, and  the  lessee  covenants  to  pay  rent,  the  lessor  may 
assign  or  devise  the  rent  without  granting  the  reversion,  and 
such  assignee  may  recover  the  subsequently  accruing  rent  in 
his  own  name,  in  an  action  of  debt.*  As  an  illustration  of 
the  manner  and  extent  in  which  the  holder  of  a  term  may 
create  a  rent  out  of  it,  and  deal  with  it  as  a  rent  reserved  by 
a  lessor  who  owns  the  fee,  the  following  case  may  be  cited  : 
The  lessor  being  possessed  of  a  term  for  years,  demised  the 
premises  for  a  longer  period  than  his  term,  reserving  a  rent, 
and  then  assigned  his  interest  and  the  rent  to  the  plaintiff, 
who  sued  the  lessee  for  the  rent  accruing  due  under  the  lease 
after  the  assignment.  It  was  held  under  the  Stat,  of  Anne 
that  no  attornment  was  necessary  in  such  a  case  to  charge  the 
lessee,  there  being  sufficient  privity  between  the  grantee  of  the 
rent,  and  the  tenant  of  the  land  out  of  which  the  rent  issues, 
to  sustain  the  action  without  any  formal  attornment,  and  that 
the  plaintiff's  action  would  lie.  The  court  also  cite  a  case 
from  Carthew,  where  the  lessee,  who  had  assigned  his  entire 

son  V.  Grimes,  7  Blackf.  176  ;  Van  Wicklen  v.  Paulson,  14  Barb.  654  ;  Walker's 
Case,  3  Rep.  23  ;  Grandin  v.  Carter,  99  Mass.  15. 

1  Linton  v.  Hart,  25  Penn.  St,  193. 

2  Whitlock's  Case,  8  Rep.  71  ;  Cother  v.  Merrick,  Hardres,  95  ;  Jaques  v. 
Gould,  4  Cush.  384. 

3  M'Murphy  v.  Minot,  4  N.  H.  251;  Co.  Lit.  47  a;  Crosby  v.  Loop,  13  111. 
C25  ;  Van  Rensselaer  v.  Hays,  19  N.  Y.  68  ;  Dixon  v.  Niccolls,  39  111.  372. 

*  Ryerson  v.  Quackenbusb,  26  N.  J.  236  ;  Demarest  v.  AVillard,  8  Cow.  206  ; 
Patten  v.  Deshon,  1  Gray,  325  ;  Childs  v.  Clark,  3  Barb.  Ch.  52  ;  Kendall  v. 
Garland,  5  Cush.  74  ;  Allen  v.  Biyan,  5  B.  &  C.  512  ;  Robins  v.  Cox,  1  Lev. 
22  ;  Moffat  v.  Smith,  4  N.  Y.  126  ;  Willard  v.  Tillman,  2  Hill,  274,  s.  c.  19 
Wend.  358  ;  Buskin  v.  Edmunds,  Cro.  Eliz.  636. 


fll.   X.    §    "k]  h>TATi;H    |-i)|J     VKAIW.  .'),')l 

term  to  another  rendering;  rent,  wius  held  at  liberty  to  sue  for 
this  in  an  uetitjii  of  <l«l)t,  although  he  liad  no  levursion  remain- 
ing in  hinisflf.  Or  th«' action  niiirlit  Im*  covenant  broken.'  JJut 
the  rent  cannot  In'  apjiortioneil  by  the  hmcUord  to  different 
persons  withont  the  tenant's  assent,-  thon^di  with  snch  as- 
sent it  may  In'.^  So  a  lessor  may  d(.'\  ise  j»art  of  a  rent,  wliicli 
will  be  good  without  attornment  (jf  the  tenant,  and  the  part  so 
dovisi'tl  will  theri'by  be  severed  from  the  revt-rsion.* 

11.  In  these  cases,  where  by  an  assignment  of  the  reversi(jn 
the  rent  pasises,  or  where  there  is  an  assignment  of  the  rent 
without  the  reversion,  the  assignee  sues  in  his  own  name  for 
any  rent  a«cruing  due  after  such  assignment.  "  It  (the  rent) 
is  not  a  thing  in  action,  but  (juani  an  inheritance."''  Thus 
where  lessor  for  life  reserving  rent  devised  the  rent  to  another 
for  life,  who  died  between  the  periods  of  payment  of  the  rent, 
the  executors  of  such  devisee  were  held  entitled  only  to  the 
rent  due  at  the  period  of  payment  next  prior  to  his  death.'' 

12.  In  this  connection  it  may  be  proper  to  add,  that  where 
a  rent  descemls  with  a  reversion  to  several  heirs,  in  an  action 
to  ri'cover  it,  they  may,  and  it  is  very  (piestionable  if  they 
must  not,  all  join."  Where  the  assignment  is  to  several  by  the 
act  of  the  lessor,  it  has  already  been  stated  that  the 

lessee  must  attorn,  *  in  order  to  be  liable  to  the  suit  ['SSO] 

•  WilluuiiH  p.  Haywanl,  1  Kllis  &  K.  1040;  Newcomb  v.  Han-cy,  Carth.  Ifll  ; 
Com.  I)ig.  Debt.  (C);  BakiT  ».  Gostliiig,  1  Hing.  N.  C.  19;  Hunt  ».  Thompson, 
2  Allen,  341  ;  Van  Hiiis-selaer  v.  Ktad,  26  N.  Y.  558,  577  ;  jxisl,  vol.  2,  p.  'IS. 
In  a  reruut  cast-  in  Mas.sachusctt8,  it  was  held  that  where  the  lessee  surieuJered 
his  lease  to  the  lessor  "  without  pn-judico  to  the  sub-leases  of  parts  of  the  premises" 
though  by  the  lessor's  acceptance  the  n-vei-sion  on  snch  sub-lea.ses  was  mcfffwl, 
the  rents  remained  and  could  be  recovere«l  by  the  lessor  from  the  sub-lessccs  as  they 
fell  due.     Deal  r.  Boston  far  Spr.  Co.,  125  Mass.  157. 

'  Anis  V.  Watkin.  Vm.  KHz.  C37  ;  Kyenwm  v.  Quackenbtish,  26  X.  J.  236. 

•  HyiTson  i:  C2iia<kenl)ush,  .iiip.  *  Anls  r.  Watkin,  .»i(/). 

»  Ards  V.  Watkin,  sup.;  Demarest  r.  Willurd,  S  I'ow.  206  :  Hyerson  r.  Quack- 
enbush,  sup.;  Childs  r.  Clark,  3  Uarb.  Ch,  52  ;  Willard  r.  Tillman,  2  Hill,  274  ; 
Crosby  v.  I.oop,  13  III.  625  ;  AU'rcrombie  r.  Kedpath,  1  Iowa,  111  ;  Van  Kens.se- 
lacr  r.  Hay.s,  19  N.  Y.  68,  99  ;  Allen  v.  Hrjan,  5  B.  i  C.  512  ;  Dixon  v.  Nictolls, 
39  111.  372,  334  ;  Pfaff  r.  Golden.  126  Mass.  402. 

«  Stillwell  r.  Doughty,  3  Bnulf.  359. 

^  Porter  r.  Bleihr,  17  Barb.  149  ;  Martin  v.  Prompe,  1  I,d.  llnym.  340  :  Hill 
r.  r.ibbs,  5  Hill,  56  ;  Wall  r.  Hinds,  4  (Jray,  256  ;  Decker  v.  Livingston,  15  Johns. 
479  ;  Lit.  $  316. 


552  LAW   OF  REAL   PROPERTY. 


[book  I. 


of  any  one  of  them  for  his  separate  share  ;i  though  in  the 
case  of  Ards  v.  Watkin,  it  was  held,  in  case  of  a  "devise  of 
a  part  of  a  rent,  that  the  devisee  may  sue  alone  for  his  share.2 
It  may  be  added,  that  the  assignee  of  the  reversion,  in  the 
above  supposed  cases,  might  sue  the  assignee  of  the  lessee  as 
well  as  the  lessee  himself,  if  in  possession  of  the  premises, 
because  of  a  privity  of  estate,  and  because  the  covenant  to' 
pay  rent  runs  with  the  land.^ 

13.  In  respect  to  the  form  of  the  action  to  be  adopted  by  or 
agamst  assignees  in  respect  to  covenants  in  leases,  so  much 
depends  upon  the  circumstances  under  which  the  action  may 
be  brought,  as  well  as  upon  the  statutes  of  the  several  States, 
that  It  only  seems  necessary  to  say  here,  that  an  action  of  debt 
or  covenant  would  lie  for  rent  against  the  assignee  of  a  lessee 
at  common  law,  and  would  be  local,  the  rule  of  the  common 
law  being,  that  an  action  founded  on  a  privity  of  estate  which 
relates  to  land  is  local,  while  one  founded  on  privity  of  con- 
tract is  transitory.4 

14.  Such  being  the  consequences  of  assignments  upon  the 
rights  of  the  parties,  it  is  important  that  the  assignee  of  a  re- 
version or  of  rent  should  give  notice  thereof  to  the  lessee  or 
tenant.  Otherwise  a  payment  of  rent  made  by  him  to  the 
lessor,  without  notice,  will  be  protected.^  But  where  the 
lessor  mortgaged  his  estate,  and  the  lessee  paid  him  the  rent 
before  it  was  due,  but  the  mortgagee,  when  it  was  due,  gave 
him  notice  and  demanded  the  rent,  it  was  held  no  defence 
that  he  had  already  paid  it  to  his  lessor.^  But  no  act  done  by 
the  assignor,  after  notice  given  to  the  other  party  of  such  as- 

1  Eyersou  v.  Quackenbush,  26  N.  J.  254.  2  Ards  v.  Watkin,  Cro.  Eliz.  637. 
Childs  V.  Clark,  3  Barb.  Ch.  52  ;  Journeay  v.  Bracklev,  1  Hilton,  447,  451  "• 
Walker's  Case,  3  Rep.  26  b ;  Howland  v.  Coffin,  12  Pick.  125. 

4  Walker's  Case,  3  Rep.  22  ;  Lienow  v.  Ellis,  6  Mass.  331  ;  Pine  v.  Leicester, 
Hobart,  37  a,  note  ;  Stevenson  v.  Lambard,  2  East,  575  ;  Rowland  v.  Coffin  9 
Pick.  52,  s.  c.  12  Pick.  125  ;  Patten  v.  Deslion,  1  Gray,  325,  326  ;  McKeon  v. 
Whitney,  3  Denio,  452.  In  Vermont  such  an  action  is  transitory  by  statute. 
Lniv.  of  Vt.  V.  Joslyn.  21  Vt.  52  ;  Buskin  v.  Edmunds,  Cro.  Eliz.  636:  Thursby 
V.  Plant,  1  Saund.  240,  n. 

6  Farley  v.  Thompson,  15  Mass.  18  ;  Fitchburg  Co.  v.  Melven,  15  Mass.  268  : 
Trent  v.  Hunt,  9  Exch.  14. 

6  Do  Kicholls  V.  Sauuders,  L.  R.  5  C.  P.  589 ;  Cook  v.  Guerra,  L.  R.  7  C.  P. 


Ca.  X.  §   ').]  ESTATES   FOR   YEARS.  5o3 

signnu'iit,  will  :ivail  him;  as  where  lessor,  after  assi^rnment 
miith-',  rc'leasc'd  the  Icssi'l*  iroin  rent  accriiinji:  (hie  iiftcr  the  as- 
sji^ninont  was  nuuK'.*  The  assij^nco  of  a  lessee,  h<»liliii;^  iiiidcr 
a  recorded  lease  containing;  a  mortgage  of  liic  jtrcniises,  is 
hound  to  take  notice  of  the  contents  thereof,  and  he  would, 
without  such  record,  he  hound  to  know  the  contents  of  the 
lease  under  which  he  claims.-  W  hne,  however,  the  lessee  has 
paid  the  rent  of  the  term  in  advance,  he  will  not  he  liahle  to 
pay  the  sanu;  again  to  an  assignee  of  the  reversion, 
although  a  *  purchaser,  of  the  entire  estate,  without  ['340] 
notice  of  such  payment  having  heen  made.  The  les- 
see, in  such  case,  is  suhstantially  a  purchaser  of  the  tcrm.^ 

lo.  In  connection  with  the  doctrine  of  assignment,  it  seems 
proper  again  to  refer  to  the  case  of  an  assignment  hy  lessee  of 
his  interest,  in  the  way  of  a  mortgage,  and  how  far  such  mort- 
gagee therehy  heeomes  liahle  as  assignee  uj»on  the  covenants 
running  with  the  land.  The  luiglish  courts  regard  him  as 
standing  in  the  light  of  an  assignee,  and  liahle  accordingly, 
though  he  may  not  have  entered;*  and  in  this  ojiinion  the  court 
of  New  Ilauipshire  coincides,^  which  is  the  more  noticeahlc 
from  the  fact  that  it  is  held  hy  the  courts  of  that  ^^tate  that  a 
man  may  hecome  an  assignee  of  a  mortgage,  with  all  legal 
rights  as  such,  hy  a  simple  transfer  of  the  mortgage  deht  hy 
delivery  without  any  writing.*^  In  the  United  States  court, 
one  of  the  judges,  in  giving  an  opini(m,  waived  "the  much 
controverted  and  variously  decided  docti'ine  as  to  the  rcs|Mtn- 
8il)ility  of  the  mortgagee  of  leasehold  property,  hut  of  whiih 
the  mortgagee  has  never  had  jtossession,  for  the  perfoi-mance 
of  covenants,"  ttc.*  In  Vermont  the  court  refer  to  the  Kng- 
lish  doctrine  with  favor,  neither,  however,  adopting  nor  reject- 
ing it.^  In  Maryland  the  mortgagee  of  a  term,  after  hreach 
of  condition  of  the  mortgage,  was  held  to  he  liahle  upon  the 
covenants  in  the  lease,  whether  he  hud  taken  actual  possession 

•  McKeon  r.  Whitney,  3  L>cnio,  i',2. 

2  B.irroilhi't  v.  Biittello,  7  Cal.  450,  I'li  :  1  Orocnl.  Ev.  §  23. 

'  Stone  p.  rattcrson,  1J»  Pick.  476.         ■•  Willinnis  c.  Bosainiiuf ,  1  Bi\).l.&  B.238. 

*  M'.Miirjiliy  i".  Minot,  4  X.  II.  251.  But  this  is  questioned  in  Lonl  v.  Fergu- 
son. 9  N.  H.  380.  383. 

•  Southerin  v.  M.ii.lum,  5  N.  If.  4'20.         ^  Calvert  v.  Bnull.y.  16  How.  r>ti3. 

*  Pingrey  v.  Wutkins,  15  Vt  479,  488.    Sot-  also  Grahaui  r.  Way,  38  Vt.  19,  24. 


554  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   L 

of  the  premises  or  not.^  In  California,  the  court  held  that  the 
mortgagee  of  a  term  would  not  be  liable  upon  the  covenants 
in  a  lease,  because  of  the  peculiar  character  of  mortgages 
in  that  State.^  The  better  opinion  as  well  as  the  weight  of 
authority  in  this  country  seems  to  be,  that  such  mortgagee 
becomes  responsible  as  assignee  when  he  takes  possession 
under  his  deed,  but  not  before.^ 

15  a.  There  is  a  well-recognized  distinction  between  a  spe- 
cial assignment  of  a  lease  by  a  lessee,  in  respect  to  binding 
his  assignee  by  the  covenants  in  the  lease,  and  an  assignment 
of  a  lease  as  a  part  of  the  property  of  an  insolvent  debtor, 
whether  by  legal  process  under  proceedings  in  bankruptcy 
or  insolvency,  or  by  a  general  assignment  at  common  law 
for  the  benefit  of  his  creditors.  In  the  first  case  the  assignee 
is  liable,  if  he  accepts  the  assignment,  wliether  he  has  entered 
upon  the  premises  under  it  or  not.^  But  where  a  debtor  by 
deed  assigned  his  estate  for  the  benefit  of  his  creditors,  and 
the  assignee  accepted  and  acted  under  the  trust,  it  was  held  to 
pass  a  lease  of  the  debtor,  and  to  make  the  assignee  liable  for 
the  rent  accruing  due  after  the  assignment  made,  although 
the  assignee  did  no  acts  to  show  his  acceptance  of  the  lease.^ 
In  the  other  case,  no  privity  of  estate,  such  as  is  always  un- 
derstood to  be  created  in  the  first  case,  will  be  considered  to 
have  arisen  unless  the  lease  shall  have  been  specially  men- 
tioned in  the  general  assignment,  or  the  assignee  shall  have 
elected  to  claim  the  benefit  of  the  same.  And  in  cases  of 
general  assignments  by  insolvents,  or  by  proceedings  in  in- 
solvency, tlie  assignee  will  have  a  reasonable  time  in  which  to 
ascertain  whether  the  lease  can  be  made  available  for  the 
benefit  of  creditors  before  he  will  be  obliged  to  make  his  elec- 
tion, and  this  election  may  be  manifested  by  acts  as  well  as  by 
words.^ 

1  Mayhew  v.  Hardesty,  8  Md.  479. 

2  Johnson  v.  Sherman,  15  Cal.  287.     See  Eugels  v.  McKinley,  5  Cal.  153. 

8  Felch  V.  Taylor,  13  Pick.  133;  2  Greenl.  Cruise,  111,  n.;  Walton  v.  Cronly. 
14  Wend.  63  ;  Astor  v.  Miller,  2  Paige,  68  ;  4  Kent,  Com.  8th  ed.  175,  n.;  Mc- 
Kee  V.  Angelrodt,  16  Mo.  283  ;  Astor  v.  Hoyt,  5  Wend.  603. 

*  Quackenboss  v.  Clarke,  12  Wend.  555  ;  Taylor,  Land.  &  Ten.  7th  ed.  §  456  ; 
2  Piatt,  Leases,  422.  ^  White  v.  Hunt,  L.  R.  6  Exch.  32. 

3  Journeay  v.  Brackley,  1  Hilton,  447  ;  Cojicland  v.  Stephens,  1  B.  &  A.  593  ; 
Bagley  v.   Freeman,  1  Hilton,  196 ;  Carter  v.  Warne,  4  C.  &  P.  191 ;  Pratt  v. 


CU.  X.  §  0.]  ESTATES    FOIl    YKARS.  Fj'ii) 

Iti.  Iliil  wlirdicr  the  iissi^iimnit  Ik>  alisoluto  or  contlitional, 
if  the  assiiriK'*'  enters  under  it  an<l  necMjiies  the  estate,  hr  can 
neither  deny  the  validity  (tf  the  assiirnnient  in  an  action  hy 
the  lessor  l'(»r  rent,  nor  can  he  escape  liahility  for  the  same  hy 
ahandonini^  the  premises  before  the  expiration  of  the  lease.' 


•SECTION   VI.  [•341] 

OF   RKNT,    EVICTION,    DESTUUCTION,    AND    USE   OF    PREMISES. 

1.  Hent,  how  i)ayulile  ;  burruil  by  eviction, 

2.  Of  elFect  of  eviction  liy  eminent  doniuin. 

3.  Of  effect  of  wrouyful  entry  by  lessor. 

3a.  What  nets  work  iin  eviction  ;  actual  or  constructive. 
3i.  Of  eviction  in  jMirt  ;  ami  tluniages  for  eviction. 

4.  Keleiwe,  surrender,  or  eviction,  alone  relieves  tenant. 

5.  Dcstmction  of  premises  does  not  affect  covenant  to  repair. 

6.  Effect  of  lessor's  insuring. 

7.  lessor  not  bound  to  rcjiair. 

7a.  Tenant,  how  far  liable  to  strangers. 
76.  Tenant  liable  for  excavations. 

8.  Of  restricted  liability  of  lessee  under  his  covenants. 
8rt.  Tenant  not  liable  for  fire. 

9.  Of  iinj)lied  obligation  as  to  use  frmii  nature  of  premises. 

10.  Incase  of  a  room  in  a  building  whicii  is  destroyed. 

11.  Lessee  not  restricte*!  in  use  of  building. 

12.  Mode  of  using  restricted  by  lease. 

1.  Sthingext  as  is  the  liability  of  a  Ics.sce  and  his  assiprnec, 
under  the  covenants  of  a  lease,  as  has  been  shown,  no  claim 
for  rent  arises  except  where  it  is  payable  in  advance,  until  the 
lessee  shall  have  enjoyed  the  premises  the  whole  time  for 
which  the  i)ayment  of  a  rent  is  stipulated  to  be  made.-     And 

Levan,  1  Miles,  35S  ;  lie  Yeaton,  1  Lowell,  420  ;  Iloyt  v.  Stod.lard,  2  Allen,  442. 
So  a  receiver  apjMMnted  by  the  court  has  his  election.  Conim'th  r.  Fnuikl.  Ins. 
Co.,  ll.";  Ma.ss.  278.  But  the  lesson  remains  liabl.-  for  rent  accruing  due  after  the 
l)anknii>tcy.     Treadwell  v.  Mard.-n,  123  Miuss.  390. 

>  Bluke  r.  Sanderson,  1  Gray,  332  ;  Carter  v.  Ilammctt,  IS  Barb.  608,  8.  c. 
12  Barb.  263  ;  Dorrance  v.  Jones,  27  Ala.  630.  In  the  latter  case,  a  debtor 
as.signed  his  goo<ls  and  store,  and  his  assignee  entore<l  and  ocpnpie«I  the  stortj  till 
the  gwMls  were  sold,  and  then  quit  possession.  Held  to  be  such  an  entry  as  to 
binil  him  for  rent  of  store  for  the  whole  balance  of  the  term. 

■  flun"s  Case.  10  H,.p.  128;  Bonhnan  v.  OsIkioj,  23  Pick.  295;  Martin  v. 
Martin.  7  .Md.  368. 


556  LAW  OF  EEAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

where  no  time  is  fixed  for  such  payment  to  be  made,  it  is  not 
due  till  the  end  of  a  year.i  So,  where  payable  quarterly,  no 
part  is  due  till  the  end  of  the  quarter.^  Nor,  when  payable 
at  a  particular  day,  can  it  be  apportioned  as  to  a  part  of  the 
time  for  which  the  tenant  may  occupy .^  Accordingly,  where 
by  virtue  of  a  riglit  reserved  to  the  lessor  to  determine  the 
lease  at  any  time  by  selling  the  estate,  and  he  did  so  in  the 
interval  between  the  times  of  payment  of  rent,  it  was  held 
that  he  could  not  recover  in  any  form  for  the  rent  or  use  and 
occupation  of  the  premises  between  the  day  of  the  last  pay- 


1  Menough's  Appeal,  5  Watts  &  S.  432  ;  Pddgley  v.  Stillwell,  27  Mo.  128  ; 
Crabb,  Real  Prop.  §  292  ;  3  Cruise,  Dig.  272. 

2  Garvey  v.  Dobyus,  8  Mo.  213  ;  Wood  v.  Partridge,  11  Mass.  488  ;  Perry  v. 
Aldrich,  13  N.  H.  343. 

3  Smith,  Land.  &Ten.  134;  3  Kent,  Com.  470;  Menough's  Appeal,  5  Watts  &S. 
432  ;  Clun's  Case,  10  Co.  128  a  ;  Cruger  v.  McLaury,  41  N.  Y.  219,  223  ;  Came- 
ron V.  Little,  62  Maine,  550,  applied  in  cases  of  tenancy  at  will.  The  Stat.  Geo.  IL 
as  to  apportionment  of  rent  is  not  in  force  in  New  Hampshire.  Perry  v.  Aldrich, 
13  N.  H.  343.  But  in  Massachusetts,  Pub.  Stat.  c.  121,  §  8,  in  case  of  surrender, 
death  of  life-tenant,  or  other  like  contingency,  or  notice  to  quit,  the  rent  may  be 
apportioned.  The  rules  and  principles  stated  in  this  section  in  regard  to  rent 
apply  in  a  considerable  degree  to  compensation  for  use  and  occujiation,  which  is 
also  barred  by  eviction  and  insusceptible  of  apportionment.  But  there  seems  to 
be  much  misconception  as  to  the  action  for  its  recovery  ;  a  notion  that  this 
will  only  lie  when  rent  as  such  cannot  be  recovered,  and  a  want  of  distinction 
between  its  two  forms,  —  debt  and  assumpsit.  Both  existed  at  common  law,  but 
the  latter  was  liable  to  be  defeated  if  a  written  demise  was  proved.  By  the  Stat. 
11  Geo.  II.,  c.  19,  however,  it  lay  unless  a  sealed  lease  existed.     Gibson  v.  Kirk, 

1  Q.  B.  850.  This  statute  did  not  give  the  action,  as  was  suggested  in  Cleves  v. 
Willoughby,  7  Hill,  83  ;  it  only  removed   one  bar  to  it.     Churchward  v.  Ford, 

2  Hurlst.  &  N.  446  ;  Hunt  v.  Wolfe,  2  Daly,  298,  302.  This  statute  is  supposed 
to  be  generally  in  force  in  the  United  States.  Taylor,  Land.  &  Ten.  (7  th  ed.)  §  635. 
Where  the  lease  is  under  seal,  assumpsit  will  not  lie.  Kiersted  v.  Orange  &  A.  R.  R., 
69  N.  Y.  343.  In  Michigan,  however,  it  will.  Dalton  v.  Laudahn,  30  Jlich.  349. 
The  action  of  debt  for  use  and  occupation  always  iay  at  common  law,  and  the  stat- 
ute had  no  application  thereto.  Gibson  v.  Kirk,  siq).  Where  the  lease  is  under 
seal,  though  debt  for  rent  lies,  debt  for  use  and  occupation  probably  will  not. 
Dungey  v.  Angove,  2  Ves.  jr.  307 ;  Gudgen  v.  Besset,  6  Ellis  &  B.  986  ;  and  Wil- 
kins  V.  Wingate,  6  T.  R.  62,  where  it  was  allowed  is  explained  in  Gibson  v.  Kirk, 

1  Q.  B.  853.  In  Fuller  v.  Ruby,  10  Gray,  285,  287,  such  a  count  was  sustained, 
though  the  demise  was  under  seal ;  but  the  later  cases  in  the  same  State  seem  to 
hold  any  count  for  use  and  occupation  bad  in  such  a  case.     Hunt  v.  Thomjjson, 

2  Allen,  341  ;  Buruham  v.  Roberts,  103  Mass.  379.  Rent  in  advance  cannot  be 
recovered  in  a  count  for  use  and  occupation.  Angell  v.  Randall,  16  L.  T.  x.  s.  498. 
For  other  points  relating  to  this  action,  see  post,  cc.  11  and  12. 


CU.  X.  ^  •').]  KSTATKS    FOIl    YF'ARS.  .",.".7 

iiiont  of  rent  ami  the  (U-tcrinination  of  tlic  lonsc'  And  the 
8anu'  doctrine  was  applied  where  the  demise  was  hy  jiarol, 
the  tenancy  havinj^  hecn  di'terniincd  hy  the  h'ssor  hetween  the 
rent-days.-  Thns  where  a  j)arol  lease  was  for  a  year,  with  the 
rent  payalilc  (piarterly,  and  in  the  interval  hetween  two  of 
these  payments  the  lessor  sold  the  jiremiscs,  and  the  jtnrchascr 
notilii'd  the  tenant  to  <piit,  and  he  did  so  before  another  (piar- 
terly rent  fell  due,  it  was  held  that  the  tenant  was  not  lial)le 
for  till-  rent  hetween  the  next  jjrevions  (piarter-<lay  and  the 
time  of  his  (piittin-j:  possession.''  If,  therefore,  the  lessee  be 
evii'tcd  fiiun  the  j)remis('s  hy  the  lessor  or  hy  a  ]>aramoiint  title, 
it  will  discharge  him  from  the  payment  of  any  rent  which  may 
fall  due,  by  the  terras  of  the  lease,  after  such  eviction.*  And 
such  eviction  may  he  constructive  as  well  as  actual.'^  And  the 
same  rule  would  apply, ^^ro  rafa^  if  he  were  evicted  from  a  part 
of  the  ])remises  by  any  other  means  than  by  the  act  of  the 
lessor  himself."  But  an  exjjulsion  from  a  part  of  the 
premises  will  •  not  afTect  the  tenant's  lial)ility  under  [*342] 
any  other  of  the  covenants  in  his  lease  than  that  for 
the  payment  of  rent :  as.  for  instance,  the  covenant  to  repair." 
But  there  can  l)e  no  liability  f(jr  rent,  and  no  eviction  until  his 
tenancy  has  in  fact  commenced.  Thus,  where  one  hired  a 
store  in  an  unfinished  building  of  another,  from  a  certain  date, 
and  the  tenant  was  to  lay  out  certain  expenses  in  fitting  it  up, 
and  the  landlord  was  to  do  other  things,  and  after  the  date 
fixed,  but  before  the  building  and  room  were  completed,  it  was 

»  Nicholson  r.  Munigle,  6  ,\llen,  215  ;  Zule  r.  Zule,  24  Wend.  76  ;  Grimman 
r.  Leggr-,  8  B.  &  C.  324  ;  Hnll  &  Burgess,  5  B.  A:  C.  332;  Emmes  v.  Fecley,  132 
Mass.  34(5. 

»  Full-r  r.  .Swett,  6  Allen,  210,  n. 

"  Kol.iiison  V.  Deering,  56  Me.  357  ;  Clun's  Case,  10  Co.  128  a  ;  Emmes  r. 
Feeley,  sup 

*  Fitchburg  Co.  v.  Melven,  15  Mnsa.  268  ;  Wood  r.  Partridge,  11  Mass.  488  ; 
Russell  V.  Fabyan,  27  N.  H.  529  ;  Bordnmn  i-.  Osborn,  23  Pick.  295  ;  2  Piatt, 
leases,  129;  Rollc,  Abr.  Rent,  0.;  Franklin  r.  Carter,  1  C.  B.  750;  Poi--  r. 
Biggs,  9  B.  &  C.  245. 

*  Home  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Sherman.  46  N.  Y.  370. 

«  Hegenian  r.  Mc Arthur,  1  E.  D.  Smith,  147;  Broom's  Maxims,  212  ;  Steven- 
son V.  Lambanl,  2  East,  575 ;  Smith  v.  Malingn,  Cro.  Jac.  160  ;  Hunt  c.  Cope, 
Cowp.  242  ;  Com.  Und.  k  Ten.  623  ;  Morrison  t>.  Chadwick,  7  C.  B.  266,  283  : 
Martin  v.  Martin,  7  Md.  363  ;  Ijiwronce  v.  French,  25  Weml.  443. 

'  Morrison  r.  Chadwick,  7  C.  B.  283. 


558  LAW  OP  REAL  PEOPERTY.  [BOOK  L 

burned  do"vm,  it  -^as  left  to  the  jury  to  determine  whether  the 
lessee  had  taken  possession  under  his  lease  or  not,  so  as  to  be 
vested  with  the  term.  If  he  had,  he  was  liable  for  the  rent ; 
otherwise  he  was  not.  Nor  would  the  non-completion  of  the 
building  be  a  defence  in  an  action  for  the  rent.^  But  if  one  is 
sued  upon  a  covenant  for  rent,  he  may  recoup  for  damages 
occasioned  by  a  breach  of  other  covenants  in  the  same  lease, 
though  they  are  implied  ones  only.^  And  if,  in  cases  like  the 
one  above  stated,  it  had  been  stipulated  in  the  lease  that  rent 
was  not  to  commence  until  the  building  was  completed,  the 
lessee  would  not  be  liable  until  then,  though  he  were  to  enter 
and  occupy  the  premises  before  they  were  finished.^ 

2.  It  has  sometimes  been  attempted  to  apply  the  principle 
of  eviction  from  a  part  of  the  premises,  where  lands  under 
lease  have  been  appropriated  to  public  use  under  the  exercise 
of  eminent  domain ;  and  the  rule  adopted  in  Missouri  is  to 
have  such  appropriation  extinguish  the  rent,  payable  by  the 
tenant  pro  tanto,  according  to  the  value  of  the  part  taken 
compared  with  the  whole.^  But  the  better  rule,  and  one  be- 
lieved to  be  adopted  in  most  of  the  States,  is  that  such  a 
taking  operates,  so  far  as  the  lessee  is  concerned,  upon  his 
interest  as  property  for  which  the  public  are  to  make  him 
compensation,  and  does  not  affect  his  liability  to  pay  rent  for 
the  entire  estate  according  to  the  tenor  of  his  lease.^     And 

1  LaFarge  v.  Mansfield,  31  Barb.  345. 

2  Mayor  v.  Mabie,  13  N.  Y.  151  ;  Wright  v.  Lattin,  38  111.  293  ;  but  not  for 
the  lessor's  trespasses,  Bartlett  v.  Farrington,  120  Mass.  284  ;  and  see  Chic.  Leg. 
News  V.  Brown,  103  111.  317. 

8  Epping  V.  Devanny,  28  Ga.  422. 

4  Biddle  v.  Hussman,  23  Mo.  597;  Kingsland  v.  Clark,  24  Mo.  24.  These  cases 
rely  on  the  authority  of  Cuthbert  v.  Kuhn,  3  Whart.  357;  but  that  and  other  cases 
in  Pennsylvania  do  not  proceed  in  eviction,  but  on  the  equitable  rights  of  the 
landlord  and  tenant.  The  statute  of  New  York  provides  in  such  a  case  for  an 
abatement  ;)ro  rata  of  the  tenant's  rent.    Gillespie  v.  Thomas,  15  Wend.  464,  468. 

6  Parks  V.  Boston,  15  Pick,  198  ;  Ellis  v.  Welch,  6  Mass.  246  ;  Patterson  v. 
Boston,  20  Pick.  159  ;  McLarren  v.  Spalding,  2  Cal.  510  ;  Folts  v.  Huntley,  7 
AVend.  210  ;  Workman  v.  Mifflin,  30  Penn.  St.  362  ;  Frost  v.  Earnest,  4  Whart. 
86  ;  Foote  v.  Cincinnati,  11  Ohio,  408.  Such  a  taking  is  not  a  breach  of  the 
covenant  for  quiet  enjoyment.  lb.  This  is  admitted  in  Pennsylvania  ;  cases 
supra ;  Peck  v.  Jones,  70  Penn.  St.  83,  85  ;  Schuylkill  Co.  v.  Schmoele,  57  Penn. 
St.  271  ;  but  as  equitable  relief  is  given  at  common  law,  and  in  equity  the  lessee's 
damages  replace  the  rent,  to  avoid  circuity  of  action  they  are  held  to  beloiig  lo 


rn.  X.  §  <!.]  KSTATFIS    FOR    VKAU'^.  •'.'0 

this  extends  to  ^M'diind  rent;  sneli  takiiitr  iloos  not  aliatc;  any 
|>art  of  the  rent  (hie.*  So  it  has  heen  attempted  to  |tioteet  a 
tenant  from  payin^^  rent  in  toto  or  pro  tuntOy  where  the  h-ascd 
promises  have  heen  sei/.i'd  upon  and  tenant  evicted  l)y  a  pnhhc 
enemy  or  a  i)nblic  armed  foree.  In  one  case  the  conrt  aUowed 
an  ahatoment  of  rent  while  the  tenant  was  thus  interrupted  in 
his  enjoyment  of  the  premises,^  Hut  the  hiw  seems  to  he  well 
settled  that  he  would  still  he  liahle  for  the  rent,thou^di  evicted 
in  the  manner  supposed."' 

3.  If  the  lessor  hinistif  interferes  to  deprive  the  lessee  of 
the  enjoyment  of  the  leased  |)n;mises,  the  law  is  in  many 
respects  much  more  strinirent  than  where  the  act  is 
done  liy  a  stranirer.  *Thn8,  if  he  enters  and  evicts  [*343] 
the  tenant,  wrouiifully,  from  a  j>art  of  the  |>remises, 
it  ojjerates  as  a  suspension  of  the  entire  rent,  until  possession 
shall  1)0  restored,  instead  of  its  heing  apportioned,  as  in  the 
cases  before  stated,  where  the  eviction  of  a  part  was  the  act  of 
a  stranger.  Such,  t)f  course,  would  \)C  the  effect  if  the  eviction 
hy  the  lessor  was  from  the  entire  premises.*  So  if  the  land- 
lord make  a  second  lease  of  a  part  of  the  premises  embraced 
in  a  prior  one,  and  the  second  lessee  evicts  the  first,  it  is  so 
far  an  eviction  by  the  lessor,  that  he  may  refuse  to  pay  rent, 
may  al)andon  the  premises,  and  remove  the  buildings,  fences, 
itc,  which  he  has  erected  thereon.^     In  case  of  eviction,  the 

the  Inmllonl  ;  nml  the  tenant  is  thenfore  relieveil  to  that  extent  from  his  rent 
oral  other  ol'ligntions  in  the  lease,  and  api>ortionnieut  takes  place.  Dyerr.  Wight- 
man,  (56  Tenn.  St.  4'2r>.  Cuthbertr.  Kuhn,  3  Whart.  357,  proceeded  on  the  ten- 
ant's oflcr  to  ap|>ortion.     lb. 

>  Workman  r.  Mifflin,  30  Penn.  St.  3(32.  The  equitable  reason  for  appor- 
tionment does  not  apply  in  coses  of  ground  rent,  os  the  les.sor  has  no  right  to  the 
land  ;  and  therefore  none  to  damages  given  for  it.     Dyer  v.  Wightman,  supra. 

^  B.iyly  r.  Lawrence,  1  Bay,  499. 

«  Wagner  r.  White,  4  Harr.  &  J.  564  ;  Pnradine  v.  Jane,  Aleyn.  26  ;  Schil- 
ling r.  Holmes,  23  Cal.  227  ;  ClifTonl  r.  Watts,  L.  R.  5  C.  P.  577,  .'■.S'5. 

«  Hegenian  i\  Mc Arthur,  1  E.  D.  Smith,  147  ;  Salmon  r.  Smith,  S.mnd.  204, 
n.  2  ;  Lew-is  v.  Payn,  4  Wend.  423  ;  Wilson  v.  Smith,  5  Yerg.  379  ;  f'hristopher 
V.  Au8tin,  11  N.  Y.  216  ;  Hroom's  Maxims,  212  ;  Ascough's  Case,  9  Rep.  135  ; 
Shumway  r.  Collins,  6  Gray,  227  ;  Morrison  r.  Chadwick.  7  C.  R.  283  ;  Law- 
rence  v.  French,  25  Wend.  443  ;  Dyett  v.  Pendleton,  8  Cow.  727  :  Edgerton  r. 
P.ige,  1  Hilton,  320,  328  ;  20  N.  Y.  231  ;  Hodgkins  v.  Rohson  and  Thomborow, 
1  V.-nt.  276,  s.  c.  Pollexf.  142  ;  Schilling  v.  Holmes,  23  Cal.  227  ;  Pier  v.  Carr, 
69  Penn.  St.  326  ;  Wright  r.  Lattin,  38  111.  293. 

6  Wright  V.  Lattin,  38  111.  293.    Aa  to  damages,  Lnrkin  r.  Mislond,  100  X.Y.  212. 


560  LAW    OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [bOOK    L 

tenant  is  exempt  from  the  payment  of  rent  from  the  quarter- 
day  anterior  to  such  eviction.^  If,  after  such  eviction,  the 
lessee  returns  and  occupies  again,  the  rent  begins  anew ,2  for, 
as  before  stated,  if  the  eviction  is  from  a  part  only,  the  tenancy 
may  continue,  but  being  suspended  as  to  the  rent.  But  to 
work  this  suspension  of  rent  pro  tanto  or  in  toto,  as  the  case 
may  be,  there  must  be  something  more  than  a  mere  entry  upon 
the  land  or  premises  by  the  lessor,  and  doing  acts  of  trespass 
thereon.  For  these  he  is  liable  as  any  other  trespasser.  There 
must  be  something  which,  in  law,  amounts  to  an  eviction  or 
expulsion  of  the  tenant,  to  work  a  suspension  or  extinguish- 
ment of  the  rent.^  What  shall  work  such  an  eviction  or 
expulsion,  it  is  often  difficult  to  determine.  Particular  cases 
may  be  referred  to,  from  which  a  rule  may  perhaps  be  defined, 
more  clearly  than  from  the  statement  of  any  rule  of  general 
application.  In  Hunt  v.  Cope,  above  cited,  the  landlord  en- 
tered and  tore  down  the  roof  and  ceiling  of  a  summer-house 
in  the  garden,  a  part  of  the  premises  leased,  and  the  court 
held  that  it  ought  to  go  to  a  jury  to  determine  whether  this 
was  an  eviction.  In  Smith  v.  Raleigh,  the  landlord  railed  off 
a  portion  of  the  garden  forming  a  part  of  the  leased  estate, 
and  the  tenant  thereupon  quitted  the  premises,  and  it  was  held 
that  he  might  treat  it  as  an  eviction.*  In  Dyett  v.  Pendleton, 
the  majority  of  the  court  allowed  the  tenant  to  regard  as  an 

act  of  ouster  from  a  tenement  which  he  hired,  consist- 
[*344]  ing  of  a  part  of  a  *  dwelling-house,  the  suffering  of 

prostitutes  openly  to  occupy  the  other  part  of  the 
house,  whose  conduct  was  noisy  and  indecent,  disturbing  the 
tenant  in  his  occupation,  and  rendering  it  disreputable  for 
moral  and  decent  people  to  dwell  in  it.     This,  it  will  be  per- 

1  Chatterton  v.  Fox,  5  Duer,  64. 

2  Martin  v.  INLartin,  7  Md.  375  ;  ^lorrison  v.  Chadwick,  7  C.  B.  283. 

3  Bennet  v.  Bittle,  i  Eawle,  339  ;  Martin  v.  Martin,  7  Md.  375  ;  Com.  Land. 
&  Ten.  523  ;  Salmon  v.  Smith,  Saund,  204,  n.  2  ;  Hunt  v.  Cope,  Cowp.  242  ; 
Wilson  V.  Smith,  5  Yerg.  379  ;  Lawrence  v.  French,  25  Wend.  443  ;  Lounsbery 
V.  Snyder,  31  N.  Y.  514  ;  Edgerton  v.  Page,  20  N.  Y.  281,  284  ;  Fuller  v.  Ruby, 
10  Gray,  285  ;  Royce  v.  Guggenheim,  106  Mass.  201 ;  Pier  v.  Carr,  69  Penn.  St. 
326. 

*  Smith  V.  Raleigh,  3  Campb.  513  ;  so  Sherman  v.  Williams,  113  Mass.  481  ; 
nor  is  it  necessaiy  that  the  tenant  should  quit  to  free  himself  from  liability  for 
rent  for  the  re.sidue,  post,  pi.  3  b. 


cii.  X.  §  •>.]  KSTATKs  hi)n  Yi:\i:s.  fidl 

Cfivcd,  WHS  II  moral  cvictiiiu,  witliout  any  net  done  in  or  n|M)n 
tho  piTiniscs  Irased.  One  of  tlif  court  likens  it  to  the  estah- 
lishnient  in  Jinotlier  i»uit  of  the  hi»iisf  of  ii  hospital  for  tin* 
sniall-pox  or  pla«,'uo,or  a  deposit  of  irunpowder,  or  of  olVensive 
or  pestilential  materials.'  In  Lewis  c  Ta}  n,  the  court,  refer- 
ring to  the  last-mentioned  case,  say,  "  It  seems  to  be  held  that 
any  obstruction  by  the  landlord  to  the  beneficial  enjoyment  of 
the  demised  premises,  or  a  diminution  of  the  consideration  of 
the  contract  by  the  acts  of  the  landlord,  amounts  to  a  con- 
struetive  eviction."-  Where  land  was  lea.sed  to  an  agricul- 
tural society  for  exhibitions,  and  the  le.s.sor  let  pigs  into  the 
jiremises,  which  rooted  up  the  ground  and  rendered  it  unlit  for 
the  uses  of  the  society,  it  was  held  to  be  such  an  eviction,  that 
the  lessee  could  avoid  paying  rent  theref(M-.'*  In  Upton  v. 
(Jreenlees,  Jervis,  C.  J.,  says,  "It  is  extremely  dillieult,  at 
the  juescnt  day,  to  define  with  technical  accuracy  what  is  an 
eviction."  "  I  think  it  maybe  taken  to  mean  this, —  not  a 
mere  trespass  and  nothing  more,  but  something  of  a  grave 
and  permanent  character,  done  by  the  landlord  with  the  in- 
tention of  depriving  the  tenant  of  the  enjoyment  of  the  dc- 
mi.setl  j)remi.ses."  *  It  must  be  some  permanent  act  done 
which  deprives  the  lessee  of  some  part  of  the  i)rcmis«'8.     A 

1  Iht'tt  V.  IVinllpton,  8  Cow.  727.  But  see  Uoyce  v.  OiiggfiiluMni,  lOG  .Mass. 
201,  201  ;  DeWitt  r.  ricnw)!!,  112  .Ma.s.s.  8.  These  were  ram'H  of  constructive  evic- 
tion ;  whieli  dilFers  from  actual  eviction,  that  no  part  of  the  demised  jireniiscs  in 
artunlly  ai>iir«ij)riated,  but  only  tlieir  value  or  use  impaired.  In  this  case  the 
tenant  must  quit  the  premises  to  complete  the  eviction,  lb.;  Borecl  v.  I^iwtou, 
90  N.  Y.  293. 

«  l/'wis  r.  Pnyn,  4  Wend.  423.  «  Wright  v.  Littin,  38  111.  293. 

*  Upton  V.  (Ireenlees,  17  C.  H.  30,  C4.  This  intention  is  a  question  of  fact. 
Henderson  r.  Mears,  1  Fost  F.  636.  But  it  is  conclusively  to  he  presumed  from 
the  acts  themselves,  and  it  is  sufficient  'if  they  "  permanently  deprive  "  the 
tenant  whatever  the  actual  intent  may  have  Injen.  Skally  f.  Shute,  132  Mass. 
367.  But  setting  a  fence  on  tenant'.s  land  liy  mistake,  which  lessor  olfers  to 
correct,  is  no  eviction.  Mirick  v.  Hopjiin,  118  Mass.  582.  The  limits  of  this 
work  do  not  admit  of  examining  at  length  a  j>retty  large  class  of  ca.scs  where  the 
quistion  has  U-en,  whether  a  former  and  existing  demise  of  a  part  of  leasi'd  pn-m- 
ises  is  such  on  eviction  as  to  deprive  the  landlonl  of  his  claim  for  rent  while  such 
prior  demise  exists.  See  I^wrence  r.  Fn^ich,  25  Wend.  443,  ami  cnsos  citoil  ; 
Neale  r.  Mackenzie,  1  M.  &  W.  747,  reversing  8.  c.  in  2  Cr.  M.  &  Ii,  84  ;  Mc- 
Elderrj' t>.  Flannagan,  1  Harr.  k  C.  .lo!^  ;  riiristophir  v  Austin  n  N,  Y.  211: 
Hayner  v.  Smith,  63  111.  430. 
VOL.  I.—  36 


562  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  L 

mere  neglect  to  make  repairs  will  not  justify  tlie  tenant  in 
quitting,  although  there  be  a  covenant  on  the  part  of  the 
landlord  to  repair.  But  though  no  implied  covenant  of  right 
to  enjoy  light  over  adjacent  premises  passes  by  a  lease  of  a 
dwelling-house,  and  the  erection  of  a  house  upon  adjacent 
land  which  obstructs  and  darkens  the  windows  of  a  leased 
dwelling-house  is  not  held  to  be  an  eviction,  yet  if  the  erection 
of  a  house  be  upon  the  leased  premises  so  as  to  deprive  them 
entirely  of  light,  and  to  render  parts  of  them  uninhabitable,  it 
would  be  such  an  interference  with  them  as  to  justify  the  tenant 
in  treating  it  as  an  eviction,  and  abandoning  the  premises.^ 

3  a.  Not  only  must  the  act  be  such  as  materially  interferes 
with  the  enjoyment  of  the  premises  by  the  lessee,  but  it  must 
have  been  done  by  the  lessor  or  his  procuration  or  by  para- 
mount title.  If  the  act  be  done  by  a  stranger,  it  is  no  ground 
of  defence  against  the  claim  for  rent.^  Thus  the  erection  of  a 
wall  by  an  adjacent  owner,  or  even  by  the  lessor  himself  upon 
his  other  premises,  which  darkens  the  windows  of  the  leased 
premises,  will  not  be  deemed  such  an  eviction  as  to  relieve  the 
tenant  from  the  payment  of  rent.^  Nor  would  a  mere  entry 
by  the  lessor  himself  be  an  eviction,  if  done  for  the  lessee's 
benefit,  as,  for  instance,  to  make  repairs.*  An  act  which  de- 
stroys the  premises,  or  renders  them  useless,  may  be  regarded 
as  an  eviction  so  far  as  affecting  the  liability  to  pay  rent. 
And  a  disturbance  of  the  enjoyment  of  them  which  renders 
them  useless  would  have  the  same  effect.^  Thus,  where  a 
building  was  let  for  the  purposes  of  a  lodging-house  adjoining 
the  wall  of  another  house  not  belonging  to  the  lessor,  the  wall 
and  roof  of  the  premises  being  secured  to  this  adjoining  wall, 
the  owner  of  this,  having  raised  his  building,  removed  the  roof 
and  one  wall  of  the  leased  premises,  and  the  tenant  abandoned 

1  Wright  V.  Lattin,  38  111.  293  ;  Royce  v.  Guggenheim,  106  Mass.  201.  So, 
perhaps,  if  the  lessor  builds  on  his  own  land  merely  to  injure  the  tenant.    Id.  205. 

2  Welles  V.  Castles,  3  Gray,  323,  326. 

3  Hazlett  V.  Powell,  30  Penn.  St.  293;  Palmer  v.  Wetmore,  2  Sandf.  316; 
Royce  v.  Guggenheim,  lOG  Mass.  202  ;  Moore  v.  Weber,  71  Penn.  St.  429,  432. 

*  Peterson  v.  Edmonson,  5  Harringt.  378. 

*  Halligan  v.  Wade,  21  111.  470.  Thus  where  one  let  a  distillery  but  pre- 
vented the  lessee's  getting  a  license,  Grabenhorst  v.  Nicodemus,  42  I\Id.  236.  See 
also  Alger  v.  Kennedy,  49  Vt.  109  ;  Scott  v.  Simons,  54  N.  H.  426. 


(11.  X.  §  •!.]  ESTATF>»    FOR    YEARS.  5tJ3 

I  ho  siunc,  it  wiiH  held  to  he  Kuch  an  fviction  as  to  siisiM'iul  the 
liahility  for  rent  from  the  time  of  thw  evietiou.*  And  many 
of  the  cases  tro  to  sustain  thr  iiroposition,  that  nothin;^  short 
of  an  eviction  whifh  (le|)rives  the  tenant  of  tlie  jn>»«eHiiiun  of 
the  premises  uonhl  har  a  ehiim  for  rent, and  that,  if  the  tenant 
actually  retains  |)ossession,  he  cannot  resist  payment  oi  the' 
rent.  The  juMjtositinii  may  perhaps  he  reconciled  with  what 
has  already  heeii  saiil,  and  what  is  hereafter  stateil,  hy  sup- 
jiosinj;  that  what  is  meant  in  some  of  the  casea  is,  that  the 
acts  spoken  of  as  tantamount  t(j  an  eviction  were  such  as  war- 
ranted the  lessee  in  ahandoninj^  the  jiremises  and  avoidini; 
the  payment  of  rent.  Thus,  in  Edgerton  <•.  Page,  the  landlord 
discharged  waste  and  IHthy  water  uj)on  the  juemises,  and  suf- 
fered a  waste-pipe  in  another  j)art  of  the  huilding  to  he  out  of 
repair,  to  the  great  nuisance  and  injury  of  the  tenant,  who  did 
not  ahandon  possession,  and  it  was  held  to  he  no  evicti«jn.- 
In  one  case,  the  court  seemed  inclined  to  treat  acts  which 
rendereil  the  premises  useless  for  the  purp(jses  for  which  they 
are  let  as  of  itself  an  eviction,  so  far  as  to  har  rent,  althoii;j.h 
the  tenant  may  not  ha\c  actually  al)audiine(l  their  occu|iaf inn.' 
While,  in  Dyett  r.  Pemlleton,  the  cast;  seems  to  go  upon  the 
ground  that  the  tenant  had  hi'cii  compelled  to  ahandon  the 
premises,  hecause  a  fuither  occupation  of  them  had  l>cen  ren- 
(lered  impossihle,  or  inconvenient  and  useless,  hy  the  acts  of 
tjje  lessor.^  And  the  cases  seem  to  concur,  that  a  m«'re  in- 
terference with  the  person  of  the  tenant  amounting  to  a  tres- 
pass,**  or  a  mere  trespass  on  the  premises,  though  attended 
with  great  inconvenience  or  olistruction  to  the  tenant  in  the 

»   B.ntli'y  I'.  Sill,  35  III.  414. 

»  F^lgiTtoii  V.  Puj^c,  1  Hilton,  320  ;  8.  c.  20  N.  Y.  281  ;  Boreel  v.  Ijiwton,  00 
N.  Y.  2'.t3.  Sei- .Inckson  v.  Kil.ly,  12  .Mo.  209  ;  St.  Jolm  r.  riilmer,  5  Hill,  r.l»l». 
&1'  Vrttel  r.  HcnuT,  1  Milton,  140,  wliert"  the  ust- of  a  privy  adjoining  tlie  iircm- 
iscs,  tliou^'h  vprj-  olFtiisivc,  wa^  not  an  eviction. 

»  Hiilligjin  r.  Wa.lo,  21  111.  470,  wIhto  the  toiirt  say,  by  way  of  illustration, 
that  it  might  Ik-  UuitAinount  to  nn  eviction  of  {ireniises  let  for  the  |)ur]x>.sca  of  a 
re.sjM'ctablf  i)ul)lic-house  to  convert  a  j«rt  of  the  preniiiu-s  into  n  pig-stye  or  cattle- 
jiens  or  a  low,  noisy  li<|Uor-saloon,  or  a  tinman's  shop,  and  would  bsir  a  claim  for 
rvut  for  tho  .same.  But  the  .same  court  in  I>eaJbeatcr  r.  Kotli,  25  111.  587,  state 
the  law  in  confonnity  witl>  the  nile  in  the  text. 

*  Dyett  r.  Pendleton,  8  Cow.  727.  Bat  lie  in  liable  until  he  .Iocs  aKmdou. 
DeWitt  r.  Picrson,  112  Mass.  8.  »  Vatel  c.  Herucr,  1  Hilton,  149. 


664  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

beneficial  enjoyment  of  them,  will  not  amount  to  an  eviction ;  ^ 
and,  in  one  of  the  cases,  it  is  held,  that,  to  have  the  entry  of 
the  lessor  work  an  eviction  of  the  tenant,  it  must  be  followed 
by  a  continuous  possession.^  The  apparent  discrepancy  be- 
tween the  cases  may  be  accounted  for  by  the  dicta  of  the 
courts  having  reference  to  different  states  of  facts,  and  being 
intended  to  be  limited  in  their  bearing  to  cases  like  those  in 
which  they  were  applied. 

3  h.  To  restate  the  rights  of  the  tenant  on  eviction  in  part, 
it  seems  if  this  be  by  a  stranger,  other  than  the  lessor  himself, 
and  is  from  a  part  only,  the  rent  will  be  apportioned  and  pay- 
able for  such  part  as  remains.^  And  this  applies  also  where 
the  demised  property  is  an  easement.*     If  the  eviction  is  by 

the  lessdr  himself,  the  tenant  may  elect  whether  to 
[*345]  abandon  entirely  and  put  an  end  *  to  the  tenancy  and 

rent  altogether,^  or  to  retain  such  part  as  remains, 
free  from  liability  to  pay  any  rent,  so  long  as  the  eviction  con- 
tinues. And  such  seems  now  the  settled  rule  of  law  both  in 
England  and  generally  in  the  United  States.^  But  as  the  ten- 
ancy in  that  case  is  not  at  an  end,  as  soon  as  the  occupancy  is 
restored  the  liability  revives  to  pay  rent  from  and  after  such 
restoration.'     If  a  part  of  the  premises  leased  is  held  by  a 

1  Edgerton  v.  Page,  suji.  ;  Bac.  Abr.  Rent,  L.  44  ;  Wilson  v.  Smith,  5  Yerger, 
379  ;  Briggs  v.  Hall,  4  Leigh,  484  ;  Day  v.  Watson,  8  Mich.  535  ;  Cohen  v.  Du- 
pont,  1  Sandf.  260  ;  Gardner  v.  Keteltas,  3  Hill,  330  ;  Hunt  v.  Cope,  Cowp.  242  ; 
Elliot  V.  Aiken,  45  N.  H.  30  ;  Bennett  v.  Bittle,  4  Rawle,  339. 

2  Day  V.  Watson,  su}). 

3  Fillebrown  v.  Hoar,  124  Mass.  580  ;  Dyett  v.  Pendleton,  8  Cow.  727  ;  Smith 
V.  Malings,  Cro.  Jac.  160  ;  Lawrence  v.  French,  25  Wend.  443  ;  Seabrook  v. 
Moyer,  88  Penn.  St.  417  ;  Com.  Laud.  &Ten.  217,  525. 

*  Blair  v.  Claxton,  18  N.  Y.  529. 

5  Suiith  V.  Raleigh,  3  Camp.  513  ;  Lawrence  r.  French,  25  Wend.  443  ;  Chris- 
topher V.  Austin,  11  N.  Y.  216  ;  Edgerton  v.  Page,  1  Hilton,  320,  328  ;  Reed  v. 
Reynolds,  37  Conn.  469. 

^  Hegeman  v.  McArthur,  1  E.  D.  Smith,  147  ;  Vermilya  v.  Austin,  2  E.  D. 
Smith,  203  ;  Halligan  v.  Wade,  21  111.  470  ;  Lewis  v.  Payn,  4  Wend.  423  ;  Chris- 
topher V.  Austin,  11  N.  Y.  216  ;  Fuller  v.  Ruby,  10  Gray,  285,  where  a  decision 
was  waived.  Colburn  v.  Morrill,  117  Mass.  262  ;  Anderson  v.  Chicago  Ins.  Co., 
21  111.  601  ;  Leishman  v.  White,  1  Allen,  489  ;  Hayner  v.  Smith,  63  111.  430  ; 
Upton  V.  Greenlees,  17  C.  B.  30,  65,  66. 

■?  MoiTison  V.  Chadwick,  7  C.  B.  283,  284 ;  Page  v.  Parr,  Styles,  432  ;  Lewis 
V.  Payn,  4  Wend.  423  ;  Lawrence  v.  French,  2.5  Wend.  443  ;  Day  v.  Watson,  8 
Mich.  535 ;  Corning  v.  Gould,  16  Wend.  531,  538  ;  Cibel  v.  Hills,  1  Leon.  110. 


CII.  X.  §  •'».]  ESTATES    FOR    YKARS.  .'>*>') 

strnniTor  advorsolv  to  llic  lessor,  tlir  It-ssoo  is  not  oliliirt'il  to 
acc('|)t  of  the  olluT  pnrt  and  |i:iy  rent  for  the  sanir.'  15ut 
wliLTO  (he  lessor  himself  has  withhehl  a  part  of  tlie  leased 
promises,  an<l  the  lossoo  has  nevertheless  elected  to  f^o  on  and 
oeonpy  the  remainder,  he  cannot  refnse  to  pay  rent  f>ro  radi 
for  what  he  enjoys,-  since  the  lessee  cannot  he  said  to  have 
hecn  evicted  from  that  whitdi  he  never  possessed.  It  was  a 
mere  withholilini^  a  i»art  of  that  which  he  had  liarjrained  to 
another."' 

4.  IJiit  nothing:  hut  a  release,  sin'render,  or  eviction,  will 
nhsolvc  a  tenant,  in  whole  or  in  part,  from  the  covenants  in 
his  lease*    Nor  will  equity  interj)ose  to  save  a  lessee  from  the 

*  Hay  r.  C'uiiilMrhinil,  2r»  Barb.  5S>4.  But  where  tlie  stmngcr  is  without  title 
the  laiidloril  is  not  lijil>le  to  tlie  tfiiant  for  not  dulivering  iiosst-ssjon.  (Jardnt-r  v. 
Kitoltas,  3  Hill,  3:J()  ;  IVckcr  r.  IK-  Foivst,  1  Swi-eny,  b'1%  ;  Cozens  v.  Stevenson, 
5  S.  &  U.  421  ;  Sijpnuixl  v.  Howard  Bk.,  29  Mil.  324  ;  Underwood  r.  Hirchard,  47 
Vt.  305  ;  Gazzolo  v.  Chambei-s,  73  111.  75.  Nor  for  any  other  act  of  a  men' 
stmnger,  Moore  t>.  WeWr,  71  I'enn.  .St.  429  ;  and  the  English  rule  to  the  contrary 
in  Coo  r.  Clay,  5  Bing.  440  ;  followed  in  L'H  ussier  v.  Zallee,  24  ilo.  13  ; 
Hughes  r.  HwhI,  50  Mo.  350  ;  King  v.  Ueynolds,  67  Ala.  229,  is  not  sustiined 
hy  the  weight  of  American  authority.  It  seems  also  that  the  tenant,  if  he  takes 
jinrt,  is  held  for  rent  of  the  whole,  IVndergast  v.  Young,  21  N.  H.  234  ;  and  so  it 
he  has  Wen  comjK'nsateil  for  the  lessor's  nou-delivery,  Knox  f.  Hextcr,  71  N.  Y. 
4G1. 

=»  Hurllmt  V.  Post,  1  Bosw.  28. 

'  The  tenant  upon  evictimi  is  not  only  relieved  from  paying  rent,  but  may 
have  damages  also.  C'hatterton  v.  Yo\,  5  Duer,  64.  In  case,  however,  of  eviction 
by  paramount  title,  the  rule  in  New  York  and  most  of  tho  Unitc<l  .States  was  to 
give  nominal  damages,  only,  as  tho  tenant's  relief  from  rpnt  was  considered  a  full 
e<|nivalent  to  him  in  analog)*  to  the  purchase  money  in  conveyances  in  fee.  Kelly 
V.  Dutch  Church,  2  Hill,  105.  But  In  Massachus«'tts  and  a  few  other  States,  anil 
latterly  in  Knglund,  full  damages  are  given  in  all  cases  of  eviction.  Dexter  r. 
Manley,  4  Gush.  14  ;  Hardy  r.  Nelson,  27  Me.  525  ;  Horsford  v.  Wright,  Kirby, 
3  ;  Williams  v.  Burrell,  1  C.  B.  402  ;  Lock  v.  Furze,  L.  li.  1  C.  V.  441  ;  Kolph 
r.  Crouch,  L.  K.  3  E.xch.  44.  And  though  the  fonner  .States  adhere  to  tlie  strict 
nile  in  case  of  eviction  solely  from  paramount  title,  Mack  r.  Patchin,  42  N.  Y. 
167  ;  Burr  v.  Stenton,  43  N.  Y.  462  ;  LanigaM  r.  Kille,  97  Penn.  St.  120  ;  yet  if 
the  tenant  is  deprived  by  the  landlonl's  act  or  fraud,  or  could  have  l»efn  protecte«l 
by  him,  full  damages  will  be  given  ;  Chatterton  r.  Fox,  supra  ;  Trull  r.  (Jranger, 
8  N.  Y.  115  ;  .Mack  v.  Patchin,  29  How.  Pr.  20  ;  Rickctts  v.  I^jstetter,  19  In<I. 
125  ;  Shaw  r.  HolTman,  25  .Mich.  162  ;  Wil.«on  r.  Kaybould,  56  HI.  417. 

*  Fisher  r.  Millikin,  8  Penn.  .St.  Ill  ;  Bain  v.  Clark,  10  Johns.  424  ;  Shejv 
ard  V.  Merrill,  2  .lohns.  Ch.  276  ;  Fuller  v.  Kuby,  10  Gray,  290  ;  Dyer  r.  Wight- 
man,  66  Penn.  St.  425.  But  a  covenant  is  fli.scharged  if  it  is  renden-d  incaimlilc 
of  performance  by  statute.     Cordes  v.  Miller,  39  MicL  5S1.     So  iu  Massachusetts 


566  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

consequences  of  such  covenants  where  there  has  been  no  fraud 
or  mistake  in  drawing  the  lease. ^ 

5.  It  has,  accordingly,  been  held  that  the  destruction  of 
the  premises  demised,  or  tlieir  becoming  untenantable,  from 
any  cause,  without  lessor's  fault,  does  not  relieve  the  lessee 
from  his  covenant  to  pay  rent,  or  to  repair,  or  to  restore  the 
premises  at  the  end  of  his  term  in  good  condition.  Nor  does 
it  furnish  any  defence,  either  in  full  or  pro  tanto,  against  a 

lessor's  claim  under  these  covenants,  unless  there  are 
[*346]  exceptions  to  that  effect  *  in  the  lease.^   And  it  would 

be  held  to  be  so,  if  the  lessee  covenants  to  pay  rent 
for  the  term,  and  makes  no  exception  for  the  contingency  of 
the  premises  being  destroyed.^  This  rests  upon  the  ground 
that  the  lessee,  in  such  cases,  is  the  purchaser  and  owner  of 
the  premises  for  the  term  and  price  agreed  upon  in  the  lease,* 
and  therefore  not  exempt  from  paying  this  price,  though  the 
premises  are  destroyed  during  the  term  by  tempest,^  or  fire,^ 

the  insolvency  of  a  decedent's  estate  will  bar  further  rent.     Deane  v.  Caldwell, 
127  Mass.  242. 

1  Gates  V.  Green,  4  Paige,  355  ;  Sheets  v.  Selden,  7  Wall.  416,  424. 

2  Phillips  V.  Stevens,  16  Mass.  238  ;  Leavitt  v.  Fletcher,  10  Allen,  121  ;  Xave 
V.  Berry,  22  Ala.  382  ;  Niedelet  v.  Wales,  16  Mo.  214  ;  Hallet  v.  Wylie,  3 
Johns.  44  ;  Clifford  v.  Watts,  L.  R.  5  C.  P.  577,  586  ;  Fowler  v.  Bott,  6  Mass.  63  ; 
White  V.  Molyneaux,  2  Ga.  124  ;  "Ward  v.  Bull,  1  Fla.  271  ;  Howard  v.  Doolit- 
tle,  3  Duer,  464  ;  Wood  v.  Hubbell,  5  Barb.  601  ;  Davis  v.  Smith,  15  Mo.  467  ; 
Hill  V.  Woodman,  14  Me.  38  ;  Linn  v.  Ross,  10  Ohio,  412.  See  post,  §  10  ; 
"Welles  V.  Castles,  3  Gray,  325.  Ross  v.  Overton,  3  Call,  268,  where  tenant  of  a 
mill  covenanted  to  leave.it  in  repair,  and  it  was  carried  off  by  ice,  he  was  bound 
to  pay  rent  and  to  perform  his  covenants.  Hare  v.  Groves,  3  Anstr.  687  ;  Holtz- 
apffel  V.  Baker,  18  Ves.  115  ;  Kramer  v.  Cook,  7  Gray,  550,  where  the  wall  of  the 
leased  building  fell  by  the  undermining  of  the  neighboring  proprietor,  the  lessor 
having  neglected  to  support  the  wall.  Sugden's  Letters,  119  ;  Story,  Eq.  Jur. 
§  101  ;  Paradine  v.  Jane,  Aleyn,  27,  in  which  the  distinction  in  the  effect  of  in- 
evitable accident,  upon  a  duty  assumed  by  contract  and  one  imposed  by  law,  is 
explained.  So  where  the  act  of  a  stranger  co-operated.  Polack  v.  Pioche,  35  Cal. 
416.  But  where  the  covenant  of  the  tenant  was  to  keep  the  premises  in  the  same 
state  as  when  taken,  he  was  held  not  responsible  for  trees  blown  down.  Main's 
Case,  5  Co.  20  b. 

8  Graves  v.  Berdan,  26  N.  Y.  498.  But  where  the  lease  is  of  a  single  room,  as 
its  destruction  terminates  the  lease,  Shawmut  Bk.  v.  Boston,  118  Mass.  125,  post, 
349,  the  tenant's  obligation  to  pay  rent  ceases.     lb. 

*  Hart  V.  Windsor,  12  M.  &  W.  68  ;  McGlashan  v.  Tallmadge,  37  Barb.  313. 

5  Peterson  v.  Edmonson,  5  Harringt.  378. 

6  Beach  v.  Farish,  4  Cal.  339  ;  Dyer  v.  Wightman,  66  Penn.  St.  425. 


I'll.  X.  §  <"'.]  ESTATtS    Fou    VliAKS.  ;')ii7 

the  loss,  to  that  extent,  bcin^  liis,  and  not  the  lessor's.  So 
wlierc  the  covenant  was  to  Hurn-ndiT  nj)  the  jiremises  at  the 
eml  of  the  term  in  gcjoil  order  and  eonditiun,  it  was  hehl  that 
the  lessee  mnst  make  the  necessarv  repaiis  dnrinj^  the  term.' 
And  an  ohli'jration  "to  repair  and  deliver  nj»"  would  reciuiie 
the  tenant  to  rebuild,  in  ease  of  a  hjss  liy  lire,  during  the  term. 
But  if  "  to  deliver  up"  alone,  or  *'  to  restore  "  the  premises,  it 
imposes  nothint;  hevond  his  not  lutldinj,'  over.-  Hut  under  the 
eivil  code  of  Louisiana,  where  a  tenement  was  rentlered  unten- 
antable by  the  owner  of  an  adjacent  parcel  taking  down,  as 
he  had  a  right  to  do,  an  adjoining  party  wall,  the  tenant  might 
quit  the  premises,  and  therel)y  absolve  himself  from  the  pay- 
ment of  rent.'' 

6.  The  law,  however,  docs  not  seem  to  be  uniform  among 
the  Stales,  and  hardly  in  the  same  State,  in  some  instances, 
in  resj)ect  to  the  eiVect  of  an  accidental  destruction  oi  the 
property  leased,  upon  the  covenants  in  the  lease.  In  Penn- 
sylvania, it  was  held  that  it  wonld  make  no  difference  with 
the  right  of  the  lessor  to  in.sist  upon  the  covenant  to  repair, 
that  he  had  had  insurance  against  the  loss  and  recovered  the 
same.*  Hut  Sir  P]dward  Sugdon,  in  his  "  Handy  Hook,"  A:c. 
(p.  110),  says,  "If  you  (the  le.s.sor)  have  insured,  though  not 
bound  to  do  so,  and  received  the  money,  you  cannot  comjjel 
payment  of  the  rent,  if  you  decline  to  lay  out  the  money  in 
building:"  "unless  the  tenant  is  exempted  by  the  lense  from 
making  good  accidents  l»y  fire,  he  must,  under  the  comuKJU 
covenants  to  repair,  rebuild  the  house  if  it  is  burned  down." 
Hut  so  far  as  Sir  Edward  Sugden  exprcs.ses  the  opin- 
ion  that  the   lessor  would  be   bound  to   *  apjdy  the   [*34T] 

>  1  Greenl.  Ev.  233,  n.  ;  Jiwiues  v.  Gould,  4  Cush.  384. 

*  Nave  r.  Ikrr)-,  22  Ala.  382  ;  Maggort  r.  HniisharKer,  8  Leigh,  532  ;  Bullock 
f.  Donimitt,  6  T.  R.  650.  In  Wanu-r  v.  Hitchins,  5  liarb.  666,  it  is  moreover 
liclH  that  a  covenant  to  surrender  \ip  in  the  same  condition  as  at  the  date  of  the 
lease  does  not  bind  to  rebuild,  as  the  covenant  looks  to  redelivery  and  not  to  n-pair. 
••^o  Howetli  r.  Anderson,  25  Tex.  557  ;  Miller  r.  Morris,  55  Tex.  412  ;  Levey  ». 
l>yes»,  51  Miss.  501.  But  the  weight  of  authority  seems  otherwise.  See  Taylor 
Liind  &,  Ten.  (7th  ed.)§  364  and  n.  In  Bull  r.  Wyeth,  8  Allen,  275,  a  covenant 
to  repair  was  held  qmilifu-d  by  an  exception  from  casualties  in  the  covenant  to 
deliver  up  ;  but  Kling  v.  Dress,  5  Rob.  X.  Y.  521,  is  contra. 

*  Coleman  r.  Haight,  14  Iju  An.  564. 

*  Magaw  r.  Ijimbcrt,  3  rcuu.  St.  444. 


568  LAW  OP  EEAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

insurance  money  in  rebuilding,  he  seems  to  have  relied  upon 
the  case  cited,^  and  is  opposed  by  the  cases  cited  below. 
The  effect  of  these  cases  is,  that  the  covenant  to  pay  rent  is 
wholly  unaffected  by  any  other  covenant  not  expresslv  con- 
nected with  it  in  the  lease,  and  that  the  lessor's  insurance  does 
not  concern  the  lessee  at  all.^  The  tenant  has  no  right  in 
equity  to  have  the  insurance  money  applied  in  rebuilding  the 
premises,  nor  to  restrain  the  lessor  from  suing  for  the  rent 
until  the  structure  is  restored.^  But  it  was  held  by  the  courts 
of  Ohio,  that  where  a  lessee  covenanted  to  insure  the  premises 
demised,  if  it  was  for  the  benefit  of  the  lessor  alone,  the  money 
in  case  of  loss  being  to  go  to  him,  it  would  be  a  collateral 
covenant,  and  would  not  run  with  the  land  to  bind  an  assignee. 
But  if  the  money  was  to  be  applied  to  repair  or  rebuild,  then 
it  was  in  its  character  like  a  covenant  to  repair,  which  may 
run  with  the  land.*  In  South  Carolina,  where  a  house  that 
was  rented  was  partially  destroyed  by  a  tempest,  it  was  held 
that  the  lessor  was  only  entitled  to  rent  so  long  as  the  prem- 
ises were  habitable,^  while  in  Pennsylvania,  in  an  early  case, 
where  the  lessee  of  a  house  covenanted  to  pay  rent  and  return 
the  premises  in  good  condition,  and  the  house  was  destroyed 
by  a  public  enemy,  the  com-t  held  the  lessee  bound  to  pay  rent, 
but  exonerated  from  his  covenant  to  repair,  "  because  equality 
is  equity,  and  the  loss  should  he  divided!  "  certainly  not  a  very 
definite  rule  in  construing  and  applying  the  law  of  express 
covenants.^  But  the  language  of  the  court  of  that  State  now 
is,  "  If  the  premises  have  been  wrongfully  entered  by  a  dis- 
seisor, and  the  tenant  be  dispossessed  for  the  entire  term,  or 

1  Brown  v.  Qnilter,  Amb.  619. 

2  See  the  remarks  of  the  Chief  Baron  on  Brown  v.  Quilter,  in  Hare  v.  Groves, 
3  Anst.  692  ;  Leeds  v.  Cheetham,  1  Simons,  Ch.  146,  that  one  party  to  a  lease  has 
nothing  to  do  with  an  insurance  effected  by  the  other  party  on  his  own  account, 
or  to  resort  to  that  for  any  redress  for  his  loss.  Belfouri;.  Weston,  1  T.  R.  310. 
Lord  Mansfield  says,  "The  house  being  insured  is  nothing  to  the  tenant."  2 
Piatt,  Leases,  124,  125  ;  Piatt,  Cov.  282. 

8  Pope  V.  Garrard,  39  Ga.  471  ;  Sheets  v.  Selden,  7  Wall.  416,  424  ;  Moffatt  v. 
Smith,  4  N.  Y.  126  ;  Bussman  v.  Ganster,  72  Penn.  St.  285. 

*  Masury  v.  Southworth,  9  Ohio  St.  340. 

5  Ripley  V.  Wightman,  4  McCord,  447  ;  cited  with  approval  in  Whitaker  v. 
Hawley,  25  Kans.  674,  where  it  is  claimed  that  the  common-law  rule  has  not 
been  established  in  Kansas.  ^  Pollard  v.  Shaaffer,  1  Dall.  210. 


t'll.  X.   ^  <».]  ESTATES    FOR    YKARS.  Of'.H 

even  hy  (he  military  force  of  n  i)ul)lic  enemy,  or  if  tlioy  have 
been  destroyed  or  rondfred  untmantalde  l)y  earthciuakf,  liL'ht- 
iiinyr.  Hood,  or  lire,  and  thus  all  t'lijoymriit  by  the  tenant  l)e 
entirely  lost,  yet  his  covenant  remains."  *  In  another  case  the 
court  refused  to  have  an  abati'mt-nt  of  rent  of  a  farm  made, 
although  a  bridjre  thereon,  which  was  important  to  its  enjoy- 
ment, was  destroyed  by  a  llood.- 

7.  Without  an  express  covenant  to  that  effect  on  the  part 
of  the  lessor,  he  cannot  be  held  liable  for  repairs  made  by  the 
tenant  upon  the  ih-mised  premises.^  Nor  would  he  be  bound 
by  a  parol  ])romisc  to  make  rcjiairs,  if  such  promise  is  founded 
oidy  ui)on  the  relations  of  landlord  and  tenant.*  Nor  is  he 
bound  to  rej)air  them  himsell",  unless  exjiressly  made  so  by 
covenant  nor  to  remove  any  nuisance,  unless  caused  by  his 
own  act,  or  he  has  covenanted  to  that  effect.''  And  where 
the  owner  of  a  building  of  three  stories  let  a  room  in  the 
middle  story,  and  covenanted  that  if  the  premises  should  be 
damapnl  by  fire  so  as  to  make  them  untenantable  for  more 
than  thirty  days,  the  rent,  at  the  election  of  the  tenant,  should 
cease ;  the  upper  story  was  in  the  occupation  of  another  ten- 
ant, and,  while  in  that  condition,  the  roof  accidentally  took 
fire,  and  rendered  the  premises  untenantable.  The  landlord 
began  to  repair  the  roof,  but,  before  it  had  been  finished,  the 
rain  injured  the  tenant's  goods,  and  he  claimed  damages  of 
the  lessor,  but  the  court  held,  that,  though  he  niitrht  have 
removed  from  the  premises  and  ceased  to  i>ay  rent  until  they 
had  been  repaired,  he  had  no  remedy  against  the  landlord  for 
the  injury  done  his  goods  while  he  kept  them  in  the  building.^ 

«  DytT  V.  Wightinan,  66  Pi-nn.  St.  -125,  i-27  ;  Workman  r.  Mifflin,  30  Penn.  St 
301)  ;  Hoy  v.  Holt,  91  Penn.  St.  88. 

«  Smith  V,  Ankrim,  13  S.  &  R.  39. 

»  Weignll  r.  Waters,  6  T.  R.  483  ;  ilumford  r.  Brown,  6  Cow.  475  ;  Bt-lfour 
V.  Weston,  1  T.  R.  312  ;  City  Council  r.  Moorhead,  2  Rich.  430  ;  Biddle  c.  Reed, 
33  Ind.  529  :  Witty  r.  Matthews,  52  N.  Y.  512. 

♦  Gill  r.  Mid.lleton,  105  Mass.  477. 

»  Arden  v.  Pullen,  10  M.  A:  W.  321  ;  Vai  v.  Weld,  17  Mo.  232  ;  Gilhooly  r. 
Washington,  4  X.  Y.  217  ;  Wtigall  r.  Waters,  6  T.  R.  488  ;  Po.st  v.  Vetter,  2 
E.  D.  Smith,  248  ;  Welles  r.  Ca.stles,  3  Gray,  323  ;  Kramer  r.  (.ok,  7  Gray, 
550  ;  2  Piatt,  Leases,  188  ;  Libky  V.  Tolford,  48  Maine,  316  ;  Moore  r.  Webec 
71  Penn.  St.  429. 

«  Doupe  V.  Gcnin,  45  N.  Y.  110. 


570  LAW   OF   REAL   PEOPERTY.  [BOOK   1. 

A  case  affording  a  further  illustration  of  this  point  -was  one 
where  a  canal  company  made  a  lease  of  a  water-power  wliich 
had  been  created  by  the  construction  of  the  canal.  It  was 
held  not  to  constitute  a  covenant  on  the  part  of  tlie  lessors 
to  keep  the  canal  in  repair  or  supply  it  with  water.  And  if 
the  canal  was  discontinued,  the  lessee  was  without  remedy .1 
So  the  lease  of  a  water-power  out  of  a  mill-pond  then  existing 
was  not  held  to  constitute  an  obligation  on  the  part  of  the 
lessor  to  keep  the  dam  in  repair.^  And  the  grant  of  a  right 
to  take  water  from  a  well  does  not  bind  the  owner  of  the  well 
to  repair  it.^ 

la.  It  has  been  accordingly  held,  that  if  a  third  party  has 
sustained  damages  by  defect  or  want  of  repair  of  premises  in 
possession  of  a  tenant,  the  law  will  presume  that  the  tenant, 
and  not  the  landlord  is  responsible  therefor,  though  this  is 
subject  to  be  rebutted  by  evidence.*  This  liability  to  a  third 
party  seems  to  depend  upon  whether  the  tenant  has  the  entire 
control  of  the  structure  which  causes  the  injury,  or  is  one  of 
several  tenants  having  control  only  of  the  part  he  occupies. 
Thus,  where  one  travelling  along  a  street  is  injured  by  falling 
ice  or  snow  from  an  awning  in  front  of  stores,  one  or  more,  in 
a  building,  or  from  the  roof  of  the  building,  if  the  tenant  in 
such  cases  has  the  sole  control  of  the  building,  he  alone  is  liable 
to  the  party  injured.  If  the  owner  has  the  general  charge  of 
it,  or  of  the  roof,  or  occupies  it  in  connection  with  tenants,  he 
will  be  liable  instead  of  the  tenant  who  occupies  a  part  only 
of  the  premises,  for  any  injury  from  the  part  not  expressly 
demised.^     So  if  the  injury  arise  from  the  erection  of  the 

1  Trustees  v.  Brett,  25  Ind.  409  ;  Sheets  v.  Selden,  7  Wall.  416. 

2  Morse  v.  Maddox,  17  Mo.  569. 

8  Ballard  r.  Butler,  30  Me.  94.  See  Gott  v.  Gandy,  2  Ellis  &  B.  845  ;  Elliot 
V.  Aiken,  45  X.  H.  30,  36. 

*  Kastor  v.  Newhouse,  4  E.  D.  Smith,  20  ;  Paj-ne  v.  Rogers,  2  H.  Bl.  349  ; 
Cheetham  v.  Hampson,  4  T.  R.  318  :  Bishop  v.  Bedf.  Charity,  1  Ellis  &  E.  697  ; 
Hadley  v.  Taylor,  L.  R.  1  C.  P.  53  ;  Irvine  v.  Wood,  51  X.  Y.  224  ;  Ditchett  v. 
S.  D.  R.  R.  67  N.  Y.  425  ;  Fisher  v.  Thirkell,  21  Mich.  1  ;  Harris  v.  Cohen,  50 
Mich.  324  ;  Mellen  v.  Morrill,  126  Mass.  545  ;  Stewart  i^.  Putnam,  127  Mass.  403  ; 
St.  Louis  V.  Kaime,  2  Mo.  App.  66  ;  Gridly  v.  Bloomington,  68  111.  47. 

6  Kirby  i;.  Boylst.  Mkt,  14  Gray,  249  ;  Milford  v.  Holbrook,  9  Allen,  17; 
Shipley  v.  Fifty  Assoc,  101  Mass.  251,  s.  c.  106  Mass.  194  ;  Readman  v.  Conway, 
126  Mass.  374  ;  Nash  v.   Minneapolis  Co.,  24  Minn.  501.     Hence  such  parcel 


III.  X.  §  '"..]  ESTATES    FOR    YEARS.  571 

Imililing  itself,  or  from  a  defect  in  its  oripinal  construction. 
tl>e  lamllord  is  liahle.'  So,  if  the  deiuiscd  jiroiuises  are  at  the 
time  of  (hiuise  a  nuisance,  he  is  lialth*  as  creating:  it,'-'  though 
the  tenant  nia\  also  l)e  liahle  for  continuing;  it/'  Anti  uj»un 
this  ground,  an  owner  has  hccn  held  lialjle  if  the  premises 
which  are  out  of  re|»air  arc  open  In  the  jiulilic  for  the  profit 
whii'h  nuiy  arise  from  the  use  of  them,  as  in  tin*  case  of  a 
wharf  In-longing  to  an  indi\  idual  ;  and  he  is  Ijound  to  keeji  it 
safe  for  the  purposes  foi'  which  it  has  Ik-cu  ojiened,  whoever 
is  in  occupation,  though  a  sul>-tenant  would  also  he  lialjh-  for 
an  injury  arising  to  one  using  it,  from  want  of  repair.^  This 
class  of  cases  j)roceeds  ujjon  the  ground  that  any  construction 
within  the  limits  of  a  pul>lic  way  is  an  incipient  nuisance,  and 
the  owner  hecomcs  liahle,  through  whosesoever  neglect  it 
becomes  an  active  one.''  But  a  dilTerent  view  j)revails  in 
other  States,  and  if  the  injury  results  from  the  tenant's  not 
keeping  in  repair  what  he  is  bound  to  do,  he,  and  not  the 
lamllord.  would  be  liable,  though  the  structure  was  under  the 
public  way.  Thus  where  the  landlord  leased  premises  bound- 
ing upon  a  street,  and  the  tenant  covenanted  to  repair 
and  keep  the  premises  in  repair,  and  one  passing  along  the 
street  sustained  an  injury  by  a  defective  grating  opening  into 
the  street,  but  of  which  defect  neither  the  landlord   nor  the 

lisscc  may  recover  from  tho  city  for  a.  dtfictivc  sidewalk  in  front  of  tlie  liiiiKling, 
OS  lie  is  not  liaMo  over.  Burt  r.  Boston,  122  Mass.  223.  But  the  owner  is  not 
liaMc  to  any  one  hurt  on  the  premises,  unless  there  hy  his  invitation  express  or 
imj.lieil.  Converse  v.  Walker,  30  Hun,  506;  Mistier  v.  O'Cnuly,  132  Mass.  IS'J  ; 
Fish  r.  I).Klge,  4  Denio,  311  ;  Pirkard  v.  Collins,  23  Barb.  4H. 

1  Durant  v.  Palmer,  29  X.  J.  514  ;  King  v.  Tcdly,  1  Ad.  &  E.  827  ;  Scott  r. 
Simons,  54  N.  H.  426  ;  Ijirue  v.  Furren  Hotel  Co.,  116  Moss.  67  ;  Strattnn  v. 
Staples,  59  .Me.  94  ;  Godley  v.  Hagerty,  20  Penn.  St.  387  ;  Carson  v.  Godley,  26 
Pcnn.  St.  111. 

»  House  r.  Mctcalf,  27  Conn.  631  ;  "Wenzler  r.  McCottor,  22  Hun,  60;  hnt 
see  Shindcll)eck  v.  Moon,  31  Ohio  St.  204,  where  upon  similar  facts  a  dilTen  nt 
conclusion  was  reocheJ.  In  Helwig  r.  Jordan,  53  InJ.  21,  a  kiln  was  so  h«  Id, 
and  tlic  le.ssor  rcsjiousible  for  a  fire  originating  from  it  by  tenant's  negligence. 

•  8  Bl.  Com.  221 ;  Staple  r.  Spring,  10  Mass.  72;  Ingwersen  v.  Rankin,  47  X.  J.  L. 
IS  ;  Fow  V.  KolxTts,  14  W.  No.  Cos.  3o7  ;  Knauss  i',  Bruii,  l(i7  I'enn.  St.  85. 

«  Clancy  r.  Byrne,  56  N.  Y.  129. 

*  Swords  V.  Edgar,  59  X.  Y.  28  ;  0 wings  v.  Jones,  9  Md.  103  ;  Congreve  v. 
Smith,  18  N.  Y.  79;  Whalen  v.  Gloucester,  4  Hun,  24.  Cf.  Turry  c.  Aiditoii, 
1  Q.  B.  D.  314. 


572  LAW  OF  EEAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

tenant  knew  an3'thing,  it  was  held  the  tenant  was  liable  to  the 
party  injured,  by  reason  of  being  in  possession  of  the  prem- 
ises, and  their  heAng  suffered  to  be  defective.^  But  there  is  no 
liability  either  of  landlord  or  tenant  for  defects  in  the  high- 
way in  front  of  premises,  caused  by  the  wrongful  act  of 
another,  nor  for  defective  sidewalks  or  flagstones  and  2:ratin2:s 
within  the  limits  of  the  highway,  where  neither  the  owner  nor 
occupant  were  at  fault.  The  public,  in  such  case,  is  liable 
to  the  party  injured  thereby.^  If  the  tenant  is  responsible  for 
that  which  causes  an  injury  to  a  passenger  in  the  highway, 
and  the  latter  recovers  in  an  action  against  the  town  or  city 
for  the  damages  thereby  sustained,  the  city  or  town  may 
recover  of  the  tenant  wh9,t  they  have  been  obliged  to  pay  in 
satisfaction  of  the  same.^  If  the  builder  of  the  house  cause 
an  excavation  to  be  made  which  endangers  the  passenger,  and 
the  tenant  continues  it  after  he  comes  into  possession,  the 
person  injured  thereby  may  have  his  action  against  either.* 
But  if  the  owner  of  land  dedicates  a  way  across  it  to  the  pub- 
lic which  is  unsafe,  and  they  accept  it,  the  public,  and  not 
he,  are  responsible  to  any  one  who  is  injured  thereby  while 
using  it.^ 

7  b.  There  is  a  class  of  cases  related  to  those  already  con- 
sidered which  deserve  notice  from  the  apparent  diversity  of 
opinion  in  respect  to  them  among  different  courts.  These 
cases  aire  where  the  owners  of  land  adjoining  a  street  or  high- 
way excavate  holes  or  ditches  within  their  own  lands,  but  so 
near  the  street  as  to  become  dangerous  to  travellers,  especially 
in  the  night-time,  and  the  question  is  whether  the  land-owner 
is  liable  therefor  to  a  traveller  who  is  thereby  injured.  The 
court  of  Massachusetts,  waiving  the  question  whether  the 
town  or  city  would  be  liable  in  such  a  case,  held  that  the 
owner  of  the  land  was  not  liable,  although  the  excavation  was 

1  Gwinnell  v.  Earner,  L.  R.  10  C.  P.  658  ;  Pretty  v.  Bickmore,  L.  R.  8  C.  P. 
401.  Cf.  Leonard  v.  Storer,  115  Mass.  86  ;  Stewart  v.  Putnam,  127  Mass.  403  ; 
Cheetham  v.  Hampson,  4  T.  R.  318.  Fire-escapes,  Keely  v.  O'Conner,  106 
Penn.  St.  321  ;  Schult  v.  Harvey,  105  Penu.  St.  222. 

2  Robbins  v.  Jones,  15  C.  B.  N.  s.  221. 

3  Durant  v.  Palmer,  29  N.  J.  546  ;  Chicago  u.  Robbins,  2  Black,  418  ;  Robbins 
V.  Chicago,  4  Wall.  657. 

*  Durant  v.  Palmer,  29  N.  J.  548  ;  McDonough  v.  Oilman,  3  Allen,  264. 

8  Robbins  v.  Jones,  15  C.  B.  N.  s.  221. 


CII.  X.  §  <i.]  KSTATES    Foil    VK.VllS.  "•7:''. 

within  "a  foot  or  two"  of  ft  piihlio  street.'  In  ft  recent 
Knirlish  case,  the  defenihuits  were  thi:  hirers  unii  oecupants  of 
a  warehouse  wliieh  was  not  yet  completed.  A  "  h«>ist  liolc  " 
was  ihiir  within  fourteen  niches  of  the  line  of  the  street  which 
was  used  in  erecting  the  warehouse,  l)ut  no  liarrior  was  placed 
hetween  it  and  the  street.  The  plaint ilT  sustained  injury  hy 
falling  into  the  hole  in  iht.'  niglit-tiine  when  passing  ahjng  the 
street,  and  was  held  to  he  t-ntitled  to  recover  damages,  for  tlie 
injury  thus  sustaiut-d,  of  the  defendants.-  In  another  case, 
tho  occupant  of  the  laud  diiir  out  '"an  aica"  "near"  the 
street,  into  which  a  i)assenger  fell,  there  heing  no  liarrier 
between  them,  and  he  was  held  liable  for  the  injury  thereby 
sitstained.''  Uut  wheie  the  vault  into  which  the  j.iaintilV  fell 
was  upon  a  part  of  the  lautl-owner's  jtrcmises,  across  which  the 
public  ofUn  i)assed,  l)Ut  without  right,  and  the  land-owner  had 
repeatedly  sent  persons  back  who  were  attcmjtting  to  cross, 
it  was  held  that  no  action  would  lie  for  the  injury  sustained 
hy  the  plaiutilf.*  A  tenant  for  ycMirs  is  responsilile  f(jr  restor- 
ing what  is  a  nuisance  to  a  right  of  way,  although  it  existed 
when  he  l)ecame  such  tenant.  So  he.  would  be  for  any  such 
nuisance  created  by  himself.  Ihit  if  existing  at  the  time  of 
his  Itecoming  tenant,  he  wmdd  not  be  liable  for  continuing 
it  until  after  he  is  notifieti  that  it  is  a  nuisance.''  Hut  the 
owner  or  tenant  of  land  is  not  responsible  to  another  who  is 
injured  by  an  act  done  uj)ou  his  land,  where  it  is  done  with- 
out his  agency  or  permission,  as  where  a  tliiid  peisou,  without 
ri'.dit,  j>laced  obstructions  in  a  watercourse  upon  the  laml 
through  which  it  llowed,  which  caused  an  injury  to  a  mill- 
owner   below.     The   mill-owner   could    neither   call   upon  the 

>  Howliin.l  V.  Vincent,  10  Met.  371.         ^  Ha.il.v  r.  Tiiyloi,  L.  It.  1  C  P.  :,X 

*  Barni-.s  r.  Ward,  9  C.  B.  392.  Set-  also  Biigi-  r.  (liiniiniT,  19  Conn.  .107  ; 
Hydniulic  Wks.  v.  Orr,  83  Peun.  St.  332  ;  and  Beck  r.  Carter,  68  N.  Y.  283, 
where  Muwlaml  r.  Vincent  is  denied  to  \h:  law.  And  the  doctrine  of  tliat  case 
is  dillicult  to  reconcile  with  the  i>rinci]>le  of  Kylands  r.  Fletcher,  L  It.  3  H.  L. 
330,  recogni/eil  in  Sliipley  v.  Fifty  Assoc.,  lol  Ma.ss.  251.  Wlien*  the  excava- 
tion is  not  near  the  liighway  no  liaMlity  ari.se.s  in  the  alienee  of  invitation. 
Granli.  k  r.  \Vurst,  86  IVnii.  St.  74  ;   Huunsell  v.  Smyth,  7  C.  B.  N.  k.  731. 

*  Stone  r.  Jackson,  16  C.  B.  199. 

*  Mcl)onouf,'h  r.  (iilnian,  3  Allen,  264  ;  Johniton  r.  I>ewi.s,  13  Conn.  303. 
But  iw'e  I{n)wn  v.  Cayuga  H.  K.,  VJ  N  V.  4'>6,  that  this  i.s  only  in  respect  to 
abatement,  not  damages. 


574  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   1. 

land-owner  to  remove  these,  nor  hold  him  responsible  for  their 
being  there.^ 

8.  And  even  where  a  lessee  guards  himself,  as  he 
[*348]  usually  does,*  against  being  responsible  for  casualties 
occurring  to  the  premises  while  in  his  occuimtion,  the 
courts  do  not  extend  this  restriction  beyond  the  language  of 
the  lease.  As  where  the  lease  provided  that  the  rent  should 
cease  upon  the  premises  becoming  untenantable  by  fire  or 
other  casualty,  it  was  held  no  defence  that  they  had  become  so 
by  widening  and  altering  the  grade  of  the  street  on  which  they 
stood  by  the  authority  of  the  city.^  Nor  would  the  tenant,  in 
case  of  such  provision,  have  a  right  to  abandon  the  premises, 
and  put  an  entire  stop  to  the  rent  by  reason  of  a  partial  de- 
struction of  the  premises,  though  it  rendered  such  part  unin- 
habitable until  repaired. 3  So  where  the  rent,  or  a  projjortionate 
part,  was  to  stop,  if  the  premises  or  any  part  thereof  were  de- 
stroyed or  damaged  by  "  unavoidable  casualty,"  it  was  held 
not  to  extend  to  cases  of  gradual  and  natural  decay.  Nor 
could  the  tenant,  if  he  continued  to  occupy,  refuse  to  pay  the 
rent.*  On  the  other  hand,  where  the  lessee  excepted,  from  his 
covenant  to  keep  the  buildings  in  repair,  such  want  of  repair 
as  arose  from  fire  and  natural  "  wear  and  tear,"  it  was  held 
that  the  latter  clause  was  not  restricted  to  a  gradual  deteriora- 
tion, but  would  extend  to  any  accident  caused  by  a  defect  in 
the  structure,  as  where  a  mill  that  was  leased  fell  from  some 
inherent  defect.^  The  covenant  to  maintain  buildings  in 
repair  upon  leased  premises  is  binding  at  all  times,  and  for  a 
breach  thereof  the  lessor  is  not  bound  to  wait  until  the  expi- 
ration of  the  lease.  He  may  sue  for  the  breaches  as  they  arise 
during  the  term,  after  a  refusal  or  neglect  on  the  part  of  the 
tenant  to  repair  within  a  reasonable  time.^  The  extent  of  the 
repairs  required  of  the  tenant,  as  stated  by  Tenterden,  C.  J., 
is  that  "  a  tenant  who  covenants  to  repair  is  to  sustain  and 


1  Saxby  v.  Manchester,  &c.  R.  R,,  38  L.  J.  N.  s.  C.  P.  153. 

2  Mills  V.  Baehr,  24  AVend.  254. 
8  Wall  V.  Hinds,  4  Gray,  256. 

*  Welles  V.  Castles,  3  Gray,  323  ;  Bigelow  v.  Collamore,  5  Gush.  226. 

^  Hess  V.  Newcomer,  7  Md.  325. 

«  Buck  V.  Pike,  27  Vt.  529  ;  Com.  Land.  &  Ten.  210. 


''II.  X.  §  •;.]  KSTATKS    FOR    YKAIIS.  •'>1>'> 

upliold  the  |troinisos.  IJiit  that  is  not  tlu>  case  with  a  truant 
from  \t'ar  to  vcar.  11'-  i^;  <>iilv  IkihhiI  to  ]ii'r\t  tliL'  lioiix-  w  iml 
and  water  tiirht."  ' 

8  (t.  In  lla*  al»si'net'  of  an  t'.\j»n*ss  covenant  to  repair,  the 
tenant  of  huihlin^^s  is  not  hahh'  for  the  accidental  destruction 
thereof  hy  lire;  and  this  is  the  common  hiw  of  this  country, 
borrowed  from  the  KngMsh  acts  of  0  Anne,  c.  31,  §  07,  and 
14  Geo.  111.  c.  7S.3 

y.  It  has  been  attempted,  at  times,  to  rai.se  imjilii-d  obliga- 
tions between  h»ndh>rd  and  tenant  repirding  h'a.sed  tenemcnt.s, 
as  to  their  charaetrr  or  condition,  or  the  mode  <»f  usinir  them, 
as  well  as  what  is  included  in  a  demi.se  of  them,  from  the  char- 
acter of  the  jiremi.ses,  and  the  purposes  for  whi(di  they  are  in- 
tended to  be  occupied.  Thus  it  has  been  held  that  where  real 
estate  was  leased,  and  with  it  personal  property,  like  ma- 
chinery, which  was  to  be  use<l  with  and  by  means  of  the  picm- 
ises  lease<l,  the  lessor  was  thereby  bound  to  do  nothing 
to  mterrupt  the  *  enjoyment,  by  the  les.see,  of  the  pro|>-  [':>41i] 
crty  lea.sed,  for  the  purpose  for  which  the  same  ha<l 
been  usually  occupied  and  emitloyed."*  So  where  a  factory  is 
lea.sed  with  its  machinery,  it  carries,  by  implication,  a  right  to 
tise  the  water-power  of  the  lessor,  belonging  to  the  same,  for 
the  j>urjK38e  of  operating  the  mill.'  Hut  the  lease  of  a  store  or 
warehou.se,  or  the  like,  does  not,  ordiuaiily,  imi)ly  any  warranty 
that  the  building  is  safe,  or  well  built,  or  that  the  premises 
are  lit  for  any  particular  u.sc.''  Or  that  the  premi.ses  are  in  a 
tenantable   condition,  or  that   the   lessor  will   make   repairs.*' 

Au worth  V.  Joliiison,  5  Car.  &  P.  23y. 
■'  Wuinscott  V.  Silvers,  13  Iiul.   41»7  ;   I,iinsing  v.  Stone,  37  Barb.  15;  2  IMatt, 
I^a-sos,  187. 

•  Dexter  r.  XIaiiley,  4  Cush.  H.  *  Wyrnnn  v.  Farrar,  35  ile.  04. 

*  Dutton  r.  Gerrish,  9  Cush.  89  ;  IMatt,  I^a.«<es,  613  ;  O'Brien  r.  Cuinvoll.  59 
Ikrb.  497  ;  Koyce  r.  Gu^igenheini,  106  Ma.is.  2"!  ;  Ixniji.'  r.  Woo<l,  SI  Cal.  5S6  ; 
Taylor  v.  Bailey,  74  III.  178  ;  Mo.iro  v.  WelK-r.  71  I'enn.  St  42y  ;  Anlen  v. 
ruU.n.  10  M.  &  W.  321  ;  Izon  r.  Gorton,  5  IHnR.  X.  ('.  501  ;  Saner  r.  Hilton, 
7  <  h.  I).  815  ;  Manih.  Wnrih.  Co.  r.  Carr,  5  C.  P.  D.  507  ;  Taylor,  I-an-l.  &  Tt»». 
§  a*-!.  In  the  ea.se  of  a  lea.Hf'  of  the  vesturi'  of  laml  for  ilejMv.sturinf;  l>y  i;»ttlf,  it 
was  hvKl  that  the  lessee  was  liable  to  jiay  rent,  thoufjh  jxnsonou.s  sulwtancrs  fatal 
to  tiie  cattle  that  fetl  there,  had  U-vn  seattercd  on  the  land  by  some  one  not  th« 
lcs.sor.     Sutton  1-.  Temjile.  12  M.  &  W.  52. 

e  Gill  V.  Middleton,  105  Mom.  477. 


676  LAW   OP   KEAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

Nor  would  a  lease  of  a  salt-well  be  held  to  be  an  assurance  of 
the  productiveness  or  capacity  of  the  well.^  Nor  is  there  any 
implied  warranty  in  a  lease  of  a  house  for  a  private  residence, 
that  it  is  reasonably  fit  for  habitation.^  Nor  can  a  lessee,  in 
the  absence  of  fraud  or  misrepresentation  as  to  the  healthi- 
ness of  a  house  leased  to  him,  abandon  the  premises  because 
the  same  are  unhealthy,  and  thereby  avoid  paying  rent.^  In 
a  case  where  a  "  furnished  house  "  was  rented,  it  was  held  to 
imply  that  it  was  so  far  fit  for  use  that  the  tenant  was  held 
justified  in  quitting  because  infested  with  bugs.  But  the  law 
of  the  case  seems  doubtful,  and  is  confined  strictly  to  cases  of 
houses  furnished.^  Many  of  the  propositions  above  stated,  and 
the  cases  referred  to,  were  considered  in  a  recent  case  in  New 
York,  where  the  court  sustain  the  doctrine  as  there  given,  and 
say,  "  The  maxim  of  caveat  emptor  applies  to  the  contract  of 
hiring  of  real  property,  as  it  does  to  the  transfer  of  all  prop- 
erty, real,  personal,  or  mixed  ; "  and  in  the  absence  of  fraud  on 
the  part  of  the  lessor,  there  is  no  implied  warranty  that  the 
premises  are  fit  for  the  use  for  which  the  lessee  requires 
them.^     So  where  the  tenant  of  part  of   a  building  suffers 

1  Clark  V.  Babcock,  23  Mich.  164,  170. 

2  Foster  v.  Peyser,  9  Cush.  242  ;  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  206  ;  Hart  v.  Windsor, 
12  M.  &  W.  68  ;  Wheeler  v.  Crawford,  86  Penn.  St.  327. 

3  Westlake  v.  De  Graw,  25  Wend.  669. 

*  Smith  V.  Marrable,  11  M.  &  W.  58,  Am.  ed.  note.  See  also  Sutton  v.  Tem- 
ple, 12  M.  &  W.  52,  and  Hart  v.  Windsor,  Id.  68,  overruling  the  cases  on  which 
Smith  V.  Marrable  was  decided.  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  206,  n.  ;  Taylor,  Land.  & 
Ten.  §  381.  It  has  also  been  repeatedly  denied  to  be  law  in  the  United  States. 
Foster  v.  Pe3'ser,  9  Cush.  242  ;  Howard  v.  Doolittle,  3  Duer,  464  ;  Naumberg  v. 
Young,  44  N.  J.  331.  It  was  reaffirmed  in  Wilson  v.  Finch  Hatton,  2  Exch.  D. 
336  ;  but  is  limited  in  Manch.  Wareh.  Co.  v.  Carr,  5  C.  P.  D.  507,  and  its  prin- 
ciple denied  in  Robertson  v.  Amazon  Tug  Co.,  46  L.  T.  N.  s.  146. 

6  McGlashan  v.  Tallmadge,  37  Barb.  313.  So  Hazlett  v.  Powell,  30  Penn. 
St.  293  ;  Wlieeler  v.  Crawford,  86  Penn.  St.  327  ;  Mayer  v.  Moller,  1  Hilton, 
491  ;  Acad,  of  Music  v.  Hackett,  2  Hilton,  217,  235  ;  Welles  v.  Ca.stles,  3  Gray, 
323  ;  Libbey  v.  Tolford,  48  Me.  316  ;  Elliot  v.  Aiken,  45  N.  H.  30  ;  Gott  v. 
Gandy,  2  Ellis  &  B.  845  ;  Cleves  v.  Willoughby,  7  Hill,  83  ;  Kaumberg  v. 
Young,  44  N.  J.  331.  And  the  lessor's  liability  is  no  greater  to  a  customer,  ser- 
vant, or  visitor  of  the  tenant  than  to  the  tenant  himself  ;  Jaffe  v.  Harteau,  56 
N.  Y.  398  ;  Robbins  v.  Jones,  15  C.  B.  N.  s.  221  ;  Burdick  v.  Cheadle,  26  Ohio 
St.  393.  The  mere  omission  to  disclose  a  known  defect  was  held  not  to  be 
fraud  in  Keates  v.  Cadogan,  10  C.  B.  591.  But  in  Wallace  v.  Lent,  1  Daly,  481 ; 
Minor  v.  Sharon,  112  Mass.  477  ;  Cesar  v.  Karutz,  60  N.  Y.  229,  where  there 


ClI.  X.  §  G.]  KSTATES    FOR   YK.VIIS.  677 

dftiuajje  from  tho  defoctivo  condition  of  a  j)art  of  the  liousc 
not  includrd  within  liis  (U-niisr,  liut  whicli  lie  is  licensi-d  to 
use,  or  which  is  in  ihr  connnon  nso  or  for  the  coniuion  hcni'lit 
of  nil  the  trnunts;'  or  is  injiiicd  liy  the  ncj^lect  of  another 
parrel  tenant,  or  the  defective  eondition  of  tjie  hitter's  pn-m- 
iscs,2  in  neither  case  is  the  landlord  liiilde.  IJnt  if  the  land- 
lord has  separate  control  of  the  defective  part  of  the  premises, 
ho  is  liaide  to  the  tenant  for  an  injnry  eansed  hy  sueh 
defect.3 

10.  And  where  the  premises  wore  a  cellar  and  lower  room 
in  a  honsc  of  several  stories,  and,  dnrin<^  the  term,  the  house 
was  destroyed  hy  fire,  it  was  held  that  tho  lessee's  interest  was 
therel>y  tjone,  and  that  he  e()nld  not  continue  to  occnj)y  by  cov- 
crinj;  in  the  cellar.*  And  the  same  principle  was  ai)plied 
where  the  lease  was  of  one  of  many  rooms  in  a  l)nildin<r  which 
was  burned  down,  and  the  lessor  rebuilt  during  the  term  of 
the  hi  rim:,  it  was  held  that  the  lessee's  entire  interest 
was  irone,  and  •the  lessor  was  under  no  obliiration  to  [*350] 
give  him  the  use  of  a  corresponding  room  in  the  new 
building.''  But  in  such  a  case  it  has  been  held  that  the  rent 
of  such  destroyed  premises  ceases  with  their  destruction,  the 

was  a  nuisance  dangerous  to  liealth  or  life,  it  was  held  the  landlord's  duty  to  ilis- 
clo8«'  it ;  and  in  a  still  more  recent  case,  (_'oke  r.  Outkese,  So  Ky.  598,  the  less<ir 
was  lu'ld  liaMe  to  the  tenant  for  an  injury  from  an  undisclosed  defect  in  the 
floorin;? ;  and  see  Crump  r.  Morrell,  35  Leg.  Int.  374  ;  Looney  v.  McLean,  129 
Mass.  33. 

»  Carstairs  v.  Taylor,  L.  U.  6  Exch.  217  ;  Anderson  v.  OppenTielmer,  5  Q.  B. 
D.  602  ;  Humphrey  r.  Wait,  22  Up.  Can.  C.  P.  580  ;  Purcell  r.  English,  86  Ind. 
34  ;  Ivay  r.  IIedg.'.s,  9  Q.  B.  D.  80.  And  the  case  of  Looney  i:  Mel/'an,  129  Mass. 
83,  eoiUrti,  is  distinguished  in  Woo<ls  v.  Naumkeng  Co.,  134  Ma-ss.  357.  In 
^  Krueger  v.  Ferrant,  29  .Minn.  385,  the  court  held  this  to  nj.y.ly  even  in  case  of  a 
defective  roof,  and  n-fer  to  Pierce  v.  Dyer.  109  Mass.  374  :  hut  the  case  of  co- 
tenants  is  not  in  analogy,  as  l)et\vcen  them  there  is  no  invitation. 

«  Simonton  v.  Loring.  6S  Me.  \(H  ;  McCarthy  r.  York  Co.  Bk..  74  Me.  315. 
The  case  of  .Jones  r.  Freid.-nberg,  60  C.a.  505,  amira,  is  wholly  unsnpporteit  by 
authority  outside  of  that  State,  the  cases  upon  which  it  rests  proceeding  on  actual 
control  or  interference  by  the  landlonl. 

•  Toole  V.  Beckett.  67  Me.  544  ;  Priest  v.  Nichols.  116  Mass.  401. 

♦  Winton  r.  Comi.sh,  6  Ohio,  477;  Shawmut  Bk.  v.  Boston,  118  Mass. 
126. 

»  Stockwell   V.  Hunter,  11  Met.  448  ;  Alexander©.  Dor»ey.  12  Oa.  12  :  .Vins- 
worth  r.   Ritt.  38  Cal.  89  ;  McMillan  v.   Solomon,  42  Ala.   356  ;    Womack  «. 
McQuarrie.  2S  Ind.  103. 
vol..  I.— 37 


578  LAW  OF  REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   L 

subject-matter  of  the  demise  no  longer  existing.^  In  England, 
however,  where  one  was  a  tenant  from  year  to  year  of  a  sec- 
ond floor  of  a  building  which  was  destroyed  by  fire,  he  was 
held  liable  for  rent  of  the  premises  after  they  were  destroyed 
until  a  regular  determination  of  the  tenancy.^ 

11.  So  in  respect  to  the  lessee,  unless  he  is  restrained  by 
the  terms  of  his  lease,  he  may  make  use  of  the  premises  for 
any  lawful  purposes  he  may  choose,  though  different  from 
those  for  which  they  were  designed,  if  not  materially  and 
essentially  affecting  the  condition  of  the  same.  As  wliere  one 
hired  a  house  erected  for  the  purposes  of  a  hotel,  but  made  no 
covenant  in  respect  to  the  mode  of  its  occupancy,  and  con- 
verted it  into  a  public  seminary,  it  was  held  that  the  lessor 
could  not  object  to  that  use  of  the  premises.^ 

12.  But  where  the  mode  of  occupation  is  fixed  by  the  lease, 
not  only  may  the  tenant  be  enjoined  from  converting  the  estate 
to  other  purposes,^  but,  in  some  cases,  his  so  doing  has  been 
held  to  work  a  forfeiture  for  which  the  lessor  might  enter  and 
expel  him ;  ^  as  wliere  a  shop  was  let  for  a  regular  dry -goods 
jobbing  business,  and  the  tenant  undertook  to  use  it  as  an  auc- 
tion-room, though  no  special  damage  could  be  shown  to  accrue 

1  Graves  v.  Berdan,  29  Barb.  100  ;  s.  c,  26  N.  Y.  498  ;  Doupe  v.  Genin, 
45  N.  Y.  119,  123.  So  in  a  recent  case  it  lias  been  held  that  where  personal  prop- 
erty is  a  substantial  part  of  the  demise,  the  rent  will  be  proportionately  abated 
upon  its  destruction,  Whitaker  v.  Hawley,  25  Kans.  674,  citing  Richards  le  Tav- 
erner's  Case,  Dyer,  56  a,  and  see  Newton  v.  Wilson,  3  Hen.  &  M.  470  ;  but  the 
authorities  on  this  point  are  not  clear.  The  rule  is  strictly  held  in  England  that 
rent  flows  only  from  the  realty.  Newman  v.  Anderton,  5  B.  &  P.  224  ;  Farewell  v. 
Dickenson,  6  B.  &  C.  251  ;  Salmon  v.  Matthews,  8  LI.  &  W.  827.  In  Mickle  v. 
Miles,  31  Penn.  St.  20,  it  is  said  rent  flows  as  well  from  personalty,  parcel  of  the 
demise  ;  but  the  point  decided  was  only  that  it  could  be  distrained  for,  qualify- 
ing Comm'th  v.  Contner,  18  Penn.  St.  439.  So  in  Armstrong  v.  Cunimings,  20 
Hun,  313,  it  was  held  summary  process  would  lie,  and  in  Sutliff  v.  Atwood,  15 
Ohio  St.  186,  that  the  covenant  to  pay  it  ran  on  a  lease  in  part  of  pei-sonalty  ; 
though  in  both  the  English  rule  was  asserted.  In  Bussman  v.  Ganster,  72  Penn. 
St.  285  ;  Fay  v.  Holloran,  35  Barb.  295,  however,  apportionment  was  denied  ; 
but  in  the  former  case  it  was  a  dicUim,  and  in  the  latter  the  personalty  was  in- 
cidental only.  But  in  Yetter's  App.,  99  Penn.  St.  52,  the  lessor's  taking  the 
personalty  was  held  an  eviction. 

2  Izon  V.  Gorton,  5  Bing.  N.  C.  501  ;  see  Graves  v.  Berdan,  26  N.  Y.  498. 
8  Nave  V.  Berry,  22  Ala.  382. 

*  Howard  v.  Eilis,  4  Sandf.  369  ;  Maddox  v.  "White,  4  Md.  72. 
6  Shepard  r.  Briggs,  26  Yt.  149. 


Cn.  X.  §  7.]  HSTATf>    FOU    VKARS.  oT9 

from  sucIj  a  use'  If  pirmisfH  an*  U-t  for  iinliiwful  purposes^ 
Huc-li  for  instance  as  tlio  unlawful  Halo  of  Hpiriluous  liquors, 
the  lessor  cannot  recover  rent  therefor;  the  lessee's  covenaut 
to  pay  it  would  bo  voiil.'- 


SECTloN    VII. 

OF   SUllUKNUKIt,    MKK(;i:U,    KTC. 

1.  WLiit  U  a  sum-iuliT. 

2.  How  it  iiiiiy  Iw  douo  iimltT  statute. 

3.  Kifjhts  of  tliinl  iMirtii-.n  not  to  !>«  iilFected. 

4.  What  iiiiiount.s  to  a  surri'iuler. 

6.  Writtvu  IfiLso  surrcmli-n-d  by  jMirol. 

6.  lA-aai-  afri'ctfd  )>y  .surrendering  i>os.sossion. 

7.  Of  nxTgiT. 

8.  Merger  of  n  tenn  of  years  in  a  freehold. 

9.  ilergor  of  a  tenn  of  years  in  the  rvx'ersion. 

10.  No  merger  in  case  of  a  n'Uiainder. 

11.  To  merge,  estates  must  bo  lield  in  same  right. 

1.  Ik  a  tenant  for  life  or  years  yields  up  his  t-statc  to  him 
who  has  the  immediate  estate  in  reversion  or  remainder,  it  is 
called  hy  the  law  a  nurrendi-r,  the  clTect  of  which  is  to  e.xtin- 
gnish  all  claim  for  rent  not  due  at  the  time.  The  es- 
tate for  years,  in  *  such  case,  is  "drowned  hy  mutual  [*3ol] 
agreement  between  thcm."^  But  if  an  estate,  how- 
ever brief,  intervenes  between  the  two  estates,  there  cannot 
be  a  technical  surrender  or  a  merger  thereof.* 

2.  To  do  this  re(|uires,  under  the  Statute  of  Frauds,  a  deed 
or  note  in  writing,  or  some  act  to  which  the  law  gives  that 
effect.'*     A  parol  surrender  of  a  lease  is  of  no  validity,  nor  is 

>  Steward  t>.  Winters,  4  Samlf.  Th.  587.  But  no  general  restriction  will  bo 
im{ilied  from  a  special  restriction  as  to  jwirt  of  the  demise.  Reed  r.  L<'wis,  74 
lad.  433. 

«  Sherman  r.  Wilder,  106  Mass.  537. 

*  Co.  Lit.  338  a  ;  Smith,  Ijind.  k  Ten.  223  ;  Oreider's  Appeal,  5  Tenn.  St, 
422;  Curtiss  v.  Miller,  17  Ikrb.  477  ;  Bailey  r.  Wells,  8  Wise.  141. 

*  Burton  v.  Barclay,  7  Bing.  745. 

*  He.ss<ltine  v.  S«'avey,  16  Me.  212  ;  Smith,  Land,  k  Ten.  224  ;  Former  r. 
Rogent,  2  Wils.  20;  AU.-n  v.  .T:i.nii,li.  '21  Wend.  623  ;  Jackson  r.  Gardner,  S 
Johns.  394. 


580  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

evidence  of  such  surrender  competent.^  Nor  would  it  make 
any  difference  if,  when  the  written  lease  was  made,  it  had 
been  orally  agreed  by  the  lessor  that  the  lessee  might  surren- 
der his  lease  at  any  time  he  might  choose.^  Nor  would  thn 
cancelling  of  the  lease  revest  the  estate  in  the  lessor,  or  oper- 
ate as  a  bar  to  the  recovery  of  rent  by  the  holder  of  the  rever- 
sion.^ And  by  the  Stat.  8  and  9  Yict.  c.  106,  §  3,  it  can  only 
be  done,  if  in  writing,  by  deed.  But  if  the  lease  do  not  exceed 
the  term  for  which  a  parol  lease  would  be  good,  there  may  be 
a  parol  surrender  of  the  same.* 

3.  It  is  not,  however,  competent  for  the  lessor  and  lessee  to 
affect  the  rights  of  third  parties  by  a  formal  surrender  of  the 
lease,  as,  for  instance,  those  of  the  lessee's  sub-tenant.^ 

4.  Questions  of  considerable  difficulty  have  arisen,  at  times, 
as  to  what  will,  in  law,  amount  to  a  surrender  of  the  lease. 
It  has  been  held  that  if  lessee  of  a  term  takes  a  new  lease  of 
the  same  premises,  to  take  effect  before  the  expiration  of  such 
term,  it  works  a  surrender  of  the  first,  on  account  of  the  in- 
compatibility of  the  two  leases,  both  of  which  cannot  be  valid 
at  the  same  time,  unless  there  are  facts  in  the  case  clearly 
rebutting  such  inference.^  It  must  be  made  clcai'ly  to  appear, 
in  the  absence  of  any  deed  or  written  instrument,  that  it  was 
the  intention  of  the  parties  to  create  a  new  lease  of  the  prem- 
ises, and  substitute  a  new  and  different  estate  from  that 
granted  by  the  original  lease.'  So  where  the  lessee  leased  the 
demised  premises  to  his  lessor,  the  owner  of  the  immediate 
reversion  in  fee,  by  an  instrument  like  that  by  which  he  be- 
came lessee,  it  was  held  to  be  a  surrender  by  the  lessee  and  a 
merger  in  the  lessor.^    But  where  the  first  lease  was  from  two, 


1  Bailey  v.  Wells,  8  Wise.  141.  2  Brady  v.  Peiper,  1  Hilton,  61. 

3  Ward  V.  Lumley,  5  H.  &  Norm.  88-94,  and  note  to  Am.  ed. 

*  Kiester  v.  Miller,  25  Penn.  St.  481  ;  M'Kinney  v.  Reader,  7  Watts,  123. 

5  McKenzie  v.  Lexington,  4  Dana,  129  ;  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  231  ;  Piggottv. 
Stratton,  Johns.  Ch.  (Eng.)  3.55  ;  Adams  u  Goddard,  48  Me.  212,  215. 

6  Burton,  Real  Prop.  §  904  ;  Wms.  Real  Prop.  337  ;  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten. 
225-330,  n.  ;  Mellow  v.  May,  Moore,  636  ;  Van  Rensselaer  v.  Penniman,  6  Wend. 
569  ;  Livingston  v.  Potts,  16  Johns.  28  ;  Co.  Lit.  338  a  ;  McDonnell  v.  Pope,  9 
Hare,  705  ;  Lyon  v.  Reed,  13  M.  &  W.  285  ;  Roe  v.  York,  6  East,  86 ;  Bailey  v. 
Wells,  sup. 

f  Brewer  v.  Dyer,  7  Cush.  337,  339.  ^  Shepard  v.  Spaulding,  4  Met.  416. 


en.   X.  §  7.]  ESTATKS    KOIl    YKARS.  681 

aii'l  I  lie  lease  back  n^aiii  was  to  one  only,  it  did  not 
opLTiite    as  a  suririi(l»  r.'     Nor,  *  where  the  origiuul   [•o">2] 
lease  was  by  one  lessor  to  several  lessees,  can  one  of 
tiiese  lessees  all'ect  the  rights  of  his  co-lessees  by  reii-asin^:  or 
conveying  to  his  h'ssor.'- 

/).  (Questions  of  more  dilliculty  have  arisen  whether  a  sealeii 
lease  for  a  term  em  lie  snrrendered  l>y  snbstitnting  a  new 
parol  one.  And  althoii«;h  the  point  does  not  seem  to  have 
been  j^eneraliy  adverted  to  in  the  cases  which  have  involved 
this  question,  it  would  seem  t(j  depend  uj»on  whether  the  new 
parol  lease  was  bindinir  within  the  Statute  of  Frauds,  as  in 
Eu'rland  and  some  of  the  States  it  may  be,  if  not  cxceedinj^  a 
certain  length  of  time,  and  followed  by  jjossession  under  it. 
In  such  case,  consistintly  with  the  eases  above  cited,  takinjr 
a  new  parol  lea.se  would  seem  to  be  a  surrender  in  law  of 
the  existinir  one  under  seal ;  while,  if  sueh  second  lease  wert' 
not  valid,  there  would  l)e  in»  suncuder.^  In  Thouias  r.  Cook, 
the  first  lessee  was  tenant  from  year  to  year,  and  the  lessor 
accepted  the  assignee  of  his  tenant  by  distraining  his  goods 
for  rent  due,  an<l  it  was  held  to  be  a  surrender  of  the  first 
letting  by  act  of  law.*  So  in  Smith  v.  Niver,  a  ]>arol  lease 
for  a  year  was  sul)8tituted  for  a  written  one.  The  court 
held  the  parol  lease  valid  and  Itiuding,  "  being  for  a  term 
not  embraced  within  the  j)rovision8  of  the  statute  reipiiring 
agreements  of  this  description  to  l)e  in  writing."''  Hut  where 
the  lessee  exj)res.sed  a  wish  to  the  lessor  to  substitute  a 
third  person  as  tenant,  who  was  present  at  the  time,  and 
the  lessor  .said,  if  the  rent  was  paid  it  would  all  be  right, 
but  the  lea.se  was  not  cancelled,  it  was  held  not  to  be  a  sur- 
render accepteil  on  the  part  of  the  lessor.''  In  some  cases 
where  the  lessee  has  assigned  Jiis  ItMse  or  underlet  to  another, 
for  his  entire  term,  in  writing,  and  the  original  lessor  has 
orally  assented  to  the  .same,  and  has  accepted  rent  from  the 


»  Sj^rr)'  r.  Six-rry,  8  N.  H.  477.  '  Ikker  r.  Tratt,  15  111.  56S. 

•  Co«p.  Hobl.y,  72  N.  Y.  HI. 

«  Thomas  r.  Cook,  2  B.  &  A.   110.     .<^oc  MDonmll   r.   Toik^.  D  Hart-,  705 
See  also  Davison  r.  GenL,  1  HiirlHt.  &.  N.  744. 

»  Smith  V.  Niver.  2  Ilarh.  180  ;  liclfoni  r.  Terhune,  30  X.  Y.  453. 
«  Whituey  c.  Mytrs,  1  Dut-r,  2C6. 


582  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

assignee,  it  has  been  held  to  operate  as  a  surrender  of  the  ori- 
ginal lease,  and  a  substitution  of  a  new  tenancy .^  But  it  is 
difficult  to  see  upon  what  legal  ground  such  oral  assent  can 
be  held  to  be  a  bar  to  an  action  upon  the  lessee's  express 
covenant  to  pay  rent.^  And  the  following  case  seems  to  rec- 
ognize this  distinction,  the  parol  agreement  of  the  parties 
being  followed  by  acts  done  towards  carrying  this  agTeement 
into  practical  effect.  The  lessee  of  a  term  of  ten  years  as- 
signed it  by  the  parol  assent  of  the  lessor,  who  agreed  to  look 
to  the  assignee  for  the  rent,  and  to  accept  him  as  his  tenant, 
and  that  the  lessee  should  be  discharged.  It  was  held  to  be 
a  surrender  so  far  as  the  lessee  was  concerned,  and  to  dis- 
charge him  from  his  obligations  as  such.  But  the  circum- 
stance of  accepting  rent  from  the  assignee  of  the  lessee  does 
not  discharge  him ;  it  is  merely  accepting  payment  through 
the  hands  of  another.^ 

6.  So  where,  before  the  expiration  of  a  lease  under  seal,  the 

lessee  actually  surrendered  possession  of  tlie  premises 
[*353]  to  his  *  lessor,  who  accepted  the  same  and  leased  them 

to  another,  it  was  held  to  be,  in  effect,  a  surrender.* 
Any  acts  which  are  equivalent  to  an  agreement  on  the  part  of 
a  tenant  to  abandon,  and  on  the  part  of  the  landlord  to  re- 
sume possession  of  the  demised  premises,  amount  to  a  sur- 
render of  the  term  by  operation  of  law.^  But  abandoning 
possession  even  with  notice,  unless  accepted  by  the  landlord, 
would  not  have  that  effect.  The  surrender,  to  be  of  any  effect 
in  barring  a  claim  for  rent,  must  be  with  the  assent  of  the 
lessor.^  So  where  lessor  and  lessee,  by  mutual  consent,  de- 
stroyed the  lease  for  the  purpose  of  making  a  new  one,  it  was 

1  Logan  V.  Anderson,  2  Doug.  (Midi.)  101 ;  Bailey  v.  Delaplaine,  1  Sandf.  5  ; 
Wallace  v.  Kenuelly,  47  N.  J.  L.  242. 

2  See  Brewer  v.  Dyer,  7  Cush.  337. 

*  Levering  v.  Langley,  8  Minn.  107  ;  Way  v.  Reed,  6  Allen,  364,  370  ;  Tliursby 
V.  Plant,  1  Wnis.  Saund.  240.  But  if  the  lessee's  term  has  expired,  accepting  rent 
from  his  assignee  discharges  him,  Lodge  v.  White,  30  Ohio  St.  569  ;  and  where 
lessor  accepted  rent  from  an  assignee  who  had  changed  the  agreed  character  of 
the  premises,  the  lessee  was  discharged,  Fifty  Assoc,  v.  Grace,  125  Mass.  161. 

*  Dodd  V.  Acklom,  6  Mann.  &  G.  672  ;  Grimman  v.  Legge,  8  B.  &  C.  324  ; 
Hegeman  v.  McArthur,  1  E.  D.  Smith,  147  ;  Walker  v.  Richardson,  2  M.  &  W. 
882  ;  Randall  v.  Rich,  11  Mass.  494  ;  HesseUine  v.  Seavey,  16  Me.  212.  See 
Brady  v.  Peiper,  1  Hilton,  61  ;  Brewer  v.  Dyer,  7  Cush.  337. 

o  Talbot  V.  Whipple,  14  Allen,  177,  180.  ^  stobie  v.  Dills,  62  111.  432. 


cii.  X.  ^  T.J  f>;tate.s  for  ykaiis.  rtRS 

hcltl  to  liavo  that  L'fTi'ct.'  JJul  to  hnvv  such  an  act  of  th<  j  .u- 
tics  uiuoimt  to  a  Ugul  suiTi'iidcr,  without  any  writing;  to  that 
efl'ect,  it  is  neccHsary  that  there  hIiuuM  bo  an  actual  Huncn- 
deriii<^  u|)  hy  the  tenant  of  the  jiosscssion  of  the  prcniiscs,  ami 
an  ac<'c|»tiuuM'  of  such  possession  hy  the  h-ssor,  such  as  recei\- 
inir  the  key  of  the  house,  or  actually  goinj^  into  occupation,  «jr 
puttiuiT  some  other  tenant  in,  or  as  stated  in  one  of  the  cases 
cited  above,  accepting  the  tenant  of  the  lessee  as  his  own 
tenant,  and  receiving  rent  from  liim.'-^  The  eases  upon  this 
j)oint  are  numerous  and  often  dillicult  to  reconcile,  each  <le- 
pendinjr  u|»on  the  peculiar  circumstances  u|ion  which  tlu' 
decision  turned.  IJut  it  nuiy  he  assumed  that  there  nnist  be 
a  nnitual  agreement  between  the  lessor  and  original  lessee, 
that  the  lease  is  terminated,  in  order  to  work  a  surrender. 
Hut  this  may  be  implied,  and  need  not  always  be  express.  It 
is  enough  that  it  is  proved,  and,  when  made,  the  original  lessee 
is  no  longer  liable,  and  the  new  tenant,  if  there  be  one,  is 
alone  responsible.^  Thus,  for  example,  if  the  tenant  actually 
surrenders  up  to  the  lessor  the  possession  of  the  jjremises,  and 
h(?  ac»-epts  it  and  ictains  it  by  going  into  occu|)ation  of  them, 
it  will  i)e  a  surn-nder,  and  j»ut  an  end  to  the  tenant's  further 
liability  upon  his  covenants.  And  the  return  and  accej»tance 
of  the  key  of  the  j)remises  may  be  evidence  of  such  surrendcf 
of  jiossession."'  IJut  merely  entering  upon  leased  ])remises, 
and  using  them  without  any  consent  of  the  tenant,  does  not 
work  a  surrender,  though  he  may  have  quit  possession  of 
them.  It  may  prevent  his  claiming  rent  of  the  tenant,  but 
that  would  depend  upon  the  nature  and  extent  of  such  use.* 

»  Baker  v.  Pratt.  15  111.  5G8. 

2  Iltjjtnmii  V.  Mc.Vrthur,  1  E.  D.  Smith,  147;  Do.1,1  v.  Acklom,  6  Mann.  &  O. 
672  ;  Orimninn  r.  Lc^Rts  8  B.  &  V.  Z'2i  ;  Thomas  r.  Cook,  2  B.  &  .V.  Ill*  ;  Aniory 
V.  Kannoir^ky,  117  .Ma.ss.  351  ;  Hanham  r.  Sherman,  114  Moss.  ly. 

»  Bidford  p.  Terhune,  30  N.  Y.  4(52-464. 

<  Klliott  r.  Aiken,  45  N.  H.  30  ;  Hill  v.  Kobin.son,  23  Mich-  24  ;  Wliitc- 
heail  r.  Clifford,  5  Taunt.  518  ;  Pluuu  v.  Popplewcll,  12  C.  B.  N.  8.  334  ;  note  to 
Am.  I'd.,  and  ca«vs  cited.  Mollott  v.  Brnyne,  2  Camp.  103  ;  Matthews  r.  Tol>e- 
nor,  39  Mo.  115,  119;  Deane  r.  CaMwill,  127  Mass.  242.  But  nR-nly  taking 
the  key  an<l  even  entering  t<>  n-jMiir  is  n<>  acceptance  of  8unvn<ler  if  not  so  in- 
t-nde.1.  Pier  v.  Carr,  «»  P«nn.  St.  32t)  ;  Bninkman  r.  Twihill,  8'.»  P.-nn.  .St,  58  ; 
Oaatler  v.  Henderson,  2  Q.  B.  I).  575  ;  Auer  v.  Peuu,  99  Pcnn.  St.  370. 

*  LJriffilh  V.  Hodgt's,  1  Car.  &,  P.  4iy. 


584  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

But  where  it  was  agreed  between  the  lessor's  agent  and  the 
lessee  that  the  latter  should  surrender  the  premises,  and  he 
accordingly  did  so  by  delivering  up  his  part  of  the  lease  with 
the  key  of  the  premises  to  the  agent,  and  the  lessor  entered 
upon  the  premises  and  let  them  to  another,  it  was  held,  that 
though  it  was  not  a  technical  surrender,  not  having  been  in 
writing,  a  court  of  equity  would  enjoin  the  prosecution  of  a 
suit  for  rent  after  such  a  transaction.^  Merely  accepting, 
without  objection,  notice  that  the  tenant  is  going  to  quit  at  a 
future  time,  though  followed  by  an  abandonment  of  the  prem- 
ises or  the  cancelling  of  the  lease,  unless  the  premises  are 
taken  possession  of  by  the  lessor,  would  not  amount  to  a  sur- 
render.2  But  where  the  lease  stipulated  for  the  payment  of 
rent  quarterly,  with  a  proviso,  that,  if  not  paid  when  due,  the 
lessor  might  enter  and  take  possession,  and  the  lessor  notified 
the  tenant  that  held  under  the  lessee,  that  unless  he  paid  the 
rent  of  the  current  quarter,  which  had  in  fact  been  paid,  he 
must  quit,  and  the  tenant  accordingly  abandoned  the  prem- 
ises, it  was  held  to  be  a  surrender,  and  the  lessee  was  thereby 
discharged  from  liability  to  pay  rent.^  In  some  cases  it  has 
been  held  that  if  the  tenant  abandons  the  premises,  especially 
if  he  has  absconded,  and  the  landlord  enters  upon  and  occu- 
^)ies  or  lets  them  to  another,  it  will  operate  as  a  surrender, 
putting  an  end  to  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant,  and  any 
right  and  liability  on  account  of  rent.*  Other  cases  might  be 
mentioned  where  the  taking  possession  by  the  landlord  with 
the  acquiescence  or  assent  of  the  tenant,  where  the  premises 
were  deserted  or  vacant,  has  been  held  to  be  a  surrender  in 
law.  In  one  of  these  the  house  was  burned,  and  the  tenant 
remained  lialjle  to  pay  rent  by  his  covenant.  Instead  of  ex- 
acting this,  the  tenant  having  neglected  to  rebuild,  the 
[*354]  landlord  went  on  *  without  objection  by  the  tenant, 
and  rebuilt,  and  it  was  held  to  be  a  complete  defence 

^  Stotesbury  v.  Vail,  13  N.  J.  Eq.  390  ;  so  where  the  lessee  gave  np  the  lease 
and  lessor  collected  rent  from  the  sub-lessee,  Amory  v.  Kannoffskj',  117  Mass.  351. 

2  Johnstone  v.  Hudlestone,  4  B.  &  C.  922  ;  Schieffelin  v.  Carpenter,  15 
Wend.  400  ;  Walker  v.  Richardson,  2  M,  &  W.  893,  per  Bolland,  B.  ;  Jackson  v. 
Gardner,  8  Johns.  394,  404. 

8  Patchin  v.  Dickerman,  31  Vt.  666. 

*  Schuisler  v.  Ames,  16  Ala.  73  ;  M'Kinney  v,  Keader,  7  Watts,  123. 


CII.  X.  §  7.]  ESTATES   Folt    \  i  AiS.  585 

to  an  acti(»ii  hrouirlit  by  the  tenant  to  rcpnin  his  itossession.' 
In  one  ciisr  it  was  held  that  an  agirrnu'nt  in  writin'^  not  un- 
der seal,  to  surnntlcr  an  cxistin'T  h'ase  for  years  which  wan 
umlcr  scal,u|M»ii  t":iihiif  t<>  |icrt'nrm  ecrtain  stipuhitions,  nii^'ht 
be  valid  as  a  eontinir<'nt  surrender,  and  that  a  Hurrendcr  of  a 
term  to  o|>i'rat('  in/uturo  would  he  irood.-  It  would  swtdl  this 
wi>rk  hrvond  its  itrnjioscil  limits  to  |iursuc  this  suhjeot  fur- 
thrr.  The  rcatler  will  lind  a  summary  (»f  the  law  in  th<' 
following  lan^uajre  of  I'arke,  1>.,  in  Lyon  v.  RcL-d  :  "  We  nmst 
consider  what  is  meant  by  a  surrender  by  oi)eration  of  law. 
This  term  is  applied  to  cases  where  the  owner  of  a  particular 
estate  has  been  a  party  to  some  act,  the  validity  of  which  lit- 
is, by  law,  afterwards  estopped  from  disputing',  and  which 
would  not  be  valid  if  his  particular  estate  had  continued  to 
exist.  There  the  law  treats  the  doinir  of  such  act  as  amount- 
ing; to  a  surrender."  ''  In  such  case,  it  will  be  observed,  there 
can  be  no  question  of  intention.  The  surrender  is  not  the  re- 
sult of  intention.  It  takes  jilace  independently,  and  even  in 
spite  of  intention."  "^ 

7.  Closely  allied  to  the  doctrine  of  surrender  is  that  of 
^lerjjer,  as  applied  to  leases.  Without  attemptinir  to  emiirace 
the  whole  sul»ject,  it  may  be  stated,  generally,  that  where  a 
term  for  years  ami  the  innnediatc  reversion  of  the  same  estate 
meet  in  one  and  the  same  person,  in  his  own  riirht,  either  by 
his  own  aet  or  by  act  of  the  law,  so  that  he  has  the  full  power 
of  alienation  of  both  estates,  they  will  merjre.*  Thus  a  re- 
conveyance of  an  entire  leasehold  estate  to  the  lessor  by  sim- 
dry  mesne  conveyances  mertres  the  term  in  the  fee,  thouirh 
in  each  of  the  transfers  of  the  estate  a  rent  was  reserved, 
together  with   a    riLdit   of   entry    ft)r   a    breach  of  covenant.'' 

>  rindir  v.  Ainslcy,  cit.'il  by  Jlitller,  J.,   in   Ik'lfoiir  r.  WcstDn,  1  T.  U.  312  ; 
Cline  V.  Black,  4  McConl,  4:51  ;  Wood  v.  Wiilb.-i.lf,'*-,  19  Bart..  130. 
«  Allen  r.  Jaqiiish,  21  Weml.  628.     See  Hot-  r.  York.  5  Fjist,  86. 

•  Lyon  V.  Kfi><l,  13  II.  &  W.  306.  But  sec  Van  Kt-nswlner  v.  IVnninmn,  6 
"Weml.  56y.  As  to  what  such  estoppel  is,  see  Nickells  v.  Atherstone,  10  Q.  B. 
944.     See  note  to  Am.  ed.  12  ('.  B.  X.  «.  343  ;  Be^lfonl  r.  Terhune,  30  X.  Y.  453. 

♦  Burton,  Real  Prop.  §§  897,  899  ;  1  Cruise,  Dig.  239  ;  3  Prest.  Conv.  201. 
But  where  a  lejwee  neipiires  only  an  nixlivided  interest  in  the  fee  Ins  term  will  not 
merge.     Martin  r.  Tohin,  1 23  Mass.  S.l. 

»  .<?niilry  r.  Van  Winkle,  6  Cul.  C05  ;  SheparJ  v.  Si«iuMiiig,  4  Met.  410  ; 
Liebischutz  r.  Moon-,  70  luJ.  142. 


586  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

And  if  the  purchaser  of  an  estate  purchase  in  a  ground  rent 
which  is  payable  out  of  the  estate,  such  a  union  of  the  two 
would  merge  the  rent,  unless  the  title  to  the  estate  should 
fail,  in  which  case  the  rent  would  revive.^  But  an  interven- 
ing outstanding  term  for  years  in  another  person  will  prevent 
their  merging.^ 

8.  Where  the  reversion  is  a  freehold  estate,  it  is  not  diffi- 
cult to  understand  how  this  may  happen,  however  long  the 

term  may  be,  from  the  nature  of  freehold  and  chattel 
[*355J  interests  *  as  originally  understood,  the  former  being 

of  so  much  higher  consideration  in  the  eye  of  the  law 
than  the  latter.  As  where  A  was  tenant  for  one  thousand 
years,  with  a  reversion  in  B  for  life,  and  A  surrendered  his 
term  to  B,  it  merged  in  the  freehold  of  B,  and  was  gone  for- 
ever, and  B  would,  after  such  surrender,  have  only  an  estate 
for  his  own  life.^ 

9.  But  when  this  comes  to  be  applied  to  terms  and  rever- 
sions, where  they  are  both  for  years,  and  the  reader  is  told 
that  if  the  immediate  term  be  for  one  thousand  years,  and  the 
reversion  for  five  hundred,  and  the  holder  of  the  immediate 
term  surrender  to  the  reversioner,  the  term  of  one  thousand 
years  is  merged  and  lost  in  that  of  five  hundred,  it  is  difficult 
to  comprehend  the  proposition,  except  as  a  positive  rule  of 
law.  And  yet  such  is  the  case.  It  grows  out  of  the  nature 
of  a  reversion,  that  if  the  intermediate  estate  ceases  to  be  in- 
terposed between  the  reversioner  and  the  present  enjoyment 
of  his  estate  as  a  reversioner,  he  will  hold  only  in  the  latter 
capacity,  and  consequently,  when  the  intermediate  term,  how- 
ever long,  was  surrendered  up  to  him,  it  was  extinguished, 
and  he  held  afterwards  as  such  reversioner.* 

10.  But  if  the  estate  which  is  limited  after  a  present  term 
for  years  is  a  remainder  instead  of  a  reversion,  and  the  pres- 
ent estate  is  surrendered  or  transferred  to  the  holder  of  the 
second  estate,  inasmuch  as  the  second  is  only  to  come  into 

1  Wilson  V.  Gibbs,  28  Penn.  St.  151. 

2  Burton,  Pteal  Prop.  §  898  ;  Crabb,  Real  Prop.  §  2447  b. 

3  Wms.  Real  Prop.  341  ;  3  Prest.  Conv.  196. 

*  Burton,  Real.  Prop.  §  899  ;  3  Prest.  Conv.  182,  183,  195,  297;  Hughes  v. 
Bobotham,  Cro.  Eliz.  303  ;  Stephens  v.  Bridges,  6  Madd.  66  ;  3  Sugd.  Vend.  23. 


CH.  X.  §  7.]  ESTATES    FOR   YKARS.  687 

enjoyment  at  tlic^  expiration  <tf  flic  first,  it  will  not  })o  a  mer- 
p'r  antl  cxtinL'iiislMijcnt  of  tlu*  lirst,  Itut  the  person  in  \vh(tin 
they  unite  will  have  the  benelit  of  hoth  tern  s  in  Huccession. 
Tims  where  A  had  an  estate  for  one  hundred  years,  and  15  an 
estate  in  remainder  for  fifty,  and  IJ  aecpiired  A'h  estate,  he 
thereby  hei'amc,  in  elTect,  tenant  for  one  hundred  and  fifty 
years.' 

11.  Hut  if  tlie  estate  accrue  in  dilTerent  rights,  iner^'i-r  will 
take  place  where  the  accession  is  by  the  act  of  the 
j)arties,  but  *  not  where  it  is  by  act  of  law :  thus  if  an  [•SoO] 
executor  who  has  the  reversion  in  his  own  rijrlit  be- 
comes possessed,  as  executor,  of  a  term  for  years,  the  two  will 
not  merire;-and  it  is  well  settled,  that  if  a  husbajid  has  a 
freehold  in  reversion,  ami  his  wife  ac(|uires  a  term  for  years, 
the  term  will  not  mer<re,  althouirh  he  has  the  complete  j»ower 
of  disposal  of  such  term.  And  where  the  husband  is  the 
termor  and  the  wife  the  owner  of  the  reversion  in  freehold, 
it  is  clear  the  term  will  not  merp:*  in  the  freehold,  since  he 
only  holds  that  in  ritrht  of  his  wife.^  But  dilTerent  opinions 
have  been  held  where  the  husband  seised  of  a  term  in  right 
of  his  wife  purchases  the  freehold  in  reversion,  whether  tlie 
term  will  merge.*  And  it  is  even  said  if  an  executor,  hold- 
ing a  term  as  such,  purchases  the  reversion  in  fee,  the  term 
will  merge  in  the  inheritance.* 

»  Crui.so,  Dig.  Tit.  39,  §§  40-46  ;  Co.  Lit.  273  b.  See  this  Bubject  discu-ssed 
by  rrc-ston,  3  Conv.  201. 

»  Hurton,  Kenl  Prop.  §  903  ;  Wins.  Heal  Prop.  342  ;  Clift  r.  Wliitt,  15 
Barb.  70. 

•  Hurton,  Rfal  Prop.  §§  901.  902  ;  Wins.  Koal  Proj..  342  ;  Piatt  r.  Slonp,  Pro. 
Jac.  275  ;  3  Sugd.  Vend.  22  ;  3  Prust.  Conv.  276  ;  Jones  v.  Davies,  5  Hurlst.  &  N. 
766. 

•  3  .Sugd.  Vend.  22  ;  3  Prest.  Conv.  276. 

•  3  Pn-st.  Conv.  21)5  ;  Wins.  IJ.  il  rrnp.  343  ;  3  Sugd.  Vend.  20,  21. 


688  LAW  OF  EEAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

SECTION  VIII. 

LESSEE  ESTOPPED   TO   DENY  LESSOR'S   TITLE. 

1.  Generality  of  the  rule. 

1  a.  How  far  it  extends  to  land  gained  by  disseisin. 

2.  Applies  while  tenant  actually  holds. 

3.  Lessee  by  indenture  estopped  to  plead  nil  habuit. 

4.  Effect  of  accepting  a  lease  from  a  stranger. 

5.  Rule  applies  in  favor  of  heirs  and  assignees  of  lessor. 

6.  Exceptions  to  the  general  rule. 

7.  May  deny  lessor's  title  after  a  surrender. 

8.  Or  after  constructive  eviction. 

9.  Eff"ect  of  disclaimer  by  lessee  of  lessor's  title. 

10.     While  holding,  lessee  cannot  set  up  want  of  title. 
10  a.  Effect  of  mistake  where  prior  possession  by  lessee. 

1.  Few  propositions  are  more  frequently  and  unqualifiedly 
made,  in  respect  to  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant,  than 
that  a  lessee  who  has  been  put  into  possession  of  leased  prem- 
ises by  a  lessor,  and  has  been  permitted  thereby  to  occupy 
them,  shall  not  be  allowed  to  question  his  lessor's  title  in  an 
action  brought  to  recover  possession  of  the  premises,  or  the 
rent  reserved  in  such  demise  or  in  assum]3sit  for  use  and  occu- 
pation.i  And  though  one  writer  says,  "  The  origin  of  this  rule 
seems  involved  in  some  obscurity,"^  it  is  by  others  said 
to  be  traceable  to  feudal  tenures,  where  the  tenant 
[*357]  *  was  bound  to  the  landlord  by  ties  not  much  less 
sacred  than  those  of  allegiance  itself.^  The  doctrine 
has  been  generally  recognized  in  this  country  as  a  part  of  the 
law  of  landlord  and  tenant.^  The  policy  of  the  law  will  not 
allow  a  tenant,  under  such  circumstances,  to  be  guilty  of  a 
breach  of  good  faith  in  denying  a  title,  by  acknowledging  and 
acting  under  which  he  originally  obtained,  and  has  been  per- 

1  Delaneyp.  Fox,  2  C.  B.  x.  s.  768  ;  Gray  v.  Johnson,  14  N".  H.  414  ;  Pope  v. 
Harkins,  16  Ala.  321  ;  Ansley  v.  Longmire,  2  Kerr,  321  ;  Bigler  v.  Furman,  58 
Barb.  545  ;  Longfellow  v.  Longfellow,  54  Me.  240,  s.  c.  61  Me.  590. 

2  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  234,  note  a.  For  the  origin  and  growth  of  this  doc- 
trine of  estoppel  between  lessee  and  lessor,  see  6  Am.  L.  Rev.  1  et  seq. 

8  Blight  V.  Rochester,  7  Wheat.  535,  548.  See  2  Smith,  Lead.  Cas.  5th  Am. 
ed.  656. 

*  2  Smith,  Lead.  Cas.  5th  Am.  ed.  657;  Smith  v.  Crosland,  106  Penn.  St.  413. 


en,  X.  §  >*.]  ESTATES    FOU    YKAUS.  689 

mittcil  to  hold  possosHion  of  tlic  piciniHOK.'  T!ms  where  a 
lessco,  whose  duty  it  was  to  pay  tlie  taxes  assessed  upon  tlje 
premises,  sulTered  the  same  to  he  soUl  for  default  of  payment, 
and  i)urcluised  the  same  at  a  puldie  sale,  it  was  held  that  he 
coidd  not  set  up  a  title  thus  aiMpiired  atrainst  his  landlord.^ 
Hut  it  would  have  l)een  otherwise  if  there  were  no  fault  on  his 
part  in  not  makinj;  payment  of  the  taxes.*  Nor  will  it  allow 
him  to  complain  of  a  Wiint  of  title  in  his  lessor,  so  loni;  as  he 
is  himself  uu«listurl»ed.' 

1  (/.  Cases  have  arisen  where  the  doctrine  ahovc  stated  has 
heen  apjtlied  in  favor  of  a  landl«»rd,  t(j  lauds  in  possession  of  a 
tenant,  althouirh  the  same  were  not  emhraeed  in  the  terms  of 
his  lease.  As  where  the  tenant,  while  oecupyini;  the  demised 
premises,  encroaehed  upon  adjacent  lands,  and  enclosed  por- 
tions of  them,  which  he  occupied  in  connection  with  the  prem- 
ises lonir  enoujih  to  ac(piirc  a  title  to  the  same  l>y  limitation, 
and  the  (luestion  was,  whether  this  should  enure  to  the  l>enelit 
of  the  landlord  or  the  tenant.  The  cases  have  heen  chiefly 
those  where  the  tenant  has  encroached  upon  and  enclosed 
parcels  of  waste  or  common  from  a  manor  adjoining  the  leased 
premises.  In  one  case  the  quantity  thus  enclosed  was  two 
acn-s,  and  did  not  actually  adjoin  the  leased  premises.'"'  In 
another,  the  encroachment  was  made  from  the  seacoa.st.''  In 
another,  there  was  a  road  hetween  the  leased  premises  and  the 
place  of  encroachment,  which  was  said  to  he  "a  small  portion 
of  waste.""  In  another,  the  parcels  were  separated  hy  a  fencc.^ 
And  in  another,  the  parcel  enclosed  was  four  acres  of  waste, 
sejiarated  from  the  leased  premises  by  a  small  stream,  a  fence, 
and  a  path.^     And  in  all  these  cases  the  court  held  that  the 

»  Cookf  V.  Loxley,  5  T.  H.  4  ;  Halls  r.  Westwoo.!,  2  ('amp.  11  ;  2  Dana,  Abr. 
443;  Hodges  v.  Shit-Ms,  18  B.  .Moii.  828;  .Miller  r.  .McHrier,  14  S.  &  IL  3S2  ; 
Hrown  r.  I>ysingiT,  1  Itawle,  4o8  ;  Bull  r.  Lively,  2  J.  J.  .Marsh.  151  ;  Dtzell  v. 
Odell.  3  Hill,  215.  219;  Iiitrmiinni  r.  Baldwin,  9  N.  Y.  45. 

a   Hiuskell  V.  Putnam,  42  .Me.  244. 

•  Bettison  P.  Budd,  17  Ark.  540  ;  Weichsclbaum  r.  Curlett,  20  Kana.  "09  ; 
Elliott  r.  Smith,  23  IVnn.  .St.  131. 

•  Ankeny  r.  Pierce,  Brecse,  202  ;  George  v.  Putney,  4  Cush.  351  ;  Vance  r. 
Johnson,  10  Fliimph.  214. 

»  Doe  r.  Jones,  15  M.  &  W.  580.  •  Doe  v.  Rees  6  Car.  A,  P.  610. 

'  Andrews  r.  Hailes,  2  Ellis  &  B.  349.  •  Doe  v.  Tidbury,  14  C.  B.  304. 

•  Liaburae  p.  Davies,  L.  R.  1  C.  P.  250. 


590  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

holding  was  to  be  presumed  to  be  for  the  benefit  of  the  land- 
lord under  whom  he  held  the  principal  estate,  unless  the  con- 
trary was  clearly  proved.  And  Campbell,  C.  J.,  in  one  of  these 
cases,  says,  "I  think  that,  when  the  property  is  taken  and  used 
as  a  part  of  the  holding,  the  tenant  can  as  little  dispute  the 
title  to  it  as  he  can  dispute  the  title  to  any  other  part  of  the 
premises."  And  in  still  another  case,  Parke,  B,,  says,  "  It  is 
not  necessary  that  the  land  enclosed  should  be  adjacent  to  the 
demised  premises ;  the  same  rule  prevails  when  the  encroach- 
ment is  at  a  distance."  "  Whether  the  enclosed  land  is  part 
of  the  waste,  or  belongs  to  the  landlord,  or  a  third  person,  the 
presumption  is  that  the  tenant  has  enclosed  it  for  the  benefit 
of  the  landlord,  unless  he  has  done  some  act  disclaiming  the 
landlord's  title."  ^  But,  as  has  already  been  said,  this  pre- 
sumption may  be  controlled  by  evidence.  As  where,  as  is  said 
in  the  case  last  cited,  "  the  tenant  conveys  it  (the  parcel  en- 
croached) to  another  person,  and  the  conveyance  is  communi- 
cated to  the  landlord,  then  it  can  no  longer  be  considered  as 
part  of  the  holding."  And  where  a  tenant  occupied  a  parcel 
of  another's  land  without  his  permission,  and  hired  and  oc- 
cupied a  parcel  adjacent  to  it,  and  paid  rent  for  it  to  the 
owner  of  the  first  parcel,  and  continued  this  for  more  than 
twenty  years,  it  was  held  that  he  might,  nevertheless,  claim  to 
hold  the  first  parcel  by  adverse  possession.^ 

2.  All  that  the  law  requires  is,  that,  during  the  time  which 
the  tenant  actually  holds  by  permission  of  the  landlord,  the 
landlord's  title  shall  not  be  disputed.  In  technical  plirase, 
the  tenant  shall  not  be  allowed  to  plead,  to  his  landlord's 
action,  nil  habuit  in  tenementis.^  And  this  would  be  applied, 
though  the  tenant  held  under  a  parol  demise  from  a  tenant  at 
will ;  he  would  be  estopped  to  deny  his  lessor's  title.'*  Upon 
this  general  proposition,  that  a  tenant  cannot  dispute  his  land- 
lord's title  in  an  action  involving  that  question,  the  reader  is 
referred  to  the  cases  cited  below,  in  addition  to  those  already 

1  Kingsmill  v.  Millard,  11  Exch.  313.  See  also  Doe  v.  Murrell,  8  Car.  &  P. 
134. 

2  Dixon  V.  Baty,  L.  R.  1  Exch.  259. 

8  Boston  V.  Binney,  11  Pick.  1,  8 ;  People  v.  Stiner,  45  Barb.  56  ;  post,  pi.  10  i 
*  Coburn  v.  Palmer,  8  Gush.  124  ;  Hilbourn  v.  Fogg,  99  Mass.  11. 


CH.  X.  §  8.]  ESTATES    FOR    YKARS.  501 

mentionetl,  wliilo  it  will  he  borne  in  mind  that  there  nre  linii- 
tations  and  exceptions  to  this  rnlr,  which  will  he  hcrcaftr-r 
referred  to.' 

3.  Under  the  older  common  law  and  before  the  development 
of  the  nxxlern  estoppel  in  y'</iK,  the  only  estopjicl  of  the  tenant 
was  where  the  demise  was  by  indenture.  Here  he  was  posi- 
tively estopped  to  plead  nil  /labuit,  \c.j  even  thon^h  he  mi^rht 
have  liired  and  enjoyed  only  what  was  clearly  his  own  bind, 
as  would  be  the  ease  if  a  disseisor  were  to  demise  to 
his  •  dis.scisee  by  indenture.'-  By  accepting  a  lease  ["SoH] 
and  becominir  a  tenant,  he  admitted  the  title  of  his 
landlord,  and  thereby  j)recludcd  him.self  from  disputinjj;  it.^ 
But  sneh  estoppel  only  continued  during  the  term  of  the 
liirintr ;  after  that  the  les.see  might  set  nj)  his  own  title  against 
his  lessor.*  Where,  however,  the  lessor  was  not  himself  in 
{josseasion,  the  lessee  was  not  estopped,  by  a  mere  written 
agri'ement  to  hold  for  a  certain  time  and  pay  rent,  to  plead  nil 
hdf'uit  to  an  action  for  rent.''  But  the  modern  rule  is  ecjually 
imperative  in  actions  for  use  and  occupation  where  the  demise 

1  Philil)  V.  Rol>crtson,  2  Overt.  399  ;  I'lolnnson  v.  Hathaway,  Braj-t.  I.IO  ; 
D.irl>y  r.  An.lerson,  1  Xott.  k  McC.  369  ;  Moore  v.  Bca-sU-y,  3  Ohio,  294  ;  Haniit 
V.  Ijiwreiifo,  2  A.  K.  Mnrsli.  366  ;  Moshit-r  v.  Reding,  12  Me.  478  ;  Lively  r. 
Ball,  2  B.  Mon.  53  ;  St.  I^mis  v.  Morton,  6  ilo.  476  ;  Terry  r.  Ferguson,  8  Port. 
(Ala.)  500;  Cal.lwi-U  r.  Harris,  4  Humph.  24;  Uussell  v.  Fabyan,  27  X.  H. 
629  ;  Willison  r.«AVatkins,  3  IVt.  43  ;  Tuttle  v.  RcynoKls,  1  Vt.  80  ;  Blif,'ht  r. 
Rtjchester,  7  Wheat.  535  ;  Smith,  I>aud.  &  Ten.  234,  Am.  ed.  ;  McCartney  r. 
Hunt,  16  111.  76  ;  jiost,  \>\.  10  a. 

'  Kempe  v.  Goodall,  2  Ld.  Raym.  1154  ;  Heath  v.  Vemieden,  3  I/ev.  146; 
Wilkins  v.  Wingate,  6  T.  R.  62  ;  Broom's  Maxims,  162 ;  Fletcher  v.  M'Farlane. 
12  Mass.  47  ;  Wilson  r.  Townshend,  2  Vcs.  603  ;  Miller  v.  Bonsadon,  9  Ak.  317  ; 
Vernam  r.  Smith,  15  N.  Y.  327  ;  Co.  Lit,  47  b. 

«  Page  V.  Kinsman,  43  N.  H.  328  ;  Alwood  v.  Mansfield,  33  111.  4.'i2. 

♦  Co.  Lit.  47  b  ;  Burt  Real  Prop.  §  850  ;  Shep.  Touch.  Preston  ed.  53  ; 
Jones's  Case,  Moore,  181  ;  2  Prest.  Abs.  210,  409.  In  a  few  mo<lem  cases  the  dis- 
tinction between  this  eatopjiel,  which  was  foundi-d  solely  on  the  instrument  of 
demise,  lieginning  and  emling  with  the  indenture,  and  the  modem  estoj)]>el,  whi'h 
is  wholly  in  p<iis,  and  continues  an  long  as  ]>obscssion  is  retained  by  the  tenant, 
apjM'urs  to  have  been  overlooked.  Carpenter  v.  Thomson,  3  N.  H.  204,  refeiTe<I 
to  i.i  Grayr.  Johnson,  14  N,  H.  421  ;  and  followed  in  Page  r.  Kinsman,  43  N.  H. 
328.  See  ilso  Ace.  Death  Ina.  Co.  c.  Mackenzie,  10  C.  B.  N.  8.  870  ;  Davis  t. 
Tyler,  18  Johns.  490.  But  that  the  estoppel  outlasts  the  t«nn  is  settled  by  Dume> 
reus  authorities  ;  see  following  notes. 

»  Chettle  V.  Pound,  1  Ld.  liaym.  746  ;  pott,  pi.  10  a.     See  pott,  vol.  8,  •463. 


692  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I, 

is  by  parol,  and  applies  as  well  after  as  during  the  term,  and 
where  the  tenant  holds  over  after  the  expiration  of  the  term ; 
and  continues  until  possession  of  the  premises  is  restored  to 
the  lessor.^  So  if  a  tenant  under  a  lease  were  to  convey  the 
estate  in  fee  to  a  third  party,  the  latter  would  have  no  better 
right  to  contest  the  title  of  the  lessor  than  the  lessee  himself.^ 
And  the  doctrine  is  thus  broadly  stated  in  one  case :  "  The 
same  estoppel  which  prevents  a  tenant  from  disputing  his 
landlord's  title  extends  to  all  persons  who  enter  upon  premises 
under  a  contract  for  a  lease,  and  to  all  persons  who,  by 
purchase,  fraud,  or  otherwise,  obtain  possession  from  such 
tenant."  ^  But  if  one,  not  knowing  that  the  tenant  holds  a 
lease,  purchases  the  estate  by  an  absolute  deed  from  the  tenant, 
who  has  an  apparent  legal  title  other  than  his  lease,  such  pur- 
chaser may  contest  the  title  of  the  lessor.^ 

4.  The  acceptance  of  a  lease  from  a  third  party  by  a  tenant, 
except  as  hereafter  explained,  would  be  a  fraudulent  attorn- 
ment, and  cannot  prevail  against  his  admission  that  he  entered 
under  the  lessor  (the  plaintiff).^  So  the  tenant  cannot  set  up 
a  title  adverse  to  the  lessor's,  either  in  himself  or  a  third  party, 
inconsistent  with  the  lessor's  right  to  grant  the  original  lease,^ 

1  Binney  v.  Chapman,  5  Pick.  124  ;  Codman  v.  Jenkins,  14  Mass.  93  ;  Shel- 
ton  V.  Doe,  6  Ala.  230  ;  Jackson  v.  Stiles,  1  Cow.  575  ;  Falkner  v.  Beers,  2  Doug. 
(Mich.)  117  ;  Vernani  v.  Smith,  15  N.  Y.  327  ;  Lewis  v.  Willis,  1  Wils.  314  ; 
Phipps  V.  Sculthorpe,  1  B.  &  A.  50  ;  Fleming  v.  Gooding,  10  Bing.  549  ;  Miller  v. 
Lang,  99  Mass.  13  ;  Delaney  v.  Fox,  2  C.  B.  N.  s.  768  ;  Longfellow  v.  Longfellow, 
61  Me.  590  ;  Bonney  v.  Foss,  62  Me.  248  ;  Abbott  v.  Cromartie,  72  N.  C.  292. 

2  Phillips  V.  Rothwell,  4  Bibb,  33  ;  Den  v.  Gustin,  12  N.  J.  42  ;  Turly  v. 
Rogers,  1  A.  K.  Marsh.  245  ;  Jackson  v.  Davis,  5  Cow.  123  ;  Cooper  v.  Smith, 
8  Watts,  536  ;  so  if  the  owner  in  fee  takes  a  lease,  Eister  v.  Paul,  54  Penn.  St. 
196  ;  Campbell  v.  Shipley,  41  Md.  81  ;  Prevot  v.  Lawrence,  51  N.  Y.  219  ; 
Lucas  V.  Brooks,  18  Wall.  431. 

'  Rose  V.  Davis,  11  Cal.  132  ;  Russell  v.  Erwin,  38  Ala.  44  ;  Lond.  &  N.  W. 
R.  R.  V.  ^Vest,  L.  R.  2  C.  P.  553  ;  Stagg  v.  Eureka  Co.,  56  Mo.  317  ;  i2e  Emerj', 
4  C.  B.  N.  s.  423,  431. 

*  Thompson  v.  Clark,  7  Penn.  St.  62. 

^  Jackson  v.  Harper,  5  Wend.  246  ;  Byrne  v.  Beeson,  1  Doug.  (Mich.)  179  ; 
Allen  V.  Chatfield,  8  Minn.  435  ;  Blanchard  v.  Tyler,  12  Mich.  339. 

6  Reed  v.  Shepley,  6  Vt.  602  ;  Jackson  v.  Stewart,  6  Johns.  34  ;  Syme  v.  San- 
ders, 4  Strobh.  196  ;  Jackson  v.  Harper,  5  Wend.  246  ;  Chambers  v.  Pleak,  6 
Dana,  426  ;  Utica  Bk.'  v.  Mersereau,  3  Barb.  Ch.  528  Jackson  v.  Rowland,  6 
Wend.  666  ;  Plumer  v.  Plumer,  30  N.  H.  558  ;  Hood  v.  Mather,  2  A.  K.  Marsh. 
553  ;  Jackson  v.  Whedon,   1  E.   D,  Smith,  141  ;  Tondro  v.   Cushman,    5  Wise, 


en.  X.  §   8.]  KSTATKS    FOR    YKARS.  ,093 

or  impeach  tlio  validity  of  tlM>  laiidlonl's  title  at  the  time  of 
the  cumiiu'iicciucnt  of  tlif  dt'iuisf,'  v\vi\  i\uyu\r\\  the  adverse 
title  may  lia\e  Ix'eii  piiiied  l>y  the  tenant  durini:  the 
continnanco  *  of  tin-  Ifasr-  hy  puichasu  from  a  thinl  [*•*'•>•'] 
person  ;^  or  the  lessee  was  in  jiosscssion  wlu'n  he  ac- 
cepted the  lease.*  And  the  |irineiplt's  al(ov(?  stated  wen- 
adopted  in  tli»>  case  of  an  iippiiealjon  hy  a  lessor  aL'ainst  ihr 
tenant  to  enjoin  him  from  ciitlinir  tindn-r  on  the  premises. 
The  fact  of  the  temmcy  was  snllieient  for  the  plaint  ill'  withont 
prodncinu:  evidence  of  his  title  to  tlie  premises.'' 

fj.  Nor  is  the  tenant  any  more  at  liberty  to  deny  the  title  of 
the  lieir,  where  the  lessor  dies  dnrin;r  the  term,  than  to  deny 
the  title  of  the  les.sor  himself.'*  And  this  doctrine  applies  as 
to  all  persons  to  whom  the  title  has  come  from  the  landlord." 
Ihit  he  may  show  that  the  ancestor  of  snch  heir  devised  the 
estate  to  a  third  jiarty.*  So  the  lessee  may  show  that  the  re- 
version was  never  validly  transferred,  either  from  its  own 
natnre  or  the  defect  of  the  mode  of  transfer.** 

279  ;  Hiii.Usty  v.  Gli-nn,  32  111.  O'J  ;  l>o»-  v.  I'liillips.  1  Kirr,  .N".  15.  ;.:$;»  ;  \MUv. 
Wcntwmwl,  '2  t'uiiip.  11  ;  Tuwiie  v.  15iitt<'rli<lil,  l»7  iliws.  105  ;  Hawt-s  r.  Shiiw, 
100  Mass.  187;  Doty  o.  Bimliik,  83  111.  473. 

»  Dflanoy  v.  Fox,  2C.  B.  N,  «.  7«8.  Sc-e  Di-simnl  v.  Walliri-I^f,  15  N.  V. 
378  ;  Hitcliie  r.  (Movi-r,  56  N.  H.  510  ;  Carter  r.  Imv,  51  Iml.  2li2  ;  where  l.-Nsor's 
titlt*  WU.S  frauiiuloiit,  Uijiley  v.  Crew,  111  Ma.s.s.  41  ;  so  Holt  r.  Martin,  51  IVnn. 
St.  499  ;  StottP.  Kiitli.Tlonl,  92  V.  S.  Ui7  ;  Bi-.lfonl  r.  Kelly,  61*Peiin.  St.  491, 
where  le.s.sor  woa  only  an  nK<nf. 

a  (;all()\vay  v.  Ogle.  2  Binn.  468;  Sharp-  r.  Kelley,  5  Denio,  431  ;  Wil.son  v. 
Smith,  5  Yerg.  379  ;  Dnuie  v.  Gregory,  3  B.  Mon.  619  ;  Klliott  v.  Smith,  23 
Penu.  St.  131  ;  Clemm  v.  Wilcox,  15  Ark.  102;  O'Hallorttu  c.  FiUgenUJ,  71  111. 
63  ;   Bertram  v.  Cook,  32  .Mich.  518. 

•  Marley  r.  Kotlgors,  5  Yerg.  217.  *  M(<'onnell  r.  Bowilry,  4  M«in.  392. 

•  Parker  ».  linyniond,  14  Mo.  535.         "  Biantin  r.  Whituker,  11  liiuiiph.  813. 
'  Hiiii.s«-ll   t).  Allar.l,  IS  N.  H.  222  ;  Tuttle  v.   HeynoM.s,   1  Vt.   bO  ;  Funk  r. 

Kincaid,  5  Mil.  404  ;  Ingraham  v.  Baldwin,  9  N.  Y.  45  ;  Doe  r.  Wiggin.s,  4  tj.  II. 
867  ;  y»V  Kmery,  4  ('.  B.  x.  s.  423,  431  ;  Doc>  r.  Austin,  9  Bing.  41. 

•  DesiMinl  V.  WaU.ridge,  15  N.  Y.  374  :  ;«).<  ]:!.  10  a. 

»  (Jillett  V.  Mathews,  45  .Mo.  307  ;  Palmer  v.  Bowker,  106  .Ma.ss.  317  ;  IIil- 
bourn  r.  Fogg,  99  .Ma.H.H.  11  ;  I)unshec  t>.  CJruntly,  15  Gray,  314  ;  Bergman  r. 
RolM-rt-s  61  Ponn.  St.  497  ;  AVhitten  v.  Peacock,  2  Bing.  N.  C.  411,  explainwl 
in  (Touldaworth  ».  Knight*,  11  M.  i  W.  337.  Where  the  want  of  title  in  tho 
IcsMor  uppeanMl  on  the  nsaignoe's  own  showing,  the  estoii]>ol  wiw  held  not  to  arise. 
Noke  r.  Awder,  C'ro.  El.  436  ;  Portmore  r.  Bunn,  1  B.  &  C.  694  ;  Pnrgeter  r. 
Harris,  7  Q.  B.  708.  Some  ca-scs  went  8<»  far  a«  to  hold  that  when  the  lesM)r'« 
title  was  good  only  by  estoiiixrl,  aa  the  assignee  must  show  a  title  in  the  lessor 
vuL.  I.  —  38 


594  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

6.  But  broad  as  might  seem  the  positions  above  stated,  as 
covering  the  question  of  a  tenant's  right  to  contest  his  lessor's 
title,  there  are  classes  of  cases  where  this  may  be  done,  which 
will  be  found  to  embrace  numerous  individual  instances. 
Among  these  are  cases  where  the  lessor's  title  has  expired  or 
been  extinguished  since  the  lessee's  term  began,  whether  by 
operation  of  law  or  the  act  of  the  lessor  himself ;  because  this 
is  not  to  dispute  the  validity  of  the  title  under  which  the  ten- 
ant entered  ;  and  he  may  concurrently  set  up  any  independent 
title  acquired  by  himself.^  And  as  the  tenant  may  show  the 
determination  or  extinguishment  of  the  landlord's  title  after 

making  the  lease,  as  above  stated,  he  may  of  course 
[*361]  show  that  he  has  himself  become  the  *  owner  of  the 

land  by  having  purchased  the  reversion.^  So  where 
the  lessee  was  induced  to  accept  possession  from  his  lessor  by 
fraud  or  mistake,^  or  where  he  has  been  deprived  of  the  pos- 

capable  of  transfer,  his  suit  must  fail,  since  the  lessee  wa,s  not  estopped  where  the 
truth  ajipeared,  Lennon  v.  Palmer,  5  Ir.  Law,  100,  105  ;  Carvick  v.  Blagrave,  1 
Brod.  &  B.  531  ;  but  the  later  cases  hold  that  the  assignee  need  not  aver  the  true 
title,  Cuthbertson  v.  Irving,  4  Hurlst.  &  N.  742  ;  s.  c.  6  Id.  135.  Where  special 
pleading  is  abolished  or  the  lease  is  not  under  seal,  no  averment  as  to  the  lessor's 
title  is  required,  and  the  estoppel  is  as  complete  in  favor  of  the  assignee  as  of  the 
lessor.  Patten  v.  Deshon,  1  Gray,  325,  326  ;  Eennie  v.  Robertson,  1  Bing.  147. 
In  Hilbourn  v.  Fogg,  99  Mass.  11  ;  Palmer  v.  Bowker,  106  Mass.  317,  the  title 
on  which  the  assignee  relied,  as  against  the  tenant,  was  not  a  succession  to,  but  a 
defeat  of  the  title  of  the  lessor. 

1  Bruilnell  v.  Roberts,  2  Wils.  143  ;  England  v.  Slade,  4  T.  R.  682  ;  Walton 
V.  Waterhouse,  2  Saund.  418  n.  ;  Smith,  Land,  k  Ten.  234  n.  ;  Doe  v.  Seaton,  2 
C.  M.  &  R.  728  ;  Hill  v.  Saunders,  4  B.  &  C.  529  ;  Franklin  v.  Carter,  1  C.  B.  750, 
757  ;  Hopcraft  v.  Keys,  9  Bing.  613  ;  Jackson  v.  Rowland,  6  Wend.  666  ;  Despard 
V.  Walbridge,  15  N.  Y.  374  ;  Ryerss  v.  Farvvell,  9  Barb.  615  ;  Hoag  v.  Hoag,  35 
X.  Y.  469  ;  Tilghman  v.  Little,  13  111.  239  ;  Wild  v.  Serpell,  10  Gratt.  415  ;  Giles 
V.  Ebsworth,  10  Md.  333  ;  Wolf  v.  Johnson,  30  Miss.  513  ;  Horner  v.  Leeds,  25 
N.  J.  106  ;  George  v.  Putney,  4  Cush.  354  ;  Hilbourn  v.  Fogg,  99  Mass.  11  ;  Doe 
V.  Edwards,  5  B.  &  Ad.  1065;  Franklin  v.  Palmer,  50  111.  202;  Shields  v.  Lozear,  34 
N.  J.  496;  Duffv.  Wilson,  69  Penn.  St.  316;  Smith  v.  Croslaud,  106  Penn.  St.  413. 

2  Caniley  v.  Stanfield,  10  Tex.  546  ;  Elliott  v.  Smith,  23  Penn,  St.  131  ; 
George  v.  Putney,  4  Cush.  351.  Thus  in  Shields  v.  Lozear,  34  N.  J.  496,  a 
lessee  who  holds  a  mortgage  on  the  demised  premises  can  resist  lessor's  claim 
to  them  from  the  day  the  mortgage  becomes  due.  Lausman  v.  Drahos,  10  Neb. 
172,  is  contra,  but  is  to  be  sup[)orted,  if  at  all,  on  tlie  ground  that  the  sale  was 
invalid.     See  Thrall  v.  Omaha  Hotel  Co.,  5  Neb.  295. 

8  Hockenbury  v.  Snyder,  2  Watts  &  S.  240  ;  Miller  v.  Bonsadon,  9  Ala.  317  ; 
Jackson  v.  Spear,  7  Wend.  401  ;  Thayer  v.  United  Bro.,  20  Penn.  St.  60  ;  Tison 
V.  Yawn,  15  Ga.  491  ;  Aldersou  v.  Miller,  15  Gratt.  279  ;  post,  pi.  10  a. 


ni.  X.  §  S.]  ESTATFS    FOR    YKARS.  [,0'j 

8cssi(jn  derived  from  l>is  lessor,  liy  sonic  one  wlio  has  a  jiara- 
mount  titU',  or  has  yielded  the  saiuc,  wlx-n  chiimed,  to  one 
having  such  title,  without  ha\  ing  |irocurrd  this  to  he  done,  ajid 
without  violating  good  faith,  he  is  no  lonjrer  esto|)jK.'d.'  And 
as  to  the  neeossity  of  an  actual  evict  itui,  the  doctrine  seems  to 
he  now  setllcij,  that  if  a  party,  havini,^  a  jiaramount  ritrht  to 
evict  tlie  tenant  of  another  wlio  is  in  occupation  of  tlie  premi- 
ses, ^oes  to  him  claimimr  to  exercise  the  ri^dit  to  evict  him,  it 
would  he  tantamount  to  an  exi)ulsion,  and  the  landlord's  title 
would  thcrehy  he  determined,  and  the  possession  which  the 
tenant  derived  from  him  no  lonp.'r  remain.^  Thus,  if  the 
tenant  has  heen  evicted  in  an  action  of  ejectment,  or  yields 
to  such  a  judgment  without  actual  eviction,  he  may 
•take  a  new  lease  from  the  plaintiff  in  ejectment,  [•3G0] 
and  thereu|>on  resist  the  claim  of  the  first  lessor,  j)ro 
videil  he  had  notice  of  the  pendency  of  such  ejectment  suit.' 
IJut  if  a  tenant  yield  to  a  writ  of  possession  which  does  not 
run  against  him  or  his  landlord,  and  then  attorn  to  the  de- 
mandant in  such  writ,  he  cannot  set  ui)tliis  in  defence  against 
his  landlord.^  So  he  cannot  l»iiy  in  a  hostile  title  not  asserted 
against  him  or  his  less<jr  and  set  it  u\t  against  the  latt<'r/' 
Again,  if  he  he  a  suh-tenant,  he  may  show  that  the  paramount 
landlord  had  entered  and  dispossessed  him  and  given  him  a 
new  leasc.*^  Or  if  a  tenant  of  a  mortgagor,  he  may  show  that 
the  mortgagee  has  gained  possession,  and  given  the  lessee 
notice  to  pay  him  the  rent."    Or  that  he  has  purchiused  the 

1  Simers  r.  Saltus,  3  Dcnio,  214  ;  Wlmlin  r.  Wliite,  25  N.  Y.  462.  405  ;  Evcrt- 
sen  V.  Sawyer,  2  Wend.  507  ;  Kane  Co.  v.  llurriiigton,  50  111.  232  ;  I'oole  v.  Whitt, 
15  M.  k  \V.  571. 

2  Poole  V.  Whitt.  15  M.  &  W.  571  ;  Dekney  r.  Fox,  2  C.  B.  N.  k.  775.  777  ; 
Morse  V.  Ooddiinl,  13  Met.  177  ;  Siuiers  r.  Sultus,  3  Deiiio,  214  ;  Whaliii  r. 
Whit«,  25  N.  Y.  4(52. 

*  Foster  v.  Morris,  3  A.  K.  Marsh.  609  ;  Lunsfonl  r.  Turner,  5  J,  J.  Marsh. 
104  ;  Stewart  r.  Koilerick,  4  Watts  i  S.  IRS  ;  Wl.eilock  r.  Waracliauer,  21  Cal. 
809. 

*  Calilerwood  r.  Pyser,  31  Cal.  333. 

*  Stout  r.  Merrill,  35  Iowa,  47  ;  Hawes  v.  Shaw,  100  Mass.  1S7  ;  Rycrson  v. 
EKln-.l.  18  Mich.  12  ;  Ronaldson  r.  Tabor,  43  Ga.  230. 

*  Elnu  V.  Randall,  2  Dana,  100. 

'  Stedmau  v  (Ja-ssett,  18  Vt.  346  ;  Ma^'ill  r.  Hinsdale,  6  Conn.  464  ;  Fit7gcr- 
aid  r.  IkeU',  2  Eng.  (.\rk.)  310  ;  Welch  r.  Adams,  1  Mot  494  ;  Jones  r.  Clark, 
20  Johns.  61  ;  Jopliu  r.  Johnson,  1  Acrr.  543  ;  Doc  v.  Sinn»8on,  3  Kerr,  104  ; 


596  LAW   OF  REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

mortgagee's  interest,  and  has  given  notice  to  the  lessor  that  he 
elects  to  hold  under  his  mortgage.^  So  he  may  show  that  the 
landlord  has  assigned  his  title,  and  that  he  is  therefore  hound 
as  tenant  to  his  assignee,  since  this  is  not  disputing  his  land- 
lord's title,  but  showing  that  he  holds  under  and  in  accord- 
ance with  it.2  So  where  the  assignment  is  by  mortgage.^  But 
a  tenant  cannot  attorn  to  one  who  has  acquired  a  title  hostile 
to  that  of  the  landlord  before  it  is  asserted  adversely,  though 
it  be  a  better  title  ;  and  if  he  do  so,  and  take  a  lease  from  the 
one  to  whom  he  has  attorned,  promising  to  pay  him  rent, 
he  may  have  to  pay  both  of  his  lessors,  since  the  privity  of  es- 
tate with  his  first  lessor  is  not  destroyed  by  such  attornment, 
and  he  is  estopped  by  his  lease  to  deny  his  second  lessor's 
title.* 

7.  If  the  tenant  surrenders  the  possession  which  he  holds 
of  the  lessor,  or  surrenders  his  lease  so  that  the  lessor  has  a 
reasonable  time  and  opportunity  to  retake  the  possession,  the 
tenant  may  take  a  new  lease  from  one  claiming  adversely  to 
his  original  lessor,  and  dispute  the  title  of  the  latter.° 

8.  The  result  of  the  numerous  cases  upon  the  difficult  ques- 
tion of  constructive  eviction  already  referred  to  may,  perhaps, 
be  summed  up  in  the  proposition,  that  wherever  there  is  an  as- 
sertion of  a  paramount  or  hostile  title  in  a  third  person,  who  has 
a  claim,  or  right  thereby  to  the  possession  of  the  premises,  the 
tenant,  in  order  to  prevent  being  expelled  by  the  holder  of  that 
title,  to  whom  he  would  otherwise  be  rendering  himself  liable 
as  a  trespasser,  may  yield  the  possession  if  it  can  be  done  with- 
out any  collusion,  or  bad  faith  to  the  lessor,  and  attorn  to  or 
take  from  such  holder  of  the  title  a  new  lease,  or  he  may 

Mass.  Hosp.  L.  L  Co.  v.  Wilson,  10  Met.  126  ;  Evans  v.  Elliot,  9  Ad.  &  E.  342  ; 
Cook  V.  Johnson,  121  Mass.  326 ;  Lucier  v.  Marsales,  133  Mass.  454. 

1  Pierce  v.  Brown,  24  Vt.  165. 

2  Pope  V.  Harkins,  16  Ala.  321,  323. 

3  Kimball  v.  Loekwood,  6  R.  I.  138  ;  Delaney  v.  Fox,  2  C.  B.  N.  s.  773.  See 
MeDevitt  v.  Sullivan,  8  Cal.  592  ;  post,  ]A.  10  a. ;  Mirick  v.  Hoppiu,  118  Mass. 
582  ;  Aldridge  v.  Eibyre,  54  Ind.  182. 

*  Bailey  v.  Moore,  21  111.  165. 

6  Boyer  v.  Smith,  3  Watts,  449  ;  Reed  v.  Shepley,  6  Vt.  602  ;  Moshier  v. 
Reding,  12  Me.  478  ;  Wild  v.  Serpell,  10  Gratt,  405  ;  Lunsford  v.  Turner,  5  J.  J. 
Marsh.  104  ;  Tilghman  v.  Little,  13  111.  239;  Thayer  v.  Society,  &c.,  20  Penn. 
St.  60  J  Ausley  v.  Longnjire,  2  Kerr,  322 ;  Bryau  v.  Wiuhuru,  43  Aik.  28. 


en.  X.   §   ^.]  KSTATKS    von    YKAUS.  'i07 

ftbaiulon  tlic  possession,  nn<l,  in  cither  case,  he  will  thorciiftcr 
not  be  lialjlf  to  pay  rent  lo  the  oriL'ina!  lessor,  Jind  may  vrs\>t 
the  h'ssoi's  claim  to  rreovcr  jiosscssion,  by  virtue  of  the  m<'\v 
ri^'ht  tluMH'by  uccpiired.  iJut  if  there  is  no  siK.'h  assertion  of 
the  host  ill'  title,  it  seems  that  he  ouL'ht,  in  any  such  ease,  to 
irive  notice  to  the  lessor  of  his  abandoning  or  holdin;;  adverse 
possession,  that  he  may  not  take  advantage  of  the  eonlidenee 
reposeil  in  him  by  tin*  lessor  in  jmttin^'  him  into  possession 
of  the  estate,  to  deprive  him  of  any  rights  which  the  lessor  had 
thereby  yielded  to  his  keeping.'  If,  therefore,  he  were  to 
])urchase  a  better  title  than  that  of  his  lessor,  he  ought,  never- 
theless, to  surrender  ])ossession  to  his  lessor  before  he  seeks 
to  avail  himself  of  his  new  title  against  his  landlord.- 

9.  This  suliject  may  be  regardetl  in  two  aspects,  one  in  its 
connection  with  the  question  of  title  to  the  jjremises  in  a  real 
action, the  other  as  alTecting  the  tenant's  liability  in  an  action 
for  the  recovery  of  rent  upon  an  actual  or  imi»lied  contract. 
Thus,  if  the  tenant  of  a  lessor  give  him  express  notice  that  he 
will  no  longer  hold  under  him,  he  is  regarded  as  thercl)y  com- 
mitting an  actual  disseisin,  and  the  statute  of  limitations  upon 
an  adverse  ptjssession  would  begin  to  run  from  the  time  of  such 
notice.  But  the  principle  of  repudiating  a  tenancy  without 
actiuilly  surrendering  possession  does  not  apply  to  actions  for 
the  recovery  of  rent,  or  excuse  the  tenant  from  paying  it,  or 
from  his  liaV)ility  for  use  and  occu|)ation  under  the  contract  l)y 
which  he  gained  his  entry  and  i)ossesslon  for  and  during  the 
full  term  of  such  occuj)ation.  In  other  words,  a  partv  cannot, 
of  his  own  will,  put  an  end  to  a  contract  under  which  he  con- 
tinues to  receive  that  for  which  he  promised  to  make  comjien- 
.sation.-^  Although  the  above  rulings  were  hardly  called  for  l>y 
the  circumstances  of  the  case,  they  will  be  to  a  consideralde 

1  IViwsor  V.  Bowaor,  10  Humph.  49  ;  Ryei-ss  r.  Fnnvcll,  9  Barb.  615  ;  Ijiw- 
ron.e  v.  Miller,  1  Sandf.  516  ;  Cnsoy  r.  Groporj-,  13  R.  Mon.  505  ;  Dovnrht  r. 
Xi'wsnm,  3  Ohio,  57  ;  Wells  r.  Mn.son.  4  Scnin.  84  ;  Perrin  r.  Ciilhojui,  2  Brrv. 
248  ;  .Morse  v.  Gwldaril.  13  Mi-t.  177  ;  Wii.lsworthvill.-  S<>hool  v.  Mwtzo,  4  Kioh. 
(S.  C.)  50  ;  Poole  r.  Whitt,  15  M.  &  W.  571.  In  Illinois  it  is  re.|uiro.l  by  st.itut« 
that  even  in  ca.se  of  constnicti\-e  eviition  the  tenant  must  have  given  notice  to 
his  landlord.     Lowe  v.  Kmerson,  48  111.  160. 

«  Ho.lp's  r.  Shiolds,  18  n.  Mon.  828,  832  ;  }»vtt,  pi.  10  a. 

•  Shenuau  p.  Champl.  Transp.  Co.,  31  Vt.  162. 


598  LAW   OF  REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   L 

extent  sustained  by  dicta  of  courts  in  the  cases  cited  below. 
The  doctrine,  that,  after  a  tenant  has  expressly  disclaimed  to 
hold  any  longer  under  his  landlord,  he  has  thereby  committed 
an  actual  disseisin,  and  may  be  sued  by  his  landlord  in  tres- 
pass, and  the  statute  of  limitations  would  begin  to  run  as  in 
cases  of  adverse  possession,  though  stated  in  the  above  case  as 
"  undoubtedly  a  new  doctrine,"  seems  to  be  sustained  by  the 
court  in  3  Peters,  p.  49,  in  the  position  there  assumed  not  only 
that  the  lessor  may  bring  ejectment  under  such  circumstances, 
but  "  was  bound  to  do  so."  But  in  Doe  v.  Smythe,  Dampier, 
J.,  says,  "The  tenant  in  possession  paid  rent  to  the  lessor,  and 
then  disclaimed.  But  he  ought  to  give  back  the  possession  to 
the  lessor.  It  has  been  ruled  often,  that  neither  the  tenant 
nor  any  one  claiming  under  him  can  controvert  the  landlord's 
title.  He  cannot  put  another  in  possession,  but  must  deliver 
up  the  premises  to  his  own  landlord."  And  in  Doe  v.  Wells, 
Patteson,  J.,  says,  "  No  case  has  been  cited  where  a  lease  for  a 
definite  term  has  been  forfeited  by  mere  words."  Sa  far  as 
the  recovery  of  rent  is  concerned,  the  cases  seem  to  concur  in 
holding,  that  the  tenant  cannot  rely  in  defence  upon  a  dis- 
claimer of  his  landlord's  title,  unless  he  has  been  actually 
evicted,  or  what  was  equivalent,  and  had  yielded  his  posses- 
sion to  one  having  a  better  title.  And  it  is  apprehended,  the 
right  to  treat  a  disclaimer  as  a  disseisin  is  by  election  upon 
the  part  of  the  lessor  alone,  as  otherwise  the  tenant,  if  holding 
under  a  long  lease  which  he  was  desirous  of  terminating,  might 
by  such  a  disclaimer  compel  his  landlord  to  oust  him  by  a 
judgment  of  court,  or  be  in  danger  of  losing  his  whole  estate 
by  the  tenant's  holding  adversely  for  the  period  of  limitation. 
And  the  language  of  the  court  in  Zcller's  Lessee  v.  Eckcrt 
is,  "  The  trustee  may  disavow  and  disclaim  his  trust,  the 
tenant  the  title  of  his  landlord  after  the  expiration  of  his 
lease."  i 

1  Willison  V.  Watkins,  3  Pet.  43,  48,  49  ;  Doe  v.  Smythe,  4  M.  &  S.  347  ;  Doe 
V.  Wells,  10  Ad.  &  E.  427  ;  Zeller  v.  Eckert,  4  How.  289,  296  ;  Jacksou  v.  Vin- 
cent, 4  Wend.  633,  637  ;  Jackson  v.  Collins,  11  Johns.  1,  5  ;  Greene  v.  Munson, 
9  Vt.  37  ;  North  v.  Barnum,  10  Vt.  220  ;  Hall  v.  Dewey,  10  Vt.  593  ;  Duke  v. 
Harper,  6  Yerg.  280,  286,  287  ;  Fusselman  v.  Worthington,  14  111.  135  ;  Wall  v. 
Goodenough,  16  111.  415  ;  Fishar  v.  Prosser,  Cowp.  217  ;  Peyton  v.  Stith,  5  Pet. 
484 ;  Wilson  v.  Weathersby,  1  Nott  &  McC.  373  ;  Blight  v.  Rochester,  7  Wheat. 


en.  X.  §  J^.]  ESTATKS    FOR    YKAR-S.  TjOO 

10.  l>iit  still,  if  the  tenant  enters  tnitler  his  lease,  an<l  eon- 
tinuos  to  occupy  without  what  would  bo  tantamount  to  ai; 
eviction, he  cannot,  in  an  action  to  recover  the  rent,  show  that 
liis  lessor  had  no  title  when  he  made  his  lease,  thou^di  he  may 
that  his  title  has  determined  since  the  making  of  his  lease.* 
Nor  could  he  set  up  in  defence  to  an  action  for  rent  that  the 
lessor  holds  under  a  grant  which  is  void  as  against  the  cre<lit- 
ors  of  his  grantor,  because  made  to  defraud  them.^  In  other 
words,  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant,  when  once 
•established,  must  be  dissolved,  and  the  possessi(»n  ['302] 
restored,  or  something  e<iuivalont  thereto  done  by  the 
tenant  Ix'fore  he  can  set  up  another  title  ;^  but  there  is  noth- 
ing' to  hinder  a  tenant  from  buying  up  a  title  adverse  to  that 
of  his  land  bird,  and  asserting  it  at  the  end  of  his  term,  after 
having  delivered  up  possession  of  the  premises,''  though  the 
mere  taking  of  a  lease,  unless  followed  by  possession  under 
it,  does  not  operate  to  estop  the  lessee  from  setting  up  a  title 
adverse  to  that  of  his  lessor.^ 

10  a.  The  frecpiency  and  extent  to  which  the  dogma,  that  a 
tenant  may  not  dispute  the  title  of  his  landlord,  is  liable  to  be 
calK'd  in  (piestion,  and  the  importance  of  defining  its  practical 
limitations  and  restrictions,  seem  to  justify  our  touching  Itrielly 
npon  two  points  already  adverted  to.  Where  the  tenant,  hav- 
ing himself  title  and  possession  of  the  land,  has  been  induced 
by  fraud,  misrepresentation,  or  mistake,  to  take  a  lease,  it 
seems  well  settled  that  he  is  n<jt  bound  by  the  estoppel,  and 
need  not  restore  possession  before  disputing  his  lantl bird's 

543,  547  ;  Doe  r.  Reynolds,  27  Ala.  364  ;  Delancey  t>.  Ganong,  9  X.  Y.  9  ;  Jones 
V.  Clark,  20  Johns.  62. 

1  Snewl  V.  Jenkins,  8  Ire<l.  27  ;  IVn  v.  Ashmore,  22  N.  J.  201  ;  Morse  p. 
R<)l>erts,  2  Cal.  515  ;  Naglee  v.  InKersoll,  7  Penn.  St.  185  ;  I-ongffllovv  r.  lx)ng- 
fellow,  61  Me,  690  ;  anU,  pi.  6  ;  and  Syme  v.  Sanders,  4  Strobli.  196,  which 
holds  that  a  tenant  cannot  show  such  dct«rmiuatioD  if  not  evicted  himself,  is  not 
sustiiinttl  liy  authority. 

^  McCimly  r.  Smith,  35  Tenn.  St.  108. 

«  Porter  r.  Mayti<  1<1,  21  IVnn.  St.  263  ;  McGinnis  v.  Porter,  20  IVnn.  .St 
80  ;  ThoniiHion  r.  Clark,  7  Penn.  St.  62  ;  Brown  v.  Keller,  32  111.  151  ;  KusscU 
V.  Krwin,  38  Ala.  44. 

*  Williams  v.  Garrison,  29  Ga.  603. 

*  yerhooth  r.  Althouso,  8  Watts,  427  ;  Chettle  c.  Pound,  1  Ld.  Ilavni. 
746. 


600  LAW  OP  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  L 

claims.^  It  has,  however,  been  held,  in  some  recent  elaborately 
considered  cases,  that  a  bare  possession  will  enable  him  to  do 
this,  and  that  neither  fraud  nor  mistake  need  exist.^  But  this 
doctrine  has  been  considerably  limited  in  the  court  which  de- 
clared it,^  and  is  not  sustained  by  the  general  current  of  au- 
thority.* An  implied  recognition  of  the  relation  of  landlord 
and  tenant  by  payment  or  promise  of  payment  of  rent,  mere 
acknowledgment,  and  the  like,  is  less  conclusive  upon  the  oc- 
cupant of  land,  himself  claiming  title,  than  a  lease  to  or  express 
attornment  by  him.^  In  some  other  recent  cases  which  are 
supposed  to  sustain  this  exemption  from  the  tenant's  estoppel, 
it  is  declared  that  where  the  occupant  having  or  claiming  to 
have  title  has  taken  a  lease  of  his  own  land  he  may  assert  his 
title  against  the  landlord  after  expiration  of  his  lease,  and 
without   restoring  possession.^     It  is  not  apparent  why  the 

1  Doe  V.  Brown,  7  Ad.  &  E.  447  ;  Gleira  v.  Rise,  6  Watts,  44  ;  AMerson  v. 
Miller,  15  Gratt.  279  ;  Givens  v.  Mullinax,  4  Rich.  (S.  C.)  590  ;  Thayer  v. 
United  Bro.,  20  Penn.  St.  60  ;  Knight  v.  Cox,  18  C.  B.  645  ;  Cornish  v.  Searell, 

8  B.  &  C.  471  ;  Schultz  v.  Elliott,  11  Humph.  183  ;  Hamilton  v.  Marsden,  6 
Binn.  45. 

2  Tewksbury  v.  Magraff,  33  Cal.  237  ;  Fi-anklin  v.  Merida,  35  Cal.  558.  But 
some  of  the  cases  cited  by  the  court  rest  on  quite  different  grounds.  Thus  Rogers 
V.  Pitcher,  6  Taunt.  202,  rests  on  the  tenant's  right  to  show  the  lessor's  title 
determined,  whether  in  the  hands  of  the  lessor  or  of  his  assignee  ;  and  so  Tenner 
V.  Duplock,  2  Bing.  10  ;  Gregory  v.  Doidge,  3  Bing.  474  ;  Claridge  v.  Mackenzie, 
4  Mann.  &  G.   143.     In  Brook  v.  Biggs,  2  Bing.  N.  C.  572  ;  Hopcraft  v.  Keys, 

9  Bing.  613  ;  Ace.  Death  Ins.  Co.  v.  Mackenzie,  10  C.  B.  n.  s.  870,  the  lessor's 
title  never  was  completed  as  it  had  been  understood  that  it  .should  be. 

^  Mason  v.  Wolff,  40  Cal.  246,  where  it  is  held  not  to  apply  to  any  of  the 
express  obligations  of  the  lease  or  process  founded  thereon  ;  Peralta  v.  Ginochio, 

47  Cal.  459  ;  Holloway  v.  Galliac,  lb.   474  ;  Abbey  Homest.  Assoc,  v.  AVillard, 

48  Cal.  614,  where  the  burden  is  held  to  be  on  the  tenant  to  show  title,  and  that 
a  bare  possession  will  not  relieve  him. 

*  McConnell  v.  Bawdry,  4  Mon.  392  ;  Hall  v.  Butler,  10  Ad.  &  E.  204  ;  In- 
graham  V.  Baldwin,  9  N.  Y.  45  ;  Prevot  v.  Lawrence,  51  N.  Y.  219  ;  Cobb  v. 
Arnold,  8  Met.  398  ;  Hogan  v.  Harly,  8  Allen,  525  ;  Miller  v.  Lang,  99  Mass. 
13  ;  Hawes  v.  Shaw,  100  Mass.  187  ;  Panton  v.  Jones,  3  Camp.  372  ;  Cooper  v. 
Bandy,  1  Bing.  N.  C.  45  ;  Gravenor  v.  "W^oodhouse,  2  Bing.  71,  where  the 
estoppel  was  applied  contrary  to  the  dictum  in  s.  c.  1  Bing.  38. 

5  Doe  V.  Barton,  11  Ad.  &  E.  307  ;  Doe  v.  Francis,  2  iloo.  &  R.  57  ;  Stokes  v. 
McKibbin,  13  Penn.  St.  267  ;  Bergman  v.  Roberts,  61  Penn.  St.  497  ;  Shelton  v. 
Carrol,  16  Ala.  148  ;  Pearce  v.  Nix,  34  Ala.  183  ;  Washington  v.  Conrad,  2 
Humph,  562,  565. 

^  Ace.  Death  Ins.  Co.  v.  Mackenzie,  10  C.  B.  N.  s.  870  ;  Fuller  v.  Sweet,  30 
Mich.  237, 


en.  X.  §  0.]  KSTATES    FOR    YEARS.  fiOl 

estopjKjl  bIiouUI  be  of  any  less  force  after  the  term  is  ended 
than  before,  if  the  tenant  never  reeeivetl  possession  from  his 
landlord,  except  upon  the  obi  rule  ap|iliealtlc  to  indentures, 
which,  us  we  have  seen,  is  wholly  distinct  from  the  ummIii  u 
rule  of  estopjiel  ;  it  is,  however,  obvious  that  the  law  as  stated 
in  these  cases  assumes  as  jtroved  what  the  estoppel  precludes 
from  being  incpiired  into;  and  that  if  the  tenant  were  at  lib- 
erty to  j;o  into  evidence  on  this  point,  in  order  to  establish 
such  title,  there  would  be  no  estoppel  in  any  case.  It  will  also 
api)ear,  on  examination,  that  these  cases  have  generally  rested 
upon  otiier  grounds;'  and,  whatever  their  weight,  tliat  they 
are  not  sustained  by  the  current  of  modern  authority  upon  the 
point  in  (piestion.-  The  doctrine  of  estoppel  apjjlicjj  where  one 
is  in  j)ossc8sion  by  mere  license.^ 


SECTION   IX. 

OF    DISCLAIMER   OF   LESSOR'S   TITLE. 

1.  Common  law  onVct  of  disolnimer  by  lessee. 

2.  EfTcct  of  disL-laimtr  n.s  to  the  fetatute  of  limitations. 

3.  Amerioau  law,  that  a  disolaimcr  works  no  forft-iturc. 

4.  No  hostile  act  of  tenant  alfects  lessor  without  notice. 

1.  Questions  have  arisen  under  leases  as  to  the  effect  of  a 
disclaimer  by  a  tenant  of  his  tenancy,  and  a  denial  of  liis  laml- 
lord's  title.  Thus  it  is  said,  "Any  act  of  the  lessee,  by  which 
he  disafhrms  or  imjMigns  the  title  of  his  lessor,  occasions  a  for- 
feiture of  his  lease,  for  to  every  lease  the  law  tacitly  annexes  a 
condition  that,  if  the  lessee  do  anything  that  may  alTect  the 
interest  of  the  lessor,  the  lease  shall  be  void,  and  the  lessor 
may  re-enter."*     So  it  is  implied  in  Wall  i-.  Goodenough,'' and 

'  In  the  former  case  the  title  to  which  the  tenant  attorned  determined  by  the 
lessor's  failure  to  get  it  perfected  ;  in  the  latter  the  lease  was  terminable  by 
notice  which  tenant  had  given,  and  the  relation  of  landlord  and  t4.-Qant  had  prob- 
ably never  existed. 

a  JyUf,  pi.  3. 

•  Glynn  r.  George,  20  N.  H.  114. 

«  "NVoodfall,  lj»iid.  &  Ten.  150.  See  Bacon,  Abr.  Lcaae,  T.  2  ;  Smith,  Land,  k 
Ten.  233 ;  Willison  r.  Watkins,  3  Pet.  43,  4S-52,  i)er  Baldwin,  J. 

»  Wall  r.  Goodeuough,  16  III.  415. 


602  LAW   OF   REAL   PROrERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

sustained  by  the  doctrine  of  the  cases  cited  below,  that  "  the 
effect  of  a  disclaimer,  disseisin,  or  an  attornment  to  an  adverse 
claimant,  or  collusion  with  him  to  deliver  possession,  as  be- 
tween landlord  and  tenant,  and  those  claiming  under  such 
tenant,  unless  a  descent  cast  by  death  of  disseisor,  would  be  a 
forfeiture  of  the  term,  and  the  landlord  might  enter  or  bring 
ejectment  or  forcible  detainer."  i  But  it  has  been  held  in 
Wisconsin,  that  accepting  a  deed  in  fee  by  the  tenant  of  the 
premises,  from  one  who  is  not  his  lessor,  does  not  work  a  for- 
feiture of  his  rights  as  lessee.^ 
[*363]  *2.  So  far  as  the  doctrine  of  the  cases  cited  relates 
to  questions  under  the  statute  of  limitations,  involv- 
ing the  inquiry  as  to  when  an  adverse  possession  on  the  part  of 
a  tenant  began,  the  rule  as  above  stated  may  be  assumed  to 
be  good  law.3  gg  it  would  be  in  cases  of  "tenancies  at  will,^ 
and  in  such  cases  as  require  a  formal  demand  of  rent  before 
commencing  legal  proceedings ;  such  adverse  claim  would  be  a 
waiver  of  the  right  to  such  notice.^ 

3.  But  the  doctrine  of  these  cases  does  not  seem  to  be  war- 
ranted, as  a  general  proposition  of  law,  where  the  demise  is 
made  by  a  written  lease  for  a  term  of  years.  In  several  of 
the  States,  by  statute,  the  conveyance  by  a  lessee  of  a  greater 
estate  than  he  himself  has,  does  not  work  a  forfeiture.  The 
grantee  becomes  in  such  case,  in  effect,  the  assignee  of  the 
lessee.     And  such  would  be  the  ordinary  effect  of  the  forms 

1  Greeno  v.  Munson,  9  Yt.  37  ;  Wild  v.  Serpell,  10  Gratt.  405  ;  North  v.  Bar- 
num,  10  Vt.  220  ;  4  Kent,  Com.  106  ;  Jackson  v.  Vincent,  4  Wend.  633;  Wads- 
•worthville  School  v.  Meetze,  4  Rich.  (S.  C. )  50.  It  has  been  held  that  if  the 
lessee  conveys  in  fee  it  is  a  disclaimer  of  tenancy,  and  the  landlord  may  sue  for 
the  land  before  the  expiration  of  the  lease,  and  without  notice  to  quit.  See  also 
Fu.sselman  v.  Worthington,  14  111.  135.  In  Fortier  v.  Ballance,  5  Gilm.  41,  the 
lessee  of  a  term  for  years  attorned  to  a  stranger,  and  denied  the  landlord's  title, 
and  claimed  to  hold  under  the  title  of  the  stranger.  The  court  said  :  "  The  mo- 
ment that  Blunip  (the  lessee)  disavowed  the  title  of  Ballance  (lessor),  and  claimed 
to  set  up  a  hostile  title  in  Fortier  (the  stranger),  the  lease  became  forfeited,  and 
the  lessor's  right  of  entry  complete."     Doty  v.  Burdick,  83  111.  473. 

2  Eosseel  v.  Jarvis,  15  Wise.  571.  ®  Duke  v.  Harper,  6  Yerg.  280. 

*  Doe  V.  Wells,  10  Ad.  &  E.  427;  Jackson  v.  Bryan,  1  Johns.  322;  Doe  v. 
Long,  9  Car.  &  P.  773;  Newman  v.  Rutter,  8  Watts,  51;  Doe  v.  Evans,  9  M.  & 
W.  48;  Doe  v.  Gower,  17  Q.  B.  589  ;  Bolton  v.  Landers,  27  Cal.  104;  Brown  v. 
Keller,  32  111.  151. 

^  Jackson  v.  Collins,  11  Johns.  1;  Jack.son  v.  Wheeler,  6  Johns.  272. 


CH.  X.  §  0.]  ESTATES   FOR   YEARS.  003 

of  convoyjuice  in  this  roimtrv.'  Tin-  lanf^uatrc  of  ruttoson,  J., 
in  Doo  V.  Wells,  is  also  to  that  ilTrct :  '-No  case  has  hi  I'li 
cited  where  a  lease  for  a  definite  term  has  heen  forfeited  l)y 
mere  words."'  So  it  luis  heen  hehl  that  a  panii  dischiimer 
of  a  hmdhn-d's  title  hy  the  tenant  d(»es  not  work  a  forfeiture  of 
a  written  lease  for  a  t«'rni  of  years,  even  thouj^h  he  set  up,  hy 
parol,  an  adverse  claim  in  himself.''  In  Alahama  it  has  heen 
held,  that  a  tenant  for  years  cannot  alVect  the  rights  of  his 
landlortl  hy  attorning;  to  and  takin;^^  a  new  lease  from  a  third 
party.^ 

4.  One  thing  in  respect  to  a  tenant's  disclaimer  of 
his  *  landlord's  title  seems  to  he  well  settled.  lie  [*3G4] 
cannot  set  up  an  adverse  claim  which  may  operate  to 
har  his  lessor's  title  l)y  adverse  j)osscssion  under  the  statute 
of  limitations,  until  he  shall  have  expressly  disafTirmed  such 
title  of  his  lessor,  and  given  him  full  nntice  that  he  claims  to 
hold  adversely  thereto.^  Without  such  notice,  tiic  law  will 
presume  the  tenant  holds  in  accordance  with  the  demise  under 
■which  he  entered.*'  And,  as  a  general  proposition,  the  owner 
in  fee  of  land  cannot  he  disseised  hy  his  tenant,  hut  at  his,  the 
owner's  election."  But  an  omission  to  pay  rent  for  a  long 
period  of  time  may  he  evidence  from  which  a  jury  may  infer 


»  4  Kent,  Com.  106. 

'  Doe  V.  Wflls,  10  Ad.  &  E.  427;  and  see  Ablwy  Ilomcst.  Assoc,  r,  Willanl,  48 
Cal.  614. 

*  I)e  Ijincpy  v.  Ga  Nun,  12  liarb.  120  ;  and  s.  c.  fully  and  elnbomtely  consid- 
ere«l  in  Court  of  Ai>p«'als,  9  N.  Y.  9;  l>oc  i-.  Cooper,  1  Mann,  k  a.  135  ;  Mont- 
gomery V.  Cniip,  3  Dana,  101.  Kusscll  r.  Fabyan,  34  N.  II.  218.  223.  See  also  a 
dictum  in  .liukson  v.  Collins,  11  Johns.  5.  In  Newman  v.  IJutter,  8  \Vntt.s  51, 
thfi  const  hold  that  the  doctrine  under  consideration  only  applies  where  there  is 
no  dispute  as  to  the  jierson  entitled  to  the  rent 

*  Doe  V.  Heynolds,  27  Ala.  304. 

*  Greeno  r.  Munson,  9  Vt.  37  ;  North  r.  Barnum,  10  Vt.  220  ;  ^Villison  r. 
^Vatkin»,  3  P<t.  43  ;  McGinnis  r.  Porter,  20  Penu.  St.  80  ;  Ijea  v.  Netherton,  9 
Yerp.  31.'i  ;  Zeller  r.  Eckert,  4  How.  289;  Shomian  r.  Champl.  Transp.  Co.,  31  Vt 
162.  The  effect  of  an  express  disttninier,  by  the  tenant,  of  the  landlord's  title  in 
laying  the  foundation  for  an  action  by  the  latter  to  eject  him  as  a  disseisor,  as  well 
as  its  eff.Tt  upon  the  landlord's  claim  to  recover  n-nt,  ha.s  been  considered,  yf  nte, 
p.  •3rtl  ;  <  olvin  r.  NVarfonl.  2it  M.l.  3r>7.  396. 

"  Ik'dford  r.  M'Elherron,  2  .S.  k  U.  49 ;  Jackson  v.  Wheeler,  6  Johns. 
272. 

">  Steams  r.  Godfrey,  16  Me.  158. 


604  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  L 

a  dissolution  of  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant.^  And  no 
notice  is  necessary  in  such  case  of  disclaimer  in  New  Jersey 
before  suing  ejectment.^ 


SECTION  X. 

LETTING   LANDS   UPON   SHARES. 

1.  Nature  of  this  contract. 

2.  Landlord  and  occupant  own  crops  in  common, 

3.  When  payment  in  grain,  &c.,  makes  a  lease. 

3  a.  Letting  for  a  year  a  tenancy,  though  rent  payable  in  grain. 
4,  5.     Cases  when  a  tenancy  in  common  or  a  lease. 

6.  Case  of  tenancy  in  common  of  crops. 

7.  Letting  on  shares,  law  considered  in  Moulton  v.  Robinson. 

• 

1.  There  is  a  mode  of  letting  lands,  not  unusual  in  the 
country,  where  the  tenant  is  to  cultivate  them,  and  share  the 
crops  with  his  landlord.  In  respect  to  these  tenancies,  many 
of  the  ordinary  rules  heretofore  explained  do  not  apply,  and 
the  rights  of  the  parties,  moreover,  depend  much  upon  the 
particular  terms  of  their  agreement.'  Thus,  if  it  amounts  only 
to  an  agreement  on  the  part  of  the  one  who  is  to  do  the  labor 
to  take  charge  of  and  manage  the  land  on  shares,  it  is  not 
regarded  as  a  lease,  but  more  in  the  nature  of  a  payment  for 
services  rendered  by  a  part  of  the  crops  raised.^  In  order  to 
constitute  a  lease,  the  occupant  must  have  an  interest  in  the 

soil  and  freehold.*  So  it  is  said,  a  letting  of  lands 
[*365]  upon  shares,  if  for  a  *  single  crop,  is  no  lease  of  the 

land,  and  the  owner  alone  must  bring  trespass  for 
breaking  the  close.  And  the  same  rule  prevails  if  it  be  for 
successive  crops.^ 

1  Whaley  v.  Whaley,  1  Speers,  225  ;  Duke  v.  Harper,  6  Yerg.  280  ;  Drane  v. 
Gregory,  3  B.  Mon.  619. 

2  Den  V.  Lloyd,  31  N.  J.  395,  399. 

8  Tanner  v.  Hills,  48  N.  Y.  662  ;  Steel  v.  Frick,  56  Penn.  St.  172  ;  Porter  v. 
Chandler,  27  Minn.  301  ;  Jeter  v.  Penn,  28  La.  Ann.  230 ;  Hudgins  v.  Wood,  72 
N.  C.  256. 

4  Maverick  v.  Lewis,  3  McCord,  211  ;  Fry  v.  .Tones,  2  Rawle,  12  ;  Adams  v. 
McKesson,  53  Penn.  St.  81  ;  Herskell  v.  Bushnell,  37  Conn.  36. 

5  Bradish  v.  Schenck,  8  Johns.  151  ;  Putnam  v.  Wise,  1  Hill,  234.  See  Chan- 
dler V.  Thurston,  10  Pick.  205  ;  Hare  v.  Celey,  Cro.  Eliz.  143  ;  Moulton  v.  Robiu- 
eoD,  27  N.  H.  550  ;  Aiken  v.  Smith,  21  Vt.  172. 


CH.  X.  §   10.]  ESTATES    FOR    YEARS.  COS 

2.  liiit  if  the  aj^rceinent  bo  for  a  tlivision  of  the  s|>cciric 
cn)i»s,  the  owner  of  the  land  and  the  oecupant,  in  the  above 
sujtptjscd  case,  are  to  be  rejxardtMl  as  tenants  in  connmtn  of 
these  entps.  And  althonj;h  called  a  rent,  it  is,  after  all,  but 
anothrr  mode  of  s;i\  in<r  that  the  occupiers  shall  work  the  farm 
for  so  loiitr,  and  divide  the  jirolits  with  tin-  owner.'  The  doc- 
trine ujion  this  subject  may  l)e  stated,  as  gathered  from  a 
variety  of  cases,  in  <reni'ial  (einis,(o  he,  that  farming  on  shares 
makes  the  owner  of  the  land  and  the  farmer  tenants  in  com- 
mon of  the  crops.*  Thus,  a  contract  by  which  A  should  have 
possession  of  B's  farm,  and  put  in  crops  upon  shares,  makes 
them  tenants  in  common  of  the  crops,  and  A  may  sell  or 
mortj2;ajre  his  share  in  the  croj)8.^  So  where  the  owner  of  the 
farm  was  to  furnish  teams  and  fodder  for  them,  seed  and  farm- 
inir  implements,  and  the  other  party  to  do  the  work,  cultivate 
and  secure  the  crops,  and  these  were  to  be  divided  between 
them  in  certain  shares  or  proportions,  it  was  hild  to  consti- 
tute a  tenancy  in  common  of  the  crops,  and  not  a  demise  of 
the  jtremises.*  Nor  would  it  chauL^e  the  rule  in  this  respect, 
although  the  land-owner  let  the  laud  for  a  year  to  the  other 
party,  to '' work  on  shares,"  and  at^recd  to  fuiwiish  a  certain 
portion  of  the  re(iuisitc  teams  and  farming-tools  and  seed,  the 

1  rutiinm  V.  Wise,  1  Hill,  234;  Chaii.lliT  r.  Thurston,  10  Pick.  205;  Dinc- 
hart  V.  Wilson,  15  Biirb.  595  ;  Alwooil  v.  Ilucknian,  21  111.  200  ;  Diiniels  r. 
Brown,  34  N.  H.  454  ;  Edsou  v.  Colhurn,  28  Vt.  631  ;  Brown  v.  Lincoln,  47 
N.  H.  469.  And  the  cultivator  may  o-ssifju  his  interest  in  such  crojis,  making 
bis  a,ssignee  co-t«'nant  of  them  with  the  land-owner.  Aiken  v.  Smith,  21  Vt. 
172.  And  where  the  tenant  was  to  cultivate  ami  hajj  the  hop  crop  nn  the  farm 
for  the  landlonl  as  rent  for  the  farm,  it  was  held  that  the  hojis  were  the  sole 
pro|K'rty  of  the  landowner.  Kellcy  i'.  Weston,  20  Me.  232.  In  Reynolds  v.  Pool, 
84  N.  •'.  37,  an  agreement  Ix-tween  the  occupier  ami  land-owner  to  share  jirofita 
was  held  a  partnership,  In-cause  a  division  of  profits  a.s  such  necessarily  implied 
this.  So  Iloliliciil  v.  White,  52  (!a.  5«i7.  But  other  cas«>s  have  denied  this.  Brown 
V.  Ja4iuette,  94  I'enn.  St.  113  ;  Donnell  i'.  Ilarshe,  67  Mo.  170  ;  Musser  v.  Brink, 
68  Mo.  242  ;  and  the  law  is  clearly  otherwisi'. 

«  Williams  r.  Nolen,  34  Ala.  167  ;  Hurd  r.  Darling,  14  Vt.  214;  Aiken  r. 
Smith.  21  Vt.  172  ;  Ix)we  v  Miller,  3  Gnitt.  205  ;  Fcrrall  v.  Kent.  4  Gill.  209; 
Moore  V.  Spruill,  13  Iml.  55  ;  Smyth  r.  Tankersley,  20  Ala.  212  ;  Tripp  r.  Kiley, 
15  Ikrb.  333;  Otis  t>.  Thomp.son,  Hill  &  Denio,  131  ;  Walls  v.  Preston.  25  ("al. 
59.  64  ;  Gue-st  r.  Optlyke,  31  N.  J.  552  ;  Berual  v.  Uovious,  17  Cal.  541  ;  Crtsel 
V.  Kirkham.  47  111.  344. 

'  Fi<pK>t  V.  Alli.son,  12  Mich.  328. 

*  Currey  i-.  Davis,  1  Houbt.  598. 


606  LAW  OF  REAL  TROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

other  to  do  the  work  of  cultivating  the  premises,  and  to  be 
paid  by  the  owner  "  the  value  of  one-half  of  all  the  grain,  but- 
ter, <fec.,  produced  upon  the  premises."  They  were  held  to  be 
tenants  in  common  of  the  crops.^ 

3.  But  if  the  occupant  is  to  pay  a  certain  quantity  of  grain, 
or  tons  of  hay,  &c.,  for  the  premises,  not  confined  to  the  spe- 
cific crops  grown  thereon,  he  is  a  tenant,  and  the  grain  or 
hay  is  rent,  and  the  owner  of  the  land  has  no  interest  in  or 
title  to  the  same  until  they  are  delivered.^  In  all  cases, 
"  whether  it  is  simply  raising  a  crop  on  joint  account,  or  a 
tenancy,  the  rent  payable  in  kind,  depends  upon  the  intention 
of  the  parties."  ^ 

3  a.  So  if  the  letting  be  for  a  year,  it  creates  the  relation 
of  landlord  and  tenant,  although  the  rent  be  to  be  paid,  in 
part,  in  crops.  The  parties  in  such  a  case  are  not  tenants  in 
common.*  But  it  was  held  to  be  a  demise,  and  the  tenant 
had  the  rights  of  a  lessee,  although,  by  the  contract,  the 
lessor  was  to  be  paid  the  rent  out  of  the  specific  crops  raised 
upon  the  premises.^  Such  a  tenant,  moreover,  is  entitled  to 
sole  possession,  and  may  have  trespass  against  his  landlord 
for  entering  during  the  tcrm.°  And  where  the  lease  was  for 
a  year,  the  tenant  being  to  deliver  the  half  of  the  grain  that 
he  raises  on  the  farm  in  the  busliel  in  the  barn,  it  was  held 
that  there  must  be  a  division  and  delivery  to  vest  the  prop- 
erty in  the  grain  in  the  landlord.  And  it  is  laid  down  as  a 
general  principle,  that  where  the  rent  of  a  farm  is  payable  in 
grain  raised  upon  it,  such  division  and  delivery  are  necessary 
to  pass  the  property  from  the  tenant  to  the  landlord.  And 
in  one  case,  the  lessee  having  divided  the  grain  and  carried 

1  Tanner  v.  Hills,  44  Barb.  428. 

2  Newcomb  v.  Ramer,  2  Johns.  421,  note;  Dinehart  v.  Wilson,  15  Barb.  595  ; 
Putnam  v.  Wise,  1  Hill,  234.  See  also  Caswell  v.  Districh,  15  Wend.  379.  The 
effect  of  the  three  last-cited  cases  is  to  overrule  Jackson  v.  Browmdl,  1  Johns. 
267,  and  Stewart  v.  Doughty,  9  Johns.  108,  the  latter  of  which  had  already  been 
doubted  in  Aiken  v.  Smith,  21  Vt.  181.  But  Jackson  v.  Brownell  is  spoken  of 
with  approbation  by  Bell,  J.,  in  Moulton  v.  Robinson,  27  N.  H.  553  ;  Herskell 
V.  Bushnell,  37  Conn.  43. 

«  Di.\on  V.  Niccoll.s,  39  111.  372,  384. 

<  Alwood  V.  Ruckman,  21  HI.  200.  5  "^^alls  v.  Preston,  25  Cal.  59,  67. 

«  Hatchell  v.  Kimbrough,  4  Jones  (N.  C.)  163.  See  also  Blake  v.  Coats,  3 
Greene  (Iowa),  548. 


ril.  X.  §  ID]  ESTATES    FOK    V  KAILS.  007 

off  his  half  of  it,  Icavinj^  the  other  half  upon  tlie  prciniHcs, 
the  property  jiassed  U)  the  hmdlord.'  So,  in  one  case,  where 
the  lessor  was,  hy  the  terms  of  the  hasc,  t<»  receive  as  rent 
a  share  of  the  |.'rain  raised,  to  he  lielivered  in  the  hushel, 
it  was  held  he  had  no  interest  in  the  ^rrain  until  it  was  sev- 
ered and  delivered  to  him.-  Ihit,  in  another  case,  where 
upon  a  lease  of  premises  for  one  crop,  or  one  year,  or  for 
several  years,  the  lessor  was  to  receive  a  part  of  the  prod- 
ucts of  the  farm  in  lieu  of  rent,  it  was  lield  that  the  contract 
operated  hy  the  way  of  reservation,  and  the  share  reserved 
was  always  tlie  property  of  the  land-owner  without  severance 
or  delivery,  while  the  property  of  the  residue  was  always  in 
the  tenant  hy  virtue  of  the  implied  grant  of  profits,  and  they 
were  therefore  tenants  in  common  of  the  crojjs  until  division.^ 
And  if  the  crops  or  any  share  of  them  are  to  he  used  upon 
the  farm,  the  peneral  property  in  them  remains  in  the  owner 
of  the  land,  thoujrh  the  possession  remains  in  common  with 
the  owner  and  tenant  of  the  land.* 

4.  It  was  accordingly  held  not  to  he  a  lease  of  the  hunl, 
hut  tenancy  in  common  of  the  crops,  where  A  let  his  farm  for 
one  year  for  a  sin;.rle  crop  to  B,  who  was  to  sow  certain  lots 
with  oats,  others  with  wheat,  and  to  give  A  one-third  in  the 
half-hushel,  the  meadow,  three  out  of  five  cocks,  and,  of  the 
rest,  one-half,  delivered  in  the  harn.  These  were  not  re- 
garded in  the  light  of  rent,  f»jr,  if  so,  they  would  h<  long 
wholly  to  the  tenant,  till  severed  and  divided  to  the  landlord, 
which  was  not  the  ca.se  here.^ 

*o.  But  where  the  agreement  recognized  the  cro|»s  [*30GJ 
to  be  the  lessee's,  though  he  is  out  of  these  to  pay  the 

'   Hums  r.  CVwi^t,  31  Penn.  St.  426. 

«  Kiiuliiirt  V.  (Jlwin.-,  5  W.  &  S.  157,  163.  See  Ream  r.  Harnish,  45  Penn. 
St.  376  ;  Front  r.  Manlin,  56  Intl.  165. 

»  Hatch  r.  Hart.  40  N.  H.  US  ;  Brown  r.  T  incln,  47  N.  H.  468. 

«  Hat.h  r.  Hart.  40  N.  H.  «3  ;  Moulton  r.  Koljinson,  27  N.  H.  550  ;  .Ionian 
r.  Stapli-s,  57  Mi-.  352.  These  cases,  and  Bonie  that  follow,  are  given  without  any 
atU-nijit  at  n-t oncilinK  them.  They  »en-e  to  show  how  difficult,  if  not  imjiomible, 
it  i»  (o  lay  down  any  general  unifunn  rule  ujion  the  subject. 

»  Caswell  r.  Dietrich,  15  Wend.  379  ;  Foote  r.  Colvin,  3  Johns.  216  :  Bmdi*h 
r.  St:h.-nrk,  8  Johns.  151  ;  Bihhoj)  r.  Doty,  1  Vt.  37;  IHnehart  r.  Wil*in,  15 
Barb.  595  ;  but  this  test  of  a  sint'le  crop  baa  been  disregarded  in  later  cases,  Se« 
Moulton  r.  HobiuMtn,  27  X.  H.  550. 


608  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

rent  of  the  premises,  or  the  lessor  is  to  have  a  lien  upon  them 
as  security  for  the  rent,  as  if  the  general  property  in  them  was 
in  the  lessee,  it  seems  to  be  a  letting,  and  to  create  the  rela- 
tion of  landlord  and  tenant,  the  property  in  the  crops  being 
the  lessee's  alone  until  divided  and  delivered  to  the  lessor.^ 
And  in  some  of  the  States  it  has  been  held,  that  where  the 
owner  of  the  land  has  let  it  to  another  to  make  a  crop  of 
grain  upon  it,  the  latter  to  give  the  former  a  share  of  the  crop 
as  rent,  the  agreement  constitutes  the  parties  landlord  and 
tenant.2  And  the  law  is  thus  stated  in  one  case :  If  one  is 
hired  to  work  lands  and  get  a  crop,  to  be  compensated  by  a 
share  of  the  same,  he  has  no  legal  possession  beyond  the  right 
to  do  the  work.  But  if  the  farm  be  let  for  a  year  to  a  tenant 
to  cultivate  and  retain  a  part  of  the  produce,  it  makes  him  a 
lessee  entitled  to  possession,  and  liable  in  Pennsylvania  to  be 
distrained  for  rent.^ 

6.  In  Ross  V.  Swaringer,*  the  land-owner  agreed  with  Ross 
by  parol  to  lease  to  him  a  parcel  of  land  for  one  year  ;  he  to 
furnish  two  horses  to  w^ork  in  the  crop,  and  their  necessary 
food;  and  the  land-owner,  for  rent,  to  have  half  the  crop, 
and  out  of  the  residue  enough  to  pay  certain  claims  he  had 
against  Ross.  It  was  held  that  the  title  to  the  crop  was  in 
Ross,  and  the  land-owner  had  no  right  to  take  it  against  his 
will. 

6  a.  It  is,  after  all,  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  fix  any  rule 
by  which  to  determine  whether  carrying  on  a  farm  by  one  not 
the  owner,  upon  shares,  constitutes  him  a  tenant  with  a  sepa- 
rate right  of  property  in  the  crops,  or  makes  him  a  tenant  in 

1  Dockham  v.  Parker,  9  Me.  137;  Bailey  v.  Fillebrown,  9  Me.  12  ;  Butterfield 
V.  Baker,  5  Pick.  522  ;  Fry  v.  Jones,  2  Kawle,  11  ;  Briggs  v.  Thompson,  9  Penn. 
St.  338;  Munsell  v.  Carew,  2  Gush.  50.  And  in  such  case,  thougli  the  agree- 
ment be  that,  if  tenant  fail  to  jiay  the  rent,  the  crops  are  to  be  the  lessor's,  and 
he  may  dispose  of  them  ;  until  they  are  actually  delivered  to  the  lessor,  they  are 
subject  to  sale  or  attachment  as  the  property  of  the  lessee.  Deaver  v.  Rice,  4 
Dev.  &  Bat.  431 ;  Ross  v.  Swaringer,  9  Ired.  481 ;  Kelley  v.  Weston,  20  ]\Ie.  232. 
And  the  lessee  may  have  trespass  against  the  lessor  for  entering  and  taking  the 
crop.     Warner  V.  Abbey,  112  Mass.  355. 

2  Hoskins  v.  Rhodes,  1  Gill  &  J.  2G6  ;  Hatchell  v.  Kimbrough,  4  Jones 
(X.  C.)  163. 

3  Steel  V.  Frick,  56  Penn.  St.  172  ;  see  also  Herskell  v.  Bushnell,  37  Conn.  36. 
*  Ross  V.  Swaringer,  9  Ired.  481. 


Cii.  X.  _!^  10]  F«T\TRS  Fni:   v; m:'^.  (ii.i'.i 

common  of  tlio  frops,  witliout  beinir  IcsKoe  of  th-^  land,  or  a 
nicro  croppor,  or  hired  labon'r,  to  do  work  fur  comf)onHation, 
to  Ix"  derived  <iiit  of  tlio  crojis,  and  especially  to  lix  any  one 
rule  which  will  apply  to  :dl  thr  States.     A  easr  in  Massnehu- 
Bctts  serves  to  illustrate  the  doubtful  «li!ir;ieter  of  llu!  rrlation 
in  a  similar  ease.     Fitts  airreed  with  Walker,  the  hiud-owner, 
in   writiuir,  to  carry  on  his  farm  for  one  season,  each  party  to 
fuinish  half  the  seed,  Fitts  to  sow  it,  and  deliver  one-half,  Ac, 
in  the  baru,  for  the  owner.     The  court  say  it  was  not 
*a  contract  of  hire,  nor  a  mere  license  to  enter  and   [•307] 
cultivate  the  farm,  nor  a  tenancy  at  will.     While  they 
held  the  parties  tenants  in  common  of  the  croj)S,  they  say, 
'•  What  the  precise  nature  and  character  of  his  (Walker's) 
interest  (in  the  land)  was,  is  not  so  easily  determined."  '    Hut 
where  half  the  hay  was  to  be  spent  uj)on  the  farm,  and  the 
other  half  divided  between  lessor  and   lessee,  the  court   of 
Maine  held  that  the  legal  property  of  the  whole  was  in  flic 
lessee  until  division  had  been  made.-     Hut  where  the  lessee 
up(m  .shares  was  to  feed  out  the  hay  to  the  h^ssor's  stock,  who 
was  to  have  what  remained,  if  any,  it  was  held  that  the  hay  was 
the  lessor's,  and  that  he  might  have  tresjiass  agaijist  a  third 
person  who  carried  away  any  ])art  of  it  even  by  the  consent  of 
the  lessee.*     So  where  A  and  B  agreed  that  U  .should  carry  on 
A's  farm,  and  give  him  a  certain  share  of  the  crops,  stooked 
in  the  field,  for  A's  use,  but  instead  of  that  B  carried  off  the 
entire  crop,  he  was  held  to  be  a  trespasser  in  so  doing,  since 
he  had  no  lease  of  the  estate,  and  the  crops  were  construc- 
tively in  the  possession  of  A.     B  had  only  a  licen.se  to  do 
what  he  agreed  to  do,  and  was  liable  in  trespass  dc  bonis  for 
carrying  off  the  crops.*     In  tliis  connection  it  seems  proper  to 
add,  that  whatever  manure   is  made  liy  the  consumption  of 
the  products  of  leased  premises  becomes  the  property  of  the 
landlord,  though  lying  in  heaps,  and  made  by  the  cattle  of  the 

»  Walker  v.  Fitts,  24  Pick.  191.  See  Lewis  v.  Lymiin,  22  Pick.  437.  nheif 
the  court  say,  "  The  part  of  the  produce  which  was  granted  by  the  plaiiitifl*  (the 
ovmer  of  the  land)  was  in  the  nature  of  wages  for  services,  so  that  all  the  protiuce, 
except  that  part  which  was  granted  to  the  tenants,  became  and  remained  the 
property  of  the  plaintiff."     Delaney  r.  Root,  PI*  .Mass.  546. 

'  Symonds  r.  Hall,  37  Me.  3:. 4.  '  JorJiin  v.  Staples,  57  Me.  352. 

*  Wami-r  i-.  Hoisington,  42  Vt.  94. 
VOL.  I.— 39 


610  LAW  OF  REAL   PROPERTY.  [bOOK   I. 

tenant  from  crops  which  belonged  to  him  till  consumed,^  even 
though  the  tenant  be  at  will  only.^  But  this  does  not  a])ply 
to  tenants  of  other  than  agricultural  premises  in  respect  to 
any  manure  made  thereon,  as  in  livery-stables  and  the  like.^ 

7.  This  subject  is  fully  and  ably  discussed  by  Bell,  J.,  in 
Moulton  V.  Robinson,  who  says  it  is  vain  to  seek  in  the  recent 
books  of  the  English  common  law  for  the  rules  which  are  to 
regulate  the  rights  of  landlord  and  tenant  in  the  cases  above 
referred  to,  since  the  "  letting  on  shares  "  of  farming  property 
seems,  to  a  great  extent,  unknown  there.  He  holds  that,  where 
there  is  a  letting  with  a  reservation  of  part  of  the  profits,  it 
cannot  be  regarded  as  rent,  while  it  is  a  reservation  of  a  share 
of  the  crops  themselves,  which  remains  the  lessor's  during  the 
whole  time  it  is  growing,  it  being  much  the  same  as  if  one  of 
two  tenants  in  common  should  hire  his  co-tenant  to  carry  on 
his  half  of  the  common  property.  And  that  in  such  a  letting 
on  shares,  the  lessee,  so  far  as  the  possession  of  the  land  is 
concerned,  is  properly  the  tenant  as  against  his  land- 
[*368]  lord,  as  well  as  others,  and  the  *  property  in  the  resi- 
due of  the  crops,  not  reserved  by  the  lessor,  is  the 
tenant's  also.  And  for  an  injury  to  these  the  lessor  and  lessee 
must  join.  Several  other  points  are  discussed  in  the  opinion 
given,  but  the  above  illustrate  the  view  of  the  court  upon  the 
point  now  under  consideration.* 

1  Lasscll  V.  Reed,  6  Me.  222  ;  Middlebrook  v.  Corwin,  15  Wend.  169  ;  Lewis 
V.  Jones,  17  Penn.  St.  262;  Plumer  v.  Plumer,  30  N.  H.  558;  Daniels  v.  Pond, 
21  Pick.  367;  Lewis  v.  Lyman,  22  Pick.  437;  Hill  v.  De  Rochmont,  48  N.  H.  87. 

2  PeiTy  V.  Can-,  44  N.  H.  118. 

3  Needham  v.  Allison,  24  N.  H.  355;  Plumer  v.  Plumer,  30  N".  H.  558. 

*  Moulton  V.  Robinson,  27  N.  H.  550,  551-567.  The  case  is  reaffirmed  in  Dan- 
iels V.  Brown,  34  X.  H.  454;  Wentworth  v.  R.  R.,  55  N.  H.  540.  See  Co.  Lit. 
142  a  ;  Id.  47  a,  and  Bractou  there  cited  ;  see  47  N.  H.  468. 


CH.  X.  §11.]  ESTATES    FOR    YKARS.  «;n 

SECTION    Xl. 
OP   DESCENT    AND    DEVISES    OF   TEIIMS. 

1.  Tirms  may  Iw  dfvisfj,  or  go  to  executors,  &c. 

2.  A  ti-nii  may  take  ••(Toot  ns  n  ilovjsc  after  a  frf<'hoIiL 

3.  Will  not  \n\nii  as  an  )-8tutc  tail. 

1.  FuoM  till'  cIimHcI  cliiinu'ltT  of  tonus  for  years,  it  is  hardly 
iioccs.sary  to  aild  that  they  may  he  devised  or  thsposed  of  in 
payniont  of  (k-hts  l)y  an  executor  or  aihiiinisf  rator,  and  when 
devised  thi'v  jiass  without  any  formal  assiL'^nnienl.'  Such 
term  for  years  pas.scs  to  the  achninistrator  of  the  K-sscc  for 
the  Itenefit  of  Ids  estate,  and  hi;  cannot  give  it  up,  an<l  take  a 
new  h'ase:  to  himself."- 

'2.  Ami  a  devise  of  a  tei  in  to  A  for  life,  with  a  remaiinler 
over  to  n,  would  ho  good  as  an  e.xecntory  devise,  althouirh, 
theoretically,  A's  lifc-cstatc  woidd  he  largo  enough  to  engross 
the  entire  term,  and  leave  nothing  to  pass  hy  the  devise  of  a 
remainder.  Xor  could  A  do  anything  on  his  part  with  the 
term  which  would  jirevent  its  passing  at  his  death  to  the 
remainder-man.'^ 

3.  Ihit  if  the  dcvi.sc  had  hccn  to  A  and  the  heirs  of  his  hody, 
as  there  eamiot  he  an  estate  tail  in  a  chattel,  A  hocomcs 
therehy  the  ahsolute  owner  of  the  term.*  There  are  other 
incidents  to  an  estate  for  years,  among  which  are,  in  some 
cases,  emhlements,  and  a  gcMioral  lialtility  on  the  part  of  the 
tenant  for  commission  of  waste.  l>ut  as  these  sulijects  have 
heen  considered  in  previous  chapters  of  this  work,  they  are 
omitted  here. 

>   Hurton,  R.-al  Prop.  §§  031,  032.  ^  K.ating  r.  Condon,  68  Pcnu.  St.  75. 

•  Burton,  Real  Prop.  §§  040,  947.  ♦   liurtou,  Iliiil  Prop.  §  943. 


612  LAW  OF  REAL  PEOPEBTY.  [bOOK  I. 


CHAPTER   XI. 

ESTATES   AT   WILL. 

Sect.  1.     Estates  properly  at  Will. 
Sect.  2.     Estates  from  Year  to  Year. 


r*370]  ^SECTION  I. 

ESTATES   PROPERLY   AT   WILL. 

1.  Estates  at  will  defined. 

1  a.  They  can  only  arise  by  agreement. 

2.  Their  nature  at  common  law. 

2  a.  Tenant  cannot  convey  or  assign. 

3.  Changed  by  usage  into  terms. 

4.  Estates  at  will,  and  those  determinable  by  notice. 

5.  Division  of  the  subject. 

6-8.  Estate  of  tenant  at  will,  how  detemiinable. 

9-12.  "What  acts  by  lessor,  &c.,  determine  it. 

13-15.  What  acts  by  tenant  determine  it. 

16.  When  tenant  becomes  a  trespasser. 

17.  When  tenant  disclaims  holding  under  his  lessor. 
18,  19.  What  he  may  do  after  tenancy  is  determined. 

20,  21.     Landlord's  remedy  for  acts  done  by  stranger,  where  there  is  tenancy  at 

will. 
22-28.     Estates  strictly  at  will,  by  agreement,  and  by  implication. 

29.     There  may  be  a  tenancy  at  will,  though  no  rent  reserved. 
30,  31.     When  one  holding  under  contract  to  purchase  is  liable  for  rent. 

31  a.  When  the  law  implies  a  liability  for  use  and  occupation. 

32.  When  tenant  under  contract  to  purchase  is  a  trespasser. 

33.  When  assumpsit  will  not  lie  for  rent. 

34.  When  vendor  may  be  charged  rent. 

35-37.  When  notice  necessary  to  determine  a  tenancy,  and  how  long. 

38,  89.  Notice  affected  by  agreement  or  statute,  and  what  is  the  general  rule. 

40.  Estates  determine  at  the  time  agreed,  though  agreement  be  not  binding. 

41.  No  notice  necessary  in  case  of  estates  strictly  at  will. 

1.  An  estate  at  will  in  lands  is  that  which  a  tenant  has  by 
an  entry  made  thereon  under  a  demise  to  hold  during  the 


Lil.   Ai.   .:^    l.J  ESTATKS    AT    WILL.  VA'-l 

joint  wills  of  the  purtit's  to  lliu  huiuc.'  It  (Iocs  imt  arise  till 
actual  possession  taken  by  the  lessee ,2  ami  is  <leterniinal)le  at 
tlie  will  of  either  party  to  the  ileniise.'' 

1  a.  A  tenancy  at  will  cannot  arise  without  un  actual  grant 
or  contract,  and  when  it  does  arise  the  tenant  is  entitled  to 
a  reasoiialih.'  notice  of  his  landlord's  wish  to  terminate  the 
estate  Id'fore  an  action  can  he  maintained  against  him  for  ]ios- 
session.*  Thus  wheit-  the  tenancy  was  to  he  for  live  years, 
unless  the  lessor  should  wish  to  l»uild  upon  the  estate,  in  which 
case  the  lessor  was  to  (piit,  is  not  a  truancy  at  will,  hut  one 
upon  condition,  and  determinahle  oidy  hy  reasonaltle  notice 
of  the  li'ssor  to  the  lessee  of  his  intention  to  build.  And  if, 
without  such  notice,  the  lessor  enters  upon  the  lessee  to  build, 
he  would  l»e  a  trespasser.''  And  whei'e  a  tenant  for  life  airreed, 
by  |)arol,  with  the  reversioner  that  he  might  occupy  with  her 
timing  her  life,  it  was  held  to  constitute  a  tenancy  at  will 
which  she  could  terminate  at  any  time  by  giving  the  notice 
reipiired  hy  statute  in  cases  of  tenancies  at  will,  which,  in  New 
Hampshire,  is  three  mouths.''  Ihit  this  agreement  nuiy  lie  an 
imitlied  one,  as  when  A  by  agreenifut  with  l>  cut  tin-  luiy  on 
the  farm  of  the  latter  upon  shares,  an<l  jdaced  it  in  ITs  l)ani 
to  be  divided,  he  was  held  to  be  so  far  a  tenant  at  will  of  the 
premises,  that  he  was  at  liberty  to  enter  and  divide  the  hay 
and  remove  the  share  belonging  to  him,  without  Iteiug  a  tres- 
passer thereby.' 

2.  At  common  law,  this  was  originally  the  nature  of  all  es- 
tates created  by  demise  for  an  uncertain  jteriod  of  time.  The 
tenant  had  no  certain  indefeasible  estate,  nothing  which  he 
could  assign,^  though  a  release  to  him  of  the  inheritance  would 
be  elYectual  to  vest  such  inheritance  in  him,  because  of  the 
privity  there  was  between  him  and  the  lessor.^  But  he  could 
not  prescribe  for  a  Avay  or  other  easement,  as  a|>i)urtenant  tu 

'  Co.  Lit.  55  n  ;  Tiid.  Cas.  10;  Smith,  UncL  i  T. n.  IC. 

a  Pollock  r.  Kittnll,  2  Taylor  (N.  C. ),  ir>2  ;  'J  Flint.  Hoal  Prop.  215. 

•  Co.  Lit.  55  n. 

«  Blum  r.  PtolxTtson,  24  Cnl.  127;  Chftmberlin  r.  Donnhue.  45  Vt  50,  55. 
»  .Shaw  V.  HofTman,  25  Mi.li.  162.  •  l.»avitt  r.  Loavitt,  47  X.  H.  32a 

'  Wliito  V.  Khvell,  48  .Mr.  3t50. 
8  2  Flint.  Heal  Prop.  215  ;  Co.  Lit.  57  a  ;  M.  270  h,  u.  223. 

•  Lit.  §  460,  u.  223  ;  2  Pnst.  Al.s.  26. 


Gl-1  LAW    OF   REAL    PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

the  premises  held  by  him,  by  reatiou  of  the  inadequacy  of  his 
own  estate.^ 

2  a.  A  tenant  at  will  has  no  such  interest  or  estate  in  the 
land  in  his  possession  that  he  can  convey  it,  or  out  of  which 
he  can  create  any  estate  in  another  which  will  avail  against 
the  owner  of  the  land.  If  he  lease  it,  it  will  be  good  between 
him  and  his  lessee  so  long  as  he  is  suffered  to  enjoy  the  prem- 
ises. But  if  such  lessee  of  the  tenant  at  will  be  evicted  by  a 
superior  title,  he  will  be  released  thereby  from  rent  falling 
due  after  such  eviction,  and  may  defend  against  a  covenant 
in  his  lease  by  way  of  recoupment  for  a  breach  of  his  lessor's 
covenant  for  quiet  enjoyment.''^  If,  therefore,  a  tenant  at  will 
assign  his  interest,  the  assignment  terminates  the  tenancy, 
nor  can  the  assignee  claim  the  rights  of  the  tenant  at  will 
against  the  original  lessor.^  The  above  doctrine  is  also  adopt- 
ed by  the  courts  of  New  York,  and  in  the  cases  cited  below. 
In  case  of  an  assignment  or  demise  by  a  tenant  at  will  and  an 
entry  made  by  his  assignee  or  lessee,  the  original  landlord 
might  enter  upon  him  as  a  disseisor.  He  would  have  no 
better  rights  than  a  tenant  at  sufferance,  and  no  notice  is  re- 
quisite to  determine  such  a  tenancy.  The  relation  of  landlord 
and  tenant  does  not  pass  to  the  assignee  of  the  tenant  where 
the  tenancy  is  terminated  by  the  very  act  of  transmission  of 
the  possession  by  the  tenant.^  But  if  the  lessor  sue  the 
assignee  of  the  tenant  at  will  for  rent,  or  for  use  and  occupa- 
tion, he  thereby  affirms  the  assignment,  and  makes  the  assignee 
his  tenant  at  will.  So  if  he  accept  rent  from  a  tenant  at  suf- 
ferance acci'uing  after  the  determination  of  the  lease.^ 

3.  It  will  hereafter  appear,  however,  that  from  an  early 
period,  in  order  to  obviate  the  inconveniences  growing  out  of 
so  precarious  a  tenure,  estates  which  at  first  were  held  to  be 
at  will,  grew,  by  usage,  into  terms  which  were  not  subject 
to  be  defeated  at  the  mere  will  of  either  party,  and  took  the 


1  2  Bl.  Com.  265.  2  Holbrook  v.  Young,  108  Mass.  83,  85. 

3  King  V.  Lawson,  98  Mass.  309,  311  ;  Say  v.  Stoddard,  27  Ohio  St.  478. 

*  Reckhow  v.  Schanck,  43  N.  Y.  448,  451  ;  Cunningham  v.  Holton,  55  Jle. 
33,  36  ;  Dingley  v.  Buffum,  57  Me.  381  ;  Ililbourn  v.  Fogg,  99  Mass.  11  ;  Pahner 
V.  Bowker,  106  Mass.  317.     Cf.  Betz  v.  Delbert,  14  W.  No.  Cns.  360. 

^  Cunningham  v.  Holton,  55  Me.  33,  38  ;  Cunningham  v.  Horton,  57  Me.  420. 


(11.   \l.   §   1.]  F.STATKS    AT    WILL.  ""V" 

mime  of  tcnancios  from  year  to  year.'  Ami  a  tenancy  win-re 
no  rent  is  reservt-d,  and  no  time  fixed  for  determininjj:  the 
occupation,  is  still  li(d<l  to  he  a  temimy  at  will,  detf'rminalil)' 
on  notice.^ 

-1.  There  is  still  a  class  ot   eslal<'s  which  have  the  (|iialiii('S 
and  projierlies  of  estates  at  will.     And  there  is  also  a  cla.^s  of 
estates  which,  thouudi  iiut  |»i((|)frly  estates  from  year 
to  year,  *  cannot   he  terminatid   without    notii-c  for  a    ['oTl] 
lon^;er  or  shorter  period. 

').  These  will  he  severally  treated  of,  l»y  considering'',  1. 
Tile  incidents  and  characteristics  of  j)roi(er  estates  at  w  ill ;  '2. 
In  what  cases  such  estates  now  exist;  3.  In  what  cases  u 
notice  to  (jnit  is  neccHsary  to  determine  an  cstato  at  will  ;  4. 
What  are  emhraced  in  estates  from  year  to  year,  their  nature 
and  characteristics;  5.  The  elTect  of  the  provision  of  the  first 
and  second  sections  of  the  lOn^lish  statute  of  frauils,  and  the 
corresponding  American  statutes,  upon  the  creation  of  estates 
by  parol. 

(i.  An  estate  at  will  is  dctei'ininaltle  at  tin-  will  of  either 
party,  altliou<^li  hy  the  airreeiiieiit  creating  it  it  is  exjiresseil  \i\ 
he  at  the  will  of  one  only.'^  IJut  where  a  lease  was  made  1o 
one  and  his  heirs  for  the  tei-m  of  one  huiidied  years,  at  a  cer- 
tain rent,  with  a  ri'.dit  in  the  lessee,  his  heirs  or  assigns,  to 
lujld  for  as  much  lont'cr  time  as  he  chose,  at  the  same  rent,  it 
was  held  in  one  case  to  he,  on  the  part  of  the  lessor,  a  perjietual 
lease,  but  on  that  of  the  lessee  an  estate  at  will,  after  the  ex- 
piration of  the  first-mentioned  term.^  While,  in  another  case, 
a  lease  to  one  at  an  agreed  rent,  so  long  as  he  chose  to  occupy, 
was  held  to  be  a  lease  at  will,  not  only  of  the  lessee,  but  of  the 
lessor  also.*  This  right,  moreover,  is  a  mere  personal  privilege 
which  he  cannot  assign  to  another.^  Still,  if  a  t<'nant  at  w  ill 
were  to  let  the  premises  to  a  third  party,  who  should  enter 
ui)on  them  under  such  lease,  the  latter  would  not  he  admitted 
to  impugn  the  title  of  his  lessor."  And  if  a  tenant  at  will  lets 
a  jHirt  of  the  jji-emises  to  a  third  party,  the  latter  itecomes  a 

'  2  Prtst.  AKst.  25.  ^  1),,,,^.  ^    Da,,,,.^  33  X.  H.  429,  aixl  com^h  c'Hed. 

•  2  Flint  Hi-nl.  Prop.  216;  Co.  Lit.  55  a  ;  Cheover  v.  IVan«on,  Hi  Pirk.  272. 

*  Elljiigrr  r.  Lewis,  32  Penn.  St.  307.  •  Doo  v.  Ki.lmnlH,  4  IiuL  374. 

■  (.0.  Lit.  57  a.  1  (.obum  r.  Pulimr,  8  Cuhli.  124. 


616  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  1. 

sub-tenant  to  the  tenant  at  will,  and  not  his  assignee,  and 
therefore  not  liable  to  the  owner  for  rent.^  And  though,  by 
virtue  of  his  possession,  the  tenant  may  have  trespass  quare 
clausum  /regit  against  a  stranger  for  an  injury  to  the  posses- 
sion,2  yet,  if  he  be  wrongfully  dispossessed  and  die,  his  execu- 
tor cannot  maintain  the  statute  process  to  recover  possession 
of  the  premises,  nor  continue  an  action  which  the  tenant  had 
begun. ^ 

7.  The  estate  of  the  lessor  of  a  tenant  at  will  is  not  prop- 
erly a  reversion,  and  therefore  such  tenant  does  not  owe  fealty 
by  reason  of  his  tenancy,  nor  can  a  remainder  be  limited  upon 
an  estate  at  will.*  In  the  words  of  Lord  Abinger,  "  A  tenant  at 
will  has  a  mere  scintilla  of  interest,  which  a  landlord  may  de- 
termine by  making  a  feoffment  upon  the  land  with  livery,  or 
by  a  demand  of  possession."  ^  A  tenant  at  will  is  entitled  to 
estovers,  and,  as  the  law  is  now  understood,  to  emblements, 
when  the  tenancy  is  determined  by  the  landlord.^  If  a  tenant 
at  will  plant  crops  and  abandon  the  premises  before  they  are 
ripe,  he  loses  them.  If  the  lessor  expel  him,  the  lessee  may 
claim  them  as  emblements.  Nor  can  the  lessor,  by  conveying 
the  land  with  the  growing  crops,  affect  the  tenant's  right  to 

such  emblements.'^ 
[*372]  *  8.  A  marked  peculiarity  of  this  estate  is  the  man- 
ner in  which  it  may  be  determined ;  any  act  or  decla- 
ration indicating  such  intention  on  the  part  of  either  party 
being  sufficient  to  put  an  end  to  it.  And  it  may  be  assumed, 
that  any  act  or  declaration  which  is  inconsistent  with  a  con- 
tinued, voluntary,  aiid  undisturbed  relation  of  landlord  and 
tenant,  will  determine  it.^ 

9.  In  respect  to  what  acts  may  be  sufficient  to  put  an  end 

1  Austin  V.  Thomson,  45  N.  H.  113. 

2  Hayward  v.  Sedgley,  14  Me.  439  ;  Little  v.  Palister,  3  Me.  6  ;  Clark  v. 
Smith,  25  Penn.  St.  137  ;  2  RoUe,  Abr.  551. 

8  Fenin  v.  Kenney,  10  Met.  294. 

*  2  Flint.  Real  Prop.  222  ;  Burton,  Real  Prop.  395,  n. 

5  Ball  V.  Cullimore,  2  Cr.  M.  &  R.  120. 

6  2  Flint.  Real  Prop.  216  ;  Co.  Lit.  55  b  ;  Davis  v.  Thompson,  13  Me.  209  ; 
Sherburne  v.  Jones,  20  Me.  70. 

7  Brown  v.  Thurston,  56  Me.  126. 

8  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  16  ;  Turner  v.  Doe,  9  M.  &  "W.  643,  and  note,  Am. 
ed.  ;  Walden  v.  Bodley,  14  Pet.  156. 


rll.  XI.  §   l.J  ESTATES    Al    WILL.  '-17 

to  such  tenancy,  it  is  stated,  in  ^'eneral  terms,  that  "any  act 
(lone  upon  the  huul  hy  the  lessor,  in  assertion  of  his  title  to 
the  |>ossessiiin,  ih-terniines  the  will."' 

10.  Thus  notice  t(t  (|uit,-  a  (Ifujiind  nf  possession,^  an  entry 
upon  the  land,  whether  tenant  is  present  or  not  '  wh<n  made 
known  to  hiui/'  doin;^  any  act  on  the  premises  fur  which  the 
lessor  won  hi  otherwise  be  liahle  to  an  action  of  trcHpas.s  at  the 
suit  of  the  tenant,'^  carryini;  oil"  stone  or  trees  from  the  prem- 
ises airainst  tenant's  will,"  makinir  a  h'ofl'ment  on  the  land  to 
a  third  party ,^  threateninji:  to  take  le^al  measures  to  recover 
the  land,'-'  or  stdlimr,*"  or  leasini;  it."  And  a  conveyance  of 
the  land  hy  a  landlord  to  a  stranger  determines  a  tenancy  at 
will,  and  chanties  it  into  one  at  sulVerance,  thou'ih  made  for 
the  express  iiurpose.'-^  And  a  written  lease  from  the  lessor  to 
a  strantrer  would  have  the  same  elTect  upon  the  oriirinal 
tenancy  at  will.'-'  And  if  one  of  two  tenants  at  will  take 
a  lease  of  the  premises,  it  determines  the  lease  of  his  co-tenant, 


»   H:ill  r.  rulliinore,  'J  C.  .M.  A:  l!.  l'J«  ;  Risiiij;  r.  Staniiiinl,  17  Muss.  2S1. 
«  Kllis  r.  I'liigf,  1  rick.  43  ;  Davis  v.  Thoiiipsoii,  13  .Mc  20t». 
»  I)..-  ..  M'K;i.g,  10  R.  k  C.  721  ;  Din  v.  How.ll,  7  Iml.  rjd. 

*  Bull  r.  Culliiiiorc,  3  Cr.  M.  k  K.  120  ;  Curl  v.  Lowoll,  U»  Pj.k.  2r>  ;  Moore 
r.  Hoyd,  24  Mf.  242  ;  Tiirn.'r  i'.  Dot-,  y  M.  &  W.  643.  If  the  n«t  !»■  an  ontr>' 
uiKiti  the  laml,  it  must  Ix-  ilunc  witli  an  intt-nt  to  end  the  lussoe's  estate,  which  is 
to  he  founil  hy  the  juiy.      Holly  r.  Hrown,  14  Conn.  2r».'i. 

*  Cook  r.  Cook,  2S  Ahi.  600  ;  Kising  r.  .St^mnanl,  17  Miuss.  282  ;  Furlong  v. 
Learj',  8  Cush.  409;  Mizner  v.  Munioe.  10  Gray,  290,  292;  Doc  r.  Thomas,  6 
Kxch.  854  ;  Pratt  i-.  Farrar,  10  Allen,  519. 

0  Turner  v.  Doe,  9  II.  &  W.  643.      , 

7  D.H-  V.  Turner,  7  .M.  &  W.  22i; ;  Co.  Lit.  55  h. 

«  Hall  V.  Cullimore,  2  C.  M.  &  R.  120  ;  Uising  r.  Stnnnar.l,  17  Mxis.  282.  2S6. 

»  Do.'  r.  Pri.e,  9  Bing.  356. 

>'  Co.  Lit.  55  h.  57  a  ;  Jackson  r.  Al.lrich,  13  .lohns.  66;  Howar.l  v.  M.rriam, 
5  Cush.  563;  Keily  r.  W.iiic,  12  .Met.  300  ;  Alton  v.  Pickering,  9  N.  11.  4'.'4  ; 
Tu.l.  Ciw.  15. 

"  Mihln-th  v.  Conant,  10  Met.  298.  And  though  lea.se  Ik-  to  commence  nt  a 
future  time,  it  determines  tlie  tenancy  nt  will  as  soon  as  lease  takes  effect.  Tuil. 
Cas.  13;   Dinsdale  r.  IK-s,  T.  Raym.  224  ;  K.dly  p.  WaiU',  12  Met,  300. 

>-  Curtis  r.  Calvin,  1  Allen,  215  ;  McFarlm.l  r.  Chase,  7  Ciray,  462  ;  F.sty  c. 
Baker,  50  Me.  32.'..  .<h-o  also  Young  r.  Youn/f,  36  .Mc.  133  :  Winter  v.  .Stevens, 
9  Allen,  526,  530.  F.ven  if  the  conveyance  be  of  part  only  of  the  premisca. 
Emmes  r.  Feely,  132  Moss.  346. 

'"  Pnitt  r.  Farmr.  10  Allen,  519  ;  Clark  v.  Whcelock,  99  Mass.  14  ;  Arnold  » 
Nosh,  126  Mass.  397. 


618  LAW    OF  REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

and  he  may  eject  him.^  Upon  an  alienation  by  the  hmdlord 
made  known  to  the  tenant,  he  becomes  a  tenant  at  suft'erance, 
and  not  entitled  to  any  notice  to  quit,  nor  to  any  action  airainst 
the  landlord  if  he  ejects  him  without  unnecessary  force.  But 
he  would  be  entitled  to  reasonable  notice  to  remove  himself, 
his  family,  and  his  goods,  and  to  remain  or  enter  for  that 
purpose  without  being  deemed  a  trespasser,  though  his  es- 
tate is  determined  by  the  conveyance  and  notice  thereof  to 
him.2 

11.  The  death  of  either  party  determines  an  estate  at  will.^ 
But  in  a  recent  case,  Kelly,  C.  B.,  uses  the  following  language  : 
"  It  would  rather  seem  that  a  tenancy  at  will  may  continue  to 
subsist  after  the  death  of  oue  of  the  parties,  unless  the  heir  or 
legal  representative  shall  do  something  to  manifest  his  inten- 
tion to  determine  the  tenancy."  *    If  the  lessor  dies, 

[*373]  the  lessee  becomes  tenant  at  sufferance,^  *  and  the 
personal  representative  of  the  deceased  lessee  has  no 
right  to  possession  after  his  death.^  But  if  there  be  two 
lessors  or  two  lessees,  the  death  of  one  does  not  determine 
the  tenancy." 

12.  So  it  would  be  determined  by  a  judgment  for  pos- 
session against  the  lessor  in  favor  of  a  stranger,  or  by 
an  entry  under  a  paramount  title,^  or  the  assignment  of 
the  lessor's  estate  under  a  process  of  insolvency  against 
him.^ 

13.  Acts  by  which  the  tenant  forfeits  or  puts  an  end  to  his 

1  Casey  v.  King,  98  Mass.  503. 

2  Pi-att  V.  Farrar,  10  Allen,  519,  521  ;  Low  v.  Elwell,  121  Mass.  309. 

8  James  r.  Dean,  11  Ves.  383  ;  Cody  v.  Quarterinau,  12  Ga.  386,  400  ;  Rising 
V.  Stonnanl,  17  Mass.  282  ;  Ferrin  v.  Kenney,  10  Met.  294  ;  Howard  v.  Merriam, 
5  Cush.  563;  Robie  v.  Smith,  21  Me.  114;  Manchester  v.  Doddridge,  3  Ind. 
360. 

*  Moi-ton  V.  Woods,  L.  R.  4  Q.  B.  293,  306. 

5  Reed  V.  Reed,  48  Me.  388. 

6  2  Flint.  Real  Prop.  217.  '  Co.  Lit.  55  b. 

8  Howard  v.  Meniam,  5  Cush.  563  ;  Hill  v.  Jordan,  30  Me.  367,  in  which  the 
lessor's  mortgagee  entered  under  his  mortgage,  thereby  determining  the  tenancy 
at  will  of  liis  lessee.  2  Flint.  Real  Prop.  220  ;  Stedman  v.  Gassett,  18  Yt.  346  ; 
Hatstat  r.  Packard,  7  Cush.  245 ;  HemphiU  v.  Tevis,  4  "Watts  &  S.  565  ;  Morse 
V.  Goddard,  13  Met.  177. 

9  Doe  V.  Thomas,  6  Exch.  854  ;  Tud.  Cas.  12. 


ClI.  XI.   sj  l.]  ESTATKS    AT  WILL.  G19 

cstiite  at  will  arc  the  assipmunt  t»f   lii.s  iutorcst  to  another,' 
or  liis  conveying  the  land  itscll'.-^ 

14.  I)Ut  such  an  assignment  does  not,  of  itsrlf,  juit  an  rnd 
to  tlu'  tenancy,  unless  the  landlord  has  notice  of  it.  I'ntil 
then,  hv  ni:iy  treat  his  lessee  as  his  tenant.^  So  where  one 
hired  a  lutiise  and  was  to  pay  rent  monthly  in  advanee,  and, 
having  failetl  to  do  so,  (jnitted  without  giving  a  month's 
notlee,  it  was  held  that  it  did  not  lie  in  him  to  determine 
his  tenancy  hy  such  failure  to  pay  the  rent  in  advanee,  with- 
out a  regular  notice,  and  that  he  was  therefore  liable  for  a 
month's  rent  after  his  ahandonment.*  The  lessor  may  hold 
the  assignee  as  his  tenant  liable  iov  rent,  or  may  treat  him  as 
a  trespasser  or  disseisor  at  his  election.'' 

15.  If  a  tenant  at  will  abandon  the  premi.ses,  his  estate 
cea.ses,  esjiecially  if  he  declare  he  will  no  longer  hold  them.'^ 

IG.  Although  it  would  seem  that  a  tenant  at  will  cannot  be 
technically  chargeable  in  waste,'  if  he  do  acts  which  would 
be  voluntary  waste  in  a  tenant  for  life  or  years,  he  may  be 
treated  as  a  trespassi'r,  having  forfeited  his  estate.^ 
So  if  he  sulVer  the  *land  to  be  set  oft'  as  his  own  on  [*3T4] 
an  execution  against  him  without  disclosing  the  true 
owner,  his  estate  is  forfeited.'^ 

IT.  If  the  tenant  disclaim  holding  under  his  lessor,  or 
denies  his  landlord's  title,'°  or  do  acts  inconsistent  with  his 
tenure,  as  if,  being  in  possession,  he  take  a  conveyance  in  fee 

'  CoojiiT  r.  Adiinis,  6  C'usli.  S"  ;  Co.  Lit.  57  a  ;  Tud.  Cas.  13  ;  Smith,   Land. 
k  Ten.  17  ;  Cole  r.  Lake  Co.,  54  N.  H.  242,  277. 
2  Den  r.  Howell,  7  I  red.  496. 

•  Pinhorn  v.  Souster,  8  Exch.  763,  772  ;  Smith,  Land,  k  Ten.  20  ;  Carpenter 
«.  Colins,  Yelv.  73. 

•  Si>raj;ue  r.  Qiiinn,  108  Mass,  553. 

•  Overman  i'.  Siiulwni,  27  Vt.  54  ;  Co.  Lit.  57  a  ;  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  20. 

•  Chandler  r.  Thurston,  10  Tick.  205  ;  Smith,  Laud,  k  Ten.  20. 
'  Co.  Lit.  57  a  ;  Smith,  Luul.  &  T.n.  20. 

•  Phillij«  r.  Covert,  7  Johns.  1  ;  Daniels  r.  Pond,  21  Pick.  367.  Rut  such 
will  not  be  the  effect  of  committing  waste  where  the  statute  re«]uires  three  mouths' 
notice  to  quit.     Young  r.  Young,  36  Me.  133. 

•  CamjiU'll  r.  Procter,  6  Me.  12. 

w  Wootlwanl  r.  Brown,  13  Pet.  1  ;  Willison  p.  Watkin.s  3  Pet.  43  ;  Currier  c. 
Earl,  13  Me.  216  ;  Farrow  r.  Kdmundson,  4  B.  Mou.  605  ;  Duke  r.  Haqn-r.  6 
Yerg.  280  ;  Harrison  r.  Middleton,  11  Gratt.  527  ;  Fui.selman  v.  WorUiini^ton. 
14  111.  135.     See  anU,  p.  •'iQ\. 


620  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   L 

of  the  premises  from  a  third  person,  he  will  determine  his 
estate  at  the  election  of  his  landlord.^  But  the  lessee  cannot 
determine  the  tenancy  so  as  to  deny  his  lessor's  title  until  he 
shall  have  surrendered  possession  of  the  leased  premises  to  the 
lessor,  or  yielded  to  an  eviction  by  a  title  paramount.^  And 
the  lessor  may  sue  him  as  a  disseisor  without  an  entry  or  no- 
tice, and  may  maintain  an  action  for  a  tort  as  if  he  had  origi- 
nally entered  by  wrong.^  And  the  same  would  be  the  effect 
of  a  denial  on  the  part  of  a  tenant,  that  he  held  ujider  \iim 
to  whom  he  stands  in  the  relation  of  tenant  and  landlord.* 

18.  Notwithstanding  the  estate  of  the  tenant  is  wholly  de- 
termined in  the  cases  above  stated,  and  he  has  no  longer  any 
right  to  possession  of  the  premises,  when  it  is  done  by  the 
lessor,  the  law  will  not  treat  the  lessee  as  a  trespasser  for 
entering  within  a  reasonable  time  and  removing  his  effects, 
nor  for  removing  his  emblements  when  entitled  to  them.^ 

19.  But  he  would  not  be  allowed,  beyond  this,  a  reasonable 
time  to  find  a  new  place  suitable  for  his  business.^  And  what 
shall  be  a  reasonable  time,  in  any  case,  is  a  question  of  law  to 
be  determined  by  the  court.'' 

20.  From  the  peculiar  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  to  the 
estate  in  case  of  a  tenancy  at  will,  the  question  has  been  dis- 
cussed, what  would  be  the  landlord's  remedy  for  an  injury 
done  by  a  stranger  to  the  premises  while  in  the  occupancy  of 
his  tenant,  and  whether  he  could  maintain  trespass  quare 
clausum  fregit.  It  has  been  held  that  if  the  injury  be  a  per- 
manent one  to  the  inheritance,  such  as  cutting  down  trees 
and  the  like,  such  action  may  be  sustained.^ 

1  Sharpe  v.  Kelley,  5  Denio,  431  ;  Isaacs  v.  Gearlieart,  12  B.  lion.  231  ;  Ben- 
nock  V.  Whipple,  12  Me.  346. 

2  Towne  v.  Butterfield,  97  Mass.  105.  ^  Russell  v.  Fabyan,  34  N.  H.  218. 

4  Sampson  v.  Schaeffer,  3  Cal.  196,  205  ;  Boston  v.  Binney,  11  Pick.  1,  8  ; 
Chamberlin  v.  Donahue,  45  Vt.  50,  55. 

5  Doe  V.  M'Kaeg,  10  B.  &  C.  721  ;  2  Flint,  Real  Prop.  218  ;  Lit.  §  69  ;  Rising 
V.  Stannard,  17  Mass.  282  ;  Ellis  v.  Paige,  1  Pick.  43  ;  TuniertJ.  Doe,  9  M.  &  W. 
647,  note  to  Am.  ed.  ;  ante,  pi.  10  and  note. 

6  Mann  v.  Hughes,  20  Law  Rep.  628. 

1  Co.  Lit.  56  b  ;  Ellis  v.  Paige,  1  Pick.  43.  See  Pratt  v.  Farrar,  10  Allen, 
519,  where  ten  days,  and  Arnold  v.  Nash,  126  Mass.  397,  where  two  days  was  so 
held. 

«  Starr  v.  Jackson,  11  Mass.  519  ;  Hingham  v.  Sprague,  15  Pick.  102.     And 


CII.  XI.  §  1.]  ESTATES    AT   WILL.  621 

*'21.  But  it  would  sccMii  that  the  doctrine  woiihl  not  [*'57r>] 
apply  in  any  cast-  except  of  a  pun-  tenancy  at  will, 
where  the  lessor  may  enter  at  any  moment;  for  where  the 
premises  hatl  heen  lea.sed  for  a  year,  the  lessor  couM  nni  have 
trespass.'  And  the  same  ride  was  applied  where  the  tenant 
was  intitled  hy  statutes  to  three  months'  notice  heforo  he  was 
comi)ellal)le  to  quit  the  prcmi.scs.-  JUit  in  all  these  cases  an 
action  on  the  ca.sc  would  lie  in  favor  of  the  lessor.*'' 

2*2.  The  necessity  of  f^ivinii;  notice  in  order  to  determine  a 
tenancy  at  will  which  has  hecomc  so  general  has  reduceil  the 
class  of  estates  held  strictly  at  will  to  comparatively  few  in 
nund»er.  They  still  exist  in  certain  ca.scs,  and  form  a  second 
division  of  this  suhjcct.  They  arc  divided  into  two  clas.ses, 
such  as  are  made  so  by  express  agreement  of  the  parties,  and 
such  as  are  created  by  imiilication  of  law. 

23.  If  therefore,  a  tenancy  be  created  by  express  word.s, 
clearly  showinjj;  the  intention  and  ajjreeraent  of  the  parties  that 
it  shall  !)('  only  .so  lonix  as  both  j)arties  please,  it  will  constitute 
a  i)ropcr  estate  at  will,  althoui^h  rent  be  reserved,  payable  by 
the  year,  or  aliquot  ])arts  of  a  year.*  If  the  tenant  at  will  is 
to  pay  rent  at  certain  intervals,  and  the  lessor  determines  the 
tenancy  between  the  intervals  of  payment,  he  camiot  recover 

this  idea  is  favored  by  Ripley  v.  Yale,  IG  Vt  257  ;  Davis  v.  Nush,  32  Me.  411. 
In  Cushin^  v.  Kenfield,  5  Allen,  307,  where  defendant  broke  a  window,  and  was 
held  liable  to  tlie  landlord,  the  form  of  the  action  was  waived. 

»  Lienow  r.  Ritchie,  8  Pick.  235. 

3  French  r.  Fuller,  23  Pick.  104.  This  is  somewhat  remarkable,  as  in  Massa- 
chusetts, notwithstanding  the  statute,  such  tenancies  have  all  the  incidents  of 
strict  tenancies  at  will. 

■  Lienow  V.  Ritchie,  8  Pick-  235.  And  that  trespass  would  not  lie,  see  Camp- 
bell r.  Arnold,  1  Johns.  511  ;  Clark  t>.  Smith,  25  Penn.  St.  137.  See  Starr  v. 
Jackson,  11  Mass.  519,  n.  In  Iowa  he  may  maintain  trespass  by  force  of  statute; 
Brown  v.  Bridges,  31  Iowa,  138,  145. 

«  2  Prcst.  Abs.  25  ;  Richanlson  v.  I.4indgridge,  4  Taunt.  128;  Smith,  Lead. 
Cas.  75  ;  Tud.  Cas.  15  ;  Smith,  Land.  &.  Ten.  23,  u  ;  Doe  v.  Cox,  11  Q.  B.  122  ; 
2  Flint,  Pical  Prop.  215  ;  Humphries  r.  Humphries,  3  Ired.  362  :  Doe  v.  Davies, 
7  Exch.  89  ;  Sullivan  v.  Enders,  3  Dana,  66;  Elliott  v.  Stone,  1  Gray,  571.  In 
both  Doe  r.  Cox  and  Doe  v.  Davies  there  was  an  agreement  to  pay  rent  quar- 
terly. In  Cudlip  V.  Rundall,  4  Mod.  9,  the  lessor  accepted  pnrt  of  the  premises 
descrilK'd,  with  i>crmis.sion  to  the  lessee  to  hold  the  excepte*!  part  when  the  lessor 
did  not  want  the  same.  In  Harrison  r.  Middleton,  11  Grntt.  527,  the  tenant 
held  under  a  sealed  instrument,  which  contained  nn  agri'<inent  to  surrender  to 
the  lessor's  grantee  whenever  he  should  choose  to  take  possession. 


622  LAW   OP   EEAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

for  the  time  the  tenant  may  have  occupied  subsequent  to  the 
last  pay-day .1 

24.  The  instances  of  tenancies  at  will  by  implication  of  law 
are  chiefly  those  where  the  tenant  enters  by  permission  of  the 
owner,  for  an  indefinite  period,  with  some  other  intention  than 

to  create  the  relation  of  lessor  and  lessee.^  Thus 
[*376]  where  a  *  householder  permitted  another  to  occupy 

rent  free,  the  tenant  was  one  at  will.^  So  wliere  the 
owners  of  a  dissenters'  chapel  and  dwelling-house  placed  a 
minister  in  the  latter  as  a  minister  of  the  congregation.*  So 
where  the  widow  of  the  tenant,  from  year  to  year,  was  suffered 
to  occupy  the  premises,  she  paying  rent  to  the  lessor,  she  was 
held  to  be  strictly  tenant  at  will  of  the  administrator  of  the 
deceased  tenant.^ 

25.  Where  a  person  is  let  into  possession  under  a  contract 
to  purchase  lands,^  or  take  a  lease  of  the  same,"  and  it  makes 
no  difference  whether  with  or  without  an  agreement  to  pay 
interest  upon  the  contract  price,  his  possession  is  strictly  a 
tenancy  at  will.  But  where  the  owner  of  land  made  his  bond 
conditioned  to  convey  it  to  the  obligee  upon  his  paying  a 
certain  sum  on  demand,  and  interest  thereon  quarterly,  and 
by  the  terms  of  the  bond  the  obligee  was  in  the  mean  time  to 
retain  possession  of  the  premises,  it  was  held  to  be  a  demise 
and  not  a  tenancy  at  will.^     Where,  however,  one,  under  a 

1  Cameron  v.  Little,  62  Me.  550  ;  Emmes  v.  Feely,  132  Mass.  346. 

2  Jackson  v.  Bradt,  2  Caines,  169.  ^  Rex  v.  Collett,  Russ.  &  Ry.  498. 

*  Doe  V.  M'Keag,  10  B.  &  C.  721.     See  also  Cheever  v.  Pearson,  16  Pick.  266. 

6  Doe  V.  Wood,  14  M.  &  W.  682. 

«  2  Flint,  Real  Prop.  216-220  ;  Gould  v.  Thompson,  4  Met.  224  ;  Doe  v. 
Chamberlaine,  5  M.  &  W.  14  ;  Proprietors  v.  McFarland,  12  Mass.  324  ;  Den  v. 
Edmonston,  1  Ired.  152  ;  Watkins,  Conv.  20,  n.  ;  Doe  v.  Miller,  5  Car.  &  P. 
595  ;  Doe  v.  Rock,  1  Car.  &  M.  549  ;  Jones  v.  Jones,  2  Rich.  (S.  C. )  542  ;  Glas- 
cock V.  Robards,  14  Mo.  350  ;  Carson  v.  Baker,  4  Dev.  220  ;  Howard  v.  Shaw,  8 
M.  &  "W.  118  ;  Jackson  v.  Miller,  7  Cow.  747  ;  Manchester  v.  Doddridge,  3  lud. 
360  ;  Prentice  v.  Wilson,  14  111.  91,  93  ;  Dean'U.  Com.stock,  32  111.  180  :  Freeman 
V.  Headley,  33  N.  J.  523  ;  Harris  v.  Frink,  49  N.  Y.  24,  32 ;  Dunne  v.  Trustees, 
39  111.  578. 

T  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  18  ;  Tud.  Cas.  10  ;  Hamerton  v.  Stead,  3  B.  &  C. 
478  ;  Riseley  v.  Ryle,  11  M.  &  W".  16  ;  Howard  v.  Shaw,  8  M.  &  W.  118  ;  Hegan 
V.  Johnson,  2  Taunt.  148  ;  Dunne  v.  Trustees,  39  111.  578. 

8  White  V.  Livingston,  10  Cush.  259  ;  Cole  v.  Gill,  14  Iowa,  527.  In  the 
former  case  the  report  finds  that  "both  parties  treated  the  payment  as  rent." 


CII.  XI.  §  1.]  ESTATKS    AT   WILL.  023 

contract  to  purchase  land,  onton'(l  and  orcnpicd  it,  and  the 
contract  was  ultimately  perfornicil,  it  ^as  held  that  he  did  not 
thcrehy  boconic  lial)K'  to  pay  rent  for  use  and  occupation  dur- 
ing the  time  of  his  occupancy,  although  it  was  for  more  than 
a  year,  and  the  value  of  the  rent  wojdd  have  hcen  8500.  His 
tenancy  was,  during  that  time,  of  the  nature  of  a  tenancy 
at  will.'  Hut  wlieie  a  tenant  entered  umler  a  promise  of  a 
written  lease  which  never  came,  and  occupied  premises  for 
which  he  was  by  the  original  agn'emeiit  to  jtay  a  certain  sum 
as  rent,  he  was  held  to  he  a  tenant  from  year  to  yeai",  and 
entitled  to  a  notice  of  six  months  to  expire  at  the  end  of  the 
year.-  Entering,  however,  under  a  conditional  promise  to 
pay  rent,  does  not  create  a  tenancy  from  year  to  year.  And 
if  a  tenant  enters  under  a  promise  to  take  a  lease  of  the 
premises,  and  he  neglects  or  refuses  to  take  one,  he  becomes 
a  tenant  at  will  and  not  from  year  to  year,  and  a  mere  de- 
mand for  possession  terminates  the  tenancy  without  any  otlier 
notice.-'^ 

2G.  And  it  may  be  laid  down,  generally,  that  if  a  person  by 
consent  of  the  ownier  of  land  is  let  into  possession  without 
having  a  freehold  interest  or  any  certain  term,  and  without 
circumstances  which  would  show  an  intention  to  create  an 
estate  from  year  to  year,  he  is  a  strict  tenant  at  will.^  Xor 
would  it  make  any  dilTerence  that  the  premises  are  under  a 
prior  lease,  provided  the  lirst  lessee  does  not  interfere  with 
the  enjoyment  by  the  second.  And  the  lessor  may  recover  of 
such  second  lessee  for  use  and  occupation  of  the  premises.* 

27.  Such  will  be  the  case  if  the  grantor  continue  in  posses- 
sion after  delivery  of  his  deed  to  the  purchaser ;  ^  or  a  judg- 
ment debtor  continue,  after  a  sale  on  fi.  fa.,  to  hold  by  consent 

Where,  however,  the  interest  is  paid  merely  as  such,  no  t^-nancy  is  implied,  Ix;- 
cause  the  occupant  is  to  remain  during  such  payment.  Dakin  v.  Allen,  8  Cuah. 
33  ;  Dunham  r.  Townsend,  110  Mass.  440. 

1  Dennett  v.  Penobscot  Co.,  57  Me.  425,  427  ;  Dakin  v.  Allen,  8  Cush.  33  ; 
Woodbur}'  t'.  Woodbury,  47  N.  H.  11. 

a  Silsby  r.  Allen,  43  Vt.  172.  '  Dunne  v.  Trustws,  39  111.  578. 

♦  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  18  ;  Richardson  v.  Langridge,  4  Taunt.  128  ;  Gould  w. 
Thompson,  4  ilet.  224  ;  Doe  v.  Wood,  14  M.  &  W.  682  ;  2  Smith,  Lead.  Cm.  76  ; 
Tud.  Cas.  10. 

»  Bedford  r.  Terhune,  30  N.  Y.  453  ;  Phipps  r.  Sculthonie,  1  B.  k  A.  60. 

«  Currier  v.  Earl,  13  Me.  216  ;  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  10,  n. 


624  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY,  FbOOK  L 

of  the  purchaser.^  But  an  action  for  use  and  occupation  will 
not  lie  where  the  tenant  holds  adversely  to  the  claimant. 
The  title  to  the  premises  cannot  be  tried  in  this  form  of 
action.2 

28.  So  where  the  trustee  who  has  the  legal  estate 

[*377]   suffers  the  *  cestui  que  trust  to  occupy  the  premises, 

the  latter  is  considered  a  tenant  at  will  of  the  former.^ 

And  the  trustee  may  have  ejectment  against  his  cestui  que  trust 

to  recover  possession  of  the  trust  property.* 

29.  But  it  should  not  be  inferred  from  the  use  of  the  terms 
landlord  and  tenant,  that  a  rent  is  always  incident  to  a  tenancy 
at  will.  It  often  depends  upon  circumstances,  whether  and 
in  what  form  such  a  tenant  will  be  chargeable  for  the  use  and 
occupation  of  premises  in  his  possession.  If,  for  instance,  a 
purchaser  enters  under  a  parol  contract  of  purchase  and  sale, 
and  the  contract  fails  by  the  fault  of  the  vendor,  he  would  not. 
be  liable  to  pay  for  the  use  and  occupation  of  the  premises  in 
the  absence  of  an  express  agreement  to  that  effect.^  But  it 
is  not  necessary  that  there  should  be  an  express  contract  to 
pay  and  receive  rent,  in  order  to  create  the  relation  of  land- 
lord and  tenant.^ 

1  Nichols  V.  Williams,  8  Cow.  13. 

2  Kittredge  v.  Peaslee,  3  Allen,  235  ;  Keyes  v.  Hill,  30  Vt.  759  ;  Hogsett  v. 
Ellis,  17  Mich.  351. 

8  Tud.  Cas.  11  ;  Wms.  Real  Prop.  325  ;  Pomfret  v.  Windsor,  2  Ves.  Sen.  472  ; 
Garrard  v.  Tuck,  8  C.  B.  231  ;  Melliug  v.  Leak,  16  C.  B.  652  ;  2  Prest.  Abs.  25. 

*  Matthews  v.  Ward,  10  Gill  &  J.  443 ;  Jackson  v.  Pierce,  2  Johns.  221  ;  post, 
vol.  2,  p.  *206. 

6  Winterbottom  v.  Ingham,  7  Q.  B.  611  ;  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  18  ;  Bell  v. 
Ellis,  1  Stew.  &  P.  (Ala.)  294  ;  Little  v.  Pearson,  7  Pick.  301  ;  Tew  v.  Jones,  13 
M.  &  W.  Am.  ed.  14,  n.  ;  Howard  v.  Shaw,  8  M.  &  \V.  118  ;  Hough  v.  Birge, 
11  Vt.  190  ;  Cotfman  v.  Huck,  24  Mo.  496 ;  Harle  v.  McCoy,  7  J.  J.  Marsh.  318; 
Sylvester  v.  Kalston,  31  Barb.  286.  The  court  in  New  York  held  that  a  pur- 
chaser under  the  above  circumstances  had  a  mere  license,  without  tlie  relation  of 
landlord  and  tenant.  Dolittle  v.  Eddy,  7  Barb.  74  ;  Stone  v.  Sprague,  20  Barb. 
509.  In  a  case  in  Connecticut,  where  the  purchaser  entered  and  occupied  the 
premises  for  some  years  under  a  written  contract  to  purchase,  paying  a  part  of  the 
purchase-money,  and  then  left  the  premises,  and  the  owner  entered  upon  them, 
the  court  held  that  the  plaintiff  could  not  recover  for  use  and  occupation,  though 
the  defendant  alone  was  in  fault  for  leaving  and  failing  to  perform  the  contract, 
—  on  the  ground,  among  other  things,  that  the  original  contract  was  still  open. 
Vandenheuvel  v.  Storrs,  3  Conn.  203. 

6  McKibsack  v.  Bullington,  37  Miss.  535. 


CH.  XI.  §  1.]  ESTATKS    AT    WILL.  G2") 

80.  But  if,  after  the  contriiet  for  i)incha«c  is  entiroly  at  an 
end,  tlu!  j)rojM)S('tl  purchaser  continues  to  hold  possession, 
he  will  lie  lialile  as  tenant  for  use  and  occupation.*  To  hold 
one  wliii  has  been  in  possessinn  ot  land  in  an  action  lor  use 
and  occupation,  there  nnist  l)e  a  contract  t'Xpress  or  implied 
on  his  part  U)  pay  for  such  use,  and  durinir  the  time  of  such 
enjoyment  the  relation  of  hnuUoid  :ind  tenant  nnist  have 
subsisted  between  them.  At  common  law,  an  action  for  rent 
would  not  lie  against  a  tenant  at  sulTcrance  ;-  but  it  seems  the 
better  opinion  that  an  action  for  use  and  occupation  would.*'' 
IJut  where,  in  the  contract  for  sale,  there  is  an  agreement  that 
the  vendee  may  occupy  the  premises,  while  the  court  of  Wis- 
consin hold  it  doubtful  whether  he  would  be  liable  for  use 
and  occupation  if  he  afterwards  refuse  to  complete  the  pur- 
chase, they  hold  that  if  by  liis  agreement  he  was  to  hold  "  as 
tenant  at  sulTerance  of  the  vendor,"  it  so  far  recognized  the 
relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  between  them  that  ui)(tn  fail- 
ure to  iierforin  he  was  liable  for  use  and  occupation."*  IJut  if 
once  in,  he  will  continue  to  be  liai)le  until  the  contract  is  re- 
scinded and  the  possession  surrendered,  whether  he  actually 
uses  the  premises  or  not.  As  where  A  hired  of  L>  a  barn,  and 
locked  it  up  and  never  occupied  it,  nor  surrendered  possession 
of  it  to  the  owner,  he  was  held  liable  in  an  action  for  use  and 
occupation.^  So  if  he  continues  to  occupy  he  will  be  liable, 
although  partially  interrujited  in  his  enjoyment  of  the  ] (rem- 
ises by  act  of  the  lessor.*^ 

31.  If  the  vendee  enter  and  occupy  under  an  agreement  to 
purchase,  and  afterwards  refuses  to  carry  out  the  contract,  or 
accept  a  conveyance,  he  will  be  liable  to  respond  in  damages, 
in  some  form,  for  such  use  and  occupation  of  the  premises. 
By  some  courts  he  has  been  held  liable  in  an  action  of  assum|>- 

»  Howard  V.  Shaw,  8  >L  &  W.  118  ;  Dwighl  c.  Cutlur,  3  MilIi.  566  ;  Hogsett 
V.  Ellis,  17  Miih.  351. 

'  CuiiDiiigliain  v.  Holton,  55  Mo.  33,  38  ;  Delauo  v.  Montague,  4  Cush.  42  ; 
Flood  V.  Flood,  1  Allen,  217. 

•  See  pos(,  •394  and  note. 

*  Wrifjlit  V.  Ho1)erts,  22  Wise.  161. 

'  Hall  V.  West.  Tmnsp.  Co.,  34  N.  Y.  234  ;  Waring  v.  King,  8  il.  i  W.  571  ; 
Pincro  V.  .ludson,  6  Hing.  2<)0. 

e  B..st.  &  W.  K.  U.  V.  Kipley,  13  Allen,  421. 
vui-  I.  —  40 


626  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  l. 

sit,  on  the  ground  that  he  held  the  premises,  beneficially,  by 
permission  of  the  owner,  thereby  raising  an  equitable  claim 
for  compensation;!  and  the  same  ground  was  also  taken  in  an 
early  case  cited  below.^ 

31  a.  The  opposite  conclusion  was,  however,  reached  by 
Mansfield,  J.,  who  denied  that  a  contract  could  arise  by  im- 
plication of  law,  under  circumstances  the  occurrence  of  which 
neither  of  the  parties  ever  had  in  their  contemplation.^  So 
far  as  compensation  is  concerned,  the  action  being  one  of 
assumpsit,  is  based  upon  the  idea  of  a  contract  between  the 
parties.  But  this  contract  may  be  express  or  implied,  pro- 
vided it  be  one  which  creates  or  recognizes  the  relation  of 
landlord  and  tenant,  by  which  the  defendant  holds  possession 
of  the  premises  under  the  plaintiff,  by  an  agreement  to  pay 
for  the  use  of  the  same.  The  questions  of  difficulty  have  been 
Tvhere,  though  the  holding  may  not  have  been  adverse,  it  had 
its  inception  in  some  other  contract  than  that  of  hiring,  but 
its  character  has  altered  by  a  change  in  the  relation  of  the 
parties  to  the  estate  in  question.  The  doctrine  upon  the  sub- 
ject as  held  by  the  United  States  Court  is  thus  stated :  If, 
under  a  contract  to  sell,  a  vendor  puts  the  vendee  into  posses- 
sion, the  latter  holds  as  licensee,  is  not  tenant  of  a  landlord, 
and  pays  nothing  for  the  enjoyment  of  the  estate.*  But  he 
can  no  more  deny  his  vendor's  title  than  if  he  were  lessee. 
And  his  assignee  is  bound  by  the  same  estoppel  as  himself.  If 
the  vendee  fails  to  pay  the  purchase-money  according  to  agree- 
ment, his  possession  becomes  tortious,  and  the  vendor  may 
have  ejectment,  without  any  previous  demand  or  notice.^ 
And  it  seems  established  by  a  great  preponderance  of  au- 
thority that  an  action  will  not  lie  for  use  and    occupation 

1  Gould  V.  Thompson,  4  Met.  224.  And  the  same  is  assumed  to  be  law, 
although  not  the  point  under  consideration,  in  Clough  v.  Hosford,  6  N.  H.  23L 
See  also  Alton  v.  Pickering,  9  N.  H.  494,  and  a  like  doctrine  was  held  in  a 
case  where  the  occupant  gained  possession  by  wrong,  though  not  by  force,  from 
one  who  yielded  it  under  a  misapprehension  of  facts,  Hull  v.  Vaughan,  6  Pick. 
157. 

2  Hearn  v.  Tomlin,  Peake's  Cases,  192. 
8  Kirtland  v.  Pouiisott,  2  Taunt.  145. 

*  Burnett  v.  Caldwell,  9  Wall.  290,  293  ;  Chamberlin  v.  Donahue,  44  Vt  57, 
59  ;  and  see  Central  Mills  Co.  v.  Hart,  124  Mass.  123. 

^  Burnett  v.  Caldwell,  sup.     See  Lawton  v.  Savage,  136  Mass.  111. 


C»l,  XI.   §  1.]  ESTATES    AT    WILL.  027 

wlirrc  the  <l('ft'ii(l:int  has  ncciipicil  uiulcr  an  cxpres.s  a^rt'cmoiit 
ii.s  to  the  terms,  altli()ii;:h  such  a^Tccincnt  may  not  Ix'  carried 
out  according  to  it.s  tcnn.s,  and  the  occnpancv  njay  not  con- 
form to  it.  Tlni.s  where  A  demi.sed  premises  to  IJ  at  a  rent 
payable  (piarterly,  and  the  tenant,  liy  permission  of  the  h'ssor, 
(putted  possession  hefore  the  ch)se  of  a  (piarter,  or  the  les- 
sor determined  the  tenuncy  between  rent  days,  it  was  held 
that  the  lessor  could  maintain  no  action  for  the  use  of  the 
jiremises  since  the  last  rent  day,  till  the  lessee  surrendered 
po.s.session.'  So  where  the  tenant  held  under  a  contract  of 
purchase  as  vendee,  it  was  held  that  the  law  raised  no  implied 
j)romisc  to  j»ay  for  the  use  of  the  premises.'^  In  case  of  refu.sal 
of  the  occupant  in  such  case  to  complete  the  purchase.  h(>  niav 
thereafter  heeome  liable  as  a  tenant  at  will.  Ihil  if  the  owner 
refuse,  on  his  part,  to  execute  a  deed,  he  cannot  turn  the  oc- 
cupancy of  the  tenant  into  a  lease  carrying  rent,  nor  recover 
possession  of  the  premi.ses  in  a  process  again.st  the  tenant  as 
a  wrongful  holder  of  the  same.'^  Xor  can  the  owner  of  land 
hold  a  tenant  responsible  in  this  form  of  action,  from  the  mere 
fact  of  his  having  enjoyed  possession  of  the  estate,  if  the  ten- 
ant refused  to  hold  the  relation  to  such  owner  of  tenant,  as 
where  two  persons  claimed  the  estate  and  the  tenant  held  un 
dcr  one  of  these,  though  in  fact  it  belonged  to  the  other.^ 

*  32,  IJut  the  ordinary  rule  of  law  in  such  cases  [*078] 
is,  that  when  a  purchaser,  who  has  lieen  in  possession 
under  a  contract  to  jturchase,  refuses  to  perlorm  on  his  jiart, 
the  owner's  remedy  is  not  in  assumpsit,  but  trespass.  Wv 
such  refusal  he  is  considered  as  annulling  the  C(jnditional 
license  under  which  he  entered,  and  as  having  entered  without 
license.^ 

1  Griniinnn  r.  L<'fCfrc,  S  B.  &  C.  3'2J  ;  Nicholson  r.  Miinigle,  6  Allen,  215  ; 
FuIKt  r.  Swvtt,  6  AIIl-h,  21'.',  n. 

'  Jones  V.  Tipton,  2  Dana,  29r)  ;  .Smith  v.  Stewart,  6  Johns.  4(5  ;  Bancroft  r. 
'.Vanlwell,  l.S  Johns.  489  ;  Aver  v.  Hawks,  11  N.  H.  148,  154  ;  Sylvester  r.  Kal- 
ston,  31  Barb.  286  ;  Dunning  v.  Finson,  46  Me.  546  ;  Winterbottom  r.  Ingham, 
7  Q.  B.  611  ;  Hadley  r.  Morrison,  3S»  111.  392. 

'  Dunham  v.  Towiisentl,  110  Mas.s.  440  ;  antl  the  rule  laid  down  in  GoulJ  r. 
Thonij»8on,  sujth,  was  liinitetl  to  a  liability  after  refusal. 

*  Key<!.s  I'.  Hill,  30  Vt.  759  ;  Hogs<^'tt  r.  Kllis,  17  Mi.h.  351. 

*  Smith  V.  Stewart,  6  Johns.  46;  Bancroft  r.  Wanlwoll,  13  Johns.  489; 
Brewer  v.  L'onover,  18  N.  J.  214  ;  Howard  v.  Shaw,  8  M.  &  W.  Am.  e*L  123,  n. 


628  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

33.  And  assumpsit  for  rent  clearly  would  not  lie  while 
the  contract  of  sale  continued  open  and  undetermined.'  But 
where  a  tenant  at  will  entered  under  an  agreement  to  pay  a 
certain  rent  by  the  year,  and  the  parties  afterwards  waived 
that  agreement,  and  then  tried  to  agree  upon  new  terms,  but 
failed,  the  tenant  continuing  to  occupy  the  premises,  was  held 
liable  in  a  quantum  meruit  for  the  use  of  the  same.^ 

34.  If  the  vendor  continues  to  hold  possession  after  a  sale 
of  land ;  in  order  to  make  him  liable  in  assumpsit  for  use  and 
occupation,  it  must  be  shown  that  his  occupation  was  by  per- 
mission of  the  purchaser.  If  he  holds  without  such  permis- 
sion, he  is  liable  only  in  trespass  for  mesne  profits.^  Nor 
would  assumpsit  for  use  and  occupation  lie  where  the  tenant 
holds  under  an  indenture  of  lease,  even  though  the  lessor,  by 
his  own  act,  has  barred  himself  from  recovering  rent  under 
such  indenture.^  But  where  one  entered  under  a  lease  which 
was  executed  by  the  lessor  only,  and  occupied  the  premises, 
he  was  held  not  a  tenant  at  will,  but  liable  in  assumpsit  for 
the  rent  reserved  in  the  lease.^ 

35.  In  respect  to  the  third  subject  of  inquiry,  as  above  pro- 
posed, in  what  cases  a  notice  to  quit  is  necessary  in  order  to 

determine  an  estate  at  will,  it  would  be  found  that 
[*379]  from  an  *  early  period  the  courts  were  inclined  to  pro- 
tect the  interest  of  the  parties  against  a  sudden  deter- 
mination  of  such  tenancies.      The  tenant  who  had  planted 
crops  was  held  entitled  to  them  if  expelled  by  his  landlord,  and 

and  12  Id.  324,  n.  ;  Cloughi;.  Hosford,  6  N.  H.  231  ;  Bell  v.  Ellis,  1  Stew.  &  P. 
(Ala.)  294. 

^  Wiggiii  V.  "VViggin,  6  N.  H.  298  ;  Johnson  v.  Beauchamp,  9  Dana,  124  ; 
Vandenheuvel  v.  Storrs,  3  Conn.  203. 

2  Forbes  v.  Smiley,  56  Me.  174. 

8  Tew  V.  Jones,  13  M.  &  W.  12,  and  note  to  Am.  ed.;  Tud.  Cas,  10  ;  McCombs 
V.  Wallace,  66  N.  C.  481  ;  Goldsberry  v.  Bishop,  2  Duvall,  143.  But  where  the 
land  has  been  conveyed,  the  presumption  of  a  tenancy  arises.  Sherburne  v.  Jones, 
20  Me.  70. 

*  Leishman  v.  White,  1  Allen,  489  ;  North  v.  Nichols,  37  Conn.  375.  As  to 
where  the  action  for  use  and  occupation  lies  where  the  lease  is  in  writing  or  under 
seal,  see  ante,  *341  and  note.  By  Mass.  Pub.  Stat.,  c.  121,  §§  3,  5,  rent  may  be 
recovered  against  a  tenant  at  sufferance  in  an  action  of  contract,  and  plaintiff  may 
use  the  deed  of  demise  in  evidence  to  prove  the  amount  due. 

6  Fitton  V.  Hamilton  City,  6  Ncv.  196  ;  Clark  v.  Gordon,  121  Mass.  330  ; 
Carroll  v.  St.  John's  Soc,  125  Mass.  565. 


ClI.  XI.  §  1.]  ESTATES    AT   WILL.  C2!> 

had  a  ritrlit  to  oiilcr,  cultivato,  and  iratlicr  llicin  without  bciiif;: 
subjected  to  an  action  of  trt'sjiass.  So  he  was  authorized  to 
enter  and  reujove  his  efl'ects,  within  a  reasonahk'  time,  after 
the  determination  of  his  tenancy.'  From  this  the  advance  was 
easy  to  requirinir  a  notice  to  cjuit,  in  all  sucli  <'ases,  from  the 
hmdlord  to  his  tenant,  before  the  ri^dit  arose  actually  to  e.\|)cl 
liini.  And  this  principk'  was  adopted  as  early  as  the  time  of 
llcnry  VI 11.-  It  was  obviously  an  act  of  justice,  also,  that 
the  teiuint  should  irive  notice  to  the  landlord  of  his  intention 
to  quit,  that  he  mi^ht  have  an  opjiortunity  to  pntcun.'  a  new 
tenant.^  In  respect  to  notice,  where  the  lessors  are  tenants 
in  common,  I'aeh  must  notify  for  himself,  nor  can  one  avail 
himself  of  a  notice  by  the  other.'  So  if  several  tenants  in  com- 
mon make  a  jtarol  lettinjr,  and  by  the  terms  in  respect  to  such 
lessors  the  lettinir<)f  one  was  by  way  of  conditional  limitation, 
although  the  tenancy  as  to  this  one  miLdit  thereby  be  deter- 
mined, as  to  all  the  rest,  notice  would  be  requisite  for  that 
purpose.^  It  is  doubtful  if  one  of  several  lessors  can  maintain 
a  process  against  a  tenant  who  holds  under  him  and  other 
lessors  who  arc  owners  in  common,  to  recover  under  the  stat- 
ute a  portion  of  the  demised  premises.^  Although  one  tenant 
in  common  may  have  a  process  of  forcible  entry  and  detainer 
against  his  co-tenant," 

36.  At  first,  the  courts  had  no  other  rule  as  to  notice  than 
that  it  should  be  a  reasonable  one,  and  the  cfTect  was,  that,  in 
ordinary  eases,  an  estate  at  will,  instead  of  being  a  tenancy, 
purely  at  will,  continued  till  a  reasonable  notice  from  one  of 
the  parties  to  the  other  of  his  election  to  determine  it."* 

37.  As  will  be  shown  hereafter,  this  uncertain  period  was  at 

1  Sniitli,  Lanil.  &  T.n.  20,  21  ;  2  Flint.  Heal  l»rop.  218. 

2  Year-Book,  35  Hen.  VI.  24,  pi.  30  ;  13  Hen.  VIII.  15  b;  14  Hon.  VIII.  13; 
Doe  V.  Watts,  7  T.  K.  83  ;  2  Smith,  Lead.  Caa.  76  ;  Doe  r.  Porter,  3  T.  H.  13  ; 
Cattley  v.  Aniol.l,  1  Johns.  &.  H.  651,  656. 

»  Ki^hly  V.  Hulkly,  Sid.  338. 

*  Dillon  V.  Brown,  11  Gray,  180;  Pickard  r.  Pcrley,  45  N.  H.  1S3;  jH-st, 
•386,  •388. 

'  Ashlty  r.  Wnmcr,  11  Cray,  43.  «  Kingr.  Dickermnn,  11  Hray,  48!. 

^  Presbny  i-.  Prcsbrey,  13  .Ulen,  281. 

«  Smith,  Lead.  C'ns.  76,  an.l  note  to  Am.  ed.  ;  Ellis  v.  Pnip-,  1  Pi.  k.  43  ; 
Davi.s  V.  Thomiwon,  13  Me.  20y  ;  Taylor.  Land,  k  Ton.  (7tli  ed.)  §  .15  and  note. 
And  such  seems  to  be  the  rule  in  Vermont.     Rich  r.  Bolton,  46  Vt.  84. 


630  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

length  converted  into  a  practical  tenancy  for  a  certain  term 5 
generally  from  year  to  year  by  the  length  of  time  required  in 
order  to  give  the  requisite  notice  to  quit,  and  the  time  at 
which  such  notice  must  expire.^  But  the  principle  of  re- 
quiring notice  does  not  apply  to  such  cases  as  have  been 
enumerated  under  the  previous  head. 

38.  In  cases  where  notice  is  required,  it  has  been  stated 
that,  originally,  the  length  of  such  notice  must  have  been  a 
reasonable  time,  and  Massachusetts  and  Maine  never  having 
adopted  the  principle  of  construing  a  tenancy  for  an  indefinite 

period,  a  holding  from  year  to  year,  retained  this  no- 
[*380]  tion  of  a  reasonable  *  notice,  until  provision   as   to 

what  that  should  be,  and  how  given,  was  made  by 
statute.^ 

39.  The  length  of  the  notice  required  to  determine  a  ten- 
ancy at  will  may  be  fixed  by  agreement  of  the  parties,^  or  it 
may  be  prescribed  by  statute,  as  is  done  in  many  of  the  States. 
It  is  competent  for  the  parties  to  a  tenancy  at  will  to  determine 
the  same  by  agreement  in  any  way  other  than  by  statute 
notice.  Thus  it  may  be  by  giving  a  month's  notice  in  writing, 
if  such  is  the  agreement,  and  in  such  case  the  notice  need  not 
have  reference  to  the  end  of  a  quarter  or  calendar  month.* 
So  by  the  agreement  of  the  parties,  the  tenancy  may  be  deter- 
mined upon  the  happening  of  some  prescribed  contingent 
event,  without  notice.^  And  if  the  landlord  agree  with  the 
tenant  that  he  may  quit,  though  it  be  by  parol,  and  the  tenant 

1  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  234. 

2  Eising  V.  Stannard,  17  Mass.  282  ;  Hollis  v.  Pool,  3  Met.  350  ;  TMoore  v. 
Boyd,  24  Me.  242  ;  Furlong  v.  Leary,  8  Cash.  409.  In  the  statute  of  frauds  in 
Massachusetts,  of  1692,  ap  exception  was  made  of  leases  for  terms  not  exceeding 
three  years.  But  this  was  omitted  in  the  revision  of  the  statute  in  1784.  4 
Dane,  Abr.  62.     Provinc.  Laws,  1692-3,  c.  15,  §  1. 

8  2  Crabb,  Real  Prop.  425  ;  Doe  v.  Donovan,  1  Taunt.  555  ;  Kemp  v.  Derrett, 
3  Camp.  510. 

*  May  V.  Rice,  108  Mass.  150. 

6  Creech  v.  Crockett,  5  Cush.  133  ;  Hollis  v.  Pool,  3  Met.  350  ;  Elliott  v. 
Stone,  1  Gray,  571  ;  Thurber  v.  Dwyer,  10  E.  I.  355  ;  Ashley  v.  Warner,  11 
Gray,  43  ;  Knecht  v.  Mitchell,  67  111.  86.  Thus  where  the  tenant's  occupancy  is 
only  so  long  as  he  nms  a  saw-mill,  Crawley  v.  Mullins,  48  Mo.  517  ;  or  is  in 
lessor's  employ,  Grosvenor  v.  Henry,  27  Iowa,  269.  See  also  Wood  v.  Beard,  2 
Exch.  Div.  30  ;  Whetstone  v.  Davis,  34  Ind.  510. 


Cll.  XI.  §   1.]  KSTATES    AT   WILL.  C,'M 

accordin^^ly  d(i  so  witliDnt   miy   fiiit''rr  nntirc,  liis  liahility  to 
pay  rent  ct'ast's.' 

40.  IJiit  where  there  is  no  a^Mcenient  nor  lime  fixed  hy 
statute  as  to  tlie  h-ntrth  of  notice  recjuisite  to  dclerniine  a  ten- 
ancy at  will,  and  the  ease  does  not  eonie  within  the  class  of 
tenancies  from  year  to  year,  it  is  ;renerally  true  that  it  will 
be  sutVieient  if  it  be  equal  to  the  interval  between  the  tinie.s  of 
payment  of  rent, or  the  h'n'j:th  of  the  time  by  which  the  letting 
was  at  lii'st  measured,  as  by  tiie  (|uarter,  month,  or  week.- 

41.  If  a  jiarty  enter  undei-  a  ]iarol  lease  for  a  term  certain, 
or  for  a  time  limited  by  a_<j:reement,  as  to  its  duration,  by  the 
happening  of  some  event,  where,  by  statute,  all  parol  leases 
are  declared  to  be  estates  at  will,  as  is  the  case  in  Massachu- 
setts and  Maine,  or  where  by  the  lease  itself  the  estate  is  an 
estate  at  will,  such  tenancy  may  still  be  determined  by  notice 
like  any  estate  at  will.  Yet,  if  not  so  determined,  it  will  come 
to  an  end  without  notice  at  the  expiration  of  the  time  or  the 
ha]ipening  of  the  event.'"'  And  where,  as  in  the  ease  in  the 
Kn'_dish  statuti^s  and  those  of  many  of  the  States,  leases 

for  a  certain  *  jieriod  are  excepted  fi'om  the  clause  [*381] 
which  declares  j)arol  leases  to  be  estates  at  will,  and 
such  a  lease  is  made  for  a  definite  ju'riod  within  that  excei>- 
tion,  no  notice  would  be  reciuisitc  to  determine  such  lca.se,  or 
would  have  any  eflect  to  determine  it  if  given  before  the 
natural  expiration.'*     And  even  if  the  parol  letting  be  made 

>  Fiirson  V.  Ooodnlc,  8  Allen,  202  ;  ami  BatclitUlcr  v.  Rntchi-Ider,  2  Allen. 
105,  aiipan'ntly  contra,  is  controlled  by  Davis  v.  Murphy,  126  Mass.  143. 

2  2  Crabb,  Real  Prop.  426  ;  Coffin  r.  Lunt,  2  Pick.  70  ;  Right  r.  Darby,  1  T. 
R.  160  ;  Doe  p.  RalTan,  6  Esp.  4  ;  Prindle  r.  Anderson,  19  Wend.  301,  .s.  r.  23 
Id.  616;  Prickett  r.  Ritter,  16  111.  06;  Ihiyser  v.  Chase,  13  Mich.  PS;  Stop- 
pelkamp  v.  Mangcot,  42  Cal.  316;  .*>kni,'gs  r.  Elkus,  4.5  Cal.  154;  Haninion  r. 
Douglas,  50  Mo.  434,  437.  In  Steffens  i-.  Ymt\,  40  X.  J.  128,  the  rule  is  ronfirined, 
though  its  adoption  is  elaborately  criticised.  In  such  ca.ses  in  Maine,  ten.iiicy  may 
W  determined  by  thirty  day>'  notice  in  writing.     Ksty  r.  Baker,  50  Me.  325,  333. 

8  Creech  v.  Crockett,  5  Cusli.  133  ;  Howard  r.  Merriam,  5  Cash.  563  ;  Sted- 
man  v.  Mcintosh,  4  Ired.  21>1  ;  2  Flint,  Real  Prop.  220  ;  Danforth  r.  Sergeant, 
14  Ma.ss.  491;  2  Crabb,  Real.  Prop.  421  ;  McGee  v.  Gibson,  1  B.  Mon.  105; 
Allen  V.  Jaquish,  21  Wend.  62S  ;  Overdeer  r.  Ixswis,  1  Watts  k  .S.  90  ;  2  Smith, 
Lead.  Cas.  5th  Am.  ed.  180  ;  Mollis  r.  Pool,  3  Met.  350  ;  Fifty  Assoc,  v.  Howloud, 
11  Met.  99  ;  Elliott  P.  Stone,  12  Cush.  174  ;  Secor  r.  Pestana,  37  111.  525. 

*  SmitJi,  Land.  &  Ten.  64  ;  Id.  65  ;  Wms.  Real  Prop.  326  ;  Edger.  Straffoitl, 
1  Tyrw.  293  ;  Brown  v.  Keller,  32  111.  151. 


632  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   L 

for  such  a  period  of  time,  as  is  declared  by  statute  to  be  void 
or  to  constitute  a  mere  tenancy  at  will,  though  a  notice  in 
such  case  would  determine  the  tenancy  before  the  time  fixed 
by  the  agreement,  it  would  expire  without  notice  at  the  end 
of  the  time  for  which  the  parol  lease  was  to  run.^ 

42.  If  by  agreement  or  by  construction  of  the  law  upon  the 
act  of  the  parties,  a  tenancy  becomes  one  strictly  at  will 
though  it  may  have  been  otherwise  originally,  no  notice  to 
quit  is  necessary  in  order  to  determine  it.^  So  if  the  relation 
of  landlord  and  tenant  once  subsisting  is  destroyed,  no  notice 
is  requisite  in  order  that  either  party  should  avail  himself  of 
his  legal  remedies.^  Nor  is  notice  to  quit  ever  necessary  un- 
less the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  subsists.*  Thus,  if 
one  in  possession  repudiates  the  relation  of  tenant  to  his  land- 
lord, or  of  vendee  to  his  vendor,  if  he  enters  under  a  contract 
of  purchase  and  sets  up  a  hostile  claim  to  title,  no  demand 
of  possession  or  notice  to  quit  is  necessary.^  So  where  the 
tenancy  at  will  is  a  conditional  limitation,  and  the  event  hap- 
pens which  determines  the  tenancy,  no  notice  is  requisite.  As 
where  the  premises  were  let  so  long  as  the  tenant  kept  a 
good  school,  and  he  failed  to  keep  one.^ 

1  2  Flint,  Real  Prop.  220  ;  People  v.  Rickert,  8  Cow.  226  ;  Larkin  v.  Avery, 
23  Conn.  304  ;  Doe  v.  Bell,  5  T.  R.  471  ;  Schuyler  v.  Leggett,  2  Cow.  660  ;  Prin- 
dle  V.  Anderson,  19  Wend.  391  ;  Tress  v.  Savage,  4  Ellis  &  B.  36  ;  Doe  v.  Moffatt, 
15  Q.  B.  257. 

2  Elliott  V.  Stone,  1  Gray,  571,  where  the  tenant  agreed  to  pay  rent  in  ad- 
vance, and  failed  to  do  so.  Jackson  v.  Miller,  7  Cow.  747,  where  the  defendant 
entered  under  contract  to  purchase,  and  failed  to  perform  on  his  part.  Chilton 
V.  Niblett,  3  Humph.  404  ;  Stone  v.  Sprague,  20  Barb.  509  ;  Dolittle  v.  Eddy,  7 
Barb.  74. 

3  Hall  V.  Burgess,  5  B.  &  C.  332,  where  the  tenant  quit  at  the  end  of  the  year, 
and  the  landlord  before  six  months  let  the  premises.  In  Thomas  v.  Cook,  2  B. 
&  A.  119,  where  the  tenant  underlet,  the  landlord,  by  distraining  on  the  under- 
tenant, was  held  to  have  lost  his  claim  on  the  tenant,  though  he  had  given  no 
notice.     Clemens  v.  Broomfield,  19  Mo.  118. 

4  Jackson  v.  Deyo,  3  Johns.  422  ;  Williams  v.  Hensley,  1  A.  K.  Marsh.  181, 
where  the  tenant  disclaimed  and  denied  the  landlord's  title.  Tuttle  v.  Reynolds, 
1  Vt.  80  ;  Ross  v.  Garrison,  1  Dana,  35  ;  Lamed  v.  Clarke,  8  Cash.  29. 

5  Ingraham  v.  Baldwin,  9  N.  Y.  45,  46  ;  Brown  v.  Keller,  32  111.  151. 

8  Ashley  v.  Warner,  11  Gray,  43;  Bolton  i;.  Landers,  27  Cal.  104  ;  Smith  ». 
Shaw,  16  Cal.  88  ;  Elliott  v.  Stone,  1  Gray,  571  ;  ante,  pi.  39. 


CU.  XI.  §  2.]  ESTATKS   AT    WILL.  688 

•SECTION   II.  [•382] 

ESTATES    FROM    YEAH    TO    YEAR. 

1,  2.  Estates  from  year  to  yuur,  —  how  cieattil. 

8.  Aj^ri'fiiu'iit  to  pay  nut  cssfntiul  to  tlifiii. 

4,  5.  How  tliey  arc  cstalilislicd  ami  liow  tlittTniino«l. 

6.  No  notice  necessary  wluire  tfUiinry  is  for  ilcfinito  time, 

7.  Lantllonl  cannot  have  trespass  a^inst  tenant  till  entry  made. 
8,  9.  Incidents  to  estates  from  year  to  year. 

10.  Lessor  and  lessee  equally  Itound  to  give  notice. 

11,  12.  Of  waiving  notice  to  (piit. 

13.  How  lonfi  tenant  liable  for  rent 

14.  Tenant  may  forfeit  estate  liy  waste. 

15-'22.  Of  notices,  —  their  form,  time,  and  manner  of  service,  Sec 

23-26.  Dilferent  rules  as  to  length  of  notice. 

27.  Of  revivini^  tenancy  1'y  accepting  rent. 

28-30.  Determinntion  of  tenancy  by  surrender,  alienation,  &c. 

31-33.  Effect  of  statute  of  frauds  on  i)arol  leases. 

34,  35.  Effect  of  occupancy  under  such  leases. 

1.  Because  of  the  uncertainty  of  the  rnle  requiring  reason- 
able notice  in  order  to  deterniinc  a  parol  lease,  and  from  tlic 
circumstance  that  rent  was  generally  mea.sured  l)y  the  year, 
courts  early  adopted  a  rule  which  has  been  extensively  fol- 
lowed in  this  country,  that  a  general  tenancy  by  a  parol  lease 
where  rent  is  to  be  paid  shall  be  considered  as  a  lease  for  a 
year,  which  can  only  be  determined  by  a  notice  for  the  time 
of  at  lea.st  six  months,  terminating  at  the  expiration  of  the 
year.  And  if  the  tenant  is  allowed  to  hold  without  such 
notice  into  a  second  year,  it  will  be  considered  as  a  holding 
for  such  second  year,  and  so  on.  So  that  the  common  mode 
of  designating  such  e.'^tates  by  parol  is  as  estates  from  year  to 
year,  to  continue  till  either  party  gives  the  other  the  requisite 
notice  to  determine  it.'  Where  the  tenancy  is  from  year  to 
year,  or  for  an  uncertain  time,  in  Illinois  sixty  days'  notice  is 
surticient  to  determine  it.      But  if  it  be  for  less  than  a  month, 

1  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  21,  22  ;  Wnis.  Ileal  Prop.  32(3  ;  2  Trest.  Abs.  25  ; 
Tnd.  Cas.  14  ;  Ix;sley  r.  Kandolph,  4  Rawle,  123  ;  Right  r.  Darby,  1  T.  R.  159, 
oer  Buller,  J.  ;  Ridgley  v.  Stillwell,  28  Mo.  400  ;  Patton  r.  Axlcy,  5  Jones  (X.  C  ). 
440.  It  is  defined  by  Parke,  B.,  as  a  "lease  for  a  year  certain,  with  a  growing 
interest  during  every  year  thereafter  springing  out  of  the  original  contract  and 
parcel  of  it."     Oxley  v.  James,  13  M.  &  W.  214. 


634  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

thirty  days  is  sufficient  in  the  absence  of  an  express  agreement 
upon  the  subject.^  In  New  York  if  a  tenant  enters  under  a 
parol  lease,  void  as  being  within  the  statute  of  frauds,  the 
landlord  must  give  one  month's  notice  in  order  to  determine 
it ;  his  tenancy  therefore  is  one  from  month  to  month,  deter- 
minable by  notice  to  quit.^ 

2.  This  change  of  tenancies  at  will  into  estates  from  year 
to  year  was  the  result  of  judicial  legislation,  as  a  measure  of 
equity  as  well  as  sound  policy,  though,  as  has  already  been 
seen,  numerous  cases  were  still  left  of  tenancies  strictly  at 
will ;  ^  and  in  Massachusetts  and  Maine  all  parol  leases,  as 
we  have  seen,  still  have  this  character,  and  are  determinable 
by  operation  of  law  in  the  various  ways  already  enumerated, 
although  a  fixed  term  of  notice  to  quit  is  prescribed  by 
statute.'^ 

3.  An  agreement  to  pay  rent  on  the  part  of  the  tenant  is 
regarded  as  an  essential  element  of  a  tenancy  from  year  to 
year,  and  the  times  at  which  it  is  payable  must  have  refer- 
ence to  a  yearly  holding,  such  as  by  the  year,  quarter,  or 
some  aliquot  part  of  a  year.^ 

4.  It  will  be  sufficient  to  establish  a  tenancy  from  year  to 
year,  to  show  an  entry  under  a  general  letting,  or  a  letting 

for  an  indefinite  time,  and  either  an  agreement  to  pay 
[*383]  rent  *  measured  by  the  year  or  its  aliquot  parts,  or  an 

actual  payment  of  rent  if  none  was  originally  fixed 
and  agreed  upon  ;  and  such  tenancy,  once  established,  will 
continue  until  determined  by  notice  to  quit,  or  some  other 
sufficient   legal  cause.^     It    has  accordingly  been  held  that 

1  Secor  V.  Pestana,  37  111.  525. 

2  People  V.  Darling,  47  N.  Y.  666  ;  1  R.  S.  745,  §§  7,  9  ;  Reeder  v.  Sa}Te,  70 
N.  Y.  180,  and  see  2}0st,  pi.  4. 

3  4  Kent,  Com.  115. 

*  Ante,  *372  and  notes  ;  Mass.  Pub.  Stat.,  c.  120,  §  3  ;  Ellis  v.  Paige,  1  Pick. 
43  ;  Withers  v.  Larrabee,  48  Me.  570. 

5  Richardson  v.  Landgridge,  4  Taunt.  128  ;  Tud.  Cas.  14  ;  Jackson  v.  Bradt, 
2  Caines,  169  ;  Doe  v.  Baker,  4  Dev.  220  ;  Roe  v.  Lees,  2  ^Y.  Bl.  1173  ;  Williams 
V.  Deriar,  31  Mo.  13  ;  Doidge  v.  Bowers,  2  M.  &  W.  365  ;  Chamberlin  v.  Donahue, 
45  Vt.  50  ;  Rich  v.  Bolton,  46  Yt.  84. 

6  Lesley  v.  Randolph,  i  Rawle,  123,  129  ;  Com.  Land.  &  Ten.  7,  8  ;  Squires 
V.  Huff,  3  A.  K.  Marsh.  17  ;  Knight  v.  Benett,  3  Bing.  361  ;  Hamerton  v.  Stead, 
8  B.  &  C.  478,  per  Littledale,  J.  ;  Burton,  Real  Prop.  396,  ii.  ;  Lockwood  v. 


CH.  XI.  §  2.]  ESTATES    AT    WILL.  G35 

when  11k'  IiiriiiL''  is  for  a  t(M-m  uliich  is  within  the  statute  of 
frauds,  and  the  le.s.sir  cnttTs,  it  will  \il'  ro-ranlcd  as  a  tcuancy 
from  year  to  year.'  I>ut  the  laudlonl  haviug  refu.sed  to  ^nvc 
a  lease,  and  haviuj?  denied  the  tenant's  litrht  to  occujjy,  who 
thereupon  ([uitted,  it  was  held  that  he  was  not  lialile  for  rent 
while  he  did  so  oceu|>y.-  A  jreneral  tenancy  in  Indiana  is  one 
from  year  to  year.  It  is  otherwise,  if  made  for  the  term  of 
a  sin^de  year.  But  the  lessor  could  not  determine  the  lease 
durini^  the  year  for  non-payment  of  rent,  unless  the  terms  of 
the  hirinj^  contained  a  condition  to  that  effect.^  But  author- 
izing; one  to  go  upon  land  and  cut  wood  thereon,  at  an  agreed 
price  per  cord,  and  his  entering  thereon  and  cutting  and  pay- 
ing for  the  wood  cut  for  several  months  in  succession,  was 
held  not  to  be  a  tenancy  from  year  to  year,  but  strictly  one  at 
will,  nor  was  the  contractor  entitled  to  notice  to  quit,'* 

5.  But  where  the  demise  is  for  one  year  or  other  term  cer- 
tain, no  notice  to  quit  is  necessary,^  though  if  the  tenant  h<»lds 

LcxkwofKl,  2-2  Conn.  425  ;  Roe  v.  Leea,  2  W.  HL  1173  ;  Hall  r.  WaJswortli,  28 
Vl.  412  ;  liiiiit  V.  Morton,  18  111.  75  ;  Hiilj,'<-ly  v.  Stillwull,  2j  Mo.  570  ;  Williunis 
V.  Deriiir,  31  Mo.  13  ;  Croniiiieliii  v.  TIul-ss,  31  Ala.  412.  Thus,  where  one 
without  authority  lets  another's  land,  ami  the  tenant  pays  rent  to  owner,  it 
creates  a  tenancy  from  year  to  yt-ar.  McDowell  i-.  Simpson,  3  Watts,  129. 
Tliough  rent  is  actually  paiil,  however,  it  is  not  conclusive  of  the  fact  of  a  ten- 
ancy, —  it  may  be  explained  l>y  either  payer  or  receiver.  Doe  v.  Crago,  6  C.  B. 
90  ;  Tuil.  Ca-s,  15  ;  contra,  Bishop  v.  Howard,  2  B.  k  C.  100. 

*  Schuyler  r.  Leggett,  2  Cow.  060  ;  Thomas  v.  Nelson,  6?  X.  Y.  US  ;  Thur- 
ber  p.  Dwyer,  10  U.  I.  355  ;  Shepherd  v.  Cummings,  1  foldw.  354;  Keeiler  r. 
Sayrc,  70  N.  Y.  180  ;  Liughran  i'.  Smith,  75  N.  Y.  205. 

^  Greton  v.  Smith,  33  N.  Y.  245  ;  Lounslwrry  v.  Snyder,  31  N.  Y.  .M4. 
»  Brown  V.  Bragg,  22  Ind.  123. 

*  Kitchen  v.  Pridgen,  3  .lones  (N.  C.)  49.  Sec  Denton  v.  Strickland,  3  Jones 
(N.  C.)  61  ;  Funk  r.  Haldeman,  53  Penn.  St.  229,  So  Colchester  v.  Brooke,  7 
Q.  B.  339,  authority  to  dredge  for  oysters  is  a  license  only  and  no  lease. 

»  Jackson  v.  McLod,  12  Johns.  182  ;  Cohh  v.  Stokes,  8  East,  353  ;  Logan  c. 
Herron,  8  S.  &  U.  459  ;  Lesley  r.  Randolph,  4  Hawle,  126  ;  Messenger  v.  Arm- 
Btrong,  1  T.  U.  53  ;  Bight  v.  Darby,  Id.  159.  Anlr,  •380  and  note.  In  some 
cases  in  New  York  a  parol  lease  for  one  month,  and  thereafter  for  successive 
months,  has  been  held  a  lease  for  fi.xed  terms,  expiring  each  month  without 
notice.  People  v.  Schackno,  48  Barb.  551  ;  C.ildtons  p.  Daj-ton,  4  Hun,  451  ; 
People  r.  Goelet,  64  liarb.  476  ;  and  in  others  no  notice  has  been  required  before 
bringing  summarj'  process,  even  in  cases  of  t<^'naneies  from  year  to  year,  because 
not  pro\ided  by  the  stAtutc,  Park  r.  Castle,  19  How.  Pr.  83 ;  Nicliols  r. 
Williams,  8  Cow.  13  ;  but  the  right  to  notice  has  since  been  broadly  aflinned  in 
the  lattt-r  class  of  tenancies,  Uce<ler  v.  Sayre,  70  N.  Y,  180  ;  Lauglimn  v 
Smith,  75  N.  Y.  2u5. 


636  LAW  OP  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  1. 

over  he  may  be  lield  at  the  election  of  the  lessor  as  tenant  for 
rent  at  the  rate  originally  reserved,  and  also  by  the  payment 
and  receipt  of  rent  or  other  act  expressly  recognizing  the  ten. 
ancy.  Such  holding  over  may  be  converted  into  a  tenancy 
from  year  to  year,  upon  the  same  terms  as  the  former  hold- 
ing, including  amount  and  times  of  payment  of  rent  as  far  as 
applicable  to  the  situation  of  the  parties.^  But  where  the  mili- 
tary authority  of  the  country  entered  upon  premises  held  by  a 
lessee  and  occupied  the  same  beyond  the  term  of  his  lease,  he 
was  not  held  liable  to  his  lessor  for  rent  after  the  expiration, 
of  his  term.^ 

6.  But  merely  suffering  a  tenant  to  hold  over  without  any 
act  of  assent  on  the  part  of  the  landlord,  unless  so  long  as  to 
raise  a  legal  presumption  of  a  new  letting,  will  not  change  the 
holding  into  a  tenancy  against  the  will  of  the  lessor,  or  prevent 
his  maintaining  an  action  of  trespass  or  ejectment  against  the 

tenant  as  a  tort  feasor.^ 

[*384]     *7.  But  trespass  will  not  lie  in  favor  of  a  lessor 

against  his  tenant  for  merely  holding  over,  until  he 

shall  have  entered  and  regained  possession  of  the  premises. 

And  such  would  be  the  law  before  notice  to  quit  given,  in  the 

1  Jackson  v.  McLeod,  12  Johns.  182;  Barlow  v.  "Wainwright,  22  Vt.  88  ;  4 
Kent,  Com.  112  ;  Conway  v.  Starkweather,  1  Denio,  113  ;  Bedford  v.  McElher- 
ron,  2  S.  &  R.  *49  ;  Moshier  v.  Reding,  12  Me.  478  ;  Harkins  v.  Pope,  10  Ala. 
493  ;  Wms.  Real  Prop.  326,  n.  ;  Bacon  v.  Brown,  9  Conn.  334  ;  De  Young  v. 
Buchanan,  10  Gill  &  J-.  149  ;  Whittemore  v.  Moore,  9  Dana,  315  ;  Moore  v.  Beas- 
ley,  3  Ohio,  294  ;  Jackson  v.  Salmon,  4  Wend.  327  ;  Laguerenne  v.  Dougherty, 
85  Penn.  St.  45 ;  Crommelin  v.  Thiess,  31  Ala.  418  ;  Com.  Land.  &  Ten.  354  ; 
Brewer  v.  Knapp,  1  Pick.  332  ;  Roe  v.  Ward,  1  H.  Bl.  99.  And  this  would  be 
true  although  the  holding  be  by  a  sub-lessee  of  the  tenant,  if  no  new  contract  has 
been  made  with  lessor.  Dimock  v.  Van  Bergen,  12  Allen,  551.  But  whether 
merely  holding  over  after  a  term  certain  makes  the  tenant  at  sufferance  a  tenant 
at  will  at  the  lessor's  election  is  differently  held  in  different  States.  The  rule  in 
Conway  v.  Starkweather,  supra,  is  denied  in  Massachusetts,  Edwards  v.  Hale, 
9  Allen,  462,  and  elsewhere,  but  is  sustained  in  most  of  the  States.  See  post, 
*393. 

2  Constant  v.  Abell,  36  Mo.  174  ;  14  Am.  Law  Reg.  443. 

8  Den  V.  Adams,  12  N.  J.  99  ;  Conway  v.  Starkweather,  1  Denio,  113  ;  Hemp- 
hill V.  Flynn,  2  Penn.  St.  144  ;  Tud.  Cas.  17  ;  Whiteacre  v.  Symonds,  10  East, 
13.  And  the  lessor  has  a  right  to  hold  a  tenant  at  will  as  trespasser  after  due 
notice  to  quit.  Ellis  v.  Paige,  1  Pick.  43  ;  Rising  v.  Stannard,  17  Mass.  282; 
Danforth  v.  Sargeant,  14  Mass.  491  ;  Vrooman  v.  McKaig,  4  Md.  450  ;  Schuyler 
V.  Smith,  51  N.  Y.  315. 


CH.  XI.  §   2.]  ESTATES    AT   WILL.  037 

ca.so  of  a  tenant  at  will  who  holds  over  after  the  detcnninaticju 
of  the  estate  l>y  the  death  of  the  lessor.' 

8.  A  tenanev  from  year  to  year,  thouirh  indeterminate  as  to 
diiralidii  until  notice  given,  has  many  n|"  the  iiiialities  and  in- 
eideiits  of  a  term  for  years,-  and,  when  notice  has  heen  given, 
the  term  is  regarded  as  for  a  definite  i)eriod,  expiring  with  the 
time  nf  the  notice.  It  would,  among  other  things,  go  to  the 
personal  representatives  of  the  tenant  on  his  dcath.^  It  might 
he  assigned.^  The  lessor  might  he  liable  to  the  tenant  for 
trcs|)ass  (ftare  clausuni,  in  the  same  manner  as  in  case  of  an 
estate  for  years.^  The  lessor  and  tenant  would  have  the  same 
rights  in  respect  to  acts  of  .strangers  which  they  would  have  in 
a  tenancy  for  years,*'  And  their  rights  in  respect  to  each  other 
would  be  the  same,  in  case  of  a  holding  over  by  sueh  a  tenant, 
as  in  case  of  an  estate  for  years."  And  the  tenant  woidd  be 
liable  for  rent,  if  the  iiremises  burneil  down.^  The  same  would 
be  the  law  in  those  States  where,  though  the  doctrine  of  ten- 
ancy from  year  to  year  has  not  been  adojjted,  a  tenancy  at  will 
is  to  lie  determined  by  a  notice  to  (piit  of  a  deiinite  length  of 
timc.^ 

9.  IJut  such  tenants  are   not  bound  to  make  sul> 
stantial  *repairs  upon  the  premises,  cxcejit  by  express  ['SSo] 
stipulation  to  that  eflect.^^     And  where  a  tenant  from 

>  Co.  Lit.  57  b  ;  2  IJl.  Corn.  150  ;  Turmr  v.  Doe,  9  M.  k  W.  C4t),  and  note  to 
Am.  ed. 

«  Cnttlty  f.  Arnol.l,  1  Johns.  &  H.  ()51  ;  Oxlcy  r.  James,  13  M.  &  W.  200. 

«  2  Pn-st.  Abs.  25;  Doe  v.  Porter,  3  T.  H.  13  ;  Tud.  Cas.  15;  Cody  r.  Quar- 
tcrman,  12  Ga.  3S6  ;  Doc  r.  Woixt,  14  M.  &  W.  682. 

*  Sniitli,  Land.  &  Ten.  23  ;  2  Pivst.  Abs.  25  ;  Bottinp  v.  Martin,  1  Camp. 
317  ;  Pleasant  r.  Benson,  14  East,  234.  But  in  Hemi>hin  r.  Giles,  66  X.  C. 
512,  the  lessor's  assignment  was  laid  to  defeat  the  tenant's  estate. 

*  Moore  v.  Boyd,  24  Me.  242.  Ami  this  is  true  of  tenancies  at  will  in  States 
when-  tenancies  from  year  to  year  do  not  exist,  Dickinson  v.  Goo<lspeed,  8  Cush. 
119,  where  the  tenant  at  will  had  tresi«.*9  against  the  lessor  for  entering  and  cut- 
ting off  a  pump,  before  giving  notice  to  (juit  ;  and  see  Cunningham  r.  Molton,  55 
Me.  33,  38  ;  Same  r.  Horton,  57  Me.  422. 

«  Clark  V.  Smith,  25  Penn.  St.  137  ;  Howanl  v.  Merriam,  5  Cush.  563  ; 
French  r.  Fuller,  23  Pick.  107  ;  and  see  anU,  •375. 

'  See  cases  cited  above,  p.  •3S3,  n.  '  Izon  v.  Gorton,  5  Bing.  X.  C.  501. 

*  P'n>nch  r.  Fuller,  23  Pick.  lo7  ;  Howard  r.  Merriam,  5  Cush.  563. 

>"  Gott  V.  Gandy,  2  Ellis  k  B.  845.  But  if  the  tenant  holds  over  under  a 
'cose  providing  for  such  rt-pair,  he  is  presumed  to  Lave  agreed  to  cuutinue  that 


638  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

year  to  year  erected  a  dwelling-house  upon  the  premises,  un- 
der a  promise  from  the  lessor  to  give  him  the  estate,  which  he 
failed  to  do,  it  was  held  that  he  might  recover  of  the  lessor  for 
such  improvements.  But  it  would  be  otherwise  in  the  case 
of  a  vendee  who  should  make  erections  on  his  own  account, 
though  the  vendor  refuse  to  deliver  a  deed  of  the  premises 
according  to  his  verbal  agreement  to  sell  and  convey  the 
estate.^  The  law  upon  the  subject  of  repairs,  as  stated  by 
Mr.  Piatt,  is  as  follows  :  "  Independently  of  contract,  a  tenant 
from  year  to  year  must  keep  the  premises  wind  and  water 
tight,  and  make  fair  and  tenantable  repairs,  as  by  putting 
fences  in  order,  or  replacing  windows  or  doors  that  are  broken 
during  his  occupation,  but  he  is  not  liable  for  the  mere  wear 
and  tear  of  the  premises,  nor  answerable  if  they  are  burned 
down,  nor  bound  to  repair  if  they  become  ruinous  by  any 
other  accident,  nor  to  replace  doors  and  sashes  worn  out  by 
time,  to  put  a  new  roof  on,  or  make  similar  substantial  repairs, 
or  what  are  called  general  repairs."  ^ 

10.  The  necessity  of  notice,  in  order  to  determine  a  tenancy 
from  year  to  year,  applies  as  well  to  the  tenant  as  the  lessor, 
the  rule  being  the  same  as  to  both.^ 

11.  When  notice  to  quit  has  been  given,  it  may  be  waived, 
and  the  tenancy  will  in  that  case  be  re-established  upon  its 
former  footing.  This  waiver  may  be  shown  in  various  ways, 
such  as  by  the  payment  and  receipt  of  rent  accruing  subse- 
quent to  the  expiration  of  the  notice,^  or  by  distraining  for 
such  rent,^  or  giving  a  new  notice  to  quit  at  a  time  subsequent 
to  the  first.^      Though  in  all  these  cases  it  is  a  question  of  in- 

obligatioii.  Richardson  v.  Gifford,  1  Ad.  &  E.  52  ;  Doe  v.  Amey,  12  Ad.  &  E. 
476,  and  see  post,  *391. 

1  Smith  V.  Smith,  28  N.  J.  L.  216  ;  Gillet  v.  Maynard,  5  Johns.  85. 

2  2  Piatt  on  Leases,  182  ;  Brown  v.  Newbold,  44  N.  J.  L.  266. 

^  Jlorehead  v.  Watkyns,  5  B.  Mon.  228  ;  Johnstone  v.  Huddlestone,  4  B.  &  C. 
922  ;  Hall  v.  Wadsworth,  28  Vt.  410. 

*  Prindle  v.  Anderson,  19  Wend.  391  ;  Goodright  v.  Cordwent,  6  T.  R.  219  ; 
Collins  ■«.  Canty,  6  Cush.  415  ;  Hoffr.  Bauni,  21  Cal.  120.  Where,  after  notice, 
the  landlord  accepted  the  rent  due  at  the  time  of  notice,  expressly  reserving  and 
not  waiving  his  right  under  the  notice,  it  was  held  that  the  payment  did  not 
affect  the  notice.     Kimball  v.  Rowland,  6  Gray,  224. 

6  Zouch  V.  Williugale,  1  H.  Bh  311. 

6  Doe  V.  Palmer,  16  East,  53. 


rH.  XI.  §  -2.]  ESTATES    AT    WILL.  039 

tontion,  and  even  the  recci|it   nf  nnf  may  not  he  conclusive, 
but  open  to  explanation.' 

12.  Tilt'  nicru  lii-niaml  of  such  i<nt  hy  the  hiiKUonl  uouM 
nut,  of  it.'^elf,  he  a  waiver  of  sucli  notice,  hut  wouM  l»r  com- 
pctcut  evi(k'nce  for  the  jury  to  that  elVei.'t.- 

13.  The  tenant's  liahility  for  rent  rontinues  till  lie  puts  an 
end  to  the  estate  hy  notice,  wln-thrr  he  continue  to  occujiy 
the  pi'eniisi's  or  not.*^ 

11.  If  a  tenant  from  year  to  year  commit  voluntary  waste, 
he  forfeit.s  all  right  to  notice  to  ([uit,  as  he  thereby  determines 
bis  estate.* 

*15.  The  sui)ject  of  notice,  as  a  mode  of  determining  ['3^0] 
estates  at  will  and  tenancies  from  year  to  year,  is  so 
important,  that  it  should  be  presented  distinctly  by  itsidf.  In 
most  respects  the  same  rules  ajiply,  excej)t  in  the  matter  of 
time,  to  notices,  which  arc  necessary  to  determine  teiuincies 
from  year  to  year  as  to  tenancies  at  will."  If  the  demise  be  by 
three,  notice  by  two  will  not  be  snnicit'iit  t(j  lay  the  foundation 
for  summary  proceedings  to  eject  the  tenant ;  all  ought  to 
join,  each  acting  in  reference  to  his  own  share'' 

10.  Such  notice  will  l)e  sulTieieut  if  l»y  parttl,  unless  re<piired 

1  Doe  V.  Humphreys,  2  East,  "237,  a  second  notice  proved  not  to  be  intended 
to  waive  tlie  lir.st.  Mussenyer  v.  Armstrong,  1  T.  U.  53  ;  Doe  v.  Htitten,  Cowp. 
2-43,  wliere  acceptance  of  rent  \va.s  allowed  to  lie  exjilained,  as  not  l>eiug  intended 
as  a  waiver  of  notice.  See  also  Kimlxill  v.  Uowland,  6  Omy,  224.  lint  the  doc- 
trine of  Doe  V.  Batten  is  denied  in  Croft  v.  Lumley,  5  Ellis  &  B.  648,  082,  s.  c. 
Ellis  B.  &  E.  1069  ;  Dendy  v.  NiclioU,  4  C.  b.  N.  8.  376,  379  ;  and  acceptjincc  of 
rent  is  conclusive  evidence  of  intent  to  waive.  See  also  Priudle  i'.  Anderson,  19 
Wend.  394  ;  Goodright  v.  Cordwcnt,  6  T.  li.  219  ;  Jackson  v.  Sheldon,  5  Cow. 
448. 

2  Blyth  V.  Dennett,  13  C.  B.  178. 

»  Barlow  v.  Wainwright,  22  Vt.  88  ;  Whitney  v.  Gordon,  1  Cush.  2Gt)  ;  Hall 
V.  Wadsworth,  sup.  ;  Parson  v.  Goodale,  8  Allen,  203;  Walker  v.  Furbush,  11 
Cush.  366;  Withers  v.  I..arralK'e,  48  Me.  573. 

*  riiillips  V.  Covert,  7  Johns.  1  ;  Perry  r.  Carr,  44  X.  H.  120. 

'  Nichols  V.  Williams,  8  Cow.  13  ;  anU',  p.  •379.  The  dictum  in  this  cnso, 
and  I'hillips  v.  Covert,  supra,  that  the  only  difference  between  these  tenancies  ia 
the  right  to  notice  before  ejectment,  while  true  of  their  origin,  is  not  so  as  to 
their  incidents.  Atilf,  •384.  The  only  jwint  in  issue  was  whether  notice  was 
reijuircd  before  summar)*  process  under  the  statute.  Park  v.  Ca-stle,  19  How.  Pr. 
83  ;  Reeder  v.  Say  re.  70  N.  Y.  180. 

•  Pickard  v.  Perley,  4.')  N.  H.  195.  Contra,  Doe  v.  Summorsott.  1  H.  A:  Ad. 
135  ;  Alford  v.  Vickerj-,  1  Car.  &  M.  280  ;  Doe  v.  Hughes,  7  M.  k  W.  139. 


640  LAW   OP  REAL   PROPERTY.  [bOOK   I. 

by  agreement  of  the  parties  or  some  statute  to  be  in  writing.^ 
It  must  also  be  direct  and  express,  and  not  in  the  alternative, 
as  to  quit  or  do  something  else.  Though  where  the  notice 
was  accompanied  with  a  declaration,  that,  if  the  tenant  did 
not  quit,  the  lessor  would  insist  on  double  rent,  —  the  statu- 
tory penalty,  —  it  was  held  to  l3e  a  good  one.^ 

17.  "Whether  a  longer  or  shorter  time  of  notice  is  re- 
quired, it  must,  in  order  to  be  binding,  clearly  indicate  the 
time  when  the  tenancy  is  to  expire,  and,  of  course,  must 
be  given  a  sufficient  number  of  days  before  the  time  so 
indicated.^ 

18.  And  the  notice  must  be  so  made  as  to  expire  at  the  end 
of  the  time  during  which  the  tenant  may  lawfully  hold ;  if 
from  year  to  year,  at  the  end  of  the  year,  or  if  from  quarter 
to  quarter,  month  to  month,  and  the  like,  it  must  expire  at  the 
end  of  such  quarter,  month,  and  the  like.*  In  New  York,  if 
the  tenancy  be  at  will,  a  month's  notice  determines  it,  although 
the  time  fixed  for  leaving  the  premises  be  one  day  anterior  to 
the  full  month,  provided  the  landlord  do  not  disturb  the  tenant 
until  one  full  month  after  the  service  of  the  notice.^  Where 
rent  is  payable  monthly  on  the  first  day  of  the  month,  notice 

1  Tud.  Cas.  16  ;  Timmins  v.  Rowlinsoii,  3  Burr.  1607,  s.  c.  1  W.  Bl.  533  ;  Doe 
V.  Crick,  5  Esp.  196.  And  where  the  notice  was  oral,  no  objection  was  made  to 
its  sufficiency  on  that  account.     Hanchet  v.  Whitney,  1  Vt.  311. 

'^  Tud.  Cas,  16;  2  Crahb,  Real  Prop.  429  ;  Doe  v.  Jackson,  Doug.  175;  Doe 
V.  Goldwin,  2  Q.  B.  143  ;  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  237.  The  same  rule  was  adopted 
in  a  recent  case,  where  the  tenant  was  reiiuired  to  pay  an  increased  rent  in  ad- 
vance.    Ahearn  v.  Bellman,  4  E.xch.  Div.  201. 

3  Hanchet  v.  Whitney,  1  Vt.  311  ;  Steward  v.  Harding,  2  Gray,  335  ;  Currier 
V.  Barker,  2  Gray,  224.  And  it  was  held  in  the  last  case  cited,  that  this  princi- 
ple applied  where  a  landlord  sought  to  put  an  end  to  a  lease  in  writing  by  notice 
to  quit  for  non-payment  of  rent.  A  notice  to  quit  "  on  the  11th  of  October  next, 
or  when  the  tenant's  tenancy  might  expire,"  was  held  too  uncertain  as  to  its  ex- 
piration. Mills  V.  Goff,  14  M.  &  W.  72  ;  Huyser  v.  Chase,  13  Mich.  102  ;  Wood- 
row  V.  Michael,  13  Mich.  190  ;  Hultain  v.  Munigle,  6  Allen,  220. 

4  Comyn,  Land.  &  Ten.  405  ;  Prescott  v.  Elm,  7  Cush.  346  ;  Godard  v.  So. 
Car.  R.  R.,  2  Rich.  (S.  C.)  346  ;  Lloyd  v.  Cozens,  2  Ashm.  131  ;  2  Crabb,  Real 
Prop.  425  ;  Hanchet  i).  Whitney,  1  Vt.  311  ;  Doe  v.  Donovan,  1  Taunt.  555; 
Doe  V.  Morphett,  7  Q.  B.  577  ;  Currier  v.  Barker,  2  Gray,  224  ;  Baker  v.  Adams, 
5  Cush.  99  ;  Sanford  v.  Harvey,  11  Cush.  93;  Oakes  v.  Monroe,  8  Cush.  282; 
Johnson  v.  Stewart,  11  Gray,  181  ;  Cunningham  v.  Holton,  55  Me.  33,  38  ;  Same 
V.  Horton,  57  Me.  422.     See  post,  pi.  24. 

5  Burns  v.  Bryant,  31  N.  Y.  453. 


en.  XI.  §  2. J  E.STATFS    .\T   WILL.  C,\] 

Oil  the  first  day  of  oiio  month  to  <juil  <in  Ihc  first  of  th<'  fol- 
lowiiifj^  month  is  Kuflicient.' 

!!•.  Ah  11  notice  is  technical,  ami  I'lXfs  tin*  time  at 
which  *  the  tenant  is  ImiiiihI  to  <|iiif  ami  the  laiidhdil  [TJsT] 
iias  a  ri<rht  to  enter,  ami  the  time  at  which  rent  ceases, 
it  is  important  to  have  a  delinite  rule  as  to  the  time  from  which 
.snch  notice  is  to  he  eompnted.  Thus,  ii'  the  fcmint  comes  in 
at  the  middle  of  a  (inarter,  an<l  pays  rent  on  the  rcLmhir  (piar- 
ter-ilays,  his  year,  in  a  tenancy  from  year  to  year,  commences 
at  the  first  rcgnlar  (piarter-day,  and  notice  to  (juit  mnst  con- 
foi-m  to  that  time.-  And  where  dilVerent  parts  of  the  premi.scs 
were  entered  on  different  days,  the  tenancy,  for  j)nrposes  of 
notice,  is  construed  to  hetrin  on  the  day  when  the  principal 
part  of  the  estate  was  entered  on,  which  is  a  question  for  the 
jiiry.^  But  a  notice  to  (piit  a  part  only  of  premi.ses  leased 
together  would  he  liad.'  And  during  the  jK'udency  of  notice 
to  a  tenant  to  <iuit,  his  rights  are  the  same  as  if  he  held  hy  a 
written  lease,  and  he  may  have  trespass  fpt.  el.  frttj.  against 
his  own  landlord,  while,  lor  an  injury  to  the  freehold  hy  a 
stranger,  the  landlord's  remedy  would  be  case  instead  of  tres- 
pass.^ 

20.  In  the  interpretation  of  notice,  however,  courts  are  not 
strict ;  the  notice  must  be  understood  in  order  to  he  effective ; 
but  if  the  time  is  so  indicated  that  the  party  notified  will  not 

1  Walker  r.  Sliaq>c,  14  Allen,  4.3.  In  this  case  the  court  applied  literally  the 
well-settled  rule  that  the  day  to  l>o  named  in  the  notice  for  quitting  is  the  rent 
day.  Baker  i;.  Adams,  5  Cash.  99  ;  Preseott  v.  Elm,  7  Cush.  340  ;  although 
liere  the  rent  was  payable  in  ailvancc  on  the  first  day  of  the  term.  But  the  rent 
day  is  jiroix-riy  the  last  day  of  the  tenu,  Ackland  c.  Lutley,  9  Ad.  k  E.  879  ; 
and  if  thi-  tenant  is  notified  to  (piit  on  a  later  day,  it  will  be  after  a  new  tenn  has 
l)egun  and  too  late,  Fox  v.  Nathans,  32  Conn.  348  ;  Thurl)er  v.  Dwyer,  10  K.  I. 
355  ;  Doe  v.  Lea,  11  East,  310,  where  the  notice  lield  good  on  a  lease  from 
Michaelmas  was  to  quit  on  Michaelmas.  In  Waters  r.  Young,  11  R.  I.  1,  and 
Stetfens  r.  Earl,  40  N.  J.  128,  a  contrarj'  conclusion  was  reached,  but  in  the  former 
case  its  soundness  was  doubted  and  was  based  mainly  on  custom. 

a  Doe  V.  Johnson,  6  Esp.  10  ;  Doe  r.  Stapleton,  3  Car.  &  P.  275  ;  Sanhill  r. 
Franklin,  L.  IL  10  C.  P.  377. 

»  Doe  r.  Snowdon,  2  W.  Bl.  1224  ;  Doc  v.  Spence,  6  East,  120  ;  Doe  r.  Wat- 
kins,  7  East,  551  ;  Doe  r.  Howard,  11  Fjist,  498  ;  Doe  r.  Hughes,  7  M.  &  W 
189. 

«  Doe  r.  Archer,  14  East.  245  ;  Sunford  r.  Hnr^-ey,  11  Cush.  93. 

•  Dickinson  r.  Ooodspced,  8  Cush.  119  ;  French  v.  Fuller,  23  Pick.  104- 
VOL.  I.— 41 


642  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   L 

be  misled,  it  will  be  sufficient.^  Nor  will  a  misdescription 
of  the  place  invalidate  the  notice,  if  the  tenant  be  not  thereby 
misled.2 

21.  And  if  the  tenant  states  a  day  to  the  lessor's  agent  as 
the  end  of  the  term,  and  the  lessor's  notice  conform  to  that, 
it  will  bind  the  tenant,  though  he  was  mistaken  in  respect  to 
it.3 

22.  In  respect  to  the  service  of  the  notice,  it  must  be  on 
the  landlord's  own  tenant,  and  not  a  sub-tenant  of  his  lessee. 
The  sub-lessee  would  be  bound,  so  far  as  legal  proceedings  for 
possession  of  the  premises  are  concerned,  by  notice  to  the 
landlord's  lessee.*  Where  the  premises  let  were  a  shop,  and  the 
lessee  took  a  partner,  but  no  new  contract  was  made  with 
the  lessor,  notice  served  upon  the  partner  in  the  absence  of 
the  lessee  and  wife  was  held  sufficient  to  determine  the  ten- 
ancy at  will.^     And  it  may  either  be  personal,  or,  as  a  general 

rule,  it  may  be  left  at  the  dwelling-house  of  the  tenant 
[*388]  with  a  *  servant,  though  it  may  not  be  upon  the  prem- 
ises.^   But  if  merely  left  upon  the  premises,  it  will  not 
be  sufficient,  unless  it  appear  that  it  came  to  the  hands  of  the 
tenant.' 

23.  The  length  of  time  required  in  order  that  a  notice  to 
quit  should  operate  to  determine  a  tenancy  at  will,  answering 
to  the  English  tenancy  from  year  to  year,  varies  in  different 
States.     By  the  English  common  law,  from  the  time  of  Henry 

1  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  237  ;  Doe  v.  Morphett,  7  Q.  B.  577  ;  Sandford  v.  Har- 
vey,  11  Cush.  93  ;  Doe  v.  Kightley,  7  T.  E.  63.  In  the  latter  case,  notice  in  1795 
was  given  to  quit  at  a  time  in  1795,  already  passed,  being  an  obvious  mistake  for 
1796.  Doe  v.  Smith,  5  Ad.  &  E.  350  ;  Doe  v.  Hughes,  7  M.  &  W.  139  ;  Granger 
V.  Brown,  11  Cush.  191. 

2  Doe  d.  Cox  V.  ,  4  Esp.  185  ;  Doe  v.  Wilkinson,  12  Ad.  &  E.  743. 

8  Doe  V.  Lambly,  2  Esp.  635. 

*  Pleasant  v.  Benson,  14  East,  234  ;  Roe  v.  Wiggs,  2  Bos.  &  P.,  N.  E.  330  ; 
Hatstat  V.  Packard,  7  Cush.  245  ;  Schilling  v.  Holmes,  23  Cal.  231  ;  Birdsall  v. 
Phillips,  17  Wend.  464. 

5  Walker  v.  Sharpe,  103  Mass.  154. 

6  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  240,  and  note  ;  Doe  v.  Dunbar,  1  Mood.  &  M.  10  ; 
Jones  V.  Marsh,  4  T.  E.  464  ;  Widger  v.  Browning,  2  Car.  &  P.  523  ;  Tud.  Cas. 
17. 

7  Doe  V.  Lucas,  5  Esp.  153  ;  Alford  v.  Vickery,  1  Car.  &  M.  280.  In  the  la^ 
ter  case  a  notice  was  put  under  the  tenant's  door,  but  it  was  shown  to  have  come 
to  his  hands  before  the  six  months  previous  to  the  expiration  of  the  year. 


ClI.  XI.  §  2. J  ESTATES    AT    WILL.  043 

VIII.,  it  has  been  si.\'  inonlhs,  ami  nnist  expire  at  the  eml  <»f 
tilt'  year.'  The  same  nilf  i.s  ii(l(>|>t('il  in  New  York,  North 
OaroHna.  'r»'iiiir.ssi'e,  X'cnnunt,  Now  .fcr.scy,  lllimti.**,  ami  Krii- 
tucky.-  In  I'fmi.->yl\aiiia,  Smitli  Carnlina,  ami  Nfvv  lIaiii|K 
shirc,  the  term  is  three  int»i»ths,  eiidiiej  at  the  e.\|»iiatii»ii  of 
tile  yeai-.'' 

ill.  It  may  i><'  repe.ited,  tiuit  in  tiiose  eases  wliieii  iieitiier 
come  within  the  notion  of  estates  strictly  at  will,  re(|nirin^'-  no 
notiee  to  lU'termine  them,  n(»r  strictly  of  estates  from  year  to 
year,  bccanse,  l)y  implication,  for  some  delinitc  period  less  than 
a  year,  as  for  a  (piai'ter,  a  month,  a  week,  ami  the  like,  the 
time  of  notice  is  measnreil,  ordinarily,  l»y  the  lenirth  of  the 
term  s])ecified  as  the  interval  between  the  times  of  i)ayment 
of  rent  and  the  notice  mnst,  if  not  regnlated  by  statute,  be 
e(|Mal  to  one  of  these  intervals,  and  nmst  ejid  at  the  expira- 
tion thereof.* 

* '25.  In  Massachusetts,  the  subject  of  terminatiuL'^  ['SHU] 
an  estate  at  will,  by  notice,  is  rei^nlateil  by  a  statute, 
which  re(|uires  the  notice  t(j  be  in  writiuir,  and  if  the  tenancy 
lie  for  an  indefinite  period,  or  Ioniser  than  a  (piartir,  or  for  a 
(piarter,  the  notice  is  to  be  that  of  a  (piarter;  if  for  a  less 
period,  or  the  rent  is  i)ayal)le  oftener  than  (piarterly,  the  notice 
is  to  be  equal  to  the  interval  of  such  payment.'' 

1  Bcssell  r.  LaiulslHTg,  7  Q.  B.  638  ;  Doe  r.  Wntts,  7  T.  K.  83  ;  2  Flint.  Ki-al 
Prop.  21i>.  But  where  the  tenant  gave  notice  of  (juitting,  which  was  in  jiroiKT 
form  and  time,  and  he  actually  had  removed  from  the  premises,  it  was  held  that 
his  accidentully  retaining  the  key  two  days  l>eyond  the  proiwr  time  did  not  avoid 
the  notice.     Of  my  v.  Bompas,  11  ('.  B.  .\.  s.  520. 

'  Jackson  v.  Bryan,  1  Johns.  322,  per  Tompkins,  J  ;  4  Kent,  Com.  113  ;  Den 
f.  Mcintosh,  4  Ired.  201  ;  Trousdale  v.  Daniell,  6  Yerg.  431  ;  Hanchett  r.  Whit- 
ii.-y,  1  Vt.  315  ;  Barlow  r.  Wainwright,  22  Vt.  88  ;  Den  v.  Drake,  14  N.  J.  523  ; 
Deii  r.  Bl.iir,  15  N.  J.  181  ;  S(iuirea  r.  Hulf,  3  A.  K.  Marsh,  17;  Sullivan  r. 
Kndtrs,  3  Dnua,  06  ;  Morehead  v.  Watkyns,  5  B.  Mon.  228  ;  Hunt  v.  .Morton, 
18  111.  75. 

»  Logan  V.  Ilerron,  8  S.  &  K.  459  ;  Ix-sley  r.  Bandolph,  4  Rawle,  123  ;  Lloyd 
V.  Cozens,  2  Ashm.  131  ;  C.odar.l  v.  .So.  Car.  \l.  H..  2  Hich.  (S.  C.)  346;  Floyd 
V.  Floyd,  4  Uich.  (S.  C.)  23  ;  Currier  v.  Perley,  24  N.  H.  219. 

♦  Taylor,  Und.  &  Ten.  50  ;  Kight  v.  Darby,  1  T.  R.  159  ;  Smith,  Land.  & 
Ten.  24  ;  Doc  v.  Hazell,  1  Esp.  94  ;  San  ford  r.  HarA-cy,  11  Cush.  93  ;  IVseott  r. 
Elm,  7  Cush.  346  ;  HoUis  v.  Bums,  100  Penn.  St.  206  ;  Stelf.ns  r.  Yuirl,  40 
N.  J.  128. 

'  .Mass.  Pub.  Stat.,  c.  121.  §  12;  Howard  v.   .Merriam,  5  Cush.  563.     Where 


644  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [bOOK   I. 

20.  But  the  distinction  should  be  borne  in  mind  betxreen 
the  notice  required  by  the  statutes  of  some  of  the  States  to 
determine  an  estate  at  will,  and  that  which  is  required  as 
preliminary  to  enforcing  legal  measures  to  expel  the  tenant. 
The  former  are  alone  referred  to  here.* 

27.  The  effect  of  accepting  rent,  by  the  way  of  reviving  a 
tenancy  which  has  once  been  forfeited  by  failure  to  pay  rent, 
or  has  been  terminated,  so  far  as  giving  notice  may  have  that 
effect,  seems  to  be  this.  If  rent  is  in  arrcar  under  a  tenancy 
at  will,  the  landlord  may  terminate  the  tenancy  by  giving  four- 
teen days'  notice  without  any  previous  demand  of  the  rent ; 
and  should  he,  after  giving  such  notice,  receive  the  rent  so 
due,  he  would  not  thereby  revive  the  lease,  if  at  the  time 
of  receiving  the  same,  he  gives  notice  of  his  intent  not  to 
waive  his  right  to  claim  the  possession  of  the  premises.^  But 
if  he  accepts  rent  without  any  such  notice  of  his  intent,  espe- 
cially if  he  accepts  rent  accruing  after  the  date  of  such  notice, 
it  is  considered  as  a  waiver  of  what  he  may  have  done  towards 
terminating  the  tenancy  at  will.^ 

28.  Another  mode  of  determining  estates  at  will,  including 
estates  from  year  to  year,  is  by  surrender,  which  is  substan- 

*  Note.  —  Tliere  are  in  England,  and  in  many  of  the  States,  summary  methods 
jjrovided  by  statute  to  enable  a  landlord  to  recover  possession  of  leased  premises, 
in  some,  if  not  all,  of  which  a  preliminary  notice  of  a  jirescribed  length  of  time 
must  be  given  before  commencing  proceedings.  But  as  the  subject  relates  to  the 
remedies  of  landlords  rather  than  to  the  nature  of  estates  at  will,  and  the  rights 
of  landlords  and  tenants  in  respect  to  such  estate,  it  is  purposely  omitted  here. 
Stat.  1  &  2  Vict.  c.  74  ;  Taylor,  Land.  &  Ten.  §  728  a  {7th  ed. )  and  note  ;  Smith, 
Land.  &  Ten.  245,  n.,  Morris'  ed.  ;  Mass.  Pub  Stat.  c.  175  ;  Howards.  Merriam, 
5  Cush.  563  ;  Granger  v.  Brown,  1]  Cush.  191  ;  Sanford  v.  Harvey,  11  Cush.  93  ; 
Eooney  v.  Gillespie,  6  Allen,  74  ;  Raynor  v.  Haggard,  18  Mich.  72  ;  Dudley  v. 
Lee,  39  111.  339  ;  Alexander  v.  Carew,  13  Allen,  70.  An  eviction  of  lessee  by 
summary  proceedings  does  not  affect  his  liability  for  past  rent ;  it  only  applies  to 
what  is  future.     Johnson  v.  Oppenheim,  55  N.  Y.  294. 

rent  is  in  aiTear  a  briefer  notice  of  two  weeks  is  provided  for.     But  this  applies  to 
all  tenancies,  and  need  not  expire  with  a  rent  day.     Pub.  Stat.  c.  121,  §  12. 

1  Kimball  v.  Rowland,  6  Gray,  224  ;  Mass.  Gen.  Stat.  1860,  c.  90,  §  31. 

2  Tuttle  V.  Bean,  13  Met.  275  ;  Collins  v.  Canty,  6  Cush.  415.  See  Norris  v. 
Morrill,  43  N.  H.  218,  commenting  on  the  above  cases,  and  maintaining  that 
merely  accepting  rent  accrued  before  the  termination  of  the  tenancy  is  not  a 
waiver  of  notice.  It  seems,  after  all,  a  mere  question  of  intent.  Farson  v. 
Goodale,  8  Allen,  202.  But  see  ante,  *385  and  note,  that  the  intent  will  be  con- 
clusively implied  from  the  act. 


ni.  XI.  §  -2.]  ESTATES    AT   WILL.  C  j'l 

tially  a  yioldinti:  up  of  posKcasioii  l»y  llic  tenant  to  tlio  loHflor, 
or  him  who  has  the  reversion,  whirh  may  he  lepally  infern-d 
from  the  aels  of  the  |>artics  as  well  as  their  I'Xjtress  words, 
siieh  as  altaiitlonin;^;  the  preniisrs  liy  the  tenant,  and  the  aHHum- 
imr  possession  (hereof  hy  the  h'ssor.*  IJut  h^avintr  the  key 
with  the  h'ssor  does  not  amonnt  to  a  surrender,  if  he  <h>  not 
aceept  it  as  sueh.'- 

21*.  If,  after  a  (U-termination  of  a  tenaney  l»y  notiee,  the 
lessee  continues  to  lioKl  the  premises,  and  the  landh)rd  ac- 
cepts rent  for  the  same,  it  will  be  regarded  as  a  renewal 
of  the  tenaney  upon  the  former  terms. ^ 

30.  If  the  tenaney  is  determined  hy  notiee,  the  lessor  may, 
if  he  i)leasc,  enter  and  take  possession  of  the  jiremises  hy 
force  if  necessary.*  And  where  the  written  notice  was  di- 
rected to  John,  when  the  tenant's  name  was  Thomas,  hut  was 
handed  to  the  tenant's  wife  at  the  dwt'llin^''-house  in  his  ali- 
sence,  commandinir  the  person  to  whom  it  was  directed  to 
(|uit  the  dwellin^-liouse  "•  you  now  hold  imder  me,"  it  was 
held  to  be  sullicient  ;  and  the  time  of  the  notice  havin*^  e.\- 
l»ired,  jiiid  the  lessee  havim:-  failed  to  remove,  the  U-ssor  en- 
tei"i'd  in  the  absence  of  the  lessee,  and  removed  his  u'oods,  ami 
fastened  the  door.  It  was  held  that  the  lessor  was  justified 
in  so  doin<r,  although  the  goods  were  injured  by  remaininir  ex- 
posed to  the  weather.^' 

31,  It  remains  to  consider  the  ell'ect  of  the  statutes  of  frauds 
up«)n  i)arol  leases,  as  it  will  be  found  that  these  vary  essen- 
tially in  their  provisions  in  respect  to  such  leases.      I'.ut  it  is 

»  Coinyn,  Laii.l.  k  Ten.  337  :  Hioiiuis  v.  Cook,  2  B.  &  AM.  1U»  ;  Ni(k.lls  ,-. 
Atla-rstoui-,  10  Q.  15.  944  ;  Whitney  v.  Meyers,  1  Duer,  266  ;  Suiitli,  Liimi.  .t 
Ten.  231,  n.,  Monis'.s  e<l, 

■'  Withei-s  r.  I^irralxe,  48  >Io.  573  ;  Cannnn  v.  Hartley,  9  C.  B.  63.1  ;  Walker 
r.  Fnrl.usli,  11  Cash.  366  ;  Towuseiul  i'.  Albers,  3  E.  D.  Sniitli,  5»-n  ;  ,inh\ 
•351-3.'>4. 

»  t;o(xlri^'lit  V.  Cord  went,  6  T.  H.  219. 

*  Taunton  i'.  Costar,  7  T.  H.  431  ;  Miner  r.  Stevens,  1  Cush.  482  ;  Men.ler  v. 
Stone,  7  Met.  147;  Harvey  v.  l?ry<lK'es,  14  M.  k  W.  437;  Hyatt  r.  Woo.1,  4 
Johns.  150  ;  Ovenleer  r.  Lewis,  1  Watts  &  S.  90.  See  contra,  Newton  p.  Hnr- 
land,  1  Mann.  &  (!.  644,  ("oltman,  .1.,  dis.senting.  See  this  snhjeet  further  dis** 
cussed,  ;*<.<  c.  12.  §  1,  [A.  10;  Mugford  v.  Hichardsou,  6  Alien,  76;  Stevens  v 
Sami>son,  59  Me.  568. 

6  Clark  V.  Kcliher,  107  Mass.  406. 


646  LAW   OP  REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK    I. 

believed  they  all,  with  the  exception  of  New  York,  agree  in 
this,  that  if  the  agreement  to  let  be  executory,  and  not  con- 
summated by  the  lessee's  taking  possession,  it  cannot  be  en- 
forced ;  if  it  be  by  parol,  the  statute  prohibits  any  action  upon 
such  a  contract.^ 

32.  If  the  lessee  takes  possession,  the  question  arises  whe- 
ther by  the  statute  of  frauds  the  lease  is  binding  as  an  agree- 
ment at  common  law,  or  the  tenancy  under  it  is  a  mere 
tenancy   at    will,   or  the   lease,   as   such,   is   to   be   deemed 

void. 
[*391]     *33.  If  the  lease  does  not  exceed  three  years  from 

the  time  of  making,  it  is  by  the  English  statute  29 
Car.  II.  c.  3,  §§  1,  2,  as  valid  and  binding  as  if  no  such 
statute  had  been  enacted.^  The  same  is  the  rule  in  Georgia, 
Indiana,  Maryland,  North  Carolina,  Pennsylvania,  New  Jer- 
sey, and  South  Carolina.  This  term  m  Florida  is  two,  and  in 
the  following  States  one  year  ;  namely,  Alabama,  Arkansas, 
California,  Connecticut,  Delaware,  Iowa,  Kentucky,  Michigan, 
Mississippi,  New  York,  Nevada,  Rhode  Island,  Tennessee, 
Texas,  Virginia,  and  Wisconsin.  In  Maine,  Massachusetts, 
Missouri,  New  Hampshire,  Ohio,  and  Vermont,  all  such  leases 
create  tenancies  at  will  only.^ 

34.  Although  parol  leases  are,  in  the  cases  before  enume- 
rated, declared  by  these  statutes  mere  estates  at  will,  or  in 
some  cases  void,  yet  if  the  lessee  enters  and  occupies,  and 
pays  rent  under  them,  he  becomes  a  tenant  from  year  to  year, 
in  those  States  where  such  tenancies  are  recognized,  or  a  ten- 
ant at  will  in  others,  with  the  rights  as  to  notice  of  such 
tenants.* 

35.  And  in  the  cases  embraced  in  the  above  section,  the 

1  Browne,  Stat.  Frauds,  §  37  ;  Edge  v.  Strafford,  1  Tyrw.  293  ;  Larkin  v. 
Avery,  23  Conn.  304  ;  Delano  v.  Montague,  4  Cush.  42  ;  Young  v.  Dake,  5  N.  Y. 
463. 

2  Bolton  V.  Tomlin,  5  Ad.  &  E.  856  ;  Rawlins  v.  Turner,  1  Ld.  Raym.  736. 

8  Browne,  Stat.  Frauds,  501-532  ;  Adams  v.  McKesson,  53  Penn.  St.  83  ; 
Birckhead  v.  Cumrnings,  33  N.  J.  44  ;  Morrill  v.  Macknian,  24  Mich.  286  ;  Lob- 
dell  V.  Hall,  3  Nev.  517. 

*  Clayton  v.  Blakey,  8  T.  R.  3  ;  McDowell  v.  Simpson,  3  Watts,  129 ;  Peo- 
ple V.  Kickhert,  8  Cow.  226  ;  Blumenthal  v.  Bloomingdale,  100  N.  Y.  561  ; 
Dumnv.  Rotherniel,  112  Penn.  St.  272  ;  Drake  v.  Newton,  23  N.  J.  Ill  ;  Lock- 
wood  V.  Lockwood,  22  Conn.  425  ;  2  Sniitli,  Lead.  Cas.  76  n.,  Am.  ed. 


CH.  XI.  §  2.]  E.STATi:.S   AT   WILL.  047 

rifjhts  of  the  itarties  will  l»e  f^ruvenu'd  by  the  terms  of  the 
original  letting,  as  agreed  uimn  hy  the  parties,  «o  Ioml'  as 
the  holdmg  continues.' 

*  Browne,  Stut.  Frauds,  §  39  ;  Schuyler  v.  Ix-ggctt,  2  Cow.  660  ;  Harlow  v, 
WiiinwriKlit,  '22  Vt.  88  ;  Doc  i;.  Bell,  5  T.  U.  -171  ;  Hollis  v.  Tool,  3  Met.  350; 
Currier  v.  Barker,  2  Gray,  224;  BeU  v.  Delbert,  14  W.  No.  C'ua.  3C0. 


648  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   L 


CHAPTER  XII. 

TENANCIES  AT  SUFFERANCE,   LICENSES,  ETC. 

Sect.  1.     Tenancies  at  Sufferance. 
Sect.  2.     License. 

SECTION   I. 
TENANCIES    AT    SUFFERANCE. 

1.  What  constitutes  a  tenant  at  sufferance. 

2.  Who  is  such  tenant. 

3.  Tenancy  at  sufferance  only  grows  out  of  agreement. 
4,  5.  Of  the  nature  of  such  tenancy. 

6.  Tenant  has  no  privity  of  estate,  nor  is  liable  to  trespass  or  for  rent. 

7.  Possession  of  such  tenant  not  adverse  to  the  owner. 

8.  When  the  owner  may  have  trespass  against  him. 

9.  Effect  of  tenant's  assigning,  in  making  possession  adverse. 

10.  Of  the  right  of  the  owner  to  enter  upon  his  tenant. 
10  a.  How  far  owner  may  use  force  to  eject  a  tenant. 

10  h.  Same  subject  with  cases  cited. 

11.  Tenants  not  entitled  to  notice  to  quit. 

1.  When  a  tenant  has  come  rightfully  into  possession  of 
lands  by  permission  of  the  owner,  and  continues  to 
[*393]  occupy  the  *  same,  after  the  time  for  which,  by  such 
permission,  he  has  a  right  to  hold  the  same,  he  is  said 
to  be  a  tenant  l)y  sufferance.  In  the  language  of  the  element- 
ary writers,  "  he  is  one  who  comes  in  by  right,  and  holds  over 
without  right."  ^  He  holds  without  right,  and  yet  is  not  a 
trespasser.^  Thus  where  the  owner  of  land  brought  process 
of  ejectment  against  the  tenant,  and  a  judgment  was  rendered 
that  the  tenant  should  remove  by  such  a  time  or  be  expelled, 

1  2  Bl.  Com.  150  ;  Co.  Lit.  57  b  ;  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  217;  Doc  v.  Hull,  2 
D.  k  R.  38  ;  Russell  v.  Fabyan,  34  N.  H.  218. 

2  Uridias  v.  Morrell,  25  Cal.  35. 


CII.  XII.  §  1.]     TENURES    AT   SCFFEHANTE,  LICENSES,  ETC".  040 

it  was  held  tli;it  trfs|»:iss  would  not  lie  ajrainst  liiiii  fm-  rttniii- 
iiiir  ixisscssiou  until  tlic  expiration  of  tlu'  tinic  prcsciilK'il.i 
But  to  make  one  a  tenant  hy  suiTeram-c  in  California  and  New 
York,  tlicrr  must  he  sonu'  hudics  on  the  part  of  tin-  owiu-r,  in 
dtdayini;  to  make  entry  uj)on  his  tenant  after  the  expiration 
of  his  term.  And  in  sueh  case  he  nnist  j;ive  his  tenant  ft 
nu)ntirs  notice  to  (piit  heforc  he  can  enter  and  remove  him, 
or  maintain  ejectment  ajrainst  him.-  Hut  if  he  demands  po.s- 
scssion  of  his  tenant  who  holds  over,  within  a  year  from  the 
termination  of  his  lease,  lie  may  recover  possession  of  his 
tenant  i)y  ex|iollin<2:  him  without  first  making  a  formal  entry 
upon  the  premises.-^  Hut  this  permission  must  he  that  of  a 
laudloi-d  to  a  tenant;  if  it  he  an  oceu|»ancy  as  a  mere  matter 
of  favor  or  accommodation,  it  would  not  he  a  tenancy  at  suf- 
fe  lance. 

2.  Under  this  class  of  occu])ants  (d"  land  have  heen  included 
tenants  per  imtrc  vie  after  the  death  of  the  cextui  que  vie,* 
tenants  for  years  whose  terms  have  expired,''  tenants  at  will 
whose  estates  liavc  hcen  determined  hy  alienation  or  hy  death 
of  the  lessor,^  or  by  the  happening  of  some  contingent  event 
upon  which  the  determination  of  an  estate  at  will  depended,^ 
undertenants  who  hold  after  the  exiiiratioii  of  the  term  of  the 
original  lessee,^  a  grantor  who  agrees  to  deliver  pos.session  hy 
a  certain  day,  and  holds  over.^  In  short,  any  one  who  con- 
tinues in  possession  without  agreement,  after  the  «leterniina- 
tion  of  the  particular  estate  by  which  he  originally  gained  it."' 
And  this,  even  though  the  original  contract  was  a  written 
lease  which  provided  for  the  recovery  of  rent,  j^ru  rata,  for 

'  Cami.bell  v.  Loader,  3  Huil.st.  &  C.  520. 

a  Moore  r.  Morrow,  28  ("iil.  r.54  ;  2  N.  Y.  Rev.  Stat.  (6th  ed.)  112<i,  §  7  ;  Rowan 
V.  Lytle,  11  Weml.  616;  Smith  r.  Littl.field,  51  N.  Y.  531».  In  K<ntneky  a  ten- 
ant for  n  term  of  ii  yenr  or  more  is  nt  suirerance  for  ninety  days  uft«r  the  tenn 
expires.     Mendel  r.  Hall,  13  Hush,  232. 

•  I'ridins  V.  Morrell,  sup.  *  C"o.  Lit.  .17  b. 

*  Co.  Lit.  o7  b  ;  Jiiekson  v.  Parkhurst,  5  Johns,  128  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  ISO. 

«  Co.  Lit.  57  b  ;  Kinsley  v.  Ames,  2  Met.  29  ;  Benedict  r.  Morse.  Ut  Met  223. 
T  Creech  v.  Crockett,  5  Cush.  133  ;   Elliott  r.  Stone,  1  Cray.  571. 

8  Simkin  v.  Ashurst,  1  Cr.  M.  k  R.  261  ;  .Smith,  Und.  k  Ten.  25. 

9  Hyatt  V.  Wooil,  4  Jolins.  150. 

'"  Com.  Dig.  "  Ustnte,"  1.  1  ;  Burton,  Real  Prop.  §  56  ;  Livinp.t<>n  r.  Tnnneii 
12  Barb.  481  ;  2  Flint  Real  Prop.  222  ;  Smith  v.  LitllcQeld,  51  N.  Y.  543. 


650  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [bOOK   t. 

the  time  the  tenant  should  hold  after  the  expiration  of  the 
lease.i  Thus,  where  the  lessee  underlet,  and  the  tenancy 
between  the  original  parties  to  the  lease  was  determined  by 
the  original  lessor,  such  sub-tenant  became  thereby  a  tenant 
at  sufferance  to  the  original  lessor.^  So  where  husband  and 
wife  conveyed  land  by  deed,  which  deed  was  void  as  to  the 
wife,  it  was  held  that,  although  it  conveyed  the  husband's 
interest  for  life,  the  moment  he  died  the  purchaser  became  a 
tenant  at  sufferance  to  the  wife.  Nor  could  the  tenant  pur- 
chase in  a  new  title  from  a  third  person  and  set  it  up  against 
the  wife's  claim  to  recover,  without  first  surrendering  posses- 
sion to  her.3  The  following  cases  may  serve  to  illustrate  some 
of  the  foregoing  propositions :  B  was  tenant  for  life  with  a 
remainder  to  A,  who,  acting  as  his  agent,  leased  the  premises 
to  C  for  three  years,  he  knowing  that  he  acted  as  agent.  B 
died  at  the  end  of  one  year,  and  A  conveyed  the  estate  to  the 
plaintiff,  who  sued  C  for  possession.  It  was  held  that  C's 
estate  determined  upon  B's  death,  and  that  from  that  time  he 
was  tenant  at  sufferance,  and  the  plaintiff  recovered.*  A, 
owning  land,  and  being  about  to  leave  the  country,  requested 
B  to  take  charge  of  it  during  his  absence,  and  he  let  it  to  C. 
It  was  held  that  A's  return  determined  the  lease,  and  that  C 
thereby  became  a  tenant  at  sufferance.^ 

3.  But  in  order  to  have  a  tenancy  grow  into  one  by  suffer- 
ance, it  must  originally  have  been  created  by  agreement  of  the 
parties,  for  where  one  was  in,  like  a  guardian,  by  act  of  the 
law,  and  lield  after  his  ward  arrived  at  age,  he  was  a  tort 
feasor,  intruder,  abator,  or  trespasser,  and  not  a  tenant  at 
sufferance.*^  It  is  held  in  New  York  and  other  States  that 
a  tenant  who  holds  over  after  his  term  has  expired  may  be 
treated  by  the  lessor  as  a  tenant  from  year  to  year  or  a  tres- 
passer, at  his  option,  but  that  the  tenant  cannot  elect  in  which 
capacity  he  shall  be  regarded.''     In  Massachusetts  and  Maine, 

1  Edwards  v.  Hale,  9  Allen,  462. 

2  Evans  v.  Reed,  5  Gray,  308.  »  Griffin  v.  Sheffield,  38  Miss.  390. 

*  Page  V.  Wight,  14  Allen,  182.  ^  Antoni  v.  Belknap,  102  Mass.  193. 

^  Co.  Lit,  57  b  ;  2d  Inst.  134  ;  Merrill  v.  Bullock,  105  Mass.  491  :  Torrey  v. 
Torrey,  14  N.  Y,  430. 

6  Conway  v.  Starkweather,  1  Denio,  113  ;  Witt  v.  New  York,  5  Hob.  248, 
8.  c.  6  Id.  441 ;  Vrooman  v.  McKaig,  4  Md.  450 ;  Moore  v.  Beasley,  3  Ohio,  294 ; 


en.  XII.  §  1.]     TKNWNCIES    AT   SUFFKUANCE,  LICENSES,  ETC.         G61 

however,  a  contrarv  rule  prevails,  ami  the  tniaiil  hohlin;;  over 
remains  at  .siilTerance  until  he,  a.s  well  a.s  the  landlonl,  have 
a^ri'e*!  to  a  m-w  tenancy  ;  thouifh  this  ajrreenient  may  be 
impliecl.'     Ami  the  riilf  in  England  seems  to  be  the  same.^ 

4.  The  principle  that  regulates  the  relation  of  landlonl  and 
tenant,  however,  so  far  applies  between  them  that  a  tenant  at 
sulVeranee  will  not  be  admitti'd  to(|Uestion  the  title  of  his  lessor 
in  an  action  to  recover  pt)ssession  of  the  land.^ 

5.  And  yet  a  holding  by  suflerance  is  rather  like  a  i«iiaiic\ 
between  landlord  and  tenant  than  in  fact  such  a  tenancy,  for 
it  is  defective  in  one  ul'  the  rjcuicnts  of  such  a  tenancy,  namely, 
an  agreement  express  or  ini|ilie(l  by  which  it  is  con- 
tinued. The  *  moment  the  pai'ties  agree,  the  one  to  [*394] 
hold  and  the  (ttlier  to  jJiMinit  him  to  hold  possession, 

it  becomes  a  tenancy  at  will,  or  from  year  to  year,  and  ceases 
to  be  one  at  sulVeranee,^  Such  would  be  the  elTect  of  paying 
and  receiving  rent  for  the  time  the  tenant  should  hold  over,'' 
or  suffering  a  distress,'^  and  very  slight  circumstances  will 
sufiice  to  establish  such  an  agreement.' 

6.  There  is  neither  privity  of  contract  nor  of  estate  between 
the  owner  and  tenant,  for  the  tenant  is  not  in  by  contract,  nor 
has  he  any  estate  which  he  can  transfer  or  transmit,  or  which 
can  be  eidarged  by  release.  lie  has  a  mere  naked  possession 
without  right  of  notice  to  (piit.  IJut  though  Ibis  po.sscssion  is 
wrongful,  he  is,  for  technical  reasons,  n«»t  lial)le  in  trespass 
l)y  reason  thereof.  His  iKtbling  is  by  the  laches  of  the  owner, 
who  may  enter  at  any  moment  and  jiut  an  end  to  the  same. 
But  until  that  has  been  done  he  cannot  have  trespass  against 

SchuyU-r  v.  ^nuth,  51  N.  Y.  309  ;  Bacon  v.  Brown,  9  Conn.  334  ;  Hemphill  v. 
Flynn,  2  Tenn.  .St.  144  ;  McGregor  v.  Kawle,  57  I'enn.  St.  184  ;  Noel  i'.  MiCrory, 
7Coklw.  623  ;  Ives  v.  Williunis,  50  Mich.  100,  106  ;  ToUe  r.  Orth,  75  Ind.  298. 

*  FLdwanls  v.  Hale,  9  Allen,  462  ;  Euiniea  r.  Feely,  132  MiuA.  346  ;  Porter 
V.  Hubbard,  134  Mass.  233,  238  ;  Witliers  r.  Larrubee,  48  Me.  570  ;  Ackernian  v. 
Lyman,  20  Wise.  454  ;  Kussell  r.  Fubyan,  34  N.  H.  218  ;  Condon  f.  Barr,  47 
N.  J.  113. 

«  Ibbs  V.  Richardson,  9  Ad.  &  E.  849  ;  Lc^'>'  r.  Lewis,  9  C.  B.  N.  s.  872. 

•  Jackson  r.  M'lx-od,  12  Johns.  182. 

*  Smith.  Liiid.  &  Ten.  26  ;  Watkins,  Conv.  24. 

•  Smitli.  Land,  k  Ten.  219-221  ;  Hn.wll  v.  Fabyan,  34  X.  H.  223;  Emmona 
V.  Scnd.Ur,  115  Mass.  367  ;  Morris  r.  Niles,  12  Abb.  Pr.  I{.  103. 

A  Panton  v.  Jones,  3  Camp.  372.  ^  GrilUtli  r.  Kniscly,  75  HL  411. 


652  LAW   OF  EEAL   PROPERTY.  [bOOK   1. 

the  tenant  for  such  occupation.^  And  where  he  has  made  such 
entry,  he  may  treat  the  tenant  as  a  trespasser  in  holding  over, 
or  any  one  holding  under  him.^  But  a  tenant  at  sufferance 
cannot  maintain  trespass  against  lessor  for  making  a  peace- 
able entry  upon  the  premises.^  If,  after  the  expiration  of  a 
tenant's  term,  his  landlord  bring  a  writ  of  entry  at  common 
law  to  recover  possession,  the  judgment  which  he  recovers 
embraces  the  mesne  profits  to  which  he  will  be  entitled.  But 
if  he  sues  out  the  process  of  forcible  entry  and  detainer,  and 
thereby  obtains  possession  of  the  premises,  he  may  after  that 
sue  in  trespass  for  mesne  profits  against  the  tenant.*  Nor 
could  he,  at  common  law,  recover  rent  as  such  for  such  pos- 
session, it  being  the  owner's  own  laches  in  suffering  him  to 
retain  it  ;^  but  he  might  recover  in  an  action  for  use  and  occu- 
pation.^ And  the  defect  of  the  common  law,  in  respect  to  its 
holding  a  tenant  at  sufferance  exempt  from  rent,  is  obviated 
by  the  English  statutes,  4  Geo.  II.  c.  28,  and  11  Geo.  II.  c.  19, 
making  him  liable  for  double  rent  if  he  holds  over  after  notice 


i  2  Bl.  Com.  150  ;  Watkins,  Conv.  24  ;  Jackson  v.  Parkhurst,  5  Johns.  128  ; 
4  Kent,  Com.  117.  "  One  tenant  at  sufferance  cannot  make  another,"  per  Lord 
EUenborough,  Thunder  v.  Belcher,  3  East,  451  ;  Layman  v.  Throp,  11  Ind. 
352. 

2  Curl  V.  Lowell,  19  Pick.  27  ;  Butcher  v.  Butcher,  7  B.  &  C.  399  ;  Hey  v. 
Moorhouse,  6  Bing.  N .  C.  52. 

3  Esty  V.  Baker,  50  Me.  334. 

*  Sargent  v.  Smith,  12  Gray,  426  ;  Eaymond  v.  Andrews,  6  Cush.  265. 

6  2  Bl.  Com.  150,  Chitty's  note  ;  Sir  Moil  Finch's  Case,  2  Leon.  143  ;  Tud. 
Cas.  9.  This  point  is  noticed  but  left  undecided  by  the  court  in  Delano  v.  Mon- 
tague, 4  Cush.  42.  In  Flood  v.  Flood,  1  Allen,  217,  though  the  action  was  for 
use  and  occupation,  it  was  said  that  rent  was  not  recoverable  ;  and  this  is  re- 
peated in  Cunningham  v.  Holton,  55  Me.  33,  38,  though  not  in  issue  as  the 
tenant  had  paid. 

6  Ibbs  V.  Richardson,  9  Ad.  &  E.  849  ;  Levi  v.  Lewis,  6  C.  B.  N.  s.  766.  For 
the  landlord  mlay  waive  the  tort  and  sue  in  assumpsit.  lb.  ;  Nat.  Oil  E,ef.  Co.  v. 
Bush,  88  Penn.  St.  335  ;  Stockton's  App.,  64  Penn.  St.  63.  In  Bonney  v.  Foss, 
62  Me.  63,  a  tenant  holding  over  was  held  liable,  presumably  as  a  tenant  at  suf- 
ferance. In  Hogsett  v.  Ellis,  17  Mich.  351,  367-370,  the  authorities  are  care- 
fully exanuned,  and  the  distinction  between  rent  and  use  and  occupation  pointed 
out.  And  now  by  statute  in  Massachusetts  such  tenant  is  liable.  Pub.  Stat, 
c.  121,  §§  3,  5.  Although  it  is  still  doubtful  if  assumpsit  for  use  and  occupation 
lay  prior  thereto.  Porter  v.  Hubbard,  134  Mass.  233,  238.  But  such  action  will 
not  lie  even  under  such  a  statute,  where  the  occupant  has  never  been  in  jiiivity 
or  hia  holding  has  been  adverse.     Hogsett  v.  Ellis,  supra;  post,  p.  653,  note  3. 


ril.  XII.  §  1.]     TENANCIES   AT  SUFFERANCE,  LICENSES,  ETC.        G53 

to  (piit.'  In  rmnsylviinia  ;i  Iniidlinil  is  allowcil  to  recover 
airainst  a  tenant  who  lioMs  over,  without  (listiii;j:uishinLr  whether 
the  lialtility  is  for  mesne  profits  or  damaires,  or  for  use  and 
occupation.-  Hut  jrencrally  no  recovery  can  be  luid  against  an 
oecJipant.  even  under  statutes  jxlvin^  an  action  against  occu- 
pants, or  tenants  at  KulTcrance,  unh'ss  they  »)ri<rinaily  licld  by 
souK^  airreenicnt  with  the  jihiintilT,  or  some  other  jjerson  with 
whom  hi'  is  in  privity.  If  the  tenant  denies  the  plaintiff's 
title,  or  that  he  holds  under  him,  he  nnist  brin;^  trespa.ss  or 
ejectment  for  mesne  |>rolits^  A  tenant  at  sullerance  is  not 
entitled  to  emblements,'''  lUit  to  constitute  a  tenancy  by  suf- 
ferance, one  must  hold  an  estate  less  than  a  fee,  and  subordi- 
nate to  a  fee.  If  he  h')ld  Ijy  a  title  which  does  not  answer 
these  couilitions,  althoujrh  it  may  have  failed  or  come  to  an 
end.  It  would  not  render  him  a  tenant  at  sufferance,  or  liable 
as  such.'' 

7.  While  the  owner  cannot  treat  the  tenant  at  sufferance 
as  a  trespasser,  until  he  shall  have  gained  possession  of  the 
premises  by  entry  thereon,"  the  tenant  cannot  avail  him.self  of 
his  possession  as  being  adverse  to  the  owner  for  the  purpose 
of  barring  his  claim  under  the  .statute  of  limitations.^  And 
the  landlord  may  have  case  against  such  tenant  for  injuries 

*  Smitli,  Land,  k  Ton.  24.'>.  And  similar  stJitutes  exist  in  New  York,  Dela- 
ware, Suutli  Carolina,  and  Arkansas.  1  Stat,  at  Large,  697  ;  Rev.  Stat.  S.  C, 
1869,  p.  435  ;  Rev.  Stat.  520. 

a  Stockton's  Appeal,  64  Pcnn.  St.  63. 

«  Knowlcs  V.  Hull,  99  Mass.  562  ;  Merrill  r.  Bullock,  105  Mass.  491  ;  Tinder 
r.  Davis,  88  Ind.  99  ;  Whitney  v.  Dart,  117  Mass.  513  ;  Wills  r.  Wills,  34  Ind. 
106  ;  Chnniboriiiiu  r.  Dunnhue,  45  Vt.  50  ;  Mar<iuette  R.  R.  v.  Harlow,  37  Mich. 
654.  But  nurely  paying  rent  to  the  mortgagor  or  his  assignee  after  entr)'  hy  th( 
mortgagee  does  not  make  an  adverse  holding  as  to  the  latter.  Sucier  v.  Marsales, 
133  -Miiss.  454. 

♦  .Schuyler  r.  Smith,  51  N.  Y.  309,  314. 

6  Doe  V.  Turner,  7  M.  k  W.  226.  «  Cook  r.  Norton,  48  111.  20. 

'  2  Bl.  Com.  150;  Co.  Lit.  57  !•  ;  Rising  c.  SUnnanl,  17  Mass.  282  ;  Newtek 
V.  Harland,  1  Mann.  &  G,  644  ;  Trevillian  v.  Andrew,  5  Mod.  384. 

8  Watkins,  Conv.  24,  Morley  &  Coote's  e<l.  ;  Smith,  Land,  k  Ten.  217  ;  Do* 
V.  Hull,  2  Dowl.  &  R.  38,  jn-r  Aliliott,  C.  J.  ;  2  Smith,  Uad.  Cas.  5th  Am.  ed. 
532  ;  Tud.  Cas.  8.  By  stat.  3  &  4  Wm,  IV.  c.  27,  the  limitation  U'gius  to  run 
against  the  landlord  from  the  time  he  might  have  entered.  But  this  haa  not 
Wen  followed,  as  is  said,  in  any  of  the  United  States.  Smith,  I^ond.  &  Ten.  218, 
n.,  Morris's  ed.  ;  Edwanls  r.  Hale,  9  Allen,  464,  465  :  Colvin  r.  Warford,  20  Md. 
396  ;  Gwynn  r.  Jones,  2  Gill  k  J.  173. 


654  LAW   OF  REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I, 

done  to  the  premises  while  retained  by  him,  and  before  entry 

made  by  the  landlord.^ 
[*395]     *  8.  It  seems  to  be  immaterial  that  the  owner  should 

make  any  formal  declaration  of  tlie  intent  with  which 
he  enters,  if  he  actually  regains  his  possession.  He  may  then 
have  trespass  against  the  tenant  for  holding  adversely  to  him.^ 

9.  But  what  has  been  said  as  to  the  possession  of  a  tenant 
at  sufferance  not  being  adverse  to  that  of  the  owner,  does  not 
apply  to  the  case  of  one  coming  into  possession  as  assignee  or 
representative  of  such  tenant.  As  the  latter  can  neither 
assign  nor  transmit  his  tenancy  at  sufferance,  whoever  comes 
in  under  him  will  hold  adversely  to  the  owner,  and  his  pos- 
session may,  under  the  statute  of  limitations,  in  process  of 
time,  ripen  into  a  good  title,  unless  he  shall  have  recognized 
the  title  of  the  owner,  and  that  he  held  under  him.'^ 

10.  In  a  former  chapter,*  the  right  of  the  owner  to  enter 
and  regain  possession  of  premises  by  force,  after  a  tenancy  at 
will  had  been  determined,  was  somewhat  considered.  The 
question  has  been  much  discussed  in  England  as  well  as  this 
country,  in  respect  to  entering  thus  upon  a  tenant  at  suffer- 
ance and  expelling  him.  The  question  has  principally  grown 
out  of  statute  5  Rich.  11.  c.  7,  forbidding  an  entry  to  be  made 
"  with  strong  hand  or  a  multitude  of  people,  but  only  in  a 
peaceable  and  easy  manner  ;  "  and  the  statute  of  8  Hen.  VI. 
c.  9,  by  which  damages  and  restitution  were  given  to  the  free- 
holder disseised.  Similar  statutes  have  been  passed  in  most  or 
all  of  the  States.^  Would  the  owner  of  land  or  tenements,  who, 
in  recovering  possession  of  the  same  from  a  tenant  at  sufferance, 

1  Russell  V.  Fabyan,  34  N.  H.  218,  225. 

2  Dorrell  v.  Johnson,  17  Pick.  266  ;  Butcher  v.  Butcher,  7  B.  &  C.  399  ;  Hey 
V.  Moorehouse,  6  Bing.  N.  C.  52  ;  Pearce  v.  Ferris,  10  N.  Y.  280.  This  is  not 
intended  to  apply  to  cases  where  the  statute  requires  the  landlord  to  give  formal 
notice,  in  order  to  avail  himself  of  the  summary  process  for  ejecting  a  tenant  at 
sufferance.     Livingston  v.  Tanner,  12  Barb.  481. 

8  2  Flint.  Real  Prop.  224  ;  Smith,  Land.  &  Ten.  217  ;  Watkins,  Conv.  25  ; 
Nepean  v.  Doe,  2  U.  &  W.  911  ;  Tud.  Cas.  8  ;  Fishar  v.  Prosser,  Cowp.  217  ; 
Reckhow  v.  Schanck,  43  N.  Y.  448. 

<  Ante,  p.  *390. 

6  For  what  entry  by  force  into  premises  in  the  possession  of  another  would 
not  come  within  the  meaning  of  "  forcible  entry,"  see  Pike  v.  Witt,  104  Mass. 
695. 


en.  XII.  §  1.]    TKN'ANriF;^  AT  ?rFFrijANri:,  i.KTNsr:?!,  rrr.       {]','\ 

slioultl  uso  so  much  violoticc  as  to  Huhjoct  him  to  imlictmcnt 
for  a  broach  of  the  peace,  thereby  become  liable  to  the  tenant 
for  thus  oustintr  him  ?  In  1840  it  was  stated  by  Erskine,  .1., 
that  the  (luestion  had  never  before  bren  ])rou<rht  di- 
rectly before  *  the  court  sittinir  in  bench.'  It  mijrht  ['GOO"] 
be  added  that  it  did  not  jtnjperly  arise  in  that  ca.se, 
as  the  enfiy  was  j)caceablc  ami  the  force  us<-d  in  expelliufr 
was  not  excessive.  The  court  in  decidin;.'  the  case,  which  was 
trespass  for  assault,  held  that  any  force  to  the  person  of  the 
occupant  made  the  entry  an  illej^al  one,  ab  initio,  by  relation. 
The  more  modern  doctrine  of  the  Enjrlish  courts  is  clearly  in 
accordance  with  the  ojjinion  of  Baron  Parke,  expressed  in  the 
followinp^  terms  :  "  I  should  have  no  dilhculty  in  saying  that 
where  a  breach  of  the  peace  is  committed  by  a  freeholder  who, 
in  order  to  get  into  possession  of  his  land,  assaults  a  person 
wrongfully  holding  possession  of  it  against  his  will,  although 
the  freeholder  may  be  responsible  to  the  public  in  the  shape  of 
an  indictment  for  forcible  entry,  he  is  not  liable  to  the  other 
party."''  2  And  the  law,  as  generally  adopted  in  the  United 
States,  may  be  assumed  to  be  substantially  as  laid  down  by 
Baron  Parke.  If  the  owner  of  land  wrongfully  held  by  an- 
other enter  and  expel  the  occupant,  but  makes  use  of 
no  more  force  than  is  reasonably  necessary  to  *accom-  [*397] 
plish  this,  he  will  not  be  liable  to  an  action  of  tresj)ass 
quare  clausum,  nor  for  assault  and  battery,  nor  for  injury  to 
the  occupant's  goods,  although,  in  order  to  effect  such  expul- 
sion and  removal,  it  becomes  necessary  to  use  so  much  force 
and  violence  as  to  subject  him  to  indictment  at  connnon  law 
for  a  breach  of  the  peace,  or  under  the  statute  for  making  for- 

1  Newton  v.  Harland,  1  Mann.  &  G.  644. 

*  Han'py  v.  Brydges,  14  M.  &  W.  442  ;  AlJerson  and  Piatt,  BB.,  concurred  ; 
see  Taylor  v.  Cole,  3  T.  R.  292  ;  Taunton  r.  Costar,  7  T.  K.  431  ;  Butcher  v. 
Butcher,  7  B.  &  C.  399  ;  Turner  v.  Maj-mott,  1  Bing.  159  ;  Kavanagh  r.  Gudge, 
7  Mann.  &  G.  316,  preceding  this  case  ;  also  Co.  Lit.  257  a,  Butler's  note,  199; 
and  Pollen  r.  Brewer,  7  C.  B.  N.  8.  371  ;  Blades  v.  Higgs,  10  C.  B.  N.  8.  713, 
721  ;  Davison  v.  Wilson,  11  Q.  B.  890  ;  Burling  v.  Read,  lb.  904  ;  Davis  v.  Burell, 
10  C.  B.  821  ;  Meriton  v.  Coombes,  1  Lowndes,  M.  k  P.  610  ;  Lows  v.  Telford, 
1  App.  Ca.  414,  426  ;  which  have  followed  and  affirmed  it.  "  The  opinion  in  the 
case  of  Newton  v.  Harland  is  alike  adverse  to  the  prior  as  well  as  the  subsequent 
decisions  of  the  English  courts  on  this  question."  Steams  v,  Sampson,  59  Me. 
668. 


656  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

cible  entrj.^  In  accordance  with  the  foregoing  propositions, 
the  cases  cited  below  seem  fully  to  sustain  the  doctrine,  tliat 
trespass  will  not  lie  in  favor  of  a  tenant  by  sufferance  against 
his  landlord  for  entering  and  expelling  him  from  the  premises, 
assuming,  of  course,  that  he  uses  no  unnecessary  force  or  vio- 
lence in  so  doing.2 

10  a.  Notwithstanding  what  has  already  been  said  upon  the 
subject,  the  contrary  rule  has  been  so  positively  asserted  by 
the  courts  of  two  of  the  States  that  it  seems  not  uncalled  for 
to  briefly  advert  thereto.  There  has  in  England,  since  the 
cases  of  Hillary  v.  Gay  and  Newton  v.  Harland  ^  were  over- 
ruled, been  no  recurrence  to  the  doctrine  propounded  by 
them,  and  it  is  unnecessary  to  do  more  than  refer  to  the  cita- 
tions already  made,*  by  which  it  will  appear  that,  whatever 
may  be  the  liability  of  the  lessor  to  indictment  for  forcible  entry 
or  expulsion  as  a  breach  of  the  peace,  he  is  under  no  liability 
to  the  occupant  either  in  trespass  quare  clausum  or  for  assault 
unless  excessive  force  is  used,  and  then  only  for  the  excess.^ 
The  uniform  cufrent  of  authority  in  the  United  States  sustain- 
ing the  same  doctrine  ®  is  broken  only  by  the  decisions  in  Ver- 
mont and  Illinois.  In  the  former  of  these  an  action  of  trespass 
quare  clausum  was  sustained  in  favor  of  a  tenant  at  sufferance 
on  the  bare  ground  of  the  statutory  prohibition  of  a  forcible 
entry,  irrespective  of  title  ;^  though  in  an  earlier  case  a  posses- 
sion gained  by  such  entry  had  been  held  lawful.^    The  decision 

^  Hyatt  V.  "Wood,  4  Johns.  150  ;  ]\Iuldrow  v.  Jones,  Rice  (S.  C. ),  71  ;  Ives  v. 
Ives,  13  Johns.  235  ;  Jackson  v.  Farmer,  9  Wend.  201  ;  Jackson  v.  Morse,  16 
Johns.  197  ;  Beecher  v.  Parmele,  9  Vt.  352  ;  Johnson  v.  Hannahan,  1  Strobh. 
313  ;  Overdeer  v.  Lewis,  1  Watts  &  S.  90  ;  Sampson  v.  Henry,  13  Pick.  36,  s.  c. 
11  Pick.  379  ;  ileader  v.  Stone,  7  ilet.  147  ;  Miner  v.  Stevens,  1  Cush.  482  ; 
Lackey  v.  Holbrook,  11  Met.  458  ;  Fifty  Assoc,  v.  Howland,  5  Cush.  214. 

2  Taunton  v.  Costar,  7  T.  R.  431  ;  Moore  v.  Mason,  1  Allen,  406  ;  Curtis  v. 
Galvin,  1  Allen,  215  ;  Mason  v.  Holt,  1  Allen,  46.  See  Todd  v.  Jackson,  26 
N.  J.  525  ;  Krevet  v.  Meyer,  24  Mo.  107  ;  Fuhr  v.  Dean,  26  Mo.  116,  118. 

8  Hillary  v.  Gay,  6  C.  &  P.  284  ;  Newton  v.  Harland,  1  Mann.  &  G.  644. 

*  Ante,  pi.  10  and  notes. 

6  lb.    See  also  Sampson  v.  Henry,  13  Pick.  36  ;  s.  c.  11  Pick.  379. 

®  See  in  addition  to  cases  cited,  post,  Killaree  v,  Jansen,  17  Penn.  St.  467  ; 
Zell  V.  Raume,  31  Penn.  St.  304. 

'  Dustin  V.  Cowdry,  23  Vt.  631  ;  and  see  Whittaker  v.  Perrj',  38  Vt.  107. 

8  Beecher  v.  Parmele,  9  Vt.  352  ;  see  also  Yale  v.  Seely,  15  Vt.  221  ;  Hodge- 
den  V.  Hubbard,  18  Vt.  604. 


CH.  XII.  §   1.]     TKNANCIKS    AT   SUFFERANCE,  LICENSES,  KTf.         '"."T 

rcstrd  mainly  <>n  the  aiitliority  <»f  tlu*  two  English  casrs  ;il>i>vt' 
nanu'd,*  and  professed  to  recopiizt'  as  conclusive  whatever 
might  be  the  Englisii  decisions  on  this  point;'*  and  might 
therefore  bo  considered  as  no  longer  autiiority  to  tlie  i)oint, 
since  those  cases  have  been  overruled.^  It  is  to  be  noticed 
furthtr  that  the  lease  untler  which  the  tenant  at  siilTcrancc 
had  eiittred  expressly  justified  his  forcil)li'  irmo\al  ;  antj  also 
that  the  court  in  conmu-nting  severely  upnn  the  cunrusinn  into 
which  other  triljunals  were  tlioiight  to  have  fallen  ln'twecii  the 
Btatute  of  Richard  II.  uliieh  gave  no  damages,  and  that  of 
Henry  VI.  which  did,  overlook  the  fact  that  by  the  latter  only 
freeholders  could  recover.*  The  illegality  of  mere  force  is 
denied  in  a  later  case,  and  it  is  held  that  if  the  tenant  is  not 
in  possession  the  lessor  may  forcibly  enter,  and  when  in  may 
forcibly  resist  the  tenant's  re-entry.^  In  Illinois,  though  in 
one  case  the  court  held  that  "  no  case  has  been  referred  to, 
and  it  is  believed  that  none  exists,  which  holds  that  a  tres- 
passer, or  a  person  in  jiossession  as  a  wrong-dt>er,  can  recover 
against  the  owner  of  the  fee  with  right  of  possession,"  '^  yet  in 

^  Hillary  ti.  Gay,  ami  Newton  r.  Harlan-l. 

'  23  Vt.  645.  "  We  have  no  disposition  to  add  anj'thing  in  regard  to  the  true 
construction  of  the  law  as  derived  from  the  decisions  of  the  courts  in  Westminster 
Hall.  And  we  think  the  decisions  of  the  English  courts  as  to  the  common  law 
or  the  construi'tion  of  ancient  statutes  arc  to  be  regarded  of  [laraniount  author- 
ity."    Per  Hedtield,  C.  J. 

"•  The  court  was  not  more  fnrtunate  in  the  American  authorities  upon  wliich 
it  relietl.  The  dictum  in  Samjison  v.  Henry,  11  Pick.  370,  was  controile<l  hy  an 
express  decision  to  the  contrary  ins.  v.  13  Pick.  36.  See  also  Low  r.  P^lwell,  121 
Mass.  309  ;  and  Moore  v.  Boyd,  24  Me.  242  ;  Ikock  v.  Berry,  31  Me.  2H3,  if 
they  had  been  cases  of  tenancy  at  sufferance  —  which  they  were  not,  sec  post, 
pi.  10  b  —  were  overrule<l  liy  Stearns  v.  Sampson,  59  Me.  568. 

*  Stat.  Hen.  VL,  c.  9,  §  6  ;  Wilhml  v.  Warren,  17  Wend.  262  ;  Cole  r.  Eagle, 
8  n.  &  C.  409  ;  Hawk.  PI.  Cr.  lik.  I.,  c.  64,  §§  15,  16  ;  King  r.  Arden,  3  Bulstr. 
71  ;  Lover's  ('a.se,  1  Leon.  327  ;  Rex  v.  Dormy,  1  L<1.  lUiym.  610.  The  court,  in 
reffrriiisj  to  this  statute  as  supjiorting  an  action  by  a  tenant  at  suffcranci-,  cito 
Ix)r.l  HaK's  note  to  2  Fitzh.  Nat.  Brev.  248  H.,  to  the  effect  that  "he  (the  ten- 
ant) shall  not  maintain  the  action  by  the  statute  Hichanl  IL,  biU  vmij  hij  the 
atatutf  of  Hen.  VL"  On  recurring  to  that  authority,  it  apiK>ars  that  there  is  no 
Btati-ment  whatever  that  such  action  i-nn  be  maintain-'d  ;  that  the  reference  t<>  Hen. 
VL  is  not  to  the  statute  at  all,  but  to  the  9  Hen.  VL  fo.  19,  j.I.  12,  which  holds 
that  no  action  can  be  maintained  ;  and  that  the  words  italicized  do  not  appear  at 
all  in  Lord  Hale's  note. 

»  Musaey  r.  Scott,  32  Vt  82.  «  Hoots  v.  Graliam,  23  111.  84. 

VOL.  I.  — 42 


658  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [bOOK   1. 

a  more  recent  case  ^  that  court  review  the  subject  and  many  of 
the  cases  above  cited,  and  come  to  the  conclusion,  that  "  the 
statutes  of  forcible  entry  and  detainer  should  be  construed  as 
taking  away  the  previous  common-law  right  of  forcible  entry 
by  the  owner,  and  that  such  entry  must  therefore  be  held  ille- 
gal in  all  forms  of  action."  The  doctrine  of  Wilder  v.  House  ^ 
depends  mainly  upon  what  is  settled  in  Reeder  v.  Purdy,^  and 
the  latter  was  decided  chiefly  upon  the  supposed  exhaustive 
inquiry  in  the  case  of  Dustin  v.  Cowdry.^  The  Illinois  doc- 
trine, as  stated  in  Reeder  v.  Purdy,  is  that,  "  in  this  State,  it 
has  been  constantly  held  that  any  entry  is  forcible,  within  the 
meaning  of  the  statute,  that  is  made  against  the  will  of  the 
occupant ;  "  and  it  is  there  assumed  that  even  if  a  tenant  were 
at  the  end  of  the  time  to  remove  his  family  and  furniture  from 
the  premises,  but  refused  to  surrender  the  key,  and  claimed 
possession,  and  the  landlord  were  to  force  the  door  of  the 
vacant  house,  he  might  thereby  render  himself  liable  to  his 
tenant  in  nominal  damages.  In  this  respect  the  case  is  di- 
rectly opposed  to  the  Vermont  case  of  Mussey  v.  Scott  already 
referred  to,^  although  so  much  reliance  is  placed  upon  Dus- 
tin v.  Cowdry.  The  later  decisions^  and  dicta"  still  adhere 
to  the  doctrine  of  Reeder  v.  Purdy,  and  carry  it  to  the  extreme 
length  of  holding  that  the  landlord  or  owner  has  no  right  of 
forcible  repossession  even  as  against  a  trespasser.^  It  is  to  be 
remarked,  however,  that  a  forcible  expulsion  has  been  recently 
held  to  be  authorized  by  a  clause  to  that  effect  in  the  lease  ;  ^ 
which  is  hardly  consistent  with  its  being  inherently  a  wrong  ; 
and  in  another  late  case  that  the  tenant's  possession  must  be 

1  Reeder  v.  Purdy,  41  111.  279.  ^  43  m.  280. 

8  Reeder  v.  Purdy,  sup.,  and  see  Page  v.  De  Puy,  40  111.  512  ;  Phillips  v. 
Springfield,  39  111.  86. 

4  Dustin  V.  Cowdry,  23  Vt.  631.  ^  32  Vt.  82. 

6  Reeder  v.  Purdy,  48  111.  261  ;  Farwell  v.  Warren,  51  111.  467  ;  111.  R.  R.  v. 
Cobb,  68  111.  53. 

■^  Haskins  v.  Haskins,  67  111.  446,  where  title  was  not  relied  upon,  but  defend- 
ant abused  the  process  he  entered  under;  Chicago  v.  Wright,  32  111.  192  ;  Huf- 
talin  V.  Misner,  70  III.  205  ;  Doty  v.  Burdick,  83  111.  473,  where  the  process  was 
forcible  entry  and  detainer  ;  Dearlove  v.  Herrington,  70  III.  251,  where  the  tenant's 
term  had  not  ended. 

8  Farwell  v.  Warren  ;  111.  R.  R.  v,  Cobb ;  Doty  v.  Burdick,  supra. 

9  Fabri  v,  Bryan,  80  111.  182. 


(11.  All     §   1.]     TKNANTIKS    AT   KUFTKItANTF:,  LICENSKS,  KTC.         «!.'/.♦ 

more  than  (eini)orary  and  1m'  under  a  claim  of  v\>^]i\  ; '  and 
aj^'ain  that  wIk-iv  the  tenant  had  no  tith-  he  Hh<juhl  not  Ijave 
trespass  quai'f  dausuni,  but  only  daniai^es  for  the  jicrsonal 
expulsion.'-^ 

li)  b.  But  whatever  may  he  Ihe  \\"ei;rht  to  he  atta(died  to 
these  decisions  in  the  jurisdictions  when;  they  were  declared, 
they  Inn!  no  more  su|>port  in  tin*  law  of  the  othei-  States  than 
in  that  of  the  Kn^lish  courts.  The  \vei)_dit  of  authority  seems 
clearly  to  he  in  favor  of  the  common  law  right  of  the  (jwner 
of  land  to  recover  hy  force  possession  of  his  j)remises  of  which 
another  is  wrongfully  in  possession,  provided  no  more  force  is 
employed  than  becomes  necessary  to  overcome  the  resistance 
made  hy  the  tenant  to  prevent  liis  regaining  such  j)Ossession, 
especially  if  his  entry  is  peaceable.'^  Thus  in  Maine,  notwith- 
standing a  dictum  in  earlier  cases  already  referred  to,*  the 
court  j)ut  the  right  of  the  owner  of  a  dwelling-house  who 
has  gained  entry  into  the  same  peaceably  to  expel  a  tenant 
wrongfully  holding  it  as  being  "  the  same  as  where  anv 
person  having  entered  a  dwelling-house  refuses  to  (piit  when 
requested."  "  Every  man's  house  is  his  castle.  But  his  neigh- 
bor's house  where  he  has  no  right  to  be  is  not  his  castle." 
"The  trespasser  in  his  neighlior's  castle  must  remove  or  be 
removed."^  So  in  Kentucky  it  is  held  that  the  English  .stat- 
utes of  forcible  entry  and  detainer  "have  ever  been  so  con- 
strued as  not  to  ailect  the  connnon-law  right  of  justifying  in 
an  action  of  trespass  (juare  claunum  the  forcible  entry  l)y  plead- 
ing and  jiroving  a  right  of  entry,  and  hence  lihcrum  trnemtntum 
has  notwithstanding  those  statutes  been  always  held  to  be  an 
eflfcctual  plea  to  the  action  of  trespass."  ^  In  New  York  the 
rule  laid  down  in  the  emjihatic  language  of  Nelson,  ('.  J., 
"statutes  of  forcible  entry  and  detainer  jiunish  criminally  the 
force  and  in  some  cases  make  restitutiou,  but  so  far  as  civil 
remedy  goes  there  is  none  whatever,""  has  been  consistently 

»  111.  K.  R.  r.  fol.l..  82  111.  1S3.  a  Comsto-k  r.  Rrossoau,  65  111.  3D. 

•  Stciliiig  r.  Ward.-n,  51  N.  H.  239,  where  the  t<-xt  is  citc«J  with  a|ipn)vnl. 

♦  Moore  V.  Royd,  24  Mt-.  242  ;  Brock  r.  lierry,  31  Me.  293.  In  both  theso 
rases  the  tenancy  wns  at  will  and  not  at  sufferance,  and  tenant's  possessor}-  right 
liad  not  licen  tcmiinated. 

'  Stearns  v.  .Sampson,  59  Me.  5*38. 

«  Trible  V.  Fnuue,  7  J.  J.  Marsh.  601.  ''  Jackaon  t.  Fanner,  9  Wend.  201. 


660  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [bOOK   I. 

adhered  to.^  In  Massachusetts  since  the  early  cases  of  Samp- 
son V.  Henry  and  Meader  v.  Stone,  ah^eady  cited,  which  may 
be  regarded  as  the  leading  cases  in  that  State,  the  same  rule 
has  been  enforced  by  repeated  decisions,^  and  in  a  quite  recent 
and  very  fully  considered  case  it  has  in  the  broadest  manner 
been  held  that  the  landlord  may  both  forcibly  enter  and  forci- 
bly expeL^ 

11.  A  tenant  at  sufferance  is  not  entitled  to  notice  to  quit 
before  the  summary  process  for  his  removal  provided  by  stat- 
ute, or  an  action  of  ejectment,  is  commenced,  where  the  tenant 
holds  over  after  the  determination  of  his  lease.'^  In  Michigan, 
tenants  at  will  and  at  sufferance  are  put  on  the  same  basis  as 
to  notice,  in  determining  the  tenancy,  unless  the  tenancy  at 
sufferance  has  become  such  by  the  determination  of  a  tenancy 
by  notice.  But  the  court  were  divided  on  the  point  whether, 
after  a  sale  and  foreclosure  of  a  mortgage,  the  mortgagor  is 
entitled  to  notice  before  the  purchaser  can  commence  proceed- 
ings to  remove  him.^ 

1  People  V.  Field,  52  Barb.  198  ;  s.  c.  1  Lans.  242. 

2  Mugford  V.  Richardson,  6  Allen,  76  ;  Winter  v.  Stevens,  9  Allen,  526,  530  ; 
Merriam  v.  Willis,  10  Allen,  118  ;  Pratt  v.  Farrar,  lb.  519,  521  ;  Morrill  v.  De 
la  Granja,  99  Mass.  383  ;  Clark  v.  Keliher,  107  Mass.  406. 

3  Low  V.  El  well,  121  Mass.  309,  where  the  language  of  Comm'th  v.  Haley,  4 
Allen,  318,  is  restricted  ;  Stone  v.  Lahey,  133  Mass.  426. 

*  Hollis  V.  Pool,  3  Met.  350  ;  Mason  v.  Denlson,  11  Wend.  612  ;  Young  v. 
Smith,  28  Mo.  65  ;  Howard  v.  Carpenter,  22  Md.  25.  The  notice  to  quit  referred 
to  is  the  formal  notice  heretofore  referred  to  in  cases  of  tenancies  at  will  or  from 
year  to  year.  They  cannot,  however,  be  treated  as  trespassers  until  they  have  been 
notified  of  the  owner's  demand  for  the  premises.  But  for  this  purpose  the  briefest 
period  is  sufficient.  Arnold  v.  Nash,  126  Mass.  397.  In  New  York  the  statute 
requiring  notice  to  terminate  a  tenancy  "by  sufferance,"  only  applies  where  a 
tenant  has  held  over  for  so  long  a  time  as  to  raise  a  presumption  that  he  has  the 
assent  of  the  lessor  so  to  do.  Smith  v.  Littlefield,  51  N.  Y.  543.  But  in  Michi- 
gan it  requires  three  months'  notice  to  determine  either  estates  at  sufferance  or 
will.     Bennett  v.  Robinson,  27  Mich.  32. 

*  Alleu  V.  Carpenter,  15  Mich.  34. 


CII.  XII    §  2.]     TKNANCIFS    AT   SUFFKRANCE,  LICENSES,  ETC.         GGl 


SECTION   11. 

LICENSE. 

1.  Of  casements. 

2,  3.  Licenses  ami  easements,  distinctions  between. 

4,  5.  Licenses  executory  and  executed. 

6.  P'xecuted  licenses  excuse  octs  done. 

7,  8.  \Vliat  licenses  revo<-nhIe. 

9.  Whiit  operates  to  n-voke  a  license. 

10.  May  1h!  re%'<>ked,  if  merely  to  do  acts  on  liccns<!r*s  land. 
10  rt.  Instances  of  revocable  licenses. 

10  b.  When  equity  restrains  a  revocation. 

11.  Easements  created  only  by  deed  or  prescription. 

12.  Not  revocable  if  connected  with  property  in  chattels. 

13.  May  be  irrevocable  if  to  affect  licenser's  ea.senient  only. 
14,  15.     F.irect  of  revocation  ujKJn  rights  of  the  parties. 

1.  TiiK  subjects  of  Ea.'^emcnt  and  License  are  so  nearly  re- 
lated to  lea.ses  and  tenancies  of  lands,  in  some  of  their  ciiar- 
acteristics,  that  it  seems  projK'r  to  notice  this  relation,  since 
it  is  sometimes  diHicult  to  distintruish  l)etw(>(Mi  tluMu  '  An 
casement  is  always  distinct  from  the  occujjation  and  enjoy- 
ment of  the  land  itself,  and  in  this  respect  dilTers  altoL^'ther 
from  the  interest  of  a  lessee.  It  is  a  lihcrty,  privilet'c,  or  ad- 
vantaL'c  in  land,  without  jtrofit.  distinct  from  an  ownership  of 
the  soil,  and  rests  npon  a  <rrant  l)y  deed  or  writinir,  the  exist- 
ence and  execution  of  which  may  he  inferred  l)y  a  lencrth  of 
enjoyment,  tf)  which  is  applied  the  term  preseri|>tion.- 

It  is  an  incorporeal  *  hereditament,  susceptible  of  a  ['oOH] 
permanent  enjoyment  by  one  man  in  another's  land,, 
such  as  that  of  way,  or  light,  or  air.^ 

2.  A  license  is  an  authority  to  do  a  particular  act  or  series 
of  acts  upon  another's  land,  without  ])ossessinfr  any  estate 
therein.^     A  license  to  do  a  thing  includes  the  doing  what- 

1  Dolittlc  r,  Eddy,  7  Barb.  74. 

2  3  Kent.  Com.  452;  Gale  k  Whatley,  Fjisements,  I'J  ;  l)nlitt'.'  r.  Kddy,  7 
Uarb.  74  ;  .Morse  v.  Copeland,  2  Gray,  302  ;  IJlaisdell  v.  IJailroa-l,  51  N.  H.  485. 

'  Tenncs  de  la  I/cy,  "  Easement." 

*  Cook  V.  Steams,  11  Mas.s.  533  ;  Tnyler  r.  Waters,  7  T.iunt.  374  ;  Mumfonl 
r.  Wliitncy,  LI  Wend.  380  ;  Wolfe  r.  Frost.  4  Saixlf.  Ch.  72;  Hridges  v.  Purcell, 
1  Dev.  k  B.  496  ;  Blaiadell  v.  Kailroad,  51  K.  H.  485.    Hence,  if  the  laud  is  token 


662  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I, 

ever  is  necessary  to  accomplish  it,  as,  for  example,  to  remove 
a  heavy  object,  the  licensee  may  employ  the  necessary  men 
and  means  to  do  it.^  But  it  does  not  relieve  the  licensee  from 
responsibility  for  acts  done  carelessly  or  unskilfully .2  It  may 
be  granted  upon  condition  precedent ;  and  upon  the  licensee's 
failino;  to  perform  this  his  license  will  become  inoperative 
and  of  no  effect.^ 

3.  An  easement  implies  an  interest  in  the  land  which  can 
only  be  created  as  above  stated,  by  writing,  or,  constructively, 
its  equivalent,  —  prescription.  A  license  may  be  created  by 
parol,  as  it  passes  no  interest  in  the  land,  though  a  permission 
to  use,  occupy,  or  take  the  profits  of  land,  is  sometimes  called 
a  license,  but  is  more  in  the  nature  of  a  lease.*  It  matters 
not  whether  the  license  be  oral  or  in  writing,  in  respect  to  its 
being  parol,  if  the  paper  giving  it  have  no  requisites  of  a  grant.^ 
A  license  is  often  implied  by  the  act  of  the  owner  of  land : 
"  The  publican,  the  miller,  the  broker,  the  banker,  the  wharf- 
inger, the  artisan,  or  any  professional  man  whatever,  licenses 
the  public  to  enter  his  place  of  business  in  order  to  attract 
custom,  but  when  the  business  is  discontinued,  the  license  is  at 
an  end,"  per  Gibson,  C.  J.,  illustrating  the  doctrine  that  when 
one  opens  a  way  across  his  land  from  one  public  thoroughfare 
to  another,  it  would  be  regarded  as  a  license  to  pass  over  it.^ 
So  a  familiar  intercourse  between  families  may  be  evidence 
of  a  general  license  to  pass  over  the  land  of  each  other  for 
the  purpose  of  visiting.^     And  one  has  a  license  to  enter  a 

by  eminent  domain,  the  licensee  has  no  claim  for  damages.    Clapp  v.  Boston,  133 
Mass.  367. 

1  Sterling  v.  Warden,  51  N.  H.  227. 

2  Selden  v.  Del.  Canal  Co.,  29  N.  Y.  640. 

8  Mumford  v.  Whitney,  15  Wend.  380 ;  Pratt  v.  Ogden,  34  N,  Y.  22. 

4  Wood  V.  Leadbitter,  13  M.  &  W.  838  ;  3  Kent,  Com.  452  ;  Gale  &  Wliatley, 
Ease.  20  ;  King  v.  Horndon,  4  M.  &  S.  562  ;  Dolittle  v.  Eddy,  7  Barb.  74  ; 
Washb.  Ease.  5  ;  Ex  parte  Coburn,  1  Cow.  568 ;  Wallis  v.  Harrison,  4  M.  &  W. 
543  ;  Thomas  v.  Sorrell,  Vaughan,  351  ;  Bailey  v.  Stephens,  12  C.  B.  N.  s.  Ill  ; 
Muskett  V.  Hill,  5  P>ing.  N.  C.  694. 

6  Rlais.lell  v.  Kailroad,  51  N.  H.  485  ;  Dodge  v.  McClintock,  47  N.  H.  383  ; 
Wiseman  v.  Lucksinger,  84  N.  Y.  31. 

6  Gowen  v.  Phila.  Exch.  Co.,  5  W.  &  S.  141,  143  ;  Kay  v.  Penn.  R.  R.,  65 
Penn.  St.  273  ;  Root  v.  Comm'th,  98  Penn.  St.  170. 

">  Martin  v.  Houghton,  45  Barb.  258  ;  Adams  v.  Freeman,  12  Johns.  408. 


CH.  XII.  §  2.]     TKNAN'CIK.S    AT   SLFFKRAN'CE,  LICENSF^?,  ETC.         GG3 

post-oflice   at  j>ro|i('r   hniirs  to   imiuirc  for  and   rc'crivu   luail- 
matU'r.' 

4.  But  it  is  proposed  in  this  chapter  to  treat  only  of  tlic 
subject  of  licenses.  Tliese  are  of  two  kinds,  one  called  execu 
tory,  where  the  act  licensed  to  he  (h>ne  is  yet  to  he  performed, 
the  otlier  executed  where  it  has  heen  done.  The  distinction 
is  an  important  one,  as  bearing  upon  the  right  of  the  licenser 
to  revoke  the  license. 

5.  So  long,  as  it  is  executory,  it  may  be  revoked  at  the 
jtleasure  of  the  licenser,  for,  from  its  very  nature,  it  is  essen- 
tially different  from  a  grant  in  respect  to  carrying  with  it  the 
means  of  being  enforced  by  legal  or  ecjuitable  process.^  Where 
A  and  li  nnitually  gave  each  other  a  license  to  do  acts  up(jn 
the  other's  land,  it  was  deemed  to  be  an  executory  one,  even 
though  one  may  have  expendeil  money  ujxjn  the  other's  land, 
relying  upon  such  license.  And  A  may  revoke  tlie  license  on 
his  part,  even  if  \>  do  not  on  his.'*  And  where  no  time  is 
fixed  within  which  the  license  is  to  be  exercised,  it  must  be 
within  a  reasonable  time."* 

6.  If  it  has  been  executed,  it  has  the  cfTect  to  relieve  or  ex- 
cuse him  who  may  have  done  the  act  from  liability  on  account 
of  the  same,  as  well  as  from  the  con-secpiences  thereof,  which 
may  arise  prior  to  a  revocation  of  the  license.^  Thus,  if  one 
by  license  of  another  tears  down  an  existing  mill-dam,  or  digs 
and  lays  an  aipieduct  in  the  other's  land,  or  cuts  a  tunnid  in 
his  land,  by  which  the  water  of  a  stream  is  diverted, 

or  cuts  down  *  a  tree  in  the  other's  land,  and  the  like,  [*399] 
no  action  will  lie  in  favor  of  such  land-owner,  how- 

»  SU-rling  v.  Warden,  51  N.  H.  231. 

»  Cook  V.  Stearns,  11  Mass.  533  ;  Munifonl  r.  Whitney,  15  Wend.  380  ;  Mil- 
ler V.  Aub.  &  S.  R.  R.,  6  Hill,  01  ;  Sterling  v.  Warden,  51  X.  H.  227;  Veghte  v. 
Rarit.-in  Co.,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  142,  154. 

»  Dodge  I'.  McClintock,  47  N.  H.  383  ;  Houston  r.  Laffee,  40  N.  H.  505. 

«  Hill  r.  Hill,  113  Mass.  103. 

'  Cook  r.  Stearns,  11  Ma-ns.  533  ;  Sampson  r.  Burnside,  13  N.  H.  264  ;  Hew- 
lius  V.  Shipi>am,  5  B.  &  C.  221  ;  Stevens  v.  Stevens,  11  Met.  251  ;  Foot  r.  N. 
Haven  k  North.  Co.,  23  Conn.  214;  Wood  v.  Loadbitter,  13  M.  &  W.  838  ; 
Syron  v.  Blakeinan,  22  Barb.  330  ;  Selden  v.  Del.  Canal  Co.,  29  N.  Y.  639. 
See  Web  V.  Paternoster,  Palmer,  71,  a  case  of  a  license  not  revocable  ;  Barnes 
V.  Barnes,  6  Vt.  388;  Snowden  v.  Wilaa,  19  Ind.  13;  Pratt  v.  Ugdeu,  34 
N.  Y.  20. 


664  LAW  OF  KEAL  PROPERTY.  FbOOK  1. 

ever  much  he  may  be  injured  by  such  act.^  Nor  does  it  make 
any  difference  that  the  license  in  such  case  is  given  by  parol, 
since  the  statute  of  frauds  does  not  apply  to  executed  licenses 
like  these.2 

7.  Questions  of  the  most  difficulty  in  respect  to  licenses 
arise,  where  the  one  who  grants,  seeks  to  revoke  the  license^ 
after  the  party  to  whom  it  was  given  has  enjoyed  or  exercised 
it,  and  especially  where  he  has  incurred  expense  thereby,  as  in 
erecting  costly  structures  upon  the  land  of  the  licenser,  or  upon 
his  own  land,  affecting  the  land  of  the  licenser.  Many  dicta 
and  decisions  upon  this  class  of  cases  are  to  be  found  in  the 
books.  Thus,  it  is  said,  "  A  license  under  seal,  provided  it  be 
a  mere  license,  is  as  revocable  as  a  license  by  parol,"  and  "  a 
license  by  parol,  coupled  with  a  grant,  is  as  irrevocable  as  a 
license  by  deed,  provided  only  that  the  grant  is  of  a  nature 
capable  of  being  made  by  parol."  ^  But  even  if  the  license  be 
so  granted  as  to  be  effectual,  it  will  be  strictly  construed,  and 
a  license  to  build  a  dam  upon  the  licenser's  land  does  not  carry 
a  license  to  rebuild,  if  it  is  destroyed.* 

8.  If  the  parties,  in  case  a  license  were  revoked,  would  be 
left  in  the  same  condition  as  before  it  was  given,  the  proposi- 
tion seems  to  be  a  general  one,  that  the  licenser  may  revoke 
it  at  his  pleasure.  Such  would  be  the  case  in  respect  to  a 
license  to  fish  in  another's  water,  or  to  hunt  in  his  park,  or  to 
use  a  carriage-way,  and  the  like.^ 

9.  A  license  is  generally  so  much  a  matter  of  personal  trust 

1  Prince  V.  Case,  10  Conn.  378  ;  Fentiman  v.  Smith,  4  East,  107  ;  Sampson  v. 
Burnside,  13  N.  H.  264  ;  Kent  v.  Kent,  18  Pick,  569  ;  Bridges  v.  Purcell,  1  Dev, 
&  B.  496  ;  Pratt  v.  Ogden,  siq). 

2  Tayler  v.  Waters,  7  Taunt.  374  ;  Woodbuiy  v.  Parshley,  7  N.  H.  237  ;  Wal- 
ter V.  Post,  6  Duer,  363.  The  authority  of  the  two  former  cases  is  denied  as  to 
the  irrevocability  of  such  a  license,  post,  pi.  10  a. 

3  Wood  V.  Leadbitter,  13  M.  &  W.  845,  per  Alderson,  B.  See  also  Jackson  v. 
Babcock,  4  Johns.  418  ;  Wood  v.  Manley,  11  Ad.  &  E.  34  ;  Wallis  v.  Harrison,  4 
M.  &  W.  538  ;  Williamston,  &,c.  R.  E.  v.  Battle,  66  N.  C.  545.  See  as  to  this 
post,  pi.  12. 

*  Cowles  V.  Kidder,  24  N.  H.  364  ;  Carleton  v.  Redington,  21  N.  H.  293  ; 
Wingard  v.  Tift,  24  Ga.  179.  There  is  an  able  discussion  of  the  subject  of  this 
section,  especially  so  much  of  it  as  relates  to  flowing  lands,  by  Judge  Cooley  of 
Michigan,  in  2  Bench  and  Bar,  N.  s.  97-106. 

6  Sampson  v.  Burnside,  13  N.  H.  264  ;  Liggins  v.  Inge,  7  Bing.  682  ;  Wood 
V.  Leadbitter,  13  M.  k  W.  838. 


Cll.  XII.  §  2.]     TENANCIES   AT  SUFFERANCE,  LICENSES,  ETC.         GGo 

ami  confi(U'ncc  that  it  dors  not  extend  (o  any  one  Imt  the 
licensee.  Thi^  (h^ath  of  either  i)arty  will,  of  itself,  levoke  it. 
So  would  a  transfer  or  alienation  of  the  interest  of  the  licenser 
or  licensee  in  the  suhject-matter  of  the  license.'  Thus  where 
one  soltl  standincT  trees  hy  parol,  it  was  held  to  he  a  license 
to  the  vendee  to  enter  and  cut  them.  Hut  he  could  not  sell 
the  trees  standin*;  to  a  third  person  and  transfer  his  license  to 
him,  hecause  it  was  in  its  nature  personal.^ 

*  10.  Another  class  of  cases  where  the  license  may  [*400] 
be  revoked  is  where  the  act  licensed  to  be  done  is  to 

be  done  upon  the  land  of  the  licenser,  and  if  granted  by  deed 
would  amount  to  an  easement  therein.  If  such  license  be  by 
parol,  it  may  be  revoked  as  to  any  act  thereafter  to  be  done, 
even  though  in  order  to  enjoy  it  the  licensee  may  have  incurred 
expenses  upon  the  jjremises  of  the  licenser  Thus  where  A, 
by  B's  license,  laid  an  acpieduct  across  B's  land,  who  then  re- 
voked it,  and  cut  off  the  pipe  that  conducted  the  water,  the 
court,  as  a  court  of  equity,  refused  to  interfere,  because  IJ 
had  a  right  to  revoke  the  license  at  his  pleasure.^  And  in 
another  case,  the  licensee  not  only  had  laid  an  atjueduct,  but 
dug  a  well  to  supply  it  upon  the  land  of  the  licenser,  and  was 
without  remedy,  though  the  licenser  cut  it  ofl'.*  In  another, 
the  licensee,  under  a  license  to  enter  upon  land,  had  expended 
money  thereon  and  incurred  expense  on  account  of  the  same, 
and  it  was  held  revocable.^ 

.  10  a.  The  importance  of  the  principle  involved  in  the  fore- 
going propositions  in  respect  to  the  power  of  a  licenser  to 
revoke  his  license,  even  though  the    licensee,  acting  under 

^  Ruggles  V.  Lesure,  24  Pick.  187  ;  Prince  v.  Case,  10  Conn.  375  ;  Jackson  v. 
Babcock,  4  Johns.  418;  Emerson  r.  Fi>k,  6  ile.  200  ;  Cowles  v.  Kidder,  24  N. 
U.  364  ;  Coleman  v.  Foster,  1  Hurlst.  &  N.  37  ;  Wolfe  r.  Frost,  4  Sundf.  Ch.  93; 
"Wickham  v.  Hawker,  7  M.  &  W.  77  ;  Duchess  of  Norfolk  v.  Wiseman,  cited  7  M. 
k  W.  77  ;  Wallis  v.  Harrison,  4  M.  A:  W.  538  ;  Harris  r.  Gillinghani,  6  X.  H.  9; 
Carleton  r.  Redington,  21  X.  H.  293  ;  Siiowden  r.  Wilas,  19  Ind.  13  ;  Blaisdell 
r.  Railroad,  51  X.  H.  485. 

3  Howe  V.  Batchelder,  49  X'.  H.  204;  Johnson  r.  Skillman,  29  Minn.  95. 

>  Owen  V.  Field,  12  Allen,  457  ;  Sildt-n  r.  Del.  Canal  Co.,  29  X.  Y.  639  ; 
Wiseman  v.  Lucksinger,  84  X.  Y.  31  ;  Eggleaton  i'.  X.  Y.  ic.  R.  R.,  35  Barh 
162. 

*  Houston  r.  Laffee,  46  X.  H.  507  ;  Marston  v.  Gale,  24  X.  H.  176. 
»  Hatfield  v.  Cent.  R.  R.,  29  X.  J.  571. 


666  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [^^^^   !• 

such  license,  may  have  incurred  expense  for  Avhich  he  can 
claim  no  remuneration,  seems  to  render  a  review  of  some  of 
the  cases,  where  the  question  has  been  raised,  proper  by  way 
of  illustration.  In  one  class  of  these,  the  licensee  at  a  con- 
siderable expense  cut  a,  drain  in  the  licenser's  land,  by  which 
the  water  of  a  spring  flowed  to  his  own  land,  and,  after  enjoy- 
ing it  some  years,  the  licenser  revoked  the  license  and  stopped 
it.  The  licensee  was  held  to  be  without  remedy .^  In  an- 
other, the  licenser  gave  the  licensees  permission  to  construct 
a  culvert  on  their  land,  and  thereby  divert  a  current  of  water 
on  to  his  land  which  they  did  at  their  own  expense,  and  it 
was  held  to  be  revocable.^  In  another,  the  license  was  to 
build  a  dam,  or  part  of  it,  on  the  licenser's  land,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  working  a  mill  belonging  to  the  licensee.^  And  in 
another,  the  license  was  to  flow  the  licenser's  land  for  raising 
a  head  of  water  to  work  licensee's  mill.*  And  in  both,  the 
licenses  were  held  revocable,  without  remedy  to  the  licensee 
for  the  expenses  incurred.  But  in  the  case  of  Smith  v.  Gould- 
ing,  cited  above,  it  was  held  that  the  owner  of  the  dam  would 
not  be  liable  in  damages,  after  the  license  had  been  revoked, 
for  keeping  the  same  where  it  was  until  he  had  a  reasonable 
time  in  which  to  remove  it.  In  another  class  of  cases  the 
license  has  been  to  erect  and  maintain  a  house  on  the  licen- 
ser's land,  and,  in  some  cases,  the  revocation  has  been  before 
the  building  was  completed,  in  others  after  it  had  been  erected, 
and  in  both  the  builder  was  obliged  to  remove  it  without  any 
right  to  claim  compensation  for  loss.^    A  license  to  use  a  way 

1  Cocker  v.  Cowper,  1  Cr.  M,  &  R.  418  ;  Hewlins  v.  Sliippam,  5  B.  &  C.  221  ; 
Sampson  v.  Burnside,  13  N.  H.  264  ;  Fentiman  v.  Smith,  4  East,  107. 

'-«  Foot  V.  N.  Haven  &  North.  Co.,  23  Conn.  223.  See  Mason  v.  Hill,  5  B.  & 
Ad.  1. 

8  Mumford  v.  Whitney,  15  Wend.  380;  Cook  v.  Stearns,  11  Mass.  533;  Smith 
V.  Goulding,  6  Cash.  155  ;  Addison  v.  Hack,  2  Gill,  221  ;  Cowles  v.  Kidder,  24 
K.  H.  364  ;  Stevens  v.  Stevens,  11  Met.  251  ;  Trammell  v.  Trammell,  11  Rich. 
474. 

*  Hazleton  v.  Putnam,  3  Chand.  (Wise.)  117;  Bridges  v.  Purcell,  1  Dev.  &  B. 
492  ;  Thompson  v.  Gregory,  4  Johns.  81  ;  Carleton  v.  Redington,  21  N.  H.  293  ; 
Hall  V.  Chaffee,  13  Vt.  150,  157  ;  Woodward  v.  Seeley,  11  111.  157,  165  ;  Clute 
V.  Can-,  20  Wise.  533. 

6  Jamieson  v.  Millemann,  3  Duer,  255;  Prince  v.  Case,  10  Conn.  378;  Jackson 
V.  Babcock,  4  Johns.  418  ;  Bachelder  v.  Wakefield,  8  Cush.  252  ;  Harris  v.  Gil 
lingham,  6  N.  H.  9  ;  Benedict  v.  Benedict,  5  Day,  464. 


CII.  XII.  §  '1.]     TENANCIES   AT   SUFFERANCE,  LICENSES,  ETC.         (U\l 

was  lalil  in  Itr  <if  (lie  same  rliarai'tcr,  altlioii-jh  tlic  licciisri' 
iniLMit  have  incmreil  t'.\j)L'iist'  u|m)Ii  the  licoiiHcr'H  land  in  (!<jn- 
struetinu:  u  ciiuseway  for  tlie  purjtnscs  of  the  way.'  So  a 
license  to  cut  trees  on  the  licenser's  land,  thou^di  in  writin<r, 
may  l»c  revoked.-  On  the  other  haml,  there  is  a  class  of 
cases  whiTe  the  conrts  of  some  of  the  States  have  heen  dis- 
poseil  to  hold  that  a  lii'cns(\  to  the  enjoyment  of  which  it  was 
necessary  to  expend  money  upon  the  licenser's  land,  eonld 
not  be  revoked  with(jnt  first  reimhiirsintr  this  expenditure, 
and  doint;  what  is  e(piivalent  to  restoriiiL''  the  licensee  in  ntatu 
iju').^  IJiit  it  is  justly  remarked  in  a  case  in  New  York,^  that 
if  the  doctrine  of  the  irrevocability  of  an  executed  license 
maintained  in  some  jurisdictions'^  is  law,  a  pai-ol  license  exe- 
cuted or  acted  upon  is  sullicient  to  pass  an  incorporeal  here- 
ditament, thus  not  merely  repealin*^  the  statute  of  frauds,  but 
abolishini;  the  rules  of  the  common  law  that  such  an  estate 
can  only  ije  conveyed  by  a  deed.  And  the  court,  in  Jamieson 
V.  Millemann,  cited  below,  declare  the  case  of  Taylcr  v.  "Waters 
to  be  conclusively  overruled  by  Knglish  and  American  cases. 
The  case  of  W(j(jd  i'.  Leadbitter  was  this  :  The  owner  of  land, 
on  which  was  a  stand  for  the  spectators  at  a  hor.se-race,  S(dd  a 
ticket  to  the  jdaintiff  to  enter  and  witness  the  race.  Before 
the  race  was  over,  without  any  misconduct  on  the  jtart  of  the 
plaintifT,  or  tendering  him  back  the  admission  fee,  the  owner 
ordered  him  to  leave  the  jiremises,  and  afterwards  removed 
him  ;  and  it  was  held  that  his  ticket  was  a  mere  license  which 
was  revocable.'^     And  the  same  doctrine  of  a  right  in  the  ven- 

*  Ej^  parte  Co))iini,  1  <"ow.  568  ;  Foster  i'.  Hrowning,  i  \l.  I.  47  ;  Dcxttr  v. 
Hfuon,  10  Johns.  2*6  ;  Wiillis  v.  Harrison,  4  M.  k  W.  538. 

2  Tillot.son  V.  Prfston,  7  Johns.  285;  Giles  v.  Sinionds,  15  Gnty,  441.  But 
if  coupled  with  a  sale,  alUcr  if  executed  and  query  if  e.xecutorj'  also.    Pest,  pi.  12. 

»  Hhwleb  V.  Otis,  33  Ala,  600  ;  Addison  p.  Hack,  2  Gill,  221  ;  Woodbun,'  r. 
Parshley,  7  N.  H.  237. 

«  Wolfe  V.  Frost,  4  Sandf.  Ch.  90. 

'  Sec  Tayler  r.  Waters,  7  Taunt.  384;  Woodbury  r.  Parshley,  supra.  Aiul 
see  the  same  doctrine  laid  down  iti  Pennsylvania,  Indiana,  Iowa,  Nebniska,  and 
perhaps  some  other  States,  post,  pi.  10  n,  ad  Jiii, 

«  Wood  I',  I.eadl)itter,  13  .M.  &  W.  838  ;  and  see  the  same  case  for  a  criticism 
ujwn  Tayler  v.  Waters,  sup.  ;  Coleman  v.  Foster,  1  Hurlst.  &  X.  37.  To  the 
above  cases  may  Ik-  added,  upon  the  general  subject  of  revoking  licenses,  Fuhr 
V.  Dean,  26  Mo.  119;  F..r,l  v.  Wliitlock,  27  Vt,  208;   H.»y8  r.  Richanl.son,  1 


668  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

dor  of  a  ticket,  to  revoke  the  license  it  gives  to  witness  an  ex- 
hibition, was  applied  in  case  of  a  play  at  the  theatre  and  at  a 
concert.  But  in  such  a  case,  the  purchaser  would  be  entitled 
to  damages  in  an  action  of  assumpsit  for  a  breach  of  contract. 
So  where,  by  a  parol  license,  one  had  gone  on  and  excavated 
another's  land  for  minerals,  at  great  expense,  and,  while  pursu- 
ing the  business  of  mining,  was  forbidden  by  the  owner,  it  was 
held  that  the  latter  might  revoke  the  license,  and  the  licensee 
would  be  without  remedy.^  In  the  case  of  Foster  v.  Browning,^ 
Ames,  C.  J.,  remarks,  that  "  in  Maine,^  New  Hampshire, 
Pennsylvania,  and  Ohio,  and  perhaps  in  some  other  States,  the 
exploded  doctrine  of  some  of  the  earlier  English  cases  is  still 
maintained  at  law,  upon  the  equitable  grounds  of  estoppel 
and  part  performance  of  a  parol  contract,"  and  intimates  that 
a  court  with  full  equity  powers  might,  in  some  of  those  cases, 
give  relief,  where  the  same  could  not  be  had  at  common  law. 
It  will  be  accordingly  found  in  a  great  number  of  cases,  that 
in  Pennsylvania  the  courts  hold  that  an  executed  license, 
where  the  licensee  has  incurred  expense,  as  in  erecting  a  dam 
upon  the  licenser's  land  to  operate  a  mill  erected  on  his  own, 
and  the  like,  is  not  revocable.^  The  Pennsylvania  doctrine 
rests  upon  the  idea  of  estoppel,  whereby  equity  treats  an  exe- 
cuted license  as  giving  an  absolute  right,  because  the  parties 
cannot  be  restored  in  statu  quo  if  it  is  revoked.  But  it  is  lim- 
ited to  cases  where  something  has  been  done  under  the  license, 
and  it  is  impossible  to  restore  the  licensee  in  statu  quo.  It 
would  not  be  so  if  the  licensee  had  simply  paid  a  considera- 
tion for  the  license.^  The  Pennsylvania  doctrine  is  substan- 
tially adopted  in  Iowa,  Indiana,  and  Nevada.     In  one  case  the 


Gill  &  J.   383  ;  Morse  v.  Copeland,  2  Gray,  302  ;  Williams  v.  Morris,  8  M.  & 
W.  488. 

1  Desloge  v.  Pearce,  38  Mo.  599  ;  McCrea  v.  Marsh,  12  Gray,  213  ;  Burton  v. 
Scherpf,  1  Allen,  134.  See  Adams  v.  Andrews,  15  Q.  B.  296.  In  the  case  from 
12  Gray,  Wood  v.  Leadbitter  is  sustained,  and  Taylor  v.  Waters  denied, 

2  4  k  I.  52,  53. 

8  ?>ut  see  Pitman  v.  Poor,  38  Me.  237,  contra. 

*  Eerick  v.  Kern,  14  S.  &  R.  267  ;  Wheatley  v.  Chrisman,  24  Penn.  St.  298  ; 
Strickler  v.  Todd,  10  S.  &  R.  74;  Laceyv.  Arnett,  33  Penn.  St.  169;  Campbell  v. 
McCoy,  31  Penn.  St.  263  ;  Swartz  v.  Swartz,  4  Penn.  St.  358. 

6  Huff  v.  McCauley,  53  Penn.  St.  209  ;  Wiseman  v.  Lucksinger,  84  N.  Y.  31. 


en   XII.  ^i  -.]    Ti:NANriiv<  at  suffkuantp:,  licknses,  iiTf.       t'.ti'J 

licensee  liat.1  Imill  ii  wall  jiaiily  nii  the  Hceiiscr'K  hind.'  In 
anotlier,  the  lieensee  had  snnk  hhalt.s  in  licen.ser's  land  for 
mincs.2  In  another  a  railroad  was  hnilt  (jver  that  laml.'  It 
wa.s  hold  that  the  licens(!  conld  not  l)0  revoked  until  eoinjK'n- 
sation  had  heen  made  for  the  e.xpen.se.s  incurred.  Ihit  it  niitrht 
he  revoked  it"  no  money  had  l»een  exjiended  hy  the  licen.see. 
Nor  docs  a  license  to  mine  in  another's  land  confer  an  exclu- 
sive riirht  of  ])roi»erty  in  the  oi-e  to  he  found  therein.'* 

10  />.  To  imrsMc  this  suliject  in  the  lidit  of  later  decisions, 
it  would  seem  that  courts  of  (-(juity  would  restiain  the  revoca- 
t'um  of  a  license,  althouLdi  the  same  may  he  doiu;  at  common 
law,  where  the  revocation  would  work  a  fraud,  or  it  would 
construe  the  license  as  an  airrecment  to  give  the  riirht,  and 
compel  specific  performance  hy  deed  as  of  a  contract  in  part 
executed.-'  The  language  of  Hates,  Ch.,  in  a  ease  in  Delaware,*' 
is  this;  '•  At  law,  a  license  can,  under  no  circumstances,  he- 
come  irrevocahle  hy  estoppel,  when  the  effect  would  he  to 
create  an  interest  in  land."  "  A  mere  license  affecting  lands 
is,  at  law,  always  rcvocahl(\  even  though  gianted  for  a  valu- 
al»le  consideration,  and  altliou-jli  the  licenser  may  have  ex- 
pended mon<'y  undei*  it."  Ihit.  as  he  states,  in  courts  of  equity, 
"  ctjuities  in  land,  though  not  created  hy  any  deed,  grant,  or 
writing,  hut  springing  out  of  the  acts  and  relations  of  the 
parties,  are  largely  enforced."  "  Ihit  this  principle  of  ecjui- 
talile  estoppel  j)roceeds  ujion  the  ground  of  preventing  fraud. 
Its  effect,  when  aj)plied,  is  to  i-i-strain  a  jtarty  fi-om  exercising 
liis  let/al  right."  And  a  recent  case  in  New  Yoik,  cited  he- 
low,  may  serve  to  illustrate  the  ])resent  .state  of  the  law.  One 
having  erected  a  mill-dam,  hy  ))ermission  of  the  owners,  acro.ss 
a  stream  of  water,  with  a  view  of  providing  ]>ower  thereliy  tt) 
work  a  mill  which  he  erected  on  his  own  land,  a|)]>lied  to  an 
intermediate  lan<l-owner  for  permission  to  cut  a  canal  through 
his  land  for  the  purj)Ose  of  conducting  the  water  from  the  dam 

i  Wickprslmiii  r.  Orr,  9  Iowa,  2«50.  •  Beatty  v.  Gn-jrorv,  17  I<>wa,  114. 

•  Buclinnan  r.  Ix)giinsj>ort,  71  1ml.  265  ;  ami  see  Ix?t'  r.  XIiI.««)*l,  12  Ncv.  2S0. 
*■  Upton  f.  Urazier,  17  Iowa,  157;  Snowileii  r.  Wilns,  19  Imi.  14;  2  .Viu.  Ix-atL 

Cos.  682  ami  cas<'8. 

»  Veglite  V.    Raritan  Co  ,  19  N.  J.  E>\.  H2,  153  ;  WiUiamston,  &c.   Ii.  K.   c 
Battle,  6rt  N.  C.  54C  (1S72V 

•  Jackson  Co.  r.  Phil.  W.  &.  1'..  i:.  K.  4  Del.  Ch.  ISO. 


670       '        LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY,  [BOOK  L 

to  his  mill,  and  obtained  a  license  so  to  do.  He  then  mort- 
gaged his  land,  but  said  nothing  of  the  mill  or  privileges,  and 
the  mortgage  was  foreclosed.  It  was  held  that  the  mortgage 
carried  the  mill  and  whatever  privileges  of  water  belonged  to 
it.  But,  as  tlie  license  to  cut  and  maintain  the  canal  was  by 
parol,  it  might  be  revoked  at  any  time  by  the  owner  of  the 
land,  although  the  mill  had  been  run  by  means  of  the  water 
more  than  twenty-five  years.  Hogeboom,  J.,  was  inclined  to 
adopt  the  Pennsylvania  doctrine,  and  hold  the  license  irrevo- 
cable ;  but  the  court  sustained  the  opposite  doctrine,  John- 
son, J.,  denying  that  it  came  within  the  principle  on  which 
equity  acts.^  In  Georgia  it  would  he  held  in  equity  an  irrevo- 
cable license.^  In  Illinois,  where  the  owner  of  a  house,  having 
a  wall  adjacent  to  another's  land,  gave  him  license  to  erect  a 
wooden  house  on  his  own  premises,  and  make  use  of  the  waU 
for  that  purpose,  and  he  did  so,  the  court  held  the  license  was 
irrevocable  at  law  both  as  to  the  licensee  and  his  grantee.^ 
But  this  case  has  been  questioned  in  later  cases  in  the  same 
State,*  and  the  rule  laid  down  in  an  early  decision^  re- 
affirmed that  there  is  no  equitable  relief  for  one  who  has  con 
structed  a  dam  under  a  license  to  flow  another's  land,  upon 
the  revocation  of  the  license  by  the  latter.  The  same  doctrine 
is  held  in  Minnesota,  where  the  revocation  of  the  license  to 
flow  destroyed  the  value  of  the  mill  ei'ccted  by  the  licensee  on 
his  own  land  and  upon  the  faith  of  the  grant  of  the  license.^ 

11.  The  doctrine  of  the  revocability  of  licenses  rests  upon 
the  familiar  principle,  that  a  freehold  interest  in  lands  can 
only  be  created  or  conveyed  by  deed  ;  and,  as  before  stated, 
an  easement  in  the  land  of  another  cannot  be  created,  except 
by  deed,  or  what  is  equivalent,  —  prescription."" 

1  Babcock  v.  Utter,  1  Abbot,  App.  27-60,  in  which  the  foregoing  text  is 
referred  to.     So  Wiseman  v.   Lucksinger,  84  N.  Y.  31. 

2  Cook  V.  Prigden,  45  Ga.  331. 

3  Russell  V.  Hubbard,  59  111.  337. 

*  Kainphouse  v.  GafTuer,  73  111.  453,  461  ;  Tanner  v.  Volentine,  75  111.  624. 

6  Woodward  v.  Seeley,  11  111.  157. 

6  Johnson  v.  Skilliuau,  29  Minn.  95.  So  in  Maine,  Pitman  v.  Poor,  38  Me. 
237. 

'  Wood  V.  Leadbitter,  13  M.  &  W.  838,  impugning  the  case  of  Taykr  v.  Wa- 
ters, 7  Taunt.  374,  and  explaining  Wood  v.  Manley,  11  Ad.  &  E.  34  :  Morse  v. 
Copeland,  2  Gray,  302  ;  Stevens  v.  Stevens,  11  Met.  251  ;  Foot  v.  N.   Haven  & 


cii.  XII.  §  2.]    ti:n.vncii:s  at  suffkkante,  LirENSES,  hn<\       f.Tl 

*12.  Hut  there  are  licenses  wliidi  are  irrevncalil' ,  ['I"1J 
tliouL^i  tliey  relate  to  laiul  and  are  \)\  parol  ;  as  wliere. 
for  instance,  the  license  is  directly  connected  with  ihe  title 
to  personal  jiroperty  which  the  licensee  accpiires  from  the 
licensi'r  at  the  time  the  license  is  ^iven,  wherehy  the  licens«; 
is  conpled  with  an  interest.  Thns,  where  one  sells  personal 
chattels  on  his  own  land,  and,  hefore  a  reas(»nai)le  time  to 
remove  them,  forhids  the  pnrchaser  to  enter  and  take  Ihem,  it 
was  held  to  he  a  license  which  he  could  not  revoke  within 
such  reas(tualilc  lime.'  So,  where  A  cut  hay  u|M)n  ll's  land 
njion  shares,  and  stored  it  in  IJ's  barn  upon  the  iiremises,  hy 
his  permission,  H  coidd  not  revoke  his  license  to  A  to  come 
and  divide  it  and  carry  off  his  sliair.-  And,  where  one  <rave 
another  license  to  cut  trees  on  his  land,  at  an  airreed  price,  to 
be  carried  away,  the  vendoi*  could  not  revoke  the  lieense  to 
remove  such  of  them  as  had  been  cut  under  it.  Ihit  until  cnt 
the  owner  may  revoke  the  license,  and  a  conveyance  of  the 
land  to  a  third  j)arty  by  ileed  would  operate  as  such  a  revoca- 
tion, as  soon  as  known  to  the  licensee,  who  would  thereupon 
become  a  trespasser  by  afterwards  cutting  the  trees.^  So 
where  the  owner  of  land  sold  it,  reserving  the  trees  standing 
and  down  ujxm  it,  with  a  right,  for  three  years,  to  cut  and 
carry  them  away.  It  was  hehl  that  all  that  he  cuts  in  that 
time  are  i»ersonal  property,  and  he  may  carry  them  away  after- 
wards, but  would  therein'  lie  liable  in  tres|»ass  qmirc  i-htmtum 
for  going  njion  the  land.  And  the  same  principle  a|t|)lies  if  one 
man's  cattle  are  on  another  man's  land  without  his  permis- 
sion.* 

North.  Co.,  23  Conn.  223;  Jnniie.son  i:  Millcriinnn,  3  Diier,  255;  Cook  v.  Steams, 
11  Mass.  533  ;  Gale  &  Wliatley.  Kase.  19  ;  hi.  \:,;  Dolitlle  v.  t/My.  7  Barb.  74  ; 
Sel.leii  V.  Del.  Canal  Co.,  29  N.  Y.  G39  ;  C'lute  v.  Carr,  20  Wise.  533. 

1  Whitiiiarsh  v.  Walker,  1  Met.  310  ;  Nittleton  v.  Sike.s,  8  Met.  31  ;  W<hx]  r. 
Mauley,  11  A.l.  &.  K.  34  ;  Woo.1  v.  Loaill.itter,  13  .M.  k  W.  85<5  ;  Am.  e«l.  ii.  ; 
Marshall  V.  Green,  1  C.  V.  Div.  35  ;  rarmms  r.  C"aiiii>,  11  C'oiin.  525  ;  Clutliii  r. 
CariK-iiU'r,  4  Met.  580,  583.  Hut  sn^'e  Williams  v.  .Morris,  8  .M.  &  W.  488  ;  Giles 
V.  SiniKii.ls,  15  Gray,  442  ;  Sterling  v.  Wanleii,  51  N.  H.  227. 

»  White  V.  Pllwell,  48  Me.  3G0. 

»  Drake  r.  Wells  11  Allen,  143,144;  Gile.s  v.  Simomls,  15  Gray,  441;  (oleniaQ 
tJ.  FosUr,  1  Hnrlst  &  N.  37  and  notes;  HolTey  r.  Henderson,  17  Q.  R  58(1;  Wescott 
V.  Delano,  20  Wise.  516,  517  ;  but  see  ilarsliall  p.  Green,  ffM/>rri ;  bImj  mtU,  B.  1, 
ch.  1,  i-l.  8.  «  Town  r.  Hiuen,  61  X.  H.  59(3. 


672  LAW  OF  EEAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

13.  The  license  may  be  irrevocable  when  executed,  though 
it  be  given  by  parol,  and  affects  the  land  of  the  licenser,  if 
the  act  licensed  be  done  on  the  licensee's  land  and  its  only 
effect  be  to  impair  or  destroy  an  easement  in  the  licenser's 
land,  which  that,  as  the  dominant  estate,  has  enjoyed  in  or 
out  of  the  land  of  the  licensee  as  the  servient  estate.     Thus, 

where  A  gave  B  license  to  erect  his  house  so  near  A's 
[*402]   ancient  house  *  as  to  obstruct  his  light  and  air,  and 

B  built  accordingly,  A  could  not  revoke  the  license, 
though  he  was  thereby  deprived  of  these  easements.  But  if 
in  order  to  enjoy  the  license  it  is  necessary  to  exercise  a  right 
of  easement  by  using  the  licenser's  land,  it  is  a  revocable  one, 
as  where  in  the  case  above  cited,  the  licensee,  in  order  to  raise 
the  pond  for  his  mill,  was  obliged  to  flow  back  the  water  upon 
the  licenser's  land.  In  the  one  case,  the  licenser  does  an  act, 
or,  what  is  the  same,  authorizes  it  to  be  done,  whicli  extin- 
guishes what  he  had  before  enjoyed  in  another's  estate.  In 
the  other,  in  order  to  enjoy  the  license,  the  licensee  must  oc- 
cupy the  land  of  the  licenser.*  ^ 

*  Note.  —  By  statute  in  Massachusetts,  a  mill-owner  has  a  right  to  flow  land 
of  another  under  certain  circumstances,  being  liable  to  pay  damages  therefor.  It 
was  held  that  where  such  land-owner,  for  a  valuable  consideration,  consented  to 
the  mill-owner's  flowing  his  land  without  further  claim  for  damages,  it  could  not 
be  revoked.  Seymour  v.  Carter,  2  Met.  520.  The  license  in  Morse  v.  Copeland, 
2  Gray,  302,  was  to  erect  a  dam  upon  the  licensee's  own  land,  which  restricted  the 
extent  of  the  casement  of  flowing  the  same,  belonging  to  the  licenser,  and  held 
irrevocable  after  it  liad  been  executed.  In  "Winter  v.  Brockwell,  8  East,  308,  the 
license  was  to  erect  a  sky-light  on  licensee's  land,  which  obstructed  the  light  and 
air  from  coming  to  licenser's  house  ;  the  license  was  held  irrevocable  after  the  sky- 
light had  been  erected.  In  Liggins  v.  Inge,  7  Bing.  682,  the  license  was  to  lower 
the  bank  of  a  stream  iu  the  licensee's  land,  and  erect  a  weir  thereon,  which  diverted 
a  portion  of  the  water  of  the  stream  from  the  licenser's  null  below.  It  was  held 
that  permitting  this  diversion  to  be  made  was  in  effect  an  abandonment  of  the. 
natural  flow  of  the  stream  ;  and  it  having  been  done  at  the  expense  of  the  licensee 
on  his  own  land,  the  license  could  not  be  revoked,  nor  the  right  thus  abandoned 
resumed. 

1  Morse  v.  Copeland,  2  Gray,  302  ;  Addison  v.  Hack,  2  Gill,  221  ;  Dyer  v. 
Sandford,  9  Met.  395  ;  Liggins  v.  Inge,  7  Bing.  682  ;  Hazleton  v.  Putnam,  3 
Chand.  (Wise.)  124;  Winter  v.  Brockwell,  8  East,  308  ;  Hewlins  v.  Shippam,  5 
B.  &  C.  221  ;  Jamieson  v.  Millemann,  3  Duer,  255  ;  Moore  v.  Kawson,  3  B.  &  C. 
332  ;  Foot  v.  N.  Haven  &  North.  Co.,  23  Conn.  223;  Gale  &  Whatley,  Ease.  20  ; 
Cocker  V.  Cowper,  per  Parke,  B.,  1  Cr.  M.  &  R.  420;  Veghte  v.  Rantan  Co.,  19 
N.  J.  Eq.  153. 


CII.  XII,  §  2.]     TKNANTIES    AT   SriTKIlANrF,  LirF:NSKS,  KTC.         073 

14.  Where,  under  n  license  wliiclj  lias  heen  revoked,  the 
licensee  before  such  revocation  has  made  inij)rovenients  upon 
the  licenser's  land  l»y  laljor  or  money  «'\|»ended  thereon, 
ccjuity  *  will  not  allow  the  licenser  to  avail  himself  of  [•403] 
thes(\  without  restoriuir  the  licensee  to  as  trood  a  situ- 
utiim  as  he  stooii  in  helore  he  entei-cd  upon  the  execution  of 
the  license.' 

1').  And  where,  hy  such  revocation,  llie  structure  erected 
by  the  licensee  on  the  licenser's  land  acipiires  the  character 
of  |)crsonal  proi)erty,  as  in  case  of  a  house  erected  uudtr  the 
license,  the  licensee  has  an  interest  in  the  same,  and  may 
remove  the  structure  within  a  reasonable  time.  And  to  that 
extent  the  license  would  be  irrevocable.^  I  Jut  whether  the 
licenser,  u\)on  revokinu;  the  license,  can  compel  the  licensee 
to  restore  the  premises  to  their  oritrinal  condition  at  his  ex- 
pense or  not,  dei)ends  upon  the  circumstances  of  the  case.*^ 

•  Xi>TE.  —  The  snhjoct  of  licenses  is  further  treatid  of  in  .Vn^'ill  on  Water- 
courses, c.  8,  nnd  2  Am.  Lead.  Cos.  .114-538,  1st  ed. 

»  llazleton  V.  Putnam,  8  Chnnd.  (Wi.s.)  117  ;  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §  1237  ;  Angell, 
■Watercourses,  §  318  ;  Short  v.  Taylor,  cited  2  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  522. 

»  Barnes  v.  Barnes,  6  Vt.  388  ;  Wood  r.  Leadbitter,  13  II.  &  W.  856,  Aia.  ed- 
n.  ;  Ashmun  r.  Williams,  8  Pick.  402. 

•  Prince  ».  Case,  10  Conn.  375  ;  Stevens  v.  Stevens,  11  Met  251. 


VOL.  I.— 48 


674  LAW   OP  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 


[*404]  *  CHAPTER  XIII. 

JOINT   ESTATES. 

Sect.  1,  Estates  in  Joint- Tenancy. 

Sect.  2.  Estates  in  Coparcenary. 

Sect.  3.  Tenancies  in  Common. 

Sect.  4.  Estates  in  Partnership. 

Sect.  5.  Joint  Mortgages. 

Sect.  6.  Estates  in  Entirety. 

Sect.  7.  Partition. 


£*406]  *  SECTION  I. 

ESTATES  IN  JOINT-TENANCY. 

1.  Of  the  quality  of  estates. 

2.  What  constitutes  a  joint-tenancy. 

3.  Relation  of  joint-tenants  to  each  other. 

4.  Of  what  estates  such  tenancy  may  be. 

5.  How  it  may  be  created. 

6.  Of  the  unities  in  joint-tenancy. 

7.  Of  survivorship. 

8-10.  By  what  terms  joint-tenancy  is  created. 

11.  Incidents  of  sucli  tenancy. 

12.  One  co-tenant  cannot  set  up  title  against  the  other. 

13.  How  the  co-tenants  may  sue  and  be  sued. 

14.  Nature  of  survivor's  interests. 

15.  One  cannot  charge  the  estate  as  to  the  other. 

16.  Of  actions  for  waste  by  either. 

17.  Of  sales  by  co-tenants. 

18.  One  co-tenant  may  not  devise  his  share. 

19.  Trustees  considered  as  joint-tenants. 

20.  How  equity  treats  joint-estates. 

21.  No  dower  or  curtesy  in  joint-tenancies. 

22.  How  these  are  dissolved. 

1,  After  treating  of  estates  in  respect  to  their  quantity, 
the  next  subject  in  the  order  of  the  work  proposed  is  the 


ril.  XIII.  §  1.]  JOINT    ESTATES.  »;T") 

quality  of  these  estates,  or  the  maiintr  in  wliicli  the  ri^'lit  of 
eiijiiyinent  may  he  exercised,  as  cither  hy  one  alone,  an  a  ten- 
ancy in  severalty,  ur  liy  several  under  tlie  names  of  joint- 
tenants,  coparceners,  or  tenants  in  common.'  A  tenancy  in 
severalty  exists,  as  the  term  implies,  wheie  one  has  the  ri^dit 
tc  enjoy  an  estate  separately  l)y  himself.''*  It  is  customary  to 
treat  of  joint-tenancy,  coparcenary,  and  tenancy  in  common, 
under  separate  heads.  Hut  the  first  two  apply  to  .so  limited 
an  ext(>nt  to  estates  in  this  country,  and  the  three  have  so 
many  thinj^s  in  common,  that  it  is  pnjposed  to  discuss  them 
all  in  a  sinjrle  chapter. 

2.  A  JOINT-TENANCY  is  deliucd  to  lie  ••  when  several  jiersoiis 
have  any  subject  of  i)roperty  jointly  between  them  in  e<pial 
shares  hy  purchase."  "Each  has  the  whole  and  every  part 
with  the  lienefit  of  survivorship,  unless  the  tenancy  lie  sev- 
ered."'^ In  the  quaint  lau^uajre  of  the  law  they  hold,  each 
per  my  et  per  tout^  the  effect  of  which,  technically  considered, 
is,  that,  for  ])urposes  of  tenure  and  survivorship,  each  is  the 
holder  of  the  whole,  Ihit  for  purposes  of  alienation,  each  has 
only  his  own  share.*  And  the  shares  of  several  joint-tenants, 
as  well  as  of  tenants  in  common,  are  always  presumed  to  l)e 
cqual.^  If  the  grrant  of  one  parcel  of  land  to  two  persons  de- 
fines the  share  and  interest  which  each  is  to  take,  it  creates 
an  estate  in  common,  and  not  a  joint-tenancy.'' 

3.  While,  moreover,  joint-tenants  constitute  hut  uue  person 
in  respect  to  the  estate,  as  to  th(i  rest  of  the  worM, 
between  *  themselves  each  is  entitled  to  his;  share  (if  [*407] 
the  rents  and  jirofits  so  loni^  as  he  lives,  but  sul)ject 

to  the  right  of  the  survivor  or  survivors  to  take  the  entire 
estate  upon  his  death,  to  the  exclusion  of  his  heirs  or  personal 
representatives.^ 

J  1  Prcst.  Est.  22. 

a  1  Prcst.  Est.  130  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  179.  Tlie  tcnn  entirtty  ns  applidl  to  estates, 
it  will  be  seen,  is  used  to  describe  the  interest  of  hu&baud  and  wife  as  joiut-owneni 
of  an  estate. 

»  1  Prest.  Est.  136  ;  Co.  Lit  180  b, 

«  1  Prest  Est.  136  ;  Wins.  Kciil  Prop.  112  ;  Co.  Lit  186  a, 

*  Shiels  c.  SUrk,  14  Ga.  429. 

•  Craig  V.  Taylor,  6  B.  Mon.  457  ;  Fenton  v.  Lord,  128  Moss.  46(J. 
'  Wms.  Real  Prop.  109;  Lit.  §  281. 


676  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  i. 

4.  There  may  be  a  joint-tenancy  whether  the  estate  be  in 
fee,  for  life,  for  years,  or  at  will,^  and  also  of  estates  in  re- 
mainder.2  So  there  may  be  a  joint-tenancy  in  an  estate  for 
life,  though  the  reversion  or  remainder  be  in  only  one  of  the 
tenants ;  and  if  he  who  has  the  reversion  in  fee  die  first,  his 
heir  will  be  postponed  as  to  his  enjoyment  of  the  estate  until 
after  the  decease  of  the  other  joint-tenant.'^ 

5.  But  a  joint-tenancy  can  only  be  created  by  purchase  or 
act  of  the  parties,  and  not  by  descent  or  act  of  the  law.  It 
must,  moreover,  be  created  by  one  and  the  same  act,  deed,  or 
devise,  and  joint  disseisors  may  be  joint-tenants.* 

6.  A  joint-tenancy  at  common  law  must  have  a  fourfold 
unity  as  it  is  called,  namely,  of  interest,  of  title,  of  time,  and 
of  possession,  —  the  interest  being  acquired  by  all,  and  by  the 
same  act  or  conveyance,  commencing  at  the  same  time,  and 
held  by  the  same  undivided  possession."  But  under  the  law 
of  uses,  as  well  as  by  will,  the  unity  of  time  may  be  so  far 
dispensed  with  as  to  allow  two  or  more  joint-tenants  to  take 
their  shares  at  different  times.^ 

7.  The  great  distinctive  characteristic  of  joint-tenancies 
among  estates  of  which  there  is  a  joint-ownership  is  the  right 
of  survivorship,  by  which,  though  the  estate  is  limited  to  them 
and  their  heirs,  the  survivor  or  survivors  take  the  entire  estate, 
to  the  exclusion  of  the  heirs  or  representatives  of  the  deceased 
co-tenant.'^  Two  corporations,  tlierefore,  cannot  be  joint-ten- 
ants. If  they  jointly  own  land,  they  are  tenants  in  common 
of  the  same.^ 

8.  By  the  common  law,  in  England,  if  an  estate  is 

[*408]   *  conveyed  to  two  or  more  persons  without  indicating 

how  the  same  is  to  be  held,  it  will  be  understood  to 

be  in  joint-tenancy,  upon  the  feudal  idea  that  the  services  due 

to  the  lord  should  be  kept  entire,  though  equity  is  inclined  to 


1  2  Bl.  Com.  179  ;  2  Flint.  Real  Prop.  322. 

2  Co.  Lit.  183  b.  '  Lit.  §  285. 
*  2  Bl.  Com.  180  ;  Lit.  §§  277,  278  ;  Putney  v.  Dresser,  2  Met.  583. 

6  2  Bl.  Com.  180. 

6  "Wnis.  Real  Prop.  112  ;  2  Prest.  Abst.  67. 

7  Lit.  §  280  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  183. 

'  Dewitt  V.  San  Francisco,  2  Cal.  289. 


CH.  XIII.  §  1.]  JOINT   ESTATES.  G77 

regard  sucli  cstatt'S  as  tiMiancirs  in  cKininon,  oHpecially  whore 
the  parties  luive  advanct'd  money  nj)»)n  the  estate.' 

U.  Hut  the  jHtliey  of  the  American  hiw  is  opposi-d  to  tlie 
notion  of  survivorship,  ami  thcrrfore  rrjrards  such  estates  as 
tenan«'i<'s  in  common.  In  many  of  the  States  the  rnle  of  sur- 
vivorship is  ab(jlished  by  statute,  except  in  the  ca.se  of  joint 
trustees,  or  mort<xagees,  whih'  in  others  all  estates  t<»  two  or 
more  j>ersons  are  taken  to  l)e  tenancies  in  eoniinon,  iniless 
expressly  declared  to  he  joint  tenancries  l)y  the  deed  or  instru- 
ment crcatini?  them,  with  a  similar  exception  of  estates  to  joint- 
trustees  or  mortgagees.  Thus  the  statute  of  Massachusetts 
makes  conveyances  or  devises  of  estates  to  several,  tenancies 
in  common,  unless  expressly  declared  to  he  joint-tenancies, 
or,  what  is  equivalent,  except  in  cases  of  trusts,  mortgages,  or 
where  the  grantees  or  devisees  arc  husl)and  and  wife.^ 

10.  And  the  court  of  that  State  waive  the  (piestion  whether 
joint  disseisors  are  tenants  in  common,''  thouirii  they  had  ]ire- 
viously  treatetl  them  as  joint-tenants,  and  held  tliat,  if  either 
abandons,  the  other  should  have  the  entire  estate.''  JJut  where 
the  devise  was  to  childi<ii,  ami  the  survivor  or  survivors  of 
them,  it  was  held  to  be  an  estate  in  joint-tenancy.''  In  Marv- 
land  a  similar  rule  prevails  as  in  Massachusetts,  while  in  Ohio 
and  Connecticut  the  estate  of  joint-tenancy  docs  not  exist,''  * 

•  Ndtk.  —  In  the  followiii<^  States  every  estate  granted  or  devised  to  two 
or  more  jiersons  in  their  own  right  is  eoiistnied  to  be  a  tenancy  in  common  ;  or 
Burvivorship  is  abolished  ;  or  each  joint-tenant's  share  descends,  ami  is  chargeable 

»  2  Flint.  Real  Pmp.  324;  Rigden  v.  Vallier,  3  Atk.  734;  Wnis.  It.al  Prop.  109, 
Rawle's  note.  It  is  said  by  Williams  that  the  jmncijMil  nse  of  a  joint-tenancy  now 
in  Eiiglami  is  for  the  puqwise  of  vesting  estates  in  tnist<'e8,  who  are  there  invaria- 
bly made  joint-tenants.      Wins.  Real  Prop.  Ill;  Duncan  v.  Forrer,  6  Hinn.  11*3. 

»  Pub.  Sut.  c.  V2<i,  §  5  ;  VVelister  r.  Vandeventer,  C  Gray,  428;  Appleton  r. 
Boyd,  7  Mass.  131;  Jones  v.  Crane,  16  Orny,  308.  But  now,  by  statute,  in  Ma-ssa- 
chusett-H,  a  conveyance  to  husbaml  and  wife  does  not  create  a  joint-tenancy,  unless 
it  is  expressed  to  Ije  to  the  grantees  or  devisees  jointly,  or  as  joint-tenantfl,  or  in 
joint-tenancy,  or  to  them  and  the  survivor  of  them.     Stat.  1885,  c.  237. 

»  Fowler  r.  Thayer,  4  Cush.  111. 

«  Putney  r.  Dres.ser,  2  Met.  583  ;  Allen  r.  Holton,  20  Pick.  458. 

'  Stimpson  r.  Hatterman,  5  Cush.  153. 

•  Punly  V.  Punly,  3  Md.  Ch.  Dec.  547;  Milea  r.  Fisher,  10  Ohio,  1;  Walker, 
Am.  Ijiw,  202  ;  Phelps  r.  Jepson,  1  Root,  48.  For  the  statute  laws  of  the  ber 
eral  States  on  this  subject,  the  reader  is  referred  to  the  accumpouyiug  note. 


678  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  L 

[*409]       *11.  Among  the  incidents  of  a  joint-tenancy  grow- 
ing out  of  the  identity  of   interest  and  title  of  the 

with  his  debts,  namely,  Massachusetts,  Pub.  Stat.  c.  126,  §  5';  Maine,  Rev.  Stat 
1884,  c.  73,  §  7  ;  New  Ham^jshire,  Gen.  Stat.  1867,  c.  121,  §  14  ;  Vermont,  Gen, 
Stat.  1863,  c.  64,  §  2  ;  Rhode  Island,  Pub.  Stat.  1882,  c.  172,  §  1  ;  New  Jer- 
sey, Rev.  1877,  p.  167  ;  New  York,  Rev.  Stat.  1863,  vol.  1,  p.  676,  vol.  3, 
p.  14,  §  44 ;  Michigan,  Gen.  Stat.  1882,  §§  5560,  5561  ;  Minnesota,  Stat.  1878, 
c.  45,  §  44  ;  WLsconsin,  Rev.  Stat.  1878,  §§  2068,  2069  ;  Kentucky,  Gen.  Stat. 
1873,  pp.  531,  586  ;  Tennessee,  Stat.  1871,  §  2010  ;  Illinois,  Rev.  Stat.  1883, 
c.  76,  §  1  ;  Delaware,  Laws  1874,  c.  86,  §  1 ";  Arkansas,  Dig.  1874,  §  3590  ;  Mis- 
sissippi, Rev.  Code,  1880,  §  1197  ;  Missouri,  Gen.  Stat.  1872,  c.  140  ;  Colorado, 
Gen.  Laws,  1877,  c.  18,  §  162  ;  California,  Hittell's  Codes,  1876,  §  6380  ;  7  CaL 
Rep.  347  ;  Indiana,  Rev.  Stat.  1881,  §§  2922,  2923  ;  Iowa,  Rev.  Code,  1880,  §  1939 
(husband  and  wife  take  as  tenants  in  common,  Hoffman  v.  Stigei-s,  28  Iowa, 
302),  Maryland,  Rev.  Code,  1878,  art.  45,  §  3  ;  Oregon,  Gen.  Laws,  1872,  c.  6  ; 
W.  Virginia,  Rev.  ^tat.  1878,  c.  82,  §§  18,  19;  Pennsylvania,  Purd.  Dig.  1872, 
p.  815  ;  Kennedy's  Appeal,  60  Penn.  St.  511,  516  ;  North  Carolina,  Code  1883, 
§§  1326,  1502  ;  Georgia,  Code  1882,  §  2300;  Alabama  Code,  1876,  §  2191;  Texas, 
Rev.  Stat.  1879,  art.  1655. 

In  Massachusetts,    Michigan,   Wisconsin,  Indiana,  Mississippi,  and  Minnesota, 
joint-tenancies  may  exist  as  to  mortgages,  in  case  of  devises  or  conveyances  in 
trust,  and  where,  from  the  tenor  of  the  instrument  creating  the  estate,  it  is  mani- 
festly intended  to  create  an  estate  in  joint-tenancy.     See  the  statutes  above  cited  ; 
also  Nichols  v.  Denny,  37  Miss.  59.     The  same  provisions  exist  in  Vermont  and 
"West  Virginia,   except  as  to  mortgages  ;  while  in  New  Hampshire,  New  Jersey, 
Maryland,  and  Iowa,  the  only  exception  by  statute  is  where  the  intent  to  create 
a  joint-tenancy  is  express  on  the  face  of  the  conveyance.     In  Maine,  when  the 
conveyance  is  by  mortgage,  or  in  trust,  to  two  or  more  persons,  with  power  to 
api^oint  a  successor  in  case  one  dies,  it  is  construed  a  joint-tenancy,  unless  the 
contrary  is  expressed,  but  otherwise  is  a  tenancy  in  common.     The  only  excep- 
tions in  New  York,  Illinois,  Delaware,  Missouri,  Arkansas,  Colorado,  and  Cali- 
fornia, to  the  general  rule  above  stated,  where  the  joint-tenancy  is  not  expressly 
declared,  arise  in  cases  where  estates  are  vested  in  executors  or  trustees.     Tliese 
are  held  in  joint-tenancy.     In  Virginia  and  Kentucky,  the  doctrine  of  survivor- 
ship is  virtually  abolished,  as  the  share  of  each  co-tenant,  at  his  death,  descends 
to  his  heirs,  or  may  be  devised.     Estates  held  by  two  or  more  as  executors  or  trus- 
tees, and  estates  where  the  conveyance  expresses  the  intention  that  the  part  of  the 
one  dying  shall  go  to  the  survivor,  are  excepted.     Code,  1873,  c.  112,  §§  18,  19  ; 
Kentucky,  Gen.  Stat.  1873,  c.  63,  art.  1,  §  13.     The  right  of  sur\nvorship  is  alx»l- 
ished  in  Tennessee,  Georgia,  Texas,  Florida,  North  Carolina,  Alabama,  and  Penn- 
sylvania.   But,  in  Pennsylvania,  there  is  an  exception  in  case  of  estates  in  trustees  ; 
in  North  Carolina  of  estates  in  executors  ;  and  the  courts  of  Alabama  hold  that  the 
statute  does  not  apply  to  trusts  and  estates  held  in  autre  droit.     Parsons  v.  Boyd, 
20  Ala.  112.     In  South  Carolina,  the  right  of  survivorship  is  not  recognized.     1 
Brev.    Dig.  435  ;  but  see  Ball  v.  Deas,  2  Strobh.   Eq.  24.     In  Rhode  Island  the 
excei)tion   to  the  statute  abolishing  survivorship  does  not  extend  to  devises  or 
conveyances  to  husband  and  wife,  and  only  applies  to  devises  or  conveyances 
where  the  instrument  manifestly  indicates  an  intention  on  the  part  of  the  devisor 
1  See  also  Stat.  1885,  c.  237. 


CH.  XIII.  §  1.]  JOINT    E55TATRS.  079 

several  tenants  *  arc  those:  that  an  entry  or  re-ontry  [*410] 
maile  by  one  is  deeincd  to  he  the  entry  of  all,  unless 
clearly  shown  to  he  adverse  towards  his  co-tenants;  so  livery 
of  seisin  made  to  one  is  made  to  all  ;'  and  the  occupatinn  hy 
one  co-tenant  is  prima  faci*'  an  occupation  hy  all.-  Ihit,  inas- 
nnich  as  it  is  competent  for  them  to  .sever  their  interests,  each, 
should  he  hold  a  separate  and  distinct  portion  of  their  com- 
mon estate  for  th(»  term  of  twenty  years,  would  tlH-rehy  ac<|uire 
an  estate  in  severally,  unless  such  holdiuL'  was  by  mutual 
agreement. 3 

12.  Tjion  the  same  princi|)le  of  identity  of  interest,  if  one 
joint-tenant  purcha.scs  in  an  adverse  title  to  the  joint  estate,  or 
acquires  an  older  le<ral  title,  it  will  enure  to  the  benefit  of  liis 
co-tenants,  if  they' will  contribute  pro  rata  towards  defrayinpr 
the  expenses  thereof.*  And  where  a  member  of  an  e.\istinjr 
company  purchases  for  tlie  uses  of  the  company,  he  cannot 
sell  it  to  the  company  at  an  enhanced  price  without  disclosing 
the  facts  ;  the  profits  made  belong  to  the  comj)any.^  Ihit  one 
cotenant  may  purchase  and  become  assignee  of  a  mortgage 
upon  the  comuion  pro])erty,  and  hold  as  mortgagee  against 
his  co-tenant.*^ 

13.  Another  conse<|uence  is  that  a  joint-tenant  (mu  neither 
sue  nor  i»e  sued  alone  in  respect  to  their  joint  estate,  if  ;idvan- 
tage  of  the  omission  to  join  his  co-tenants  be  ])roperly  takcMi.' 

14.  The  interest  which  a  joint-tenant  has  as  survivor  is  not 
a  new  one  acquired  by  him  from  his  co-tenant,  upon  tlie  hit- 
ter's death  ;  for  his  own  interest  is  not  changed  in  amount, 
but  only  his  co-tenant's  is  extinguished.^ 

or  grantor  to  create  an  estate  in  joint-tenancy.  So  in  Kcnturky,  Mississippi,  ami 
AVi'st  Virj^iiiii,  survivorship  in  conveyances  to  luisliand  ami  wife  is  alwlislio*!  ; 
while  in  Imliana  antl  Wisconsin  the  joint  clmracter  of  such  conveyances  is  ex- 
pressly saved.  And  in  Ohio,  joint-tenancy,  with  a  right  of  survivorshi)*,  never 
exist<'d.     Si-rgeant  v.  Steinberger,  2  (IJiio,  305  (1  Dliio,  4'2.T). 

»  ("o.  Lit  49  b  ;  2  Cruise,  DiR.  377. 

2  Wiswall  V.  Wilkins,  5  Vt.  87  ;  Small  v.  ClilTord,  38  Me.  213. 
«  Taylor  v.  Cox,  2  H.  Mon.  429  ;  Drane  v.  Cregor)",  3  H.  Mon.  619. 
«  I'icot  V.  Pa«e,  26  Mo.  3lt8  ;  C.ossam  v.  Donaldson,  18  R.  Mon.  280  ;  Brittin 
V.  Handy,  20  Ark.  381  ;  /x>.t/,  p.  •430  ;  Brown  v.  Hoglc,  30  111.  119. 
'  DensmoreCo.  r.  Densmon*,  64  Penn.  St.  43. 
•  ni.Klgctt  r.  Hililreth,  8  AU.n,  183. 
'  Lit.  5  311  ;  Webster  r.  Vau.leveuter,  6  Gray,  428.     *  2  Flint,  Real  Prop.  83a 


680  LAW   OP   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   L 

15.  No  charge,  therefore,  like  a  rent,  or  a  right  of  way,  or  ^. 

judgment,  created  by  one  co-tenant,  can  bind  the  es- 
[*411]  tate  in  the  *  hands  of  the  survivor  unless  the  charge 

be  created  by  the  one  who  becomes  such  survivor,  or 
the  creator  of  the  charge  releases  his  estate  to  a  co-tenant, 
who,  as  releasee,  accepts,  with  that  part  of  the  estate,  the 
charge  inhering  therein  by  his  own  act.^ 

16.  The  relation,  however,  between  joint-tenants  is  such, 
that,  if  either  wastes  the  joint  estate,  the  otlier  may  have  an 
action  of  waste  against  him,  by  the  statute  of  Westminster  II. 
c.  22.2  ^i^(j  in  several  of  the  States  there  are  statutes  giving 
joint-tenants  actions  of  waste  in  similar  cases.^  If  one  of  two 
joint-tenants  flow  the  joint  land,  so  as  to  appropriate  it  to 
himself,  the  other  may  have  an  action  against  him  as  for  an 
ouster.* 

17.  Though  thus  united  in  their  ownership,  either  tenant 
may  convey  his  share  to  a  co-tenant,  or  even  to  a  stranger, 
who  thereby  becomes  tenant  in  common  with  the  other  co-ten- 
ant. If  the  conveyance  be  b}^  one  of  two  joint-tenants  to  the 
other,  the  estate  is  turned  into  one  in  severalty.  But  if  there 
be  more  than  two,  the  purchaser  remains  joint-tenant  with  the 
others,  as  to  their  original  shares,  and  tenant  in  common  as 


1  Lit.  §  286  ;  Co.  Lit.  185  b  ;  2  Prest.  Abst.  58  ;  65,  66  ;  Tud.  Cas.  724  ; 
Lord  Abergaveny's  Case,  6  Piep.  78. 

2  2d  Inst.  403  ;  Shiels  v.  Stark,  14  Ga.  429. 

^  lu  Missouri,  each  tenant  is  liable  to  his  co-tenant  for  the  damage  done,  and 
to  treble  damages  if  the  jury  find  that  the  act  was  wantonly  committed.  Stat. 
1872,  c.  85,  §  46.  A  similar  provision  exists  in  Virginia.  Code,  1873,  c.  133.  In 
Massachusetts  each  joint-tenant  will  be  liable,  without  first  giving  thirty  days' 
notice  to  his  co-tenants  in  writing,  to  pay  treble  damages  for  waste  coujmitted  on 
the  premises.  Pub.  Stat.  1881,  c.  179,  §  7.  A  like  provision  exists  in  Maine. 
Rev.  Stat.  1871,  c  95,  §  5.  In  Pihode  Island,  if  he  commit  waste  without  the 
consent  of  his  co-tenant,  he  forfeits  double  the  amount  of  the  waste.  Itev.  Stat. 
1872,  c.  220,  §  2.  In  New  York,  the  co-tenant  in  such  case  may  have  the  judg- 
ment for  treble  damages,  and  elect  to  recover  these,  or  have  partition  of  the  estate, 
and  have  their  amount  set  out  to  him  from  the  defendant's  share.  Stat.  1863, 
vol.  2,  p.  346.  In  New  Jersey  there  is  a  similar  statute,  except  that  the  damages 
are  single.  Rev.  1877,  p.  1236.  In  California,  such  co-tenant  may  recover  treble 
damages  for  waste  done.  Wood,  Dig.  1858.  In  Michigan,  the  tenant  committing 
waste  is  liable  for  double  damages.  Comp.  Laws,  1871,  c.  197,  §§  3,  6.  In 
Wisconsin,  the  law  is  the  same.    Rev.  Stat.  1858,  c.  143.    And  see  ;)oa/,  723,  724. 

*  Jones  V.  Weathersbee,  4  Strobh.  50. 


CM.  XIII.   §   1.]  JOINT    ESTATES.  C81 

to  the  share  acquired  l»y  purchase'  lii  conveyinp  Iuk 
iutt'rt'st  to  a  strau<rc'r,  •  u  joiut-tcuiiut,  like  a  tenant  in  [•  ll'J] 
couuuoii,  must  do  so  hy  deed  of  jrrant  with  words  of 
inhiritaiKC,  if  it  is  intended  U>  pass  an  estate  in  fee.  Whereas, 
in  conveyiuL''  to  his  co-tenant,  a  re  lease  is  not  only  sufllcient, 
but  is  the  projjcr  form  of  nuikinj;  such  conveyance  ;  nor  need 
there  he  any  words  of  inheritance  in  the  same,  since  the  one 
to  whom  the  conveyance  is  made  is  already  seised  of  the 
estate  as  a  whole,  and  it  is  only  necessary  to  extin;ruish  the 
rijrht  of  his  co-tenant  in  order  to  invest  him  with  the  exclusive 
ownershii»  of  the  entire  estate.'  But  a  deed  of  ^rant  from  one 
joint-tenant  to  another  would  he  efl'ectual  as  a  relea.se  iu  vest- 
ing the  entire  owuershij)  in  the  prantee.^  So,  a  morttrape  hy 
a  joint-tenant  of  his  share  to  a  stranjrcr  would  he  effectual 
airainst  survivorship,  and  may  amount  to  a  severance  of  the 
joint  estate.* 

18.  Hut  a  dcvi.se  by  one  joint-tenant  of  his  share  will  he 
inoperative,  inasumch  as  the  ri^ht  of  survivorship  lakes  jire- 
cedeuce  of  such  devise.  And  so  far  does  this  j)iiiu'iple  pre- 
vail, that  if  such  devisor  he  hiiusrlf  the  survivor,  he  must 
republish  his  will  after  the  survivorship  has  accrued,  iu  order 
to  <rive  it  effect.^ 

ll>.  As  a  jjeneral  proposition,  estates  jriven  U)  two  or  more 
trustees  will  be  held  by  them  as  joint-tenants,  ami  will  l'o  to 
the  surviv(jr,  nor  will  the  heirs  of  any  but  the  survivor  be  en- 
titled to  hold  any  interest  in  the  joint  estate.*  Ami  this  will 
be  found  to  apjily  in  nu)st  of  the  States,  even  where  the  riirht 
of  survivorship  as  to  ordinary  joint  estates  has  been  abolished 
by  law."     Thoujrh  it  may  be  renuirked  that  conveyances  are 

»  Lit.  §§  292,  294,  304  ;  2  IVst.  Al.st.  01  ;  Co.  Lit.  273  b  ;  TuiL  (us.  724. 
2  Wilis.  l!e.il    Fro]..    112,    113;    2    PriAt.    -Vbst.    61;    H.ctor   r.    Waugh,    17 
Mo.  13. 

•  Eu.stnce  r.  Scawon,  Cro.  Jac.  69(5  ;  Clie.strr  r.  Wjllnn,  2  .S,uin.i.  t'fl. 

•  York  r.  Stoue,  1  Salk.  158,  s.  c.  1  E«i.  (."as.  Al>r.  2l»3  ;  Siiiiji-stiii  r.  Amnions, 
1  Binn.  175. 

'  Duncan  r.  Forrcr,  C  Binn.  193  ;  2  Pn-.st.  Al.st.  67  ;  Lit.  {  287.  In  Co.  Lit. 
18'»  l>,  the  rulo  of  law  is  stat»'<l^'iM  aeertxendi  jvraffjiur  ultima:  t»luntati. 

•  Hill,  Trust.  303,  and  Wliarton'n  note  of  Am.  cases  ;  Wnis.  lU-al  Prop.  Ill  ; 
Rabe  r.  Fyler,  10  S.  k  M.  440  ;  Wpl»stfr  v.  Vamieveuter,  6  dray,  42i>  ;  tic  com 
of  an  assif^nicnt  of  a  nior^a|i;e  to  tru.st«f«. 

^  Parsons  r.  BoyJ,  20  Ala.  112  ;  Wins.  Itval  Prop.  Ill,  lUvrlc's  note. 


682  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  L 

often  made,  in  such  cases,  with  an  intention  to  create  a  joint- 
tcnancj,  which  fails,  when  technically  considered,  to 

[*413]  answer  that  end.  *  Thus  deeds  and  devises  are  often 
made  to  two  or  more,  and  to  the  survivor  of  them  and 

his  heirs,  the  effect  of  which  is  to  make  them  joint-tenants 

for  life,  with  a  contingent  remainder  in  fee  to  the  one  who 

survives.! 

20.  It  may  also  be  further  remarked  that  it  is  a  rule  in 
equity,  that  if  an  estate  be  conveyed  to  several  in  unequal 
shares,  in  consequence  of  their  having  contributed  unequally 
towards  the  purchase,  they  become  tenants  in  common,  and 
not  joint-tenants.2 

21 .  And  another  incidental  remark  which  has  been  previ- 
ously explained  is,  that  there  can  be  neither  dower  nor  curtesy 
of  an  estate  held  in  joint-tenancy,  the  right  of  the  survivor 
taking  precedence  of  that  of  the  husband  or  the  wife  of  the 
deceased  co-tenant." 

22.  There  are  various  ways  of  terminating  joint-tenancies, 
some  of  which  have  already  been  spoken  of ;  as  by  the  estate 
being  wholly  vested  in  one  b}'  survivorship,  or  being  changed 
into  a  tenancy  in  common,  by  alienation  of  his  share  by  one  of 
the  tenants.  So  it  might  have  been  by  a  voluntary  partition 
of  the  estate  among  the  co-tenants,  each  taking  his  part,  to 
be  held  thereafter  in  severalty  without  any  right  of  survivor- 
ship. But  there  was  no  compulsory  process  by  the  common 
law  to  effect  such  partition,  nor  was  it  supplied  until  the 
Stat.  31  Hen.  VIII.  c.  1,  and  32  Hen.  VHI.  c.  32.  The 
subject  of  partition  by  process  of  law  will  be  treated  of  in 
the  latter  part  of  this  chapter.  An  illustration  of  the  effect 
of  a  partition  is,  that  if  there  are  two  joint-tenants  for  life, 
and  partition  be  made  between  them,  the  reversioner,  instead 
of  having  to  wait  till  the  death  of  both  before  entering  upon 
any  part  of  the  estate,  may  enter  and  possess  himself  of  the 
part  of  either  immediately  upon  his  decease,  and  will  hold 
that  in  severalty.^ 

1  Vick  V.  Edwards,  3  P.  Wms.  372  ;  Co.  Lit.  191,  Butler's  note,  78  ;  Ewing 
V.  Savary,  3  Bibl),  235  ;  Watkins,  Conv.,  White's  ed.  208,  n. 

2  Tud.  Cas.  721  ;  Burton,  Real  Prop.  §  1524,  u. 

8  Co.  Lit.  37  b.  4  2  Flint.  Real  Prop.  334. 


cu.  xiii.  §  2.]  JOINT  estatj:s.  088 


SECTION'   TI. 

COPAUCENARY. 

1.  EstnU's  in  coimrcfimn'  ilifiiH-d. 

2,  8.  Distinction  Ix-twceu  c»>i<iirit'ner9  auJ  joint-tenantB. 

4.  Of  conveyance  by  co|»arctiiiTH. 

6.  CoiMircenere  may  di'ViHu  their  est^itea. 

6.  When  heirs  take  as  tenants  in  common. 

1.  Op  estates  in  coparcenary,  or,  as  coninionly  called,  par- 
cenary, little  more  need  be  said  tiian  to  jjive  some  idea  of  their 
nature  and  incidents,  because  oi  their  infrequency  as  subjects 
of  i-eference  in  this  ciMintry.  The  term  is  apj)lied  to  estates 
of  whieh  two  or  more  persons  form  one  heir,  us  is  the  e:ise  in 
EnL^hiuil,  where,  in  the  absence  of  sons,  several  dauirhters 
toi^ether  form  the  heir  to  the  ancestor's  estates;  or  where 
several  sons  take  as  one  heir  liy  the  custom  of  jravclkind.' 

2.  While  joint-tenancies  refer  to  persons,  the  idea  of  c<> 
parcenary  refers  to  the  estate.  The  title  to  it  is  always  l)y 
descent.  The  respective  shares  may  be  une(|ual,  as,  for  in- 
stance, one  dau<j:htcr  and  two  jrrand-dausxhtei's,  chiblren  of  a 
deceased  dauji:hter,  may  take  by  the  same  act  of  descent.  As 
to  strangers,  the  tenants'  seisin  is  a  joint  one,  but,  as  between 
themselves,  each  is  seised  of  his  or  her  own  share,  on  whose 
death  it  goes  to  the  heirs,  and  not  by  survivorshi|».2  The 
riirht  of  jjosse.ssion  of  coparceners  is  in  common,  an<l  the  i)os- 
session  of  one  is,  in  general,  the  possession  of  the  others.^ 

3.  And  the  relation  of  a  tenant  to  the  estate  may  be  sucli, 
that  he  may  be  a  parcener  with  himself,  as,  ff»r  instance,  where 
one  half  of  an  estate  descends  to  him  fnuu  the  fatiier,  and  inw 
half  from  the  mother.  If,  in  such  case,  he  die  witlmut  lineal 
descendants,  the  half  of  the  estate  that  came  to  him  from  his 
father  descends  to  his  father's  heirs,  while  the  other  ilescends 
to  the  heirs  of  his  mother.* 

»  2  Bl.  Com.  183. 

'  2  Ml.  Com.  188;  "Watkins,  Conv.  143,  Coventry's  note  ;  Turcell  r.  Wilson, 
4  Gratt.  16. 

»  1  IVst.  Est.  137  ;  Manchester  r.  DodJrige,  3  Ind.  360  ;  2  Prvst.  AUt.  70. 
*  Watkins,  Conv.  145,  Coventrj-'s  note. 


684  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

4.  One  parcener  might  convey  his  share  to  a  third 
[*41o]  person,  *  who  would  become  thereby  a  tenant  in  com- 
mon with  the  other  parceners  as  to  such  share.  But 
to  do  this,  a  deed  of  feoffment,  or  grant  with  words  of  inher- 
itance, was  requisite  in  order  to  convey  a  fee.  Whereas,  by  a 
deed  of  release,  one  parcener  might  convey  to  his  coparcener, 
and  a  fee  might  be  created  without  words  of  inheritance,  since 
he  already  has  a  seisin  in  fee  of  the  estate  by  descent.^  One 
prcecipe  to  recover  the  estate  lay  against  them  all.^ 

5.  One  parcener  may  dispose  of  his  share  by  his  last  will, 
nor  will  a  devise  thus  made  be  affected  by  his  subsequently 
making  a  partition  of  the  estate.^  The  name  parcener  is  said 
to  have  been  derived  from  the  power  that  either  had  to  com- 
pel the  other  to  make  partition  at  common  law,*  a  power  still 
incident  to  the  estate,  and  which  will  be  treated  of  hereafter. 

6.  But  as  in  some  of  the  States  children  and  heirs  take  by 
descent  expressly  as  tenants  in  common,  and  as  such  is  con- 
structively the  effect  of  a  descent  in  most  if  not  all  the  States, 
the  distinction  of  estates  in  coparcenary  is  of  comparatively 
little  practical  importance,  and  properly  gives  place  to  the 
familiar  form  of  joint  estates  in  universal  use,  tenancy  in 
common.* 

*  Note.  —  In  Maryland,  children  take  the  estates  of  parents  in  fee,  as  copar- 
ceners.    Hotfar  V.  Dement,  5  Gill,  132. 

1  Co.  Lit.  273  b,  Sector  v.  Waugh,  17  Mo.  13 ;  Watkins,  Con  v.  145,  Coven- 
try's note  ;  1  Prest.  Est.  138  ;  Gilpin  v.  Hollingsworth,  3  Md.  190. 

2  Co.  Lit.  174  a.  '2  Prest.  Abst.  72. 

*  Lit.  §  241. 


ClI.  XIII.  §  3.]  JOINT    ESTATES.  085 


si:cTi(>N  iir. 

TKNANTS    IN    (<niM<iN. 

1  Trnnnrics  in  oonimnii  ilifnnd, 

2.  Nature  of  the  sevenil  estates  of  tonnntA  in  common. 

3.  What  oonstitiite.s  a  tcnnin-y  in  ronmion. 

4.  Curtesy  nml  dower  of  tenants  in  common. 
5,  0.  Of  conveyances  by  tennntJi  in  common. 
7-9.  Ktfect  of  possession  by  one  co-tennnt. 

10-1  J.     Of  suits  by  one  co-tenant  a^inst  another. 

15.  Wlien  one  is  liable  for  rent  to  liis  co-tenant 
15  n.  Same  subject. 

16.  f»f  the  right  to  crops  planted  on  common  land. 

17.  Of  repaii-s  of  the  common  estate. 

17  a.  Of  making  improvements  on  the  common  estate. 
IS.     Of  joining  in  actions  relating  to  the  estate. 

1.  A  TENANCY  in  common  i.s  whore  two  or  more  lioM  |>or- 
scs.sion  of  lands  or  tenements  at  the  same  time  by  several  and 
distinct  titles.  The  quantities  of  their  estate  may  be  differ 
ent,  tlu'ir  jiroportionate  shares  of  the  premi.ses  may  1)0  un- 
ecjual,  the  modes  of  accinirinir  those  titles  may  be 
unlike,  and  the  only  *  nnity  bctwcm  (jiciii  In-  that  ["Hi!] 
of  jiossossion.  Tims  one  may  bold  in  foo,  and  an- 
other for  life;  one  may  act|nire  bis  title  by  jtunbasc,  and 
another  by  descent;  one  may  bold  a  liltb,  ami  anotju-r  a 
twentieth,  and  the  like.'  And  there  njay  lie  a  tenancy  in 
common  amonir  several  owners  of  u  remainder.* 

2.  Each  owner  in  respect  to  his  share  has  all  the  rifrbts, 
cxcojit  that  of  sole  possession,  which  a  tenant  in  severalty 
would  have ;  and  if  he  wishes  to  convey  his  share  to  his  co- 
tenant,  he  must  do  so  by  the  same  kind  of  deed  that  would 
be  necessary  to  convey  it  to  a  stranper.  A  mere  technical 
release  would  not,  as  in  cases  of  joint-tenancy  and  coj)arce- 
nary,  have  that  elTect,^     He    may   manage   bis  part  of   the 

«  2  HI.  Com.  VJ\  ;  1  Prest.  Est.  139  ;  Co.  Lit.  189,  1  ;  Lit.  §  21'2  ;  2  Flint. 
Real  Prop.  346. 

'  Coleman  r.  Lane,  26  Ga.  515. 

•  Co.  Lit.  193  a»  n.  80  :  2  Flint.  Real  Prop.  349  ;  2  Prest  Al»t  77.  Fortho 
rights  of  joint  owners  of  a  lake  for  sailing,  Hshing,  and  the  like,  sec  Menzies  v. 
Macdonald,  36  E.  L.  &  E^i  20. 


686  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

estate  as  he  pleases,  provided  he  does  not  injure  his  co-tenant 
in  so  doing.^  But  if  he  build  buildings,  or  make  improve- 
ments upon  the  common  property,  he  may  not  charge  them 
to  his  co-tenant,  though,  as  will  appear  hereafter,  sometimes 
partition  of  the  estate  is  so  made  as  to  give  him  such  improve- 
ments.2  On  the  other  hand,  where  one  co-tenant  cut  timber 
upon  the  common  estate,  and  sawed  it  into  fencing  materials 
at  a  mill  upon  the  estate,  and  used  it  for  constructing  fences 
and  making  repairs  upon  the  same,  it  was  held  that  his 
co-tenant  had  no  claim  upon  him  for  the  property  so  taken 
and  used.^ 

3.  What  would  be  necessary  in  a  deed  or  will  to  constitute 
a  tenancy  in  common,  where  several  persons  are  grantees  or 
devisees  of  an  estate,  is  often  a  nice  question  of  law,  but  it 
may  be  generally  stated  that,  in  this  country,  wherever  two 
or  more  persons  acquire  the  same  estate  by  the  same  act,  deed, 
or  devise,  and  no  indication  is  therein  made  to  the  contrary, 
they  will  hold  as  tenants  in  common.'*  Thus,  where  commis- 
sioners confirmed  claims  to  the  same  land  to  two  different 
persons,  they  took  equal  shares  in  common,^  and  the  same 
would  be  the  effect  of  two  simultaneous  conveyances  to  differ- 
ent persons.^  So  where  two  creditors  made  simultaneous  levies 
on  land,  as  they  took  at  the  same  time  with  equal  rights,  they 
were  held  to  be  tenants  in  common  in  equal  sharesJ  So  if 
several  persons  take  by  descent.^  If  one  joint-tenant  convey 
his  share  of  the  estate  to  a  stranger,  the  alienee  and  the  other 
tenant  become  tenants  in  common,  as  has  been  before  stated, 
and  the  same  would  be  the  effect  if  one  who  held  in  severalty 

1  Peabody  v.  Minot,  24  Pick.  329,  333. 

2  Thurston  v.  Dickinson,  2  Rich.  Eq.  317  ;  2^ost,  p.  *427. 

3  Walker  v.  Humbert,  55  Penn.  St.  408. 

*  Miller  v.  Miller,  16  Mass.  59  ;  Gilman  v.  Morrill,  8  Vt.  74  ;  Martin  v.  Smith, 
5  Binn.  16  ;  Partridge  v.  Colegate,  3  Har.  &  McH.  339  ;  Briscoe  v.  McGee,  2 
J.  J,  Marsh.  370  ;  Wiswall  v.  AVilkins,  5  Vt.  87  ;  Evans  v.  Brittain,  3  S.  &  R. 
135  ;  Hoffman  v.  Lyons,  5  Lea,  377. 

6  Challefoux  v.  Ducharme,  8  Wise.  287. 

6  Young  V.  DeBruhl,  11  Rich.  638.  See  Clark  v.  Brown,  3  Allen,  509; 
Aldrich  v.  Martin,  4  R.  L  520,  case  of  two  mortgages. 

7  Shove  V.  Dow,  13  Mass.  529  ;  Cutting  v.  Rockwood,  2  Pick.  443  ;  Durant  v. 
Johnson,  19  Pick.  544  ;  Sigourney  v.  Eaton,  14  Pick.  414. 

»  Johnson  v.  Harris,  5  Hayw.  (Tenn.)  113  ;  4  Kent,  Com.  367. 


CH.  XIII.  §  '^.'\  JDINT    ESTATRS.  C87 

were  to  convoy  ono-lialf  or  any  other  slmro  of  his  oslato  to  an- 
other, without  dcsi^niatinj;  tho  \nivi  l)y  nictos  and  hounds,  tliat 
ia,  he  wouhl  hoconie  tenant  in  coniuion  with  his  alienee.'  So 
if  the  owner  of  a  parcel  of  hmd  convey  so  many  acres  of  it  to 
one,  and  so  many  to  another,  amountinfr  tofrcther  to  the  full 
nunil»er  of  acres  in  the  parcel,  his  grantees  would  take,  as 
tenants  in  common,  the  shares  which  their  respective  numher 
of  acres  hore  to  the  entin;  parcel.'"^  So  where  A  granted  one 
acre  of  woodland,  lyiuir  in  common  with  liis  other  woodland, 
it  w;is  held  to  ])e  such  an  ali(|Uot  part  of  his  woodland  in  com- 
mon a.s  one  acru  would  he  to  the  whole  woodland  owned  hy  the 
grantor.'*^  And,  upon  a  similar  princijde,  where  a  deed  of  a 
given  quantity  of  land,  parcel  of  a  larger  tract,  docs  not  locate 
it  by  its  descri|)tion,  the  purchaser  l)CComes  a  tenant  in  com- 
mon, pro  rata,  in  the  whole  parcel.'' 

4.  As  has  been  heretofore  stated,  the  hushanil  or 

wife  of  a  *  tenant  in  common  of  an  estate  of  inherit-  [*417] 
ance  is  entitled  to  curtesy  or  dower  out  of  the  share 
of  such  co-tenant.^ 

5.  Although  each  tenant  in  common  has  so  general  a  jjower 
of  alienation  of  his  share,  and  may  convey  any  ali(juot  j)ortion 
of  his  share,  yet,  as  a  gcni'ral  proj)osition,  he  may  not  i-onvey 
his  share  in  any  particular  j)art  of  the  estate  so  licld  by  metes 
and  bounds,  if  objected  to  by  his  co-tenant,''  though  it  would 
be  valid  and  elTectual  as  against  himself  and  all  jiersons  claim- 
ing under  him.  And  the  reason  is,  that  such  a  conveyance 
impairs  the  rights  of  Ids  co-tenant  in  respect  to  partition. 
Instead  of  giving  him  his  share  together  in  one  parcel,  by  a 
single  partition,  it  would  require  him  to  have  several,  and  to 
take  his  share  in  as  many  distinct  i)arcels.  And,  by  analogy, 
the  same  rule  apjdics  when  the  share  of  a  tenant  in  common 

»  Lit.  §  299  ;  Adiims  r.  Frothingham,  3  Mass.  .3.12. 

»  Preston  r.  Robinson,  24  Vt.  5!j3.     See  vol.  3,  •C22. 

>  Jewett  V.  Foster,  14  Grny,  4'.»»5 ;  Pliillip.s  v.  Tudor,  10  Orny,  82;  Bntttl  r. 
Sniitli,  14  Gray,  497  ;  Gibbs  v.  Swift,  12  Cush.  393  ;  Small  v.  Jeukin.s,  16  Grny, 
158. 

*  Schenck  r.  Evoy,  24  Cal.  110;  Jackson  r.  Li\'Uig8tOB,  7  WenJ.  130;  Lick 
r.  O'Donnell,  3  Cal.  63  ;  post,  vol.  2,  i..  •622. 

»  2  Flint  Real  Prop.  347. 

»  Marks  v.  Sewall,  120  Ma^w.  174. 


688  LAW  OP  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I, 

is  set  off  to  satisfy  an  execution  against  him.*  ^  The  grant 
of  a  specific  portion  of  a  larger  joint  estate,  or  the  levy  of  an 
execution  on  such  portion,  conveys  no  interest  in  common  to 
the  grantee  or  creditor  in  the  general  estate.^  Thus,  where 
one  tenant  in  common  of  a  larger  lot  conveyed  sixty-four  rods 
thereof,  it  was  held  to  pass  nothing,  it  being  without  bounds, 
and  not  to  be  held  in  common  with  the  lot  generally.^  So  in 
a  deed  of  one  co-tenant's  share  of  the  common  estate,  a  reser- 
vation of  his  share  of  the  mines  in  the  same,  would  be  void.* 
Nor  can  one  of  several  joint  owners  of  land  dedicate  it  to  the 
public.^  Nor  can  he  create  an  easement  upon  or  over  the 
common  estate.  Nor,  if  he  owns  land  adjoining  the  common 
estate,  can  he  so  use  the  latter  in  connection  with  the  former 
as  to  acquire  an  easement  over  the  common  estate  in  favor  of 
his  private  estate,  though  he  might  estop  himself  from  claim- 
ing damages  if  the  use  is  made  l)y  another.^  Where  one  has 
conveyed  a  specific  part  of  an  estate,  of  which  he  is  tenant  in 
common  with  others,  the  conveyance  may  be  made  good  by 
the  other  co-tenants  releasing  to  him  their  interest  in  such 
portion.     Or,  if  partition  be  made,  the  portion  thus  conveyed 

*  Note.  —  In  Ohio  and  Marj'land,  a  tenant  in  common  may  convey  his  share 
in  a  particular  part  of  the  estate,  and  a  levy  may  be  made  in  the  same  manner. 
Treon  v.  Emerick,  6  Ohio,  391  ;  White  v.  Sayre,  2  Ohio,  110  ;  Reinicker  v. 
Smith,  2  Har.  &  J.  421. 


»  Brown  v.  Bailey,  1  Met.  254  ;  Peabody  v.  Minot,  24  Pick.  329  ;  Bartlet  v. 
Harlow,  12  Mass.  348  ;  Baldwin  v.  Whiting,  13  Mass.  57  ;  Rising  v.  Stannard, 
17  Mass.  282  ;  Griswold  v.  Johnson,  5  Conn.  363  ;  Duncan  v.  Sylvester,  24  Me. 
482  ;  Jewett  v.  Stockton,  3  Yerg.  492  ;  Varnum  v.  Abbot,  12  Mass.  474  ; 
Nichols  V.  Smith,  22  Pick.  316  ;  Jeffers  v.  R<adcliff,  10  N.  H.  242  ;  Staniford  v. 
Fullerton,  18  Me.  229  ;  Smith  v.  Knight,  20  N.  H.  9  ;  Challefoux  v.  Ducharme, 
4  Wise.  554  :  Great  Falls  Co.  v.  Worster,  15  N.  H.  412  ;  Whitton  v.  Whitton,  38 
N.  H.  127  ;  McKey  v.  Welch,  22  Tex.  390  ;  Good  v.  Coombs,  28  Tex.  51  ;  Blos- 
som V.  Brightman,  21  Pick.  283,  285  ;  Primm  v.  Walker,  38  Mo.  97  ;  but  see 
Barnhart  v.  Campbell,  50  Mo.  599. 

2  Soutter  V.  Porter,  27  Me.  405  ;  Great  Falls  Co.  v.  Worster,  15  N.  H.  412. 

8  Phillips  V.  Tudor,  10  Gray,  82  ;  post,  vol.  3,  p.  *622. 

*  Adam  v.  Briggs  Iron  Co.,  7  Cush.  361. 

5  Scott  V.  State,  1  Sneed,  629  ;  Holcomb  v.  Coryell,  11  N.  J.  Eq.  548  ;  Dom 
V.  Dunham,  24  Tex.  376.  The  same  rule  under  the  civil  law,  1  Domat,  Pt.  1, 
B.  2,  Tit.  5,  §  2,  art.  6. 

"  Cripi)en  v.  Morss,  49  N.  Y.  67. 


CH.  XIII.  §  o]  JOIST    t:STATra.  C>^9 

falls  to  liiiii  iis  a  pait  of  all  liis  ))ro|i(Mty.'  The  court  of  Mi(;hi- 
gaii  liol<l  that  a  coiivryuiu'i'  \>y  (»iic  co-tciiant  of  a  sjn'cifu'  part 
of  the  laiul  hi'Ul  ill  coiuiuoii  with  tithcrs  would  he  pjod  as  to 
all  jHTsons  except  his  co-tenants,  and  only  voidable  as  to  thcin 
where  it  works  an  injury  to  thcni,  and  cite  cases  from  Vir- 
ginia and  New  Jersey  as  sustaining  the  same  doctrine.'-*  IJut 
they  hold  nn(pialinedly,that,  if  there  are  co-tenants  of  sejmrate 
and  distinct  parcels  of  estate,  it  is  competent  for  one  of  them 
to  convey  his  interest  in  one  of  these  to  the  exclusion  of  the 
others,  or  his  creditor  might  levy  his  execution  upon  the 
debtor's  interest  in  one  or  more  of  these  as  sejiaratc  es- 
tates,^ and  refer  to  Peahody  v.  Minot,*  as  sustaining  tlie 
same  doctrine. 

G.  So  distinct  is  the  interest  of  one  tenant  in  common 
from  that  of  his  co-tenant,  that,  if  they  join  in  making  a 
lease,  it  is  regarded  as  a  demise  by  each  of  his  own 
part.'^ 

7.  But  their  possession  being  common,  and  each  having  a 
right  to  oceujty,  not  only  will  such  jiossession,  though  held  by 
one  alone,  be  presumed  not  to  be  adver.se  to  his  cotenant, 
l)ut  it  is,  ordinarily,  held  to  be  for  the  hitter's  l>enelit,  so  far 
as  j)re.serving  his  title  thereto,  the  possession  of  one  tenant 
in  C(immon  being  deemed  to  be  the  pos.session  of  all.*^  It  was 
held   to  be  a  fraud   in  one   co-tenant  to   sulTer   the  ctnnmon 

»  Johnson  r.  Stevens,  7  Cush.  431  ;  Cox  r.  MoMullin,  14  Gratt.  84  ;  Camoron 
t».  Thurmond,  56  Tex.  27  ;  Bof;i,'ess  r.  il<-ivdith,  16  W.  Va.  1  ;  IJanihart  r. 
Cain|il)«'ll,  50  Mo.  599.  In  otlier  States  tlie  courts  only  n-cognize  such  grauti-c  as 
a  utrt'sr,jiry  jwirty  to  a  jKirtition.  Harlan  v.  Langhani,  GO  IVnu.  .St.  23S  ;  Whit- 
ton  V.  Whitton,  38  N.  M.  133. 

2  Canipau  r.  Cclfrcy,  18  Midi.  30  ;  Hobinett  v.  rix-ston,  2  Robin.  273  ;  Mc 
Kee  r.  Barley.  11  tiratt.  340;  Holconib  r.  Coryell,  11  N.  J.  E<i.  548;  and  s«'e 
pn-ceiling  note.  In  California  the  same  rule  hius  In^cu  fully  adopted.  Gates  r. 
Sjilmon,  35  Cnl.  .188  ;  Sutter  v.  .San  Fnincisco,  30  Cal.  115. 

>  Butler  r.  Hoys,  25  ilich.  53,  58. 

«  24  Pick.  329. 

»  2  I'rest.  Abst.  77  ;  post,  pL  18.     Cf.  McKinley  v.  Peters,  111  Penn.  SL  2S3. 

«  «'o.  Lit.  199  h  ;  Colburn  r.  Mason,  25  Me.  434  ;  German  f.  M.ichin,  6  Paige. 
288  ;  Lloyd  r.  Gordon,  2  Har.  &  McH.  254  ;  Brown  r.  Wowl,  17  Mass.  68  ;  Bar- 
nanl  r.  Poi)e,  14  Moss.  434  ;  Catlin  v.  Kidder,  7  Vt.  12  :  MClung  r.  Hoss,  5 
Wheat  116;  Allen  r.  Hall.  1  McCorxl.  131  ;  ThomoB  c.  Hatch,  3  Suiun.  170  ; 
Clymer  v.  Dawkins,  3  How.  674  ;  Poage  r.  Chinn,  4  Dana,  50  ;  Slor)'  •• 
Saunders,  8  Humph.  063  ;  Thornton  f.  Vork  B'k,  45  Me.  143. 
vou  I.— 44 


690  LAW   OP   EEAL   PROPERTY.  [bOOK   I. 

property  to  be  sold  for  taxes,  and  to  purchase  it  in  himself ;  ^ 
and  if  he  do  so,  tlie  tax  title  enures  to  the  common 
[*418]  benefit.^  Nor  can  one  *  co-tenant  sue  another  to  try 
the  title  to  the  lands  in  question,  unless  he  shall  have 
been  disseised  and  kept  out  of  possession  by  the  defendant ;  ^ 
and  inasmuch  as  one  has  an  equal  right  with  tlie  other  to  hold 
the  papers  or  documents  relating  to  the  common  estate,  the 
one  out  of  possession  of  these  cannot  maintain  any  action 
against  the  other  for  the  recovery  of  them.* 

8.  But  a  tenant  in  common  may  be  disseised  by  his  co- 
tenant's  actually  ousting  or  holding  him  out  of  possession 
under  a  claim  of  an  exclusive  right  of  possession,  and  a  denial 
of  the  riglit  of  the  tenant,  but  tliis  must  be  known  expressly 
or  by  implication  to  the  tenant.^  One  tenant  in  common  may 
maintain  a  process  for  forcible  entry  and  detainer  against  an- 
other co-tenant  who  has  evicted  him  from  the  premises.^  But 
it  is  difficult  to  determine  by  any  fixed  rule  what  constitutes 
a  disseisin,  especially  between  tenants  in  common.  The  pos- 
session of  one  is  the  possession  of  all,  unless  by  an  actual 
ouster  or  an  exclusive  pernancy  of  profits,  against  the  will  of 
the  others,  one  shall  manifest  an  election  to  hold  the  land  by 
wrong,  rather  than  by  a  common  title.''     And  this  would  be 

1  Brown  v.  Hogle,  30  111.  119  ;  Bender  v.  Stewart,  75  Ind.  88.  So  where  the 
possessoiy  title  was  in  several,  and  one  of  them  bought  in  the  legal  fee.  Bosko- 
witz  V.  Davis,  12  Nev.  446. 

2  Flinn  v.  McKinley,  44  Iowa,  68  ;  Austin  v.  Barrett,  lb.  488  ;  Allen  v.  Poole, 
54  Miss.  323  ;  unless  special  circumstances  exist  to  rebut  the  co-tenant's  claim, 
King  V.  Rowan,  10  Heisk.  675. 

3  Martin  v.  Quattlebam,  3  McCord,  205. 
*  Clowes  V.  Hawley,  12  Johns.  484. 

5  Bracket  v.  Norcross,  1  Me.  89  ;  Doe  v.  Bird,  11  East,  49  ;  Dexter  v.  Ar- 
nold, 3  Sumn.  152  ;  Harpending  v.  Dutch  Ch..l6  Pet.  455  ;  Willison  v.  Watkins, 
3  Pet.  52  ;  Gray  v.  Givens,  Ptiley,  Ch.  (S.  C.)  41  ;  Jackson  v.  Tibbits,  9  Cow. 
241  ;  M'Clung  v.  Ross,  5  Wheat.  116  ;  Norris  v.  Sullivan,  47  Conn.  474  ;  Culver 
V.  Rhodes,  87  N.  Y.  348. 

6  Presbrey  v.  Presbrey,  13  Allen,  284,     Cf.  Byam  v.  Bickford,  140  Mass.  31. 

7  Munroe  v.  Luke,  1  Met.  459  ;  Barnard  v.  Pope,  sm;j.  ;  Small  v.  Clifford,  38 
Me.  213  ;  Corbin  v.  Cannon,  31  Miss.  570  ;  Roberts  v.  Morgan,  30  Vt.  319  ;  For- 
ward V.  Deetz,  32  Penn.  St.  69  ;  Hoffstetter  v.  Blattner,  8  Mo.  276  ;  Meredith 
V.  Andres,  7  Ir«d.  5  ;  Peck  v.  Ward,  18  Penn.  St.  506  ;  Abercrombie  v.  Baldwin, 
15  Ala.  363  ;  Johnson  v.  Swaine,  Busbee  (N.  C),  335  ;  Brock  v.  Eastman,  28  Vt 
658 ;  Owen  v.  Morton.  24  Cal.  377,  379  ;  M'Clung  v.  Ross,  5  Wheat.  124. 


en.  Xlll.  §  8.]  JOINT    ESTATES.  <"01 

true,  so  far  us  Ihe  oxdiisivo  occu|iiition  oxtontlcd,  nltln»n;.'h  it 
bo  only  11  |i;iit  of  tlii'  entire  coininoii  estate.'  liiit  mere  srpa- 
ratc  occupauey,  however  long  continued,  would  not  ulTeet  tliu 
rights  of  the  otlier  co-tenants,  unless  intended  t<j  be  in  exclu- 
sion of  these,  with  a  view  of  therel)y  gaining  an  adverse  right. 
Thus,  where  after  the  death  of  the  father,  the  several  «'liildren 
loft  the  homestead  one  after  another,  except  one,  who  contin- 
ued to  occui)y  and  manage  it  from  1778  to  182'J,  it  was  held 
that  such  occupancy  had  nothing  advei-sc  in  it,  and  gained  no 
exclusive  title  for  the  occupant.'-  Among  the  acts  which  have 
bi-eu  hold  to  be  evidence  of  a  disseisin  of  one  co-tenant  by  an- 
other, is  the  C(Miveyance  of  the  entire  estate  by  doe<l  to  a  third 
party,  who  enters  and  occupies  the  same  under  such  deed.' 
So  where  one  of  two  co-tenants  devised  the  entire  estate  l>y  a 
will  to  which  the  other  was  an  attesting  witness,  and  the 
devisee  t<jok  jxissession,  it  was  held  to  be  a  disseisin  of  the 
co-tenant.*  And  an  open  and  exclusive  po.ssossiun  may  be  .so 
long  continued  as  to  be  evidence  of  an  oiiginal  ouster.  This 
was  held  in  one  Ciuse,  where  such  occupation  hud  been  f«>r 
thirty-six  years  without  accounting  for  rents  or  profits.  In 
another  ca.se,  the  holding  had  been  for  forty  years,  while  in 
another  twenty-one  years  were  held  suflicient.*  So  the  (low- 
ing of  the  common  land  by  one  of  the  tenants  in  common  may 
be  equivalent  to  an  ouster  of  his  co-ttnants.*^  An<l  where  the 
possession  is  sole,  and  under  a  claim  adverse  to  the  co-tenant, 
the  Statute  of  Limitations  begins  to  run  as  to  all  the  land  held 
in  common  by  them.^ 

1  Caqjentit-r  r.  Webster,  27  ("a.\.  L2i,  560  ;  Bennett  r.  Clemencc,  6  Allen,  10. 

«  CiunpJxll  r.  Ciiinplx-ll,  13  X.  H.  4S3. 

■  B();(:»ril"s*  ^-  Trinity  Ch.,  4  Pai^'e,  178  ;  Bigt-low  r.  Jones,  10  Pick.  HI  ; 
Weisiii;,'ir  v.  .Miirjiliy,  2  H.-ml,  t374  ;  Thomas  v.  PicktrinK,  13  Me.  337  ;  Burton 
V.  Murphy.  2  Tuyl.  255*;  Uill  v.  Fauntlcroy,  8  B.  Mon.  177;  HiRU'e  c.  like, 
5  Mjiss.  344,  352  ;  Ilinkley  c.  Greene,  52  111.  230  ;  Culler  r.  MoUer,  13  S.  k  K. 
356.  *  Miller  r.  Miller,  60  Peun.  St.  16,  22. 

'  Doe  r.  Prosser,  Cowp.  217  ;  Jnckson  v.  Wbitlieck,  6  Cow.  632  ;  Fntlerick 
V.  Orny,  10  .S.  &  H.  182  ;  MehnfTy  c.  Dobbs,  9  Wntta,  363. 

•  Jones  p.  Weathersboe,  4  Strobh.  50  ;  Great  FiUla  Co.  v.  Worstor,  15  N.  H. 
412.. 

T  Hubbord  v.  Wood,  1  Snecd,  279.  Sec  Mehnffey  v.  Dobba,  9  Wntts.  363  ; 
Laminn  r.  Hnoy,  13  B.  Mon.  436;  Black  r.  LimLsay,  Bu.sl)oo  (N.«'.>,  4G7,  whero 
the  hulJing  had  been  but  twenty  years.     Noble  v.  McFarlaiid,  51  IIL  230. 


692  LAW   OF   EEAL   PROPERTY.  [bOOK   I. 

9.  And  where,  by  agreement  of  two  tenants  in  common, 
one  occupied  a  particular  part  of  the  common  estate  in  sev- 
eralty, as  of  a  house,  for  instance,  and  tlie  other  entered  upon 
it  without  his  consent,  it  was  held  that  he  might  have  tres- 
pass  quare  clausum  fregit  against  his  co-tenant  for  making 
such  entry .1  If  two  co-tenants  divide  their  estate,  and  each 
enters  upon  his  allotted  share  and  occupies  it  separately,  and 
to  the  exclusion  of  tlie  other,  for  the  period  of  statute  limita- 
tion, it  will  operate  as  a  bar  to  the  claim  of  either  upon  the 
other  for  the  part  so  occupied  by  the  latter,^  And  it  has 
been  held,  that,  if  one  co-tenant  enters  and  actually 
[*419]  *  ousts  the  other  tenant  in  common  from  the  prem- 
ises, tlie  latter  may  have  trespass  quare  clausum  fregit, 
for  such  ouster.^  Where  a  railroad  company  were  tenants  in 
common  of  land  with  other  owners,  their  co-tenants  being  a 
tenant  for  life  and  a  reversioner  in  fee,  and  they  purchased 
the  life  interest  of  the  co-tenant  and  then  laid  their  railroad 
across  it,  it  was  held  that  they  had  not,  by  so  doing,  so  ousted 
the  reversioner  that,  upon  the  death  of  the  tenant  for  life,  he 
could  maintain  ejectment  against  the  railroad  company.  His 
only  remedy  was  under  the  statute.*  So  if  one  co-tenant  erect 
a  building  on  the  common  land  for  his  own  special  use,  it  is 
an  act  of  ouster  for  which  a  co-tenant  may  have  trespass, 
or  may  remove  the  building  from  the  premises.^  The  rule, 
however,  may  be  regarded  as  well-nigh  imperative  and  univer- 
sal, that  one  tenant  in  common  may  not  have  trespass  quare 
clausum  against  another.  It  can  never  be  done  unless  the 
party  charged  has  done  something  inconsistent  with  the  rights 
of  the  other  co-tenant  in  the  premises.^  So  long  as  both  re- 
tain possession,  neither  can  have  this  action  against  the  other 
for  any  act  done  upon  the  premises,  unless  it  amount  to  an 
unequivocal   eviction   from,''  or  destruction   of,  the  property 

1  Keay  v.  Goodwin,  16  Mass.  1  ;  contra,  ]\IcPlierson  v.  Seguine,  3  Dcv.  153. 
'•^  Ptider  v.  Maul,  46  Penn.  St.  380. 

3  Envin  v.  Olmsted,  7  Cow.  229  ;  M'Gill  v.  Ash,  7  Penn.  St.  397  ;  Booth  v. 
Adams,  11  Vt.  156  ;  King  v.  Phillips,  1  Lans.  421. 

4  Austin  V.  Ptutland,  &c.  R.  R.,  45  Vt.  215. 

*  Bennett  v.  Clemencc,  6  Allen,  18  ;  Stedinan  v.  Smith,  8  Ellis  &  B.  1. 
^  Jones  V.  Chiles,  8  Dana,  163  ;  McPherson  v.  Seguine,  3  Dev.  153  ;  Lawton 
V.  Adams,  29  Ga.  273.  ^  Filbert  v.  Hoff,  42  Penn.  St.  97. 


ril.  XIII.   §   ;^..'J  JDINT    KSTATKS.  (JiKi 

itself,  or  some  j)art  of  it.'  TrcspuHH,  however,  lies  to  recover 
mesne  profits,  where  one  tenant  has  jtrevailed  n^'ainst  another 
in  a  real  action  to  recov<'r  his  share  of  u  common  estate.'- 
Mesne  j»iolits  are  mily  recoverahle  in  Kn;rlantl  in  trespass 
qunre  rlauxtim  after  a  jinlirment  in  ejectnjenf.  In  this  conn- 
try,  in  several  of  tlie  Slates,  they  fornj  a  jiart  of  the  jndirnnnt 
recovereil  in  actiuns  fiti-  the  recovery  of  the  land  ;  and  in 
Vermont  and  Mas.sa<'linsetts  damaircs  may  also  l)e  nM'overcd 
beyond  these  for  acts  done  l»y  the  tenant  while  wron^'"fnlly  in 
possession.^  IJnt  mesne  {n-ofits  may  not  be  reeovere<l  beyond 
six  years  or  th<^  limitation  of  an  action  of  trespass.*  Trespass 
or  ejectment,  at  his  election,  lies  in  favor  of  one  co-tenant 
atrainst  another  who  has  actnally  exixdled  or  onsted  him  from 
the  premises.  Bnt  not  for  merely  taking  the  crops  raised  upon 
the  common  land.^  Xor  for  cnttinir  trees  u|ton  the  common 
estate.  Xor,  generally,  for  an  entry  ni)on  and  enjoyment  "f 
the  common  property.*^ 

10.  Where  a  tenant,  holding  by  a  deed  to  him  as  a  tenant 
in  common,  onsteil  his  co-tenant,  who  liri>nght  ejectment  |ur 
such  ouster,  it  was  held  that  the  tenant  could  not  set  m]i  in 
defence  an  adverse  title  in  a  stranger.' 

11.  If  one  co-tenant  misuse  or  destroy  the  common  pro|>- 
crty,  his  co-tenant  may  have  an  action  against  him  for  such 
misfeasance.  IJnt  to  render  him  liaide  as  a  tort  feasor,  he 
must  do  something  more  than  exercise  mere  acts  of  ownershi]» 

»  R'nnct  r.  Bullock,  S.")  Pcnn.  St.  3C4  ;  Jcwctt  v.  Wliitncy,  43  Me.  242  ;  Mnd- 
dox  V.  fJodilanl,  15  Me.  218,  the  two  last  arc  cast-s  of  tlestroyiiif;  mills.  Silloway 
V.  lirown,  12  All.-ii,  37  ;  Co.  Lit.  200  ;  Su-.lmaii  v.  Smith,  8  Ellis  &  B.  1  ;  Krwin 
r.  Olmsti-.l.  7  Cow.  229. 

2  B.iiiii't  V.  Bulhxk,  35  P.-nii.  St.  367  ;  Ooo<ltitl<' r.  ToiiiK  3  Wils.  118.  Stt; 
Mai-NJi  V.  HuiiiihoikI,  l(t3  ila.ss.  150,  for  tho  rule  of  ndiiicnsiinng  the  ilainnj^-s 
recoveniblo  as  iiiesno  iirofits.  Sears  v.  Sellcw,  28  lown,  506,  507  ;  I^iiie  r.  HarroKl, 
72  IViin.  St.  267. 

■  Li|ii«tt  r.  Ki'lley,  46  Vt.  524,  525  ;  Mass.  Tub.  Stat.  c.  173,  §  12. 

«  Hill  r.  .Meyers,  46  IVnii.  St.  15. 

9  Murray  v.  Hall,  7  C.  B.  441,  454  ;  Sillowny  r.  Urowni,  12  Allen,  37.  And 
in  aw  action  of  ejeotmeiit  the  jihiintifT  may  recover  ilamagra  ami  n>esne  profits, 
while  the  defendant  may  recover  fi>r  his  l)ettcnuent8  in  such  action.  Backtu  v. 
Chapman,  111  Mass.  383. 

<  Ha.stiniis  r.  Hastings,  110  Mn.S3.  285. 

'  Braiutrec  t.  Battles,  6  Vt.  395. 


694  LAW   OF  REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   L 

over  it,  or  claim  it  as  his  own.^  Thus,  where  one  co-tenant  of 
a  mill,  while  in  the  sole  occupation  of  it,  suffered  it  to  be  de- 
stroyed by  his  negligence,  it  was  held  that  he  was  liable  to  the 
other  co-tenants  for  such  destruction.^  Such  is  the  case  where 
one  co-tenant  of  a  mill  erected  a  dam  below  the  same  on  his 
own  private  land,  and  flowed  back  upon  the  common  mill  to 
its  injury,^  or  authorized  another  to  do  this,  or  to  divert  the 
waters  of  the  stream  from  the  common  mill.*  And  where  one 
co-tenant  of  a  well  attempted  to  go  down  into  it  to  examine  if 
it  was  clean,  and  the  other  prevented  him,  the  latter  had  a 
right  of  action  for  such  obstruction.^ 

12.  One  tenant  in  common  may  have  an  action  of  waste 
against  his  co-tenant,  under  the  statute  of  Westminster  II. 
c.  22,  for  waste  done  on  the  premises,  and  by  statute,  or  at 
the  common  law,  in  the  several  States.^  And  so  held  in  New 
York,  if,  by  the  act  complained  of,  the  inheritance  is  perma- 
nently injured.'  And  if  one  co-tenant,  while  in  possession  of 
the  whole  estate  by  consent  of  the  others,  threaten  to  commit 
wilful  waste,  which  would  work  an  irremediable  mischief, 
chancery  will  interfere  to  enjoin  him.® 

13.  If  one  tenant  cut  timber  growing  upon  the  common  land, 
and  sell  the  same  and  convert  it  into  money,  the  co-tenants 
may  recover  of  him  their  respective  shares  of  the  proceeds  of 
such  sale.^ 

14.  So  in  some  cases,  one  tenant  in  common  may  re- 
cover from  his  co-tenant  a  share  of  the  rents  and  profits  of 

1  Martin  v.  Knowlys,  8  T.  R.  146  ;  Wilbraham  v.  Snow,  2  Saund.  47,  n.  f,  g ; 
Farr  v.  Smith,  9  Wend.  338  ;  Co.  Lit.  200  ;  Hyde  v.  Stone,  9  Cow.  230  ;  Figlit- 
master  v.  Beasly,  7  J.  J.  Marsh.  410  ;  Gilbert  v.  Dickerson,  7  Wend.  449  ;  Tubbs 
V.  Richardson,  6  Vt.  442  ;  Harman  v.  Gartman,  Harper,  430. 

2  Chesley  v.  Thompson,  3  N.  H.  9. 

3  Odiorne  v.  Lyford,  9  N.  H.  502 ;  Hutchinson  v.  Chase,  39  Me.  508 ;  Pills- 
bury  V.  Moore,  44  Me.  154. 

*  Hines  v.  Robinson,  57  Me.  328.  ^  Newton  v.  Newton,  17  Pick.  201. 

6  Co.  Lit.  200  b;  4  Kent,  Com.  369,  n.;  Matts  v.  Hawkins,  5  Taunt.  20.  In 
Missouri,  Virginia,  Maine,  Massachusetts,  Rhode  Island,  New  Jersey,  Michigan, 
Wisconsin,  and  California,  the  law  is  the  same  as  to  waste  by  a  tenant  in  com- 
mon as  by  a  joint-tenant,  for  which  see  the  note  at  the  end  of  this  chapter. 
Anders  v.  Meredith,  4  Dev.  &  B.  199  ;  Shiels  v.  Stark,  14  Ga.  429. 

^  Elwell  V.  Burnside,  44  Barb.  454.  See  McCord  v.  Oakland  Q.  M.  Co.,  64 
Cal.  134. 

8  Twort  V.  Twort,  16  Yes.  128,  132.  »  Miller  v.  Miller,  7  Pick.  133. 


en.  XIII.  §  n.]  JOINT    KSTATES.  G*Ji> 

the  C()iniu(»n  *  ostato.  IJiit  in  order  to  ohnrpo  a  ro-  [••120] 
teiiiMit  for  such  rents,  lie  must  either  liave  heeii  made 
the  l)aililT  of  the  other  tenant,  ami  then  ho  wouM  In;  liahlo  at 
common  law,  or  he  must  have  received  more  than  liis  Hhare  of 
the  rents  and  profits  of  the  estate,  in  which  case  he  is  liahle 
under  the  statute  4  Anne.  e.  liI.'  And  this  scM-ms  to  he  the 
law  generally  in  the  United  Stat<'s/''  The  same  rule  would 
apply  thouL'h  tlu;  tenant  who  occupies  the  whole  premises 
were  himself  the  lessee  of  one  of  the  tenants  in  common,  if 
he  had  not  attorned  to  the  other  co-tenants.'^  If  one  tenant 
in  Common  sell  hay,  or  {.'■rass  trrowinir  upon  tlu;  common  estate, 
lie  may  recover  therefor,  althouL'h  his  co-tenant  forbids  the 
purchaser  to  j)ay  him.  It  is  a  mode  of  occupvintr  the  estate 
which  he  may  exercise  if  he  do  not  prevent  his  co-tenant  from 
occupying  with  him.* 

15.  One  co-tenant  may  he  liable  to  another  for  rent,  or  for 
use  and  occuitation  under  an  express  demise,''  but  there  must 
be  something  more  than  an  occujiancy  of  the  estate  by  one 
and  a  forbearance  to  occujiy  by  the  other.  The  tenant  who 
merely  occui)ies  the  estate  does  no  nujre  than  he  has  a  right 
to  do  on  his  own  account.'' 

1  Co.  Lit.  199 II,  and  Butli-r's  note,  8.3  ;  Peck  r.  t  nqMiitrr,  7  <imy,  283  ;  Pico 
r.  CoIuniWt,  12  Cul.  414  ;  the  stat.  of  Aiine  is  not  in  force  there.  Israel  v. 
Israel,  30  M.l.  126.     Gregory  v.  Connolly,  7  U.  C.  Q.  B.  500. 

"  Jones  V.  Harmden,  9  Mass.  ri4()  ;  Bri;,'hiini  v.  Eveleth,  9  Mass.  .138  ;  .«?arRent 
c.  Parsons,  12  Muss.  149  ;  Shiels  r.  .Stark,  14  Oa.  429  ;  Hulf  r.  MT)onnM.  22  fJa, 
131  ;  .Shejmnl  v.  Hiohards,  2  (!niy,  424  ;  Oowen  r.  Sliaw,  40  Me.  .'.tJ  ;  l)i.kin»on 
V.  Williams,  11  Ciish.  25S  ;  Munroo  r.  Luko,  1  Met.  459,  4«J3  ;  I/iird  r.  Boilinc, 
11  N.  J.  E.j.  403  ;  Webster  v.  Calef,  47  N.  H.  289. 

»  Biiiijjer  r.  Holmes,  6  Gray,  118.  *  Bro«Ti  v.  Wellington,  lOG  Mass.  318. 

»  CowjKjr  r.  Fletcher,  6  B.  k  S.  4(54  ;  Leigh  r.  Dickeson,  12  Q.  B.  I).  194 ; 
even  after  the  lease  expires,  lb.;   Bayley  v.  Bradley,  5  C.  B.  696. 

«  Sargent  v.  Parsons,  12  Mass.  149  ;  Calhoun  r.  Curtis.  4  Met.  413  ;  Norris  r. 
Gould,  15  W.  No.  Cas.  187  ;  Keisel  v.  FJirne.st,  21  Penu.  .St.  90  ;  Klino  v.  Jacob.s 
68  Penn.  St.  57  ;  Israel  v.  Ismel,  30  Md.  120  ;  Kverts  v.  Beach,  31  Mich.  136  ; 
Scott  I'.  Guernsey,  60  Barb.  163  ;  Balfour  v.  B.ilfour,  33  Ln.  Ann.  297  ;  Crow  r. 
Mark,  52  111.  332  ;  Lyles  v.  Lylis,  1  Hill,  Ch.  (S.  C.)  85  ;  Volentinc  r.  Johnson, 
Id.  49.  In  South  Carolina,  in  ci|uity,  if  one  tenant  occupies  and  cultivati-a  and 
derives  i)rofit  from  more  than  his  share  of  the  estate,  he  must  account  for  net  ex- 
cess of  profits.  Holt  r.  UoWrtson,  McMullan,  Cli.  475;  HnnciK-k  r.  Day,  Id.  298; 
Thonii)son  v.  Bostick,  Id.  75;  Kdsall  r.  Merrill,  37  X.  J.  E-|.  114.  These  cases 
are  ilisapproved  in  Pico  v.  Columlxt,  12  Cal.  414;  but  a  similar  rule  U  adopted  in 
Mississippi  in  cases  of  i>artition.     Medford  v.  Frazier,  58  Miss.  241. 


696  LAW   OF  REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   L 

15  a.  The  court  of  Vermont  consider  this  subject  quite  at 
length,  and  point  out  the  rules  of  the  common  law,  and  in  what 
respect  that  of  Vermont  differs.  By  the  common  law,  if  one 
co-tenant  occupied  the  entire  estate  and  took  the  profits,  he 
would  not  be  liable  to  account  therefor  to  his  co-tenant.  By 
the  statute  of  4  Anne,  c.  16,  account  lies  by  one  co-tenant 
against  another  "  receiving  more  than  comes  to  his  just  share 
and  proportion."  It  was  held  in  the  case  cited  below  ^  that 
the  statute  relates  only  to  cases  where  one  co-tenant  receives 
money  or  something  else,  where  another  person  gives  or  pays 
it,  which  the  co-tenants  are  entitled  to  simply  by  reason  of 
their  being  tenants  in  common,  and  of  which  one  receives  and 
keeps  more  than  his  just  share,  according  to  the  proportion 
of  his  interest  as  such  tenant.  This  includes  cases  of  leasing 
land  at  a  rent,  but  it  does  not  include  occupation  merely 
without  ousting  the  co-tenant,  where  no  agreement  to  pay 
has  been  made.  If  one  merely  takes  the  grass  growing  and 
sells  it  or  uses  it,  he  is  not  liable  to  the  other  tenant  under 
the  statute.  "  He  is  to  account  when  he  receives,  not  takes, 
more  than  comes  to  his  just  share,"  citing  the  case  below,^ 
and  this  seems  to  be  the  rule  in  some  of  the  United  States.^ 
But  in  Vermont,  where  one  of  several  co-tenants  of  land  con- 
verted it  into  a  race-course,  out  of  which  he  made  a  profit, 
and  to  prepare  it  cut  down  and  used  trees  growing  upon  it, 
it  was  held  he  was  liable  to  account  both  for  the  timber  and 
the  profits  of  the  race-course.* 

16.  In  Massachusetts,  however,  it  was  held  that  where  one 
co-tenant  was  suffered  to  occupy  the  common  property  and  to 
plant  and  raise  a  crop  thereon  without  objection  by  the  other 
tenant,  the  crop  when  severed  became  his  individual  property, 
and  that  if  the  other  took  it  when  gathered,  and  carried  it 
away,  or  any  part  of  it,  he  was  thereby  a  trespasser.^  But  had 
the  estate  been  divided  between  them  before  the  crops  were 

1  Henderson  v.  Eason,  17  Q.  B.  701.        '  McMahon  v.  Burcliell,  2  Phillips,  134. 

8  Jones  V.  Massey,  14  S.  C.  292;  Jollyr.  Bryan,  86  N.  C.  457;  Holmes  v.  Best, 
58  Vt.  547. 

*  Hayden  v.  Merrill,  44  Vt.  336.  So  in  Tennessee,  Tyner  v.  Fenner,  4  Lea, 
4C9  ;  and  in  Maine  hy  .statute,  Richardson  v.  Richardson,  72  Me.  403. 

6  Calhoun  v.  Curtis,  4  Met.  413. 


ClI.  XUI.  §  O.J  JOINT   i-rviix.  CfiT 

jjatliiTcd,  tlu'so  would  pass  to  Ihr  oiu-  to  wlioso  sliarr  the  land 
on  which  thuy  woro  ^rowiiij;  was  assi^riicd,  nor  wouM  the  doc- 
trine of  cmldoments  apply  in  such  case  in  favor  of  the  one 
who  planted  them,  since  a  liahility  to  have  partition  made  is 
ono  of  the  incidents  of  such  estates.'  Wiiere  a  claim  does  arise 
in  favor  of  one  tenant  in  common  against  another  for  occupyinf^ 
the  common  land,  it  is  a  |)erKonal  one,  and  does  not  pass  with 
the  estate  if  such  claimant  jrrants  his  estate  to  another.''* 

*17.  The  law,  indeitendent  of  statute,  as  to  the  [*421] 
making  of  improvenn'uts  or  repairs  u]ion  eonimon 
property,  if  either  co-tenant  is  unwillinir  to  join  in  the  same, 
seems  to  lie  this:  One  tenant  in  common  cannot  ;ro  on  and 
make  improvements,  ereet  hiiildinurs,  and  the  like,  on  the  com- 
mon projierty,  and  make  his  co-tenant  lial)le  for  any  jiart  of 
the  same,  nor  has  he  a  ri'j-lit  to  hold  and  use  these  to  the  ex- 
clusion of  his  co-tenants.'*  If  the  property  is  not  susceptible 
of  convenient  partition,  like  a  mill  or  a  house,  and  requires 
repairs  in  order  to  its  preservation,  either  tenant  might  have 
a  writ  at  common  law,  de  reparatione  faciendn^  to  comjiei  his 
co-tenant  to  join  in  makincr  such  rcjiairs.*  IJut  now  it  seems 
that  such  tenant  may  have  a  remedy  hy  an  action  on  the  case 
ajrainst  his  co-tenant  for  retusimr,  il  he  shall  have  himself 
incurred  the  expense,  after  having  first  notified  his  co-tenant 
of  studi  repairs  being  necessary,  and  rerpiested  him  to  join  in 
making  them.'"'  The  writ  de  repnratinyi,'  facieyida^  is  super- 
seded, as  to  mills,  by  statute  jirovisions  upim  the  subject  in 
Massachusetts.** 

17  a.  Hy  the  later  decisions,  however,  the  law  upon  these 
subjects  seems  to  have  been  somewhat  modified  from  what  is 
above  laid  down  in  respect  to  the  right   which  one  tenant  in 

*  Ibid.  3  Hnnnan  r.  Osborn,  4  Pnigc,  336. 

»  Crest  V.  Jack,  3  Watts,  239  ;  Taylor  v.  Bnltlwin,  10  Barb.  582  ;  Stcv.-na  v. 
Thoiin)son,  17  N.  H.  lOD  ;  Calvert  v.  AKhich,  99  MaiW.  74,  78  ;  Converse  r.  Ferre, 
11  .Mass.  325. 

*  Co.  I>it.  200  b  ;  Fitzli.  N.  B.  295  ;  Doane  r.  Ba.lg.'r,  12  .Mass.  65  ;  Coffin  r. 
Heath,  6  Met.  79. 

•»  Duane  r.  Badger,  12  Mass.  65,  a  case  of  a  well  and  pump.  Mutnfonl  r. 
Blown,  6  Cow.  475  ;  Stevens  r.  Thompson,  sup. 

*  Pub.  Stat  c.  190,  §  59;  Carver  r.  MilUr,  4  iIas.M.  559.  As  to  buyin-  tlio 
laud  at  rorcclosure,  see  Calkins  v.  Steiubacb,  66  CaL  117. 


698  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [bOOK   L 

common  has  to  make  improvements  and  repairs  upon  the 
common  estate,  and  charire  a  part  of  it  to  his  co-tenant.  The 
court  in  Calvert  v.  Aldrich  ^  review  the  cases,  especially  Doane 
V.  Badger,  and,  regarding  the  writ  de  reparatione  facienda  as 
obsolete,  thcv  conclude  that,  "  between  tenants  in  common, 
partition  is  the  natural  and  usually  the  adequate  remedy  in 
every  case  of  controversy,"  and  that,  independent  of  any  ex- 
press agreement,  neither  in  England  nor  this  country  "  an 
action  at  law  of  any  kind  has  been  sustained  either  for  contri- 
bution or  damages,  after  one  has  made  needful  repairs  in  which 
the  other  refused  to  join,"  and  approve  of  the  law  as  laid  down 
in  Converse  v.  Ferre,  siip.  The  same  rule  prevails  in  England 
unless  the  repairs  are  needed  to  prevent  ruinous  decay .^  In 
New  York  it  has  been  held,  that,  if  a  tenant  in  common  of  a 
reversion  erect  buildings  on  the  premises,  he  has  no  claim 
in  any  form  on  account  of  the  same  against  his  co-tenant.^ 
In  Maryland  the  court  disallowed  expenses  incurred  by  one 
co-tenant  for  improvements  made,  which  "  were  not  incurred 
for  the  preservation  of  the  property."  ^  In  Pennsylvania,  where 
equitable  remedies  are  sought  through  the  forms  of  the  common 
law,  one  tenant  may  recover  of  his  co-tenant  for  expenditures 
which  were  necessary  to  the  enjoyment  of  the  property ;  he 
cannot  for  improvements  made  by  him  upon  the  same.^  And 
there  seems  to  be  a  remedy  in  equity  for  one  co-tenant  against 
another  to  compel  a  contribution  towards  the  repairs  of  the 
common  property  when  the  same  are  necessary.^ 

18.  From  the  nature  of  tenancies  in  common,  a  different 
rule  applies  as  to  the  joinder  of  the  tenants  in  actions  for  the 
recovery  of  the  freehold,  and  for  injuries  affecting  their  pos- 
session. As  each  has  a  separate  and  distinct  freehold,  if  they 
have  been  disseised  and  seek  to  recover  the  estate,  they  must 
bring  separate  actions,  and  may  not  join."     So  in  covenant 

1  99  Mass.  78.  This,  however,  is  directly  opposed  to  the  dicta  of  Wilde,  J., 
in  Coffin  v.  Heath. 

■  6  Met.  79.  8  Scott  v.  Guernsey,  48  N.  Y.  106,  124. 

*  Israel  v.  Israel,  30  Md.  128. 

6  Dech's  Appeal,  57  Penn.  St.  472  ;  Beaty  v.  Bordwell,  91  Peiin.  St.  438. 

6  Coffin  V.  Heath,  6  Met.  80  ;  Story,  1  Eq.  §  1236;  Checseborough  v.  Green,  10 
Conn.  318  ;  post,  vol.  2,  »79,  pi.  49. 

7  Lit.  §  311  ;  Co.  Lit.  200  a ;  Rehoboth  v.  Hunt,  1  Pick.  224  ;  Brisco  v.  Mc- 


CII.  XIII.  §  r,.]  JOINT   ESTATES.  699 

broken  updii  covenants  of  waiTunty  minie  <o  leii.int>  in  eoni- 
nion,  lliev  nnisf  sne  separately,  ami  not  jointly.'  Iiiit  tenants 
in  foiuiunii  (if  a  nii>if;raL''e  may  sue  ii|ion  it  jointly  or  Kovcrnlly, 
if  it  seenre  separate  and  indiv  iilual  deltts.^  And  if  one  tenant 
in  conmion  reeoxcr  judL'^nient  for  ptissession,  in  an  a<"ti<»n  for 
tlie  whole  land,  he  can  only  reeover  dan»a*rcs  pro  rata  accord- 
ing' to  his  actnal  interest  in  the  estate.^  Ihit  ns  they  have  ono 
posses.sion,  they  ninst  join  in  actions  for  injnricH  to  thi.s,  as 
tresjiass  tjuare  dauHumfrvijity  nui.sanco,  and  the  like.*  And  if 
they  make  a  joint  demise  of  their  common  estate,  reservin;^ 
rent,  the  action  to  reeover  it  nnist  be  joint .^  For  the  reasons 
abcne  stated,  if  one  of  several  tenants  in  common  ])rinfj:  an 
action  for  the  recovery  of  hind  of  which  he  has  been  disseised, 
and  ehiim  the  entire  estate  instead  of  his  jiroper  undi- 
vided share,  he  will  not  *  be  nonsuited,  but  will  have  ['4-2] 
judgment  for  such  share,  in  connnon,  as  he  j)roves 
himself  to  be  entitled  to.*^  And  in  Vermont,  one  of  two  joint- 
tenants  may  recover  the  entire  estate  in  an  action  of  ejectment 
against  one  wIkj  has  no  title.'^  So  one  tenant  in  common  may 
have  tresi)ass  quare  clausum  against  a  stranger  for  entering 

Geo,  2  J.  J.  Mnrsh.  870  ;  Allen  v.  Gibson,  4  Rand.  468  ;  Johnson  r.  Harris,  5 
Huyw.  113  ;  Mines  v.  Franthani,  27  Ala.  359;  Hughea  v.  Holliday,  3  Greene, 
(Iowa)  30  ;  Young  v,  Adams,  14  B.  Mon.  127.  But  in  Connecticut  tliey  may 
sue  jointly  or  severnlly  in  such  case.  Hilliiouse  v.  Mix,  1  Root,  246.  So  in  Mjis- 
sachusetts  by  statute.  Pub.  Stat.  c.  170,  §  7.  But  if  one  fails  to  make  title, 
judgment  will  1«'  nndired  agjiinst  all.     Chandler  v.  Simmons,  97  Mass.  508. 

1   Lamb  V.  Danforth,  59  .Me.  324. 

a  Brown  v.  Bates,  55  Me.  522.  "  Muller  v.  Boggs,  25  Cal.  187. 

♦  Austin  V.  Hail,  13  .Johns.  286  ;  Decker  r.  Livingston,  15  Johns.  479  ;  Gil- 
more  v.  Wilbur,  12  Pick.  120  ;  Merrill  v.  Berkshire,  11  Pick.  269  ;  I>ow  r.  Mum- 
ford,  14  Johns.  426  ;  Doo  r.  Botts,  4  Bibb,  420  ;  Winters  v.  McGhee.  3  Sneed, 
128  ;  I'arke  v.  Kilham,  8  Cal.  77,  case  for  diverting  water  ;  Duiuiy  r.  Strong,  37 
N.  Y.  372  ;  Phillips  r.  Sherman,  61  Me.  548,  case  of  flowing  lands. 

'  Lit.  §  316  ;  Decker  v.  Livingston,  15  Johns.  479  ;  Wall  v.  Hinds,  4  Gmy, 
256.  2.->8  ;  Wilkinson  v.  Hall,  1  Bing.  N.  C.  713  ;  Co.  Lit.  198  b  ;  ante,  p.  •417. 

0  MFadden  v.  Haley,  2  Bay,  457  ;  Perry  v.  Walker,  Id.  461  ;  Watson  r.  Hill, 
1  McCord,  161  ;  Dewey  r.  Brown,  2  Pick.  337  ;  Somes  v.  Skinner,  3  Pick.  52. 
For  the  i-ffect  of  one  of  several  co-tenants  I>aying  off  a  charge  or  ]iunhasing  in 
un  outstanding  title  affecting  the  common  estate,  see />«»/,  p.  '430.  In  Illinois, 
demandant  cannot  recover  a  different  estate  from  that  suetl  for.  He  cannot  re- 
cover a  share  where  he  sues  for  an  entire  estate.  Winstanley  r.  Meacham,  58  IlL 
98,  99. 

">  Robinson  v.  Johnson,  36  Vt.  74  ;  Chandler  r.  Spoor,  22  Vt.  388. 


700  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   1. 

upon  and  damaging  the  common  property,  and  recover  both 
his  own  and  his  co-tenant's  damage  in  such  action.^ 


SECTION    IV. 

ESTATES   IN   PARTNERSHIP. 

1.     What  constitutes  estates  in  partnership. 
2,  3.     How  far  real  is  treated  as  personal  estate,  as  to  survivorship. 
4.     When  partnership  has  the  incidents  of  individual  property. 

1.  There  are  other  joint  estates  proper  to  be  treated  of  here, 
though  not  coming  in  all  respects  under  any  one  of  the  fore- 
going classes,  but  rather  partaking  of  the  nature  both  of  joint- 
tenancies  and  tenancies  in  common.  The  first  of  these  is  an 
ESTATE  IN  PARTNERSHIP.  This  is  wlicre  real  estate  is  pur- 
chased and  held  by  two  or  more  partners,  out  of  partnership 
funds  for  partnership  purposes.  But  engaging  in  a  single 
transaction  by  several  persons  does  not  bring  them  so  far  into 
the  category  of  partners  as  to  take  away  the  common-law 
jurisdiction  of  their  affairs.'-^  Independent  of  the  rights  of 
creditors,  such  estate  will  be  held  by  the  owners  as  tenants  in 
common,  with  all  the  incidents  of  such  estates.^  Thus,  where 
one  of  two  partners  leased  the  land  of  the  company  under 
seal,  it  only  operated  upon  his  share,  since  one  partner  cannot 
convey  another's  interest  in  their  real  estate,  unless  specially 
authorized.  And  if  several  join  in  a  lease,  each  lets  his  own 
share  only,  as  by  a  distinct  demise,  though  it  may  enure  to  the 
benefit  of  the  firm.*  One  reason  for  this  would  often  be  the 
inequality  of  ownership  or  interest  among  the  partners ;  and 
another  is,  that,  as  partnership  property,  it  partakes  of  the 
character  of  stock  in  trade,  held  subject  to  the  hazard  of  profit 
or  loss,  to  which  the  principle  of  Jus  accrescendi  does  not 

1  Bigelow  V.  Rising,  42  Vt.  678.  ^  Hurley  v.  Walton,  63  111.  260. 

8  Goodwin  v.  Richardson,  11  Mass.  469  ;  Deloney  v.  Hutcheson,  2  Rand.  183 ; 
Dyer  v.  Clark,  5  Met.  581  ;  Cary,  Part.  26  ;  Gow,  Part.  48  ;  Lane  v.  Tyler,  49 
Me.  252  ;  Howard  v.  Priest,  5  Met.  582. 

*  Dillon  V.  Brown,  11  Gray,  180  ;  Peck  v.  Fisher,  7  Cash.  386  ;  Moderwell  v. 
Mullison,  21  Penn.  St.  257. 


CIl.  Mil.   v^    I.]  JOINT    E^TATKS.  701 

apj)!)'.^  Tht'sc  general  principles  have  boon  a|)j»lic'il  in  the 
AnuMie;in  C(nirts  in  a  gri'jit  variety  of  cases.  Thus,  real  es- 
tate thus  purchased  i.s  subject  to  the  ilebts  of  the  |)artnership, 
in  j)ruference  to  that  of  a  private  creditor  of  either  partner.'-' 
Nor  does  it  make  any  difference  that  the  title  is  taken  in  the 
name  of  one  partner.  A  trust  results  in  favor  of  the  partner- 
ship, as  wht'iL'  the  couvcyiincc  wjis  t(j  "  S.  L.  it  Co.,"  S.  L. 
took  the  leiral  estate  clothed  with  a  tru.st  for  the  comjiany.^ 
But  if  a  partner  purchase  lands  with  partnership  funds,  and 
take  the  deed  to  himself,  he  may  convey  it  to  one  ignorant  of 
the  source  of  his  title,  and  if  for  a  valuable  consideration,  his 
grantee  will  hold  it  against  the  creditors  of  the  com|»any  as 
well  as  the  copartners.  And  an  obligatory  promise  to  marry 
the  grantor  in  such  case  would  be  deemed  a  valuable  consid- 
eration if  the  marriage  was  prevented  l)y  the  death  of  the 
grantor.*  13ut  though  the  legal  title,  where  the  conveyance 
is  to  the  several  partners,  is  in  them  as  tenants  in  commou, 
yet  as  to  the  beuelicial  interest  it  is  held  in  trust,  each  hi>ld- 
ing  his  .share  in  tru.st  for  the  company  until  its  accounts  are 
settled,  ami  the  partnership  debts  arc  piiid.''  Tiiis  is  accom- 
jilished  in  eipiity  l>y  regarding  such  real  estate  as  personal, 
enabling  the  surviving  partner,  if  it  is  needed  to  i)ay  company 
debts,  to  dispose  of  it  and  apply  it  accordingly.®  And  where 
the  business  of  the  partnershij)  consisted  of  buying  ami  selling 
lands,  it  was  held  that,  on  closing  it,  a  court  of  chancery  might 
cause  the  unsold  lands  to  be  sold,  and  the  proceeds  divi«led 
among  the  partners.^     Ihit  in  another  case,  a  .share  of  the 

>   Uke  V.  Craddock.  3  P.  Wins.  158  ;  Co.  Lit  182n  ;  Tud.  Caa.  721. 
2  Piatt  V.  Oliver,  3  McLean,  27  ;  Hunter  v.  Martin,  2  Rich.  Ijiw,  541  ;  Marvin 
r.  Trumbull,  Wrij^ht,  386.     But  cmilni,  Hhike  v.  Nutter,  19  .Mo.  10. 

•  McGuire  v.  IJninsey,  4  Eng.  (Ark.)  51.S  ;  Monau  v.  Sjitrenuis,  3  Siieed,  505  ; 
Hewitt  r.  Haukin,  41  lowa,  35;  Fowler  i-.  Bailley,  14  Wi.sc.  125  ;  King  r.  Weeks, 
70  N.  C.  372  ;  Uhler  r.  Senijile,  20  N.  J.  Kq.  288  ;  Fairchild  r.  FaircliiKI,  64 
N.  Y.  471.  «  Sniitli  r.  Allen,  5  Allen,  456. 

*  Howanl  v.  Prie.st,  5  Met.  582,  585.  See  al.so  Buchaii  r.  Sunnier,  2  B.irb.  Ch. 
165  ;  Call.mitli  r.  Gwlge,  16  B.  Mon.  631  ;  Stnith  r.  Turlton,  2  Barb.  Ch.  336  ; 
Biaek  V.  Black,  15  Ga.  445  ;   Lang  p.  Waring,  25  Ala.  625. 

«  Delinuiiico  v.  Guillaume,  2  Saiidf.  (  h.  366  ;  Boyers  v.  Elliott,  7  Humidi.  204  ; 
Boyce  V.  Coster,  4  Strobli.  E<i.  25  ;  Mutlock  v.  Matlock,  6  lud.  403  ;  Aruold  t>. 
Wainwright,  6  Minn.  358. 

'  Olcott  I'.  Wint;,  4  McUau,  15. 


702  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  L 

surplus  of  unsold  lands  at  the  death  of  a  partner  went  to  his 
widow  and  heirs.^  In  order  to  subject  real  estate  to  the  inci- 
dents of  partnership  assets,  it  must  have  been  bought  with 
partnership  funds,  for  partnership  purposes,  though  the  deed 
may  be  made  to  the  several  partners,  to  hold  to  them  and 
their  heirs.^  And  the  same  can  only  be  conveyed  by  a  deed 
executed  by  those  having  the  legal  title .^  And  it  may  be  added, 
if  one  partner  leases  the  real  estate  of  the  partnership  in  his 
own  name,  it  enures  to  the  benefit  of  the  firm.* 

2.  In  England,  however,  courts  of  equity  have  recently  been 
inclined  to  regard  real  estate  thus  held  as  personal,  subject  to 
the  same  rules  of  distribution  as  personal  estate.^  This  doc- 
trine was  applied  in  the  case  cited  below,  where  A  and  B 
purchased  land  on  a  joint  speculation  with  their  joint  moneys, 
for  the  purpose  of  building  upon  and  reselling  at  joint  profit  or 
loss.  It  was  held  to  be  a  conversion  out  and  out;  and  upon 
one  of  them  dying,  his  share  in  the  real  estate  passed  to  his 
personal  representatives.^ 

3.  In  this  country,  as  formerly  in  England,  the  doctrine  of 
survivorship  is  almost  universally  limited  by  the  extent  to 
which  equity  stamps  the  character  of  personalty  upon  such 
estates,  and  that  is  so  far  as  and  no  farther  than  tliey  are 
required  to  pay  partnership  debts.     If,  therefore,  one  of  two 

partners  owning  real  estate  dies,  the  survivor  has  an 
[*423]  equitable  lien  upon  the  *  share  of  the  deceased,  which 

takes  precedence  of  any  claim  for  dower  or  of  heirs,  to 
have  the  same  applied,  if  necessary,  to  the  payment  of  the 

1  Dilworth  v.  Maylield,  36  Miss.  40.  See  Ludlow  v.  Cooper,  4  Ohio  St.  1  ; 
Whaling  Co.  v.  Borden,  10  Cush.  458. 

2  Cox  V.  McBurney,  2  Sandf.  561  ;  Lancaster  Bank  v.  Myley,  13  Penn.  St.  544  ; 
Deming  v.  Colt,  3  Sandf.  284  ;  Coder  v.  Haling,  27  Penn.  St.  84  ;  Arnold  v.  Wain- 
wriglit,  6  Minn.  370. 

8  Davis  V.  Christian,  15  Gratt.  1 1. 

4  Moderwell  v.  Mullison,  21  Penn.  St.  257. 

6  Tud.  Cas.  721.  See  also  llice  v.  Barnard,  20  Vt.  479  ;  Lang  v.  "Waring,  17 
Ala.  145. 

6  Darby  v.  Darby,  3  Drewry,  495,  in  1856  ;  Essex  v.  E.ssex,  20  Beav.  442.  See 
the  comments  on  this  case,  98  Mass.  114  ;  1  White  &  T.  Cases  in  Equity  (4th  ed.), 
192,  193,  and  cases  there  collected.  The  English  rule  is  adopted  in  Kentucky. 
Cornwall  v.  Cornwall,  6  Bush,  372  ;  Louisville  Bank  v.  Hall,  8  Bush,  678.  And 
see  Pierce  v.  Trigg,  10  Leigh,  406. 


OH.  XIII.  §  I.]  JOINT  e.statf:s.  703 

outstaiuliuj^  debts  of  tin-  juirtnerHhip,  or  to  rcimburfic  the  Kur- 
vivDT  if  lie  shall  hiivo  paid  inuri'  than  his  share  of  tin-  partiiLT- 
shijt  iiitlfhtctliifss.*  And  if  the  survi\  inir  partner  be  hintself 
insolvent,  his  assignees  may  avail  themselves  of  the  partner- 
ship real  estate,  if  neecled  f«ir  the  payment  of  the  cnnipany 
debts,  and  to  aid  in  this  they  may  retpiire  the  widow  and 
heirs  of  the  deceased  to  exccnte  proper  deeds  of  release.*  in 
Tennessee  and  North  Carolina  this  riLdit  of  snrvivorship  is 
secnred  by  statnte,  and  it  has  l»een,  aceordin^rly,  helil  in  the 
former  State,  that  the  survivor  of  a  partnershijf  may  sell  the 
entire  jtartnership  property  as  a  survivinj^  joint-tenant.^  In 
Virginia  and  Maine  the  survivor  <jf  a  partnershijt  has  no  rights 
in  respect  to  their  real  estate  superior  to  any  ordinary  survivor 
of  two  or  more  tenants  in  comuKJU.'  In  Alabama,  e(piity  re- 
gards real  estate  owned  by  partners  as  the  ))ropcrty  of  the 
lirm,  and  will  approjiriatc  it  in  payment  of  the  delits  of  the 
firm,  whether  it  be  in  the  possession  of  the  surviviuL""  partner, 
or  in  that  of  his  heirs;  neitlu-r  of  them  can  hav<'  any  bene- 
licial  interest  in  the  real  estate  of  the  j»artneiship  until  the 
debts  of  the  lii'ni  are  j)ai(l.  Ihit  it  was  held,  that  it"  the  sur- 
viving partner,  for  a  valual)le  consideration,  convey  his  inter- 
est in  the  real  estate  to  a  purchaser  without  notice  that  it  is 
needed  to  [)ay  partncr.ship  debts,  he  will  hold  it  against  the 
creditors  of  the  firm.  The  surplus  of  |iartnership  lands,  after 
paying  the  jiartuership  debts,  has  the  (lualities  of  real  estate, 
and  is  disp(jsed  of  accordingly.^  And  in  Pennsylvania,  jtart- 
nership lands  are  no  longer  regarded  as  jtersonalty  than  till 
the  debts  of  the  jiartnership  are  paid.     Whatever  remains  has 

»  Bunisidf  V.  Mi'rrick,  4  Met.  537;  Dyer  v.  Clark,  5  Met.  502;  Smith  r.  Jiick- 
Bon,  2  Kilw.  C"li.  2S  ;  Fiiirchild  r.  Faircliild,  64  N.  Y.  471  ;  Wntkins,  C'oiiv.  107, 
168  ;  Howard  i;.  Priest,  5  Met.  585  ;  Biillimi  v.  Buirum,  49  Me.  108  ;  Loubat  t;. 
Nourse,  5  Fla.  350  ;  Sorug^  v.  Blair,  44  Miss.  406. 

2  Winslow  V.  Chiirelle,  Harin-r.  Va\.  25  ;  2  SiK-nce,  F^].  Jur.  209  ;  Story,  F>1. 
Jur.  §§  674,  675  ;  Dclmonico  v.  (iuillaunie,  2  Saudf.  (.'h.  366  ;  Willett  r.  Brown, 
65  Mc  133. 

8  Teiinessce  Code,  1858,  §  2011  ;  N.  Carolina,  Uev.  Code,  1854,  c.  43,  §  2  ; 
M'Allister  v.  Montgomer}',  3  llayw.  96.  But  see  Gaines  r.  Catruu,  1  Humph.  514  ; 
Blake  r.  Nutter,  19  Me.  16. 

*  Deloney  v,  Hutch&son,  2  lland.  183.  But  sec  ilorris  r.  Morris,  4  GratU 
293. 

6  Offutt  p.  Scott,  47  Ala.  105. 


704  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

the   properties   of   realty    owned    by   the    several    i)artners. 
Neither  of  these  can  sell  his  interest  in  them  as  personalty.^ 

4.  And,  as  would  naturally  be  inferred  from  the  premises 
above  stated,  whatever  remains  of  such  partnership  real 
estate  after  the  debts  of  the  company  shall  have  been  dis- 
charged, is  held  in  common,  at  once  subject  to  dower  or 
curtesy,  and  goes  to  heirs  or  devisees  accordingly ,2  and  is 
subject  to  partition.^ 


SECTION  V. 

JOINT   MORTGAGES. 

1,  2.     Of  mortgages  to  several  to  secure  a  joint  debt. 

3.  Of  mortgages  to  several  to  secure  separate  debts. 

4.  Effect  of  foreclosure  on  joint  mortgages. 

1.  Another  class  of  joint  estates  which  has  already  been 
mentioned  is  that  by  joint  mortgages.     In  England 

[*424]  and  in  *  most  of  the  States,  the  interest  of  a  mort- 
gagee in  lands  is  regarded  as  an  estate  in  lands,  but 

so  far  partaking  of  the  nature  of  the  debt  thereby  secured, 

,  Note.  —  The  following  cases  lately  decided  cover  so  many  of  the  points  stated 
in  the  several  paragraphs  of  the  foregoing  section,  and  are  so  generally  in  accord 
with  what  is  therein  stated,  that  they  are  referred  to  in  general  terms,  instead  of 
citing  them  in  detail,  to  sustain  the  several  points  \ipon  which  they  bear.  Le- 
fevre's  Appeal,  69  Peun.  St.  122  ;  Bopp  v.  Fox,  63  111.  540  ;  Ebbert's  Api)eal,  70 
Penn.  St.  81  ;  Wilcox  v.  Wilcox,  13  Allen,  252  ;  Jones's  Appeal,  70  Penn.  .St. 
169  ;  Shearer  v.  Shearer,  98  Mass.  107  ;  Jleily  v.  Wood,  71  Penn.  St.  488  ;  Fos- 
ter's Appeal,  22  Am.  L.  Reg.  300,  to  which  is  appended  an  extended  note,  307- 
310,  collating  the  American  cases  upon  the  subject,  and  concluding  •'  that  the 
surplus  proceeds  of  real  estate  of  a  partnership,  after  the  creditors  are  satisfied, 
and  the  equities  of  the  partners  adjusted,  are  to  be  considered  as  realty,  and  that, 
on  the  death  of  a  partner,  his  interest  in  such  surplus  goes  to  his  heir,  subject  to 
the  widow's  dower,  and  not  to  his  personal  representatives." 

1  Foster's  Appeal,  74  Penn.  St.  398,  399. 

^  Burnside  v.  Merrick,  4  ilet.  537  ;  Howard  v.  Priest,  5  Jlet.  586  ;  Buchan  v. 
Sumner,  2  Barb.  Ch.  163  ;  Buckley  v.  Buckley,  11  Barb.  43  ;  Tillinghast  v. 
Chaplin,  4  Pt.  I.  173  ;  Dilworth  v.  Mayfield,  36  Miss.  40  ;  Piper  v.  Smith,  1 
Head,  93. 

8  Patterson  v.  Blake,  12  Ind.  436  ;  Loubat  v.  Nourse,  5  Fla.  363. 


CU.  XJII.   §  i).]  JOINT    F.STATFLS.  705 

tluit,  for  |>ui'|M)s»'s  of  roinrdy  and  «'iifun  rmont  of  the  saino,  tlio 
doctrine  of  survivorslii|i  applies  a.s  well  to  the  estate  as  the 
debt;  and  this  extends  to  the  assignment  of  a  mortgage  to 
two  trustees.* 

2.  If,  in  such  a  ease,  either  <»f  the  niortL'agees  dies,  the  sur- 
vivors may  proceed  in  tlieir  own  name,  and  do  whatever  is 
necessary  to  foreehjsc  the  mortjrage;  and  for  that  purpose 
tlioy  have  a  ri<rht  to  tlie  jiossession  of  the  mortga|ire  and  notes, 
without  makiuir  the  heir  or  personal  rejtresentative  of  their  eo- 
mortjragec  a  party.^ 

3.  JJut  if  the  debts  seeurctl  by  the  morlpip-  br-jou;;  iu  sever- 
alty to  the  dill'erent  mort<ra;;ees  named,  they  l)ecome,  in  such 
case,  tenants  in  eoinnniii  ami  nut  joint-tenants  as  to  such 
estate,  without  the  rifrht  of  survivorshij) ;  ami  if,  after  the 
debt  of  one  shall  have  Ijccn  satislir(l,  the  other  dies,  his 
representatives,  and  not  the  survivor  or  survivors,  wouM  lie 
the  only  proper  parties  to  j)roceeding8  to  enforce  the  mort- 
gagc.3 

4.  As  soon,  however,  as  the  mortgage  is  foreclosed,  though 
the  debt  may  have  been'  a  joint  one,  the  mortgagees  l>ecome 
tenants  in  common  of  the  estate,  the  share  of  each  being 
in  proportion  to  his  share  of  the  debt.* 

*  'NVel)stcr  r.  Vnndeventer,  6  Gray,  428. 

'  Appleton  r.  Boyd,  7  Mass.  131  ;  Kinsley  v.  Abbott,  19  Mc.  430  ;  Martin  r. 
M'Rcynolds,  6  Mich.  72  ;  Cote  r.  Dequimln-,  Walker,  Ch.  64. 

»  Buniett  V.  Pratt,  22  Pick.  557  ;  2  iJuue,  Abr.  22(5  ;  Browu  r.  Bates,  55  Me. 
622, 

*  Goodwin  v.  Richardson,  11  Mass.  469  ;  Deloney  o.  Hutcheson,  2  Rand.  183; 
Donnels  v.  Edwnnls,  2  Piik.  617  ;  Tud.  Cas.  721  ;  Puarce  v.  Savage,  45  Me.  t>0 ; 
Kinsley  r.  Abbott,  19  Mc.  430. 

VOL.  I.—  45 


706  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [bOOK    I. 


SECTION   VI. 

ESTATES    IN   ENTIRETY. 

1.  Who  are  tenants  by  entirety,  and  how  they  liold, 

2.  Of  the  nature  of  survivorship  as  to  such  estates. 

3.  Effect  of  conveyance  by  husband. 

3a.  Same  subject,  Stat.  32  Hen.  VIII.  c.  28,  §  6. 

4.  "When  husband  and  wife  may  be  tenants  in  common. 

5.  American  law  on  the  subject. 

1.  A  STILL  more  peculiar  joint  estate  is  that  which  belongs 
to  a  husband  and  wife,  where  the  same  is  conveyed  to  them  as 
such.     If  a  man  and  woman,  tenants  in  common,  marry,  they 

still  continue  to  hold  in  common.^  But  if  the  estate  is 
[*425]   conveyed  *  to  them  originally  as  husband  and  wife, 

they  are  neither  tenants  in  common  nor  properly  joint- 
tenants,  though  having  the  right  of  survivorship,  but  are  what 
are  called  tenants  by  entirety.  While  such  estates  have,  like 
a  joint-tenancy,  the  quality  of  survivorship,  they  differ  from 
that  in  this  essential  respect,  that  neither  can  convey  his  or 
her  interest  so  as  to  affect  the  right  of  survivorship  in  the 
other.  They  are  not  seised,  in  the  eye  of  the  law,  of  moieties, 
but  of  entireties.^ 

2.  In  such  cases,  the  survivor  does  not  take  as  a  new  acqui- 
sition, but  under  the  original  limitation,  his  estate  being  sim- 
ply freed  from  participation  by  tlie  other ;  ^  so  that  if,  for 

1  1  Prest.  Est,  434  ;  Co.  Lit.  187  b  ;  Ames  v.  Norman,  4  Sneed,  683,  696 ; 
McDermott  v.  French,  15  N.  J.  Eq.  80  ;  Babbit  v.  Scroggin,  1  Duv.  272. 

2  1  Prest.  Est.  131  ;  2  Flint.  Real  Prop.  527  ;  Tud.  Cas.  730  ;  Shaw  v.  Hear- 
sey,  5  Mass.  521  ;  Fox  v.  Fletcher,  8  JIass.  274  ;  Draper  v.  Jackson,  16  Mass. 
480  ;  Brownson  v.  Hull,  16  Vt.  309  ;  Harding  v.  Springer,  14  Me.  407;  Fairchild 
V.  Chastelleux,  1  Penn.  St.  176  ;  Den  v.  Branson,  5  Ired.  426;  Taul  v.  Campbell, 
7  Yerg.  319  ;  Cord,  Mar.  Women,  §  107  ;  Rogers  v.  Grider,  1  Dana,  242  ;  Doe  v. 
Howland,  8  Cow.  277;  2  Kent,  Comi.  132;  Torreyi;.  Torrey,  14  N.  Y.  430;  Zorntlein 
V.  Bram,  100  N.  Y.  12;  Aniesi;.  Norman,  4  Sneed,  683;  "Wright  v.  Saddler,  20  N.  Y. 
320.  See  Gen.  Stat.  "Vt.  1863,  c.  64,  §  3  ;  Davis  v.  Clark,  26  Ind.  424  ;  Ketchum 
V.  Walsworth,  5  Wise.  95  ;  Babbit  v.  Scroggin,  1  Duv.  272  ;  Wales  v.  Coffin,  13 
Allen,  215  ;  Lux  v.  Hoff,  47  111.  425  ;  Marrinerr.  Saunders,  10  111.  124  ;  McCurdy 
V.  Canning,  64  Penn.  St.  39;  Hemingway  v.  Scales,  42  Miss.  1;  Marburg  v.  Cole, 
49  Md.  402  ;  Hall  v.  Stei^hens,  65  Mo.  670 ;  Fisher  v.  Provin,  25  Mich.  350. 

»  Watkins,  Conv.  170;  Tud.  Cas.  730. 


CII.  XIII.   §  0.]  .KiIVT    KSTATKS.  T<'T 

iiistuiifc,  the  wife  Kurvivcs  and  then  dirs,  her  Ihmik  would 
tak(!  to  the  exclusion  of  the  heirs  of  the  hu^lmnil.'  N'di-  ran 
partition  be  made  of  the  estate.* 

.'}.  If  the  hn.shand  convey  the  entire  e.state  during eovertun-, 
and  die.s.  hi.s  conveyance  will  not  have  alVected  her  right.s  <»f 
survivorship  to  the  entire  estate.  But  if,  in  such  case,  the 
husband  survive,  his  conveyance  becomes  as  effective  to  jiass 
the  whole  estate  as  it  wouUl  have  been  liad  the  husband  lieen 
sole  seised  when  he  conveyed.^  And  during  coverture,  tiie 
husband  lias  the  entire  control  of  the  estate,  and  the  same 
is  lialile  to  be  seizeil  by  his  cri-ditors  during  his  life.*  lint 
if  husband's  creditors  levy  upon  the  estate,  it  survives  to 
th(>  wife  on  the  death  of  the  husband,  as  if  no  such  h'vy 
had  been  niade.'''  And  even  where  the  husband  niortgagcil 
half  the  estate  for  the  support  of  self  and  wife,  and  she 
joiiHMJ  in  tilt'  (jfcd  rclcasinL^  her  dower  and  honu'stead,  it  was 
held  to  be  of  no  avail  to  bar  her  right  as  surviv(jr  ujion  the 
death  of  the  husband,  since  her  release  of  dower  conveyed 
nothing ;  nor  was  she  estopped  by  the  mortgage,  because, 
being  a  feme  covert,  she  did  not  bind  herself  personally.'^ 

3  a.  Although  the  effect  of  a  disseisin  of  the  husl)and,  or 
Ills  conveyance  of  her  estate  upon  a  wife's  interest  in  lands, 
has  been  referred  to  (p.  *  141,  ante),  it  seems  proper  to  speak, 
in  this  connection,  more  at  large  upon  the  subject.  l>y  the 
common  law,  if  a  husband  by  line  or  feolTment  conveyed  land 
in  fee  which  he  held  in  the  right  of  his  wife,  including  estates 
held  in  entirety,  it  woike(|  a  discontinuance  of  her  estate,  and, 
at  his  death,  she  or  her  heirs  were  driven  to  an  action  t(j  re- 
cover it.  T..  obviate  this,  the  statute  32  Ibn  \1I1.  c.  28, 
§  <),  |irovide(l  that  such  conveyance  should  not  work  a  discon- 
tinuance, i)ut  that  at  the  death  of  the  husband,  the  wife  (tr 
licr  heirs  might  enter  upr)n  the  inheritance,  without  being 
driven  to  an  action.  This  statute'  w:is  once  re-onacted,  and 
still  seems  to  be  in  force  in  New  York.  It  is  in  force  in  Ten- 
nessee, in  Mas.sachu8etts,  and  has  been  re-enacted  in  Ken- 

»  1  Prrst  F.St.  132.  •  Rennctt  r.  fhil.l,  19  Wise.  362. 

*  1  I'rcst.  YM.  135  ;  Ames  v.  Nominn,  4  Sncwl,  683. 

*  Barber  v.  Harri.s,  15  WeniL  615  ;  Bennett  v.  Child,  19  Wise.  362,  365. 

*  French  v.  Mehan,  56  Pcnn.  8t,  286.  «  Pierce  r.  Chase,  108  Maas.  25a 


708  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [bOOK   I. 

tucky,  and  such  is  the  effect  of  the  statutes  in  New  Jersey. 
In  Tennessee,  the  wife  has  seven  years  after  the  husband's 
death  in  whicli  to  enter  or  bring  her  action.  In  Kentucky, 
she  has  twenty  years.  Nor  has  the  tenant,  in  such  case,  any 
right  to  a  notice  to  quit  before  proceedings  are  instituted  to 
remove  him.  He  is  not  even  tenant  at  sufferance,  as  the 
relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  did  not  subsist  between  him 
and  the  survivor.^  If  there  be  a  divorce  of  the  wife  from  the 
husband,  she  is  restored  to  a  moiety  of  tlie  estate,  during  the 
lives  of  the  two,  with  the  right  of  survivorship  upon  his  death. 
But  such  divorce  cannot  disturb  a  conveyance  of  the  estate 
already  made  by  the  husband.  So  long  as  the  husband  lives, 
such  conveyance  will  be  good.^ 

4.  It  is  always  competent,  however,  to  make  husband  and 
wife  tenants  in  common,  by  proper  words,  in  the  deed  or  de- 
vise by  which  they  take,  indicating  such  an  intention.^  And 
if  an  estate  be  made  to  a  husband  and  wife  and  a  third  per- 
son, the  shares  of  each  will  depend  upon  the  kind  of  estate 
the  husband  and  wife  take.  If  there  is  nothing  to  indicate  a 
tenancy  in  common,  they  together  would  take  one  half  by 
entirety,  and  the  third  person  the  other  half,  to  be  held  in 
common  ;  *  whereas,  if  they  take  in  common,  then  each  is  en- 
titled to  one  third  in  common  and  undivided.     And  in  the 

case  supposed,  if  their  connection  with  a  third  person 
[*426]  was  that  of  a  joint-tenancy,  and  *  he  were  to  die,  the 

husband  and  wife  would,  by  their  survivorship,  take 
the  whole  estate  by  entirety.^  Where  a  conveyance  was  to  a 
husband  and  wife  and  their  six  children  by  name,  it  was  held 
that  the  interest  of  the  tenants  was  divisible  into  seven  parts, 
of  which  the  husband  and  wife  held  one  by  entirety,  undivided 
and  in  common  with  the  other  six  parts  undivided,  to  which 
the  several  children  were  entitled.^ 

5.  The  law  of  this  country  is  not,  however,  uniform  as  to 

1  Co.  Lit.  326  a  ;  2  Kent,  Com.  133,  and  note  ;  Miller  v.  Miller,  Meigs,  492, 
493  ;  Miller  v.  Shackleford,  4  Dana,  264,  277  ;  Bruce  v.  Wood,  1  Met.  542. 

2  Ames  V.  Norman,  4  Sneed,  683. 

«  McDermott  v.  French,  15  N.  J.  Eq.  81. 

*  Hall  V.  Stephens,  65  Mo.  670  ;  Hulet  v.  Inlow,  57  Ind.  412. 

5  1  Prest.  Est.  132  ;  2  Flint.  Real  Prop.  327. 

s  Barber  v.  Harris,  15  Wend.  615. 


en.  XMi.  §  n.]  j'lisr  KviAiKs.  709 

tliis  (loctrino  of  entirety.  In  Ohio,  where  there  never  was 
any  joint-tenancy  with  a  rij^ht  of  survivorship,  it  is  hcUl  that 
a  ck'vis*!  to  a  hushantl  and  wile  and  th«'ir  heirs  nmkes  them 
tenants  in  common,  and  such  is  the  efl'ect  of  a  conveyance  to 
husl):ind  and  wih;  of  an  cipiitahlc  estate.*  In  Connecticut,  a 
husband  and  wile,  in  sui'h  a  case,  arc  considered  joint-trnants, 
and  not  tenants  in  entirety.-  In  \'ir<rinia,  if  an  estate  of  in- 
heritance is  tlevised  to  husband  and  wih',  n|»oii  the  death  of 
cither,  his  or  her  share  th'scends  to  heii's,  suliject  to  (h'bts, 
rijrhts  of  curtesy,  or  of  dower,  as  the  ca.se  may  he.^  In  Rhode 
Island,  such  an  estate  in  husbaml  and  wife  is  a  tenancy  in 
Common,  witliout  the  rijrht  of  survivorship."*  And  the  same 
is  tlie  hiw  in  Iowa,  unless  the  contrary  is  expressed  in  the 
grant. ^  And  while  it  has  been  generally  held  that  the  statutes 
abolishing  joint-tenancies,  or  changing  these  into  tenancies  in 
common,  do  not  apjtly  to  tenancies  by  entirety,^  yet,  by  express 
provision,"  or  by  imj)lication  fmiu  the  statutes  giving  married 
women  control  of  their  own  jiroperty,  these  have  in  several 
States  l)een  reduced  to  tenancies  in  eonnnon.'^  In  Indiana,  and 
perhaj)S  in  some  otlicr  I^tates,  wjiile  tenancy  by  entirety  is 
still  held  to  exist,  notwithstanding  tiie  marrie(l  women's  acts, 
the  eonnnon-law  incident  of  control  of  the  joint  proj»erty  by 
the  husband  during  coverture,  or  its  alienability  during  the 
same  jteriod  I)y  his  act,  or  liability  for  his  debts,  is  dcnie<l.'* 
In  New  York  the  continuance  of  this  species  of  tenancy  has 

•  .Si-rpeniit  i'.  .St('inlH?rj»<'r,  2  Ohio,  30.1;  Wilson  v.  Flemiug,  13  Ohio,  G3. 
2  WliittK-scy  r.  Full.r,  11  Conu.  337,  341. 

•  Co.l.-,  1873,  c.  112,  18,  19. 

•  OiMi.  .Stat.  1872,  c.  Itn,  §  1. 

»  Hoiriiiiin  t?.  Stip'fs,  28  Iowa,  302. 

•  Ko^-rs  V.  (IrJiU'r,  1  Dana,  242  ;   Bahhit  r.  .Srrogpin,  1  Puv.  272. 

'  Kentucky  Gen.  .Stat.  1873,  c.  52,  nrt.  4,  §  13  ;  but  this  is  not  retrospective. 
Elliott  f.  Nichols,  4  Bush,  .102. 

»  (lurk  r.  ('lurk,  .1(1  N.  H.  10.1:  r<>o|«T  r.  CcM.pcr,  76  111.  57,  followiu;,'  the  act 
of  ISt^l,  and  <listingiii.HhiiiK  Lux  r.  HofT.  47  111.  426,  as  jirior  to  that  statute  ;  Ma.>i.4. 
St.  1885,  c.  237;  Pray  v.  Stehhins,  141  Mas.H.  219. 

"  Arnold  v.  Arnold,  30  Ind.  30.1  ;  Chandler  r.  (Tieney,  37  Ind.  391,  nothing 
pas-ses  by  husband's  deed;  Davis  v.  Clark,  2«5  Ind.  424;  Montpomerj'  r.  Hickman, 
62  Ind.  598  ;  I'atton  r.  Rankin,  68  Ind.  245,  or  can  K-  taken  on  execution  by  hin 
cre«litors.  So  in  New  York  and  perhaps  Missi.ssippi,  it  is  left  undetennincd 
whether  the  huRlmnd  can  alien  his  joint  inten>.st  during  coverture,  Ik-rtles  v. 
Kunivn,  92  N.  Y.  152  ;  .McDulf  v.  Bcauchanip,  50  Miss.  531. 


710  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  I. 

been  affirmed  after  some  fluctuations  of  decision,^  and  the  same 
rule  has  been  laid  down  in  Michigan,  Mississippi,  Arkansas, and 
]\Iaryland,  at  least  to  the  extent  of  the  right  of  survivorship.^ 
While  in  Pennsylvania,  Missouri,  New  Jersey,  and  Wisconsin, 
the  tenancy  exists  with  all  its  common-law  incidents.^ 


SECTION  VII. 

PARTITION. 

1.  Of  partition  by  common  law  and  by  statutes. 

2, 3.  Partition  by  chancery. 

4-6.  How  and  when  made  by  common  law  and  chancery. 

7,  8.  How  far  seisin  necessary  to  maintain  partition. 

8  a.  Who  must  be  parties  to  proceedings  for  partition. 

9.  Of  partition  of  several  parcels. 

10.  Of  partition  of  mills  and  the  like. 

11.  Of  probate  partition. 

12,  1.3.     Of  partition  by  parties,  how  made. 

14-17.     Of  the  setting  up  of  an  adverse  title  by  one  co-tenant  against  an- 
other. 

18.  Each  co-tenant  a  warrantor  to  the  other. 

19.  Tenant's  remedy  if  evicted  of  his  share. 
Note.  —  Statutes  as  to  waste  and  mode  of  partition. 

1.  At  common  law  no  owner  of  any  of  these  joint-estates, 
except  parceners,  had  a  right  to  have  partition  thereof  made 
against  the  will  of  his  co-tenant.  The  right  of  having  partition 
in  the  excepted  estates  gave  rise  to  the  name  of  parcenary. 
And  for  this  or  some  other  reason,  in  some  of  the  States  it 
has  been  held  that  a  parol  partition  of  their  estate  between 
parceners,  if  followed  by  possession,  is  as  good  and  effectual 
as  if  made  by  deed.    It  is  apprehended  that  this  is  confined  to 

1  In  Goelet  v.  Gori,  31  Barb.  314  ;  Farmer's  Bk.  r.  Gregory,  49  Barb.  155 ; 
Miller  v.  Miller,  9  Abbot,  Pr.  n.  s.  444  ;  Freeman  v.  Barber,  3  Thomps.  &  C.  574; 
Beach  v.  Hollister,  3  Hun,  519,  it  was  held  still  to  exist ;  but  in  Meeker  v. 
Wright,  76  N.  Y.  262,  followed  by  Feely  v.  Buckley,  28  Hun,  451,  it  was  declared 
inconsistent  with  tlie  mamed  women's  statutes.  But  these  latter  cases  have  since 
been  overruled  in  Bertles  v.  Nunan,  92  N.  Y.  152  :  Zorntlein  v.  Bram,  100  N.  Y.  12 

2  Fisher  v.  Provin,  25  Mich.  350;  McDuft"  v.  Boauchamp,  50  Mi.ss.  531;  Robin- 
son V.  Eagle,  29  Ark.  202  ;  Marburg  v.  Cole,  49  Md.'4n2. 

3  Bates  V.  Seely,  46  Penn.  St.  248  ;  French  v.  Mehan,  56  I'enn.  St.  289  ; 
Washburn  v.  Burns,  34  N.  J.  18  ;  Hall  v.  Stephens,  65  Mo.  670  ;  Bennett  v. 
Child,  19  Wise.  362. 


(11.  XIII.   ^  7.]  JOINT    E.'^TATKS.  711 

States  whure  coparcenary  ut  commuii  law  is  still  retained,  and 
would  not  extend  to  States  where  heirs  take  as  tenants  in 
common.'  The  statute  M  Hen.  Vlll.  c.  1,  and  32  Hen.  Vlil. 
c.  32,  provided  for  a  com|)ul.sory  process  of  partition  by  a  writ 
or  aetion  at  common  law.''*  This  form  of  jjroceedinj^  continued 
in  Knirland  to  he  one  of  the  forms  hy  whieh  jiartition  eouhl  he 
effected,  until  the  statute  3  tfc  t  Win.  I\'.  c.  -~ ,  \>\  whieh  it 
was  al>olished,  and  the  statutes  hy  whieji  it  was  cre- 
ated have  heen  *  re-<Miacted  in  most  of  the  Sfates.  llut  ['427] 
in  Enjrland  and  this  country  it  had  become  practically 
obsolete  many  years  aj^o.'^ 

2.  There  is  still  a  i)ower  to  compel  partition  which  may  lje 
readily  ap|)lied  in  l)oth  countries.  In  Enjrland  it  is  done 
throuirh  ehaneery.  The  laws  of  the  several  States  ujton  the 
subject  will  be  found  compiled  at  the  close  of  this  chapter. 
But  in  some  form  or  other,  the  ri<jrht  of  having  partition  made 
is  incident  to  an  ownership  in  joint-tenancy  as  well  as  to  es- 
tates in  common.^  But  it  is  competent  for  joint  owners  of  land 
to  have  their  estate  so  created  as  to  [)revent  partition  thereof 
being  made  except  by  mutual  consent,  as  where  several  joined 
in  jairehasing  an  estate  on  whieh  to  erect  and  maintain  a 
hotel,  and  had  a  clause  inserted  in  the  deed  by  whiih  they 
acquired  their  title,  jtiithiijiting  them  from  haviuL''  jtartition 
thereof  made.  They  were  tlierel)y  estopped  from  maintaining 
a  process  for  jjartition.^  But  where,  by  the  terms  of  the  grant 
of  a  parcel  of  land,  it  was  to  be  occupied  in  common  as  a  yard 
by  the  grantor  and  grantee  and  their  heirs  and  assigns,  it  was 
held  that  partition  of  the  premises  might  be  made,  giving  to 

1  Colci.  V.  WooJing,  2  Pat.  &  H.  (Va. )  ISlI,  197  ,  "WilJcy  r.  Bouncy,  31  Mibs. 
644.  652. 

3  2  Flint.  Real  Prop.  3.32  ;  ."Story,  Eij.  Jur.  §  647. 

'  4  KLiit.Coin.  364  ;  Cliauniion  v.  SiH-iu-cr,  1  Koot,  147  ;  Cook  r.  Allon,  2  Mass. 
462  ;  WitluTsiKKin  v.  Dunlap,  1  McCord,  546  ;  il'Kce  v.  Stniub,  2  Biiin.  1  ; 
Wms.  Heal  Prop.  81,  115. 

*  Mitohell  r.  Starbuck,  10  Moss.  6;  Withcrspoon  r.  I)unla]i,  Har]H.'r,  390; 
PotUr  r.  Wheeler,  13  Mass.  504  ;  IxJbcttcr  v.  Gash,  8  In-*!.  462  ;  Uanbury  r. 
Husscy,  5  E.  L.  &  E«).  81;  Hig>,'inbottom  r.  Short,  25  Miss.  160;  Holniesi  r. 
Holmes,  2  Jon«>s,  Ki].  334.  See  Culeiuan  r.  Coleman,  19  Penu.  St.  100;  Hoyt 
V.  Kimball,  49  N.  H.  322. 

»  Hunt  V.  Wright^  47  X.  H.  399,  401  ;  sec  also  Fisher  r,  Ucwcrsou,  3  Met 
546. 


712  LAW   OP   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   L 

each  an  easement  in  the  land  of  the  other  so  as  to  serve  the 
purposes  of  the  grant.^  But  where  one  tenant  in  common 
owned  one  undivided  part  in  his  own  right  in  common  with 
another  part  of  which  he  and  others  were  trustees,  it  was  held 
he  could  not  have  partition  of  the  estate.^ 

3.  This  power  of  compelling  partition  has  been  exercised 
in  England  by  chancery  ever  since  the  time  of  Elizabeth.^  It 
may  be  done  in  chancery  in  several  of  the  States,  in  most  if 
not  all  of  which  there  are  also  modes  provided  by  statute  for 
causing  partitions  to  be  made.*  In  New  York  a  wife,  owning 
land  as  tenant  in  common  with  her  husband,  may  have  a  bill 
in  equity  for  partition  of  the  same.^  Tlie  act  of  making  par- 
tition through  chancery  is  done  by  commissioners  appointed 
for  the  purpose,  who  return  their  doings  into  court,  and,  in 
order  to  make  it  effectual,  mutual  conveyances  to  each  other 
by  the  co-tenants  are  required.^  And  if  it  becomes  necessary, 
in  order  to  equalize  the  partition,  the  commissioners  may 
require  the  payment  of  money  by  one  co-tenant  to  another, 
called  owelty  of  partition.'^  And  if  one  co-tenant  has  made 
improvements  upon  the  estate,  equity  may  so  divide  it  as  to 
give  these  to  the  tenant  who  made  them,  although,  at  law,  he 
would  have  no  right  of  action  to  recover  their  value.^  But 
under  proceedings  at  law  the  commissioners  cannot  settle  con- 
tested questions  of  title  between  the  parties ;  such  questions 
are  to  be  settled  at  the  original  hearing  :  nor  have  they  power 
to  award  that  buildings  standing  upon  the  premises  are  the 
property  of  some  one  of  the  tenants  in  common,  and  to  set 
the  same  to  him  as  his  own.^  In  Illinois,  however,  if  one 
co-tenant  make  improvements  upon  the  common  estate,  the 

1  Fisher  v.  Dewerson,  sup. ;  Hoyt  v.  Kimball,  49  N.  H.  322. 

2  Winthrop  v.  Minot,  9  Cush.  405. 

3  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §  647. 

4  Whitten  v.  Whitten,  36  N.  H.  326  ;  Patton  v.  "Wagner,  19  Ark.  233  ;  Bailey 
V.  Sisson,  1  R.  I.  233  ;  Spitts  v.  Wells,  18  Mo.  468  ;  Adam  v.  Ames  Iron  Co., 
24  Conn.  230  ;  Greenup  v.  Sewell,  18  111,  53.  In  Indiana  the  proceedings  are  in 
law,  and  not  in  equity.     Wilbridge  v.  Case,  2  Carter  (Ind.),  36. 

6  Moore  v.  Moore,  47  N.  Y.  469,  «  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §  650. 

''  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §  654. 

8  Green  v.  Putnam,  1  Barb.  500.  See  also  Crafts  v.  Crafts,  13  Gray,  360 ; 
Thorn  v.  Thorn,  14  Iowa,  55  ;  Robinson  v.  McDonald,  11  Tex.  385. 

9  Gourley  v.  Woodbury,  43  Vt.  89. 


CH.  XIII.  §  7]  JOINT   ESTATBS.  713 

court  directs  the  commissioners  to  set  the  improved  part  to 
him  without  cluirtriui;  liiiu  for  such  iuiprovcMnt'iilH.' 

4.  When  jiurtition  was  nuKh'  upon  proceedings  lit  common 
law,  it  was  done  hy  a  sherilT  and  jury,  who  set  out  to  each 
his  proj)er  share,  and  this  was  l)indin<r  upon  the  jmrties 
without  the  formality  of  mutual  conveyances,  as  required 
when  made  in  clumcery.^  Hut  chancery  did  not  act  in  ease 
the  title  to  the  land  was  in  dispute.  It  recjuired  the  (piestion 
of  title  to  1)0  first  settled  at  hiw.^ 

:').  I'roeeedimrs  in  partition,  like  real  actions,  penerally  are 
local,  and  must  be  had  in  the  county  in  which  the  land  lies 
which  is  the  suhjeet  of  division.'  A  petition  for  partition  is  a 
j)roceediui(  in  rem.^  In  a  writ  of  partition  all  the  co-tenants 
must  he  named,  and  partition  must  l»e  made  am(Uigst  them, 
the  share  of  each  must  be  stated,  and  wo  partition  can  Itc 
made  where  any  of  the  co-tenants  are  unknown,  or  their 
shares  cannot  be  stated.  But  in  Massachusetts  one  co-tenant 
can  have  his  share  set  off,  leaving  Ww  other  co-tenants  to 
have  their  shares  set  off  by  a  new  process,  and  this  though 
the  others  are  unknown.  The  essential  thing  in  such  a  pro- 
cess is,  that  the  petitioner  should  have  an  estate  in  possession 
in  common  with  some  other  jjcrson.  It  is  no  objection  to  the 
proceeding  that  there  is  a  contingent  remainder  in  another 
in  some  portion  of  the  estate.  But  a  remainder-man  cannot 
have  partition,  and  if  he  has  a  share  in  possession,  and  one  in 
remainder,  he  may  have  the  first  set  off  without  affecting  his 
right  to  the  other  share.  As  to  the  two  he  is  regarded  as  a 
separate  tenant.  It  is  no  olijection  to  maiutainiuir  partition 
that  tlie  petitioner's  share  is  sid)iect  to  a  mortgage  if  the 
mortgagor  is  in  possession.''  I5y  the  law  of  the  same  State, 
a  tenant  in  common  for  life  may  have  partition,  ami  it  is  no 

1  Dean  v.  O'Meara,  47  111.  120  ;  Kurtz  r.  Hibnor,  55  111.  521.     S,f  a  like  doc- 
trine in  Kentucky.     Borah  v.  Archers,  7  Pana,  177. 
■^  Story,  E-i.  Jur.  §§  652,  654. 

•  2  Daniels  Ch.  (IVrk.  ed.)  1326,  n.;  4  Kent,  f'oni.  365  ;  Ilosfonl  r.  Mcnrin, 
5  Barh.  51  ;  MoCall  v.  Car]Hnter,  18  How.  21»7  ;  Shearvr  r.  WiiiNtnn,  33  Miaa. 
149  ;  Tubler  r.  Wiwnian,  2  Ohio  St.  207  ;  01»ert  r.  OUrt,  In  N.  J.  E"!-  98. 

*  Ii.inner.  Petitioner,  4  Mass.  122  ;  Brown  r.  McMullen,  1  Nott  k  McC".  252; 
PealHxly  r.  .Minot,  24  Pick.  333. 

'  Corwithe  v.  G rifling,  21  Barb.  9.  •  Taylor  r.  Blake,  109  Mass.  513. 


714  LAW   OF  REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK  L 

objection  to  tlie  process  that  the  petitioner  holds  his  estate  sub- 
ject to  a  condition  if  the  same  has  not  been  broken.^ 
[*428]  *  6.  It  is  not  competent  for  a  tenant  in  common  to 
enforce  partition  as  to  a  part  of  the  common  estate. 
He  must  go  for  a  partition  of  the  entire  estate  if  he  would 
divide  any  part.^  And  where  tlie  commissioners,  in  dividing 
the  land,  laid  an  open  passage-way  through  it,  and  then  set  off 
the  respective  shares  of  the  co-tenants,  bounding  them  by  this 
passage-way,  and  giving  to  each  an  easement  of  way  over  the 
open  passage  to  be  used  by  them  in  common,  it  was  held  to 
be  a  good  partition  ;  tho  sliare  of  each  would  be  bounded  by 
the  centre  line  of  this  way,^  But  two  or  more  of  several 
tenants  in  common  may  join  in  ha\ing  their  respective  inter- 
ests set  off  together  from  the  other  shares  of  their  co-tenants. 
Or  one  or  more  of  the  tenants  may  have  their  shares  set  off, 
leaving  the  rest  of  the  common  estate  undivided.^  This  would 
be  so,  though  the  parties,  other  than  the  petitioners,  are  un- 
known. The  effect  of  a  partition  is  like  that  of  a  judgment 
in  establishing  the  titles  of  the  respective  tenants.  It  re- 
quires no  deeds  between  the  parties  to  make  good  the  titles.^ 
A  judgment  in  partition,  settling  and  confirming  the  shares  and 
interests  of  the  several  parties,  is  equivalent  to  a  conveyance, 
and  is  to  be  construed  by  the  same  rules  as  ordinary  convey- 
ances.^ But  where  tenants  in  common  covenanted  that  a 
certain  part  of  the  premises  should  for  ever  remain  to  be  oc- 
cupied by  them  and  their  heirs  and  assigns  as  a  yard,  it  was 
no  bar  to  having  a  partition  of  the  premises,  but  the  right  to 
this  occupation  in  the  nature  of  an  easement  will  remain  after 
as  before  the  partition.''  But  if,  in  a  deed  to  two  persons,  it 
is  recited  at  the  close  of  the  grant  that  tlie  premises  are  "  to 
remain  in  common  and  undivided,"  such  recital  would  not 
prevent  either  of  the  parties  from  having  partition  by  process 

1  Judkins  v.  Judkins,  109  Mass.  181. 

2  Duncan  v.  Sylvester,  16  Me.  388  ;  Colton  v.  Smith,  11  Pick.  311  ;  Bigelow 
V.  Littlefield,  52  Me.  24. 

8  Clark  V.  Parker,  106  Mass.  554. 

4  Ladd  V.  Perley,  18  N.  H.  396  ;  Abbott  v.  Berry,  46  N.  H.  369. 

6  Hassett  v.  Ridgley,  49  111.  201. 

«  Hoffman  v.  Stigers,  28  Iowa,  302. 

'  Fisher  v.  Dewerson,  3  Met.  544  :  Hoyt  v.  Kimball,  49  N.  H.  324. 


CM.   XUI.   ^  7.]  JOINT    KSTATEfl.  71'> 

of  law.'  IJut  a  coiulition  that  |)aititi()n  bIiouM  iipver  Uo  made 
uf  the  premises  Lri-anlrd  would  l»r  pnxl.-  I>y  the  statute  31 
IIl'Uit  \'11I.,  none  liiit  tenants  of  the  freehold  who  have  estates 
of  inheritance  could  have  partition,  and  only  against  tenants 
of  the  freehold.  IJy  that  of  .'{2  Henry  VIII.  tenants  for  life  or 
yeais  nu;rht  have  jiartition,  l)ut  not  to  afl'eet  the  reversioner 
or  reiuainder-nuin.^  Where,  during  the  pendency  of  proceed- 
ings for  partition,  one  eotenant  mortgaged  his  interest,  it  was 
held  that  the  mortgage  attached  to  his  property  as  soon  as  set 
out  to  the  mortgagor,  and  the  same  rule  would  apply  if  the 
conveyance  had  been  in  fee.^  Within  the  rule  above  stated,  a 
tenant  l>y  the  curtesy  initiate  may  have  jiartition.'' 

7.  There  are  some  general  rules  and  princijjles  aj)pliealjle 
to  the  partition  of  estates  which  may  be  stated  in  anticipation 
of  the  statute  regulations  of  the  .several  States,  which  will  be 
found  at  the  close  of  this  chajiter.  A  petition  for  partition 
ordinarily  lies  only  in  favor  of  one  who  has  a  seisin  and  light 
of  immediate  jiossession,'' and  a  disseisin  or  adverse  |)ossession 
negatives  the  community  of  jiossession  upon  which  the  right 
to  partition  depends."  Partition  is  not  a  process  to  try  ques- 
tions of  title  if  the  petitioner  is  out  of  j)ossession.  If  therefore 
another  than  the  petitioner  is  in  adverse  ])ossession  for  how- 
ever short  a  time,  he  cannot  sustain  the  petition,  so  that  one 

1  Spaliling  V.  Wooilwanl,  53  N.  II.  573. 

«  Hunt  J>.  Wright,  47  N.  H.  31*0  ;  post,  vol.  2,  •448. 

•  Co.  Lit  167  ;  Mussey  v.  Saiiboni,  15  Ma&s.  155  ;  Austin  r.  Kutlaiul  K.  I?., 
45  Vt.  215. 

•  W.-stervflt  V.  Half,  2  Sandf.  Ch.  98  ;  Hainl  r.  Corwin,  17  Pi-nn.  St,  4»12. 
»  Kik.T  V.  Dark.',  4  Kdw.  Ch.  0(58. 

•  Bonner  v.  KcnnclK-ok  Punch.,  7  Mn.s.s.  475  ;  Hickanl  r.  Hickanl,  13  Pick- 
SSI  ;  W.Us  V.  Princf,  9  .Mjiss.  508;  nnulnhaw  v.  Cailaglian,  8  .luhns.  558;  Bmw- 
nell  V.  Brown.ll,  19  Wtml.  'Ml  ;  Barnar.1  v.  Vo\h',  14  .Ma.ss.  434  ;  .Milhr  r.  Den- 
nett, 6  N.  H.  109  ;  Call  v.  Barker,  12  Me.  320  ;  Stevens  v.  En.lers,  13  N.  J.  271  ; 
Whitt.n  V.  Whitten,  3f5  N.  H.  32t5  ;  .Ma.vwcl!  v.  Maxwell,  8  In'<l.  K-j.  25  ;  Hun- 
newell  V.  Taylor,  6  Gush.  472  ;  Foust  r.  .Moorninn,  2  Carter  (Iml.),  17  ;  Tahler  r. 
Wiseman,  2  Oliio  St.  207  ;  Lambert  v.  Blumenthal,  26  Mo.  471  ;  Brock  r.  East- 
man, 23  Vt.  658. 

'  Clai>p  V.  Bromaghain,  9  Cow.  iSO  ;  Thomaa  r.  Garvnn,  4  Dev.  223.  But  in 
Ma.sKaehu setts  i^  i*  helil  that  a  mere  technical  disseisin  docs  not  aflV-ct  one 
tenant  in  common  in  maintaining  |>artiti<>n,  y>o  lung  as  he  has  a  right  to  make  an 
inuuidiate  entry.  Marshall  r.  t  rehore,  13  Met.  462  ;  Kisher  v.  Dewer»on,  3  Met. 
544. 


716  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [bOOK  L 

co-tenant,  by  conveying  the  whole  estate  to  a  stranger,  may 
compel  his  co-tenant  to  regain  his  seisin  and  possession  before 
he  can  bring  process  for  partition.^  Thus,  one  claiming  a 
share  of  an  estate  for  an  alleged  breach  of  condition  cannot 
have  partition  until  he  shall  have  regained  his  seisin  by  an 
entry  upon  the  premises.^  A  judgment  for  partition,  when 
executed,  is  conclusive  evidence  that  the  part  set  off  to  one 
petitioner  was  a  part  of  the  premises  held  by  the  parties  in 
common,  nor  would  it  be  open  to  a  former  co-tenant  to  set  up 
an  easement  in  the  part  thus  set  off,  upon  the  ground  that  he 
had  enjoyed  it  adversely  before  such  partition  was  made.^ 

8.  Partition,  consequently,  does  not  lie  by  tenants  in  com- 
mon in  reversion  or  remainder,*  though  in  New  York  it  may 
be  made  of  an  equitable  estate,^  and  of  a  vested  remainder  by 
a  statute  of  that  Statc.^  An  outstanding  right  of  dower  in  a 
widow,  which  has  never  been  enforced,  is  no  objection  to  a 
valid  partition  among  those  having  the  inheritance."  So  the 
owners  of  an  equity  of  redemption  may  have  partition,  if  the 
mortgagee  has  not  entered  and  taken  possession  under  his 
mortgage.^  But  one  co-tenant  cannot  have  partition  against 
another  who  holds  a  mortgage  upon  the  whole  estate,  although 
it  may  not  have  been  recorded.^  But  if  partition  has  been 
made  while  there  is  an  outstanding  mortgage,  attachment,  or 
other  lien  upon  the  share  of  one  of  the  co-tenants,  it  will 
conclude  the  one  having  such  lien,  and  the  same  will  at- 
tach to  the  part  set  off  to  the  one  against  whom  it  exists.^*^ 

1  Florence  v.  Hopkins,  46  N.  Y.  184,  186. 

2  O'Dougherty  v.  Aldrich,  5  Denio,  385.       ^  Edson  v.  Munsell,  12  Allen,  602. 
*  Culver  V.  Culver,  2  Root,  278  ;  Ziegler  v.  Grim,  6  Watts,  106  ;  Hodgkinsou, 

Pet.,  12  Pick.  374  ;  Brown  v.  Brown,  8  N.  H.  93  ;  Kobertson  t;.  Robertson,  2 
Swan,  197  ;  Tabler  v.  Wiseman,  2  Ohio  St.  207  ;  Adam  v.  Ames  Iron  Co.,  24  Conn. 
230  ;  Nichols  v.  Nichols,  28  Vt.  228  ;  Hunnewell  v.  Taylor,  6  Cush.  472  ;  Johnson 
V.  Johnson,  7  Allen,  198. 

5  Hitchcock  V.  Skinner,  1  Hoffm.  Ch.  21. 

«  Blakeley  v.  Calder,  15  N.  Y.  617.  So  in  Hlinois  and  New  Jersey.  Scoville  v. 
Hilliard,  48  111.  453  ;  Hilliard  v.  Scoville,  52  111.  449;  Smith  v.  Gaines,  38  N.  J. 
Eq.  65. 

7  Bradshaw  v.  Callaghan,  8  Johns.  558  ;  Motley  v.  Blake,  12  Mass.  280  ; 
Leonard  v.  Motley,  75  Me.  418. 

8  Call  V.  Barker,  12  Me.  320. 

9  Blodg(!tt  V.  Hildreth,  8  Allen,  186;  Fuller  r.  Bradley,  23  Pick.  9. 
10  Mass.  Pub.  Stat.  c.  178,  §  44. 


Cll.  XIII.   §   7.]  JOINT    i;ST\TIN.  717 

IJiit  two  iiiortLratroos  ^vitll  siimiltaiicous  iiiorttrnpos  *c;m-  [•420] 
not     liJivc    jtartitioii    until   alter    fon-closun-    of    tlirir 
mortgaj^cs.^ 

Ha.  To  <rlvc  validity  and  cITt'ct  to  n  j»aitition,  ull  persona 
interi'stcd  should  1)0  made  parties  to  the  proceedings.  Such 
parties  ami  none  others  would  l)e  bound  by  tlie  judgment. 
'J'hus,  bci'oro  the  statute  l)ound  mortgagees  and  attaching 
creditors  of  one  co-tenant  by  a  partition  to  which  he  is  party, 
and  gave  a  lien  upon  his  jiroperty  when  set  out  to  liim,  such 
mortgagee  or  attaching  creditor  was  not  bound  by  such  par- 
tition comnionced  and  perfected  after  the  lien  thus  createii 
was  institute(l,  miiess  he  was  nia<lc  a  jiarty  to  the  proeeed- 
ings.2  And  a  jiartition  where  one  of  the  co-tenants  is  a 
disseisor,  or  wrongfully  ('laiins  a  share  of  the  estate,  will 
not  alTeet  the  rights  of  the  disseisee,  although  such  coten- 
nant  is  in  possession  of  the  i»remise8,  but  when  the  dissei- 
see regains  his  seisin  he  will  be  tenant  in  common  with 
the  rightful  co-tenant.^ 

9.  It  has  been  held  in  Massachusetts,  that  if  the  common 
estate  consists  of  several  parcels,  it  is  not  required  in  making 
partition  that  each  jtarcel  should  be  divided ;  the  entire  share 
of  one  of  the  co-tenants  may  be  set  ofT  in  one  of  the  parcels, 
if  the  commissioners  see  fit.*  The  same  rule  applies  in  de- 
scribing what  is  set  off  to  a  co-tenant  ui)on  partition  made,  as 
in  making  a  deed  from  one  to  another.  Thus  the  assignment 
of  a  mill  to  one  carries  with  it  the  land  on  which  it  stands, 
and  the  appurtenant  easements  necessary  to  its  full  enjoy- 
ment.-^ 

10.  In  Vermont,  the  court  refused  to  order  a  partition  of  an 
ore  bed,  or  of  a  mill,  mill-pond,  and  mill-yard,  which  formed 

1  Ewer  V.  Hobbs,  5  Met.  1.     Contra,  Munroe  v.  Walbridge,  2  Aik.  410. 

2  Colton  V.  Sniitli,  11  Pick.  311  ;  Munroe  r.  Luke,  19  Pick.  39  ;  Ma.ss.  Pub. 
Stat.  c.  178,  §  43  ;  Cook  v.  Allen,  2  Mass.  4C2.  See  Purvis  v.  Wilson,  5  Jones 
(N.  C),  22  ;  Ke.ster  v.  Stark,  19  111.  328  ;  Burhans  r.  Burhans,  2  Burb.  Cli.  398  ; 
De  I'l-rey  r.  De  Uprey,  27  Cal.  332  ;  Harlan  v.  Stout,  22  Ind.  488  ;  Koss  r.  Cobb, 
48  111.  114  ;  Kilgour  v.  Crawford,  51  111.  249.  Of.  Duke  v.  Hague,  15  W.  No. 
Cas.  353. 

»  Dom  V.  Beasly,  7  Rich,  Eq.  84  ;  Foxcroft  v.  Barnes,  29  Me.  128  ;  Arp>le  v. 
Dwinel,  29  Me.  29.  CotUra,  Mass.  Pub.  Stot.  c.  178,  §  35  ;  Foster  v.  Abbot, 
8  Met.  596. 

♦  Hagar  v.  Wiswall,  10  Pick.  152.     Cf.  Hardin  r.  Lawrence,  40  N.  J.  Eq.  151 

•  Munroe  r.  Stickney,  48  Me.  458. 


718  LAW   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  [bOOK   L 

one  estate,  because  they  were  not  subjects  of  partition.^  And 
a  partition  made  in  New  Hampshire,  of  a  mill,  by  assigning  to 
the  co-tenants  the  alternate  use  of  it  for  specified  periods,  was 
set  aside  as  being  unauthorized  by  law  ;  ^  and  such  was  held  to 
be  the  case  in  Massachusetts,  until  a  statute  made  provision 
for  such  a  partition.^  The  courts  of  California  do  not  regard 
the  water  flowing  in  a  ditch  designed  for  mining  purposes  as 
a  subject  of  partition  by  any  mechanical  division.  And  the 
only  way  in  which  the  interests  of  such  common  owners  can 
be  divided  is  by  making  sale  of  the  same,^  But  in  New  York, 
where  there  were  several  mills  upon  the  same  stream,  parti- 
tion was  made  by  assigning  a  mill  and  mill-dam  to  one,  with  a 
privilege  of  flowing  the  land  of  the  other  above  him,  for  the 
purpose  of  raising  the  necessary  head  of  water.^  In  a  case  in 
Maine,  where  the  common  property  was  a  cotton  factory,  the 
commissioners  reported  that  it  could  not  be  divided,  to  be 
used  for  the  purposes  for  which  it  was  constructed,  but  might 
be  for  other  uses,  and  the  court  required  it  to  be  done.^  In 
some  of  the  States,  if  the  property  is  not  susceptible  of  parti- 
tion, the  court  may  order  it  sold,  and  the  proceeds  divided.'' 
In  Massachusetts,  if  the  premises  cannot  be  divided,  they  may 
all  be  set  to  one,  and  he  be  required  to  pay  the  estimated  value 
of  his  co-tenant's  share  to  him.^ 

11.  In  most  of  the  States,  in  addition  to  the  modes  of  effect- 
ing partition  above  mentioned,  courts  of  probate  jurisdiction 
have  the  power  to  cause  partition  to  be  made  among  the  heirs 
or  devisees  of  an  estate  which  has  come  within  the  cognizance 

1  Conant  v.  Smith,  1  Aik.  67  ;  Brown  v.  Turner,  Id,  350. 

2  Crowell  V.  Woodbury,  52  N.  H.  613. 

8  Miller  v.  Miller,  13  Pick.  237;  Pub.  Stat.  c.  136,  §  77  ;  De  Witt  v.  Harvey, 
4  Gray,  486. 

*  McGillivray  v.  Evans,  27  Cal.  96. 

5  Hills  V.  Dey,  14  Wend.  204.  See,  as  to  special  partition  of  mines  and  other 
indivisible  hereditaments  by  means  of  resort  to  equity,  Adam  v.  Briggs  Iron  Co., 
7  Cush.  361  ;  Tyler  v.  Wilkinson,  4  Mason,  397  ;  Belknap  v.  Trimble,  3  Paige, 
577  ;  De  Witt  v.  Harvey,  4  Gray,  499  ;  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §  656.  See  also,  as  to 
dividing  water-power  in  New  Hampshire,  Morrill  v.  Morrill,  5  N.  H.  134  ;  and 
Me.  Stat.  1821,  c.  37,  §  2  ;  Hanson  v.  Willard,  12  Me.  142. 

6  Wood  V.  Little,  35  Me.  107. 

^  Eoyston  v.  Royston,  13  Ga.  425  ;  Higginbottom  v.  Short,  25  Miss.  160. 
8  King  V.  Reed,  11  Gray,  490. 


CH.  XIII.  §  7.]  JOINT  f:statf.s.  719 

of  tlic  court,'  In  such  case  no  dccil  of  irlcasc  of  their  Kovcral 
propoi'tions  by  out-  heir  or  devisee  to  ancjtlier  is  required,  uh 
the  adjudication  of  the  court,  accepting  and  anirniing  the 
dt»inirs  (jf  the  coinniissioners  ajipoiuted  to  make  the  partition, 
is  binding  and  conchisive.  The  partition  must  be  of  the  entire 
estate  and  not  of  a  part  only,-  nor  can  it  affect  an 
alienee  of  one  of  the  heirs*  or  devisees  who  ac(piires  ['4J30J 
his  title  before  proceedings  are  commenced,  as  such 
alienee  is  not  a  party  to  the  proceedings  of  settling  the  estate 
in  the  probate  court.^ 

12.  No  jiarol  partition  can  be  elTectual  unless  accompanied 
by  deeds  from  one  co-tenant  to  the  other,  inasmuch  as  the 
statute  of  frauds  applies  to  such  cases.'*  But  where  two  ten- 
ants in  common  made  parol  partition  of  land,  it  was  held  to 
be  good  and  elVectual  against  crediti)rs  and  purchasers  if  it  is 
followed  by  separate  open  and  notorious  jjossession.  And 
such  possession  would  be  notice  of  an  existing  deed,  though  it 
had  not  been  recorded.'^  But  in  one  case  in  New  York,  the 
court  gave  practical  effect  to  a  [)artition  made  by  co-tenants 
by  parol  between  themselves,  which  was  followed  by  a  separate 
occupation  by  each  tenant  for  several,  though  less  than  twenty 
years.  One  of  these  having  made  expensive  im])rovemeuts 
upon  the  part  set  to  him,  and  another  of  the  original  co-tenants 
having  sought  to  enforce  a  new  partition,  the  court  refused  to 
allow  this  partition  to  be  disturbed.'^  But  in  New  Ilamjishirc 
and  Massachusetts  there  is  a  class  of  quasi  corporations  known 
as  proprietors  of  common  lands,  which  may  make  partition  of 
their  lands  l)y  a  sim})lc  vote  properly  made  and  recorded  with- 
out any  deed." 

1  Walton  I'.  Willis,  1  Dall.  265  ;  Witham  i;.  Cutts,  4  Me.  31, 

2  Arms  V.  Lyman,  5  Pick.  210. 

8  Pond  v.  Pond,  13  Mass,  413  ;  Cook  v.  Davenport,  17  Mass.  84.S, 

*  Porter  v.  Hill,  9  Mass.  34  ;  Porter  t;.  Perkins,  5  Mass.  232  ;  Siiively  r.  Luce, 
1  Watts,  69  ;  Gratz  v.  Gratz,  4  Rawle,  411  ;  Gardiner  Mr.  Co,  r,  Heald,  5  Me. 
384  ;  Dow  v.  Jewell,  13  N.  H.  354  ;  Den  v.  Lon^street,  18  N.  J.  L.  414.  Hut  it  is 
otherwise  in  Te.xas.     Stuart  v.  Buker,  17  Tex,  420, 

&  Manly  v.  Pettee,  38  111,  128-132. 

6  Wood  V.  Fleet,  36  N.  Y.  501.     See  also  Conkling  r.  Brown,  57  Barb.  265. 

^  Cobum  V.  EUenwood,  4  N.  H.  99 ;  Folger  v.  Mitchell.  3  Pick,  31t6  ;  Adams 
r.  Frothingham,  3  Mass.  852  ;  Corbett  v.  Norcross,  35  N.  H.  *.»!'  :  Hot)! well  v. 
Dewees,  2  Block,  613. 


720  LAW   OF   REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

13.  But  although  a  parol  partition  between  tenants  in  com- 
mon may  not,  for  the  reasons  stated,  affect  the  legal  title  of 
the  several  owners,  where  it  is  followed  by  a  possession  in 
conformity  with  such  partition  it  will  so  far  bind  the  pos- 
session as  to  give  to  each  co-tenant  the  rights  and  incidents  of 
an  exclusive  possession  of  his  purparty.^  Exclusive  posses- 
sion by  one  tenant  in  common  of  a  particular  part  of  the 
estate,  accompanied  by  a  denial  of  his  co-tenant's  right  of 
possession  in  the  part  thus  occupied,  may  grow  into  a  legal 
presumption  of  partition  having  been  made.^  And  in  some 
cases  the  law  will  infer  this  from  the  mere  sole  and  exclusive 
occupation  of  such  part,  if  continued  a  sufficient  length  of 
time,  —  in  Pennsylvania  twenty-one  years,  and  in  Kentucky 
twenty  years.^ 

14.  Although  each  of  several  tenants  in  common  has  a 
several  freehold  in  his  share  or  part  of  the  common  inherit- 
ance, yet  the  interests  of  all  are  so  far  identical,  and  each  is 
so  far  regarded  as  acting  for  the  others  in  regard  to  the  estate, 
that,  if  there  were  an  outstanding  adverse  title  to  any  part  of 
the  estate,  no  one  of  them,  before  partition  made,  could,  by 
purchasing  it  in,  use  it  against  his  co-tenants  if  they  were 
willing  to  contribute  'pro  rata  towards  reimbursing  him  the 
moneys  he  may  have  had  to  pay  to  acquire  such  title.  Equity 
would,  in  such  case,  restrain  the  use  of  such  title  adversely  to 
his  co-tenants.  In  making  such  purchase,  he  would  be  con- 
sidered as  acting  as  trustee  for  his  co-tenants,  until  they  should 
have  disaffirmed  the  presumption  by  refusing  to  contribute.* 
The  rule  of  equity  is  thus  stated  in  Britton  v.  Handy  :  "  Equity 
prohibits  a  purchase  by  parties  placed  in  the  situation  of  trust 

1  Jackson  v.  Harder,  4  Johns.  202,  212  ;  Jackson  v.  Vosburgh,  9  Johns.  276  ; 
Slice  V.  Derrick,  2  Rich.  627,  629  ;  Piatt  v.  Hubbel,  5  Ohio,  243  ;  Corbin  v.  Jack- 
son, 14  Wend.  619  ;  Keay  d.  Goodwin,  16  Mass.  1,  3  ;  Eider  v.  Maul,  46  Penn.  St. 
376  ;  Maul  v.  Rider,  51  Penn.  St.  377.  And  see  Hazen  v.  Barnett,  50  Mo.  507, 
that  it  gives  an  equitable  title.     So  Tomlin  v.  Hilyard,  43  111.  302. 

2  Lloyd  V.  Gordon,  2  Har.  &  McH.  254. 

8  Gregg  v.  Blackmore,  10  Watts,  192  ;  Drane  v.  Gregory,  3  B.  Mon.  619. 

*  Venable  u  Beauchamp,  3  Dana,  321  ;  Lee  v.  Fox,  6  Dana,  171  ;  Thruston 
V.  Masterson,  9  Dana,  228  ;  Owings  v.  M'Clain,  1  A.  K.  Marsh.  230  ;  Van  Home 
V.  Fonda,  6  Johns.  Ch.  407  ;  4  Kent,  Com.  371  ;  Titsworth  v.  Stout,  49  lU. 
78,  80. 


CII.  XIII.  §  7.]  JOINT   ESTATES.  721 

or  conliiloncL'  with  ivspi'ct  to  the  Kuhjcrt  of  the  piircliaHc, — 
no  i)iirty  can  he  jteriuittcd  to  jmrchase  for  his  own  iK'ncfit  or 
interest,  where  he  has  a  «hity  t<»  jMrfoini  whidi  is  ineon«ist<M»t 
with  the  character  of  the  jiurchase;  and  this  has  Ijcen  aiiplied 
to  j)Uicliases  of  outstandinir  titles  and  inciunhrances  by  joint- 
tenants,  and,  in  some  instances,  by  tenants  in  common."  ^ 
And  it  has  accordinjrly  l)een  held  that  one  tenant  cuunot  j^ain 
any  advantai^c  airainst  his  co-tenant  hy  bidding  in  the  common 
jiroperty,  if  sold  for  taxes  ^-^  thoii^rh  it  has  been  said  tiiat, 
after  the  period  of  redemption  from  such  sale  has  exj)ired, 
cither  of  the  co-tenants  may  juirchase  the  estate  of  the  <mc 
who  may  have  bid  it  oil',  without  thereby  creating  any  rights 
in  his  co-tenant.^ 

*  lo.  r>ut  how  far  this  principle  shall  be  ajijdied  [*i-^'l] 
after  partition  made,  dcjicnds  upon  the  circumstances 

of  the  cases  as  they  arise.  Thus,  supposing  partition  to  be 
made  by  mutual  deeds  of  release  without  fraud,  and  the  title 
to  some  })art  of  the  premises  fails,  the  loss,  as  a  general 
proposition,  falls  on  the  party  whose  property  is  immediately 
affected  l)y  it.* 

IC.  But  by  the  statute  31  Henry  A'lll.  it  was  expressly 
provided  that  tenants  in  common,  between  whom  partition 
has  been  made  by  a  writ  of  partition,  may  have  the  aid  of 
each  other  "  to  deraign  the  warranty  "  as  to  the  estate  ;  that 
is,  to  avail  himself  of  the  benefit  of  the  general  warranty 
which  had  attached  to  the  estate,  by  rendering  it  effectual  for 
the  protection  of,  or  compensation  for,  the  land  which  should 

1  Brittin  v.  Handy,  20  Ark.  381,  402.  See  also  Jones  r.  Stanton.  11  Mo.  433  ; 
Flagg  V.  Mann,  2  Sumn.  486  ;  Weaver  v.  Wible,  25  Penn.  St.  270  ;  Ti.sdale  r. 
Ti3<lale,  2  Snced,  596  ;  Lloyd  v.  Lpich,  23  Penn.  St.  419  ;  Picot  v.  Pagi',  26  -Mo. 
398  ;  Gossom  v.  Donaldson,  18  B.  Mon.  230;  and;  ]>.  "410  ;  .Sullivan  v.  Mel^n- 
ans,  2  Iowa,  442.  But  see  Wells  v.  C'liapnian,  4  Sandf.  Cli.  312.  The  Ri-nenil 
doctrine  above  stated  is  fully  sustaiur<l  liy  tlie  U.  S.  Court  Kotiiwell  v.  Dewees, 
2  Blaek,  613,  citing  Farmer  v.  Samuel,  4  Littell,  187  ;  Lee  r.  Fox,  6  Dana,  170  ; 
Butler  V.  Porter,  13  Mich.  292  ;  Downer  v.  Smith,  38  Vt.  464  ;  Titiworth  v. 
Stout,  49  111.  80. 

2  Page  V.  Webster,  8  Mich.  263  ;  Lloyd  v.  Lynch,  28  Penn.  St.  419  ;  llalscy 
V.  Blood,  29  Penn.  St.  319  ;  Morgan  v.  Herrick,  21  111.  481. 

'  Keinboth  v.  Zerbe  Run  Imp.  Co.,  29  Penn.  St.  139.  See  also  Watkina  « 
Eaton,  30  Me.  529. 

*  Beardsley  r.  Knight,  10  Vt.  185  ;  Wciser  r.  WeUer,  5  Watta,  279. 

VOL.  I.—  46 


722  LAW   OP   REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

be  adversely  demanded  or  recovered.^  This  proposition  may 
perhaps  be  made  a  little  more  intelligible  by  the  analogy  there 
is  between  the  case  of  such  tenant  in  common,  and  that  of  a 
tenant  having  the  right  to  call  "  in  aid  "  another  to  protect 
his  title.  Thus,  for  instance,  if  a  tenant  for  life  is  sued  in  a 
writ  of  entry  by  some  one  claiming  the  inheritance,  as  he  is 
not  supposed  to  be  cognizant  of  the  full  title,  he  properlj' 
calls  upon  the  reversioner  to  aid  him  in  making  defence.  So 
if  one  has  purchased  the  inheritance,  and  his  vendor  has  war- 
ranted the  title,  and  he  is  sued,  in  such  an  action  he  may  call 
upon,  or,  in  technical  terms,  "  vouch  in,"  his  warrantor  to 
defend  the  title.^  But  as  tenants  in  common,  after  partition 
made,  are  not  considered  as  holding  under  each  other,  so  that, 
if  one  is  sued  in  respect  to  his  title  to  his  property,  he  can 
call  the  others  in  aid,  or  vouch  them  in  to  defend  as  warran- 
tors, they  are  all  considered  as  holding  under  the  original 
general  or  paramount  warrantor.  And  when  either  of  them 
was  sued  in  respect  to  his  title,  he  might  require  the  aid  of 
his  former  co-tenants  in  calling  upon  their  general  or  para- 
mount warrantor  to  make  good  his  warranty,  or  make  com- 
pensation.^ 
[*432J  *17.  Applying  this  common-law  duty  of  co-tenants 
to  aid  each  other  in  protecting  what  had  been  a  com- 
mon estate,  even  after  partition  made,  the  law  holds  it  incom- 
patible with  their  duty  towards  each  other  for  either  to  become 


1  Cowel,  Interp.  Verb.  "Deraign,"  Monice's  Case,  6  Rep.  12  ;  Allnatt,  Part. 
161,  163  ;  6  Dane,  Abr.  5,  where  it  is  said  the  Stat.  31  Henry  VIII.  is  a  part  of 
Massachusetts  common  law;  and  so  in  Tennessee,  8  Humph.  285.  "Z>e  ar- 
raign" applied  to  hindering  or  preventing  battle  when  tenant  waged  it,  is  said 
to  be  derived  from  "  dcrismer,"  signifying  to  deny  or  refuse.  Barringt.  Stat.  296, 
and  note.  In  this  sense  it  would  seem  to  imply  the  making  use  of  the  warranty 
by  way  of  estoppel,  by  calling  in  a  party  to  whom  it  applied.  But  in  a  book 
called  "Law  French  and  Latin  Dictionary,"  published  in  1701,  "by  F.  0."  one 
definition  of  "deraign"  is  "to  prove  or  make  good."  "A  deraignment  or 
proof." 

2  Steams,  Real  Act.  99,  131  ;  Booth,  Real  Act.  60. 

8  Morrice's  Case,  6  Rep.  12  ;  Allnatt,  Part.  156-164  ;  1  Prest.  Abs.  304  ;  Saw- 
yers V.  Cator,  8  Humph.  256  ;  Morris  v.  Harris,  9  Gill,  19  ;  Dugan  v.  Hollins,  4 
Md.  Ch.  139  ;  Co.  Lit.  174  a.  The  reader,  however,  should  bear  in  mind  that 
the  warranty  here  spoken  of  is  the  ancient  warranty  of  the  common  law,  which 
never  practically  obtained  in  the  United  States.     4  Kent,  Com.  470. 


CH.  XIII.  §  7.]  JOINT   ESTATES.  723 

tlu>  (It'iiiandant  in  a  suit  ti»  rccovtT  any  jmrtion  of  tlw  laml  In' 
a  jtanunount  title,  ami  tliiis  to  iihu-c  liinisclf  in  antagonism  to 
his  co-tenants  and  tht'ir  common  warrantor.' 

18.  And  where  partition  has  liccn  made  In-  hnv,  each  jiarti- 
titionor  becomes  a  wariantor  to  all  tlu'  others  to  the  extent  of 
his  sliare,  so  long  as  the  privity  of  estate  continnes  between 
them.  And  inasmuch  as  a  warrantor  cajniot  claim  against  hirt 
own  warranty,  no  tenant  after  i)artition  made  can  set  u|»  an 
adverse  title  to  the  |»ortion  of  another,  for  the  purpose  of 
ousting  him  from  the  jiait  which  has  been  parted  oil'  to  him.'^ 
Willi!  partition  has  been  made,  the  tenant,  to  whom  a  jiart 
has  been  set  out,  is  regarded  in  law  as  a  purchaser  for  value 
of  the  same.-' 

111.  It',  aftei-  tlic  partition  has  been  mad'',  one  (jf  the  parties 
is  evicted  of  his  jtrctperty  in-  a  j)aramount  title,  the  partition  as 
to  him  is  defeated  at  his  election,  and  he  may  enter  uj)on  the 
shares  of  the  others  as  if  none  had  been  made,  and  have  a  new 
partition  of  the  premises.  But  this  right  does  not  extend  to 
the  alienee  of  one  of  these  tenants,  because  by  such  alienation 
the  privity  of  estate  between  them  and  tlie  holder  of  his  share 
is  destroyed.  Nor  can  the  alienee  himself  enter  upon  the 
shares  of  the  other  tenants  in  such  a  case  and  defeat  the 
{)artition.'*  And  if,  in  the  case  su|)posed,  one  cotenant  after 
partition  is  evicted  by  paramount  title,  he  is  not  conlined  for 
his  remedy  to  a  new  partition,  but  may  rely  upon  his  warranty 
and  recover  his  rec(jmpense  f<jr  his  loss  by  an  action  thereon 
against  his  former  co-tenants.*  * 

*  Note.  —  In  some  of  the  States,  as  before  stated,  joint  tenants  ami 
tcniints  *  in  common  are    inohibited  by  statute    from   committing  waste  [•iSS] 
upon  the  common  inliuritance.     In  MossachiLscft.i  and  Mninc,  if  a  tenant 
commits  waste  without  first  f^^'i"  thirty  days'  prior  notice  to  his  co-t<'iiant«  in 
writing,  he  forfeits  three  times  the  amount  of  the  damages  that  shall  be  occa- 
sioned thereby  in  a  suit  by  one  or  more  of  the  co-tenants.     Mass.  Gen.  Stat. 

^  Venable  v.  Beauchamp,  3  Dana,  326. 

'  Co.  Lit.  174a;  Com.  Dig.  i'arciMi<r,  ('.  13;  Venable  r.  Beauchamp,  3 
Dana,  326. 

«  Campau  v.  Barnard,  25  Mich.  382. 

*  Co.  Lit.  173  b;  Id.  174  a;  Com.  Dig.  Parcener,  C.  13;  Feather  r.  Strohoecker, 
3  Penn.  505. 

*  Com.  Dig.  Parcener,  C.  14. 


724  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  L 

1860,  c.  138,  §  7  ;  Maine  Rev.  Stat.  1871,  c.  95,  §  5.  In  Rhode  Island,  if  a  tenant 
commit  waste  without  the  consent  of  his  co-tenants,  he  forfeits  double  damages 
for  the  waste  done.  Gen.  Stat.  c.  220,  §  2.  In  New  York,  the  co-tenant  in  such 
a  case  may  take  judgment  for  treble  damages,  or  he  may  have  partition  of  the 
estate  at  his  election,  and  the  amount  of  such  damage  deducted  from  the  defend- 
ant's share  and  added  to  his  own.  And  the  law  is  the  same  in  Neiv  Jersey,  ex- 
cept that  single  damages  only  can  be  recovered.  In  Ohio,  one  parcener  may 
have  an  action  of  waste  in  a  civil  form  against  his  coparceners.  N.  Y.  Rev. 
Stat.  vol.  2,  p.  346  ;  Nixon,  Dig.  of  N.  J.  Stat.  1868,  p.  1022  ;  Ohio  Rev.  Stat. 
1860,  c.  8],  §  15.  In  3Iissouri,  a  tenant  in  common  is  liable  to  his  co-tenant  in 
an  action  at  law  for  doing  waste  upon  the  premises,  and  if  wantonly  done  he  may 
recover  treble  damages.  Stat.  1872,  vol.  2,  c.  85,  §  46.  In  Virginia,  the  law  is 
the  same  in  such  cases  as  in  Missouri.  Code,  1873,  c.  133,  §  2.  So  in  Kentucky, 
Gen.  Stat.  1873,  c.  &Q,  art.  3,  §  5.  In  Minnesota,  the  tenant  committing  waste  is 
liable  to  forfeit  his  estate  and  pa}'  treble  damages  to  his  co-tenant  in  certain  cases. 
Stat.  1873,  c.  43,  §  27.  And  a  similar  law  prevails  in  Iowa  and  Indiana.  Iowa, 
Code,  1873,  Tit.  20,  §  3332  ;  Ind.  Rev.  Stat.  1852,  vol.  2,  p.  174.  In  Michigan 
and  Wisconsin,  such  tenant  may  have  an  action  on  the  case  for  the  waste,  and 
recover  double  damages.  Mich.  Comp.  Laws,  1871,  vol.  2,  c.  197,  §  3;  Wis.  Rev. 
Stat.  1858,  c.  143.  In  California,  he  may  recover  treble  damages  in  an  action  for 
such  waste.     Wood,  Dig.  1858. 

Note.  —  In  a  large  majority  of  the  States,  partition  may  be  made  by  a  sum- 
mary and  convenient  method  of  petition  to  the  courts  of  common  law. 

In  Massachusetts,  one  or  more  of  the  persons  holding  lands  as  joint-tenants,  co- 
parceners, or  tenants  in  common  may  ajiply  by  petition  to  the  Superior  or  Supreme 
Court,  held  for  the  county  in  which  the  lands  lie,  for  a  partition  of  the  same.  The 
petition  may  be  maintained  by  any  person  who  has  an  estate  in  possession,  but 
not  by  one  who  has  only  a  remainder  or  reversion  ;  nor  by  any  tenant  for  years, 
of  whose  term  less  than  twenty  years  remain  unexpired,  as  against  a  tenant  of  the 
freehold.  Tenants  for  years,  however,  may  have  partition  between  themselves, 
though  such  partition  shall  not  affect  the  premises  when  they  revert  to  the  respec- 
tive landlords  or  reversioners.  The  petition  sets  forth  the  rights  and  titles  of  all 
persons  interested  who  would  be  bound  by  the  partition,  whether  they  have  an 
estate  of  inheritance  for  life  or  years,  in  possession,  remainder,  or  reversion,  and 
whether  vested  or  contingent ;  and  if  the  petitioner  holds  an  estate  for  life  or 
years,  the  person  entitled  to  the  remainder  or  reversion  is  a  party  interested,  and 
entitled  to  notice.  Parties  within  the  State  are  notified  by  serving  upon  them  an 
attested  copy  of  the  petition  and  of  the  summons  ;  and  parties  absent  from 
[*434]  the  State,  or  unknown,  are  notified  by  public  *  advertisement,  and  the 
court  may  allow  them  time  to  appear  and  answer.  Where  some  of  the 
parties  are  infants  or  insane  persons,  the  court  may  assign  guardians  to  such.  If 
a  person  not  named  in  the  petition  appears  and  defends,  the  petitioner  may  deny 
his  title.  If  it  appears  that  the  petitioner  is  entitled  to  partition,  an  interlocutory 
judgment  that  partition  be  made  is  awarded,  and  commissioners  are  appointed  to 
make  it.  If  there  are  several  petitioners,  they  may,  at  their  election,  have  their 
shares  set  off  together  or  in  severalty.  If  a  division  cannot  be  made  without 
damage  to  the  owners,  the  whole  estate,  or  the  part  incapable  of  division,  may  be 
set  off  to  any  one  who  will  accept  it,  he  paying  a  sum  of  money  to  make  tlie  i)arti- 
tion  just  and  etj^ual;  or  the  exclusive  occupancy  and  enjoyment  of  the  whole  oi 


CII.  XIII,  §  7.]  JOINT   ESTATES.  7'J.' 

part  may  be  n«*i};iu'<l  to  cmh  of  the  jmrtieH  altoniatcly  for  certain  *ix'<'ifii'<l  tinif«, 
in  iirft|»ortion  to  tlu-ir  rf«|>eotivo  intvrfiitA.  In  Buch  cmu:  tin*  occiijioiit  for  thi* 
time  being  In  liuble  to  bin  i-u-t<-nantH  for  any  injury  to  the  prfniiwn  u<-(uu>iun<  il 
by  his  miscondiiit,  iw  if  a  tenant  for  years  witliout  exprew*  rovtiiantM  ;  and 
like  such  tenant  he  may  n'eover  daniagi-H  for  an  injnrj"  by  a  Rtnin}?er;  ami  lie 
nn<l  tbo  otlier  tenants  may  reeover  joijitly  for  any  fiirtlier  tiamnpi'*  in  like  manner 
AS  lessors.  I'lmn  the  return  of  tlie  eommissioners,  the  final  judgment  confirming 
their  rejKirt  i.s  oonclnsivi-  as  to  the  rights  of  pn>|)«'rty,  and  |>oKS4»sion  i>f  i>^irti(<i 
and  privies  to  the  judgment,  including  all  \vhi>  might  have  apin-ared  and  answen-d, 
except  that  an  alisent  jMirt-owner  may  apply  for  a  new  jiartition  within  three  years. 
A  stranger  claiming  in  severalty  is  not  buuml  by  a  judgment  of  partition  ;  but  if 
one  who  has  not  a|)peareil  and  answered,  claims  the  shan-  assignc«i  to  or  left  for  any 
of  the  supposed  jwrt-owners,  he  is  bound  by  the  judgment,  so  far  as  it  respe<tj»  the 
partition  and  assignment  of  the  shares,  like  a  jKirty  to  the  suit;  but  he  may  bring 
his  action  for  the  share  claimed  by  him  against  the  person  to  whom  it  was  assigned 
or  left.  In  cu.se  two  or  more  n'SjKindents  claim  the  sjime  sluin-,  their  n-sjK-ctive 
claims  may  be  left  undeciiled,  except  so  far  as  to  determine  which  shall  Im-  uilmitte<i 
to  ap]>ear  ;  and  the  share  so  claimed  is  left  for  whichever  jiarty  is  proved  to  l>e  en- 
titleil  to  it  in  a  suit  iK-tween  themselves  subsequent  to  the  partition.  If  it  is  de- 
cided in  the  suit  for  partition  that  either  of  the  resiKimlents  is  not  entitled  to  the 
share  that  he  claims,  he  is  concluded  by  the  judgment,  so  far  as  it  resjM-cts  the  jmr- 
tition  and  assignment,  but  he  may  bring  an  action  against  the  other  claimant  for 
his  share.  If  any  person  who  has  not  appeared  and  answere<l,  claims  an  addi- 
tional share  as  i>art -owner,  he  is  bound  by  the  jMirtition,  but  may  recover  against 
each  of  the  other  tenants  his  iirojwrtion  thereof.  In  ca.sc  a  share  is  left  or 
assigned  to  a  part-owner  who  is  »lead,  his  heir  or  devisee  may  claim  the  origi- 
nal share,  though  made  a  party  to  the  [>etition.  A  jiarty  evictetl  of  his  share 
by  jaraniount  title  nuiy  have  a  new  partition  of  the  residue.  A  jH-i-son  hav- 
ing  a  mortgiige  or  other  lieu  ui>on  the  share  of  a  part-owner  is  concluded  by 
the  Jiartition  ;  but  his  lien  remains  in  full  force  ui>on  the  part  nssigtjcd  or 
left  to  such  jMirt-owner.  If  tlio  j>etitioncr  recovers  judgment  in  any  jirocess 
of  {Mirtition  in  which  the  res|>ondeut  claims  any  part  of  the  pn'mi.s«»s  as  his 
own  estate  in  fee,  and  it  is  proved  that  the  latter  held  the  same  under  a 
title  which  he  believed  to  be  goo<l,  *  he  is  entitled  to  iK-tterments  as  [•43.''.] 
pro\-ided  for  tenants  in  real  actions,  and  the  petitioner  must  i>ay  for  them 
after  deducting  the  rents,  profits,  and  other  damages  for  which  the  resi»ondent  in 
chargeable.  So  a  party  holding  \nider  partition  is  entitled  to  betterments  in  eas<' 
of  eviction.  If,  after  a  first  partition,  improvement's  have  Wen  made  on  onv 
part  of  the  premises  which  by  the  new  {tartition  is  taken  from  the  share  of  the 
party  who  made  them,  he  is  entitled  to  contribution,  to  l»o  awanb-"!  bv  the  com- 
missioners. A  lea.se  of  the  whole  or  a  part  of  the  estate  to  l)e  divid(><l  dcH-s  not 
pn-vent  or  invaliilate  the  partition  ;  nor  is  it  pn-ventetl  or  invalidated  by  ony  of 
the  tenants  b-ing  tnistee,  attorney,  or  guardian  of  a  co-tenant.  In  ca.s<!  of  re- 
mainders or  estates  devi.sc<I  or  limited  to,  or  in  trust  for,  persons  not  in  heinf^  at 
thi-  time  of  the  application  for  partition,  n|x)n  notice  to  the  persons  who  may  be 
parents  of  such  jiersons,  the  court  may  appoint  a  p«'rson  to  api>ear  as  the  next 
friend  of  such  person.s.  The  n-tum  of  the  commissioners  is  to  Ik-  rceonle<|  in  the 
registr>-  of  deeds  for  the  county  when-  the  lan<l  lies.  Partition  may  also  l<e  com- 
pelled by  writ  of  partition  at  the  common  law.     (Pub.  Stat.  c.  178,  §  1.)     Courts 


726  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  L 

of  probate  may  make  partition  of  lands  held  in  common  by  joint-tenants  or  tenants 
in  common,  where  their  respective  shares  are  not  in  dispute,  in  the  same  way  as 
such  partition  might  be  made  among  heirs  or  devisees  of  an  estate  of  a  deceased 
person.  And  if  the  lands  of  which  partition  is  to  be  made  cannot  be  advantage- 
ously divided,  the  court  may  authorize  the  commissioners  to  make  sale  and  con- 
veyance of  the  whole  or  any  part  of  the  same,  and  the  proceeds  to  be  distributed 
in  such  a  manner  as  to  make  the  partition  equal.     Pub.  Stat.  1881,  c.  178. 

In  Maine,  the  petition  is  addressed  to  the  Supreme  Court  held  for  the  county 
where  the  land  lies,  and  the  proceedings  under  the  petition  are,  in  all  the  more 
important  features,  similar  to  those  in  Massachusetts,  as  described  above.  A 
writ  of  partition  may  also  be  had  at  common  law.  Rev.  Stat.  1857,  c.  88.  And 
see  Acts  1860,  c.  180  ;  Rev.  Stat.  1871,  c.  88  ;  Rev.  Stat.  1884,  c.  88. 

In  New  Hampshire,  one  or  more  persons  having  or  holding  real  estate  with 
others  may  have  partition  by  applying  by  petition  to  the  Superior  Court  in  the 
county  where  the  land  lies.  Issues  of  fact  may  be  made  and  tried  as  on  a  writ  at 
common  law.  Gen.  Stat.  1867,  c.  228.  The  partition  is  made  by  a  committee  of 
three  residents  of  the  county.  It  is  provided  that  no  partition  shall  be  avoided 
by  any  conveyance  after  the  entry  of  the  petition,  nor  unless  recorded  before 
such  entry  ;  nor  by  any  mortgage  or  other  lien  upon  the  estate.  If  any  share 
be  set  off  to  any  person  other  than  the  legal  owner,  such  share  enures  to  the 
benefit  of  the  legal  owner.  If  there  is  no  dispute  about  the  title,  the  petition 
may  be  directed  to  the  judge  of  probate.  If  the  property  is  not  suscejrtible  of 
division,  a  sale  may  be  ordered  by  the  Superior  Court.  In  other  respects  the 
mode  of  procedure  is  similar  to  that  in  Massachusetts.  Comp.  Stat.  1853,  c.  219; 
Gen.  Stat.  1867,  c.  228  ;  Gen.  Laws,  1878,  c.  247. 

In  Vermont,  the  petition  is  made  to  the  county  court,  and  three  commissioners 
from  the  county  are  appohited  to  make  the  partition.  If  the  land  cannot  be  con- 
veniently divided,  and  no  one  of  the  parties  interested  will  consent  to  raise  an 
assignment  of  it,  and  pay  such  sum  as  the  commissioners  direct,  the  court  will 
order  the  commissioners  to  sell  such  estate,  and  execute  conveyances  which  bind 
the  owners,  and  all  persons  claiming  under  them.  No  commissioner  can  become 
a  purchaser  at  such  sale.  No  partition  is  avoided  by  any  conveyance  by  a  part- 
owner  previous  to  the  service  of  the  petition,  unless  it  be  recorded,  or  it  appear 
that  the  petitioner  had  knowledge  of  such  conveyance.  If  any  share  is  set  off  to 
any  person  other  than  the  legal  owner,  such  share  enures  to  the  benefit  of  the  legal 
owner.  A  party  without  the  State  who  had  not  a  personal  notice  may  avoid 
the  partition  within  three  years  for  sufficient  cause,  when  a  new  partition  is 
[*436]  ordered.  Improvements  *  made  after  the  first  partition  are  allowed  for. 
The  process  does  not  abate  by  death  of  a  party  Gen.  Stat.  1860,  c. 
45  ;  Rev.  Laws,  1880,  c.  70.  By  the  Public  Acts,  1870,  No,  &^,  provision  is 
made  for  effecting  partition  of  the  waters  of  any  mineral  or  medicinal  spring 
which  is  owned  by  joint-tenants,  tenants  in  common,  or  copartners,  in  such  man- 
ner as  commissioners  shall  judge  just  and  equitable. 

In  Rhode  Island,  joint-tenants,  tenants  in  common,  and  coparceners,  actually 
seised  of  an  estate  for  life  or  years,  may  have  partition  by  writ  of  partition.  If 
the  premises  are  situate  in  two  or  more  counties,  partition  may  be  sued  for  by 
action  at  law,  or  by  bill  in  equity  in  either  county.  In  suits  in  equity  the  Su- 
preme Court  may,  in  their  discretion,  upon  motion  of  any  party,  order  the  whole 
or  any  portion  of  the  premises  to  be  sold  at  auction  by  commissioners.     In  actions 


cii.  XHi.  §  7.]  JOINT  e«;tatrs.  727 

nt  liiw,  till!  coiirt  iijipoint  ono  or  niorw  penwuiH  to  iiinkc  pnrtition.  Tin?  report  of 
tlix  <'i)iiuiiis.siiiii(Ts  niul  the  jiid^iiu-iit  of  tlic  court  tli<ri>oii  U  n-<'or<li-<l  in  the  oliii-f 
of  the  clerk  of  the  town.  lU>v.  Suit.  I8i7,  c.  'i08.  I'artition  nwiy  Ix-  unuU-  ot  law 
liy  inut«8  iind  IkjuihIs,  or  in  I'nuity  by  wilu  ami  divlHion  of  proccfiU,  nil  jM-pvonii  in 
intt>rc>«t  iN-in^  niatlu  particM  by  nctiiiil  noticr  or  by  jniblicution,  imd  their  titlejt  M-t 
forth,  the  court  apiicintinK  persons  to  repnim-nt  thojw  having  inten-xtA  who  are  not 
in  being  ;  and  the  purchu.ser  tiikex  a  i>vrfuct  titlu  Imwh,  ]8<i)i.  I'artition  in  or- 
dinary cuhcs  may  be  etrectc<l  u|)oii  |K-tition,  wherein  are  set  forth  theowneni'  nainei« 
and  the  title.s  by  which  they  claim,  and  cn-ditors  may,  at  tlu'  jietitioner'i*  election,  U' 
made  parties  to  such  pn«'eeilinj,'s.  The  motle  of  procee<linfj  in  the  matter  of  ph-.w 
and  answers  is  prescrilM-d  in  the  act.  I'pon  tlie  trial  of  an  issue,  the  court  n-nders 
judgment,  and  directs  partition  to  W  made  by  referees  ;  and  if  by  their  n'i>ort  it 
shoulil  api«ar  that  a  partition  wouM  be  injurious,  the  court  may  ilirect  a  sale  of 
the  whole  t)r  a  part  of  the  estiite,  and  a  partition  of  the  resL  A  judgment  uihjii 
the  final  report  of  the  referees,  allirniing  the  same,  bi-conies  a  final  and  clfectual 
partition.      Kev.  Stat.  18t?fi,  p.  538  ;  Pub.  Stat.  1882,  c.  230. 

In  Connecticut,  the  Su|)erior  Court,  as  a  court  of  eijuity,  may,  uiwn  the  i>eti- 
tion  of  any  iwrson  interested,  order  [wirtition  of  nny  estate  held  in  joint-tenancy, 
tenancy  in  common,  or  coparcenary  ;  and  may  appoint  a  committee  for  that  pur- 
pose. When  in  the  opinion  of  the  court  a  sale  will  Wtter  promote  the  interest  of  all 
jMirtie.s,  thoy  may  apiM>int  a  committee  to  make  a  sale.  The  decree  for  partition  and 
the  prcM-eedings  uinler  it  must  be  recorded  in  the  records  of  lands  in  the  town  where 
the  estate  lies.     (Jen.  Stat.  1866,  pp.  3[»8,  410;  Gen.  Stat.  1875,  p.  414,  §  S,  p.  480. 

In  Xehnuka ,  all  joint  tenants  and  tenants  in  common  are  entitled  to  partition, 
and  this  is  made  by  commi.ssioners  ui)on  a  jx-tition  to  the  court  of  the  conntv 
where  the  laml  lies;  and  these  are  appointed  by  the  Probate  Court.  And  the 
court  may  a-ssign  the  whole  to  one  of  them,  on  payment  by  him  to  the  others  of 
the  value  of  their  shares,  or  may  order  a  sale  of  a  whole  or  a  pait  if  no  division  can 
be  made  conveniently  of  the  land.  Incumbmncers  may  Ijc  made  parties  at  the 
option  of  the  jtetitioncrs  ;  and  the  incumbrances  are  either  to  !«  paid  off  or  a 
security  given  or  sum  invested  to  secure  them.  Gen.  Stat  1873,  c.  17,  §§  292, 
297  :  t'omp.  Stat.  1881.  pt.  1,  tit.  3;  pt.  2,  tit  20. 

In  Xcw  York,  any  joint  tenant,  or  tenant  in  common,  having  an  estate  of  in- 
heritance for  life  or  for  years,  may  proceed  in  the  .Supreme  Court,  or  the  court 
of  the  county,  or  the  mayor'.s  court  of  a  city  or  su|»i'rior  court  of  the  city  of  New 
York  for  jtartition,  or,  if  neces.sary,  for  a  s;ile  of  the  land.  The  proceeding  is 
partly  legal  ami  partly  efjuitable,  but  a  jury  trial  is  a  matter  of  right,  by  suit  at 
law  in  place  of  jwtition  as  formerly,  and  descril>es  the  pnmi.scs  ami  the  rights  and 
titles  of  parties,  and  is  verified  by  aflidavit.  Kvery  jH-rson  interested  may  be 
made  a  party.  In  case  any  party  or  his  interest  is  unknown,  uncertain,  or  con- 
tingent, or  the  ownership  dcjM'nds  ui)on  an  executory  de\'T3e,  or  the  remainder  is 
contingent,  it  n)U3t  be  so  stated.  Cretlitors  Iiaving  liens  neetl  not  be  made  jiarties. 
Such  liens  attach  to  the  part  set  off  to  the  debtor.  The  complainant  moy  make 
iwrsons  having  sjH'cific  liens  parties  to  the  proceeding.  Notice  of  the  pnx-eeiling 
having  Ix-en  given,  any  party  interested  may  app«>ar  and  answer,  and  nny  person 
not  named  as  a  party  therein  may  bo  admitted  to  appear.  All  issues  are  tri*-*! 
OS  in  personal  actions.  The  court  apjwint  three  commissioners  to  make  the 
division.  The  final  judgment  upon  their  re|>ort  is  conclusive  on  all  parties  named 
therein,  and  all  jH-rsons  interested,  who  may  be  unknown,  to  whom  notice  was 


728  LAW   OP  REAL  PROPERTY.  [BOOK  I. 

given  by  publication.  But  the  judgment  does  not  affect  persons  having  claims  to 
the  whole  of  the  premises,  as  tenants  in  dower,  by  the  curtesy,  or  for  life.  If  the 
commissioners  report  that  the  land  cannot  be  divided  without  prejudice  to  the 
owners,  the  court  may  order  a  sale  on  such  security  as  they  shall  prescribe.  Be- 
fore the  order  of  sale,  all  holders  of  specific  liens  are  to  be  made  parties,  and  their 
incumbrances  are  first  satisfied  from  the  proceeds  of  the  sale,  and  the  residue  is 
then  distributed.  The  court  in  their  discretion  may  order  any  estate  in  dower,  by 
the  curtesy,  or  for  life,  to  be  sold,  or  otherwise  excepted  from  the  sale  ;  and  in 
case  of  the  sale  of  such  interest,  the  court  directs  the  payment  of  such  sum  in 
gross  to  the  part}',  if  he  formally  assent ;  otherwise  an  investment  is  made  for 
his  benefit,  in  amount  proportioned  to  his  interest.  No  commissioner  or 
[*437]  guardian  to  an  infant  party  *  can  be  a  purchaser.  The  commissioners  ex- 
ecute conveyauces,  which  are  recorded,  and  which  are  a  bar  to  all  parties 
named,  and  all  unknown,  if  the  required  notice  has  been  given,  and  to  all  having 
liens  on  any  undivided  share.  The  late  court  of  chancery  had  the  same  power, 
upon  petition  or  bill,  to  decree  partitions  and  sales,  as  is  given  to  the  common- 
law  courts.  The  Sujireme  Court  may  appoint  a  receiver  of  the  rents  or  profits, 
pending  proceedings  for  partition.  Acts,  1863 ;  Rev.  Stat.  5th  ed.  vol.  3,  pt.  '6, 
tit.  3,  c.  5,  pp.  603-620 ;  1863,  vol.  2,  pp.  326-342  ;  Rev.  Stat.  7th  ed.  vol.  4,  c. 
14,  tit.  1,  art.  2 ;  c.  3,  tit.  3,  art.  1  ;  Croghan  v.  Livingston,  17  N.  Y.  225  ;  Hew- 
lett V.  Wood,  62  N.  Y.  75. 

In  Wiscmisin,  one  or  more  tenants  in  common,  or  coparcenary,  or  joint-ten- 
ants, may  have  partition  by  complaint  in  the  circuit  court  for  the  county  where 
the  laud  lies.  The  action  may  be  maintained  by  any  such  person  who  has  an 
estate  in  possession,  but  not  by  one  who  has  only  an  estate  in  remainder  or 
reversion.  The  manner  of  procedure  is  the  same  as  that  in  New  York.  Rev. 
Stat.  1858,  c.  142  ;  Rev.  Stat.  1878,  c.  184. 

In  Michigan,  joint-tenants,  and  tenants  in  common,  may  have  partition  by 
a  suit  in  the  circuit  court  for  the  county  by  bill  in  equity.  The  suit  may  be 
maintained  by  any  one  who  has  an  estate  in  possession,  but  not  by  one  who  has 
only  an  estate  in  remainder  or  reversion.  If  the  bill  is  taken  as  confessed  by  any 
of  the  defendants,  the  court  order  a  reference  to  a  Master  to  take  proof  of  the  title 
of  the  complainants.  Upon  making  a  decree  for  partition,  reference  is  made  to  a 
commissioner  to  inquire  whether  the  premises  can  be  divided  without  prejudice. 
Partition  is  made  by  three  commissioners,  who  proceed  in  the  same  manner  as  the 
commissioners  under  the  statutes  of  New  York  ;  and  the  bill  in  equitj-  is  in  other 
respects  conducted  in  the  same  manner  as  the  suit  by  petition  was  in  that  State. 
Comp.  Laws,  1857,  vol.  2,  c.  135.  Persons  having  contingent  interests  which 
become  certain  after  the  filing  of  the  bill  may  become  parties.  Laws,  1867; 
Comp.  Laws,  1871,  vol.  2,  p.  196  ;  Gen.  Laws,  1882,  c.  270.  Partition  is  also 
had  by  petition  in  the  probate  court  among  heirs  or  devisees  on  petition  of  any  of 
them.  The  partition  is  made  by  commissioners  appointed  by  the  court  who  may 
set  off  the  whole  to  one  if  the  propertj^  is  insusceptible  of  division.  Gen.  Laws, 
1882,  c.  226. 

In  Minnesota,  joint-tenants,  and  tenants  in  common,  having  an  estate  of  inher- 
itance, for  life  or  for  years,  may  have  partition  by  an  action  in  the  district  court 
of  the  proper  county  by  complaint.  After  notice,  if  it  be  alleged  in  the  complaint, 
and  established  by  proof,  that  partition  cannot  be  made  without  prejudice  to  the 
owner,  the  court  order  a  sale,  and  for  that  purpose  appoint  one  or  more  referees  ; 


I'll.    XIIl.  §  7.]  JiilM     I>T\TKS.  729 

othenviso  n  partition  is  or<Kn<l  ti)  Im-  inmlc  by  tlm-o  rvfcrocs.  Tlio  jinlj^rnont  ti|>fin 
thfir  rt'jHjrt  is  loiulusivf  u|k)ii  nil  i>iirtti-.s  niiiiiol  or  intt-n'-stod  who  Imvk  ln-t-n  noti- 
fied lis  ifquiivd  ;  but  it  does  not  iiircct  tin;  (riiiiiiiM  of  tcnniitjt  in  tlowcr,  by  tliu 
curtesy,  or  for  life,  to  tliu  ic/io.V  of  the  proi^Tty.  If  tlieru  ore  ^cnenil  lietm  ii|><)n 
the  proiR-rty,  the  court  onler  u  reference  to  iiscertAin  the  nniount  imd  jiriority  of 
tile  siune  ;  and  nil  liens  are  siitisfie*!  In-fore  nny  diNtribution  to  the  imrt-owner.  If 
the  teiiimts  do  not  consi'nt  to  receive  n  sum  in  gn)ss,  the  court  onler  n  just  iiro|K)r- 
tion  to  be  investi'd  for  their  lienefit.  Inchoiite  rights  of  dower  iind  curtesy 
art!  estiiii(it«'d  on  the  principlo  of  iinntiities  and  survivorshiiM.  The  sale  ia 
at  auction  in  the  sonic  nuinner  ns  on  execution,  and  the  conveyances  are  exe* 
cute»l  by  the  referees  and  reconled  in  the  county  where  situated.  Conip. 
Stat.  18.'i9,  c.  65.  And  the  court  may  authorize  the  sale  of  nil,  or  only  a 
iMirt,  of  the  lands.  Geu.  Ijiws,  18G4  ;  Suit.  1873,  vol.  2,  c.  43,  tiu  2  ;  Suit. 
1878,  c.  74. 

In  lllinoiji,  partition  Utwccn  joint-tenants,  tenants  in  common,  or  in  coparce- 
nary, ia  made  by  {tetition  to  the  circuit  court  of  the  county  describing  the  pn-in- 
ises,  and  all  in-rsons  having  a  vested  or  contingent  interest  therein,  nnd  verified 
by  nllidavit.  All  i>ersons  intt-rested,  in  i>osscssion  or  otherwise,  or  entitled  to 
dower  in  the  premises,  must  1>c  made  parties  and  notified  by  summons, 
or,  if  absent,  'by  pnljlication.  New  jmrties  may  Imj  admitted  by  way  of  [•438] 
intoqdeador.  Tiie  court  apiKiint  three  commissioners  to  make  partition, 
or,  if  they  find  that  this  cannot  U;  ilone  witlioiit  [)rejudice,  to  .sell  the  same  by 
orvler  of  court,  and  execute  conveyaiuts,  which  shall  ojKirate  as  a  bar  against  nil 
owners  an»l  all  i»ersoiis  claiming  under  tlieiii.  C'onip.  SUit.  1858,  vol.  1,  p.  IGO  ; 
Uev.  Stat  1874,  c.  106. 

In  Indiana,  joint-tenants,  tenants  in  common,  or  cojiarcenarj',  may  have  par- 
tition by  applying  to  the  circuit  court  or  court  having  projHjr  juris<liction  of  tlie 
county  by  petition.  The  proceeding  is  the  same  as  in  civil  suits  and  if  it  apjiear 
to  the  court  that  i»artition  ought  to  be  made,  the  court  awani  an  interlocutory 
judgment  to  this  clfect,  nnd  apjwint  three  commissioners  to  make  jwrtition. 
When  the  premises  cannot  Iw  divided  without  damage  to  the  owners,  the  court 
may  order  the  whole  or  a  jmrt  to  be  sold  nt  public  or  privat*-  sale.  The  commis- 
sioners execute  conveyances  which  are  as  elfcctual  as  if  executed  by  the  owners 
themselves.  On  the  death  of  a  l>arty,  the  proceedings  do  not  alxite  if  bis  heirs  arc 
mode  jtarties.  Uikjii  showing  suflicient  cause,  any  person  not  servwi  with  sum- 
mons may  ojKn  the  proceedings  within  one  year,  and  also  ony  person  of  unsound 
mind,  or  any  infant  whose  guanlian  did  not  attend  and  approve  such  partition, 
may,  within  one  year  after  the  removal  of  his  disability,  have  a  review  of  such 
partition.  Kev.  SUit  1852,  vol.  2,  p.  329,  c.  13 ;  and  see  Acts,  1859,  c.  101 ; 
Sup.  liev.  St  1870.  p.  363;  Rev.  Stat  1881,  §§  1186-1209. 

In  Ohio,  joint  tenants,  tenants  in  common,  or  in  cojiarcenarj*,  may  have  jvirti- 
tion  by  applying  by  [tetition  to  the  court  of  common  pleas  for  the  county,  or, 
where  the  pi-emises  are  situate  in  two  or  more  counties,  to  the  court  of  common 
pleas  held  for  either  of  the  counties.  The  court  issue  a  writ  of  partition  to  the 
sheritfof  the  county,  directing  him  to  make  partition  by  the  oaths  of  time  fn-e- 
hoMers  named  by  the  court.  If  the  freeholders  aiv  of  opinion  that  tlie  premises 
cannot  Ihj  divided  acconling  to  the  writ  without  injury  thereto,  they  n>tuni  n  ju.st 
valuation  of  such  estate  to  the  court  ;  and  if  one  or  more  of  the  jmrties  elect  to 
take  the  land  at  the  appraisement,  the  saiue  is  adjudged  to  bim  or  them,  and,  on 


730  LAW   OF  REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   I. 

pa)Tiient  of  a  proper  proportion  of  the  appraised  value,  the  sheriff  executes  the 
conveyances.  Otherwise  the  court  order  a  sale  by  the  sheriff,  who  executes  a  deed 
of  the  estate.  A  widow  entitled  to  dower  in  the  estate  must  be  made  a  party,  and 
dower  must  be  assigned  unless  it  is  in  an  undivided  interest  only,  or  is  already 
assigned,  or  the  dowress  elects  to  be  endowed  in  the  proceeds.  Guardians  of  minor 
heirs,  and  guardians  of  idiots  and  insane  persons,  may  act  in  their  behalf  in  any 
partition.     Williams's  Rev.  Stat.  (1883),  vol.  2,  §§  5754-5778. 

In  Pennsylvania,  the  Supreme  Court  and  the  county  courts  of  common  pleas 
grant  writs  of  partition  at  the  suit  of  joint-tenants,  tenants  in  common,  and  co- 
parceners, by  an  inquest  of  seven  men  or  a  commission  of  three  men.  When  the 
inquest,  who  are  directed  to  make  such  partition,  are  of  opinion  that  the  lands 
cannot  be  divided  without  prejudice  to  the  whole,  they  shall  return  to  the  court 
an  appraisement  ;  whereupon  the  court  may  atljudge  the  same  to  one  or  more  of 
the  parties  who  may  elect  to  take  it  at  the  valuation,  and  the  sheriff  shall  execute 
the  deed,  which  is  to  be  recorded  in  the  registry  of  deeds.  In  case  none  of  the 
parties  agree  to  take  the  land,  it  is  sold  by  the  sheriff  at  public  auction.  "Where 
partition  is  made  upon  default  of  any  party,  he  may,  for  good  cause  showTi,  obtain 
a  reversal  witliin  a  year  thereafter.  "When  equal  partition  cannot  be  made  Mith- 
out  prejudice  to  the  whole,  the  inipiest  shall  return  a  just  valuation  of  the  lands 
and  tenements  ;  and  if  one  or  more  of  the  parties  shall  elect  to  take  the  same  at 
the  appraised  value,  the  court  shall  adjudge  the  same  to  him  or  them  on  payment 
to  the  other  parties  of  their  pi-oportions  of  the  appraised  value  ;  whereupon  the 
sheriff  executes  conveyances  to  the  party  or  parties  making  such  election,  subject 
to  a  lien  in  favor  of  the  others  for  the  payment  of  their  shares.  In  case  none  of 
the  parties  elect  to  take  the  land,  the  court  may  order  a  sale  at  public  auction  ; 
and  the  sheriff  is  empowered  to  execute  deeds  to  the  purchasers.  The  sheriffs  in- 
quisition and  all  orders  of  court  in  relation  to  partition  are  recorded.    Pardon,  Dig. 

1861,  pp.  770-775,  1872,  pp.  1112-1119  ;  Laws,  1874,  p.  156. 
[*439]  *  In  New  Jersey,  a  coparcener,  joint-tenant,  or  tenant  in  common,  may 
make  application  for  partition  to  the  Supreme  Court,  or  circuit  court,  or 
court  of  common  pleas  for  the  covmty.  The  court  appoints  three  commissioners 
to  divide  the  land  into  a  definite  number  of  shares.  The  shares  are  numbered, 
and  an  allotment  made  by  ballot,  at  which,  on  the  application  of  any  party,  a 
judge  or  justice  shall  attend.  The  proceedings  are  recorded  in  the  clerk's  office, 
and  are  as  effectual  to  make  a  partition  as  if  made  on  writs  of  partition  at  common 
law.  Where  one  or  more  of  the  joint- tenants,  &c.,  are  minors,  the  orphans'  court 
may  order  partition. 

Any  lien  upon  the  undivided  estate  of  any  owner  becomes  a  lien  only  on  the 
share  allotted  to  such  owner.  If  a  partition  would  be  injurious,  the  court  may 
order  the  commissioners  to  sell  the  whole  at  auction,  and  execute  conveyances. 
This  act  does  not  extend  to  the  partitioning  of  lands  held  in  common  by  the 
general  proprietors  of  the  eastern  or  western  divisions  of  the  State.  Joint-ten- 
ants, and  tenants  in  common,  may  also  be  compelled  to  make  partition,  like 
coparceners  at  common  law,  by  writ  of  partition  in  the  court  of  chancery.  A  part 
of  the  lands  may  be  sold,  and  the  remainder  divided,  when  the  whole  cannot  be 
divided  without  prejudice.  There  may  be  partition  among  parties  holding  in  re- 
version or  remainder,  by  consent  of  the  particular  tenants  ;  or  if  partition  cannot 
be  made,  the  premises  may  be  sold,  and  the  particular  tenants  paid  their  propor- 
tion of  the  proceeds.     If  any  of  the  parties  are  minors,  the  partition  may  be  made 


en.  XIII.  §   7.]  JOINT    ESTATES.  731 

by  tho  rierogativc  Court.      Nixon,  Dig.  1S55,  jip.  r)72-.'>fl3  ;  Ijiws,  1858.  c.  50, 
an.l  c.  '22:J  ;   K.-v.  Stat.  lS7r.,  \i\>.  555-573  ;  K.-v.  1877,  71*5-806. 

In  Vinjinia,  tonaiit.s  in  coninioii,  joint-tcmints,  ami  coiiftrccnum,  arc  (virniH-llnlili! 
to  maki'  jiaititioii,  uiitl  the  court  of  i-fjuity  of  tlio  county  or  coriwrulioii,  \t lu-n-in 
tile  estate  or  nny  part  tliereof  is  situate,  lias  jurisdiction  for  sueli  pur|Mise.  Wlien 
partition  cannot  be  conveniently  made,  the  entin;  estatu  nwy  Ijc  alluttc<l  to  any 
party  who  will  accept  tlie  same,  and  coniiK-nsatc  the  other  ixirticH  in  interest  then*- 
for  ;  or  if  the  interest  of  the  parties  will  Ik;  prnmotwi  then-by,  the  court  may  onler 
a  side  of  tho  entire  osteite,  or  an  allotment  of  part  and  sale  of  the  residue,  and  mako 
distribution  of  the  pnx'eeds  of  sale.  Any  two  or  nion-  of  the  partiis,  if  they  so 
elect,  may  have  their  shan's  laid  off  tofjether.  If  the  name  or  share  of  any  |M>rson 
interested  be  unknown,  so  much  as  is  known  in  relation  thereto  must  l»e  stated  in 
the  bill  Any  lessee  of  lands  thus  divided  or  sold  still  Imlds  the  sjimi>  of  him  to 
whom  such  land  is  allotted  or  sold.  Code,  lS4y,  tit.  3>,  c.  12-1,  p.  525,  §§  1-5  ; 
Code,  1S73,  p.  »20,  §§  1-5. 

In  Missiwipin',  apjilication  for  partition  is  mado  to  the  courts  of  chancery  by 
jHJtition,  and  jMirtitiou  is  made  by  these  courts  by  allotment  in  the  same  manner 
as  ill  New  Jersey,  but  they  may  in  the  first  instance  onler  a  sale.  Kev.  Code, 
1857,  pp.  316-320  ;  Kcv.  Code,  1871,  c.  26  ;  Hcv.  Code,  1880,  c.  71. 

In  Aliibama,  jiartition  is  made  in  the  same  manner,  on  apjilication  to  the  pro- 
bate court.     Code,  1867.  §§  3105,  3119  ;  Co<le,  lS7ti,  §§  3497-3520. 

•  In  Gforgut,  joint-tenants,  tenants  in  common,  and  cojiarceiiers,  may  ['440] 
api>ly  to  the  su|K-rior  court  of  the  county  for  a  writ  of  partition.  This  may 
Ih}  contested,  but  if  allowed  the  writ  i.ssues  to  five  partitioners,  who  proceed  to 
make  partition;  whiili  boinp  made,  the  court  pive  final  judjjmentwliicli  concludes 
all  jiarties.  Within  one  year  after  such  jutlm'ment,  or,  in  case  of  disability,  within 
one  year  after  it.s  removal,  a  l)arty  interested  may  have  the  partition  .set  aside  for 
goo*l  cause  shown  ;  when  it  is  shown  to  the  court  that  a  division  cannot  l)e  made 
without  pivjudice  to  the  whole,  they  may  order  a  sale  thereof  by  persons  appointed, 
who  are  to  make  conveyances  binding  on  all  parties.  Parlies  intcrcste<l  but  under 
disability  have  a  year  after  the  disability  is  removed  to  reojien  the  partition. 
Cobb,  New  Dig.  1851,  vol.  1,  p.  581  ;  Code,  1873,  pp.  711-715  ;  Code,  1882, 
§§  3990-4007. 

In  Arkanscut,  partition  between  joint-tenants,  tenants  in  common,  and  co- 
parceners, is  nuule  by  petition  to  the  circuit  court  for  the  county.  Partition  may 
be  had  by  owners  of  the  fee,  freehold,  or  for  years,  or  by  a  dowress  ;  and  whether 
it  shall  be  had  or  not  is  tried  as  a  suit  at  law.  If  allowed,  it  is  made  by  com- 
missioners, or,  if  this  cannot  be  done  without  prejudice  to  the  owners,  the  prem- 
ises are  ordered  to  be  sold  at  auction,  when  the  conveyances  are  executed  by  tlio 
commissioners  and  recorded.  Partition  or  sale  is  not  to  be  made  contrary  to  the 
will  of  a  testator.     Ark.  Dig.  1858,  c.  122  ;  Dig.  1874,  c.  102. 

In  Kaitucky,  land  held  by  joint-tenants,  tenants  in  common,  coparceners,  or 
devisees,  may  be  dinded  by  commissioners  appointed  by  the  county  court.  The 
deeds  of  partition  are  executed  by  the  commissioners  and  rccordeil.  Kev.  Stat. 
1860,  c.  67.  And  if  i>artition  would  be  injurious,  the  court  on  petition  may  onler 
sale.  Sup.  Rev.  Stat.  1866,  y.  751.  Joint-tenants  may  be  comjH-lled  to  make  jwr- 
tition  ;  and  if  a  joint-tenant  dies,  his  i«rt  descends  to  heirs,  ic,  subject  to  debts, 
dower,  curtesy,  and  distribution.     Gen.  Stat.  1873,  c.  63. 

Id  Tennessee,  any  persou  having  an  estate  in  common  or  otherwiae  with  otben 


732  LAW   OF  REAL   PROPERTY.  [BOOK   5, 

in  fee  for  life  or  years  may  have  partition  by  bill  or  petition  to  the  county,  circuit, 
or  chancery  courts.  The  bill  or  petition  must  set  forth  the  parties  and  their  titles, 
with  a  description  of  the  property.  It  is  no  objection  that  parties  are  infants 
or  the  premises  incumbered  by  dower,  curtesy,  or  mortgage  rights.  No  sale  is 
made  if  the  will  directs  otherwise.  Partition  is  made  by  three  commissioners, 
and  their  report,  when  confirmed  by  the  court,  vests  the  title  according  to  its 
terms,  and  such  partition  is  conclusive  upon  all  parties  named  and  parties  un- 
kno\\Ti  to  whom  the  required  notice  has  been  given  by  publication,  but  does  not 
affect  the  claim  of  any  one  having  a  claim  of  dower  or  a  life-estate  in  the  whole  of 
the  premises.  The  commissioners  may  divide  the  land  into  unequal  shares,  ard 
charge  the  larger  shares  with  the  sums  necessary  to  equalize  all  the  shares.  If 
partition  cannot  be  made  without  prejudice  to  the  whole,  the  court  may  order  a 
sale  by  the  commissioners.  There  is  a  lien  upon  the  land  for  the  purchase-money 
till  the  whole  is  paid.  Incumbrances  upon  the  estate  are  paid  before  distribution 
of  the  proceeds  of  sale.  The  court  may  order  an  investment  of  the  shares  of  any 
persons  under  any  disability.     Stat.  1871,  §§  3262-3322. 

In  North  Carolina,  tenants  in  common  may  have  partition  on  petition  to  the 
superior  courts,  who  appoint  three  commissioners  to  make  partition,  and  if  neces- 
sary they  may  make  the  shares  uneqiial,  and  charge  the  more  valuable  of  them 
with  a  sum  of  monej^  sufficient  to  make  an  equitable  diWsion.  Such  sums  charged 
on  minors  are  not  payable  till  they  are  of  age,  but  these  sums  bear  interest,  and  the 
guardian  is  to  pay  them  upon  receiving  assets.  A  superior  court  may  order  a  sale 
when  partition  would  be  injurious,  and  also  when  the  land  of  joint-owners  is  re- 
quired for  public  uses.  The  proceeds  belonging  to  any  party  under  disability  must 
be  invested  for  his  benefit.     Rev.  Code,  1854,  c.  82;  Battles'  Eevisal,  1873,  c.  84; 

Code,  1883,  c.  47. 
[*441]  *  In  South  Carolina,  joint-tenants,  tenants  in  common,  and  coparceners, 
may  apply  to  the  court  of  common  pleas  for  a  writ  of  partition  ;  whereupon 
the  court  issue  the  writ  to  three  or  more  persons,  commanding  them  to  make  a 
division  of  the  lands.  Division  is  made  by  allotment  if  not  prejudicial.  The 
writ  may  also  issue  from  the  court  of  chancery.  Stat,  at  Large,  vol.  3,  p.  708  ; 
vol.  6,  p.  412.  Judges  of  probate  may  direct  partition  where  there  is  no  dispute 
as  to  title.  If  there  is,  it  is  referred  to  the  circuit  court  for  adjudication.  Eev. 
Stat.  1873,  c.  114. 

In  Florida,  joint  tenants,  tenants  in  common,  and  coparceners,  may  sue  for 
partition  of  real  estate  by  bill  or  petition,  on  the  equity  side  of  the  circuit  courts 
for  the  county  or  circuit  in  which  the  lands  lie.  The  court,  if  partition  is  decreed, 
appoint  three  commissioners  to  make  the  partition,  and  the  final  decree  upon  their 
report  vests  the  title  of  the  several  portions  in  the  respective  parties.  If  they  re- 
port that  the  premises  cannot  be  divided  without  prejudice  to  the  owners,  the  court 
may  order  a  sale  and  conveyance  by  the  commissioners.  Thompson,  Dig.  1847, 
p.  382 ;  Dig.  1881,  c.  160. 

In  Texas,  it  is  provided  that  any  joint  owner  of  lands  may  compel  partition  by 
a  petition  to  the  district  court  of  the  county  where  the  land  lies  ;  and  the  court 
are  to  determine  not  only  the  several  chares,  but  any  questions  as  to  title.  The 
partition  is  to  be  made  by  three  commissioners,  but  no  such  partition  shall 
prejudice  those  entitled  to  reversions  or  remainders.  If  no  fair  partition  can  be 
maile  of  the  estate  or  any  part  thereof,  a  sale  may  be  ordered.  After  the  partition, 
tenants  shall  hold  of  the  landlords  to  whom  the  lands  are  allotted  in  severalty, 


Cll.  XIII.  §  7.]  JOINT    ESTATES.  733 

uiidor  tlio  siiiiio  routs  nnJ  covi-niuiU,  iiiul  tl»o  lamllonlB  Khali  warrant  the  sovenil 
jMirU  unto  tlie  tuiiuiits,  iw  tliey  Wfix'  IhjuikI  hy  Icjim-s  dp  gniiiU  m.HjMctivcly.  Ami 
tho  decree  of  the  court  vesta  title  without  other  conveyance.  Ohihuin  &  Whit*-, 
Dig.  1859,  i».  340,  urU  1510  ;  Puschiil's  Dig.  1S«(J,  pp.  7i»0-7»2;  lU-v.  SUit.  I87tf, 
urt.  3405-3583. 

In  Ciilijornitt,  joint-tenant.s  [larceniTs,  nnd  tonnnt.s  in  coninion,  may  have  jwir- 
tition  on  cumphiint,  bettinj;  forth  the  ixirties  and  tiu-ir  titlcn.  After  notice  and 
the  reiiuisite  proofs  U-ing  made  the  court  onicr  u  partition  of  the  whole  or  j«irt, 
and  apjioiiit  three  referees  tiierefor.  Tlie  juilgnieiit  of  the  court  confirming  their 
partition  i.s  binding  on  all  parties  named,  aii<l  on  all  unknown  jMirties  to  whom 
notice  h:us  been  given  by  publication  ;  but  «ucli  partition  dm-.s  not  alfect  a  tenant 
for  a  term  of  less  than  ten  years  to  the  whole  of  the  projurty.  When  it  is  allegid 
in  tho  complaint,  and  established  i>y  proof,  that  a  partition  cannot  Im<  made  with- 
out great  prejudice,  the  court  may  order  a  .sale  of  the  land.  The  [iroceeds  of  the 
Siilo  of  incumbei-ed  property  are  applied  to  satisfy  the  lien.s  of  reconl  Iteforo  any 
distribution  is  made  to  the  part-owners.  If  the  lien  is  on  the  undivided  share,  it 
remains  a  charge  thereon  after  partition.  The  sale  is  made  on  such  tenns  a.s  the 
court  direct,  by  tho  referees,  who  must  not  be  interested  in  any  purchajic,  and  the 
court  will  protect  future  and  contingent  interests.  If  the  sale  is  con(inne<l,  the  court 
order  the  referees  to  execute  conveyances,  and  take  securities  pursuant  to  such  sale. 
The  conveyance  must  be  recorded,  and  will  Iw  a  bar  against  all  p<-rsons  name<l  a.s 
parties  or  notified  by  publication.  Wood,  Dig.  1858,  p.  20'2,  art.  9'J9-103«J.  Co- 
tenants  having  an  estate  for  life  or  years,  or  of  inheritance,  may  have  a  process  for 
]iartition,  or  for  sale  of  all  or  a  part  of  the  lands  acconling  to  their  resjiective  inter- 
ests ;  and  no  one  having  an  unreconled  conveyance  need  Ik-  made  a  jiarty.  Act.s, 
1866;  (wle,  1872,  c.  4,  §§  752-801  ;  Hittell,  Co<le,  1876,  §§  10752-10801. 

In  Mi.isoHri,  joint-tenants,  tenants  in  common,  and  coparceners,  of  estates  in 
fee  for  life  or  years,  may  (wtition  tho  circuit  court  of  the  county  for  a  ]iartition 
of  their  lands,  and  for  a  sale  thereof,  if  it  shall  aj^K'ar  that  ]tartition  cannot  be 
made  without  prejudice  to  the  owners.  Tho  iHjtition  shall  dcscrilx-  tho  premises, 
and  set  forth  the  titles  of  all  parties  interested.  Every  jwrson  having  any  vested 
or  contingent  interest,  whether  in  iK)ssession  or  othenvis*',  and  every  jterson  enti- 
tlwl  to  dower  in  the  premi.ses,  may  be  made  a  party.  The  court  apjK>int  commis- 
sionera  to  make  the  jwrtition,  who  are  authorized  at  their  discretion  to  divide  the 
land  into  lots,  and  lay  out  streets  and  alleys,  and  a  map  thereof  shall  be  n'conled. 
The  court  may  order  any  numlnr  of  shares  to  l>e  set  off  in  one  parcel.  If 
their  reiwrt  is  conlinned,  the  judgment  thereon  is  •  conclusive  on  all  |>arties  [*442) 
to  the  jiroceedings.  The  rejwrt  and  judgment  nmst  be  recorded.  If  tho 
commissioners  refwrt  that  |>artition  is  impracticable,  the  court  may  onler  a  sale  of 
the  whole  premises  by  the  sheriff  of  the  county,  who  makes  a  deed,  which  is  a  bnr 
against  all  jxirties  to  the  proceedings.  In  the  distribution  of  the  procee<ls,  if  any 
of  the  jMirties  are  aKsent  from  the  State,  or  unknown,  tho  court  must  dinx-t  their 
shares  to  Ije  invested.  Any  ))arty  claiming  the  money  arising  from  such  sales  by 
adverse  title,  on  i>etition  to  the  circuit  court,  may  have  his  claim  tried,  and  the 
court  will  order  payment  to  the  party  entitlcsl.  No  ]tartition  or  sale  of  lands  is  to 
1)0  made  contrarj'  to  the  intention  of  any  testator.  (Juanlians  are  authoriz«><l  to  act 
for  their  wards  in  jKirtition  of  lands,  and  the  court  may  ap|>oint  a  guardian  for  any 
minor  for  the  purjKiso  of  su<h  <livisiou.  Gen.  Stat.  1806,  c.  152  ;  StaL  1872,  c. 
104  ;  Kev.  SUit.  1879,  §§  3339-3397. 


734  LAW   OF   REAL    PROPERTY.  [BOOK   L 

In  Iowa,  joint-owners  may  have  partition  of  real  estate  by  petition  in  equity, 
setting  forth  the  interests  of  the  parties  and  describing  the  property.  Lien  hold- 
ers may  be  made  parties  at  the  option  of  plaintiff  or  defendant.  When  all  the 
shares  of  the  parties  have  been  settled,  judgment  is  rendered  confirming  those 
shares,  and  directing  partition  accordingly.  The  court  appoint  referees  to  make 
the  partition.  If  it  appears  to  them  that  a  partition  cannot  be  made  without 
great  prejudice  to  the  owners,  and  the  court  are  satisfied  with  such  report,  they 
may  order  a  sale  of  the  premises.  Provision  is  made  for  satisfying  incumbrances 
upon  the  estate.  The  court,  on  confirming  the  sale,  order  the  referees  to  execute 
convej'ances,  which  on  being  recorded  are  valid  against  all  subsequent  pur- 
chasers, and  also  against  all  parties  to  the  proceedings.  When  the  referees  deem 
a  i)artition  proper,  the  court,  for  good  reasons  shown,  may  direct  particular  por- 
tions of  the  land  to  be  allotted  to  particular  individuals.  There  may  be  partition 
of  one  part ,  and  a  sale  of  the  other.  The  partition,  when  confirmed  by  the  court, 
is  conclusive  on  all  parties  in  interest  who  have  been  notified  by  service  or  pub- 
lication. The  ascertained  share  of  any  absent  owner  shall  be  retained,  or  the 
proceeds  invested  for  his  benefit.  Code,  1851,  c.  117  ;  Ptevision,  1860,  c.  145  ; 
Code,   1873,  tit.  20,  c.  3  ;  Rev.  Code,  1880,  §§  3277-3306. 

In  Kansas,  joint-tenants,  tenants  in  common,  and  coparceners,  may  be  com- 
pelled to  make  or  suffer  partition,  on  petition  to  the  district  court  of  the  countj', 
setting  forth  the  title  of  the  demandant,  and  describing  the  property  and  the  other 
parties  in  interest.  After  notice,  the  court  order  partition  by  writ  directed  to  com- 
missioners to  make  partition  as  directed.  If  the  freeholders  are  of  opinion  that 
partition  cannot  be  made  without  injury  to  the  property,  they  are  required  to 
make  and  return  to  the  court  a  just  valuation  of  the  property.  Whereupon,  if  the 
court  approve  the  return,  and  any  of  the  parties  elect  to  take  the  property  at  the 
appraised  value,  the  same  is  adjudged  to  such  party  on  his  paying  to  the  other 
parties  their  proportion  of  the  appraised  value.  In  case  the  parties  cannot  agree, 
and  'no  one  elects  to  take  the  estate,  the  court  may  order  a  sale  at  auction  by  the 
sheriff,  provided  the  sale  be  not  for  less  than  two-thirds  the  appraised  value.  The 
couit  has  full  power  to  make  any  order  not  inconsistent  witli  the  provisions  of 
this  article  that  may  be  necessary  to  make  a  just  and  equitable  partition  between 
the  parties  and  to  secure  their  respective  rights.  Comp.  Laws,  1862,  c.  162  ;  Gen. 
Stat.  1868,  c.  80,  §  16. 

In  Oregon,  partition  may  be  had  between  tenants  in  common  by  suit  in  equity. 
If  it  is  alleged  in  the  complaint,  and  ])roved,  that  the  property  cannot  be  divided 
without  prejudice  to  the  owner,  the  court  may  order  a  sale,  and  for  that  purpose 
may  appoint  one  or  more  referees.  Otherwise,  upon  the  requisite  proof  being 
made,  it  shall  decree  partition  and  appoint  three  referees,  who  make  partition 
according  to  the  rights  of  the  parties  as  determined  by  the  court,  and  make  report 
of  their  proceedings  to  the  court.  Upon  the  report  being  confirmed,  a  decree  is 
made  that  such  partition  be  effectual  for  ever.  The  decree  does  not  aflect  tenants 
for  years  or  for  life  of  the  whole  property.  When  a  sale  is  made,  the  referees  are 
required  to  report  their  proceedings  to  the  court ;  and  if  the  sale  is  confirmed,  the 
referees  are  ordered  to  execute  conveyances.  Code,  1862,  pp.  109-119,  c.  5,  tit. 
5  ;  Comp.  Laws,  1872,  c.  5,  pp.  198,  205. 

In  'Delaware,  writs  for  the  partition  of  real  estate  held  in  joint-tenanc)',  or 
tenancy  in  common,  may  be  issued  by  the  superior  court  of  the  county.  Upon 
judgment  in  partition,  the  court  may,  instead  of  awarding  a  writ  of  partition. 


CII.  XIII.  §  7.]  JOINT   ESTATES.  Tufj 

appoint  five  jutUcious  nnd  iinpartinl  freclioMcrs  of  the  county  to  mnkc  the  |«r- 
tition.  Joint-ti-niintJi  and  teniuit«  in  cuninion  nmy  nl.so  i>i*tition  to  thu  chiuuvUur 
of  iho  State  for  iwrtition  ;  nnd  njKin  dccn**-  tlinl  imrlitiun  «h<iU  bt*  niiulr,  he  »hall 
issue  a  roinniission  to  five  fnt'lioldcrs  for  tliis  piiriKKM-,  and  the  final  dicrt-e  ui»on 
their  return  is  concUusive  ujion  all  the  parties.  If  from  the  n-turn  c»f  the  com- 
missioned  it  apjK-ara  that  no  jmrtition  has  been  made,  the  chancellur  shall  <iriler 
the  Pdtiito  to  be  sold  by  a  trusti'e ;  and  such  sale  having  Inen  approved,  tin-  tru»- 
tee  is  ordered  to  execute  a  died  to  the  purchaser,  who  lakes  all  the  interest  of 
the  joint-owners,  free  from  all  incumbrances,  except  such  hh  may  Ije  i>arumount. 
Kev.  Code,  18r.2,  c.  86  ;   Uev.  Code,  1874,  o.  86. 

In  Miirylmul,  joint-tenants,  and  tenants  in  common,  may  liave  partition  by  bill 
in  the  court  of  chancery,  or  on  the  eijuity  side  of  the  county  court.  If 
it  •appears  to  the  court  that  a  sale  will  be  most  equitable  for  all  con-  [•■143] 
cerned,  the  court  may  decree  a  sale  on  the  terms  an«l  comlitions  usual  in 
sales  under  decrees  in  chancery  ;^  and  if  it  apjiears  that  them  ought  to  Ijc  a 
siKJcific  division  of  the  lands,  such  division  is  decreed  accordingly.  Code,  1860, 
p.  91,  art.  19,  §  99.  Uev.  Code,  1878,  art.  6(5,  §  13.  Partition  nmy  also  be  had 
in  the  circuit  court  of  the  county  among  heirs  of  an  intestate.  Five  commissioners 
arc  appointed,  who  utter  notice  to  parties  in  interest  and  non-resiilents  shall  divide 
the  whole  or  so  nuuh  as  is  susceptible  of  division  without  injury,  and  allot  tho 
shares.  If  not  so  susceptible,  a  right  of  election  is  given  in  order  of  pnority  to  the 
heirs,  on  jwiyment  of  tho  value  of  tlitnr  shares  to  the  others.  If  neither  partition 
nor  election  takes  place,  a  sale  may  be  made  and  the  proceeds  after  providing  for 
liens  be  divided  and  invested  till  claimed.  Deeds  are  to  be  made  by  the  commis- 
sioners.    Rev.  Code,  1878,  art.  47. 

In  West  Virginia,  tenants  in  common,  &c.,  may  have  partition,  the  circuit 
courts  of  the  counties  having  jurisdiction.  Any  two  or  more  may  have  their  shares 
set  otr  together.  If  the  estate  cannot  be  conveniently  divided,  the  court  nmy  allot 
it  entire  to  one,  he  paying  the  others  their  proi>ortional  amounts,  or  may  stdl  it,  or 
allot  a  part  and  sell  the  remainder.     Code,  1870,  c.  79.     Rev.  SUit.  1878,  c.  144. 

In  Nevada,  partition  is  made  by  courts  of  ecjuity.  The  court  may  onler  a  sale 
when  partition  cannot  be  made  without  prejudice,  or  may  appoint  three  n^fereea 
to  make  partition,  and  in  case  of  sale  tho  referees  execute  the  conveyances.  Tho 
court  may  require  compensation  to  be  made  by  one  party  to  another  to  equalize 
partition.     Comp.  Laws,  1873,  pp.  373-382. 

In  Colorado,  where  any  land  is  held  in  joint-tenancy,  tenancy  in  common  or 
coparcenary  the  i)etition  is  to  the  district  court  of  the  county  where  the  major  part 
of  the  premises  is  situate.  The  court  ajipoint  thife  commissioners  to  make  the 
pirtition,  or,  if  that  would  be  prejudi<'ial,  to  nmke  sale  of  the  premises.  Courts 
of  chancery  may  also  have  power  to  make  partition,  or  to  order  sale  ujicii  a  bill  in 
equity  for  partition.  Rev.  Stat.  1868,  c.  67  ;  Gen.  Laws,  1877,  c.  74. 
1  Wilson  I'.  Green,  63  Md.  547. 


END   OF   VOL.   I. 


AA    UU0  851  ?9b 


